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diff --git a/17147.txt b/17147.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49477f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/17147.txt @@ -0,0 +1,17017 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy, by G. W. Leibniz + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Theodicy + Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil + +Author: G. W. Leibniz + +Commentator: Austin Farrer + +Translator: E.M. Huggard + +Release Date: November 24, 2005 [EBook #17147] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEODICY *** + + + + +Produced by John Hagerson, Juliet Sutherland, Keith Edkins +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + +Theodicy + +Essays on +the Goodness of God +the Freedom of Man and +the Origin of Evil + +G.W. LEIBNIZ + +Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, Fellow of Trinity College, +Oxford + +Translated by E.M. Huggard from C.J. Gerhardt's Edition of the Collected +Philosophical Works, 1875-90 + +Open [Logo] Court + +La Salle, Illinois 61301 + + * * * * * + +[Logo] + +OPEN COURT and the above logo are registered in the U.S. Patent & Trademark +Office. + + Published 1985 by Open Court Publishing Company, Peru, Illinois 61354. + This edition first published 1951 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, + London. + Second printing 1988 + Third printing 1990 + Fourth printing 1993 + Fifth printing 1996 + +Printed and bound in the United States of America. + +LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA + + Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716. + Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the + freedom of man, and the origin of evil. + + Translation of: Essais de Theodicee. + Includes index. + 1. Theodicy--Early works to 1800. I. Title. + B2590.E5 1985 231'.8 85-8833 + ISBN O-87548-437-9 + + [5] + * * * * * + +CONTENTS + + * * * * * + +EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION page 7 +PREFACE 49 +PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH 73 +REASON +ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE 123, 182, 276 +ORIGIN OF EVIL, IN THREE PARTS + APPENDICES +SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY, REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS 377 +EXCURSUS ON THEODICY, Sec. 392 389 +REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN 393 +ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE' +OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL', 405 +PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON +CAUSA DEI ASSERTA 443 +INDEX 445 + + [7] + * * * * * + +EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION + + * * * * * + +I + +Leibniz was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that his +head was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences lacked interest for +him. Not at all--he felt a lively concern for theological debate, he was a +mathematician of the first rank, he made original contributions to physics, +he gave a realistic attention to moral psychology. But he was incapable of +looking at the objects of any special enquiry without seeing them as +aspects or parts of one intelligible universe. He strove constantly after +system, and the instrument on which his effort relied was the speculative +reason. He embodied in an extreme form the spirit of his age. Nothing could +be less like the spirit of ours. To many people now alive metaphysics means +a body of wild and meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument. A +professor of metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with the +duties of his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements at +all, though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them, by showing +them up as confused forms of something else. A chair in metaphysical +philosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases: what is +taught from it is not the propagation but the cure. + +Confidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed through +philosophical history; periods of speculation have been followed by periods +of criticism. The tide will flow again, but it has not turned yet, and [8] +such metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue a +case for the possibility of their art. It would be an embarrassing task to +open an approach to Leibnitian metaphysics from the present metaphysical +position, if there is a present position. If we want an agreed +starting-point, it will have to be historical. + +The historical importance of Leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable. If +metaphysical thinking is nonsensical, its empire over the human imagination +must still be confessed; if it is as chimerical a science as alchemy, it is +no less fertile in by-products of importance. And if we are to consider +Leibniz historically, we cannot do better than take up his _Theodicy_, for +two reasons. It was the only one of his main philosophical works to be +published in his lifetime, so that it was a principal means of his direct +influence; the Leibniz his own age knew was the Leibniz of the _Theodicy_. +Then in the second place, the _Theodicy_ itself is peculiarly rich in +historical material. It reflects the world of men and books which Leibniz +knew; it expresses the theological setting of metaphysical speculation +which still predominated in the first years of the eighteenth century. + +Leibniz is remembered for his philosophy; he was not a professional +philosopher. He was offered academic chairs, but he declined them. He was a +gentleman, a person of means, librarian to a reigning prince, and +frequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance. The librarian +might at any moment become the political secretary, and offer his own +contributions to policy. Leibniz was for the greater part of his active +life the learned and confidential servant of the House of Brunswick; when +the Duke had nothing better to do with him, he set him to research into +ducal history. If Leibniz had a profession in literature, it was history +rather than philosophy. He was even more closely bound to the interests of +his prince than John Locke was to those of the Prince of Orange. The Houses +of Orange and of Brunswick were on the same side in the principal contest +which divided Europe, the battle between Louis XIV and his enemies. It was +a turning-point of the struggle when the Prince of Orange supplanted +Louis's Stuart friends on the English throne. It was a continuation of the +same movement, when Leibniz's master, George I, succeeded to the same +throne, and frustrated the restoration of the Stuart heir. Locke returned +to England in the wake of the Prince of Orange, and became the [9] +representative thinker of the regime. Leibniz wished to come to the English +court of George I, but was unkindly ordered to attend to the duties of his +librarianship. So he remained in Hanover. He was then an old man, and +before the tide of favour had turned, he died. + +Posterity has reckoned Locke and Leibniz the heads of rival sects, but +politically they were on the same side. As against Louis's political +absolutism and enforced religious uniformity, both championed religious +toleration and the freedom of the mind. Their theological liberalism was +political prudence; it was not necessarily for that reason the less +personally sincere. They had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with bigotry, +or set Protestant intolerance against Catholic absolutism. But they had too +much sympathy with the spirit of Europe to react into free thinking or to +make a frontal attack on revealed truth. They took their stand on a +fundamental Christian theism, the common religion of all good men; they +repudiated the negative enormities of Hobbes and Spinoza. + +The Christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of defences. +The base line was to be the substance of Christian theism and of Christian +morals, and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason, without aid +from scriptural revelation. The middle line was laid down by the general +sense of Scripture, and the defence of it was this. 'Scriptural doctrine is +reconcilable with the findings of sheer reason, but it goes beyond them. We +believe the Scriptures, because they are authenticated by marks of +supernatural intervention in the circumstances of their origin. We believe +them, but reason controls our interpretation of them.' There remained the +most forward and the most hazardous line: the special positions which a +Church, a sect, or an individual might found upon the scriptural +revelation. A prudent man would not hold his advance positions in the same +force or defend them with the same obstinacy as either of the lines behind +them. He could argue for them, but he could not require assent to them. + +One cannot help feeling, indeed, the readiness of these writers to fall +back, not only from the front line to the middle line, but from the middle +line itself to the base line. Leibniz, for example, writes with perfect +seriousness and decency about the Christian scheme of redemption, but it +hardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from perdition. It is +not the intervention of Mercy, by which alone He possesses himself of [10] +us: it is one of the ways in which supreme Benevolence carries out a cosmic +policy; and God's benevolence is known by pure reason, and apart from +Christian revelation. + +In one politically important particular the theological attitude of Leibniz +differed from that of Locke. Both stood for toleration and for the +minimizing of the differences between the sects. This was a serious enough +matter in England, but it was an even more serious matter in Germany. For +Germany was divided between Catholics and Protestants; effective toleration +must embrace them both. English toleration might indulge a harmless +Catholic minority, while rejecting the Catholic regime as the embodiment of +intolerance. But this was not practical politics on the Continent; you must +tolerate Catholicism on an equal footing, and come to terms with Catholic +regimes. Leibniz was not going to damn the Pope with true Protestant +fervour. It was his consistent aim to show that his theological principles +were as serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his own +church. On some points, indeed, he found his most solid support from +Catholics; in other places there are hints of a joint Catholic-Lutheran +front against Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's writings suggest that +the important decisions cut across all the Churches, and not between them. + +Leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by the +religious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the political +weakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV's +highest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in Catholic +Austria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear. +Leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could not +the Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel? +And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement? +Hence Leibniz's famous negotiation with Bossuet for a basis of +Catholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly destined to fail; and it was +bound to recoil upon its author. How could he be a true Protestant who +treated the differences with the Catholics as non-essentials? How could he +have touched pitch and taken no defilement? Leibniz was generally admired, +but he was not widely trusted. As a mere politician, he may be judged to +have over-reached himself. + +It has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that Leibniz[11] +the politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the same person; not +at all to suggest that his rational theology was just political expediency. +We may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine, the pre-established +harmony between nature and grace. Everything happens as though Leibniz were +a liberal politician, and his theology expressed his politics. Yes, but +equally, everything happens as though Leibniz were a philosophical +theologian, and his politics expressed his theology. His appreciation of +Catholic speculation was natural and sincere; his dogmatic ancestry is to +be looked for in Thomism and Catholic humanism as much as anywhere. Above +all, he had himself a liberal and generous mind. It gave him pleasure to +appreciate good wherever he could see it, and to discover a soul of truth +in every opinion. + +From the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an independent +thinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called it 'my +principles', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes 'pre-established +harmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was always ready to +oblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a letter or an +enclosed memorandum, and several such have come down to us. The doctrine +may have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was applicable to every +department of human speculation or enquiry. It provided a new alphabet of +philosophical ideas, and everything in heaven and earth could be expressed +in it; not only could be, but ought to be, and Leibniz showed tireless +energy in working out restatements of standing problems. + +As a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may be +compared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that Leibniz +was a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there is no +comparison between the two men in the width of their range. About many +things Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the most +surprising instance of his neglect--he assured the world that his whole +doctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a theology? +He scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it. He preferred to +keep on defending and explaining his _esse est percipi_. With Leibniz it is +wholly different; he carries his new torch into every corner, to illuminate +the dark questions. + +The wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to its +inventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will find it less[12] +surprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in view from the +start. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed upon +him? What was he _not_ thinking of? He had a many-sided mind. If the +origins of the principle were complex, little wonder that its applications +were manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz who does not wish to be endlessly +tedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of Leibniz's principle, +and one source of its origin. We will here give an account of the matter +which, we trust, will go most directly to the heart of it, but we will make +no claims to sufficient interpretation of Leibniz's thought-processes. + +Leibniz, then, like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century, was +reforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science. The science +was mathematical in its form, mechanistical in its doctrine, and +unanswerable in its evidence--it got results. But it was metaphysically +intractable, and the doctrines of infinite and finite substance which it +generated furnish a gallery of metaphysical grotesques; unless we are to +except Leibniz; his system is, if nothing else, a miracle of ingenuity, and +there are moments when we are in danger of believing it. + +It is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought to +underestimate the tenacity of scholastic Aristotelianism. Descartes, we all +know, was reared in it, but then Descartes overthrew it; and he had done +his work and died by the time that Leibniz was of an age to philosophize at +all. We expect to see Leibniz starting on his shoulders and climbing on +from there. We are disappointed. Leibniz himself tells us that he was +raised in the scholastic teaching. His acquaintance with Descartes's +opinions was second-hand, and they were retailed to him only that they +might be derided. He agreed, like an amiable youth, with his preceptors. + +The next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of Cartesian +writings, and of other modern books beside, such as those of the atomist +Gassendi. He was delighted with what he read, because of its fertility in +the field of physics and mathematics; and for a short time he was an +enthusiastic modern. But presently he became dissatisfied. The new systems +did not go far enough, they were still scientifically inadequate. At the +same time they went too far, and carried metaphysical paradox beyond the +limits of human credulity. + + [13] +There is no mystery about Leibniz's scientific objections to the new +philosophers. If he condemned them here, it was on the basis of scientific +thought and observation. Descartes's formulation of the laws of motion +could, for example, be refuted by physical experiment; and if his general +view of physical nature was bound up with it, then so much the worse for +the Cartesian philosophy. But whence came Leibniz's more strictly +metaphysical objections? Where had he learned that standard of metaphysical +adequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians? His own +disciples might be satisfied to reply, that he learnt it from Reason +herself; but the answer will not pass with us. Leibniz reasoned, indeed, +but he did not reason from nowhere, nor would he have got anywhere if he +had. His conception of metaphysical reason was what his early scholastic +training had made it. + +There are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been taught, +although, when put to it, we find it hard to name the teacher. Among them +is something of this sort. 'Leibniz was a scholarly and sympathetic +thinker. He had more sense of history than his contemporaries, and he was +instinctively eclectic. He believed he could learn something from each of +his great predecessors. We see him reaching back to cull a notion from +Plato or from Aristotle; he even found something of use in the scholastics. +In particular, he picked out the Aristotelian "entelechy" to stop a gap in +the philosophy of his own age.' What this form of statement ignores is that +Leibniz _was_ a scholastic: a scholastic endeavouring, like Descartes +before him, to revolutionize scholasticism. The word 'entelechy' was, +indeed, a piece of antiquity which Leibniz revived, but the thing for which +it stood was the most familiar of current scholastic conceptions. +'Entelechy' means active principle of wholeness or completion in an +individual thing. Scholasticism was content to talk about it under the name +of 'substantial form' or 'formal cause'. But the scholastic interpretation +of the idea was hopelessly discredited by the new science, and the +scholastic terms shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine. Leibniz +wanted a term with a more general sound. 'There is an _X_', he wanted to +say, 'which scholasticism has defined as substantial form, but I am going +to give a new definition of it.' Entelechy was a useful name for _X_, the +more so as it had the authority of Aristotle, the master of scholasticism. + +Under the name of entelechy Leibniz was upholding the soul of [14] +scholastic doctrine, while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes. +The doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had +_something_ in it; he could not settle down in the principles of Descartes +or of Gassendi, because both ignored this vital _something_. Since the +requirements of a new science would not allow a return to sheer +scholasticism, it was necessary to find a fresh philosophy, in which +entelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side by side. + +If one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the +'ancient' doctrine he most abominated, he would most likely have replied, +'Substantial form'. Let us recall what was rejected under this name, and +why. + +The medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we may +call common-sense biology. Biology, indeed, is the science of the living, +and the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all physical +bodies with life. What they did do was to take living bodies as typical, +and to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them. Such an +approach was _a priori_ reasonable enough. For we may be expected to know +best the physical being closest to our own; and we, at any rate, are alive. +Why not argue from the better known to the less known, from the nearer to +the more remote, interpreting other things by the formula of our own being, +and allowing whatever discount is necessary for their degree of unlikeness +to us? + +Common-sense biology reasons as follows. In a living body there is a +certain pattern of organized parts, a certain rhythm of successive motions, +and a certain range of characteristic activities. The pattern, the sheer +anatomy, is basic; but it cannot long continue to exist (outside a +refrigerator) without accompanying vital rhythms in heart, respiration and +digestion. Nor do these perform their parts without the intermittent +support of variable but still characteristic activities: dogs not only +breathe and digest, they run about, hunt their food, look for mates, bark +at cats, and so on. The anatomical pattern, the vital rhythm, and the +characteristic acts together express dogginess; they reveal the specific +form of the dog. They _reveal_ it; exactly what the specific form +_consisted in_ was the subject of much medieval speculation. It need not +concern us here. + +Taking the form of the species for granted, common-sense biology proceeds +to ask how it comes to be in a given instance, say in the dog Toby. [15] +Before this dog was born or thought of, his form or species was displayed +in each of his parents. And now it looks as though the form of dog had +detached itself from them through the generative act, and set up anew on +its own account. How does it do that? By getting hold of some materials in +which to express itself. At first it takes them from the body of the +mother, afterwards it collects them from a wider environment, and what the +dog eats becomes the dog. + +What, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog-form +which assimilates them? Before assimilation, they have their own form. +Before the dog eats the leg of mutton, it has the form given to it by its +place in the body of a sheep. What happens to the mutton? Is it without +remainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? It loses all its +distinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some more +basically material characteristics which it preserves. They underlay the +structure of the mutton, and they continue to underlie the structure of the +dog's flesh which supplants it. Whatever these characteristics may be, let +us call them common material characteristics, and let us say that they +belong to or compose a common material nature. + +The common material nature has its own way of existing, and perhaps its own +principles of physical action. We may suppose that we know much or that we +know little about it. This one thing at least we know, that it is capable +of becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh. It is not essential +to it to be mutton, or mutton it would always be; nor dog's flesh, or it +would always be dog's flesh. It is capable of becoming either, according as +it is captured by one or other system of formal organization. So the voters +who are to go to the polls are, by their common nature, Englishmen; they +are essentially neither Socialist curs nor Conservative sheep, but +intrinsically capable of becoming either, if they become captured by either +system of party organization. + +According to this way of thinking, there is a certain _looseness_ about the +relation of the common material nature to the higher forms of organization +capable of capturing it. Considered in itself alone, it is perhaps to be +seen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own. It is heavy, +then it will fall unless obstructed; it is solid, then it will resist +intrusions. But considered as material for organization by higher forms, it +is indeterminate. It acts in one sort of way under the persuasion of the +sheep-form, and in another sort of way under the persuasion of the [16] +dog-form, and we cannot tell how it will act until we know which form is +going to capture it. No amount of study bestowed on the common material +nature will enable us to judge how it will behave under the persuasion of +the higher organizing form. The only way to discover that is to examine the +higher form itself. + +Every form, then, will really be the object of a distinct science. The form +of the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common, but that merely +happens to be so; we cannot depend upon it, or risk inferences from sheep +to dog: we must examine each in itself; we shall really need a science of +probatology about sheep, and cynology about dogs. Again, the common +material nature has its own principles of being and action, so it will need +a science of itself, which we may call hylology. Each of these sciences is +mistress in her own province; but how many there are, and how puzzlingly +they overlap! So long as we remain within the province of a single science, +we may be able to think rigorously, everything will be 'tight'. But as soon +as we consider border-issues between one province and another, farewell to +exactitude: everything will be 'loose'. We can think out hylology till we +are blue in the face, but we shall never discover anything about the entry +of material elements into higher organizations, or how they behave when +they get there. We may form perfect definitions and descriptions of the +form of the dog as such, and still derive no rules for telling what +elements of matter will enter into the body of a given dog or how they will +be placed when they do. All we can be sure of is, that the dog-form will +keep itself going in, and by means of, the material it embodies--unless the +dog dies. But what happens to the matter in the body of the dog is +'accidental' to the nature of the matter; and the use of this matter, +rather than of some other equally suitable, is accidental to the nature of +the dog. + +No account of material events can dispense with accidental relations +altogether. We must at least recognize that there are accidental relations +between particular things. Accident in the sense of brute fact had to be +acknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of the last +century. That atomism must allow it to be accidental, in this sense, that +the space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other atoms in a given +manner. It belonged neither to the nature of space to be occupied by just +those atoms in just those places, nor to the nature of the atoms to be [17] +distributed just like that over space; and so in a certain sense the +environment of any atom was an accidental environment. That is, the +particular arrangement of the environment was accidental. The nature of the +environment was not accidental at all. It was proper to the nature of the +atom to be in interaction with other atoms over a spatial field, and it +never encountered in the fellow-denizens of space any other nature but its +own. It was not subject to the accident of meeting strange natures, nor of +becoming suddenly subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction. All +interactions, being with its own kind, were reciprocal and obedient to a +single set of calculable laws. + +But the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations between +distinct sorts of _natures_, the form of living dog and the form of dead +matter, for example. No one could know _a priori_ what effect an accidental +relation would produce, and all accidental relations between different +pairs of natures were different: at the most there was analogy between +them. Every different nature had to be separately observed, and when you +had observed them all, you could still simply write an inventory of them, +you could not hope to rationalize your body of knowledge. Let us narrow the +field and consider what this doctrine allows us to know about the wood of a +certain kind of tree. We shall begin by observing the impressions it makes +on our several senses, and we shall attribute to it a substantial form such +as naturally to give rise to these impressions, without, perhaps, being so +rash as to claim a knowledge of what this substantial form is. Still we do +not know what its capacities of physical action and passion may be. We +shall find them out by observing it in relation to different 'natures'. It +turns out to be combustible by fire, resistant to water, tractable to the +carpenter's tools, intractable to his digestive organs, harmless to +ostriches, nourishing to wood-beetles. Each of these capacities of the wood +is distinct; we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another, nor deduce +them from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'. + +We can now see why 'substantial forms' were the _betes noires_ of the +seventeenth-century philosophers. It was because they turned nature into an +unmanageable jungle, in which trees, bushes, and parasites of a thousand +kinds wildly interlaced. There was nothing for it, if science was to +proceed, but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows: to +postulate a single uniform nature, of which there should be a single +science. Now neither probatology nor cynology could hope to be [18] +universal--the world is not all sheep nor all dog: it would have to be +hylology; for the world is, in its spatial aspect, all material. Let us +say, then, that there is one uniform material nature of things, and that +everything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material nature; +as the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply from an +arrangement of vapours. And let us suppose that the interactions of the +parts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead manipulable +bodies--in mechanism, in fact. Such was the postulate of the new +philosophers, and it yielded them results. + +It yielded them results, and that was highly gratifying. But what, +meanwhile, had happened to those palpable facts of common experience from +which the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise? Is the +wholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations of +its parts? Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is? Is the life of +a living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch, except +in degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance? And if an animal's +body, say my own, is simply an agglomerate of minute interacting material +units, and its wholeness is merely accidental and apparent, how is my +conscious mind to be adjusted to it? For my consciousness appears to +identify itself with that whole vital pattern which used to be called the +substantial form. We are now told that the pattern is nothing real or +active, but the mere accidental resultant of distinct interacting forces: +it does no work, it exercises no influence or control, it _is_ nothing. How +then can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? It cannot. +Then is my soul homeless? Or is it to be identified with the activity and +fortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in the +animal clockwork? If so, how irrational! For the soul does not experience +itself as the soul of one minute part, but as the soul of the body. + +Such questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the seventeenth-century +philosophers. It will cause us no great surprise that Leibniz should have +quickly felt that the Formal Principle of Aristotle and of the Scholastic +philosophy must be by hook or by crook reintroduced--not as the detested +_substantial form_, but under a name by which it might hope to smell more +sweet, _entelechy_. + +Nothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy in[19] +dealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions Descartes +had proposed. He had boldly declared the unity of animal life to be purely +mechanical, and denied that brutes had souls at all, or any sensation. He +had to admit soul in man, but he still denied the substantial unity of the +human body. It was put together like a watch, it was many things, not one: +if Descartes had lived in our time, he would have been delighted to compare +it with a telephone system, the nerves taking the place of the wires, and +being so arranged that all currents of 'animal spirit' flowing in them +converged upon a single unit, a gland at the base of the brain. In this +unit, or in the convergence of all the motions upon it, the 'unity' of the +body virtually consisted; and the soul was incarnate, not in the plurality +of members (for how could it, being one, indwell many things?), but in the +single gland. + +Even so, the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutely +unintelligible, as Descartes disarmingly confessed. Incarnation was all +very well in the old philosophy: those who had allowed the interaction of +disparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particular +difficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation. Why should +not a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be dead +matter as to 'indwell' it? But the very principle of the new philosophy +disallowed the interaction of disparate natures, because such an +interaction did not allow of exact formulation, it was a 'loose' and not a +'tight' relation. + +From a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland theory +would serve. If we could be content to view Descartes as a man who wanted +to make the world safe for physical science, then there would be a good +deal to be said for his doctrine. In the old philosophy exact science had +been frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over the field of +nature. Descartes had cleared them from as much of the field as science was +then in a position to investigate; he allowed only one such relation to +subsist, the one which experience appeared unmistakably to force upon +us--that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle. He had exorcized the +spirits from the rest of nature; and though there was a spirit here which +could not be exorcized, the philosophic conjurer had nevertheless confined +it and its unaccountable pranks within a minutely narrow magic circle: all +mind could do was to turn the one tiny switch at the centre of its [20] +animal telephone system. It could create no energy--it could merely +redirect the currents actually flowing. + +Practically this might do, but speculatively it was most disturbing. For if +the 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance, it was admitted in +principle; and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it would turn up +elsewhere, and that the banishment of it from every other field represented +a convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid metaphysical truth. +Moreover, the correlation of the unitary soul with the unitary gland might +do justice to a mechanistical philosophy, but it did not do justice to the +soul's own consciousness of itself. The soul's consciousness is the 'idea' +or 'representation' of the life of the whole body, certainly not of the +life of the pineal gland nor, as the unreflective nowadays would say, of +the brain. I am not conscious in, or of, my brain except when I have a +headache; consciousness is in my eyes and finger-tips and so on. It is +physically true, no doubt, that consciousness in and of my finger-tips is +not possible without the functioning of my brain; but that is a poor reason +for locating the consciousness in the brain. The filament of the electric +bulb will not be incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo; but +that is a poor reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo. + +Certainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply equivalent +to the area of our body. But in so far as the confines of mental +representation part company with the confines of the body, it is not that +they may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland, but that they may +expand and advance over the surrounding world. The mind does not represent +its own body merely, it represents the world in so far as the world affects +that body or is physically reproduced in it. The mind has no observable +natural relation to the pineal gland. It has only two natural relations: to +its body as a whole and to its effective environment. What Descartes had +really done was to pretend that the soul was related to the pineal gland as +it is in fact related to its whole body; and then that it was related to +the bodily members as in fact it is related to outer environment. The +members became an inner environment, known only in so far as they affected +the pineal gland; just as the outer environment in its turn was to be known +only in so far as it affected the members. + + [21] +This doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial. It was forced +on Descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science: if the members +were simply a plurality of things, they must really be parts of +environment; the body which the soul indwelt must be _a_ body; presumably, +then, the pineal gland. An untenable compromise, surely, between admitting +and denying the reality of the soul's incarnation. + +What, then, was to be done? Descartes's rivals and successors attempted +several solutions, which it would be too long to examine here. They +dissatisfied Leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfied +posterity. It will be enough for us here to consider what Leibniz did. He +admitted, to begin with, the psychological fact. The unity of consciousness +is the representation of a plurality--the plurality of the members, and +through them the plurality of the world. Here, surely, was the very +principle the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation of substantial +unity with mechanical plurality of parts. For it is directly evident to us +that consciousness focuses the plurality of environing things in a unity of +representation. This is no philosophical theory, it is a simple fact. Our +body, then, as a physical system is a mechanical plurality; as focused in +consciousness it is a unity of 'idea'. + +Very well: but we have not got far yet. For the old difficulty still +remains--it is purely arbitrary, after all, that a unitary consciousness +should be attached to, and represent, a mechanical collection of things +which happen to interact in a sort of pattern. If there is a consciousness +attached to human bodies, then why not to systems of clockwork? If the body +is _represented_ as unity, it must surely be because it _is_ unity, as the +old philosophy had held. But how can we reintroduce unity into the body +without reintroducing substantial form, and destroying the mechanistical +plurality which the new science demanded? + +It is at this point that Leibniz produces the speculative postulate of his +system. Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent the +mind as the mind represents the members? For then the unity of person +represented in the mind will become something actual in the members also. + +Representation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of traffic. If +my mind represents my bodily members, something happens to my mind, for it +becomes a representation of such members in such a state; but nothing +happens to the members by their being so represented in the mind. The [22] +mental representation obeys the bodily facts; the bodily facts do not obey +the mental representation. It seems nonsense to say that my members obey my +mind _because_ they are mirrored in it. And yet my members do obey my mind, +or at least common sense supposes so. Sometimes my mind, instead of +representing the state my members are in, represents a state which it +intends that they shall be in, for example, that my hand should go through +the motion of writing these words. And my hand obeys; its action becomes +the moving diagram of my thought, my thought is represented or expressed in +the manual act. Here the relation of mind and members appears to be +reversed: instead of its representing them, they represent it. With this +representation it is the opposite of what it was with the other. By the +members' being represented in the mind, something happened to the mind, and +nothing to the members; by the mind's being represented in the members +something happens to the members and nothing to the mind. + +Why should not we take this seriously? Why not allow that there is two-way +traffic--by one relation the mind represents the members, by another the +members represent the mind? But then again, how can we take it seriously? +For representation, in the required sense, is a mental act; brute matter +can represent nothing, only mind can represent. And the members are brute +matter. But are they? How do we know that? By brute matter we understand +extended lumps of stuff, interacting with one another mechanically, as do, +for example, two cogs in a piece of clockwork. But this is a large-scale +view. The cogs are themselves composed of interrelated parts and those +parts of others, and so on _ad infinitum_. Who knows what the ultimate +constituents really are? The 'modern' philosophers, certainly, have +proposed no hypothesis about them which even looks like making sense. They +have supposed that the apparently inert lumps, the cogs, are composed of +parts themselves equally inert, and that by subdivision we shall still +reach nothing but the inert. But this supposition is in flat contradiction +with what physical theory demands. We have to allow the reality of _force_ +in physics. Now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily be +the block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents. If not, +where does it come from? Let it be supposed, then, that these minute real +constituents are active because they are alive, because they are minds; for +indeed we have no notion of activity other than the perception we have [23] +of our own. We have no notion of it except as something mental. On the +hypothesis that the constituents of active body are also mental, this +limitation in our conception of activity need cause us neither sorrow nor +surprise. + +The mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and fully +conscious minds like yours or mine, and it is only for want of a better +word that we call them minds at all. They will be mere unselfconscious +representations of their physical environment, as it might be seen from the +physical point to which they belong by a human mind paying no attention at +all to its own seeing. How many of these rudimentary 'minds' will there be +in my body? As many as you like--as many as it is possible there should +be--say an infinite number and have done with it. + +We may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity without +prejudicing mechanical plurality. Each of the mind-units in my body is +itself and substantially distinct. But since each, in its own way and +according to its own position, represents the superior and more developed +mind which I call 'me', they will order themselves according to a common +form. The order is real, not accidental: it is like the order of troops on +a parade-ground. Each man is a distinct active unit, but each is really +expressing by his action the mind of the officer in command. He is +expressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks--to obey the +officer is to keep in step with them. So the metaphysical units of the +body, being all minds, represent one another as well as the dominant mind: +one another co-ordinately, the dominant mind subordinately. + +But if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of mind, +then _the_ mind is a mind among minds, a spirit-atom among spirit-atoms. +What then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and makes it a mind +_par excellence_? Well, what constitutes the officer an officer? Two +things: a more developed mentality and the fact of being obeyed. In +military life these two factors are not always perfectly proportioned to +one another, but in the order of Leibniz's universe they are. A fuller +power to represent the universe is necessarily combined with dominance over +an organized troop of members; for the mind knows the universe only in so +far as the universe is expressed in its body. That is what the [24] +_finitude_ of the mind means. Only an infinite mind appreciates the whole +plurality of things in themselves; a finite mind perceives them in so far +as mirrored in the physical being of an organized body of members. The more +adequate the mirror, the more adequate the representation: the more highly +organized the body, the more developed the mind. + +The developed mind has an elaborate body; but the least developed mind has +still some body, or it would lack any mirror whatever through which to +represent the world. This means, in effect, that Leibniz's system is not an +unmitigated spiritual atomism. For though the spiritual atoms, or monads, +are the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed, they stand +composed together from the beginning in a minimal order which cannot be +broken up. Each monad, if it is to be anything at all, must be a continuing +finite representation of the universe, and to be that it must have a body, +that is to say, it must have other monads in a permanent relation of mutual +correspondence with it. And if you said to Leibniz, 'But surely any +physical body can be broken up, and this must mean the dissolution of the +organic relation between its monadical constituents,' he would take refuge +in the infinitesimal. The wonders revealed by that new miracle, the +microscope, suggested what the intrinsic divisibility of space itself +suggests--whatever organization is broken up, there will still be a minute +organization within each of the fragments which remains unbroken--and so +_ad infinitum_. You will never come down to loose monads, monads out of all +organization. You will never disembody the monads, and so remove their +representative power; you will only reduce their bodies and so impoverish +their representative power. In this sense no animal dies and no animal is +generated. Death is the reduction and generation the enrichment of some +existing monad's body; and, by being that, is the enrichment or the +reduction of the monad's mental life. + +'But,' our common sense protests, 'it is too great a strain on our +credulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from what +sense and science make of them. If the real universe is what you say it is, +why do our minds represent it to us as they do?' The philosopher's answer +is, 'Because they _represent_ it. According to the truth of things, each +monad is simply its own mental life, its own world-view, its own thoughts +and desires. To know things as they are would be simultaneously to live +over, as though from within and by a miracle of sympathy, the [25] +biographies of an infinite number of distinct monads. This is absolutely +impossible. Our senses represent the coexistent families of monads _in the +gross_, and therefore conventionally; what is in fact the mutual +representation of monads in ordered systems, is represented as the +mechanical interaction of spatially extended and material parts.' This does +not mean that science is overthrown. The physical world-view is in terms of +the convention of representation, but it is not, for all that, illusory. It +can, ideally, be made as true as it is capable of being. There is no reason +whatever for confusing the 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparent +physical world with the fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination. + +So far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from the +simplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation. The nature of +idea, it is assumed, is to represent plurality in a unified view. If idea +did not represent, it would not be idea. And since there _is_ idea (for our +minds at least exist and are made up of idea) there is representation. It +belongs to idea to represent, and since the whole world has now been +interpreted as a system of mutually representing ideations, or ideators, it +might seem that all their mutual relations are perfectly natural, a harmony +of agreement which could not be other than it is. But if so, why does +Leibniz keep saying that the harmony is _pre-established_, by special and +infinitely elaborate divine decrees? + +Leibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludes +interaction. By representing environment a mind does not do anything to +environment, that is plain. But it is no less plain that environment does +nothing to it, either. The act of representing is simply the act of the +mind; it represents _in view of_ environment, of course, but not under the +causal influence of environment. Representation is a business carried on by +the mind on its own account, and in virtue of its innate power to +represent. + +Very well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? Is +not Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely stated +alternatives? '_Either_ finite beings interact _or else_ they do not +directly condition one another. Monads do not interact, therefore they do +not directly condition one another. How then explain the actual conformity +of their mutual representation, without recourse to divine fore-ordaining?' +It seems sufficient to introduce a further alternative in the first line of +the argument, and we are rid of the theology. Things may condition the [26] +action of a further thing, without acting upon it. It acts of itself, but +it acts in view of what they are. We are tempted to conclude that Leibniz +has introduced the _Deus ex machina_ with the fatal facility of his age. +'Where a little further meditation on the characters in the play would +furnish a natural _denouement_, he swings divine intervention on to the +scene by wires from the ceiling. It is easy for us to reconstruct for him +the end of the piece without recourse to stage-machines.' + +Is it? No, I fear it is not. There is really no avoiding the +pre-established harmony. And so we shall discover, if we pursue our train +of reflexion a little further. It is natural, we were saying, than an idea +should represent an environment; indeed, it _is_ the representation of one. +Given no environment to represent, it would be empty, a mere capacity for +representation. Then every idea or ideator, taken merely in itself, _is_ an +empty capacity. But of what is the environment of each made up? According +to the Leibnitian theory, of further ideas or ideators: of empty +capacities, therefore. Then no idea will either be anything in itself, or +find anything in its neighbours to represent. An unhappy predicament, like +that of a literary clique in which all the members are adepts at discussing +one another's ideas--only that unfortunately none of them are provided with +any; or like the shaky economics of the fabled Irish village where they all +lived by taking in one another's washing. + +It is useless, then, to conceive representations as simply coming into +existence in response to environment, and modelling themselves on +environment. They must all mutually reflect environment or they would not +be representations; but they must also exist as themselves and in their own +right or there would be no environment for them mutually to represent. +Since the world is infinitely various, each representor must have its own +distinct character or nature, as our minds have: that is to say, it must +represent in its own individual way; and all these endlessly various +representations must be so constituted as to form a mutually reflecting +harmony. Considered as a representation, each monadical existence simply +reflects the universe after its own manner. But considered as something to +be represented by the others, it is a self-existent mental life, or world +of ideas. Now when we are considering the fact of representation, that +which is to be represented comes first and the representation follows upon +it. Thus in considering the Leibnitian universe, we must begin with the[27] +monads as self-existent mental lives, or worlds of ideas; their +representation of one another comes second. Nothing surely, then, but +omnipotent creative wisdom could have pre-established between so many +distinct given mental worlds that harmony which constitutes their mutual +representation. + +Our common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of the +pre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do. Let +the world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order, with room +to manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another. Then, by good luck or +good management, through friction and disaster, by trial and error, by +accident or invention, they may work out for themselves a harmony of +_action_. There is no need for divine preordaining here. But on Leibniz's +view what the monads do is to represent, and what they are is +representation; there is no ultimate distinction between what they are and +what they do: all that they do belongs to what they are. The whole system +of action in each monad, which fits with such infinite complexity the +system of action in each other monad, is precisely the existence of that +monad, and apart from it the monad is not. The monads do not _achieve_ a +harmony, they _are_ a harmony, and therefore they are pre-established in +harmony. + +Leibniz denied that he invoked God to intervene in nature, or that there +was anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology. He was +simply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutual +representation; he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to be +of its nature intrinsically pre-established, and therefore God-dependent. +He was not adding anything to mutual representation, he was just showing +what it necessarily contained or implied. At least he was doing nothing +worse than recognized scholastic practice. Scholastic Aristotelianism +explained all natural causality as response to stimulus, and then had to +postulate a stimulus which stimulated without being stimulated, and this +was God. Apart from this supreme and first stimulus nothing would in fact +be moving. The Aristotelians claimed simply to be analysing the nature of +physical motion as they perceived it, and to find the necessity of +perpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it. No violence was +thereby done to the system of physical motion nor was anything brought in +from without to patch it up; it was simply found to be of its own [28] +nature God-dependent. + +It seems as though the reproachful description _'Deus ex machina'_ should +be reserved for more arbitrary expedients than Aristotle's or Leibniz's, +say for the occasionalist theory. Occasionalism appeared to introduce God +that he might make physical matter do what it had no natural tendency to +do, viz. to obey the volitions of finite mind. Ideas, on the other hand, +have a natural tendency to represent one another, for to be an idea is to +be a representation; God is not introduced by Leibniz to make them +correspond, he is introduced to work a system in which they shall +correspond. This may not be _Deus-ex-machina philosophy_, but it is +_physical theology_; that is to say, it treats divine action as one factor +among the factors which together constitute the working of the natural +system. And this appears to be perhaps unscientific, certainly blasphemous: +God's action cannot be a factor among factors; the Creator works through +and in all creaturely action equally; we can never say 'This is the +creature, and that is God' of distinguishable causalities in the natural +world. The creature is, in its creaturely action, self-sufficient: but +because a creature, insufficient to itself throughout, and sustained by its +Creator both in existence and in action. + +The only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to the +religious consciousness, and builds upon the insufficiency of finite +existence throughout, because it is finite. All arguments to God's +existence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites are +to be rejected. They do not indicate God, they indicate the failure of our +power to analyse the world-order. When Leibniz discovered that his system +of mutual representations needed to be pre-established, he ought to have +seen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out; he ought not to have +said, 'With the help of God I will leap over the wall.' + +If we condemn Leibniz for writing physical theology, we condemn not him but +his age. No contemporary practice was any better, and much of it a good +deal worse, as Leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out. And +because he comes to theology through physical theology, that does not mean +that all his theology was physical theology and as such to be written off. +On the contrary, Leibniz is led to wrestle with many problems which beset +any philosophical theism of the Christian type. This is particularly so[29] +in the _Theodicy_, as its many citations of theologians suggest. His +discussions never lack ingenuity, and the system of creation and providence +in which they result has much of that luminous serenity which colours the +best works of the Age of Reason. + +Every theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to conceive +God by the analogy of the human mind. When Leibniz declares the harmony of +monads to be pre-established by God, he is invoking the image of +intelligent human pre-arrangement. Nor is he content simply to leave it at +that: he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act by which +God pre-arranges; and this involves the detailed adaptation for theological +purposes of Leibnitian doctrine about the human mind. + +The human mind, as we have seen, is the mind predominant in a certain +system of 'minds', viz. in those which constitute the members of the human +body. If we call it predominant, we mean that its system of ideas is more +developed than theirs, so that there are more points in which each of them +conforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them. The conception +of a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous. It will be the +conception of a mind _absolutely_ dominant, to whose ideas, that is to say, +the whole system simply corresponds, without any reciprocating +correspondence on his side. In a certain sense this is to make God the +'Mind of the World'; and yet the associations of the phrase are misleading. +It suggests that the world is an organism or body in which the divine mind +is incarnate, and on which he relies for his representations. But that is +nonsense; the world is not _a_ body, nor is it organic to God. Absolute +dominance involves absolute transcendence: if everything in the world +without remainder simply obeys the divine thoughts, that is only another +way of saying that the world is the creature of God; the whole system is +pre-established by him who is absolute Being and perfectly independent of +the world. + +Of createdness, or pre-establishedness, there is no more to be said: we can +think of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection to +dominant mind. It is no use asking further _how_ God's thoughts are obeyed +in the existence and action of things. What we can and must enquire into +further, is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus obeyed. They +must be understood to be volitions or decrees. There are indeed two ways in +which things obey the divine thought, and correspondingly two sorts of +divine thoughts that they obey. In so far as created things conform to [30] +the mere universal principles of reason, they obey a reasonableness which +is an inherent characteristic of the divine mind itself. If God wills the +existence of any creature, that creature's existence must observe the +limits prescribed by eternal reason: it cannot, for example, both have and +lack a certain characteristic in the same sense and at the same time; nor +can it contain two parts and two parts which are not also countable as one +part and three parts. Finite things, if they exist at all, must thus +conform to the reasonableness of the divine nature, but what the divine +reasonableness thus prescribes is highly general: we can deduce from it +only certain laws which any finite things must obey, we can never deduce +from it which finite things there are to be, nor indeed that there are to +be any. Finite things are particular and individual: each of them might +have been other than it is or, to speak more properly, instead of any one +of them there might have existed something else; it was, according to the +mere principles of eternal reason, equally possible. But if so, the whole +universe, being made up of things each of which might be otherwise, might +as a whole be otherwise. Therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys by +existing have the nature of _choices_ or _decrees_. + +What material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of the +infinite mind making choices or decrees? If we use such language of God, we +are using language which has its first and natural application to +ourselves. We all of us choose, and those of us who are in authority make +decrees. What is to choose? It involves a real freedom in the mind. A +finite mind, let us remember, is nothing but a self-operating succession of +perceptions, ideas, or representations. With regard to some of our ideas we +have no freedom, those, for example, which represent to us our body. We +think of them as constituting our given substance. They are sheer datum for +us, and so are those reflexions of our environment which they mediate to +us. They make up a closely packed and confused mass; they persevere in +their being with an obstinate innate force, the spiritual counterpart of +the force which we have to recognize in things as physically interpreted. +Being real spiritual force, it is quasi-voluntary, and indeed do we not +love our own existence and, in a sense, will it in all its necessary +circumstances? But if we can be said to will to be ourselves and to enact +with native force what our body and its environment makes us, we are [31] +merely willing to conform to the conditions of our existence; we are making +no choice. When, however, we think freely or perform deliberate acts, there +is not only force but choice in our activity. Choice between what? Between +alternative possibilities arising out of our situation. And choice in +virtue of what? In virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as +seemingly better. + +Can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God's creative +decrees? We will take the second point in it first: our choice is in virtue +of the appeal of the seeming best. Surely the only corrective necessary in +applying this to God is the omission of the word 'seeming'. His choice is +in virtue of the appeal of the simply best. The other point causes more +trouble. We choose between possibilities which arise for us out of our +situation in the system of the existing world. But as the world does not +exist before God's creative choices, he is in no world-situation, and no +alternative possibilities can arise out of it, between which he should have +to choose. But if God does not choose between intrinsic possibilities of +some kind, his choice becomes something absolutely meaningless to us--it is +not a choice at all, it is an arbitrary and unintelligible _fiat_. + +Leibniz's solution is this: what are mere possibilities of thought for us +are possibilities of action for God. For a human subject, possibilities of +action are limited to what arises out of his actual situation, but +possibilities for thought are not so limited. I can conceive a world +different in many respects from this world, in which, for example, +vegetables should be gifted with thought and speech; but I can do nothing +towards bringing it about. My imaginary world is practically impossible but +speculatively possible, in the sense that it contradicts no single +principle of necessary and immutable reason. I, indeed, can explore only a +very little way into the region of sheer speculative possibility; God does +not explore it, he simply possesses it all: the whole region of the +possible is but a part of the content of his infinite mind. So among all +possible creatures he chooses the best and creates it. + +But the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas. Out of +the consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a choice? +Why not? His mind is not, of course, discursive; he does not successively +turn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds, for then he +would never come to the end of it. Embracing infinite possibility in [32] +the single act of his mind, he settles his will with intuitive immediacy +upon the best. The inferior, the monstrous, the absurd is not a wilderness +through which he painfully threads his way, it is that from which he +immediately turns; his wisdom is his elimination of it. + +But in so applying the scheme of choice to God's act, have we not +invalidated its application to our own? For if God has chosen the whole +form and fabric of the world, he has chosen everything in it, including the +choices we shall make. And if our choices have already been chosen for us +by God, it would seem to follow that they are not real open choices on our +part at all, but are pre-determined. And if they are pre-determined, it +would seem that they are not really even choices, for a determined choice +is not a choice. But if we do not ourselves exercise real choice in any +degree, then we have no clue to what any choice would be: and if so, we +have no power of conceiving divine choice, either; and so the whole +argument cuts its own throat. + +There are two possible lines of escape from this predicament. One is to +define human choice in such a sense that it allows of pre-determination +without ceasing to be choice; and this is Leibniz's method, and it can be +studied at length in the _Theodicy_. He certainly makes the very best he +can of it, and it hardly seems that any of those contemporaries whose views +he criticizes was in a position to answer him. The alternative method is to +make the most of the negative element involved in all theology. After all, +we do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinite +creative will. Perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divine +freedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments. But so +mystical a paradox is not the sort of thing we can expect to appeal to a +late-seventeenth-century philosopher. + +One criticism of Leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making. He +allows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative to +a choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal is a +choice of mere caprice. There is a sort of choice Leibniz never so much as +considers and which appears at least to fall quite outside his categories, +and that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic creativity. In such +choice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme, we do not arbitrate +simply between shaped and given possible schemes. And perhaps some such +element enters into all our choices, since our life is to some extent [33] +freely designed by ourselves. If so, our minds are even more akin to the +divine mind than Leibniz realized. For the sort of choice we are now +referring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an infinite, or at +least indefinite, range of less attractive possibility. And such is the +nature of the divine creative choice. The consequence of such a line of +speculation would be, that the divine mind designs more through us, and +less simply for us, than Leibniz allowed: the 'harmony' into which we enter +would be no longer simply 'pre-established'. Leibniz, in fact, could have +nothing to do with such a suggestion, and he would have found it easy to be +ironical about it if his contemporaries had proposed it. + +II + +Leibniz wrote two books; a considerable number of articles in learned +periodicals; and an enormous number of unpublished notes, papers and +letters, preserved in the archives of the Electors of Hanover not because +of the philosophical significance of some of them, but because of the +political importance of most of them. From among this great mass various +excerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors of +Leibniz's works. It may be that the most profound understanding of his mind +is to be derived from some of these pieces, but if we wish to consider the +public history of Leibniz, we may set them aside. + +Of the two books, one was published, and the other never was. The _New +Essays_ remained in Leibniz's desk, the _Theodicy_ saw the light. And so, +to his own and the succeeding generation, Leibniz was known as the author +of the _Theodicy_. + +The articles in journals form the immediate background to the two books. In +1696 Leibniz heard that a French translation of Locke's _Essay concerning +Human Understanding_ was being prepared at Amsterdam. He wrote some polite +comments on Locke's great work, and published them. He also sent them to +Locke, hoping that Locke would write a reply, and that Leibniz's reflexions +and Locke's reply might be appended to the projected French translation. +But Locke set Leibniz's comments aside. Leibniz, not to be defeated, set to +work upon the _New Essays_, in which the whole substance of Locke's book is +systematically discussed in dialogue. The _New Essays_ were written in +1703. But meanwhile a painful dispute had broken out between Leibniz [34] +and the disciples of Locke and Newton, in which the English, and perhaps +Newton himself, were much to blame, and Leibniz thought it impolitic to +publish his book. It was not issued until long after his death, in the +middle of the century. + +The discussion with Locke was a failure: Locke would not play, and the book +in which the whole controversy was to be systematized never appeared. The +discussion with Bayle, on the other hand, was a model of what a discussion +should be. Bayle played up tirelessly, and was never embarrassingly +profound; he provided just the sort of objections most useful for drawing +forth illuminating expositions; he was as good as a fictitious character in +a philosophical dialogue. And the book in which the controversy was +systematized duly appeared with great eclat. + +Here is the history of the controversy. In 1695 Leibniz was forty-nine +years old. He had just emerged from a period of close employment under his +prince's commands, and he thought fit to try his metaphysical principles +upon the polite world and see what would come of it. He therefore published +an article in the _Journal des Savants_ under the title: 'New System of +Nature and of the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Union +between Soul and Body'. In the same year Foucher published an article in +the _Journal_ controverting Leibniz; and in the next year Leibniz replied +with an 'Explanation'. A second explanation in the same year appeared in +Basnage's _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, in answer to reflexions by +the editor. M. Pierre Bayle had all these articles before him when he +inserted a note on Leibniz's doctrine in his article on 'Rorarius', in the +first edition of his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_. The point of +connexion between Rorarius and Leibniz was no more than this, that both +held views about the souls of beasts. + +Pierre Bayle was the son of a Calvinist pastor, early converted to +Catholicism, but recovered to his old faith after a short time. He held +academic employments in Switzerland and Holland; he promoted and edited the +_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, and he produced that +extraordinary work the _Historical and Critical Dictionary._ The notices it +contains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs upon which Bayle +could hang his philosophical reflexions. He could write an intelligent +discussion on any opinion; what he could not do was to reconcile the points +of view from which he felt impelled to write upon this author and that.[35] +His was not a systematic mind. So far as he had a philosophical opinion, he +was a Cartesian; in theology he was an orthodox Calvinist. He could not +reconcile his theology with his Cartesianism and he did not try to. He made +a merit of the oppositions of faith to reason and reason to itself, so that +he could throw himself upon a meritorious and voluntary faith. + +There is nothing original in this position. It was characteristic of +decadent scholasticism, it squared with Luther's exaggerations about the +impotence of reason in fallen man, and Pascal had given his own highly +personal twist to it. Bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of Voltairean +scepticism. It would be truer to say that a Voltairean sceptic could read +Bayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he wished. +But Bayle was not a sceptic. It is hard to say what he was; his whole +position as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused. He was a +scholar, a wit, and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectly +convenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality, we +might have suspected Leibniz of inventing him. + +In the first edition of his _Dictionary_, under the article 'Rorarius', +Bayle gave a very fair account of Leibniz's doctrine concerning the souls +of animals, as it could be collected from his article in the _Journal des +Savants_, 27 June 1695. He then proceeded to comment upon it in the +following terms: + +'There are some things in Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to some +difficulties, though they show the great extent of his genius. He will have +it, for example, that the soul of a dog acts independently of outward +bodies; that _it stands upon its own bottom, by a perfect _spontaneity_ +with respect to itself, and yet with a perfect _conformity_ to outward +things_.... That _its internal perceptions arise from its original +constitution, that is to say, the representative constitution (capable of +expressing beings outside itself in relation to its organs) which was +bestowed upon it from the time of its creation, and makes its individual +character_ (_Journal des Savants_, 4 July 1695). From whence it results +that it would feel hunger and thirst at such and such an hour, though there +were not any one body in the universe, and _though nothing should exist but +God and that soul_. He has explained (_Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, +Feb. 1696) his thought by the example of two pendulums that should +perfectly agree: that is, he supposes that according to the particular laws +which put the soul upon action, it must feel hunger at such an hour; [36] +and that according to the particular laws which direct the motion of +matter, the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that same +hour as it is modified when the soul is hungry. I will forbear preferring +this system to that of occasional causes till the learned author has +perfected it. I cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and spontaneous +actions which would have this effect, that the soul of a dog would feel +pain immediately after having felt joy, though it were alone in the +universe. I understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure to pain +when, being very hungry and eating a piece of bread, he is suddenly struck +with a cudgel. But I cannot apprehend that his soul should be so framed +that at the very moment of his being beaten he should feel pain though he +were not beaten, and though he should continue to eat bread without any +trouble or hindrance. Nor do I see how the spontaneity of that soul should +be consistent with the sense of pain, and in general with any unpleasing +perceptions. + +'Besides, the reason why this learned man does not like the Cartesian +system seems to me to be a false supposition; for it cannot be said that +the system of occasional causes brings in God acting by a miracle (ibid.), +_Deum ex machina_, in the mutual dependency of the body and soul: for since +God does only intervene according to general laws, he cannot be said to act +in an extraordinary manner. Does the internal and active virtue +communicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz know the train +of actions which it is to produce? By no means; for we know by experience +that we are ignorant whether we shall have such and such perceptions in an +hour's time. It were therefore necessary that the forms should be directed +by some internal principle in the production of their acts. But this would +be _Deus ex machina,_ as much as in the system of occasional causes. In +fine, as he supposes with great reason that all souls are simple and +indivisible, it cannot be apprehended how they can be compared with a +pendulum, that is, how by their original constitution they can diversify +their operations by using the spontaneous activity bestowed upon them by +their Creator. It may clearly be conceived that a simple being will always +act in a uniform manner, if no external cause hinders it. If it were +composed of several pieces, as a machine, it would act different ways, +because the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment the +progress of others; but how will you find in a simple substance the [37] +cause of a change of operation?' + +Leibniz published a reply to Bayle in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des +Savants_ for July 1698. As in all his references to Bayle, he is studiously +polite and repays compliment for compliment. The following are perhaps the +principal points of his answer. + +1. On the example of the dog: + +(_a_) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since everything left +to itself continues in the state in which it is? Because the state may be a +state of _change_, as in a moving body which, unless hindered, continues to +move. And such is the nature of simple substances--they continue to evolve +steadily. + +(_b_) Would it really feel as though beaten if it were not beaten, since +Leibniz says that the action of every substance takes place as though +nothing existed but God and itself? Leibniz replies that his remark refers +to the causality behind an action, not to the reasons for it. The +spontaneous action of the dog, which leads to the feeling of pain, is only +decreed to be what it is, for the reason that the dog is part of a world of +mutually reflecting substances, a world which also includes the cudgel. + +(_c_) Why should the dog ever be displeased _spontaneously_? Leibniz +distinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary: many things occur in the +mind, of itself, but not chosen by it. + +2. On Cartesianism and miracle: + +Cartesianism in the form of occasionalism _does_ involve miracle, for +though God is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body and +mind to one another, he thereby causes them to act beyond their natural +capacities. + +3. On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly? + +Leibniz distinguishes: some uniform action is monotonous, but some is not. +A point moves uniformly in describing a parabola, for it constantly fulfils +the formula of the curve. But it does not move monotonously, for the curve +constantly varies. Such is the uniformity of the action of simple +substances. + +Bayle read this reply, and was pleased but not satisfied with it. In the +second edition of the dictionary, under the same article 'Rorarius', he +added the following note: + +'I declare first of all that I am very glad I have proposed some small +difficulties against the system of that great philosopher, since they [38] +have occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer to +me, and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to be +admired in it. I look now upon that new system as an important conquest, +which enlarges the bounds of philosophy. We had only two hypotheses, that +of the Schools and that of the Cartesians: the one was a _way of influence_ +of the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body; the other was a +_way of assistance_ or occasional causality. But here is a new acquisition, +a new hypothesis, which may be called, as Fr. Lami styles it, a _way of +pre-established harmony_. We are beholden for it to M. Leibniz, and it is +impossible to conceive anything that gives us a nobler idea of the power +and wisdom of the Author of all things. This, together with the advantage +of setting aside all notions of a miraculous conduct, would engage me to +prefer this new system to that of the Cartesians, if I could conceive any +possibility in the _way of pre-established harmony_. + +'I desire the reader to take notice that though I confess that this way +removes all notions of a miraculous conduct, yet I do not retract what I +have said formerly, that the system of occasional causes does not bring in +God acting miraculously. (See M. Leibniz's article in _Histoire des +Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698.) I am as much persuaded as ever I was +that an action cannot be said to be miraculous, unless God produces it as +an exception to the general laws; and that everything of which he is +immediately the author according to those laws is distinct from a miracle +properly so called. But being willing to cut off from this dispute as many +things as I possibly can, I consent it should be said that the surest way +of removing all notions that include a miracle is to suppose that all +created substances are actively the immediate causes of the effects of +nature. I will therefore lay aside what I might reply to that part of M. +Leibniz's answer. + +'I will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his opinion +than to that of some other philosophers. I will not therefore propose the +difficulties that may be raised against the supposition that a creature can +receive from God the power of moving itself. They are strong and almost +unanswerable, but M. Leibniz's system does not lie more open to them than +that of the Aristotelians; nay, I do not know whether the Cartesians would +presume to say that God cannot communicate to our souls a power of acting. +If they say so, how can they own that Adam sinned? And if they dare not[39] +say so they weaken the arguments whereby they endeavour to prove that +matter is not capable of any activity. Nor do I believe that it is more +difficult for M. Leibniz than for the Cartesians or other philosophers, to +free himself from the objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys human +liberty. Wherefore, waiving this, I shall only speak of what is peculiar to +the system of the _pre-established harmony_. + +'I. My first observation shall be, that it raises the power and wisdom of +the divine art above everything that can be conceived. Fancy to yourself a +ship which, without having any sense or knowledge, and without being +directed by any created or uncreated being, has the power of moving itself +so seasonably as to have always the wind favourable, to avoid currents and +rocks, to cast anchor where it ought to be done, and to retire into a +harbour precisely when it is necessary. Suppose such a ship sails in that +manner for several years successively, being always turned and situated as +it ought to be, according to the several changes of the air and the +different situations of seas and lands; you will acknowledge that God, +notwithstanding his infinite power, cannot communicate such a faculty to a +ship; or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is not capable of +receiving it from God. And yet what M. Leibniz supposes about the machine +of a human body is more admirable and more surprising than all this. Let us +apply his system concerning the union of the soul with the body to the +person of Julius Caesar. + +'II. We must say according to this system that the body of Julius Caesar +did so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its death it went +through continual changes which did most exactly answer the perpetual +changes of a certain soul which it did not know and which made no +impression on it. We must say that the rule according to which that faculty +of Caesar's body performed such actions was such, that he would have gone +to the Senate upon such a day and at such an hour, that he would have +spoken there such and such words, etc., though God had willed to annihilate +his soul the next day after it was created. We must say that this moving +power did change and modify itself exactly according to the volubility of +the thoughts of that ambitious man, and that it was affected precisely in a +certain manner rather than in another, because the soul of Caesar passed +from a certain thought to another. Can a blind power modify itself so +exactly by virtue of an impression communicated thirty or forty years [40] +before and never renewed since, but left to itself, without ever knowing +what it is to do? Is not this much more incomprehensible than the +navigation I spoke of in the foregoing paragraph? + +'III. The difficulty will be greater still, if it be considered that the +human machine contains an almost infinite number of organs, and that it is +continually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it,[1] and +which by an innumerable variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sorts +of modifications. How is it possible to conceive that this _pre-established +harmony_ should never be disordered, but go on still during the longest +life of a man, notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocal +action of so many organs upon one another, which are surrounded on all +sides with infinite corpuscles, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, sometimes +dry and sometimes moist, and always acting, and pricking the nerves a +thousand different ways? Suppose that the multiplicity of organs and of +external agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety of +changes in a human body: will that variety have the exactness here +required? Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with +the changes of the soul? This seems to be altogether impossible. + +[1] 'According to M. Leibniz what is active in every substance ought to be +reduced to a true unity. Since therefore the body of every man is composed +of several substances, each of them ought to have a principle of action +really distinct from the principle of each of the others. He will have the +action of every principle to be spontaneous. Now this must vary the effects +_ad infinitum_, and confound them. For the impression of the neighbouring +bodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of every +one of them.' + +'IV. It is in vain to have recourse to the power of God, in order to +maintain that brutes are mere machines; it is in vain to say that God was +able to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man, the +reflected light of an object, etc., will strike them exactly where it is +necessary, that they may move in a given manner. This supposition is +rejected by everybody except some Cartesians; and no Cartesian would admit +it if it were to be extended to man; that is, if anyone were to assert that +God was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do whatever we see +other men do. By denying this we do not pretend to limit the power and +knowledge of God: we only mean that the nature of things does not permit +that the faculties imparted to a creature should not be necessarily +confined within certain bounds. The actions of creatures must be [41] +necessarily proportioned to their essential state, and performed according +to the character belonging to each machine; for according to the maxim of +the philosophers, whatever is received is proportionate to the capacity of +the subject that receives it. We may therefore reject M. Leibniz's +hypothesis as being impossible, since it is liable to greater difficulties +than that of the Cartesians, which makes beasts to be mere machines. It +puts a perpetual harmony between two beings, which do not act one upon +another; whereas if servants were mere machines, and should punctually obey +their masters' command, it could not be said that they do it without a real +action of their masters upon them; for their masters would speak words and +make signs which would really shake and move the organs of the servants. + +'V. Now let us consider the soul of Julius Caesar, and we shall find the +thing more impossible still. That soul was in the world without being +exposed to the influence of any spirit. The power it received from God was +the only principle of the actions it produced at every moment: and if those +actions were different one from another, it was not because some of them +were produced by the united influence of some springs which did not +contribute to the production of others, for the soul of man is simple, +indivisible and immaterial. M. Leibniz owns it; and if he did not +acknowledge it, but if, on the contrary, he should suppose with most +philosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age (Mr. +Locke, for instance) that a compound of several material parts placed and +disposed in a certain manner, is capable of thinking, his hypothesis would +appear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible, and I could refute +it several other ways; which I need not mention since he acknowledges the +immateriality of our soul and builds upon it. + +'Let us return to the soul of Julius Caesar, and call it an immaterial +automaton (M. Leibniz's own phrase), and compare it with an atom of +Epicurus; I mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides, and which +will never meet any other atom. This is a very just comparison: for this +atom, on the one hand, has a natural power of moving itself and exerts it +without any assistance, and without being retarded or hindered by anything: +and, on the other hand, the soul of Caesar is a spirit which has received +the faculty of producing thoughts, and exerts it without the influence [42] +of any other spirit or of any body. It is neither assisted nor thwarted by +anything whatsoever. If you consult the common notions and the ideas of +order, you will find that this atom can never stop, and that having been in +motion in the foregoing moment, it will continue in it at the present +moment and in all the moments that shall follow, and that it will always +move in the same manner. This is the consequence of an axiom approved by M. +Leibniz: _since a thing does always remain in the same state wherein it +happens to be, unless it receives some alteration from some other thing ... +we conclude_, says he, _not only that a body which is at rest will always +be at rest, but that a body in motion will always keep that motion or +change, that is, the same swiftness and the same direction, unless +something happens to hinder it_. (M. Leibniz, ibid.) + +'Everyone clearly sees that this atom, whether it moves by an innate power, +as Democritus and Epicurus would have it, or by a power received from the +Creator, will always move in the same line equally and after a uniform +manner, without ever turning or going back. Epicurus was laughed at, when +he invented the motion of declination; it was a needless supposition, which +he wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a fatal necessity; and he +could give no reason for this new part of his system. It was inconsistent +with the clearest notions of our minds: for it is evident that an atom +which describes a straight line for the space of two days cannot turn away +at the beginning of a third, unless it meets with some obstacle, or has a +mind all of a sudden to go out of its road, or contains some spring which +begins to play at that very moment. The first of these reasons cannot be +admitted in a vacuum. The second is impossible, since an atom has not the +faculty of thinking. And the third is likewise impossible in a corpuscle +that is a perfect unity. I must make some use of all this. + +'VI. Caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict sense. The +faculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature (so M. Leibniz), +which it has received from God, both as to possession and exercise. If the +first thought it produces is a sense of pleasure, there is no reason why +the second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure; for when the total +cause of an effect remains the same, the effect cannot be altered. Now this +soul, at the second moment of its existence, does not receive a new faculty +of thinking; it only preserves the faculty it had at the first moment, and +it is as independent of the concourse of any other cause at the second [43] +moment as it was at the first. It must therefore produce again at the +second moment the same thought it had produced just before. If it be +objected that it ought to be in a state of change, and that it would not be +in such a state, in the case that I have supposed; I answer that its change +will be like the change of the atom; for an atom which continually moves in +the same line acquires a new situation at every moment, but it is like the +preceding situation. A soul may therefore continue in its state of change, +if it does but produce a new thought like the preceding. + +'But suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds; it must be +granted at least that its going from one thought to another implies some +reason of affinity. If I suppose that in a certain moment the soul of +Caesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms, I can conceive that it does +immediately desire to see one that has only leaves, and then one that has +only blossoms, and that it will thus successively produce several images +arising from one another; but one cannot conceive the odd change of +thoughts, which have no affinity with, but are even contrary to, one +another, and which are so common in men's souls. One cannot apprehend how +God could place in the soul of Julius Caesar the principle of what I am +going to say. He was without doubt pricked with a pin more than once, when +he was sucking; and therefore according to M. Leibniz's hypothesis which I +am here considering, his soul must have produced in itself a sense of pain +immediately after the pleasant sensations of the sweetness of the milk, +which it had enjoyed for the space of two or three minutes. By what springs +was it determined to interrupt its pleasures and to give itself all of a +sudden a sense of pain, without receiving any intimation of preparing +itself to change, and without any new alteration in its substance? If you +run over the life of that Roman emperor, every page will afford you matter +for a stronger objection than this is. + +'VII. The thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed that the +soul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits, each of +which has its functions, that begin and end precisely as the changes made +in a human body require. By virtue of this supposition it should be said +that something analogous to a great number of wheels and springs, or of +matters that ferment, disposed according to the changes of our machine, +awakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of each of those +spirits. But then the soul of man would be no longer a single substance[44] +but an _ens per aggregationem_, a collection and heap of substances just +like all material beings. We are here in quest of a single being, which +produces in itself sometimes joy, sometimes pain, etc., and not of many +beings, one of which produces hope, another despair, etc. + +'In these observations I have merely cleared and unfolded those which M. +Leibniz has done me the honour to examine: and now I shall make some +reflexions upon his answers. + +'VIII. He says (ibid., p. 332) that _the law of the change which happens in +the substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to pain at the +very moment that a solution of continuity is made in his body; because the +law of the indivisible substance of that animal is to represent what is +done in his body as we experience it, and even to represent in some manner, +and with respect to that body, whatever is done in the world_. These words +are a very good explication of the grounds of this system; they are, as it +were, the unfolding and key of it; but at the same time they are the very +things at which the objections of those who take this system to be +impossible are levelled. The law M. Leibniz speaks of supposes a decree of +God, and shows wherein this system agrees with that of occasional causes. +Those two systems agree in this point, that there are laws according to +which the soul of man is _to represent what is done in the body of man, as +we experience it_. But they disagree as to the manner of executing those +laws. The Cartesians say that God executes them; M. Leibniz will have it, +that the soul itself does it; which appears to me impossible, because the +soul has not the necessary instruments for such an execution. Now however +infinite the power and knowledge of God be, he cannot perform with a +machine deprived of a certain piece, what requires the concourse of such a +piece. He must supply that defect; but then the effect would be produced by +him and not by the machine. I shall show that the soul has not the +instruments requisite for the divine law we speak of, and in order to do it +I shall make use of a comparison. + +'Fancy to yourself an animal created by God and designed to sing +continually. It will always sing, that is most certain; but if God designs +him a certain tablature, he must necessarily either put it before his eyes +or imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a manner that +according to the laws of mechanism one certain note will always come after +another, agreeably to the order of the tablature. Without this one cannot +apprehend that the animal can always follow the whole set of the notes [45] +appointed him by God. Let us apply this to man's soul. M. Leibniz will have +it that it has received not only the power of producing thoughts +continually, but also the faculty of following always a certain set of +thoughts, which answers the continual changes that happen in the machine of +the body. This set of thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to the +singing animal above mentioned. Can the soul change its perceptions or +modifications at every moment according to such a set of thoughts, without +knowing the series of the notes, and actually thinking upon them? But +experience teaches us that it knows nothing of it. Were it not at least +necessary that in default of such a knowledge, there should be in the soul +a set of particular instruments, each of which would be a necessary cause +of such and such a thought? Must they not be so placed and disposed as to +operate precisely one after another, according to the correspondence +_pre-established_ between the changes of the body and the thoughts of the +soul? but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and indivisible +substance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude of particular +instruments placed one before another, according to the order of the +tablature in question. It is not therefore possible that a human soul +should execute that law. + +'M. Leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its future +perceptions, _but that it perceives them confusedly_, and that _there are +in each substance traces of whatever hath happened, or shall happen to it: +but that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us from +distinguishing them. The present state of each substance is a natural +consequence of its preceding state. The soul, though never so simple, has +always a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one time: which +answers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces, like a +machine. For each foregoing perception has an influence on those that +follow agreeably to a law of order, which is in perceptions as well as in +motions...The perceptions that are together in one and the same soul at the +same time, including an infinite multitude of little and indistinguishable +sentiments that are to be unfolded, we need not wonder at the infinite +variety of what is to result from it in time. This is only a consequence of +the representative nature of the soul, which is, to express what happens +and what will happen in its body, by the connexion and correspondence of +all the parts of the world_. I have but little to say in answer to this: I +shall only observe that this supposition when sufficiently cleared is the +right way of solving all the difficulties. M. Leibniz, through the [46] +penetration of his great genius, has very well conceived the extent and +strength of this objection, and what remedy ought to be applied to the main +inconveniency. I do not doubt but that he will smooth the rough parts of +his system, and teach us some excellent things about the nature of spirits. +Nobody can travel more usefully or more safely than he in the intellectual +world. I hope that his curious explanations will remove all the +impossibilities which I have hitherto found in his system, and that he will +solidly remove my difficulties, as well as those of Father Lami. And these +hopes made me say before, without designing to pass a compliment upon that +learned man, that his system ought to be looked upon as an important +conquest. + +'He will not be much embarrassed by this, viz. that whereas according to +the supposition of the Cartesians there is but one general law for the +union of spirits and bodies, he will have it that God gives a particular +law to each spirit; from whence it seems to result that the primitive +constitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others. Do +not the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals in +angelic nature?' + +Leibniz acknowledged Bayle's note in a further reply, which is written as +though for publication. It was communicated to Bayle, but it was not in +fact published. It is dated 1702. It may be found in the standard +collections of Leibniz's philosophical works. It reads almost like a sketch +for the _Theodicy_. + +The principal point developed by Leibniz is the richness of content which, +according to him, is to be found in each 'simple substance'. Its simplicity +is more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine Being, than like +the simplicity of the atom of Epicurus, with which Bayle had chosen to +compare it. It contains a condensation in confused idea of the whole +universe: and its essence is from the first defined by the part it is to +play in the total harmony. + +As to the musical score ('tablature of notes') which the individual soul +plays from, in order to perform its ordained part in the universal harmony, +this 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at any moment +present, from which an omniscient observer could always deduce what is to +happen next. To the objection 'But the created soul is not an omniscient +observer, and if it cannot read the score, the score is useless to it',[47] +Leibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous action arises from +subjective and yet unperceived reasons, as we are all perfectly aware, once +we attend to the relevant facts. All he claims to be doing is to generalize +this observation. All events whatsoever arise from the 'interpretation of +the score' by monads, but very little of this 'interpretation' is in the +least conscious. + +Leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article +'Rorarius' to other articles of Bayle's dictionary, and touches the +question of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive their +fuller treatment in the _Theodicy_. + +In the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle himself, +offering further explanations of disputed points. He concluded it with a +paragraph of some personal interest, comparing himself the +historian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, and +revealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history: + +'We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your striking +reflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by your +boundless researches into matters of fact. I too am not always able to +excuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged to +descend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, were +it not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them. I have +worked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon these +countries, a study which has furnished me with some observations belonging +to general history. So I have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheer +facts. But if the choice were open to me, I should prefer natural history +to political, and the customs and laws God has established in nature, to +what is observed among mankind.' + +Leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in +Bayle's works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer to +them. Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died. The work +nevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in _Theodicy_. + + [49] + * * * * * + +PREFACE + + * * * * * + +It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms +for the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, light +and virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not wonder +at this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are impressed +by what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires +consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As true +piety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion +imitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonial +practices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies resemble +virtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth and +approach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would be +commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to +maintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies, +ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human laws were always +like a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from any approach to +vice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue. That was +the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who founded +religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the +purest and most enlightened religion. It is just the same with the +formularies of belief: they would be valid provided there were nothing [50] +in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though the full truth +concerned were not there. But it happens only too often that religion is +choked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions +of men. + +The pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, had +only one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, but +they had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up +formularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their gods +were real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, the +planets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas +but in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those who +were not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very often +ridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order to +guard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: they +boasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries, +portents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of the +goodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended to +sway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the great +future of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to impart +to men true notions of God and of the soul. + +Of all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public dogmas +for their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in one God, +source of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of him in a +manner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at seeing the +inhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the rest +of the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other nations have +sometimes said the same, but they have not had the good fortune to find a +sufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. Nevertheless Moses +had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: it +was consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it was +not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil, +and, without having force in his hand, taught with all the force of a +lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shall +receive the wages of their deeds. Moses had already expressed the beautiful +conceptions of the greatness and the goodness of God, whereto many +civilized peoples to-day assent; but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully [51] +the results of these ideas, proclaiming that divine goodness and justice +are shown forth to perfection in God's designs for the souls of men. + +I refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian doctrine, +and I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the conversion of +natural religion into law, and gained for it the authority of a public +dogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vain +to do; and Christians having at last gained the upper hand in the Roman +Empire, the master of the greater part of the known earth, the religion of +the wise men became that of the nations. Later also Mahomet showed no +divergence from the great dogmas of natural theology: his followers spread +them abroad even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whither +Christianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countries +heathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity +of God and the immortality of souls. + +It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that +the Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but +also of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, and +gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there is +nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that +mental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object +of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor any greater +delight than in him. To love him it suffices to contemplate his +perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of these within +ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses +them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have +been granted; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but +in God they are all in their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight +us; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he always +keeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is an +effusion of his rays. + +It follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in the +love of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended by +insight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which gives +relief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the centre, transports the +human to the divine. For in doing one's duty, in obeying reason, one [52] +carries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs all one's intentions +to the common good, which is no other than the glory of God. Thus one finds +that there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of the +community, and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in the +acquisition of true benefits for men. Whether one succeeds therein or not, +one is content with what comes to pass, being once resigned to the will of +God and knowing that what he wills is best. But before he declares his will +by the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears most +in accord with his commands. When we are in this state of mind, we are not +disheartened by ill success, we regret only our faults; and the ungrateful +ways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition. +Our charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer; +attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are +inclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of +others. We must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. There +is no piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly and +beneficent one cannot show sincere religion. + +Good disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious and +virtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition +for our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by good +principles. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour, +that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting of +our will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be the +effect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when virtue +is reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme reason of +things, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without knowing his +perfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety. The +purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls: +but in some strange way it has happened all too often that men, that +teachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. Contrary to the +intention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced to ceremonies and +doctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often these ceremonies +have not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue, and the +formulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe it? Some Christians +have imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour,[53] +and pious without loving God; or else people have thought that they could +love their neighbour without serving him and could love God without knowing +him. Many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by the +people at large; and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness. +There are divers persons who speak much of piety, of devotion, of religion, +who are even busied with the teaching of such things, and who yet prove to +be by no means versed in the divine perfections. They ill understand the +goodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine a +God who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemed +to me dangerous in its effect, since it is of serious moment that the very +source of piety should be preserved from infection. The old errors of those +who arraigned the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been +renewed sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistible +power of God when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme +goodness; and they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather +have conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I have +observed that these opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confused +notions which had been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny; +and I have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give +explanations on these important matters. But finally I have been compelled +to gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impart +them to the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I +offer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of +Evil. + +There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray: +one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in +the production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion +of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements +thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. The +first perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophers +only. I shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declare +myself on the second, and to point out that, for lack of a true conception +of the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false positions +leading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properly +be applied to the overthrow of these very positions. But if the [54] +knowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that of +necessity is none the less so for practical application; and it, together +with the questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and the +justice of God, forms the object of this treatise. + +Men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the +ancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing nothing, +or at least towards being careful for nothing and only following +inclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the future +is necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Now +the future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinity +foresees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of all +things in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, through +the concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature of truth, +which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events, +as it is in all assertions, since the assertion must always be true or +false in itself, even though we know not always which it is. And all these +reasons for determination which appear different converge finally like +lines upon one and the same centre; for there is a truth in the future +event which is predetermined by the causes, and God pre-establishes it in +establishing the causes. + +The false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has given +rise to what I call _Fatum Mahometanum_, fate after the Turkish fashion, +because it is said of the Turks that they do not shun danger or even +abandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of such reasoning +as that just recorded. For what is called _Fatum Stoicum_ was not so black +as it is painted: it did not divert men from the care of their affairs, but +it tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events, through the +consideration of necessity, which renders our anxieties and our vexations +needless. In which respect these philosophers were not far removed from the +teaching of our Lord, who deprecates these anxieties in regard to the +morrow, comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himself +in labouring to increase his stature. + +It is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of some +famous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this alleged +necessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspires +thoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining +contentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and [55] +wise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair of +our head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should see, +if we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even possible to +wish for anything better (as much in general as for ourselves) than what he +does. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty and be content with that +which shall come of it, not only because you cannot resist divine +providence, or the nature of things (which may suffice for tranquillity, +but not for contentment), but also because you have to do with a good +master. And that is what may be called _Fatum Christianum_. + +Nevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce into +their dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, although +they do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they are not +inactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopes +present themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that is about +to fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path; and they +will burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered, without +waiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the good or the evil is +remote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste, the +lazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when it is a question of +preserving one's health and even one's life by good diet, people to whom +one gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered and +that it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which God destines +for us. But these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies when +the evil they had neglected draws near. One reasons in somewhat the same +way when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instance +when one asks oneself, _quod vitae sectabor iter_? what profession one must +choose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being +undertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be +inclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to +fate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy +cases. One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although +this way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality +occurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazy +reason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of the +need to reason properly. One will thus overlook the fact that if this [56] +argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would always +hold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This laziness is to +some extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers, +which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher's +stone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of +happiness without trouble. + +I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they +have been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein. Their +argument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the +principles of astrology and of other kinds of divination. They overlook the +fact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, _una marea_, as +Italians playing basset are wont to call it. With regard to this they make +their own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counsel +none to trust too much. Yet this confidence that people have in their +fortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, and +causes them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves. +Even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold, +as it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them +resolute. Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally as +providing a remedy for other errors: and truth is unquestionably better. + +But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to +employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often heard +it said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that it +is useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward and +fears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that what +is written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein. +Thus, they would say, it were best to follow one's inclination, dwelling +only upon such things as may content us in the present. They did not +reflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would prove +too much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take a +pleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned. For the same reason +(if it were valid) I could say: if it is written in the records of the +Parcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm, this will happen +even though I were not to take this beverage; and if this is not written, +it will not happen even though I should take this same beverage; +consequently I shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to [57] +take what is pleasing, however injurious it may be; the result of which +reasoning is an obvious absurdity. This objection disconcerted them a +little, but they always reverted to their argument, phrased in different +ways, until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophism +lies. It is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do: it will +happen because one does what leads thereto; and if the event is written +beforehand, the cause that will make it happen is written also. Thus the +connexion of effects and causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of a +necessity detrimental to conduct, serves to overthrow it. + +Yet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one may +envisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity, +considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to +the morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise and blame, +punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and nobody will +be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what is +absolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this consideration +in order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not escape +embarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging the actions +of others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which there are some +even concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will speak presently. And +as an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety, whether through +the impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt to +resist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it, it is important to +note the different degrees of necessity, and to show that there are some +which cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted without +giving rise to evil consequences. + +Some go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity to +prove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the hardihood +to make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, and they +imitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of their +crimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy of +Christians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients the +dependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with all +the actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Some +able men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to [58] +creatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinary +opinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles, +or two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma were a better +solution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet again he +acknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of the +Principle is incontestably founded on _a priori_ reasons; but he wishes to +infer that our Reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections, and +that one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas, which +teach us the existence of one God altogether good, altogether powerful and +altogether wise. But many readers, convinced of the irrefutable nature of +his objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofs +for the truth of religion, would draw dangerous conclusions. + +Even though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one could +not help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that, +being able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits them. +This is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosen +to deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above all, of +future events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness. +The Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and Thomas +Bonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedingly +learned, who wrote a book _De Concordia Scientiae cum Fide_, of which I +will speak later, appears to hint at this also. + +They are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, convinced +that nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of God, ascribe +to him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best of +all beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogma +which recognizes God's justice and goodness. They thought that, being +supreme Master of the universe, he could without any detriment to his +holiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will and pleasure, or in +order that he might have the pleasure of punishing; and even that he could +take pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing any +injustice, because no one has the right or the power to control his +actions. Some even have gone so far as to say that God acts thus indeed; +and on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him, they liken +us to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk, or in +general to animals that are not of our species and which we do not [59] +scruple to ill-treat. + +I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by +these ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of their +consequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice is +thus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only +will for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by the +rules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the idea +contained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, which +designated as _just_ that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is the +position taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligation +upon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right. But +one will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good and +charitable through the imitation of God. For one will reflect that a God +who would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguished +from the evil principle of the Manichaeans, assuming that this principle +had become sole master of the universe; and that in consequence one must +attribute to the true God sentiments that render him worthy to be called +the good Principle. + +Happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among +theologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to make +difficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by uniting +the controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes of +philosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, of +freedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto those of +original sin, of grace and of predestination. The original corruption of +the human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to have imposed a +natural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace: but necessity +being incompatible with punishment, it will be inferred that a sufficient +grace ought to have been given to all men; which does not seem to be in +conformity with experience. + +But the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's dispositions +for the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; therefore the +choice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is admitted that +those whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, and are not even +fundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have coming only from the +gift of God, the difficulty is increased. Where is, then, his justice [60] +(people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? Partiality, or +respect of persons, goes against justice, and he who without cause sets +bounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure. It is true +that those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault: they lack good +will or living faith; but it rested with God alone to grant it them. We +know that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstances +which distinguish men, and that training, conversation, example often +correct or corrupt natural disposition. Now that God should call forth +circumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences which +contribute to their misfortune, will not that give us cause for +astonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say with some that +inward grace is universal and equal for all. For these same authors are +obliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and to say: 'O the +depth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may call +outward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the diversity of +circumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the masters, and +which have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns their +salvation. + +Nor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being involved +in the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left them all in +their misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver some +of them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemn +anyone, but there still remains the question why God does not deliver +all--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference to +others. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and just master; his +power is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that power +in an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed. + +Moreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God's +permission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he had +considered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of the +human race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the abandonment +of all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one's +view to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of oneself, go back to +the knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, preceding the decree +whereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted simultaneously that [61] +the damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not be +delivered: for God and the sage make no resolve without considering its +consequences. + +I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolute +necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes +geometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, does +not exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only from +constraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself, +although he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity, +and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness of +things, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and +arbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have not +sufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifference +in freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the +other; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise. +And I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity +beyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plain +that the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions +are open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism. + +Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a +vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his +justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his +independence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God, +for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will, +to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be the +author of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of +evil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has a +source other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to say +of moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most important +of all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and +misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to +his holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, he +could have avoided all these evils. + +Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable +assertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the [62] +prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid; +that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those +whose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they +wish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of +election, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that +they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet +it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and that +this very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faith +likewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect, +for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and +circumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom. + +Now, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was as +great as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, had +applied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the +difficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I found +a fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail. I +acknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak of him) has +on his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter, but I +hope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our side) by its +very plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will prevail over +all the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for success therein +is all the greater because it is the cause of God I plead, and because one +of the maxims here upheld states that God's help is never lacking for those +that lack not good will. The author of this discourse believes that he has +given proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear upon +this subject. He has meditated upon it since his youth; he has conferred +with some of the foremost men of the time; and he has schooled himself by +the reading of good authors. And the success which God has given him +(according to the opinion of sundry competent judges) in certain other +profound meditations, of which some have much influence on this subject, +gives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers who +love truth and are fitted to search after it. + +The author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him to +take pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which he had +concerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany and in +France, and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished [63] +of princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. He had had the +honour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon divers passages of +the admirable _Dictionary_ of M. Bayle, wherein religion and reason appear +as adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to silence reason after having +made it speak too loud: which he calls the triumph of faith. The present +author declared there and then that he was of a different opinion, but that +he was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius had +brought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects, subjects as +important as they are difficult. He admitted having examined them also for +some long time already, and having sometimes been minded to publish upon +this matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of God +as is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue. This Princess exhorted +and urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention, and some friends +added their persuasions. He was all the more tempted to accede to their +requests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to his +investigation M. Bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subject +such illumination as it might receive with his support. But divers +obstacles intervened, and the death of the incomparable Queen was not the +least. It happened, however, that M. Bayle was attacked by excellent men +who set themselves to examine the same subject; he answered them fully and +always ingeniously. I followed their dispute, and was even on the point of +being involved therein. This is how it came about. + +I had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain the +union of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even from +those who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent persons +testified that they had already been of my opinion, without having reached +so distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had written on the +matter. M. Bayle examined it in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, +article 'Rorarius'. He thought that my expositions were worthy of further +development; he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions, +and he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty. I could not but +reply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions so +instructive as his. In order to turn them to greater account, I published +some elucidations in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698. M. +Bayle replied to them in the second edition of his _Dictionary_. I sent[64] +him a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether he +ever made a further reply. + +Meanwhile it happened that M. le Clerc had inserted in his _Select Library_ +an extract from the _Intellectual System_ of the late Mr. Cudworth, and had +explained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable author +applied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle believed (see the +continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 21, art. 11) that, +these natures being without cognition, in establishing them one weakened +the argument which proves, through the marvellous formation of things, that +the universe must have an intelligent Cause. M. le Clerc replied (4th art. +of the 5th vol. of his _Select Library_) that these natures required to be +directed by divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the _Histoire +des Ouvrages des Savants_, August 1704) that direction alone was not +sufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to be +a mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. My +system was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to send +a short essay to the illustrious author of the _Histoire des Ouvrages des +Savants_, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, art. 9. In this I +endeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient to +produce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of other plastic +natures, provided there be added thereto the _preformation_ already +completely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence, +contained in those of the bodies whence they spring, right back to the +primary seeds. This could only proceed from the Author of things, +infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating all in the beginning +in due order, had _pre-established_ there all order and artifice that was +to be. There is no chaos in the inward nature of things, and there is +organism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from God. More +and more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination of +the anatomy of bodies; and we should continue to observe it even if we +could go on to infinity, like Nature, and make subdivision as continuous in +our knowledge as Nature has made it in fact. + +In order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made use of +a Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had used to +explain another marvel, namely the correspondence of soul with body, [65] +wherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles I had +employed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my system of accounting +for this correspondence, which he had examined formerly. He declared (in +chapter 180 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. +1253) that he did not believe God could give to matter or to any other +cause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the idea +and the knowledge of organic nature. Also he was not yet disposed to +believe that God, with all his power over Nature and with all the +foreknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive, could have +so disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel (for +instance) should go to its port of destination without being steered during +its passage by some intelligent guide. I was surprised to see that limits +were placed on the power of God, without the adduction of any proof and +without indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on the +side of the object or any imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shown +before in my Rejoinder that even men often produce through automata +something like the movements that come from reason, and that even a finite +mind (but one far above ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinks +impossible to the Divinity. Moreover, as God orders all things at once +beforehand, the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no more +strange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks, since the +whole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them by +means of their influence one upon the other. + +This declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore purposed +to point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms organic bodies +himself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted this care to +intelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, we must hold the +opinion that God _preformed_ things in such sort that new organisms are +only a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution. Even so +do butterflies come out of silkworms, an instance where M. Swammerdam has +shown that there is nothing but development. And I would have added that +nothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animals +to confirm my System of Pre-established Harmony between the soul and the +body. For in this the body is prompted by its original constitution to +carry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordance +with the will of the soul. So the seeds by their original constitution [66] +carry out naturally the intentions of God, by an artifice greater still +than that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity with +our will. And since M. Bayle himself deems with reason that there is more +artifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the +world or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable, +it follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is +as intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. For +this opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom of +God has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to form +animals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibility +of it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there will be no cause +for surprise that God has so made the body that by virtue of its own laws +it can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul: for all that the +reasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than the +organization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. Bayle says (_Reply to +the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 182, p. 1294) that it is only very +recently there have been people who have understood that the formation of +living bodies cannot be a natural process. This he could say also (in +accordance with his principles) of the communication between the soul and +the body, since God effects this whole communication in the system of +occasional causes to which this author subscribes. But I admit the +supernatural here only in the beginning of things, in respect of the first +formation of animals or in respect of the original constitution of +pre-established harmony between the soul and the body. Once that has come +to pass, I hold that the formation of animals and the relation between the +soul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinary +operations of Nature. A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary +thinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. One +recognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them. I +am, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my +explanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample +range, to that opinion. + +Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of +M. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which +I had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67] +in opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith in +regard to the existence of evil. Indeed, there are perhaps few persons who +have toiled more than I in this matter. Hardly had I gained some tolerable +understanding of Latin writings when I had an opportunity of turning over +books in a library. I flitted from book to book, and since subjects for +meditation pleased me as much as histories and fables, I was charmed by the +work of Laurentius Valla against Boethius and by that of Luther against +Erasmus, although I was well aware that they had need of some mitigation. I +did not omit books of controversy, and amongst other writings of this +nature the records of the Montbeliard Conversation, which had revived the +dispute, appeared to me instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of our +theologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me, +served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the +Augsburg Confession. I had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some +excellent men of different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter von +Wallenburg, Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premier +theologian of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. To +him I even tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon this +subject, about the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God, +having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted by +his wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which still +did not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that +could be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors on +these subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge +that seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea +of supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have not +neglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended furthest +the doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes and +Spinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in +his _Physical Elements_ and elsewhere, but also in a special book against +Bishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancient +Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the first +cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, with +complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understanding +in this first source of things. + + [68] +I have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the contrary in +a way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter. +For having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the laws +of motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical necessity, as Spinoza +appears to have believed they had. Neither, as I have made plain, are they +purely arbitrary, even though this be the opinion of M. Bayle and of some +modern philosophers: but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as I +have already pointed out above, or upon that which I call the 'principle of +the best'. Moreover one recognizes therein, as in every other thing, the +marks of the first substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme +wisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that this +harmony connects both the future with the past and the present with the +absent. The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places. +This second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body, +and in general in the communication of true substances with one another and +with material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation of +organic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organism +everywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pond +may very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it is +not itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them. +Thus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in a +conclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that +reason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts were +properly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficulties +of the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence formed for +myself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperation +of God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offend +reason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny of M. Bayle, +as well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he has departed +from us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose learning and +acumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under consideration and +men of talent are still occupied with it, while the public also follows it +attentively, I take this to be a fitting moment for the publication of +certain of my ideas. + +It will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing this +preface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the [69] +body or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one to +disturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one with +the other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is something +metaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is what I have +already said in reply to the objection raised against me, in the _Memoires +de Trevoux_, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, whose wit and learning +are of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one may say also in a +metaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon the +soul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active +principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only +the passive. Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have +explained more than once in the _Leipzig Journal_. More especially does +this appear in my answer to the late Herr Sturm, philosopher and +mathematician of Altorf, where I have even demonstrated that, if bodies +contained only the passive, their different conditions would be +indistinguishable. Also I take this opportunity to say that, having heard +of some objections made by the gifted author of the book on +_Self-knowledge_, in that same book, to my System of Pre-established +Harmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing that he has attributed to me +opinions I am far from holding. On another matter recently I met with like +treatment at the hands of an anonymous Doctor of the Sorbonne. And these +misconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if my +own words, which were being taken in evidence, had been quoted. + +This tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of others +leads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man helps himself +in conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only that he derives +advantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome, but +without any cooperation on his part: just as there is no co-operation in +ice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work of God's grace, +wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more +or less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances +also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise +in the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the +strength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the +operation of grace, although not rendering it necessary. I have expounded +sufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation [70] +unregenerate man is to be considered as dead; and I greatly approve the +manner wherein the theologians of the Augsburg Confession declare +themselves on this subject. Yet this corruption of unregenerate man is, it +must be added, no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and his +performance of good actions in his civic life, actions which spring from a +good principle, without any evil intention and without mixture of actual +sin. Wherein I hope I shall be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge from +the opinion of St. Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirable +intelligence, but inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things, +above all in the heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some persons +who profess to be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the Reverend +Father Quenel, a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit of +controversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies. +But I have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous +merit (of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there is +right on both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in the +matter of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of the +human heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than +defence. I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Society +credit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine, +will give us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of his +acumen and his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And one +must believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there +will arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one is +justified in thinking that men like Usserius or Daille will again appear +among the Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove the +misconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall be +well pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the +objections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the small +treatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I have +endeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, for +instance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will as +preliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others; +how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of all +the saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, despite [71] +that there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has been +permitted as a _conditio sine qua non_ of good, I mean not according to the +principle of necessity, but according to the principle of the fitness of +things. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit is such as +always to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God will not +refuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of that +which they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to give on +some difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, moreover, +followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that I should +add two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on between +Mr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, the other of +the learned work on _The Origin of Evil_, published a short time ago in +England. + +Finally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and if I +have conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it necessary +to relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement. It is with +that in view that I have introduced into this dissertation the pleasing +chimera of a certain astronomical theology, having no ground for +apprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it and +refute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, instead of imagining that +the planets were suns, one might conceive that they were masses melted in +the sun and thrown out, and that would destroy the foundation of this +hypothetical theology. The ancient error of the two principles, which the +Orientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes and Arimanius, caused me to +explain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples. It appears indeed +probable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes, the +one monarch of a part of upper Asia, where there have since been others of +this name, the other king of the Scythian Celts who made incursions into +the states of the former, and who was also named amongst the divinities of +Germania. It seems, indeed, that Zoroaster used the names of these princes +as symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemble +in the ideas of Asiatics. Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arab +authors, who in this might well be better informed than the Greeks, it +appears from detailed records of ancient oriental history, that this +Zerdust or Zoroaster, whom they make contemporary with the great Darius, +did not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and [72] +independent, but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle. They +relate that he believed, in conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, that +God, who is without an equal, created all and separated the light from the +darkness; that the light conformed with his original design, but that the +darkness came as a consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, and +that this is nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancient +author of the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning caused +the Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptians +and Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin to +this same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury, +was called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by the +Asiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and the +Persians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by the +Slavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the Luneburg +region, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the Orientals. These +observations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious. And I flatter +myself that the small dialogue ending the Essays written to oppose M. Bayle +will give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficult +but important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way. I have written +in a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it, because that +language has been recently used by others in treating of my subject, and +because it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefit +by this small work. It is to be hoped that the language errors will be +pardoned: they are to be attributed not only to the printer and the +copyist, but also to the haste of the author, who has been much distracted +from his task. If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed, +the author will be the first to correct it, once he has been better +informed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that +he hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase. + + [73] + * * * * * + +PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH REASON + + * * * * * + +1. I begin with the preliminary question of the _conformity of faith with +reason_, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has much +influence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayle +introduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict each +other; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an +extraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, but +especially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind +can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. This +definition of reason (that is to say of strict and true reason) has +surprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a +vague sense. They gave me the answer that they had never heard of any such +explanation of it: the truth is that they have never conferred with people +who expressed themselves clearly on these subjects. They have confessed to +me, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, understood in +the sense which I gave to it. It is in the same sense that sometimes reason +is contrasted with experience. Reason, since it consists in the linking +together of truths, is entitled to connect also those wherewith experience +has furnished it, in order thence to draw mixed conclusions; but reason +pure and simple, as distinct from experience, only has to do with truths +independent of the senses. And one may compare faith with experience, since +faith (in respect of the motives that give it justification) depends [74] +upon the experience of those who have seen the miracles whereon revelation +is founded, and upon the trustworthy tradition which has handed them down +to us, whether through the Scriptures or by the account of those who have +preserved them. It is rather as we rely upon the experience of those who +have seen China and on the credibility of their account when we give +credence to the wonders that are told us of that distant country. Yet I +would also take into account the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who +takes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good, that +is, to faith and to charity, without always having need of motives. + +2. Now the truths of reason are of two kinds: the one kind is of those +called the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether necessary, so that the +opposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths whose necessity is +logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without being +led into absurdities. There are others which may be called _positive_, +because they are the laws which it has pleased God to give to Nature, or +because they depend upon those. We learn them either by experience, that +is, _a posteriori_, or by reason and _a priori_, that is, by considerations +of the fitness of things which have caused their choice. This fitness of +things has also its rules and reasons, but it is the free choice of God, +and not a geometrical necessity, which causes preference for what is +fitting and brings it into existence. Thus one may say that physical +necessity is founded on moral necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice +which is worthy of his wisdom; and that both of these ought to be +distinguished from geometrical necessity. It is this physical necessity +that makes order in Nature and lies in the rules of motion and in some +other general laws which it pleased God to lay down for things when he gave +them being. It is therefore true that God gave such laws not without +reason, for he chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in +pure indifference; but the general reasons of good and of order, which have +prompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases by stronger +reasons of a superior order. + +3. Thus it is made clear that God can exempt creatures from the laws he has +prescribed for them, and produce in them that which their nature does not +bear by performing a miracle. When they have risen to perfections and +faculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain, the +Schoolmen call this faculty an 'Obediential Power', that is to say, a [75] +power which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can give +that which the thing has not. The Schoolmen, however, usually give +instances of this power which to me appear impossible: they maintain, for +example, that God can give the creature the faculty to create. It may be +that there are miracles which God performs through the ministry of angels, +where the laws of Nature are not violated, any more than when men assist +Nature by art, the skill of angels differing from ours only by degree of +perfection. Nevertheless it still remains true that the laws of Nature are +subject to be dispensed from by the Law-giver; whereas the eternal +verities, as for instance those of geometry, admit no dispensation, and +faith cannot contradict them. Thus it is that there cannot be any +invincible objection to truth. For if it is a question of proof which is +founded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linking +together of eternal verities, the conclusion is certain and essential, and +that which is contrary to it must be false; otherwise two contradictories +might be true at the same time. If the objection is not conclusive, it can +only form a probable argument, which has no force against faith, since it +is agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances. Now +M. Bayle declares, in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc, that he does not +claim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith: and as +a result all these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars between +reason and faith, vanish away. + + _Hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta,_ + _Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt._ + +4. Protestant theologians as well as those of the Roman confession admit +the maxims which I have just laid down, when they handle the matter with +attention; and all that is said against reason has no force save against a +kind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false appearances. It +is the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of God, which +are spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition of +their nature. But in that case we should have no ground for ascribing these +attributes to him, or lauding him for them. His goodness and his justice as +well as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely more +perfect. Thus the simple notions, the necessary truths and the conclusive +results of philosophy cannot be contrary to revelation. And when some [76] +philosophical maxims are rejected in theology, the reason is that they are +considered to have only a physical or moral necessity, which speaks only of +that which takes place usually, and is consequently founded on appearances, +but which may be withheld if God so pleases. + +5. It seems, according to what I have just said, that there is often some +confusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy and +theology, or faith and reason: they confuse the terms 'explain', +'comprehend', 'prove', 'uphold'. And I find that M. Bayle, shrewd as he is, +is not always free from this confusion. Mysteries may be _explained_ +sufficiently to justify belief in them; but one cannot _comprehend_ them, +nor give understanding of how they come to pass. Thus even in natural +philosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities, +but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is it +possible for us, either, to prove Mysteries by reason; for all that which +can be proved _a priori_, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All that +remains for us then, after having believed in the Mysteries by reason of +the proofs of the truth of religion (which are called 'motives of +credibility') is to be able to _uphold_ them against objections. Without +that our belief in them would have no firm foundation; for all that which +can be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false. And +such proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a _moral certainty_ +would be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an +_absolute certainty_, provided they were convincing and altogether +conclusive. This little might suffice me to remove the difficulties +concerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if one +had not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons. But as the subject +is important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will be well +to take it in greater detail. + +6. The question of the _conformity of faith with reason_ has always been a +great problem. In the primitive Church the ablest Christian authors adapted +themselves to the ideas of the Platonists, which were the most acceptable +to them, and were at that time most generally in favour. Little by little +Aristotle took the place of Plato, when the taste for systems began to +prevail, and when theology itself became more systematic, owing to the +decisions of the General Councils, which provided precise and positive +formularies. St. Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus in the West, and [77] +St. John of Damascus in the East contributed most towards reducing theology +to scientific form, not to mention Bede, Alcuin, St. Anselm and some other +theologians versed in philosophy. Finally came the Schoolmen. The leisure +of the cloisters giving full scope for speculation, which was assisted by +Aristotle's philosophy translated from the Arabic, there was formed at last +a compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arose +from the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason. But this +had not met with the full success hoped for, because theology had been much +corrupted by the unhappiness of the times, by ignorance and obstinacy. +Moreover, philosophy, in addition to its own faults, which were very great, +found itself burdened with those of theology, which in its turn was +suffering from association with a philosophy that was very obscure and very +imperfect. One must confess, notwithstanding, with the incomparable +Grotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of the +monks' barbarous Latin. I have therefore oft-times wished that a man of +talent, whose office had necessitated his learning the language of the +Schoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth, and that +another Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the Schoolmen what these +two learned men have done in respect of the Fathers. It would be a very +curious work, and very important for ecclesiastical history, and it would +continue the History of Dogmas up to the time of the Revival of Letters +(owing to which the aspect of things has changed) and even beyond that +point. For sundry dogmas, such as those of physical predetermination, of +mediate knowledge, philosophical sin, objective precisions, and many other +dogmas in speculative theology and even in the practical theology of cases +of conscience, came into currency even after the Council of Trent. + +7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the West +that still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers which +disputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They were +dubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author, +who was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, and who appeared to be the +one of all his race that penetrated furthest into Aristotle's meaning. This +Commentator, extending what Greek expositors had already taught, maintained +that according to Aristotle, and even according to reason (and at that time +the two were considered almost identical) there was no case for the [78] +immortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The human kind is eternal, +according to Aristotle, therefore if individual souls die not, one must +resort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher. Or, if there are +always new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls existing from +all eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, according to the doctrine +of the same Aristotle. Therefore it is a necessary conclusion that the +souls, that is, the forms of organic bodies, must perish with the bodies, +or at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs to +each one individually. Thus there will only remain the active understanding +common to all men, which according to Aristotle comes from outside, and +which must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as the +wind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ +pipes. + +8. Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof. It is not true +that Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity of +the human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinity +is impossible. Yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst Aristotelians, +and induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunary +intelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation in +it. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so far as to advocate a +universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this +universal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are +born and die. According to this opinion the souls of animals are born by +being separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body which +they can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when +the body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. Many even went so +far as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thought +that this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very +ancient and apt to dazzle the common herd. It is expressed in these +beautiful lines of Vergil (_Aen._, VI, v. 724): + + _Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes,_ + _Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra,_ + _Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus_ + _Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet._ + _Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum._ + + [79] +And again elsewhere (_Georg._, IV, v. 221): + + _Deum namque ire per omnes_ + _Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:_ + _Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,_ + _Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas._ + _Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri._ + +9. Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, but +there is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soul +which swallows all the rest. Those who are of this opinion might be called +'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only one soul +that subsists. M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion almost +universally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States of the +Grand Mogul; it appears even that it has gained a footing with the +Cabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth, +converted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name Moses +Germanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinoza +revived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confuted +this proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. It is known that +Spinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual souls +are but transient modifications. Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau in +Saxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have it +that he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; as was +also a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain quite +pleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of epigrams, which +have just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' doctrine of deification +was liable to such a sinister interpretation. Gerson already has written +opposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose intention was evidently good +and whose expressions are excusable. But it would be better to write in a +manner that has no need of excuses: although I confess that oft-times +expressions which are extravagant, and as it were poetical, have greater +force to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement. + +10. The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, carried to +great lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled irreligion in +certain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the Quietism of Foe, +originator of a great Chinese sect. After having preached his religion [80] +for forty years, when he felt death was approaching, he declared to his +disciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil of +metaphors, and that all reduced itself to Nothingness, which he said was +the first source of all things. That was still worse, so it would seem, +than the opinion of the Averroists. Both of these doctrines are +indefensible and even extravagant; nevertheless some moderns have made no +difficulty about adopting this one and universal Soul that engulfs the +rest. It has met with only too much applause amongst the so-called +freethinkers, and M. de Preissac, a soldier and man of wit, who dabbled in +philosophy, at one time aired it publicly in his discourses. The System of +Pre-established Harmony is the one best qualified to cure this evil. For it +shows that there are of necessity substances which are simple and without +extension, scattered throughout all Nature; that these substances must +subsist independently of every other except God; and that they are never +wholly separated from organic body. Those who believe that souls capable of +feeling but incapable of reason are mortal, or who maintain that none but +reasoning souls can have feeling, offer a handle to the Monopsychites. For +it will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing; and +once the admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling can +die, it is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of our +souls. + +11. I have made this short digression because it appeared to me seasonable +at a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow natural +religion to its very foundations. I return then to the Averroists, who were +persuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively in accordance with +reason. As a result they declared that man's soul is, according to +philosophy, mortal, while they protested their acquiescence in Christian +theology, which declares the soul's immortality. But this distinction was +held suspect, and this divorce between faith and reason was vehemently +rejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time, and condemned in the +last Lateran Council under Leo X. On that occasion also, scholars were +urged to work for the removal of the difficulties that appeared to set +theology and philosophy at variance. The doctrine of their incompatibility +continued to hold its ground _incognito_. Pomponazzi was suspected of it, +although he declared himself otherwise; and that very sect of the +Averroists survived as a school. It is thought that Caesar Cremoninus, [81] +a philosopher famous in his time, was one of its mainstays. Andreas +Cisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who came nearest after +Michael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood), was +accused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled _Alpes Caesae_) of belonging +to these anti-religious Peripatetics. Traces of this doctrine are found +also in the _Circulus Pisanus Claudii Berigardi_, an author of French +nationality who migrated to Italy and taught philosophy at Pisa: but +especially the writings and the letters of Gabriel Naude, as well as the +_Naudaeana_, show that Averroism still lived on when this learned physician +was in Italy. Corpuscular philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears to +have extinguished this excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to have +been intermixed with its teaching. It may be indeed that there have been +Atomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of the +Averroists, if circumstances so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm such +good as there is in Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combined +with all that is sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both into +harmony with true theology. + +12. The Reformers, and especially Luther, as I have already observed, spoke +sometimes as if they rejected philosophy, and deemed it inimical to faith. +But, properly speaking, Luther understood by philosophy only that which is +in conformity with the ordinary course of Nature, or perhaps even +philosophy as it was taught in the schools. Thus for example he says that +it is impossible in philosophy, that is, in the order of Nature, that the +word be made flesh; and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true in +natural philosophy might be false in ethics. Aristotle was the object of +his anger; and so far back as the year 1516 he contemplated the purging of +philosophy, when he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the Church. +But at last he curbed his vehemence and in the _Apology for the Augsburg +Confession_ allowed a favourable mention of Aristotle and his _Ethics_. +Melanchthon, a man of sound and moderate ideas, made little systems from +the several parts of philosophy, adapted to the truths of revelation and +useful in civic life, which deserve to be read even now. After him, Pierre +de la Ramee entered the lists. His philosophy was much in favour: the sect +of the Ramists was powerful in Germany, gaining many adherents among the +Protestants, and even concerning itself with theology, until the revival of +Corpuscular philosophy, which caused that of Ramee to fall into [82] +oblivion and weakened the authority of the Peripatetics. + +13. Meanwhile sundry Protestant theologians, deviating as far as they could +from Scholastic philosophy, which prevailed in the opposite party, went so +far as to despise philosophy itself, which to them was suspect. The +controversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of Daniel Hoffmann. He +was an able theologian, who had previously gained a reputation at the +Conference of Quedlinburg, when Tilemann Heshusius and he had supported +Duke Julius of Brunswick in his refusal to accept the Formula of Concord. +For some reason or other Dr. Hoffmann flew into a passion with philosophy, +instead of being content to find fault with the wrong uses made thereof by +philosophers. He was, however, aiming at the famous Caselius, a man +esteemed by the princes and scholars of his time; and Henry Julius, Duke of +Brunswick (son of Julius, founder of the University), having taken the +trouble himself to investigate the matter, condemned the theologian. There +have been some small disputes of the kind since, but it has always been +found that they were misunderstandings. Paul Slevogt, a famous Professor at +Jena in Thuringia, whose still extant treatises prove how well versed he +was in Scholastic philosophy, as also in Hebrew literature, had published +in his youth under the title of _Pervigilium_ a little book 'de dissidio +Theologi et Philosophi in utriusque principiis fundato', bearing on the +question whether God is accidentally the cause of sin. But it was easy to +see that his aim was to demonstrate that theologians sometimes misuse +philosophical terms. + +14. To come now to the events of my own time, I remember that when in 1666 +Louis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the book +entitled _Philosophia Scripturae Interpres_ (by many persons wrongly +attributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland bestirred +themselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to great +disputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the Cartesians, +in confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much to +philosophy. Jean de Labadie (before he had seceded from the Reformed +Church, his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into public +observance and which he considered intolerable) attacked the book by Herr +von Wollzogen, and called it pernicious. On the other hand Herr Vogelsang, +Herr van der Weye and some other anti-Cocceians also assailed the same [83] +book with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod. +Afterwards in Holland people spoke of 'rational' and 'non-rational' +theologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. Bayle, who finally +declared himself against the former. But there is no indication that any +precise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept or +reject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of Holy +Scripture. + +15. A like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in the +Churches of the Augsburg Confession. Some Masters of Arts in the University +of Leipzig gave private lessons at their homes, to students who sought them +out in order to learn what is called 'Sacra Philologia', according to the +practice of this university and of some others where this kind of study is +not restricted to the Faculty of Theology. These masters pressed the study +of the Holy Scriptures and the practice of piety further than their fellows +had been wont to do. It is alleged that they had carried certain things to +excess, and aroused suspicions of certain doctrinal innovations. This +caused them to be dubbed 'Pietists', as though they were a new sect; and +this name is one which has since caused a great stir in Germany. It has +been applied somehow or other to those whom one suspected, or pretended to +suspect, of fanaticism, or even of hypocrisy, concealed under some +semblance of reform. Now some of the students attending these masters had +become conspicuous for behaviour which gave general offence, and amongst +other things for their scorn of philosophy, even, so it was said, burning +their notebooks. In consequence the belief arose that their masters +rejected philosophy: but they justified themselves very well; nor could +they be convicted either of this error or of the heresies that were being +imputed to them. + +16. The question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated much +amongst Christians, and difficulty was experienced over settling the limits +of its use when it came to detailed consideration. The Mysteries of the +Trinity, of the Incarnation and of the Holy Communion gave most occasion +for dispute. The new Photinians, disputing the first two Mysteries, made +use of certain philosophic maxims which Andreas Kessler, a theologian of +the Augsburg Confession, summarized in the various treatises that he +published on the parts of the Socinian philosophy. But as to their +metaphysics, one might instruct oneself better therein by reading the [84] +work of Christopher Stegmann the Socinian. It is not yet in print; but I +saw it in my youth and it has been recently again in my hands. + +17. Calovius and Scherzer, authors well versed in Scholastic philosophy, +and sundry other able theologians answered the Socinians at great length, +and often with success: for they would not content themselves with the +general and somewhat cavalier answers that were commonly used against that +sect. The drift of such answers was: that their maxims were good in +philosophy and not in theology; that it was the fault of heterogeneousness +called [Greek: metabasis eis allo genos] to apply those maxims to a matter +transcending reason; and that philosophy should be treated as a servant and +not a mistress in relation to theology, according to the title of the book +by a Scot named Robert Baronius, _Philosophia Theologiae ancillans_. In +fine, philosophy was a Hagar beside Sara and must be driven from the house +with her Ishmael when she was refractory. There is something good in these +answers: but one might abuse them, and set natural truths and truths of +revelation at variance. Scholars therefore applied themselves to +distinguishing between what is necessary and indispensable in natural or +philosophic truths and that which is not so. + +18. The two Protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is a +question of making war on the Socinians; and as the philosophy of these +sectaries is not of the most exact, in most cases the attack succeeded in +reducing it. But the Protestants themselves had dissensions on the matter +of the Eucharistic Sacrament. A section of those who are called Reformed +(namely those who on that point follow rather Zwingli than Calvin) seemed +to reduce the participation in the body of Jesus Christ in the Holy +Communion to a mere figurative representation, employing the maxim of the +philosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time. +Contrariwise the Evangelicals (who name themselves thus in a particular +sense to distinguish themselves from the Reformed), being more attached to +the literal sense of Scripture, opined with Luther that this participation +was real, and that here there lay a supernatural Mystery. They reject, in +truth, the dogma of Transubstantiation, which they believe to be without +foundation in the Text; neither do they approve that of Consubstantiation +or of Impanation, which one could only impute to them if one were +ill-informed on their opinion. For they admit no inclusion of the body [85] +of Jesus Christ in the bread, nor do they even require any union of the one +with the other: but they demand at least a concomitance, so that these two +substances be received both at the same time. They believe that the +ordinary sense of the words of Jesus Christ on an occasion so important as +that which concerned the expression of his last wishes ought to be +preserved. Thus in order to show that this sense is free from all absurdity +which could make it repugnant to us, they maintain that the philosophic +maxim restricting the existence of, and partaking in, bodies to one place +alone is simply a consequence of the ordinary course of Nature. They make +that no obstacle to the presence, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the +body of our Saviour in such form as may be in keeping with the most +glorified body. They do not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity, which +would disperse the body and leave it nowhere in particular; nor do they +admit the multiple-reduplication theory of some Schoolmen, as if to say one +and the same body could be at the same time seated here and standing +elsewhere. In fine, they so express themselves that many consider the +opinion of Calvin, authorized by sundry confessions of faith from the +Churches that have accepted his teaching, to be not so far removed from the +Augsburg Confession as one might think: for he affirmed a partaking in the +substance. The divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that Calvin +demands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols, and +consequently excludes the unworthy. + +19. Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation can +be supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some Schoolmen) +by a properly understood analogy between _immediate operation_ and +_presence_. Many philosophers have deemed that, even in the order of +Nature, a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remote +bodies at the same time. So do they believe, all the more, that nothing can +prevent divine Omnipotence from causing one body to be present in many +bodies together, since the transition from immediate operation to presence +is but slight, the one perhaps depending upon the other. It is true that +modern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate natural +operation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I am +of their opinion. Meanwhile remote operation has just been revived in +England by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the nature of +bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another, in proportion[86] +to the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives. +Accordingly the famous Mr. Locke, in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet, +declares that having seen Mr. Newton's book he retracts what he himself +said, following the opinion of the moderns, in his _Essay concerning Human +Understanding_, to wit, that a body cannot operate immediately upon another +except by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion. He +acknowledges that God can put properties into matter which cause it to +operate from a distance. Thus the theologians of the Augsburg Confession +claim that God may ordain not only that a body operate immediately on +divers bodies remote from one another, but that it even exist in their +neighbourhood and be received by them in a way with which distances of +place and dimensions of space have nothing to do. Although this effect +transcends the forces of Nature, they do not think it possible to show that +it surpasses the power of the Author of Nature. For him it is easy to annul +the laws that he has given or to dispense with them as seems good to him, +in the same way as he was able to make iron float upon water and to stay +the operation of fire upon the human body. + +20. I found in comparing the _Rationale Theologicum_ of Nicolaus Vedelius +with the refutation by Johann Musaeus that these two authors, of whom one +died while a Professor at Franecker after having taught at Geneva and the +other finally became the foremost theologian at Jena, are more or less in +agreement on the principal rules for the use of reason, but that it is in +the application of these rules they disagree. For they both agree that +revelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose necessity is called by +philosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical', that is to say, whose opposite +implies contradiction. They both admit also that revelation will be able to +combat maxims whose necessity is called 'physical' and is founded only upon +the laws that the will of God has prescribed for Nature. Thus the question +whether the presence of one and the same body in divers places is possible +in the supernatural order only touches the application of the rule; and in +order to decide this question conclusively by reason, one must needs +explain exactly wherein the essence of body consists. Even the Reformed +disagree thereon amongst themselves; the Cartesians confine it to +extension, but their adversaries oppose that; and I think I have even +observed that Gisbertus Voetius, a famous theologian of Utrecht, [87] +doubted the alleged impossibility of plurality of locations. + +21. Furthermore, although the two Protestant parties agree that one must +distinguish these two necessities which I have just indicated, namely +metaphysical necessity and physical necessity, and that the first excludes +exceptions even in the case of Mysteries, they are not yet sufficiently +agreed upon the rules of interpretation, which serve to determine in what +cases it is permitted to desert the letter of Scripture when one is not +certain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths. It is agreed that +there are cases where one must reject a literal interpretation that is not +absolutely impossible, when it is otherwise unsuitable. For instance, all +commentators agree that when our Lord said that Herod was a fox he meant it +metaphorically; and one must accept that, unless one imagine with some +fanatics that for the time the words of our Lord lasted Herod was actually +changed into a fox. But it is not the same with the texts on which +Mysteries are founded, where the theologians of the Augsburg Confession +deem that one must keep to the literal sense. Since, moreover, this +discussion belongs to the art of interpretation and not to that which is +the proper sphere of logic, we will not here enter thereon, especially as +it has nothing in common with the disputes that have arisen recently upon +the conformity of faith with reason. + +22. Theologians of all parties, I believe (fanatics alone excepted), agree +at least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or contravene +proofs as exact as those of mathematics, where the opposite of the +conclusion can be reduced _ad absurdum_, that is, to contradiction. St. +Athanasius with good reason made sport of the preposterous ideas of some +writers of his time, who maintained that God had suffered without any +suffering. _'Passus est impassibiliter. O ludicram doctrinam aedificantem +simul et demolientem!'_ It follows thence that certain writers have been +too ready to grant that the Holy Trinity is contrary to that great +principle which states that two things which are the same as a third are +also the same as each other: that is to say, if A is the same as B, and if +C is the same as B, then A and C must also be the same as each other. For +this principle is a direct consequence of that of contradiction, and forms +the basis of all logic; and if it ceases, we can no longer reason with +certainty. Thus when one says that the Father is God, that the Son is God +and that the Holy Spirit is God, and that nevertheless there is only [88] +one God, although these three Persons differ from one another, one must +consider that this word _God_ has not the same sense at the beginning as at +the end of this statement. Indeed it signifies now the Divine Substance and +now a Person of the Godhead. In general, one must take care never to +abandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholding +Mysteries, lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion for +decrying both religion and Mysteries. + +23. The distinction which is generally drawn between that which is _above_ +reason and that which is _against_ reason is tolerably in accord with the +distinction which has just been made between the two kinds of necessity. +For what is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain and +inevitable truths; and what is above reason is in opposition only to what +one is wont to experience or to understand. That is why I am surprised that +there are people of intelligence who dispute this distinction, and that M. +Bayle should be of this number. The distinction is assuredly very well +founded. A truth is above reason when our mind (or even every created mind) +cannot comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; such +are the miracles reserved for God alone, as for instance Creation; such is +the choice of the order of the universe, which depends upon universal +harmony, and upon the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once. But +a truth can never be contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed +and refuted by reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may say +that nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity. +For I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not mean the +opinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they have formed of +judging things according to the usual course of Nature, but rather the +inviolable linking together of truths. + +24. I must come now to the great question which M. Bayle brought up +recently, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can +prove to be subject to irrefutable objections. This excellent author +appears to answer with a bold affirmative: he quotes theologians of repute +in his party, and even in the Church of Rome, who appear to say the same as +he affirms; and he cites philosophers who have believed that there are even +philosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the objections that are +brought up against them. He believes that the theological doctrine of [89] +predestination is of this nature, and in philosophy that of the composition +of the _Continuum_. These are, indeed, the two labyrinths which have ever +exercised theologians and philosophers. Libertus Fromondus, a theologian of +Louvain (a great friend of Jansenius, whose posthumous book entitled +_Augustinus_ he in fact published), who also wrote a book entitled +explicitly _Labyrinthus de Compositione Continui_, experienced in full +measure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines; and the renowned +Ochino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths of +predestination'. + +25. But these writers have not denied the possibility of finding thread in +the labyrinth; they have recognized the difficulty, but they have surely +not turned difficulty into sheer impossibility. As for me, I confess that I +cannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can admit of irrefutable +objections: for is an _objection_ anything but an argument whose conclusion +contradicts our thesis? And is not an irrefutable argument a +_demonstration_? And how can one know the certainty of demonstrations +except by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, in +order to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is either +admitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able to +make do with admitted premisses alone? Now if there is such an objection +against our thesis we must say that the falsity of this thesis is +demonstrated, and that it is impossible for us to have reasons sufficient +to prove it; otherwise two contradictories would be true at once. One must +always yield to proofs, whether they be proposed in positive form or +advanced in the shape of objections. And it is wrong and fruitless to try +to weaken opponents' proofs, under the pretext that they are only +objections, since the opponent can play the same game and can reverse the +denominations, exalting his arguments by naming them 'proofs' and sinking +ours under the blighting title of 'objections'. + +26. It is another question whether we are always obliged to examine the +objections we may have to face, and to retain some doubt in respect of our +own opinion, or what is called _formido oppositi_, until this examination +has been made. I would venture to say no, for otherwise one would never +attain to certainty and our conclusion would be always provisional. I +believe that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by the objections +of Joseph Scaliger against Archimedes, or by those of Mr. Hobbes [90] +against Euclid; but that is because they have fully understood and are sure +of the proofs. Nevertheless it is sometimes well to show oneself ready to +examine certain objections. On the one hand it may serve to rescue people +from their error, while on the other we ourselves may profit by it; for +specious fallacies often contain some useful solution and bring about the +removal of considerable difficulties. That is why I have always liked +ingenious objections made against my own opinions, and I have never +examined them without profit: witness those which M. Bayle formerly made +against my System of Pre-established Harmony, not to mention those which M. +Arnauld, M. l'Abbe Foucher and Father Lami, O.S.B., made to me on the same +subject. But to return to the principal question, I conclude from reasons I +have just set forth that when an objection is put forward against some +truth, it is always possible to answer it satisfactorily. + +27. It may be also that M. Bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' in +the sense that I have just explained. I observe that he varies, at least in +his expressions: for in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc he does not +admit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of faith. It +appears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble only in +respect of our present degree of enlightenment; and in this Reply, p. 35, +he even does not despair of the possibility that one day a solution +hitherto unknown may be found by someone. Concerning that more will be said +later. I hold an opinion, however, that will perchance cause surprise, +namely that this solution has been discovered entire, and is not even +particularly difficult. Indeed a mediocre intelligence capable of +sufficient care, and using correctly the rules of common logic, is in a +position to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth, when +the objection is only taken from reason, and when it is claimed to be a +'demonstration'. Whatever scorn the generality of moderns have to-day for +the logic of Aristotle, one must acknowledge that it teaches infallible +ways of resisting error in these conjunctures. For one has only to examine +the argument according to the rules and it will always be possible to see +whether it is lacking in form or whether there are premisses such as are +not yet proved by a good argument. + +28. It is quite another matter when there is only a question of +_probabilities_, for the art of judging from probable reasons is not yet +well established; so that our logic in this connexion is still very [91] +imperfect, and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judging +from demonstrations. But this art is sufficient here: for when it is a +question of opposing reason to an article of our faith, one is not +disturbed by objections that only attain probability. Everyone agrees that +appearances are against Mysteries, and that they are by no means probable +when regarded only from the standpoint of reason; but it suffices that they +have in them nothing of absurdity. Thus demonstrations are required if they +are to be refuted. + +29. And doubtless we are so to understand it when Holy Scripture warns us +that the wisdom of God is foolishness before men, and when St. Paul +observed that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is foolishness unto the Greeks, as +well as unto the Jews a stumbling-block. For, after all, one truth cannot +contradict another, and the light of reason is no less a gift of God than +that of revelation. Also it is a matter of no difficulty among theologians +who are expert in their profession, that the motives of credibility +justify, once for all, the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunal +of reason, so that reason in consequence gives way before it, as before a +new light, and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities. It is more or less +as if a new president sent by the prince must show his letters patent in +the assembly where he is afterwards to preside. That is the tendency of +sundry good books that we have on the truth of religion, such as those of +Augustinus Steuchus, of Du Plessis-Mornay or of Grotius: for the true +religion must needs have marks that the false religions have not, else +would Zoroaster, Brahma, Somonacodom and Mahomet be as worthy of belief as +Moses and Jesus Christ. Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it is +kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and depends not +upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advances +beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to +make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. Then we have +no further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of +argument which the mind may anticipate. + +30. Thus what we have just said of human reason, which is extolled and +decried by turns, and often without rule or measure, may show our lack of +exactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors. Nothing would +be so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and of +reason if men would make use of the commonest rules of logic and reason[92] +with even a modicum of attention. Instead of that, they become involved in +oblique and ambiguous phrases, which give them a fine field for +declamation, to make the most of their wit and their learning. It would +seem, indeed, that they have no wish to see the naked truth, peradventure +because they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error: for they +know not the beauty of the Author of all things, who is the source of +truth. + +31. This negligence is a general defect of humanity, and one not to be laid +to the charge of any particular person. _Abundamus dulcibus vitiis_, as +Quintilian said of the style of Seneca, and we take pleasure in going +astray. Exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as puerilities. Thus +it is that common logic (although it is more or less sufficient for the +examination of arguments that tend towards certainty) is relegated to +schoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic which +should determine the balance between probabilities, and would be so +necessary in deliberations of importance. So true is it that our mistakes +for the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of thinking: for +nothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessary +arguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, such as the authors +of _The Art of Thinking_, of _The Search for Truth_ and of the _Essay +concerning Human Understanding_, have been very far from indicating to us +the true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make us +weigh the probabilities of the true and the false: not to mention the art +of discovery, in which success is still more difficult of attainment, and +whereof we have nothing beyond very imperfect samples in mathematics. + +32. One thing which might have contributed most towards M. Bayle's belief +that the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be obviated +is that he seems to demand that God be justified in some such manner as +that commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused before his +judge. But he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men, which cannot +always penetrate to the truth, one is often compelled to be guided by signs +and probabilities, and above all by presumptions or prejudices; whereas it +is agreed, as we have already observed, that Mysteries are not probable. +For instance, M. Bayle will not have it that one can justify the goodness +of God in the permission of sin, because probability would be against a man +that should happen to be in circumstances comparable in our eyes to [93] +this permission. God foresees that Eve will be deceived by the serpent if +he places her in the circumstances wherein she later found herself; and +nevertheless he placed her there. Now if a father or a guardian did the +same in regard to his child or his ward, if a friend did so in regard to a +young person whose behaviour was his concern, the judge would not be +satisfied by the excuses of an advocate who said that the man only +permitted the evil, without doing it or willing it: he would rather take +this permission as a sign of ill intention, and would regard it as a sin of +omission, which would render the one convicted thereof accessary in +another's sin of commission. + +33. But it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil and +has not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so with +ease, and one has even done things that have facilitated it, it does not +follow on that account _necessarily_ that one is accessary thereto. It is +only a very strong presumption, such as commonly replaces truth in human +affairs, but which would be destroyed by an exact consideration of the +facts, supposing we were capable of that in relation to God. For amongst +lawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass for +truth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than +'conjecture', although the _Dictionary_ of the Academy has not sifted the +difference. Now there is every reason to conclude unquestionably that one +would find through this consideration, if only it were attainable, that +reasons most just, and stronger than those which appear contrary to them, +have compelled the All-Wise to permit the evil, and even to do things which +have facilitated it. Of this some instances will be given later. + +34. It is none too easy, I confess, for a father, a guardian, a friend to +have such reasons in the case under consideration. Yet the thing is not +absolutely impossible, and a skilled writer of fiction might perchance find +an extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the circumstances I +have just indicated. But in reference to God there is no need to suppose or +to establish particular reasons such as may have induced him to permit the +evil; general reasons suffice. One knows that he takes care of the whole +universe, whereof all the parts are connected; and one must thence infer +that he has had innumerable considerations whose result made him deem it +inadvisable to prevent certain evils. + +35. It should even be concluded that there must have been great or [94] +rather invincible reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to the +permission of the evil that surprises us, from the mere fact that this +permission has occurred: for nothing can come from God that is not +altogether consistent with goodness, justice and holiness. Thus we can +judge by the event (or _a posteriori_) that the permission was +indispensable, although it be not possible for us to show this (_a priori_) +by the detailed reasons that God can have had therefor; as it is not +necessary either that we show this to justify him. M. Bayle himself aptly +says concerning that (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, +ch. 165, p. 1067): Sin made its way into the world; God therefore was able +to permit it without detriment to his perfections; _ab actu ad potentiam +valet consequentia._ In God this conclusion holds good: he did this, +therefore he did it well. It is not, then, that we have no notion of +justice in general fit to be applied also to God's justice; nor is it that +God's justice has other rules than the justice known of men, but that the +case in question is quite different from those which are common among men. +Universal right is the same for God and for men; but the question of fact +is quite different in their case and his. + +36. We may even assume or pretend (as I have already observed) that there +is something similar among men to this circumstance in God's actions. A man +might give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and his holiness that +all the most apparent reasons one could put forward against him to charge +him with an alleged crime, for instance a larceny or murder, would deserve +to be rejected as the calumnies of false witnesses or as an extraordinary +play of chance which sometimes throws suspicion on the most innocent. Thus +in a case where every other would run the risk of being condemned or put to +the torture (according to the laws of the country), this man would be +absolved by his judges unanimously. Now in this case, which indeed is rare, +but which is not impossible, one might say in a sense (_sano sensu_) that +there is a conflict between reason and faith, and that the rules of law are +other in respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainder +of mankind. But that, when explained, will signify only that appearances of +reason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and the +integrity of this great and holy man, and that he is privileged above other +men; not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for him, +nor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to him. +It is rather because the rules of universal justice do not find here [95] +the application that they receive elsewhere, or because they favour him +instead of accusing him, since there are in this personage qualities so +admirable, that by virtue of a good logic of probabilities one should place +more faith in his word than in that of many others. + +37. Since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases, may one not +suppose this incomparable man to be the Adept or the Possessor of + + _'that blessed Stone_ + _Able to enrich all earthly Kings alone'_ + +and that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to rescue +from distress countless numbers of poor men? Be there never so many +witnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this great +benefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny, is it not +true that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation, however +specious it might be? Now God is infinitely above the goodness and the +power of this man, and consequently there are no reasons at all, however +apparent they be, that can hold good against faith, that is, against the +assurance or the confidence in God wherewith we can and ought to say that +God has done all things well. The objections are therefore not insoluble. +They only involve prejudices and probabilities, which are, however, +overthrown by reasons incomparably stronger. One must not say either that +what we call _justice_ is nothing in relation to God, that he is the +absolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn +the innocent without violating his justice, or finally that justice is +something arbitrary where he is concerned. Those are rash and dangerous +expressions, whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of the +attributes of God. For if such were the case there would be no reason for +praising his goodness and his justice: rather would it be as if the most +wicked spirit, the Prince of evil genii, the evil principle of the +Manichaeans, were the sole master of the universe, just as I observed +before. What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from the +false God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an +arbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anything +whatever? + +38. It is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to commit +ourselves to a doctrine so strange, since it suffices to say that we [96] +have not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question of +answering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice and +the goodness of God, and which would vanish away if the facts were well +known to us. We need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faith +nor blind ourselves in order to see clearly, as Queen Christine used to +say: it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary to +Mysteries; and this is not contrary to reason, since even in natural things +we are very often undeceived about appearances either by experience or by +superior reasons. All that has been set down here in advance, only with the +object of showing more plainly wherein the fault of the objections and the +abuse of reason consists in the present case, where the claim is made that +reason has greatest force against faith: we shall come afterwards to a more +exact discussion of that which concerns the origin of evil and the +permission of sin with its consequences. + +39. For now, it will be well to continue our examination of the important +question of the use of reason in theology, and to make reflexions upon what +M. Bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his works. As he paid +particular attention in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_ to +expounding the objections of the Manichaeans and those of the Pyrrhonians, +and as this procedure had been criticized by some persons zealous for +religion, he placed a dissertation at the end of the second edition of this +_Dictionary_, which aimed at showing, by examples, by authorities and by +reasons, the innocence and usefulness of his course of action. I am +persuaded (as I have said above) that the specious objections one can urge +against truth are very useful, and that they serve to confirm and to +illumine it, giving opportunity to intelligent persons to find new openings +or to turn the old to better account. But M. Bayle seeks therein a +usefulness quite the reverse of this: it would be that of displaying the +power of faith by showing that the truths it teaches cannot sustain the +attacks of reason and that it nevertheless holds its own in the heart of +the faithful. M. Nicole seems to call that 'the triumph of God's authority +over human reason', in the words of his quoted by M. Bayle in the third +volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (ch. 177, p. 120). +But since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention between +them would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of +reason against any article of faith are insoluble, then it must be said +that this alleged article will be false and not revealed: this will be [97] +a chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capable +of comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat. Such is the doctrine of +the damnation of unbaptized children, which M. Nicole would have us assume +to be a consequence of original sin; such would be the eternal damnation of +adults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of salvation. + +40. Yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions; and persons +whose condition allows not of exact researches should be content with +instruction on faith, without being disturbed by the objections; and if +some exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them, it is +permitted to them to avert the mind from it, offering to God a sacrifice of +their curiosity: for when one is assured of a truth one has no need to +listen to the objections. As there are many people whose faith is rather +small and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests, I think one must not +present them with that which might be poisonous for them; or, if one cannot +hide from them what is only too public, the antidote must be added to it; +that is to say, one must try to add the answer to the objection, certainly +not withhold it as unobtainable. + +41. The passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this triumph +of faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the principles I +have just affirmed. There appear in some objects of faith two great +qualities capable of making it triumph over reason, the one is +_incomprehensibility_, the other is _the lack of probability_. But one must +beware of adding thereto the third quality whereof M. Bayle speaks, and of +saying that what one believes is _indefensible_: for that would be to cause +reason in its turn to triumph in a manner that would destroy faith. +Incomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing even natural truths. +For instance (as I have already pointed out) we do not comprehend the +nature of odours and savours, and yet we are persuaded, by a kind of faith +which we owe to the evidence of the senses, that these perceptible +qualities are founded upon the nature of things and that they are not +illusions. + +42. There are also things contrary to appearances, which we admit when they +are sufficiently verified. There is a little romance of Spanish origin, +whose title states that one must not always believe what one sees. What was +there more specious than the lie of the false Martin Guerre, who was +acknowledged as the true Martin by the true Martin's wife and [98] +relatives, and caused the judges and the relatives to waver for a long time +even after the arrival of the other? Nevertheless the truth was known in +the end. It is the same with faith. I have already observed that all one +can oppose to the goodness and the justice of God is nothing but +appearances, which would be strong against a man, but which are nullified +when they are applied to God and when they are weighed against the proofs +that assure us of the infinite perfection of his attributes. Thus faith +triumphs over false reasons by means of sound and superior reasons that +have made us embrace it; but it would not triumph if the contrary opinion +had for it reasons as strong as or even stronger than those which form the +foundation of faith, that is, if there were invincible and conclusive +objections against faith. + +43. It is well also to observe here that what M. Bayle calls a 'triumph of +faith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative reason against apparent and +deceptive reasons which are improperly set against the demonstrations. For +it must be taken into consideration that the objections of the Manichaeans +are hardly less contrary to natural theology than to revealed theology. And +supposing one surrendered to them Holy Scripture, original sin, the grace +of God in Jesus Christ, the pains of hell and the other articles of our +religion, one would not even so be delivered from their objections: for one +cannot deny that there is in the world physical evil (that is, suffering) +and moral evil (that is, crime) and even that physical evil is not always +distributed here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil, as it +seems that justice demands. There remains, then, this question of natural +theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has +been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could +resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy? + +44. Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a sole +Principle of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this by +infallible proofs; and in consequence all the objections taken from the +course of things, in which we observe imperfections, are only based on +false appearances. For, if we were capable of understanding the universal +harmony, we should see that what we are tempted to find fault with is +connected with the plan most worthy of being chosen; in a word, we _should +see_, and should not _believe_ only, that what God has done is the best. I +call 'seeing' here what one knows _a priori_ by the causes; and [99] +'believing' what one only judges by the effects, even though the one be as +certainly known as the other. And one can apply here too the saying of St. +Paul (2 Cor. v. 7), that we walk by _faith_ and not by _sight_. For the +infinite wisdom of God being known to us, we conclude that the evils we +experience had to be permitted, and this we conclude from the effect or _a +posteriori_, that is to say, because they exist. It is what M. Bayle +acknowledges; and he ought to content himself with that, and not claim that +one must put an end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto. It +is as if one asked that there should be no more dreams or optical +illusions. + +45. And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in God, +who gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for his +love, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us, are an +admirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology, when the divine +grace in Jesus Christ arouses these motions within us. That is what Luther +aptly observed in opposition to Erasmus, saying that it is love in the +highest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so unlovable, so +harsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn, and to condemn for +evils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary, at least in the +eyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false reasons. One may +therefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined by divine grace is +at the same time the triumph of faith and love. + +46. M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he declares +himself against reason, when he might have been content to censure its +abuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero, where he goes so far as to +say that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would be to blame for +having given it, since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle also thinks that +human reason is a source of destruction and not of edification (_Historical +and Critical Dictionary_, p. 2026, col. 2), that it is a runner who knows +not where to stop, and who, like another Penelope, herself destroys her own +work. + + _Destruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis._ + +(_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 725). But he takes +pains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other, in order +to show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason just as he +does, and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as oppose +religion only that they may sacrifice them to faith by a mere [100] +repudiation, answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument that is +brought against them. He begins with the New Testament. Jesus Christ was +content to say: 'Follow Me' (Luke v. 27; ix. 59). The Apostles said: +'Believe, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts xvi. 3). St. Paul acknowledges +that his 'doctrine is obscure' (1 Cor. xiii. 12), that 'one can comprehend +nothing therein' unless God impart a spiritual discernment, and without +that it only passes for foolishness (1 Cor. ii. 14). He exhorts the +faithful 'to beware of philosophy' (Col. ii. 8) and to avoid disputations +in that science, which had caused many persons to lose faith. + +47. As for the Fathers of the Church, M. Bayle refers us to the collection +of passages from them against the use of philosophy and of reason which M. +de Launoy made (_De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna,_ cap. 2) and especially to +the passages from St. Augustine collected by M. Arnauld (against Mallet), +which state: that the judgements of God are inscrutable; that they are not +any the less just for that they are unknown to us; that it is a deep abyss, +which one cannot fathom without running the risk of falling down the +precipice; that one cannot without temerity try to elucidate that which God +willed to keep hidden; that his will cannot but be just; that many men, +having tried to explain this incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vain +imaginations and opinions full of error and bewilderment. + +48. The Schoolmen have spoken in like manner. M. Bayle quotes a beautiful +passage from Cardinal Cajetan (Part I, _Summ._, qu. 22, art. 4) to this +effect: 'Our mind', he says, 'rests not upon the evidence of known truth +but upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth. And as St. Gregory says: +He who believes touching the Divinity only that which he can gauge with his +mind belittles the idea of God. Yet I do not surmise that it is necessary +to deny any of the things which we know, or which we see as appertaining to +the immutability, the actuality, the certainty, the universality, etc., of +God: but I think that there is here some secret, either in regard to the +relation which exists between God and the event, or in respect of what +connects the event itself with his prevision. Thus, reflecting that the +understanding of our soul is the eye of the owl, I find the soul's repose +only in ignorance. For it is better both for the Catholic Faith and for +Philosophic Faith to confess our blindness, than to affirm as evident what +does not afford our mind the contentment which self-evidence gives. I do +not accuse of presumption, on that account, all the learned men who [101] +stammeringly have endeavoured to suggest, as far as in them lay, the +immobility and the sovereign and eternal efficacy of the understanding, of +the will and of the power of God, through the infallibility of divine +election and divine relation to all events. Nothing of all that interferes +with my surmise that there is some depth which is hidden from us.' This +passage of Cajetan is all the more notable since he was an author competent +to reach the heart of the matter. + +49. Luther's book against Erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile to +those who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our reason. +Calvin often speaks in the same tone, against the inquisitive daring of +those who seek to penetrate into the counsels of God. He declares in his +treatise on predestination that God had just causes for damning some men, +but causes unknown to us. Finally M. Bayle quotes sundry modern writers who +have spoken to the same effect (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, +ch. 161 et seq.). + +50. But all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not prove +that the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as M. Bayle supposes. +It is true that the counsels of God are inscrutable, but there is no +invincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are unjust. +What appears injustice on the part of God, and foolishness in our faith, +only appears so. The famous passage of Tertullian (_De Carne Christi_), +'mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultus +revixit, certum est, quia impossibile', is a sally that can only be meant +to concern appearances of absurdity. There are others like them in Luther's +book on _Freewill in Bondage_, as when he says (ch. 174): 'Si placet tibi +Deus indignos coronans, non debet displicere immeritos damnans.' Which +being reduced to more temperate phrasing, means: If you approve that God +give eternal glory to those who are not better than the rest, you should +not disapprove that he abandon those who are not worse than the rest. And +to judge that he speaks only of appearances of injustice, one only has to +weigh these words of the same author taken from the same book: 'In all the +rest', he says, 'we recognize in God a supreme majesty; there is only +justice that we dare to question: and we will not believe provisionally +[tantisper] that he is just, albeit he has promised us that the time shall +come when his glory being revealed all men shall see clearly that he has +been and that he is just.' + + [102] +51. It will be found also that when the Fathers entered into a discussion +they did not simply reject reason. And, in disputations with the pagans, +they endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to reason, and how +the Christian religion has the better of it on that side also. Origen +showed Celsus how reasonable Christianity is and why, notwithstanding, the +majority of Christians should believe without examination. Celsus had +jeered at the behaviour of Christians, 'who, willing', he said, 'neither to +listen to your reasons nor to give you any for what they believe, are +content to say to you: Examine not, only believe, or: Your faith will save +you; and they hold this as a maxim, that the wisdom of the world is an +evil.' + +52. Origen gives the answer of a wise man, and in conformity with the +principles we have established in the matter. For reason, far from being +contrary to Christianity, serves as a foundation for this religion, and +will bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination of +it. But, as few people are capable of this, the heavenly gift of plain +faith tending towards good suffices for men in general. 'If it were +possible', he says, 'for all men, neglecting the affairs of life, to apply +themselves to study and meditation, one need seek no other way to make them +accept the Christian religion. For, to say nothing likely to offend anyone' +(he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd, but he will not say so +explicitly), 'there will be found therein no less exactitude than +elsewhere, whether in the discussion of its dogmas, or in the elucidation +of the enigmatical expressions of its prophets, or in the interpretation of +the parables of its gospels and of countless other things happening or +ordained symbolically. But since neither the necessities of life nor the +infirmities of men permit of this application to study, save for a very +small number of persons, what means could one find more qualified to +benefit everyone else in the world than those Jesus Christ wished to be +used for the conversion of the nations? And I would fain ask with regard to +the great number of those who believe, and who thereby have withdrawn +themselves from the quagmire of vices wherein before they were plunged, +which would be the better: to have thus changed one's morals and reformed +one's life, believing without examination that there are punishments for +sin and rewards for good actions; or to have waited for one's conversion +until one not only believed but had examined with care the foundations of +these dogmas? It is certain that, were this method to be followed, few[103] +indeed would reach that point whither they are led by their plain and +simple faith, but the majority would remain in their corruption.' + +53. M. Bayle (in his explanation concerning the objections of the +Manichaeans, placed at the end of the second edition of the _Dictionary_) +takes those words where Origen points out that religion can stand the test +of having her dogmas discussed, as if it were not meant in relation to +philosophy, but only in relation to the accuracy wherewith the authority +and the true meaning of Holy Scripture is established. But there is nothing +to indicate this restriction. Origen wrote against a philosopher whom such +a restriction would not have suited. And it appears that this Father wished +to point out that among Christians there was no less exactitude than among +the Stoics and some other philosophers, who established their doctrine as +much by reason as by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, who +found his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity. + +54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the same +place. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their "Examine not, +only believe", they must tell me at least what are the things they wish me +to believe.' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells against those +who would say that God is good and just, and who yet would maintain that we +have no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute these +perfections to him. But one must not always demand what I call 'adequate +notions', involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptible +qualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such notions. Thus +we agreed that Mysteries should receive an explanation, but this +explanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to have some analogical +understanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to the +end that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of +meaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we would +wish, that is, to the extent of comprehension and to the _how_. + +55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of +_common notions_ (in the third volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a +Provincial_, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not consult the idea of +goodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had declared himself +quite differently in his _Dictionary_. Of necessity there must be agreement +upon the meaning of _good_ and _bad_, amongst those who are in dispute[104] +over the question whether there is only one principle, altogether good, or +whether there are two, the one good and the other bad. We understand +something by union when we are told of the union of one body with another +or of a substance with its accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of the +place with the moving body, of the act with the potency; we also mean +something when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to make +thereof one single person. For albeit I do not hold that the soul changes +the laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul, and I +have introduced the Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, I +nevertheless admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makes +thereof a suppositum. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas a +union of influence would belong to the physical. But when we speak of the +union of the Word of God with human nature we should be content with an +analogical knowledge, such as the comparison of the union of the soul with +the body is capable of giving us. We should, moreover, be content to say +that the Incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the +Creator and the creature; and further we should not want to go. + +56. It is the same with the other Mysteries, where moderate minds will ever +find an explanation sufficient for belief, but never such as would be +necessary for understanding. A certain _what it is_ ([Greek: ti esti]) is +enough for us, but the _how_ ([Greek: pos]) is beyond us, and is not +necessary for us. One may say concerning the explanations of Mysteries +which are given out here and there, what the Queen of Sweden inscribed upon +a medal concerning the crown she had abandoned, 'Non mi bisogna, e non mi +basta.' Nor have we any need either (as I have already observed) to prove +the Mysteries _a priori_, or to give a reason for them; it suffices us +_that the thing is thus_ ([Greek: to hoti]) even though we know not the +_why_ ([Greek: to dioti]), which God has reserved for himself. These lines, +written on that theme by Joseph Scaliger, are beautiful and renowned: + + _Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium,_ + _Quaecumque libris vis Prophetarum indidit_ + _Afflata caelo, plena veraci Deo:_ + _Nec operta sacri supparo silentii_ + _Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri._ + [Page 105] + _Nescire velle, quae Magister optimus_ + _Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est._ + +M. Bayle, who quotes them (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. +III, p. 1055), holds the likely opinion that Scaliger made them upon the +disputes between Arminius and Gomarus. I think M. Bayle repeated them from +memory, for he put _sacrata_ instead of _afflata_. But it is apparently the +printer's fault that _prudenter_ stands in place of _pudenter_ (that is, +modestly) which the metre requires. + +57. Nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines contain; and +M. Bayle is right in saying (p. 729) that those who claim that the +behaviour of God with respect to sin and the consequences of sin contains +nothing but what they can account for, deliver themselves up to the mercy +of their adversary. But he is not right in combining here two very +different things, 'to account for a thing', and 'to uphold it against +objections'; as he does when he presently adds: 'They are obliged to follow +him [their adversary] everywhere whither he shall wish to lead them, and it +would be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter, if they were to admit +that our intelligence is too weak to remove completely all the objections +advanced by a philosopher.' + +58. It seems here that, according to M. Bayle, 'accounting for' comes short +of 'answering objections', since he threatens one who should undertake the +first with the resulting obligation to pass on to the second. But it is +quite the opposite: he who maintains a thesis (the _respondens_) is not +bound to account for it, but he is bound to meet the objections of an +opponent. A defendant in law is not bound (as a general rule) to prove his +right or to produce his title to possession; but he is obliged to reply to +the arguments of the plaintiff. I have marvelled many times that a writer +so precise and so shrewd as M. Bayle so often here confuses things where so +much difference exists as between these three acts of reason: to +comprehend, to prove, and to answer objections; as if when it is a question +of the use of reason in theology one term were as good as another. Thus he +says in his posthumous Conversations, p. 73: 'There is no principle which +M. Bayle has more often inculcated than this, that the incomprehensibility +of a dogma and the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide no +legitimate reason for rejecting it.' This is true as regards the +incomprehensibility, but it is not the same with the insolubility. And it +is indeed just as if one said that an invincible reason against a [106] +thesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it. For what other +legitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an invincible +opposing argument is not such an one? And what means shall one have +thereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of any +opinion? + +59. It is well to observe also that he who proves a thing _a priori_ +accounts for it through the efficient cause; and whosoever can thus account +for it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a position to comprehend +the thing. Therefore it was that the Scholastic theologians had already +censured Raymond Lully for having undertaken to demonstrate the Trinity by +philosophy. This so-called demonstration is to be found in his _Works_; and +Bartholomaeus Keckermann, a writer renowned in the Reformed party, having +made an attempt of just the same kind upon the same Mystery, has been no +less censured for it by some modern theologians. Therefore censure will +fall upon those who shall wish to account for this Mystery and make it +comprehensible, but praise will be given to those who shall toil to uphold +it against the objections of adversaries. + +60. I have said already that theologians usually distinguish between what +is above reason and what is against reason. They place _above_ reason that +which one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for. But _against_ +reason will be all opinion that is opposed by invincible reasons, or the +contrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner. They avow, +therefore, that the Mysteries are above reason, but they do not admit that +they are contrary to it. The English author of a book which is ingenious, +but has met with disapproval, entitled _Christianity not Mysterious_, +wished to combat this distinction; but it does not seem to me that he has +at all weakened it. M. Bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepted +distinction. This is what he says on the matter (vol. III of the _Reply to +the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 158). Firstly (p. 998) he +distinguishes, together with M. Saurin, between these two theses: the one, +_all the dogmas of Christianity are in conformity with reason_; the other, +_human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason_. He affirms +the first and denies the second. I am of the same opinion, if in saying +'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to account +for it or to explain its _how_ by reason; for God could doubtless do so, +and we cannot. But I think that one must affirm both theses if by [107] +'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that we can +demonstrate, if need be, that there is no contradiction between this dogma +and reason, repudiating the objections of those who maintain that this +dogma is an absurdity. + +61. M. Bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing. He +acknowledges fully that our Mysteries are in accordance with the supreme +and universal reason that is in the divine understanding, or with reason in +general; yet he denies that they are in accordance with that part of reason +which man employs to judge things. But this portion of reason which we +possess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural light that has +remained with us in the midst of corruption; thus it is in accordance with +the whole, and it differs from that which is in God only as a drop of water +differs from the ocean or rather as the finite from the infinite. Therefore +Mysteries may transcend it, but they cannot be contrary to it. One cannot +be contrary to one part without being contrary to the whole. That which +contradicts a proposition of Euclid is contrary to the _Elements_ of +Euclid. That which in us is contrary to the Mysteries is not reason nor is +it the natural light or the linking together of truths; it is corruption, +or error, or prejudice, or darkness. + +62. M. Bayle (p. 1002) is not satisfied with the opinion of Josua Stegman +and of M. Turretin, Protestant theologians who teach that the Mysteries are +contrary only to corrupt reason. He asks, mockingly, whether by right +reason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian and by corrupt +reason that of an heretic; and he urges the objection that the evidence of +the Mystery of the Trinity was no greater in the soul of Luther than in the +soul of Socinius. But as M. Descartes has well observed, good sense is +distributed to all: thus one must believe that both the orthodox and +heretics are endowed therewith. Right reason is a linking together of +truths, corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and passions. And in order +to discriminate between the two, one need but proceed in good order, admit +no thesis without proof, and admit no proof unless it be in proper form, +according to the commonest rules of logic. One needs neither any other +criterion nor other arbitrator in questions of reason. It is only through +lack of this consideration that a handle has been given to the sceptics, +and that even in theology Francois Veron and some others, who [108] +exacerbated the dispute with the Protestants, even to the point of +dishonesty, plunged headlong into scepticism in order to prove the +necessity of accepting an infallible external judge. Their course meets +with no approval from the most expert, even in their own party: Calixtus +and Daille derided it as it deserved, and Bellarmine argued quite +otherwise. + +63. Now let us come to what M. Bayle says (p. 999) on the distinction we +are concerned with. 'It seems to me', he says, 'that an ambiguity has crept +into the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above reason +and things that are against reason. The Mysteries of the Gospel are above +reason, so it is usually said, but they are not contrary to reason. I think +that the same sense is not given to the word reason in the first part of +this axiom as in the second: by the first is understood rather the reason +of man, or reason _in concreto_ and by the second reason in general, or +reason _in abstracto_. For supposing that it is understood always as reason +in general or the supreme reason, the universal reason that is in God, it +is equally true that the Mysteries of the Gospels are not above reason and +that they are not against reason. But if in both parts of the axiom human +reason is meant, I do not clearly see the soundness of the distinction: for +the most orthodox confess that we know not how our Mysteries can conform to +the maxims of philosophy. It seems to us, therefore, that they are not in +conformity with our reason. Now that which appears to us not to be in +conformity with our reason appears contrary to our reason, just as that +which appears to us not in conformity with truth appears contrary to truth. +Thus why should not one say, equally, that the Mysteries are against our +feeble reason, and that they are above our feeble reason?' I answer, as I +have done already, that 'reason' here is the linking together of the truths +that we know by the light of nature, and in this sense the axiom is true +and without any ambiguity. The Mysteries transcend our reason, since they +contain truths that are not comprised in this sequence; but they are not +contrary to our reason, and they do not contradict any of the truths +whereto this sequence can lead us. Accordingly there is no question here of +the universal reason that is in God, but of our reason. As for the question +whether we know the Mysteries to conform with our reason, I answer that at +least we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between the +Mysteries and reason. Moreover, we can always abolish such alleged [109] +opposition, and so, if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing faith +with reason, or recognizing the conformity between them, it must be said +that we can recognize this conformity and this harmony. But if the +conformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the _how_, we cannot +recognize it. + +64. M. Bayle makes one more ingenious objection, which he draws from the +example of the sense of sight. 'When a square tower', he says, 'from a +distance appears to us round, our eyes testify very clearly not only that +they perceive nothing square in this tower, but also that they discover +there a round shape, incompatible with the square shape. One may therefore +say that the truth which is the square shape is not only above, but even +against, the witness of our feeble sight.' It must be admitted that this +observation is correct, and although it be true that the appearance of +roundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles, which distance +causes to disappear, it is true, notwithstanding, that the round and the +square are opposites. Therefore my answer to this objection is that the +representation of the senses, even when they do all that in them lies, is +often contrary to the truth; but it is not the same with the faculty of +reasoning, when it does its duty, since a strictly reasoned argument is +nothing but a linking together of truths. And as for the sense of sight in +particular, it is well to consider that there are yet other false +appearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our eyes' nor from the +loss of visibility brought about by distance, but from the very _nature of +vision_, however perfect it be. It is thus, for instance, that the circle +seen sideways is changed into that kind of oval which among geometricians +is known as an ellipse, and sometimes even into a parabola or a hyperbola, +or actually into a straight line, witness the ring of Saturn. + +65. The _external_ senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. It is our +inner sense which often makes us go too fast. That occurs also in brute +beasts, as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror: for beasts have +_consecutions_ of perception which resemble reasoning, and which occur also +in the inner sense of men, when their actions have only an empirical +quality. But beasts do nothing which compels us to believe that they have +what deserves to be properly called a _reasoning_ sense, as I have shown +elsewhere. Now when the understanding uses and follows the false decision +of the inner sense (as when the famous Galileo thought that Saturn had[110] +two handles) it is deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect of +appearances, and it infers from them more than they imply. For the +appearances of the senses do not promise us absolutely the truth of things, +any more than dreams do. It is we who deceive ourselves by the use we make +of them, that is, by our consecutions. Indeed we allow ourselves to be +deluded by probable arguments, and we are inclined to think that phenomena +such as we have found linked together often are so always. Thus, as it +happens usually that that which appears without angles has none, we readily +believe it to be always thus. Such an error is pardonable, and sometimes +inevitable, when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that which +appearances recommend; but when we have the leisure and the time to collect +our thoughts, we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so. +It is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth, but our +reasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rules +of the art of reasoning. If by _reason_ one meant generally the faculty of +reasoning whether well or ill, I confess that it might deceive us, and does +indeed deceive us, and the appearances of our understanding are often as +deceptive as those of the senses: but here it is a question of the linking +together of truths and of objections in due form, and in this sense it is +impossible for reason to deceive us. + +66. Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle carries too +far _the being above reason_, as if it included the insoluble nature of +objections: for according to him (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, +vol. III, ch. 130, p. 651) 'once a dogma is above reason, philosophy can +neither explain it nor comprehend it, nor meet the difficulties that are +urged against it'. I agree with regard to comprehension, but I have already +shown that the Mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation, to the end +that the terms employed be not _sine mente soni_, words signifying nothing. +I have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answering +the objections, and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis. + +67. He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize the +insoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries. Luther is one of +the chief of these; but I have already replied, in Sec. 12, to the passage +where he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology. There is +another passage (_De Servo Arbitrio_, ch. 246) where he says that the +apparent injustice of God is proved by arguments taken from the [111] +adversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked, an argument +irresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence ('Argumentis +talibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere'). +But soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who know +nothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospel +dissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where +that which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive +its due. The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without +the aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There is +also quoted (_Reply_, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz, +criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous +theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God +which are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passage +must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in +accordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it. + +68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who are +more favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This great man +says positively (Part I of his _Principles_, art. 41) 'that we shall have +not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' (which +one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the +eternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our thought is finite, and +that the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only +known from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also has +willed it, is infinite. We have therefore quite enough intelligence to +recognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are in +God; but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can know +how they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined. Yet the +Power and the Knowledge of God must not prevent us from believing that we +have a free will; for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are +inwardly conscious, and which we know by experience to be within us, simply +because we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to be +incomprehensible in its nature.' + +69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who rarely +think of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to me. Not +content with saying that, as for him, he sees no way of reconciling [112] +the two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all rational +creatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that there is +no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For such an +objection could only be a necessary linking together of other truths whose +result would be contrary to the truth that one maintains; and consequently +there would be contradiction between the truths, which would be an utter +absurdity. Moreover, albeit our mind is finite and cannot comprehend the +infinite, of the infinite nevertheless it has proofs whose strength or +weakness it comprehends; why then should it not have the same comprehension +in regard to the objections? And since the power and the wisdom of God are +infinite and comprehend everything, there is no pretext for doubting their +scope. Further, M. Descartes demands a freedom which is not needed, by his +insistence that the actions of the will of man are altogether undetermined, +a thing which never happens. Finally, M. Bayle himself maintains that this +experience or this inward sense of our independence, upon which M. +Descartes founds the proof of our freedom, does not prove it: for from the +fact that we are not conscious of the causes whereon we depend, it does not +follow, according to M. Bayle, that we are independent. But that is +something we will speak of in its proper place. + +70. It seems that M. Descartes confesses also, in a passage of his +_Principles_, that it is impossible to find an answer to the difficulties +on the division of matter to infinity, which he nevertheless recognizes as +actual. Arriaga and other Schoolmen make well-nigh the same confession: but +if they took the trouble to give to the objections the form these ought to +have, they would see that there are faults in the reasoning, and sometimes +false assumptions which cause confusion. Here is an example. A man of parts +one day brought up to me an objection in the following form: Let the +straight line BA be cut in two equal parts at the point C, and the part CA +at the point D, and the part DA at the point E, and so on to infinity; all +the halves, BC, CD, DE, etc., together make the whole BA; therefore there +must be a last half, since the straight line BA finishes at A. But this +last half is absurd: for since it is a line, it will be possible again to +cut it in two. Therefore division to infinity cannot be admitted. But I +pointed out to him that one is not justified in the inference that there +must be a last half, although there be a last point A, for this last point +belongs to all the halves of its side. And my friend acknowledged it [113] +himself when he endeavoured to prove this deduction by a formal argument; +on the contrary, just because the division goes on to infinity, there is no +last half. And although the straight line AB be finite, it does not follow +that the process of dividing it has any final end. The same confusion +arises with the series of numbers going on to infinity. One imagines a +final end, a number that is infinite, or infinitely small; but that is all +simple fiction. Every number is finite and specific; every line is so +likewise, and the infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes that +one may take as great or as small as one wishes, to show that an error is +smaller than that which has been specified, that is to say, that there is +no error; or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitude +at its vanishing point or its beginning, conceived after the pattern of +magnitudes already actualized. + +71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle puts +forward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposes +to the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. 3140 of the +second edition of his _Dictionary_). 'It is enough for me', he says, 'that +it be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of the Gospel are above +reason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible to +settle the difficulties raised by the philosophers, and in consequence that +a dispute where only the light of Nature is followed will always end +unfavourably for the theologians, and that they will see themselves forced +to give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light.' I +am surprised that M. Bayle speaks in such general terms, since he has +acknowledged himself that the light of Nature is against the Manichaeans, +and for the oneness of the Principle, and that the goodness of God is +proved incontrovertibly by reason. Yet this is how he continues: + +72. 'It is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above it. +Now if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to the +dogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to those +two Mysteries, it would have them in subjection and submit them to the +strictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or with the +aphorisms that spring from common notions, and proceed until finally it had +drawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with natural light. It +would therefore do what exceeds its powers, it would soar above its [114] +confines, and that is a formal contradiction. One must therefore say that +it cannot provide answers to its own objections, and that thus they remain +victorious, so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of God +and to the necessity of subjugating one's understanding to the obedience of +faith.' I do not find that there is any force in this reasoning. We can +attain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining +it; as we can attain to the sky by sight, and not by touch. Nor is it +necessary that, in order to answer the objections which are made against +the Mysteries, one should have them in subjection to oneself, and submit +them to examination by comparison with the first principles that spring +from common notions. For if he who answers the objections had to go so far, +he who proposes the objections needs must do it first. It is the part of +the objection to open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answers +to say Yes or No. He is not obliged to counter with a distinction: it will +do, in case of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition in +the objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these things +without penetrating beyond the objection. When someone offers me a proof +which he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel him +merely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward, +and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful. For the purpose +of doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the matter; on +the contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be justified in +doubting. M. Bayle continues thus: + +73. 'Let us endeavour to clarify that. If some doctrines are above reason +they are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot attain to +them, it cannot comprehend them.' (He could have begun here with the +'comprehend', saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it.) +'If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea' (_Non valet +consequentia_: for, to 'comprehend' something, it is not enough that one +have some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of everything that +goes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, distinct, +_adequate_. There are a thousand objects in Nature in which we understand +something, but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend. We have +some ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon them up to a certain +point; but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we do +not yet comprehend the whole nature of light.) 'nor any principle such[115] +as may give rise to a solution;' (Why should not evident principles be +found mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) 'and consequently the +objections that reason has made will remain unanswered;' (By no means; the +difficulty is rather on the side of the opposer. It is for him to seek an +evident principle such as may give rise to some objection; and the more +obscure the subject, the more trouble he will have in finding such a +principle. Moreover, when he has found it he will have still more trouble +in demonstrating an opposition between the principle and the Mystery: for, +if it happened that the Mystery was evidently contrary to an evident +principle, it would not be an obscure Mystery, it would be a manifest +absurdity.) 'or what is the same thing, answer will be made with some +distinction as obscure as the very thesis that will have been attacked.' +(One can do without distinctions, if need be, by denying either some +premiss or some conclusion; and when one is doubtful of the meaning of some +term used by the opposer one may demand of him its definition. Thus the +defender has no need to incommode himself when it is a question of +answering an adversary who claims that he is offering us an invincible +proof. But even supposing that the defender, perchance being kindly +disposed, or for the sake of brevity, or because he feels himself strong +enough, should himself vouchsafe to show the ambiguity concealed in the +objection, and to remove it by making some distinction, this distinction +need not of necessity lead to anything clearer than the first thesis, since +the defender is not obliged to elucidate the Mystery itself.) + +74. 'Now it is certain', so M. Bayle continues, 'that an objection which is +founded on distinct notions remains equally victorious, whether you give to +it no answer, or you make an answer where none can comprehend anything. Can +the contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection to you that +which you and he very clearly conceive, and you, who can only defend +yourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything?' (It is +not enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct notions, it is +necessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the thesis. And when I +answer someone by denying some premiss, in order to compel him to prove it, +or some conclusion, to compel him to put it in good form, it cannot be said +that I answer nothing or that I answer nothing intelligible. For as it is +the doubtful premiss of the adversary that I deny, my denial will be [116] +as intelligible as his affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as to +explain myself by means of some distinction, it suffices that the terms I +employ have some meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in my +answer will be comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend all +that it involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also.) + +75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that the +disputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be desirable, +but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point, +if the necessity arises.) 'and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, and +the signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything lies +in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or +immediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is done by means +of the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether the premisses of a +proof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the conclusion is +properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether +some aphorism of the chapter _de oppositis_ or _de sophisticis elenchis_, +etc., has not been violated.' (It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny +some premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained +some ambiguous term.) 'One comes off victorious either by showing that the +subject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been +agreed upon' (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing, +and then the defender wins the case), 'or by reducing the defender to +absurdity' (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well +proved). 'Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that +the conclusions of his thesis are "yes" and "no" at once, or by +constraining him to say only intelligible things in answer.' (This last +embarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance new +theses.) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon +obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.' (It is the aim of the opposer, +for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot +here be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that +one cannot demonstrate it.) 'This leads to the opinion that during the +course of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or +with the opposer, according to whether there is more or less clarity in the +propositions of the one than in the propositions of the other.' (That [117] +is speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected; +but the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defence +works, and it is for the attacker to destroy them. The defender has no need +here of self-evidence, and he seeks it not: but it is for the opposer to +find it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order that +the defender may be no longer protected.) + +76. 'Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are +such that one comprehends nothing in them,' (It is a very equivocal sign of +victory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend +anything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided. +The order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to +answer them by denying or making a distinction.) 'and who confesses that +they are incomprehensible.' (It is permitted to him who maintains the truth +of a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if this +confession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no +need of objection. It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible, +but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing +at all therein. It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called +_Scindapsus_ or _Blityri_ (Clem. Alex., _Stromateis_, 8), that is, words +devoid of meaning.) 'He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding +victory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has +covered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his +antagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an +army which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the +victor only under cover of night.' (Matching allegory with allegory, I will +say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by +his entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it is +permitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blame +for that.) + +77. I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. Bayle +has put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements in +support of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how this +excellent man has been misled. That happens all too easily to the ablest +and shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without +exercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundations +of their systems. The details we have entered into here will serve as [118] +answer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed through +the works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says in his _Reply to the +Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 133, p. 685): 'To prove that one +has brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only that +one has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith, but also that the +particular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with our +Catechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way.' I +do not see that one has need of all that, unless one aspire to press +reasoning as far as the _how_ of the Mystery. When one is content to uphold +its truth, without attempting to render it comprehensible, one has no need +to resort to philosophic maxims, general or particular, for the proof; and +when another brings up some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for us +to prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our +dogma, but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto. + +78. M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we need +an answer as clearly evident as the objection.' I have already shown that +it is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest it is +not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always to +advance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning the +Mystery itself is not evident. He adds further: 'If we must make reply and +rejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that we have +accomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make answer with +things as evident as our reasons can be.' But it is not for the defender to +adduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent. + +79. Finally the author draws the conclusion: 'If it were claimed that, on +making an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer which +we can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us, that +would be unfair.' He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, against M. +Jacquelot, p. 69. I am not of this opinion. If the objection were +completely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown. +But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of +the most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw from +it a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery may +answer with the instance of a bare possibility. For such an instance [119] +suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, is +neither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds the +Mystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that it +is probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries are +against appearances. He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce such +an instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work of +supererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to the +adversary. + +80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to +M. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. Bayle' +(according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his _Dictionary_, whenever +the subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting and +destroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely any +philosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create +great difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one desired to follow it in a +disputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to a +state of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainly +true, which it disputes with insoluble objections.' I think that what is +said here in reproach of reason is to its advantage. When it overthrows +some thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis. And when it seems to be +overthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that it +promises us something profound, provided that we follow it _as far as it +can go_, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search +out and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great +measure of success. + +81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections, +recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.' And I think, on the other +hand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind, +which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are new +openings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greater +light: I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology. But +when these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that one +be able to repel them, provided that one do so in a submissive and zealous +spirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of God. And when we +succeed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by his +greatness and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves through +the clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward [120] +appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to that +which to us is invisible, but none the less sure. + +82. 'Thus' (to continue with M. Bayle) 'reason will be compelled to lay +down its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, which +it can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims. +Thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless in +accordance with that which it is, that is to say, in reason.' But one must +know 'that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are only +those which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinary +course of things.' This reason enjoins upon us even in philosophical +subjects, when there are invincible proofs to the contrary. It is thus +that, being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the +justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and injustice +which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our +gaze. Hitherto we have been illumined by the _light of Nature_ and by that +of _grace_, but not yet by that of _glory_. Here on earth we see apparent +injustice, and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice of +God; but we shall see that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shall +show himself as he is. + +83. It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning those +ostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; for he +acknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith. In these +posthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of being +accused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against reason, and +(p. 9, against M. le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who acknowledges +that a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by a +necessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine. Nevertheless one would +be justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than an +outward appearance. + +84. It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. Bayle +on the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his opinions +were not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, which have +provided matter for our considerations, have led one to believe. It is true +that frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer the +objections of reason against faith, and that he asserts the necessity of +comprehending, in order to achieve such an end, how the Mystery comes [121] +to be or exists. Yet there are passages where he becomes milder, and +contents himself with saying that the answers to these objections are +unknown to him. Here is a very precise passage, taken from the excursus on +the Manichaeans, which is found at the end of the second edition of his +_Dictionary_: 'For the greater satisfaction of the most punctilious +readers, I desire to declare here' (he says, p. 3148) 'that wherever the +statement is to be met with in my _Dictionary_ that such and such arguments +are irrefutable I do not wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality. +I mean naught else than that they appear to me irrefutable. That is of no +consequence: each one will be able to imagine, if he pleases, that if I +deem thus of a matter it is owing to my lack of acumen.' I do not imagine +such a thing; his great acumen is too well known to me: but I think that, +after having applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections, he had +not enough attention left over for the purpose of answering them. + +85. M. Bayle confesses, moreover, in his posthumous work against M. le +Clerc, that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs. It +is therefore _ad hominem_ only, or rather _ad homines_, that is, in +relation to the existing state of the human race, that he deems these +objections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable. There is even a +passage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that the +answer or the explanation may be found, and even in our time. For here is +what he says in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc (p. 35): 'M. Bayle +dared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those great +men of genius who create new systems, and that they could discover a +solution hitherto unknown.' It seems that by this 'solution' he means such +an explanation of Mystery as would penetrate to the _how_: but that is not +necessary for replying to the objections. + +86. Many have undertaken to render this _how_ comprehensible, and to prove +the possibility of Mysteries. A certain writer named Thomas Bonartes +Nordtanus Anglus, in his _Concordia Scientiae cum Fide,_ claimed to do so. +This work seemed to me ingenious and learned, but crabbed and involved, and +it even contains indefensible opinions. I learned from the _Apologia +Cyriacorum_ of the Dominican Father Vincent Baron that that book was +censured in Rome, that the author was a Jesuit, and that he suffered for +having published it. The Reverend Father des Bosses, who now teaches +Theology in the Jesuit College of Hildesheim, and who has combined [122] +rare erudition with great acumen, which he displays in philosophy and +theology, has informed me that the real name of Bonartes was Thomas Barton, +and that after leaving the Society he retired to Ireland, where the manner +of his death brought about a favourable verdict on his last opinions. I +pity the men of talent who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil and +their zeal. Something of like nature happened in time past to Pierre +Abelard, to Gilbert de la Porree, to John Wyclif, and in our day to the +Englishman Thomas Albius, as well as to some others who plunged too far +into the explanation of the Mysteries. + +87. St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of the +possibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but this +Father believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiar +grace: 'Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus +sanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' (in +_De Genesi ad Literam_, lib. 11, c. 4). Luther reserves the knowledge of +the Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. _De Servo +Arbitrio_, c. 174): 'Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam spargit in +indignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; utrobique nimius et +iniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se ipsum. Nam quomodo hoc +justum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile est modo, videbimus +autem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed revelata facie +videbitur. Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos damnet, +incomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur filius +hominis.' It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself surrounded by +that light which is lacking to us here below, since there is reason to +suppose that he was not lacking in good will. + + VIRGIL + _Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi,_ + _Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis._ + + LUCAN + _...Illic postquam se lumine vero_ + _Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra_ + _Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret_ + _Nostra dies._ + + [123] + * * * * * + +ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL + + * * * * * + +PART ONE + +1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place +reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how +they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of +nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation +to evil. The _difficulties_ are distinguishable into two classes. The one +kind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompatible with the divine +nature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man may +be deemed guilty and open to punishment. The other kind concerns the +conduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence +of evil, even though man be free and participate also therein. And this +conduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice of +God, since God co-operates in evil as well physical as moral, and +co-operates in each of them both morally and physically; and since it seems +that these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in that +of grace, and in the future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, in +this transitory life. + +2. To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that freedom +is opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of any kind +whatever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states that +the truth of contingent futurities is determined. The foreknowledge of[124] +God renders all the future certain and determined, but his providence and +his foreordinance, whereon foreknowledge itself appears founded, do much +more: for God is not as a man, able to look upon events with unconcern and +to suspend his judgement, since nothing exists save as a result of the +decrees of his will and through the action of his power. And even though +one leave out of account the co-operation of God, all is perfectly +connected in the order of things, since nothing can come to pass unless +there be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, this taking place no +less in voluntary than in all other actions. According to which it appears +that man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and in +consequence that he deserves therefor neither recompense nor chastisement: +thus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice, divine and +human, shaken. + +3. But even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he arrays +himself to his own hurt, the conduct of God could not but provide matter +for a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men, who would +wish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense of God. It is +objected that all the reality and what is termed the substance of the act +in sin itself is a production of God, since all creatures and all their +actions derive from him that reality they have. Whence one could infer not +only that he is the physical cause of sin, but also that he is its moral +cause, since he acts with perfect freedom and does nothing without a +complete knowledge of the thing and the consequences that it may have. Nor +is it enough to say that God has made for himself a law to co-operate with +the wills or resolutions of man, whether we express ourselves in terms of +the common opinion or in terms of the system of occasional causes. Not only +will it be found strange that he should have made such a law for himself, +of whose results he was not ignorant, but the principal difficulty is that +it seems the evil will itself cannot exist without co-operation, and even +without some predetermination, on his part, which contributes towards +begetting this will in man or in some other rational creature. For an +action is not, for being evil, the less dependent on God. Whence one will +come at last to the conclusion that God does all, the good and the evil, +indifferently; unless one pretend with the Manichaeans that there are two +principles, the one good and the other evil. Moreover, according to the +general opinion of theologians and philosophers, conservation being a [125] +perpetual creation, it will be said that man is perpetually created corrupt +and erring. There are, furthermore, modern Cartesians who claim that God is +the sole agent, of whom created beings are only the purely passive organs; +and M. Bayle builds not a little upon that idea. + +4. But even granting that God should co-operate in actions only with a +general co-operation, or even not at all, at least in those that are bad, +it suffices, so it is said, to inculpate him and to render him the moral +cause that nothing comes to pass without his permission. To say nothing of +the fall of the angels, he knows all that which will come to pass, if, +having created man, he places him in such and such circumstances; and he +places him there notwithstanding. Man is exposed to a temptation to which +it is known that he will succumb, thereby causing an infinitude of +frightful evils, by which the whole human race will be infected and brought +as it were into a necessity of sinning, a state which is named 'original +sin'. Thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion, by this +means death and diseases being introduced, with a thousand other +misfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad; +wickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth, so +that it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs. But it is +much worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number of +men will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally. Furthermore +these men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn from the corrupt +mass through an unreasoning election, whether it be said that God in +choosing them has had regard to their future actions, to their faith or to +their works, or one claim that he has been pleased to give them these good +qualities and these actions because he has predestined them to salvation. +For though it be said in the most lenient system that God wished to save +all men, and though in the other systems commonly accepted it be granted, +that he has made his Son take human nature upon him to expiate their sins, +so that all they who shall believe in him with a lively and final faith +shall be saved, it still remains true that this lively faith is a gift of +God; that we are dead to all good works; that even our will itself must be +aroused by a prevenient grace, and that God gives us the power to will and +to do. And whether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself, that +is to say, through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our [126] +will to the good that it does; or whether there be only a sufficient grace, +but such as does not fail to attain its end, and to become efficacious in +the inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed +by God: one must return to the same conclusion that God is the final reason +of salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus Christ. And be +the election the cause or the result of God's design to give faith, it +still remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases, +without any discernible reason for his choice, which falls upon but few +men. + +5. So it is a terrible judgement that God, giving his only Son for the +whole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of +men, yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his +enemy, who torments them eternally and makes them curse their Creator, +though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness, +his justice and his other perfections. And this outcome inspires all the +more horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all +eternity is God's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew +they would not resist; as this sin is inherent and imputed to men before +their will has participated in it; as this hereditary vice impels their +will to commit actual sins; and as countless men, in childhood or maturity, +that have never heard or have not heard enough of Jesus Christ, Saviour of +the human race, die before receiving the necessary succour for their +withdrawal from this abyss of sin. These men too are condemned to be for +ever rebellious against God and plunged in the most horrible miseries, with +the wickedest of all creatures, though in essence they have not been more +wicked than others, and several among them have perchance been less guilty +than some of that little number of elect, who were saved by a grace without +reason, and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not +deserved. Such in brief are the difficulties touched upon by sundry +persons; but M. Bayle was one who insisted on them the most, as will appear +subsequently when we examine his passages. I think that now I have recorded +the main essence of these difficulties: but I have deemed it fitting to +refrain from some expressions and exaggerations which might have caused +offence, while not rendering the objections any stronger. + +6. Let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be said in +answer to those objections; and here a course of explanation through [127] +fuller dissertation will be necessary: for many difficulties can be opened +up in few words, but for their discussion one must dilate upon them. Our +end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an +absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and +unworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to God +inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love +him above all things: and that cannot come about unless there be knowledge +of his perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves, and +which makes the felicity of those that love him. Feeling ourselves animated +by a zeal such as cannot fail to please him, we have cause to hope that he +will enlighten us, and that he will himself aid us in the execution of a +project undertaken for his glory and for the good of men. A cause so good +gives confidence: if there are plausible appearances against us there are +proofs on our side, and I would dare to say to an adversary: + + _Aspice, quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum._ + +7. _God is the first reason of things_: for such things as are bounded, as +all that which we see and experience, are contingent and have nothing in +them to render their existence necessary, it being plain that time, space +and matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything, +might have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in another +order. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world, +which is the whole assemblage of _contingent_ things, and seek it in the +substance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in +consequence is _necessary_ and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be +intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of +other worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to +existence with it, the cause of the world must needs have had regard or +reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them. +This regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities +can be nothing other than the _understanding_ which has the ideas of them, +while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the +_will_ which chooses. It is the _power_ of this substance that renders its +will efficacious. Power relates to _being_, wisdom or understanding to +_truth_, and will to _good_. And this intelligent cause ought to be +infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in _power_, in _wisdom_ and in +_goodness_, since it relates to all that which is possible. [128] +Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for +admitting more than _one_. Its understanding is the source of _essences_, +and its will is the origin of _existences_. There in few words is the proof +of one only God with his perfections, and through him of the origin of +things. + +8. Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, +cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, +even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a +greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God +if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no +maximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done +equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be +said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than +mathematics, that if there were not the best (_optimum_) among all possible +worlds, God would not have produced any. I call 'World' the whole +succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be +said that several worlds could have existed in different times and +different places. For they must needs be reckoned all together as one world +or, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one should fill all times +and all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in +innumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among +which God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without +acting in accordance with supreme reason. + +9. Some adversary not being able to answer this argument will perchance +answer the conclusion by a counter-argument, saying that the world could +have been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that then it would +have been _better_. For it must be known that all things are _connected_ in +each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all +of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to +any distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in +proportion to the distance. Therein God has ordered all things beforehand +once for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the +rest; and each thing _as an idea_ has contributed, before its existence, to +the resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so that +nothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save its +essence or, if you will, save its _numerical individuality_. Thus, if the +smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it [129] +would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all +allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it. + +10. It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and without +unhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Sevarambian romances: +but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. I +cannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I present infinities +to you and compare them together? But you must judge with me _ab effectu_, +since God has chosen this world as it is. We know, moreover, that often an +evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that +evil. Often indeed two evils have made one great good: + + _Et si fata volunt, bina venena juvant_. + +Even so two liquids sometimes produce a solid, witness the spirit of wine +and spirit of urine mixed by Van Helmont; or so do two cold and dark bodies +produce a great fire, witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil combined +by Herr Hoffmann. A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake which +brings about the winning of a great battle; and do they not sing on the eve +of Easter, in the churches of the Roman rite: + + _O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!_ + _O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!_ + +11. The illustrious prelates of the Gallican church who wrote to Pope +Innocent XII against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination, being of +the principles of St. Augustine, have said things well fitted to elucidate +this great point. The cardinal appears to prefer even to the Kingdom of +Heaven the state of children dying without baptism, because sin is the +greatest of evils, and they have died innocent of all actual sin. More will +be said of that below. The prelates have observed that this opinion is ill +founded. The apostle, they say (Rom. iii. 8), is right to disapprove of the +doing of evil that good may come, but one cannot disapprove that God, +through his exceeding power, derive from the permitting of sins greater +goods than such as occurred before the sins. It is not that we ought to +take pleasure in sin, God forbid! but that we believe the same apostle when +he says (Rom. v. 20) that where sin abounded, grace did much more [130] +abound; and we remember that we have gained Jesus Christ himself by reason +of sin. Thus we see that the opinion of these prelates tends to maintain +that a sequence of things where sin enters in may have been and has been, +in effect, better than another sequence without sin. + +12. Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of the +senses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain, to prove +that there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures. A little +acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; shadows +enhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place gives relief to +harmony. We wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point of falling +and we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep. Do men relish +health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick? +And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more +discernible, that is to say, greater? + +13. But it will be said that evils are great and many in number in +comparison with the good: that is erroneous. It is only want of attention +that diminishes our good, and this attention must be given to us through +some admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom in good health, +we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we should be less +sensible of our evils. But is it not better, notwithstanding, that health +should be usual and sickness the exception? Let us then by our reflexion +supply what is lacking in our perception, in order to make the good of +health more discernible. Had we not the knowledge of the life to come, I +believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were +not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same +amount of good and evil, provided always that it were not the same kind: +one would be content with variety, without requiring a better condition +than that wherein one had been. + +14. When one considers also the fragility of the human body, one looks in +wonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the Author of Nature, who has made +the body so enduring and its condition so tolerable. That has often made me +say that I am not astonished men are sometimes sick, but that I am +astonished they are sick so little and not always. This also ought to make +us the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of animals, +whose Author has made machines so fragile and so subject to corruption[131] +and yet so capable of maintaining themselves: for it is Nature which cures +us rather than medicine. Now this very fragility is a consequence of the +nature of things, unless we are to will that this kind of creature, +reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, be not in the world. But that, to +all appearance, would be a defect which some philosophers of old would have +called _vacuum formarum_, a gap in the order of species. + +15. Those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with Nature and with +fortune and not to complain about them, even though they should not be the +best endowed, appear to me preferable to the other sort; for besides that +these complaints are ill founded, it is in effect murmuring against the +orders of providence. One must not readily be among the malcontents in the +State where one is, and one must not be so at all in the city of God, +wherein one can only wrongfully be of their number. The books of human +misery, such as that of Pope Innocent III, to me seem not of the most +serviceable: evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to be +averted from them, to be turned towards the good which by far +preponderates. Even less do I approve books such as that of Abbe Esprit, +_On the Falsity of Human Virtues_, of which we have lately been given a +summary: for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side out, and +cause men to be such as it represents them. + +16. It must be confessed, however, that there are disorders in this life, +which appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in the +misfortune of many good people. There is a German proverb which even grants +the advantage to the evil ones, as if they were commonly the most +fortunate: + + _Je kruemmer Holz, je bessre Kruecke:_ + _Je aerger Schalck, je groesser Gluecke._ + +And it were to be desired that this saying of Horace should be true in our +eyes: + + _Raro antecedentem scelestum_ + _Deseruit pede poena claudo._ + +Yet it often comes to pass also, though this perchance not the most often, + + [132] + _That in the world's eyes Heaven is justified,_ + +and that one may say with Claudian: + + _Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum,_ + _Absolvitque deos..._ + +17. But even though that should not happen here, the remedy is all prepared +in the other life: religion and reason itself teach us that, and we must +not murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought fit to +grant to men for repentance. Yet there objections multiply on another side, +when one considers salvation and damnation: for it appears strange that, +even in the great future of eternity, evil should have the advantage over +good, under the supreme authority of him who is the sovereign good, since +there will be many that are called and few that are chosen or are saved. It +is true that one sees from some lines of Prudentius (Hymn. ante Somnum), + + _Idem tamen benignus_ + _Ultor retundit iram,_ + _Paucosque non piorum_ + _Patitur perire in aevum,_ + +that divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked enough +to be damned would be very small. To some indeed it seems that men believed +at that time in a sphere between Hell and Paradise; that this same +Prudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere; that St. +Gregory of Nyssa also inclines in that direction, and that St. Jerome leans +towards the opinion according whereunto all Christians would finally be +taken into grace. A saying of St. Paul which he himself gives out as +mysterious, stating that all Israel will be saved, has provided much food +for reflexion. Sundry pious persons, learned also, but daring, have revived +the opinion of Origen, who maintains that good will predominate in due +time, in all and everywhere, and that all rational creatures, even the bad +angels, will become at last holy and blessed. The book of the eternal +Gospel, published lately in German and supported by a great and learned +work entitled [Greek: 'Apokatastasis panton], has caused much stir over +this great paradox. M. le Clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the cause of +the Origenists, but without declaring himself for them. + + [133] +18. There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even to +arbitrary suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself a +theology well-nigh astronomical. He believes that the present confusion in +this world below began when the Presiding Angel of the globe of the earth, +which was still a sun (that is, a star that was fixed and luminous of +itself) committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department, perhaps +rising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun; that +simultaneously, by the Pre-established Harmony of the Realms of Nature and +of Grace, and consequently by natural causes occurring at the appointed +time, our globe was covered with stains, rendered opaque and driven from +its place; which has made it become a wandering star or planet, that is, a +Satellite of another sun, and even perhaps of that one whose superiority +its angel refused to recognize; and that therein consists the fall of +Lucifer. Now the chief of the bad angels, who in Holy Scripture is named +the prince, and even the god of this world, being, with the angels of his +train, envious of that rational animal which walks on the surface of this +globe, and which God has set up there perhaps to compensate himself for +their fall, strives to render it accessary in their crimes and a +participator in their misfortunes. Whereupon Jesus Christ came to save men. +He is the eternal Son of God, even as he is his only Son; but (according to +some ancient Christians, and according to the author of this hypothesis) +having taken upon him at first, from the beginning of things, the most +excellent nature among created beings, to bring them all to perfection, he +set himself amongst them: and this is the second filiation, whereby he is +the first-born of all creatures. This is he whom the Cabalists called Adam +Kadmon. Haply he had planted his tabernacle in that great sun which +illumines us; but he came at last into this globe where we are, he was born +of the Virgin, and took human nature upon him to save mankind from the +hands of their enemy and his. And when the time of judgement shall draw +near, when the present face of our globe shall be about to perish, he will +return to it in visible form, thence to withdraw the good, transplanting +them, it may be, into the sun, and to punish here the wicked with the +demons that have allured them; then the globe of the earth will begin to +burn and will be perhaps a comet. This fire will last for aeons upon aeons. +The tail of the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly, +according to the Apocalypse, and this fire will be hell, or the second[134] +death whereof Holy Scripture speaks. But at last hell will render up its +dead, death itself will be destroyed; reason and peace will begin to hold +sway again in the spirits that had been perverted; they will be sensible of +their error, they will adore their Creator, and will even begin to love him +all the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they emerge. +Simultaneously (by virtue of the _harmonic parallelism_ of the Realms of +Nature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will have purged the +earth's globe of its stains. It will become again a sun; its Presiding +Angel will resume his place with the angels of his train; humans that were +damned shall be with them numbered amongst the good angels; this chief of +our globe shall render homage to the Messiah, chief of created beings. The +glory of this angel reconciled shall be greater than it was before his +fall. + + _Inque Deos iterum factorum lege receptus_ + _Aureus aeternum noster regnabit Apollo._ + +The vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower of Origen: but +we have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a greater +part than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to account. For it +does not appear that there is one principal place in the known universe +deserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of created +beings; and the sun of our system at least is not it. + +19. Holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men damned +eternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved, we must say +that the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in comparison with +the good, when one contemplates the true vastness of the city of God. +Coelius Secundus Curio wrote a little book, _De Amplitudine Regni +Coelestis_, which was reprinted not long since; but he is indeed far from +having apprehended the compass of the kingdom of heaven. The ancients had +puny ideas on the works of God, and St. Augustine, for want of knowing +modern discoveries, was at a loss when there was question of explaining the +prevalence of evil. It seemed to the ancients that there was only one earth +inhabited, and even of that men held the antipodes in dread: the remainder +of the world was, according to them, a few shining globes and a few +crystalline spheres. To-day, whatever bounds are given or not given to the +universe, it must be acknowledged that there is an infinite number of +globes, as great as and greater than ours, which have as much right as[135] +it to hold rational inhabitants, though it follows not at all that they are +human. It is only one planet, that is to say one of the six principal +satellites of our sun; and as all fixed stars are suns also, we see how +small a thing our earth is in relation to visible things, since it is only +an appendix of one amongst them. It may be that all suns are peopled only +by blessed creatures, and nothing constrains us to think that many are +damned, for few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantage +which good extracts from evil. Moreover, since there is no reason for the +belief that there are stars everywhere, is it not possible that there may +be a great space beyond the region of the stars? Whether it be the Empyrean +Heaven, or not, this immense space encircling all this region may in any +case be filled with happiness and glory. It can be imagined as like the +Ocean, whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures, when they shall +have reached their perfection in the system of the stars. What will become +of the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? Will it not be +something incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is as a +point in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? Thus since the +proportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost lost in +nothingness compared with that which is unknown, and which we yet have +cause to assume, and since all the evils that may be raised in objection +before us are in this near nothingness, haply it may be that all evils are +almost nothingness in comparison with the good things which are in the +universe. + +20. But it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and metaphysical +difficulties which have been mentioned, and which concern the cause of +evil. The question is asked first of all, whence does evil come? _Si Deus +est, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?_ The ancients attributed the cause +of evil to _matter_, which they believed uncreate and independent of God: +but we, who derive all being from God, where shall we find the source of +evil? The answer is, that it must be sought in the ideal nature of the +creature, in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal verities +which are in the understanding of God, independently of his will. For we +must consider that there is an _original imperfection in the creature_ +before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues +that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other +errors. Plato said in _Timaeus_ that the world originated in [136] +Understanding united to Necessity. Others have united God and Nature. This +can be given a reasonable meaning. God will be the Understanding; and the +Necessity, that is, the essential nature of things, will be the object of +the understanding, in so far as this object consists in the eternal +verities. But this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding. +And therein is found not only the primitive form of good, but also the +origin of evil: the Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted for +matter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things. + +This region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of good: +but, properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no _efficient_ +cause, for it consists in privation, as we shall see, namely, in that which +the efficient cause does not bring about. That is why the Schoolmen are +wont to call the cause of evil _deficient_. + +21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. _Metaphysical +evil_ consists in mere imperfection, _physical evil_ in suffering, and +_moral evil_ in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be not +necessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they be +possible. And as this vast Region of Verities contains all possibilities it +is necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds, that evil +enter into divers of them, and that even the best of all contain a measure +thereof. Thus has God been induced to permit evil. + +22. But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of 'permitting'? Is it +not God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? Here it will be necessary +to explain what 'permission' is, so that it may be seen how this term is +not employed without reason. But before that one must explain the nature of +will, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the general sense, one may +say that _will_ consists in the inclination to do something in proportion +to the good it contains. This will is called _antecedent_ when it is +detached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. In +this sense it may be said that God tends to all good, as good, _ad +perfectionem simpliciter simplicem_, to speak like the Schoolmen, and that +by an antecedent will. He is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all +men, to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said that +this will is efficacious _of itself (per se)_, that is, in such sort that +the effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to prevent +it: for this will does not pass into final exercise (_ad summum conatum_), +else it would never fail to produce its full effect, God being the [137] +master of all things. Success entire and infallible belongs only to the +_consequent will_, as it is called. This it is which is complete; and in +regard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to do what one wills, +when one has the power. Now this consequent will, final and decisive, +results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills, of those which tend +towards good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrence +of all these particular wills comes the total will. So in mechanics +compound movement results from all the tendencies that concur in one and +the same moving body, and satisfies each one equally, in so far as it is +possible to do all at one time. It is as if the moving body took equal +account of these tendencies, as I once showed in one of the Paris Journals +(7 Sept. 1693), when giving the general law of the compositions of +movement. In this sense also it may be said that the antecedent will is +efficacious in a sense and even effective with success. + +23. Thence it follows that God wills _antecedently_ the good and +_consequently_ the best. And as for evil, God wills moral evil not at all, +and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. Thus it is that +there is no absolute predestination to damnation; and one may say of +physical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, and +often also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or to +obtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment and example. +Evil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes too it +contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the seed that +one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate: this +is a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself used. + +24. Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that it +may serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, it is +not this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or a +legitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or +_permitted_ in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of an +indispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was determined not to +permit another's sin were to fail of his own duty, or as if an officer on +guard at an important post were to leave it, especially in time of danger, +in order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of the +garrison who wanted to kill each other. + +25. The rule which states, _non esse facienda mala, ut eveniant bona_, and +which even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the end of [138] +obtaining a physical good, far from being violated, is here proved, and its +source and its reason are demonstrated. One will not approve the action of +a queen who, under the pretext of saving the State, commits or even permits +a crime. The crime is certain and the evil for the State is open to +question. Moreover, this manner of giving sanction to crimes, if it were +accepted, would be worse than a disruption of some one country, which is +liable enough to happen in any case, and would perchance happen all the +more by reason of such means chosen to prevent it. But in relation to God +nothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to _the rule of the +best_, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this +sense that God permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself, +in what he owes to his wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followed +not the grand result of all his tendencies to good, and if he chose not +that which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the evil of guilt, which +is involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities. Hence +the conclusion that God wills all good _in himself antecedently_, that he +wills the best _consequently_ as an _end_, that he wills what is +indifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a _means_, but that he will +only permit moral evil as the _sine quo non_ or as a hypothetical necessity +which connects it with the best. Therefore the _consequent will_ of God, +which has sin for its object, is only _permissive_. + +26. It is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great only +because it is a source of physical evils, a source existing in one of the +most powerful of creatures, who is also most capable of causing those +evils. For an evil will is in its department what the evil principle of the +Manichaeans would be in the universe; and reason, which is an image of the +Divinity, provides for evil souls great means of causing much evil. One +single Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil than an earthquake. An evil +man takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction, and for that there +are only too many opportunities. But God being inclined to produce as much +good as possible, and having all the knowledge and all the power necessary +for that, it is impossible that in him there be fault, or guilt, or sin; +and when he permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue. + +27. It is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing the +sin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning ourselves. +But someone will perhaps bring up the objection that it is God himself[139] +who acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the creature. This +objection leads us to consider the _physical co-operation_ of God with the +creature, after we have examined the _moral co-operation_, which was the +more perplexing. Some have believed, with the celebrated Durand de +Saint-Pourcain and Cardinal Aureolus, the famous Schoolman, that the +co-operation of God with the creature (I mean the physical cooperation) is +only general and mediate, and that God creates substances and gives them +the force they need; and that thereafter he leaves them to themselves, and +does naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. This +opinion has been refuted by the greater number of Scholastic theologians, +and it appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings of +Pelagius. Nevertheless a Capuchin named Louis Pereir of Dole, about the +year 1630, wrote a book expressly to revive it, at least in relation to +free actions. Some moderns incline thereto, and M. Bernier supports it in a +little book on freedom and freewill. But one cannot say in relation to God +what 'to conserve' is, without reverting to the general opinion. Also it +must be taken into account that the action of God in conserving should have +some reference to that which is conserved, according to what it is and to +the state wherein it is; thus his action cannot be general or +indeterminate. These generalities are abstractions not to be found in the +truth of individual things, and the conservation of a man standing is +different from the conservation of a man seated. This would not be so if +conservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off some +foreign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve; as +often happens when men conserve something. But apart from the fact that we +are obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve, we must +bear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual immediate +influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependence +attaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and one can +perhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians and +philosophers in general, that it is a continued creation. + +28. The objection will be made that God therefore now creates man a sinner, +he that in the beginning created him innocent. But here it must be said, +with regard to the moral aspect, that God being supremely wise cannot fail +to observe certain laws, and to act according to the rules, as well [140] +physical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose. And the same reason +that has made him create man innocent, but liable to fall, makes him +re-create man when he falls; for God's knowledge causes the future to be +for him as the present, and prevents him from rescinding the resolutions +made. + +29. As for physical co-operation, here one must consider the truth which +has made already so much stir in the Schools since St. Augustine declared +it, that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends to +the positive. This answer is accounted a quibble, and even something +chimerical in the minds of many people. But here is an instance somewhat +similar, which will serve to disabuse them. + +30. The celebrated Kepler and M. Descartes (in his letters) after him have +spoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'; and it is something which may be +regarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitation +of creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal character of +the imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in its +actions. Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried +along with it various boats, which differ among themselves only in the +cargo, some being laden with wood, others with stone, and some more, the +others less. That being so, it will come about that the boats most heavily +laden will go more slowly than the others, provided it be assumed that the +wind or the oar, or some other similar means, assist them not at all. It is +not, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this retardation, +since the boats are going down and not upwards; but it is the same cause +which also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density, which +are, that is to say, less porous and more charged with matter that is +proper to them: for the matter which passes through the pores, not +receiving the same movement, must not be taken into account. It is +therefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or +privation of speed; not indeed of itself to lessen this speed, having once +received it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivity +the effect of the impression when it is to receive it. Consequently, since +more matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is more +laden, it is necessary that it go more slowly; and experiments on the +impact of bodies, as well as reason, show that twice as much force [141] +must be employed to give equal speed to a body of the same matter but of +twice the size. But that indeed would not be necessary if the matter were +absolutely indifferent to repose and to movement, and if it had not this +natural inertia whereof we have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnance +to being moved. Let us now compare the force which the current exercises on +boats, and communicates to them, with the action of God, who produces and +conserves whatever is positive in creatures, and gives them perfection, +being and force: let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with the +natural imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the laden boat with +the defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature; +and we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison. The +current is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation; +God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the +creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the +cause of the defects there are in its action. Thus the Platonists, St. +Augustine and the Schoolmen were right to say that God is the cause of the +material element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the formal +element, which lies in privation. Even so one may say that the current is +the cause of the material element of the retardation, but not of the +formal: that is, it is the cause of the boat's speed without being the +cause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the cause of sin than +the river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. Force also +in relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the flesh; the spirit +is willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits act... + + _quantum non noxia corpora tardant._ + +31. There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such an +action of God, and such and such a passion or reception of the creature, +which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to +its 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that the +creature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts, +and even that conservation is a continual creation, this is true in that +God gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is +positive, good and perfect, every perfect gift coming from the Father of +lights. The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects in operations +spring from the original limitation that the creature could not but [142] +receive with the first beginning of its being, through the ideal reasons +which restrict it. For God could not give the creature all without making +of it a God; therefore there must needs be different degrees in the +perfection of things, and limitations also of every kind. + +32. This consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern philosophers +who go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is true that God is +the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed +'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's participation in +actions, since _the action of the creature_ is a modification of the +substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in +the perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the +limitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we +see that there is an actual distinction between the substance and its +modification or accidents, contrary to the opinion of some moderns and in +particular of the late Duke of Buckingham, who spoke of that in a little +_Discourse on Religion_ recently reprinted. Evil is therefore like +darkness, and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formally +in a certain kind of privation. Here is an example of error which we have +already employed. I see a tower which from a distance appears round +although it is square. The thought that the tower is what it appears to be +flows naturally from that which I see; and when I dwell on this thought it +is an affirmation, it is a false judgement; but if I pursue the +examination, if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearances +deceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my error. To abide in a certain place, +or not to go further, not to espy some landmark, these are privations. + +33. It is the same in respect of malice or ill will. The will tends towards +good in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits us, and +the supreme perfection is in God. All pleasures have within themselves some +feeling of perfection. But when one is limited to the pleasures of the +senses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good, as of +health, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it is in this privation +of a further aspiration that the defect consists. In general perfection is +positive, it is an absolute reality; defect is privative, it comes from +limitation and tends towards new privations. This saying is therefore as +true as it is ancient: _bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu_; +as also that which states: _malum causam habet non efficientem, sed [143] +deficientem_. And I hope that the meaning of these axioms will be better +apprehended after what I have just said. + +34. The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the will +contributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom. I am of +opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from +necessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in +freedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over +our actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if +we were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are +not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happen +if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. There is +_contingency_ in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is no +judgement in him who acts there is no _freedom_. And if we had judgement +not accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be an +understanding without will. + +35. It is not to be imagined, however, that our freedom consists in an +indetermination or an indifference of equipoise, as if one must needs be +inclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction of +different courses, when there are several of them to take. This equipoise +in all directions is impossible: for if we were equally inclined towards +the courses A, B and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A and +towards not A. This equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience, +and in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been some +cause or reason inclining us towards the course taken, although very often +we be not aware of that which prompts us: just in the same way one is +hardly aware why, on issuing from a door, one has placed the right foot +before the left or the left before the right. + +36. But let us pass to the difficulties. Philosophers agree to-day that the +truth of contingent futurities is determinate, that is to say that +contingent futurities are future, or that they will be, that they will +happen: for it is as sure that the future will be, as it is sure that the +past has been. It was true already a hundred years ago that I should write +to-day, as it will be true after a hundred years that I have written. Thus +the contingent is not, because it is future, any the less contingent; and +_determination_, which would be called certainty if it were known, is not +incompatible with contingency. Often the certain and the determinate are +taken as one thing, because a determinate truth is capable of being [144] +known: thus it may be said that determination is an objective certainty. + +37. This determination comes from the very nature of truth, and cannot +injure freedom: but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere, +and in the first place from the foreknowledge of God, which many have held +to be contrary to freedom. They say that what is foreseen cannot fail to +exist, and they say so truly; but it follows not that what is foreseen is +necessary, for _necessary truth_ is that whereof the contrary is impossible +or implies contradiction. Now this truth which states that I shall write +tomorrow is not of that nature, it is not necessary. Yet supposing that God +foresees it, it is necessary that it come to pass; that is, the consequence +is necessary, namely, that it exist, since it has been foreseen; for God is +infallible. This is what is termed a _hypothetical necessity_. But our +concern is not this necessity: it is an _absolute necessity_ that is +required, to be able to say that an action is necessary, that it is not +contingent, that it is not the effect of a free choice. Besides it is very +easily seen that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determination +of the truth of contingent futurities, save that this determination is +known: and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' (as +it is termed) of these events, that whereon we agreed at the outset. + +38. This answer is doubtless very correct. It is agreed that foreknowledge +in itself does not make truth more determinate; truth is foreseen because +it is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it is +foreseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not +also in the knowledge of the past or of the present. But here is what an +opponent will be able to say: I grant you that foreknowledge in itself does +not make truth more determinate, but it is the cause of the foreknowledge +that makes it so. For it needs must be that the foreknowledge of God have +its foundation in the nature of things, and this foundation, making the +truth _predeterminate_, will prevent it from being contingent and free. + +39. It is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up, one of +the _predeterminators_, the other of the supporters of _mediate knowledge_. +The Dominicans and the Augustinians are for predetermination, the +Franciscans and the modern Jesuits on the other hand are for mediate +knowledge. These two parties appeared towards the middle of the sixteenth +century and a little later. Molina himself, who is perhaps one of the [145] +first, with Fonseca, to have systematized this point, and from whom the +others derived their name of Molinists, says in the book that he wrote on +the reconciliation of freewill with grace, about the year 1570, that the +Spanish doctors (he means principally the Thomists), who had been writing +then for twenty years, finding no other way to explain how God could have a +certain knowledge of contingent futurities, had introduced predetermination +as being necessary to free actions. + +40. As for himself, he thought to have found another way. He considers that +there are three objects of divine knowledge, the possibles, the actual +events and the conditional events that would happen in consequence of a +certain condition if it were translated into action. The knowledge of +possibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'; that +of events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is called the +'knowledge of intuition'. And as there is a kind of mean between the merely +possible and the pure and absolute event, to wit, the conditional event, it +can be said also, according to Molina, that there is a mediate knowledge +between that of intuition and that of intelligence. Instance is given of +the famous example of David asking the divine oracle whether the +inhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he designed to shut himself in, +would deliver him to Saul, supposing that Saul should besiege the town. God +answered yes; whereupon David took a different course. Now some advocates +of this mediate knowledge are of opinion that God, foreseeing what men +would do of their own accord, supposing they were placed in such and such +circumstances, and knowing that they would make ill use of their free will, +decrees to refuse them grace and favourable circumstances. And he may +justly so decree, since in any case these circumstances and these aids +would not have served them aught. But Molina contents himself with finding +therein generally a reason for the decrees of God, founded on what the free +creature would do in such and such circumstances. + +41. I will not enter into all the detail of this controversy; it will +suffice for me to give one instance. Certain older writers, not acceptable +to St. Augustine and his first disciples, appear to have had ideas somewhat +approaching those of Molina. The Thomists and those who call themselves +disciples of St. Augustine (but whom their opponents call Jansenists) +combat this doctrine on philosophical and theological grounds. Some [146] +maintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mere +intelligence. But the principal objection is aimed at the foundation of +this knowledge. For what foundation can God have for seeing what the people +of Keilah would do? A simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself +to yield a principle of certainty, unless one look upon it as predetermined +by the decrees of God, and by the causes that are dependent upon them. +Consequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also +in conditional free actions, that is to say, God will know them only under +the condition of their causes and of his decrees, which are the first +causes of things: and it will not be possible to separate such actions from +those causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent +of the knowledge of its causes. Therefore all must of necessity be traced +back to the predetermination of God's decrees, and this mediate knowledge +(so it will be said) will offer no remedy. The theologians who profess to +be adherents of St. Augustine claim also that the system of the Molinists +would discover the source of God's grace in the good qualities of man, and +this they deem an infringement of God's honour and contrary to St. Paul's +teaching. + +42. It would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and +rejoinders coming from one side and the other, and it will suffice for me +to explain how I conceive that there is truth on both sides. For this +result I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds, +represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of +the divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must be +comprised. For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible +world, _which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this +hypothesis_, and the idea of this possible world represents that which +would happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certain +knowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or must +happen in a certain case. For in the region of the possibles they are +represented as they are, namely, as free contingencies. Therefore neither +the foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for the +certainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem to +prejudice freedom. And though it were true and possible that contingent +futurities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely +independent of the decrees of God and of external causes, there would [147] +still be means of foreseeing them; for God would see them as they are in +the region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them into +existence. + +43. But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependence +or independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance of +God, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, always +contribute to the determination of the will. And if I am for the Molinists +in the first point, I am for the predeterminators in the second, provided +always that predetermination be taken as not necessitating. In a word, I am +of opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course it +adopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it. That it +will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary. The case +corresponds to that of the famous saying, _Astra inclinant, non +necessitant_, although here the similarity is not complete. For the event +towards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there +were some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass, whereas +the course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be +adopted. Moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations that +co-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater inclination of +the will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations. It is almost as +we have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results from all +the antecedent wills. + +44. Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring about +the necessity of the determinate truth. All philosophers acknowledge this, +asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, and that +nevertheless they remain contingent. The thing indeed would imply no +contradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; and therein lies +contingency. The better to understand this point, we must take into account +that there are two great principles of our arguments. The one is the +principle of _contradiction_, stating that of two contradictory +propositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is that +of the _determinant reason_: it states that nothing ever comes to pass +without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, +something to give an _a priori_ reason why it is existent rather than +non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other. This great +principle holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be +supplied: and although more often than not we are insufficiently [148] +acquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that +there are such. Were it not for this great principle we could never prove +the existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and +very profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, it +suffers no exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened. Besides, +nothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of +exceptions. That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system I +approve, where everything happens in accordance with general rules that at +most are mutually restrictive. + +45. We must therefore not imagine with some Schoolmen, whose ideas tend +towards the chimerical, that free contingent futurities have the privilege +of exemption from this general rule of the nature of things. There is +always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for +the maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should +incline without necessitating. That is also the opinion of all the +ancients, of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is never +prompted to action save by the representation of the good, which prevails +over the opposite representations. This is admitted even in relation to +God, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged that +they are none the less free in consequence of that. God fails not to choose +the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no +necessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is +equally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent +of necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will is +determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object. This is +therefore not a defect where God and the saints are concerned: on the +contrary, it would be a great defect, or rather a manifest absurdity, were +it otherwise, even in men here on earth, and if they were capable of acting +without any inclining reason. Of such absurdity no example will ever be +found; and even supposing one takes a certain course out of caprice, to +demonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure or advantage one thinks to find in +this conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it. + +46. There is therefore a freedom of contingency or, in a way, of +indifference, provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothing +necessitates us to one course or the other; but there is never any +_indifference of equipoise_, that is, where all is completely even on [149] +both sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great and +small movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the most +part unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves a room +there are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first, +without pausing to reflect. For there is not everywhere a slave, as in +Trimalchio's house in Petronius, to cry to us: the right foot first. All +that we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of the +philosophers, who teach that a cause cannot act without having a +disposition towards action. It is this disposition which contains a +predetermination, whether the doer have received it from without, or have +had it in consequence of his own antecedent character. + +47. Thus we have no need to resort, in company with some new Thomists, to a +new immediate predetermination by God, such as may cause the free creature +to abandon his indifference, and to a decree of God for predetermining the +creature, making it possible for God to know what the creature will do: for +it suffices that the creature be predetermined by its preceding state, +which inclines it to one course more than to the other. Moreover, all these +connexions of the actions of the creature and of all creatures were +represented in the divine understanding, and known to God through the +knowledge of mere intelligence, before he had decreed to give them +existence. Thus we see that, in order to account for the foreknowledge of +God, one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of the Molinists and +the predetermination which a Banez or an Alvarez (writers otherwise of +great profundity) have taught. + +48. By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists were +much embarrassed. They were asked not only how it was possible to know in +what direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be determined, but +also how it was possible that there should finally result therefrom a +determination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it is +the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant that +cause the privilege of being chimerical. It is pleasing to see their +harassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence there is absolutely no +means of egress. Some teach that the will, before it is determined +formally, must be determined virtually, in order to emerge from its state +of equipoise; and Father Louis of Dole, in his book on the _Co-operation of +God_, quotes Molinists who attempt to take refuge in this expedient: [150] +for they are compelled to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposed +to act. But they gain nothing, they only defer the difficulty: for they +will still be asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually. +They will therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging that +there is a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature, +which inclines it to be determined. + +49. In consequence of this, the case also of Buridan's ass between two +meadows, impelled equally towards both of them, is a fiction that cannot +occur in the universe, in the order of Nature, although M. Bayle be of +another opinion. It is true that, if the case were possible, one must say +that the ass would starve himself to death: but fundamentally the question +deals in the impossible, unless it be that God bring the thing about +expressly. For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through the +middle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its length, so that all +is equal and alike on both sides, in the manner wherein an ellipse, and +every plane figure of the number of those I term 'ambidexter', can be thus +halved, by any straight line passing through its centre. Neither the parts +of the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike nor are they evenly +placed on both sides of this vertical plane. There will therefore always be +many things in the ass and outside the ass, although they be not apparent +to us, which will determine him to go on one side rather than the other. +And although man is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the same +reason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise +between two courses is impossible. Furthermore it is true that an angel, or +God certainly, could always account for the course man has adopted, by +assigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced him +to adopt it: yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible to +ourselves, because the concatenation of causes linked together is very +long. + +50. Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove the +independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward +sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our +independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often +imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic +needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that +it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the +imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter. Nevertheless we shall [151] +see later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogether +its own natural principle in relation to its actions, dependent upon itself +and independent of all other creatures. + +51. As for _volition_ itself, to say that it is an object of free will is +incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will; +else we could still say that we will to have the will to will, and that +would go on to infinity. Besides, we do not always follow the latest +judgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will; but we always +follow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that come from +the direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens without +an express judgement of the understanding. + +52. All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as +everywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of _spiritual automaton_, +although contingent actions in general and free action in particular are +not on that account necessary with an absolute necessity, which would be +truly incompatible with contingency. Thus neither futurition in itself, +certain as it is, nor the infallible prevision of God, nor the +predetermination either of causes or of God's decrees destroys this +contingency and this freedom. That is acknowledged in respect of futurition +and prevision, as has already been set forth. Since, moreover, God's decree +consists solely in the resolution he forms, after having compared all +possible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it into +existence together with all that this world contains, by means of the +all-powerful word _Fiat_, it is plain to see that this decree changes +nothing in the constitution of things: God leaves them just as they were in +the state of mere possibility, that is, changing nothing either in their +essence or nature, or even in their accidents, which are represented +perfectly already in the idea of this possible world. Thus that which is +contingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than under +his prevision. + +53. But could God himself (it will be said) then change nothing in the +world? Assuredly he could not now change it, without derogation to his +wisdom, since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what it +contains, and since, likewise, he has formed this resolution to bring it +into existence: for he cannot be mistaken nor repent, and it did not behove +him to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not the [152] +whole. Thus, all being ordered from the beginning, it is only because of +this hypothetical necessity, recognized by everyone, that after God's +prevision or after his resolution nothing can be changed: and yet the +events in themselves remain contingent. For (setting aside this supposition +of the futurition of the thing and of the prevision or of the resolution of +God, a supposition which already lays it down as a fact that the thing will +happen, and in accordance with which one must say, 'Unumquodque, quando +est, oportet esse, aut unumquodque, siquidem erit, oportet futurum esse'), +the event has nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no +other thing might have happened in its stead. And as for the connexion +between causes and effects, it only inclined, without necessitating, the +free agency, as I have just explained; thus it does not produce even a +hypothetical necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, to +wit, this very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs. + +54. It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then perform +miracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in the +world were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same world +considered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who has since +performed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed to perform +them. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, merits and +demerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing can be changed. +This objection causes most perplexity to people in general, and yet it is +purely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these good or bad actions that +occur to-day were already before God when he formed the resolution to order +things. Those things which happen in this existing world were represented, +with their effects and their consequences, in the idea of this same world, +while it was still possible only; they were represented therein, attracting +God's grace whether natural or supernatural, requiring punishments or +rewards, just as it has happened actually in this world since God chose it. +The prayer or the good action were even then an _ideal cause_ or +_condition_, that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace +of God, or to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, all +is wisely connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeing +that which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basis +beforehand, or (what is the same) he chose that possible world in [153] +which everything was ordered in this fashion. + +55. This consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients called +the 'Lazy Sophism' ([Greek: logos argos]) which ended in a decision to do +nothing: for (people would say) if what I ask is to happen it will happen +even though I should do nothing; and if it is not to happen it will never +happen, no matter what trouble I take to achieve it. This necessity, +supposedly existent in events, and detached from their causes, might be +termed _Fatum Mahometanum_, as I have already observed above, because a +similar line of reasoning, so it is said, causes the Turks not to shun +places ravaged by plague. But the answer is quite ready: the effect being +certain, the cause that shall produce it is certain also; and if the effect +comes about it will be by virtue of a proportionate cause. Thus your +laziness perchance will bring it about that you will obtain naught of what +you desire, and that you will fall into those misfortunes which you would +by acting with care have avoided. We see, therefore, that the _connexion of +causes with effects_, far from causing an unendurable fatality, provides +rather a means of obviating it. There is a German proverb which says that +death will ever have a cause; and nothing is so true. You will die on that +day (let us presume it is so, and that God foresees it): yes, without +doubt; but it will be because you will do what shall lead you thither. It +is likewise with the chastisements of God, which also depend upon their +causes. And it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famous +passage from St. Ambrose (in cap. I _Lucae_), 'Novit Dominus mutare +sententiam, si tu noveris mutare delictum', which is not to be understood +as of reprobation, but of denunciation, such as that which Jonah dealt out +for God to the Ninevites. This common saying: 'Si non es praedestinatus, +fac ut praedestineris', must not be taken literally, its true sense being +that he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is required +for him to obtain it by the grace of God. The sophism which ends in a +decision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes to +induce certain people to face danger fearlessly. It has been applied in +particular to Turkish soldiers: but it seems that hashish is a more +important factor than this sophism, not to mention the fact that this +resolute spirit in the Turks has greatly belied itself in our days. + +56. A learned physician of Holland named Johan van Beverwyck took the +trouble to write _De Termino Vitae_ and to collect sundry answers, [154] +letters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this subject. +This collection has been printed, and it is astonishing to see there how +often people are misled, and how they have confused a problem which, +properly speaking, is the easiest in the world. After that it is no wonder +that there are very many doubts which the human race cannot abandon. The +truth is that people love to lose themselves, and this is a kind of ramble +of the mind, which is unwilling to subject itself to attention, to order, +to rules. It seems as though we are so accustomed to games and jesting that +we play the fool even in the most serious occupations, and when we least +think to do so. + +57. I fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of the +Augsburg Confession, _De Termino Paenitentiae Peremptorio_, which has +called forth so many treatises in Germany, some misunderstanding, though of +a different nature, has slipped in. The terms prescribed by the laws are +amongst lawyers known as _fatalia_. It may be said, in a sense, that the +_peremptory term_, prescribed to man for his repentance and amendment, is +certain in the sight of God, with whom all is certain. God knows when a +sinner will be so hardened that thereafter nothing can be done for him: not +indeed that it would be impossible for him to do penance or that sufficient +grace needs must be refused to him after a certain term, a grace that never +fails; but because there will be a time whereafter he will no more approach +the ways of salvation. But we never have certain marks for recognizing this +term, and we are never justified in considering a man utterly abandoned: +that would be to pass a rash judgement. It were better always to have room +for hope; and this is an occasion, with a thousand others, where our +ignorance is beneficial. + + _Prudens futuri temporis exitum_ + _Caliginosa nocte premit Deus_. + +58. The whole future is doubtless determined: but since we know not what it +is, nor what is foreseen or resolved, we must do our duty, according to the +reason that God has given us and according to the rules that he has +prescribed for us; and thereafter we must have a quiet mind, and leave to +God himself the care for the outcome. For he will never fail to do that +which shall be the best, not only in general but also in particular, for +those who have true confidence in him, that is, a confidence composed [155] +of true piety, a lively faith and fervent charity, by virtue of which we +will, as far as in us lies, neglect nothing appertaining to our duty and +his service. It is true that we cannot 'render service' to him, for he has +need of nothing: but it is 'serving him', in our parlance, when we strive +to carry out his presumptive will, co-operating in the good as it is known +to us, wherever we can contribute thereto. For we must always presume that +God is prompted towards the good we know, until the event shows us that he +had stronger reasons, although perhaps unknown to us, which have made him +subordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his own +designing, which he has not failed or will not fail to effect. + +59. I have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its causes; +that there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this dependence of +our actions; and that otherwise one would slip into a preposterous and +unendurable fatality, namely into the _Fatum Mahometanum_, which is the +worst of all because it overthrows foresight and good counsel. It is well +to show, notwithstanding, how this dependence of voluntary actions does not +fundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful +_spontaneity_, which in a certain sense makes the soul in its resolves +independent of the physical influence of all other creatures. This +spontaneity, hitherto little recognized, which exalts our command over our +actions to the highest pitch, is a consequence of the System of +Pre-established Harmony, of which I must give some explanation here. The +Scholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physical +influence between body and soul: but since it has been recognized that +thought and dimensional mass have no mutual connexion, and that they are +creatures differing _toto genere_, many moderns have acknowledged that +there is no _physical communication_ between soul and body, despite the +_metaphysical communication_ always subsisting, which causes soul and body +to compose one and the same _suppositum_, or what is called a person. This +physical communication, if there were such, would cause the soul to change +the degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that are in +the body, and _vice versa_ the body to change the sequence of the thoughts +that are in the soul. But this effect cannot be inferred from any notion +conceived in the body and in the soul; though nothing be better known to us +than the soul, since it is inmost to us, that is to say inmost to itself. + + [156] +60. M. Descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body's +action dependent upon the soul. He believed in the existence of a rule of +Nature to the effect, according to him, that the same quantity of movement +is conserved in bodies. He deemed it not possible that the influence of the +soul should violate this law of bodies, but he believed that the soul +notwithstanding might have power to change the direction of the movements +that are made in the body; much as a rider, though giving no force to the +horse he mounts, nevertheless controls it by guiding that force in any +direction he pleases. But as that is done by means of the bridle, the bit, +the spurs and other material aids, it is conceivable how that can be; there +are, however, no instruments such as the soul may employ for this result, +nothing indeed either in the soul or in the body, that is, either in +thought or in the mass, which may serve to explain this change of the one +by the other. In a word, that the soul should change the quantity of force +and that it should change the line of direction, both these things are +equally inexplicable. + +61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been discovered +since M. Descartes' day. The first is that the quantity of absolute force +which is in fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement, as I +have demonstrated elsewhere. The second discovery is that the same +direction is still conserved in all bodies together that are assumed as +interacting, in whatever way they come into collision. If this rule had +been known to M. Descartes, he would have taken the direction of bodies to +be as independent of the soul as their force; and I believe that that would +have led direct to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, whither these +same rules have led me. For apart from the fact that the physical influence +of one of these substances on the other is inexplicable, I recognized that +without a complete derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act +physically upon the body. And I did not believe that one could here listen +to philosophers, competent in other respects, who produce a God, as it +were, _ex machina_, to bring about the final solution of the piece, +maintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soul +pleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires. For this +system, which is called that of _occasional causes_ (because it teaches +that God acts on the body at the instance of the soul, and _vice versa_), +besides introducing perpetual miracles to establish communication [157] +between these two substances, does not obviate the derangement of the +natural laws obtaining in each of these same substances, which, in the +general opinion, their mutual influence would cause. + +62. Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle of +Harmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the +_preformation_ and the Pre-established Harmony of all things amongst +themselves, of that between nature and grace, between the decrees of God +and our actions foreseen, between all parts of matter, and even between the +future and the past, the whole in conformity with the sovereign wisdom of +God, whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive. Thus I +could not fail to arrive at the system which declares that God created the +soul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and represent +to itself successively that which takes place within the body, and the body +also in such a fashion that it must do of itself that which the soul +ordains. Consequently the laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in the +order of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptions +must produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of +bodies on our organs; and likewise the laws of movements in the body, which +follow one another in the order of efficient causes, meet and so harmonize +with the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to act at the time +when the soul wills it. + +63. Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to +freedom than that system. And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in his +book on the _Conformity of Faith with Reason_, that it is just as if he who +knows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on the +morrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry out +to-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that would +not prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, although the +action of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free. + +64. Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to this +system, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only from +it and from its present state, how can one give it a greater +_independence_? It is true that there still remains some imperfection in +the constitution of the soul. All that happens to the soul depends upon it, +but depends not always upon its will; that were too much. Nor are such[158] +happenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived with +distinctness. For there is in the soul not only an order of distinct +perceptions, forming its dominion, but also a series of confused +perceptions or passions, forming its bondage: and there is no need for +astonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity if it had none but +distinct perceptions. It has nevertheless some power over these confused +perceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For although it cannot +change its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end with +enough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits. It even +has a like power over the more distinct perceptions, being able to endue +itself indirectly with opinions and intentions, and to hinder itself from +having this one or that, and stay or hasten its judgement. For we can seek +means beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding +step of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponement +of our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be +judged. Although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects +of our will (as I have already observed), one sometimes, takes measures +nevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one does +not will, or believe, now. So great is the profundity of the spirit of man. + +65. And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of _spontaneity_, it +must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it the +principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that the +same is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature, +although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent. In the +popular sense notwithstanding, speaking in accordance with appearances, we +must say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon the +impressions of the senses: much as we speak with Ptolemy and Tycho in +everyday converse, and think with Copernicus, when it is a question of the +rising and the setting of the sun. + +66. One may however give a true and philosophic sense to this _mutual +dependence_ which we suppose between the soul and the body. It is that the +one of these two substances depends upon the other ideally, in so far as +the reason of that which is done in the one can be furnished by that which +is in the other. This had already happened when God ordered beforehand the +harmony that there would be between them. Even so would that [159] +automaton, that should fulfil the servant's function, depend upon me +_ideally_, in virtue of the knowledge of him who, foreseeing my future +orders, would have rendered it capable of serving me at the right moment +all through the morrow. The knowledge of my future intentions would have +actuated this great craftsman, who would accordingly have fashioned the +automaton: my influence would be objective, and his physical. For in so far +as the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the +body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to +execute its orders. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its +perceptions are confused, God has accommodated the soul to the body, in +such sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal +representations. This produces the same effect and the same appearance as +if the one depended immediately upon the other, and by the agency of a +physical influence. Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts that +the soul represents the bodies which encompass it. The same thing must +apply to all that we understand by the actions of simple substances one +upon another. For each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportion +to its perfection, although this be only ideally, and in the reasons of +things, as God in the beginning ordered one substance to accord with +another in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is in +each. (Withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures, +because one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what is +done, and which have served to bring it into existence, is in the one of +these substances, and another part of these reasons is in the other, +perfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared.) Thus it is +we attribute _action_ to the one, and _passion_ to the other. + +67. But after all, whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary actions, +and even though there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (which +there is not) it would not follow that there would not be a sufficient +degree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable. It +is true that generally we speak as though the necessity of the action put +an end to all merit and all demerit, all justification for praise and +blame, for reward and punishment: but it must be admitted that this +conclusion is not entirely correct. I am very far from sharing the opinions +of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems,[160] +this entirely mathematical necessity, which I think I have adequately +refuted, and perhaps more clearly than is customary. Yet one must always +bear testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that does +not result from it. Moreover, these arguments prove too much, since they +would prove just as much against hypothetical necessity, and would justify +the lazy sophism. For the absolute necessity of the sequence of causes +would in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of a +hypothetical necessity. + +68. In the first place, therefore, it must be agreed that it is permitted +to kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself. It will be +granted also that it is permitted, and often even necessary, to destroy +venomous or very noxious animals, although they be not so by their own +fault. + +69. Secondly, one inflicts punishments upon a beast, despite its lack of +reason and freedom, when one deems that this may serve to correct it: thus +one punishes dogs and horses, and indeed with much success. Rewards serve +us no less in the managing of animals: when an animal is hungry, the food +that is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never be +obtained from him. + +70. Thirdly, one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments (where it +is no longer a question of correcting the beast that is punished) if this +punishment could serve as an example, or inspire terror in others, to make +them cease from evil doing. Rorarius, in his book on reason in beasts, says +that in Africa they crucified lions, in order to drive away other lions +from the towns and frequented places, and that he had observed in passing +through the province of Juelich that they hanged wolves there in order to +ensure greater safety for the sheepfolds. There are people in the villages +also who nail birds of prey to the doors of houses, with the idea that +other birds of the same kind will then not so readily appear. These +measures would always be justified if they were of any avail. + +71. Then, in the fourth place, since experience proves that the fear of +chastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from evil +and strive to do good, one would have good reason to avail oneself of such, +even though men were acting under necessity, whatever the necessity might +be. The objection will be raised that if good or evil is necessary it is +useless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to hinder it: but the +answer has already been given above in the passage combating the lazy [161] +sophism. If good or evil were a necessity without these means, then such +means would be unavailing; but it is not so. These goods and evils come +only with the aid of these means, and if these results were necessary the +means would be a part of the causes rendering them necessary, since +experience teaches us that often fear or hope hinders evil or advances +good. This objection, then, differs hardly at all from the lazy sophism, +which we raise against the certainty as well as the necessity of future +events. Thus one may say that these objections are directed equally against +hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity, and that they prove as much +against the one as against the other, that is to say, nothing at all. + +72. There was a great dispute between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes, which +began when they were both in Paris, and which was continued after their +return to England; all the parts of it are to be found collected in a +quarto volume published in London in the year 1656. They are all in +English, and have not been translated as far as I know, nor inserted in the +Collection of Works in Latin by Mr. Hobbes. I had already read these +writings, and have obtained them again since. And I had observed at the +outset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all things, +but had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all the rules +of divine or human justice, and would not prevent altogether the exercise +of this virtue. + +73. There is, however, a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards and +of punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act by an +absolute necessity, supposing such necessity existed. It is that kind of +justice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example, nor even +redress of the evil. This justice has its foundation only in the fitness of +things, which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation of an evil +action. The Socinians, Hobbes and some others do not admit this punitive +justice, which properly speaking is avenging justice. God reserves it for +himself in many cases; but he does not fail to grant it to those who are +entitled to govern others, and he exercises it through their agency, +provided that they act under the influence of reason and not of passion. +The Socinians believe it to be without foundation, but it always has some +foundation in that fitness of things which gives satisfaction not only to +the injured but also to the wise who see it; even as a beautiful piece of +music, or again a good piece of architecture, satisfies cultivated [162] +minds. And the wise lawgiver having threatened, and having, so to speak, +promised a chastisement, it befits his consistency not to leave the action +completely unpunished, even though the punishment would no longer avail to +correct anyone. But even though he should have promised nothing, it is +enough that there is a fitness of things which could have prompted him to +make this promise, since the wise man likewise promises only that which is +fitting. And one may even say that there is here a certain compensation of +the mind, which would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement did +not contribute towards restoring order. One can also consult what Grotius +wrote against the Socinians, of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, and the +answer of Crellius thereto. + +74. Thus it is that the pains of the damned continue, even when they no +longer serve to turn them away from evil, and that likewise the rewards of +the blessed continue, even when they no longer serve for strengthening them +in good. One may say nevertheless that the damned ever bring upon +themselves new pains through new sins, and that the blessed ever bring upon +themselves new joys by new progress in goodness: for both are founded on +the _principle of the fitness of things_, which has seen to it that affairs +were so ordered that the evil action must bring upon itself a chastisement. +There is good reason to believe, following the parallelism of the two +realms, that of final causes and that of efficient causes, that God has +established in the universe a connexion between punishment or reward and +bad or good action, in accordance wherewith the first should always be +attracted by the second, and virtue and vice obtain their reward and their +punishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things, which contains +still another kind of pre-established harmony than that which appears in +the communication between the soul and the body. For, in a word, all that +God does, as I have said already, is harmonious to perfection. Perhaps then +this principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beings +acting without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity; and in +that case corrective justice alone would be administered, and not punitive +justice. That is the opinion of the famous Conringius, in a dissertation he +published on what is just. And indeed, the reasons Pomponazzi employed in +his book on fate, to prove the usefulness of chastisements and rewards, +even though all should come about in our actions by a fatal necessity,[163] +concern only amendment and not satisfaction, [Greek: kolasin ou timorian]. +Moreover, it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one destroys +animals accessary to certain crimes, as one razes the houses of rebels, +that is, to inspire terror. Thus it is an act of corrective justice, +wherein punitive justice has no part at all. + +75. But we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question more +curious than necessary, since we have shown sufficiently that there is no +such necessity in voluntary actions. Nevertheless it was well to show that +_imperfect freedom_ alone, that is, freedom which is exempt only from +constraint, would suffice as foundation for chastisements and rewards of +the kind conducive to the avoidance of evil, and to amendment. One sees +also from this that some persons of intelligence, who persuade themselves +that everything is necessary, are wrong in saying that none must be praised +or blamed, rewarded or punished. Apparently they say so only to exercise +their wit: the pretext is that all being necessary nothing would be in our +power. But this pretext is ill founded: necessary actions would be still in +our power, at least in so far as we could perform them or omit them, when +the hope or the fear of praise or blame, of pleasure or pain prompted our +will thereto, whether they prompted it of necessity, or in prompting it +they left spontaneity, contingency and freedom all alike unimpaired. Thus +praise and blame, rewards and punishments would preserve always a large +part of their use, even though there were a true necessity in our actions. +We can praise and blame also natural good and bad qualities, where the will +has no part--in a horse, in a diamond, in a man; and he who said of Cato of +Utica that he acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature, and that +it was impossible for him to behave otherwise, thought to praise him the +more. + +76. The difficulties which I have endeavoured up to now to remove have been +almost all common to natural and revealed theology. Now it will be +necessary to come to a question of revealed theology, concerning the +election or the reprobation of men, with the dispensation or use of divine +grace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of God. But +when I answered the preceding objections, I opened up a way to meet those +that remain. This confirms the observation I made thereon (_Preliminary +Dissertation,_ 43) that there is rather a conflict between the true [164] +reasons of natural theology and the false reasons of human appearances, +than between revealed faith and reason. For on this subject scarcely any +difficulty arises that is new, and not deriving its origin from those which +can be placed in the way of the truths discerned by reason. + +77. Now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on this +subject of predestination and grace, and often give different answers to +the same objections, according to their various principles, one cannot +avoid touching on the differences which prevail among them. One may say in +general that some look upon God more metaphysically and others more +morally: and it has already been stated on other occasions that the +Counter-Remonstrants took the first course and the Remonstrants the second. +But to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the independence of God +and the dependence of creatures, and on the other side the justice and +goodness of God, which makes him dependent upon himself, his will upon his +understanding or his wisdom. + +78. Some gifted and well-intentioned authors, desiring to show the force of +the reasons advocated by the two principal parties, in order to persuade +them to a mutual tolerance, deem that the whole controversy is reduced to +this essential point, namely: What was God's principal aim in making his +decrees with regard to man? Did he make them solely in order to show forth +his glory by manifesting his attributes, and forming, to that end, the +great plan of creation and providence? Or has he had regard rather to the +voluntary movements of intelligent substances which he designed to create, +considering what they would will and do in the different circumstances and +situations wherein he might place them, so as to form a fitting resolve +thereupon? It appears to me that the two answers to this great question +thus given as opposites to one another are easy to reconcile, and that in +consequence the two parties would be agreed in principle, without any need +of tolerance, if all were reduced to this point. In truth God, in designing +to create the world, purposed solely to manifest and communicate his +perfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of his +greatness, his wisdom and his goodness. But that very purpose pledged him +to consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of pure +possibility, that he might form the most fitting plan. He is like a great +architect whose aim in view is the satisfaction or the glory of having[165] +built a beautiful palace, and who considers all that is to enter into this +construction: the form and the materials, the place, the situation, the +means, the workmen, the expense, before he forms a complete resolve. For a +wise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he +does not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means of +attaining thereto. + +79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that, +God being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer that +everything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers himself +alone, without concern for others, and that thus he has made some happy and +others unhappy without any cause, without choice, without reason. But to +teach so about God were to deprive him of wisdom and of goodness. We need +only observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he owes +to himself, to conclude that he considers his creatures also, and that he +uses them in the manner most consistent with order. For the more a great +and good prince is mindful of his glory, the more he will think of making +his subjects happy, even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs, +and though his subjects were slaves from birth, bondsmen (in lawyers' +parlance), people entirely in subjection to arbitrary power. Calvin himself +and some others of the greatest defenders of the absolute decree rightly +maintained that God had _great and just reasons_ for his election and the +dispensation of his grace, although these reasons be unknown to us in +detail: and we must judge charitably that the most rigid predestinators +have too much reason and too much piety to depart from this opinion. + +80. There will therefore be no argument for debate on that point (as I +hope) with people who are at all reasonable. But there will always be +argument among those who are called Universalists and Particularists, +according to what they teach of the grace and the will of God. Yet I am +somewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on the +will of God to save all men, and on that which depends upon it (when one +keeps separate the doctrine _de Auxiliis_, or of the assistance of grace), +rests rather in expressions than in things. For it is sufficient to +consider that God, as well as every wise and beneficent mind, is inclined +towards all possible good, and that this inclination is proportionate to +the excellence of the good. Moreover, this results (if we take the [166] +matter precisely and in itself) from an 'antecedent will', as it is termed, +which, however, is not always followed by its complete effect, because this +wise mind must have many other inclinations besides. Thus it is the result +of all the inclinations together that makes his will complete and +decretory, as I have already explained. One may therefore very well say +with ancient writers that God wills to save all men according to his +antecedent will, but not according to his consequent will, which never +fails to be followed by its effect. And if those who deny this universal +will do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will, they +are only troubling themselves about a question of name. + +81. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination to +eternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether this +destination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good and +destination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of all +parties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say, +that none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which is +damnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: for +predestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination, +which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of those +whom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate are _destined_ to be +condemned, because they are known to be impenitent. But it cannot so well +be said that the reprobate are _predestined_ to damnation: for there is no +_absolute_ reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence. + +82. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing to +manifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy of +him, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected the +damned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this resolve +he thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these two +virtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some in order to +save them, while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punish +them. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', because the decree +to punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge of the future +existence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day amongst those who are +called Reformed, and one that is favoured by the Synod of Dordrecht, is +that of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding somewhat to the conception of +St. Augustine. For he asserts that God having resolved to permit the [167] +sin of Adam and the corruption of the human race, for reasons just but +hidden, his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freely +saved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his justice made him resolve to +punish the others by the damnation that they deserved. That is why, with +the Schoolmen, only the saved were called _Praedestinati_ and the damned +were called _Praesciti_. It must be admitted that some Infralapsarians and +others speak sometimes of predestination to damnation, following the +example of Fulgentius and of St. Augustine himself: but that signifies the +same as destination to them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words. +That pretext, notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating that +Godescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and who +took the name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author. + +83. As for the destination of the elect to eternal life, the Protestants, +as well as those of the Roman Church, dispute much among themselves as to +whether election is absolute or is founded on the prevision of final living +faith. Those who are called Evangelicals, that is, those of the Augsburg +Confession, hold the latter opinion: they believe that one need not go into +the hidden causes of election while one may find a manifest cause of it +shown in Holy Scripture, which is faith in Jesus Christ; and it appears to +them that the prevision of the cause is also the cause of the prevision of +the effect. Those who are called Reformed are of a different opinion: they +admit that salvation comes from faith in Jesus Christ, but they observe +that often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is posterior in +intention, as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end. Thus +the question is, whether faith or salvation is anterior in the intention of +God, that is, whether God's design is rather to save man than to make him a +believer. + +84. Hence we see that the question between the Supralapsarians and the +Infralapsarians in part, and again between them and the Evangelicals, comes +back to a right conception of the order that is in God's decrees. Perhaps +one might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that, properly +speaking, all the decrees of God that are here concerned are simultaneous, +not only in respect of time, as everyone agrees, but also _in signo +rationis_, or in the order of nature. And indeed, the Formula of Concord, +building upon some passages of St. Augustine, comprised in the same [168] +Decree of Election salvation and the means that conduce to it. To +demonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of decrees with which we +are concerned, we must revert to the expedient that I have employed more +than once, which states that God, before decreeing anything, considered +among other possible sequences of things that one which he afterwards +approved. In the idea of this is represented how the first parents sin and +corrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems the human race; how some, +aided by such and such graces, attain to final faith and to salvation; and +how others, with or without such or other graces, do not attain thereto, +continue in sin, and are damned. God grants his sanction to this sequence +only after having entered into all its detail, and thus pronounces nothing +final as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered upon +everything and compared it with other possible sequences. Thus God's +pronouncement concerns the whole sequence at the same time; he simply +decrees its existence. In order to save other men, or in a different way, +he must needs choose an altogether different sequence, seeing that all is +connected in each sequence. In this conception of the matter, which is that +most worthy of the All-wise, all whose actions are connected together to +the highest possible degree, there would be only one total decree, which is +to create such a world. This total decree comprises equally all the +particular decrees, without setting one of them before or after another. +Yet one may say also that each particular act of antecedent will entering +into the total result has its value and order, in proportion to the good +whereto this act inclines. But these acts of antecedent will are not called +decrees, since they are not yet inevitable, the outcome depending upon the +total result. According to this conception of things, all the difficulties +that can here be made amount to the same as those I have already stated and +removed in my inquiry concerning the origin of evil. + +85. There remains only one important matter of discussion, which has its +peculiar difficulties. It is that of the dispensation of the means and +circumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation. This comprises +amongst others the subject of the Aids of Grace (_de auxiliis gratiae_), on +which Rome (since the Congregation _de Auxiliis_ under Clement VIII, when a +debate took place between the Dominicans and the Jesuits) does not readily +permit books to be published. Everyone must agree that God is [169] +altogether good and just, that his goodness makes him contribute the least +possible to that which can render men guilty, and the most possible to that +which serves to save them (possible, I say, subject to the general order of +things); that his justice prevents him from condemning innocent men, and +from leaving good actions without reward; and that he even keeps an exact +proportion in punishments and rewards. Nevertheless, this idea that one +should have of the goodness and the justice of God does not appear enough +in what we know of his actions with regard to the salvation and the +damnation of men: and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sin +and its remedies. + +86. The first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with original +sin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on God's part in +exposing the soul thereto. This difficulty has given rise to three opinions +on the origin of the soul itself. The first is that of the _pre-existence +of human souls_ in another world or in another life, where they had sinned +and on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body, an +opinion of the Platonists which is attributed to Origen and which even +to-day finds adherents. Henry More, an English scholar, advocated something +like this dogma in a book written with that express purpose. Some of those +who affirm this pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis. The +younger van Helmont held this opinion, and the ingenious author of some +metaphysical _Meditations_, published in 1678 under the name of William +Wander, appears to have some leaning towards it. The second opinion is that +of _Traduction_, as if the soul of children were engendered (_per +traducem_) from the soul or souls of those from whom the body is +engendered. St. Augustine inclined to this judgement the better to explain +original sin. This doctrine is taught also by most of the theologians of +the Augsburg Confession. Nevertheless it is not completely established +among them, since the Universities of Jena and Helmstedt, and others +besides, have long been opposed to it. The third opinion, and that most +widely accepted to-day, is that of _Creation_: it is taught in the majority +of the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with the greatest difficulty in +respect of original sin. + +87. Into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human soul +has entered the philosophic dispute on _the origin of forms._ Aristotle and +scholastic philosophy after him called _Form_ that which is a [170] +principle of action and is found in that which acts. This inward principle +is either substantial, being then termed 'Soul', when it is in an organic +body, or accidental, and customarily termed 'Quality'. The same philosopher +gave to the soul the generic name of 'Entelechy' or _Act_. This word +'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the Greek word signifying +'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed it literally +in Latin by _perfectihabia_: for Act is a realization of potency. And he +had no need to consult the Devil, as men say he did, in order to learn +that. Now the Philosopher of Stagira supposes that there are two kinds of +Act, the permanent act and the successive act. The permanent or lasting act +is nothing but the Substantial or Accidental Form: the substantial form (as +for example the soul) is altogether permanent, at least according to my +judgement, and the accidental is only so for a time. But the altogether +momentary act, whose nature is transitory, consists in action itself. I +have shown elsewhere that the notion of Entelechy is not altogether to be +scorned, and that, being permanent, it carries with it not only a mere +faculty for action, but also that which is called 'force', 'effort', +'conatus', from which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it. +Faculty is only an _attribute_, or rather sometimes a mode; but force, when +it is not an ingredient of substance itself (that is, force which is not +primitive but derivative), is a _quality_, which is distinct and separable +from substance. I have shown also how one may suppose that the soul is a +primitive force which is modified and varied by derivative forces or +qualities, and exercised in actions. + +88. Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question +of the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound of form +and matter is produced and that the form is only _comproduced_ means +nothing. The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of +matter, this being called _Eduction_. That also meant in fact nothing, but +it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a +statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This +comparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the +case of shape. Some have thought that forms were sent from heaven, and even +created expressly, when bodies were produced. Julius Scaliger hinted that +it was possible that forms were rather derived from the active potency of +the efficient cause (that is to say, either from that of God in the [171] +case of Creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation), +than from the passive potency of matter. And that, in the case of +generation, meant a return to traduction. Daniel Sennert, a famous doctor +and physicist at Wittenberg, cherished this opinion, particularly in +relation to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed. A certain +Julius Caesar della Galla, an Italian living in the Low Countries, and a +doctor of Groningen named Johan Freitag wrote with much vehemence in +opposition to Sennert. Johann Sperling, a professor at Wittenberg, made a +defence of his master, and finally came into conflict with Johann Zeisold, +a professor at Jena, who upheld the belief that the human soul is created. + +89. But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a +question of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same with +accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and +their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of +limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quite +another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whose +beginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain. Sennert and +Sperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the indestructibility +of the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms, although they allowed +that they were indivisible and immaterial. But the fact is that they +confused indestructibility with immortality, whereby is understood in the +case of man that not only the soul but also the personality subsists. In +saying that the soul of man is immortal one implies the subsistence of what +makes the identity of the person, something which retains its moral +qualities, conserving the _consciousness_, or the reflective inward +feeling, of what it is: thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement or +reward. But this conservation of personality does not occur in the souls of +beasts: that is why I prefer to say that they are imperishable rather than +to call them immortal. Yet this misapprehension appears to have been the +cause of a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the Thomists and of other +good philosophers: they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility of +all souls, without being willing to admit their indestructibility, greatly +to the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul. John Scot, that is, +the Scotsman (which formerly signified Hibernian or Erigena), a famous +writer of the time of Louis the Debonair and of his sons, was for the +conservation of all souls: and I see not why there should be less [172] +objection to making the atoms of Epicurus or of Gassendi endure, than to +affirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible substances, +which are the sole and true atoms of Nature. And Pythagoras was right in +saying generally, as Ovid makes him say: + + _Morte carent animae_. + +90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest exceptions +possible, here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in every sense on +this important question. I consider that souls and simple substances +altogether cannot begin except by creation, or end except by annihilation. +Moreover, as the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable in +the order of nature only when one assumes a _preformation_ already organic, +I have thence inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only a +transformation and augmentation. Thus, since the same body was already +furnished with organs, it is to be supposed that it was already animate, +and that it had the same soul: so I assume _vice versa_, from the +conservation of the soul when once it is created, that the animal is also +conserved, and that apparent death is only an envelopment, there being no +likelihood that in the order of nature souls exist entirely separated from +all body, or that what does not begin naturally can cease through natural +forces. + +91. Considering that so admirable an order and rules so general are +established in regard to animals, it does not appear reasonable that man +should be completely excluded from that order, and that everything in +relation to his soul should come about in him by miracle. Besides I have +pointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of God's wisdom that all +should be harmonious in his works, and that nature should be parallel with +grace. It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human +souls, like those of other species, have been in the seed, and in the +progenitors as far back as Adam, and have consequently existed since the +beginning of things, always in a kind of organic body. On this point it +seems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, Mr. Pitcairne, M. +Hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion. This +doctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of +M. Leeuwenhoek and other good observers. But it also for divers reasons +appears likely to me that they existed then as sentient or animal [173] +souls only, endowed with perception and feeling, and devoid of reason. +Further I believe that they remained in this state up to the time of the +generation of the man to whom they were to belong, but that then they +received reason, whether there be a natural means of raising a sentient +soul to the degree of a reasoning soul (a thing I find it difficult to +imagine) or whether God may have given reason to this soul through some +special operation, or (if you will) by a kind of _transcreation_. This +latter is easier to admit, inasmuch as revelation teaches much about other +forms of immediate operation by God upon our souls. This explanation +appears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy or +theology. For the difficulty of the origin of forms thus disappears +completely; and besides it is much more appropriate to divine justice to +give the soul, already corrupted _physically_ or on the animal side by the +sin of Adam, a new perfection which is reason, than to put a reasoning +soul, by creation or otherwise, in a body wherein it is to be corrupted +_morally_. + +92. Now the soul being once under the domination of sin, and ready to +commit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason, a +new question arises, to wit: whether this tendency in a man who has not +been regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him, even though he should +never come to commit sin, as may happen, and happens often, whether he die +before reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before he +has made use of his reason. St. Gregory of Nazianzos is supposed to have +denied this (_Orat. de Baptismo_); but St. Augustine is for the +affirmative, and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient to +earn the flames of hell, although this opinion is, to say the least, very +harsh. When I speak here of damnation or of hell, I mean pains, and not +mere deprivation of supreme felicity; I mean _poenam sensus, non damni_. +Gregory of Rimini, General of the Augustinians, with a few others followed +St. Augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of the Schools of his +time, and for that reason he was called the torturer of children, _tortor +infantum_. The Schoolmen, instead of sending them into the flames of hell, +have assigned to them a special Limbo, where they do not suffer, and are +only punished by privation of the beatific vision. The Revelations of St. +Birgitta (as they are called), much esteemed in Rome, also uphold this +dogma. Salmeron and Molina, and before them Ambrose Catharin and [174] +others, grant them a certain natural bliss; and Cardinal Sfondrati, a man +of learning and piety, who approves this, latterly went so far as to prefer +in a sense their state, which is the state of happy innocence, to that of a +sinner saved, as we may see in his _Nodus Praedestinationis Solutus_. That, +however, seems to go too far. Certainly a soul truly enlightened would not +wish to sin, even though it could by this means obtain all imaginable +pleasures. But the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simply +chimerical, and it is better to obtain bliss (even after repentance) than +to be deprived of it for ever. + +93. Many prelates and theologians of France who are well pleased to differ +from Molina, and to join with St. Augustine, seem to incline towards the +opinion of this great doctor, who condemns to eternal flames children that +die in the age of innocence before having received baptism. This is what +appears from the letter mentioned above, written by five distinguished +prelates of France to Pope Innocent XII, against that posthumous book by +Cardinal Sfondrati. But therein they did not venture to condemn the +doctrine of the purely privative punishment of children dying without +baptism, seeing it approved by the venerable Thomas Aquinas, and by other +great men. I do not speak of those who are called on one side Jansenists +and on the other disciples of St. Augustine, for they declare themselves +entirely and firmly for the opinion of this Father. But it must be +confessed that this opinion has not sufficient foundation either in reason +or in Scripture, and that it is outrageously harsh. M. Nicole makes rather +a poor apology for it in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, written to +oppose M. Jurieu, although M. Bayle takes his side in chapter 178 of the +_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III. M. Nicole makes use of +this pretext, that there are also other dogmas in the Christian religion +which appear harsh. On the one hand, however, that does not lead to the +conclusion that these instances of harshness may be multiplied without +proof; and on the other we must take into account that the other dogmas +mentioned by M. Nicole, namely original sin and eternity of punishment, are +only harsh and unjust to outward appearance, while the damnation of +children dying without actual sin and without regeneration would in truth +be harsh, since it would be in effect the damning of innocents. For that +reason I believe that the party which advocates this opinion will never +altogether have the upper hand in the Roman Church itself. Evangelical[175] +theologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this question, +and to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency of their +Creator. Nor do we know all the wonderful ways that God may choose to +employ for the illumination of souls. + +94. One may say that those who condemn for original sin alone, and who +consequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the Covenant, +fall, in a sense, without being aware of it, into a certain attitude to +man's inclination and God's foreknowledge which they disapprove in others. +They will not have it that God should refuse his grace to those whose +resistance to it he foresees, nor that this expectation and this tendency +should cause the damnation of these persons: and yet they claim that the +tendency which constitutes original sin, and in which God foresees that the +child will sin as soon as he shall reach years of discretion, suffices to +damn this child beforehand. Those who maintain the one and reject the other +do not preserve enough uniformity and connexion in their dogmas. + +95. There is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reach +years of discretion and plunge into sin, following the inclination of +corrupt nature, if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary for +them to stop on the edge of the precipice, or to drag themselves from the +abyss wherein they have fallen. For it seems hard to damn them eternally +for having done that which they had no power to prevent themselves from +doing. Those that damn even children, who are without discretion, trouble +themselves even less about adults, and one would say that they have become +callous through the very expectation of seeing people suffer. But it is not +the same with other theologians, and I would be rather on the side of those +who grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away from evil, +provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this succour, and not +to reject it voluntarily. The objection is made that there has been and +still is a countless multitude of men, among civilized peoples and among +barbarians, who have never had this knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ +which is necessary for those who would tread the wonted paths to salvation. +But without excusing them on the plea of a sin purely philosophical, and +without stopping at a mere penalty of privation, things for which there is +no opportunity of discussion here, one may doubt the fact: for how do we +know whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of [176] +kinds unknown to us? This maxim, _Quod facienti, quod in se est, non +denegatur gratia necessaria_, appears to me to have eternal truth. Thomas +Aquinas, Archbishop Bradwardine and others have hinted that, in regard to +this, something comes to pass of which we are not aware. (Thom. quest. XIV, +_De Veritate_, artic. XI, ad I et alibi. Bradwardine, _De Causa Dei_, non +procul ab initio.) And sundry theologians of great authority in the Roman +Church itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of God above all +things, when the grace of Jesus Christ arouses it, suffices for salvation. +Father Francis Xavier answered the Japanese that if their ancestors had +used well their natural light God would have given them the grace necessary +for salvation; and the Bishop of Geneva, Francis of Sales, gives full +approval to this answer (Book 4, _On the Love of God,_ ch. 5). + +96. This I pointed out some time ago to the excellent M Pelisson, to show +him that the Roman Church, going further than the Protestants, does not +damn utterly those who are outside its communion, and even outside +Christianity, by using as its only criterion explicit faith. Nor did he +refute it, properly speaking, in the very kind answer he gave me, and which +he published in the fourth part of his _Reflexions_, also doing me the +honour of adding to it my letter. I offered him then for consideration what +a famous Portuguese theologian, by name Jacques Payva Andradius, envoy to +the Council of Trent, wrote concerning this, in opposition to Chemnitz, +during this same Council. And now, without citing many other authors of +eminence, I will content myself with naming Father Friedrich Spee, the +Jesuit, one of the most excellent in his Society, who also held this common +opinion upon the efficacy of the love of God, as is apparent in the preface +to the admirable book which he wrote in Germany on the Christian virtues. +He speaks of this observation as of a highly important secret of piety, and +expatiates with great clearness upon the power of divine love to blot out +sin, even without the intervention of the Sacraments of the Catholic +Church, provided one scorn them not, for that would not at all be +compatible with this love. And a very great personage, whose character was +one of the most lofty to be found in the Roman Church, was the first to +make me acquainted with it. Father Spee was of a noble family of Westphalia +(it may be said in passing) and he died in the odour of sanctity, according +to the testimony of him who published this book in Cologne with the [177] +approval of the Superiors. + +97. The memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to persons +of knowledge and good sense, because he is the author of the book entitled: +_Cautio Criminalis circa Processus contra Sagas_, which has caused much +stir, and has been translated into several languages. I learnt from the +Grand Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, uncle of His Highness +the present Elector, who walks gloriously in the footsteps of that worthy +predecessor, the story that follows. That Father was in Franconia when +there was a frenzy there for burning alleged sorcerers. He accompanied even +to the pyre many of them, all of whom he recognized as being innocent, from +their confessions and the researches that he had made thereon. Therefore in +spite of the danger incurred at that time by one telling the truth in this +matter, he resolved to compile this work, without however naming himself. +It bore great fruit and on this matter converted that Elector, at that time +still a simple canon and afterwards Bishop of Wuerzburg, finally also +Archbishop of Mainz, who, as soon as he came to power, put an end to these +burnings. Therein he was followed by the Dukes of Brunswick, and finally by +the majority of the other princes and states of Germany. + +98. This digression appeared to me to be seasonable, because that writer +deserves to be more widely known. Returning now to the subject I make a +further observation. Supposing that to-day a knowledge of Jesus Christ +according to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation, as indeed it +is safest to teach, it will be possible to say that God will give that +knowledge to all those who do, humanly speaking, that which in them lies, +even though God must needs give it by a miracle. Moreover, we cannot know +what passes in souls at the point of death; and if sundry learned and +serious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a kind of faith, +although they do not remember it afterwards when they are questioned about +it, why should one maintain that nothing of a like nature, or even more +definite, could come about in the dying, whom we cannot interrogate after +their death? Thus there are countless paths open to God, giving him means +of satisfying his justice and his goodness: and the only thing one may +allege against this is that we know not what way he employs; which is far +from being a valid objection. + + [178] +99. Let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend, but good will. +They are doubtless not to be excused; but there always remains a great +difficulty concerning God, since it rested with him to give them this same +good will. He is the master of wills, the hearts of kings and those of all +other men are in his hand. Holy Scripture goes so far as to say that God at +times hardened the wicked in order to display his power by punishing them. +This hardening is not to be taken as meaning that God inspires men with a +kind of anti-grace, that is, a kind of repugnance to good, or even an +inclination towards evil, just as the grace that he gives is an inclination +towards good. It is rather that God, having considered the sequence of +things that he established, found it fitting, for superior reasons, to +permit that Pharaoh, for example, should be in such _circumstances_ as +should increase his wickedness, and divine wisdom willed to derive a good +from this evil. + +100. Thus it all often comes down to _circumstances_, which form a part of +the combination of things. There are countless examples of small +circumstances serving to convert or to pervert. Nothing is more widely +known than the _Tolle, lege_ (Take and read) cry which St. Augustine heard +in a neighbouring house, when he was pondering on what side he should take +among the Christians divided into sects, and saying to himself, + + _Quod vitae sectabor iter?_ + +This brought him to open at random the book of the Holy Scriptures which he +had before him, and to read what came before his eyes: and these were words +which finally induced him to give up Manichaeism. The good Steno, a Dane, +who was titular Bishop of Titianopolis, Vicar Apostolic (as they say) of +Hanover and the region around, when there was a Duke Regent of his +religion, told us that something of that kind had happened to him. He was a +great anatomist and deeply versed in natural science; but he unfortunately +gave up research therein, and from being a great physicist he became a +mediocre theologian. He would almost listen to nothing more about the +marvels of Nature, and an express order from the Pope _in virtute sanctae +obedientiae_ was needed to extract from him the observations M. Thevenot +asked of him. He told us then that what had greatly helped towards inducing +him to place himself on the side of the Roman Church had been the voice of +a lady in Florence, who had cried out to him from a window: 'Go not on[179] +the side where you are about to go, sir, go on the other side.' 'That voice +struck me,' he told us, 'because I was just meditating upon religion.' This +lady knew that he was seeking a man in the house where she was, and, when +she saw him making his way to the other house, wished to point out where +his friend's room was. + +101. Father John Davidius, the Jesuit, wrote a book entitled _Veridicus +Christianus_, which is like a kind of _Bibliomancy_, where one takes +passages at random, after the pattern of the _Tolle, lege_ of St. +Augustine, and it is like a devotional game. But the chances to which, in +spite of ourselves, we are subject, play only too large a part in what +brings salvation to men, or removes it from them. Let us imagine twin +Polish children, the one taken by the Tartars, sold to the Turks, brought +to apostasy, plunged in impiety, dying in despair; the other saved by some +chance, falling then into good hands to be educated properly, permeated by +the soundest truths of religion, exercised in the virtues that it commends +to us, dying with all the feelings of a good Christian. One will lament the +misfortune of the former, prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance from +being saved like his brother, and one will marvel that this slight chance +should have decided his fate for eternity. + +102. Someone will perchance say that God foresaw by mediate knowledge that +the former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained in +Poland. There are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind takes +place. But will it therefore be said that this is a general rule, and that +not one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have been saved +if he had been amongst Christians? Would that not be to contradict our +Lord, who said that Tyre and Sidon would have profited better by his +preaching, if they had had the good fortune to hear it, than Capernaum? + +103. But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge against +all appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers what a man +would do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains true that +God could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable, and given +him inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmal +wickedness existing in any soul. I shall be told that God is not bound to +do so, but that is not enough; it must be added that greater reasons +prevent him from making all his goodness felt by all. Thus there must [180] +needs be choice; but I do not think one must seek the reason altogether in +the good or bad nature of men. For if with some people one assume that God, +choosing the plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin and +damnation, has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in +order to make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficiently +appear to be a free gift. Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind +of inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles of +St. Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason. + +104. It is true that there are reasons for God's choice, and the +consideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs enter +therein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule +such as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride of +men. Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and in a +more favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be less, +and that he abandons the rest to their self-will. We may readily suppose +that this is often the case, and this expedient, among those which make man +distinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is the farthest +removed from Pelagianism. But I would not venture, notwithstanding, to make +of it a universal rule. Moreover, that we may not have cause to vaunt +ourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for God's +choice. Those reasons are too diverse to become known to us; and it may be +that God at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the most +obstinate resistance, to the end that none may have cause either to despair +or to be puffed up. St. Paul, as it would seem, had this in mind when he +offered himself as an example. God, he said, has had mercy upon me, to give +a great example of his patience. + +105. It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequently +incapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good +or less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way: +for there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as the +Pre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or less inclined towards a +particular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all in +accordance with their natural dispositions. But since the general plan of +the universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes men to be in +different circumstances, those who meet with such as are more [181] +favourable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, the +most virtuous, the most happy; yet it will be always by aid of the +influence of that inward grace which God unites with the circumstances. +Sometimes it even comes to pass, in the progress of human life, that a more +excellent nature succeeds less, for lack of cultivation or opportunities. +One may say that men are chosen and ranged not so much according to their +excellence as according to their conformity with God's plan. Even so it may +occur that a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in a +group because it proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap. + +106. But, in fine, all these attempts to find reasons, where there is no +need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make clear +to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God. All +the disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all the +difficulties one may raise for oneself, are no hindrance to a belief +founded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof, as has +been shown and will later become more apparent, that there is nothing so +exalted as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgements, nothing so +pure as his holiness, and nothing more vast than his goodness. + + [182] + * * * * * + +ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL + + * * * * * + +PART TWO + +107. Hitherto I have devoted myself to giving a full and clear exposition +of this whole subject: and although I have not yet spoken of M. Bayle's +objections in particular, I have endeavoured to anticipate them, and to +suggest ways of answering them. But as I have taken upon myself the task of +meeting them in detail, not only because there will perhaps still be +passages calling for elucidation, but also because his arguments are +usually full of wit and erudition, and serve to throw greater light on this +controversy, it will be well to give an account of the chief objections +that are dispersed through his works, and to add my answers. At the +beginning I observed 'that God co-operates in moral evil, and in physical +evil, and in each of them both morally and physically; and that man +co-operates therein also morally and physically in a free and active way, +becoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'. I have shown also +that each point has its own difficulty; but the greatest of these lies in +maintaining that God co-operates morally in moral evil, that is, in sin, +without being the originator of the sin, and even without being accessary +thereto. + +108. He does this by _permitting_ it justly, and by _directing_ it wisely +towards the good, as I have shown in a manner that appears tolerably +intelligible. But as it is here principally that M. Bayle undertakes [183] +to discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot +be harmonized with reason, it is also here especially I must show that my +dogmas are fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, even +of reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries. He +has ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his _Reply to the Questions of +a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 812), where he includes the theological +doctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophic +maxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart. Let us +begin with the theological propositions. + +109. I. 'God,' he says, 'the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely good, +holy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a bliss +that can never either increase or diminish.' This proposition of M. Bayle's +is no less philosophical than theological. To say that God possesses a +'glory' when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of the term. One +may say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being aware +of one's own perfections; and in this sense God possesses it always. But +when glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections, one may +say that God acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligent +creatures; even though it be true that God thereby gains no new good, and +it is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage, when they +apprehend aright the glory of God. + +110. II. 'He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he chose +from among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased him +to choose, to give them existence, and to compose the universe of them, +while he left all the rest in nothingness.' This proposition is also, just +like the preceding one, in close conformity with that part of philosophy +which is called natural theology. One must dwell a little on what is said +here, that he chose the possible beings 'whom it pleased him to choose'. +For it must be borne in mind that when I say, 'that pleases me', it is as +though I were saying, 'I find it good'. Thus it is the ideal goodness of +the object which pleases, and which makes me choose it among many others +which do not please or which please less, that is to say, which contain +less of that goodness which moves me. Now it is only the genuinely good +that is capable of pleasing God: and consequently that which pleases God +most, and which meets his choice, is the best. + + [184] +111. III. 'Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed to +produce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst other +favours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but he +threatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave +them to abstain from a certain fruit.' This proposition is in part +revealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that _free +will_ be understood properly, according to the explanation I have given. + +112. IV. 'They ate thereof nevertheless, and thenceforth they were +condemned, they and all their posterity, to the miseries of this life, to +temporal death and eternal damnation, and made subject to such a tendency +to sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and without +ceasing.' There is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itself +entailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect, and that +it was for that very reason, and not by a purely arbitrary decree, that God +had forbidden it: much as one forbids knives to children. The famous Fludde +or de Fluctibus, an Englishman, once wrote a book _De Vita, Morte et +Resurrectione_ under the name of R. Otreb, wherein he maintained that the +fruit of the forbidden tree was a poison: but we cannot enter into this +detail. It suffices that God forbade a harmful thing; one must not +therefore suppose that God acted here simply in the character of a +legislator who enacts a purely positive law, or of a judge who imposes and +inflicts a punishment by an order of his will, without any connexion +between the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. And it is not +necessary to suppose that God in justifiable annoyance deliberately put a +corruption in the soul and the body of man, by an extraordinary action, in +order to punish him: much as the Athenians gave hemlock-juice to their +criminals. M. Bayle takes the matter thus: he speaks as if the original +corruption had been put in the soul of the first man by an order and +operation of God. It is that which calls forth his objection (_Reply to the +Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1218) 'that reason would +not commend the monarch who, in order to chastise a rebel, condemned him +and his descendants to have a tendency towards rebellion'. But this +chastisement happens naturally to the wicked, without any ordinance of a +legislator, and they become addicted to evil. If drunkards begot children +inclined to the same vice, by a natural consequence of what takes place in +bodies, that would be a punishment of their progenitors, but it would [185] +not be a penalty of law. There is something comparable to this in the +consequences of the first man's sin. For the contemplation of divine wisdom +leads us to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace; and that +God as an Architect has done all in a manner befitting God considered as a +Monarch. We do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, or +that of the action, or its effects, to judge of the details of this matter: +nevertheless we must do God justice so far as to believe that it comprised +something other than what painters depict for us. + +113. V. 'It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few men +from this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this life to the +corruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which enable them to +obtain the never-ending bliss of paradise.' Many in the past have doubted, +as I have already observed, whether the number of the damned is so great as +is generally supposed; and it appears that they believed in the existence +of some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss. But +we have no need of these opinions, and it is enough to keep to the ideas +accepted in the Church. In this connexion it is well to observe that this +proposition of M. Bayle's is conceived in accordance with the principles of +sufficient grace, given to all men, and sufficing them provided that they +have good will. Although M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (as +he states in the margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with a +system of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events. + +114. VI. 'He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he ordered +all things and placed them each one in its own place, and he guides and +controls them continually, according to his pleasure. Thus nothing is done +without his permission or against his will, and he can prevent, as seems +good to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, all that does not +please him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing in the world that +most offends him and that he most detests; and he can produce in each human +soul all the thoughts that he approves.' This thesis is also purely +philosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of natural reason. It is +opportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on _that which pleases_, to +dwell here upon _that which seems good_, that is, upon that which God finds +good to do. He can avoid or put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that does +not please him'. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of +his aversion, such as certain evils, and especially sin, which his [186] +antecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his consequent +or decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best, +which the All-wise must choose after having taken all into account. When +one says 'that sin offends God most, and that he detests it most', these +are human ways of speaking. God cannot, properly speaking, be _offended_, +that is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; and he _detests_ +nothing of that which exists, in the sense that to detest something is to +look upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust, that +greatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot suffer either vexation, or +grief or discomfort; he is always altogether content and at ease. Yet these +expressions in their true sense are justified. The supreme goodness of God +causes his antecedent will to repel all evil, but moral evil more than any +other: it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons, and +with great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage. It +is true also that God could produce in each human soul all the thoughts +that he approves: but this would be to act by miracles, more than his most +perfectly conceived plan admits. + +115. VII. 'He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to +accept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminal +than they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he assures them +that it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does not give them +the grace which he knows they would accept.' It is true that these people +become more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered them +nothing, and that God knows this. Yet it is better to permit their crime +than to act in a way which would render God himself blameworthy, and +provide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it was +not possible for them to do better, even though they had or might have +wished it. God desires that they receive such grace from him as they are +fit to receive, and that they accept it; and he desires to give them in +particular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees: but it is +always by a will antecedent, detached or particular, which cannot always be +carried out in the general plan of things. This thesis also is among the +number of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation, like +three others of the seven that we have just stated here, the third, fourth +and fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary. + + [187] +116. Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle opposes to +the seven theological propositions. + +I. 'As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a bliss +that can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone has +determined him to create this universe: neither the ambition to be praised, +nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and his +glory, has had any part therein.' This maxim is very good: praises of God +do him no service, but they are of service to the men who praise him, and +he desired their good. Nevertheless, when one says that _goodness_ alone +determined God to create this universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESS +prompted him _antecedently_ to create and to produce all possible good; but +that his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to select the best +_consequently_; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry out +_actually_ the great design which he had formed. + +117. II. 'The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, and +would not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater than +this. This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his other +perfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc., they must be the +greatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections of the +_Judgement on Methods_, where he argues constantly upon this principle, as +upon a primary notion. See also in Wittich, _De Providentia Dei_, n. 12, +these words of St. Augustine, lib. I, _De Doctrina Christiana_, c. 7: "Cum +cogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atque +sublimius. Et paulo post: Nec quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat +esse, quo melius aliquid est.")' + +This maxim is altogether to my liking, and I draw from it this conclusion, +that God does the very best possible: otherwise the exercise of his +goodness would be restricted, and that would be restricting his _goodness_ +itself, if it did not prompt him to the best, if he were lacking in good +will. Or again it would be restricting his _wisdom_ and his _power_, if he +lacked the knowledge necessary for discerning the best and for finding the +means to obtain it, or if he lacked the strength necessary for employing +these means. There is, however, ambiguity in the assertion that love of +virtue and hatred of vice are infinite in God: if that were absolutely and +unreservedly true, in practice there would be no vice in the world. But +although each one of God's perfections is infinite in itself, it is +exercised only in proportion to the object and as the nature of things +prompts it. Thus love of the best in the whole carries the day over [188] +all other individual inclinations or hatreds; it is the only impulse whose +very exercise is absolutely infinite, nothing having power to prevent God +from declaring himself for the best; and some vice being combined with the +best possible plan, God permits it. + +118. III. 'An infinite goodness having guided the Creator in the production +of the world, all the characteristics of knowledge, skill, power and +greatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the happiness of +intelligent creatures. He wished to show forth his perfections only to the +end that creatures of this kind should find their felicity in the +knowledge, the admiration and the love of the Supreme Being.' + +This maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact. I grant that the happiness +of intelligent creatures is the principal part of God's design, for they +are most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can prove that to +be his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must serve the realm +of grace: but, since all is connected in God's great design, we must +believe that the realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that of +nature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty, to render the +combination of the two the most perfect that can be. And there is no reason +to suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, would +reverse the whole order of nature. Each perfection or imperfection in the +creature has its value, but there is none that has an infinite value. Thus +the moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does not +infinitely exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical, namely +that which lies in the perfection of the other creatures; and yet one would +be bound to say this if the present maxim were strictly true. When God +justified to the Prophet Jonah the pardon that he had granted to the +inhabitants of Nineveh, he even touched upon the interest of the beasts who +would have been involved in the ruin of this great city. No substance is +absolutely contemptible or absolutely precious before God. And the abuse or +the exaggerated extension of the present maxim appears to be in part the +source of the difficulties that M. Bayle puts forward. It is certain that +God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be +said with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the +whole of lion-kind. Even should that be so, it would by no means follow +that the interest of a certain number of men would prevail over the [189] +consideration of a general disorder diffused through an infinite number of +creatures. This opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhat +discredited maxim, that all is made solely for man. + +119. IV. 'The benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable of +felicity tend only to their happiness. He therefore does not permit that +these should serve to make them unhappy, and, if the wrong use that they +made of them were capable of destroying them, he would give them sure means +of always using them well. Otherwise they would not be true benefits, and +his goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of in another +benefactor. (I mean, in a Cause that united with its gifts the sure skill +to make good use of them.)' + +There already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim. It is +not strictly true (though it appear plausible) that the benefits God +imparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to their +happiness. All is connected in Nature; and if a skilled artisan, an +engineer, an architect, a wise politician often makes one and the same +thing serve several ends, if he makes a double hit with a single throw, +when that can be done conveniently, one may say that God, whose wisdom and +power are perfect, does so always. That is husbanding the ground, the time, +the place, the material, which make up as it were his outlay. Thus God has +more than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rational +creatures is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his whole aim, +nor even his final aim. Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some +of these creatures may come about _by concomitance_, and as a result of +other greater goods: this I have already explained, and M. Bayle has to +some extent acknowledged it. The goods as such, considered in themselves, +are the object of the antecedent will of God. God will produce as much +reason and knowledge in the universe as his plan can admit. One can +conceive of a mean between an antecedent will altogether pure and +primitive, and a consequent and final will. The _primitive antecedent will_ +has as its object each good and each evil in itself, detached from all +combination, and tends to advance the good and prevent the evil. The +_mediate will_ relates to combinations, as when one attaches a good to an +evil: then the will will have some tendency towards this combination when +the good exceeds the evil therein. But the _final and decisive will_ +results from consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enter +into our deliberation, it results from a total combination. This shows[190] +that a mediate will, although it may in a sense pass as consequent in +relation to a pure and primitive antecedent will, must be considered +antecedent in relation to the final and decretory will. God gives reason to +the human race; misfortunes arise thence by concomitance. His pure +antecedent will tends towards giving reason, as a great good, and +preventing the evils in question. But when it is a question of the evils +that accompany this gift which God has made to us of reason, the compound, +made up of the combination of reason and of these evils, will be the object +of a mediate will of God, which will tend towards producing or preventing +this compound, according as the good or the evil prevails therein. But even +though it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men (which, +however, I do not admit), whereupon the mediate will of God would discard +it with all its concomitants, it might still be the case that it was more +in accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men, +notwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have with +reference to them. Consequently, the final will or the decree of God, +resulting from all the considerations he can have, would be to give it to +them. And, far from being subject to blame for this, he would be +blameworthy if he did not so. Thus the evil, or the mixture of goods and +evils wherein the evil prevails, happens only _by concomitance_, because it +is connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture. This +mixture, therefore, or this compound, is not to be conceived as a grace or +as a gift from God to us; but the good that is found mingled therein will +nevertheless be good. Such is God's gift of reason to those who make ill +use thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the combination of this +good with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard +to those who in consequence thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be by +concomitance, because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe. +And it is doubtless that which prompted God to give reason to those who +have made it an instrument of their unhappiness. Or, to put it more +precisely, in accordance with my system God, having found among the +possible beings some rational creatures who misuse their reason, gave +existence to those who are included in the best possible plan of the +universe. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goods +which turn into evil by the fault of men, this often happening to men in +just punishment of the misuse they had made of God's grace. Aloysius [191] +Novarinus wrote a book _De Occultis Dei Beneficiis_: one could write one +_De Occultis Dei Poenis_. This saying of Claudian would be in place here +with regard to some persons: + + _Tolluntur in altum,_ _Ut lapsu graviore ruant_. + +But to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will will +abuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or again to +say that he should give certain means for preventing it, contrary to this +same general order: that is to wish (as I have observed already) that God +himself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so. To +object, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be smaller than +that of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift, is to +overlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by a +single benefit. It may well be that a gift from a private person is greater +than one from a prince, but the gifts of this private person all taken +together will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all together. Thus one +can esteem fittingly the good things done by God only when one considers +their whole extent by relating them to the entire universe. Moreover, one +may say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are the +gifts of an enemy, [Greek: hechthron dora adora], + + _Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis._ + +But that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them, as +there was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good to people +in order to give them the means of destroying themselves. His design was +evil, but God's design cannot be better than it is. Must God spoil his +system, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe, +because there are people who misuse reason? The common sayings are in place +here: _Abusus non tollit usum_; there is _scandalum datum et scandalum +acceptum_. + +120. V. 'A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent gifts +upon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use that will +destroy them. It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good Being to +give to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, they would +make a use that would render them unhappy. Therefore if he gives them free +will he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely, and +permits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any [192] +conjuncture; and if there were no sure means of determining the good use of +this free will, he would rather take from them this faculty, than allow it +to be the cause of their unhappiness. That is the more manifest, as free +will is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without their +asking for it; so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness it +would bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to their +importunate prayers.' + +What was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to be +repeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim. Moreover, +the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third, +stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God. If +that were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur, even by +concomitance. God would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all these +evils would be excluded. But God would fail in what is due to the universe, +that is, in what he owes to himself. If there were only spirits they would +be without the required connexion, without the order of time and place. +This order demands matter, movement and its laws; to adjust these to +spirits in the best possible way means to return to our world. When one +looks at things only in the mass, one imagines to be practicable a thousand +things that cannot properly take place. To wish that God should not give +free will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of these +creatures; and to wish that God should prevent them from misusing it is to +wish that there be none but these creatures alone, together with what was +made for them only. If God had none but these creatures in view, he would +doubtless prevent them from destroying themselves. One may say in a sense, +however, that God has given to these creatures the art of always making +good use of their free will, for the natural light of reason is this art. +But it would be necessary always to have the will to do good, and often +creatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have; +often they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a +good will. Of this I have already spoken more than once. This fault must be +admitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have been +able to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing to +prevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be always +to have good will. But I reply that it is not necessary, and that it was +not feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection,[193] +and such as would bring them so close to the Divinity. It may even be that +that can only be made possible by a special divine grace. But in this case, +would it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to act +miraculously in respect of all rational creatures? Nothing would be less +rational than these perpetual miracles. There are degrees among creatures: +the general order requires it. And it appears quite consistent with the +order of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in the +good should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when they +were in a more imperfect state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage, +_in Ecclesia militante, in statu viatorum_. The good angels themselves were +not created incapable of sin. Nevertheless I would not dare to assert that +there are no blessed creatures born, or such as are sinless and holy by +their nature. There are perhaps people who give this privilege to the +Blessed Virgin, since, moreover, the Roman Church to-day places her above +the angels. But it suffices us that the universe is very great and very +varied: to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof. 'But', M. +Bayle goes on, 'God has given free will to creatures capable of sinning, +without their having asked him for this grace. And he who gave such a gift +would be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought upon those who +made use of it, than if he had granted it only in response to their +importunate prayers.' But importunity in prayers makes no difference to +God; he knows better than we what we need, and he only grants what serves +the interest of the whole. It seems that M. Bayle here makes free will +consist in the faculty for sinning; yet he acknowledges elsewhere that God +and the Saints are free, without having this faculty. However that may be, +I have already shown fully that God, doing what his wisdom and his goodness +combined ordain, is not answerable for the evil that he permits. Even men, +when they do their duty, are not answerable for consequences, whether they +foresee them or not. + +121. VI. 'It is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a silk +cord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to strangle +himself, as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body. One desires his +death not less when one makes use of the first way, than when one employs +the second: it even seems as though one desires it with a more malicious +intention, since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the whole +blame of his destruction.' + + [194] +Those who write treatises on Duties (De Officiis) as, for instance, Cicero, +St. Ambrose, Grotius, Opalenius, Sharrok, Rachelius, Pufendorf, as well as +the Casuists, teach that there are cases where one is not obliged to return +to its owner a thing deposited: for example, one will not give back a +dagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is about to stab +someone. Let us pretend that I have in my hands the fatal draught that +Meleager's mother will make use of to kill him; the magic javelin that +Cephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his Procris; the horses of Theseus +that will tear to pieces Hippolytus, his son: these things are demanded +back from me, and I am right in refusing them, knowing the use that will be +made of them. But how will it be if a competent judge orders me to restore +them, when I cannot prove to him what I know of the evil consequences that +restitution will have, Apollo perchance having given to me, as to +Cassandra, the gift of prophecy under the condition that I shall not be +believed? I should then be compelled to make restitution, having no +alternative other than my own destruction: thus I cannot escape from +contributing towards the evil. Another comparison: Jupiter promises Semele, +the Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to grant whatever favour the other shall ask. +They swear by the Styx, + + _Di cujus jurare timent et fallere Numen_. + +One would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard, + + _Voluit Deus ora loquentis_ + _Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras_. + +One would gladly draw back after the request was made, making vain +remonstrances; but they press you, they say to you: 'Do you make oaths that +you will not keep?' The law of the Styx is inviolable, one must needs +submit to it; if one has erred in making the oath, one would err more in +not keeping it; the promise must be fulfilled, however harmful it may be to +him who exacts it. It would be ruinous to you if you did not fulfil it. It +seems as though the moral of these fables implies that a supreme necessity +may constrain one to comply with evil. God, in truth, knows no other judge +that can compel him to give what may turn to evil, he is not like Jupiter +who fears the Styx. But his own wisdom is the greatest judge that he can +find, there is no appeal from its judgements: they are the decrees of +destiny. The eternal verities, objects of his wisdom, are more [195] +inviolable than the Styx. These laws and this judge do not constrain: they +are stronger, for they persuade. Wisdom only shows God the best possible +exercise of his goodness: after that, the evil that occurs is an inevitable +result of the best. I will add something stronger: To permit the evil, as +God permits it, is the greatest goodness. + + _Si mala sustulerat, non erat ille bonus._ + +One would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this that it +is more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the whole blame +of his destruction. When God does leave it to a man, it has belonged to him +since before his existence; it was already in the idea of him as still +merely possible, before the decree of God which makes him to exist. Can +one, then, leave it or give it to another? There is the whole matter. + +122. VII. 'A true benefactor gives promptly, and does not wait to give +until those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of what +he could have imparted to them at first very easily, and without causing +any inconvenience to himself. If the limitation of his forces does not +permit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other inconvenience, +he acquiesces in this, but only regretfully, and he never employs this way +of rendering service when he can render it without mingling any kind of +evil in his favours. If the profit one could derive from the evils he +inflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good as from those +evils, he would take the straight road of unalloyed good, and not the +indirect road that would lead from the evil to the good. If he showers +riches and honours, it is not to the end that those who have enjoyed them, +when they come to lose them, should be all the more deeply afflicted in +proportion to their previous experience of pleasure, and that thus they +should become more unhappy than the persons who have always been deprived +of these advantages. A malicious being would shower good things at such a +price upon the people for whom he had the most hatred.' + +(Compare this passage of Aristotle, _Rhetor._, 1. 2, c. 23, p. m. 446: +[Greek: hoion ei doie an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipesei; hothen kai +tout' eiretai,] + + [Greek: pollois ho daimon ou kat' eunoian pheron] + [Greek: Megala didosin eutychemat', all' hina] + [Greek: tas symphoras labosin epiphanesteras.] + + [196] +Id est: Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) erepto +(ipsum) afficiat dolore. Unde etiam illud est dictum: + + _Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus,_ + _Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo._) + +All these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change and +mutilate the fact, they only half record things: God has care for men, he +loves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true. Yet he allows men +to fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods that tend +towards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it is after +many sufferings: where is his affection, where is his goodness or again +where is his power? Vain objections, which suppress the main point, which +ignore the fact that it is of God one speaks. It is as though one were +speaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose well-nigh only care is +concerned with the upbringing, the preservation, the happiness of the +person in question, and who neglect their duty. God takes care of the +universe, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best on the whole. If in +spite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it behoved him to be so. +God (so they say) could have given happiness to all, he could have given it +promptly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience, for he +can do all. But should he? Since he does not so, it is a sign that he had +to act altogether differently. If we infer from this either that God only +regretfully, and owing to lack of power, fails to make men happy and to +give the good first of all and without admixture of evil, or else that he +lacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all, then we +are comparing our true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with +the demon of the poet whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have just +translated into Latin, who gives good things in order that he may cause +more affliction by taking them away. That would be trifling with God in +perpetual anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must give +himself up completely to one particular business, whose goodness must be +chiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and who +lacks either aptitude or good will. God is not lacking therein, he could do +the good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but +he must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to +it. Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually [197] +one attains salvation only through many sufferings, and by bearing the +cross of Jesus Christ. These evils serve to make the elect imitators of +their master, and to increase their happiness. + +123. VIII. 'The greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is the +master of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue, order, peace, +contentment of mind. The glory that he would derive from their unhappiness +can be nothing but a false glory.' + +If we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the most +perfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign there, +as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; that sin +and unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons +of the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there in +comparison with the good, and even are of service for greater good. Now +since these evils were to exist, there must needs be some appointed to be +subject to them, and we are those people. If it were others, would there +not be the same appearance of evil? Or rather, would not these others be +those known as We? When God derives some glory from the evil through having +made it serve a greater good, it was proper that he should derive that +glory. It is not therefore a false glory, as would be that of a prince who +overthrew his state in order to have the honour of setting it up again. + +124. IX. 'The way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love for +virtue is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised without any +mixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure for his subjects this +advantage, and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head, save that he +punishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection for +virtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not infinite.' + +I am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am weary +of refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multiplies +unnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If things +connected together may be separated, the parts from their whole, the human +kind from the universe, God's attributes the one from the other, power from +wisdom, it may be said that God _can cause_ virtue to be in the world +without any mixture of vice, and even that he can do so _easily_. But, +since he has permitted vice, it must be that that order of the universe +which was found preferable to every other plan required it. One must +believe that it is not permitted to do otherwise, since it is not [198] +possible to do better. It is a hypothetical necessity, a moral necessity, +which, far from being contrary to freedom, is the effect of its choice. +_Quae rationi contraria sunt, ea nec fieri a Sapiente posse credendum est_. +The objection is made here, that God's affection for virtue is therefore +not the greatest which can be conceived, that it is not _infinite_. To that +an answer has already been given on the second maxim, in the assertion that +God's affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to the +value of the thing. Virtue is the noblest quality of created things, but it +is not the only good quality of creatures. There are innumerable others +which attract the inclination of God: from all these inclinations there +results the most possible good, and it turns out that if there were only +virtue, if there were only rational creatures, there would be less good. +Midas proved to be less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdom +must vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity, +and poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in one's library, +always to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break all +the china in order only to have cups of gold, to have only diamond buttons, +to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only Hungarian or Shiraz +wine--would one call that reason? Nature had need of animals, plants, +inanimate bodies; there are in these creatures, devoid of reason, marvels +which serve for exercise of the reason. What would an intelligent creature +do if there were no unintelligent things? What would it think of, if there +were neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had only distinct +thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: that is one +of the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a mixture of confused +thoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these confused thoughts come +from the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration and +extent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational creature +without some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely detached +from matter. But these organic bodies vary no less in perfection than the +spirits to which they belong. Therefore, since God's wisdom must have a +world of bodies, a world of substances capable of perception and incapable +of reason; since, in short, it was necessary to choose from all the things +possible what produced the best effect together, and since vice entered in +by this door, God would not have been altogether good, altogether wise if +he had excluded it. + + [199] +125. X. 'The way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed to +allow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it, but to crush it +before its birth, that is, prevent it from showing itself anywhere. A king, +for example, who put his finances in such good order that no malversation +was ever committed, would thus display more hatred for the wrong done by +factionaries than if, after having suffered them to batten on the blood of +the people, he had them hanged.' + +It is always the same song, it is anthropomorphism pure and simple. A king +should generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his subjects free +from oppression. One of his greatest interests is to bring good order into +his finances. Nevertheless there are times when he is obliged to tolerate +vice and disorders. He has a great war on his hands, he is in a state of +exhaustion, he has no choice of generals, it is necessary to humour those +he has, those possessed of great authority with the soldiers: a Braccio, a +Sforza, a Wallenstein. He lacks money for the most pressing needs, it is +necessary to turn to great financiers, who have an established credit, and +he must at the same time connive at their malversations. It is true that +this unfortunate necessity arises most often from previous errors. It is +not the same with God: he has need of no man, he commits no error, he +always does the best. One cannot even wish that things may go better, when +one understands them: and it would be a vice in the Author of things if he +wished to change anything whatsoever in them, if he wished to exclude the +vice that was found there. Is this State with perfect government, where +good is willed and performed as far as it is possible, where evil even +serves the greatest good, comparable with the State of a prince whose +affairs are in ruin and who escapes as best he can? Or with that of a +prince who encourages oppression in order to punish it, and who delights to +see the little men with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds? + +126. XI. 'A ruler devoted to the interests of virtue, and to the good of +his subjects, takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey his +laws; and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience, he sees to +it that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil, and restores in +their soul a strong and constant tendency towards good: so far is he from +any desire that the penalty for the error should incline them more and more +towards evil.' + + [200] +To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be done +on his side without detriment to what is due. The most usual aim of +punishment is amendment; but it is not the sole aim, nor that which God +always intends. I have said a word on that above. Original sin, which +disposes men towards evil, is not merely a penalty for the first sin; it is +a natural consequence thereof. On that too a word has been said, in the +course of an observation on the fourth theological proposition. It is like +drunkenness, which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the same +time a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins. + +127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whether +it be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be committed.' + +By no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if +they turned all their efforts in that direction? But other more important +cares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve upon adjusting +irregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a great war. And the +action of an English Parliament in this direction a little before the Peace +of Ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated. Can one conclude from this +that the State has no anxiety about this irregularity, or even that it +desires it? God has a far stronger reason, and one far more worthy of him, +for tolerating evils. Not only does he derive from them greater goods, but +he finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that are +possible: so that it would be a fault not to permit them. + +128. XIII. 'It is a very great fault in those who govern, if they do not +care whether there be disorder in their States or not. The fault is still +greater if they wish and even desire disorder there. If by hidden and +indirect, but infallible, ways they stirred up a sedition in their States +to bring them to the brink of ruin, in order to gain for themselves the +glory of showing that they have the courage and the prudence necessary for +saving a great kingdom on the point of perishing, they would be most +deserving of condemnation. But if they stirred up this sedition because +there were no other means than that, of averting the total ruin of their +subjects and of strengthening on new foundations, and for several +centuries, the happiness of nations, one must needs lament the unfortunate +necessity (see above, pp. 146, 147, what has been said of the force of[201] +necessity) to which they were reduced, and praise them for the use that +they made thereof.' + +This maxim, with divers others set forth here, is not applicable to the +government of God. Not to mention the fact that it is only the disorders of +a very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in objection, it is +untrue that he has no anxiety about evils, that he desires them, that he +brings them into being, to have the glory of allaying them. God wills order +and good; but it happens sometimes that what is disorder in the part is +order in the whole. I have already stated this legal axiom: _Incivile est +nisi tota lege inspecta judicare_. The permission of evils comes from a +kind of moral necessity: God is constrained to this by his wisdom and by +his goodness; _this necessity is happy_, whereas that of the prince spoken +of in the maxim is _unhappy_. His State is one of the most corrupt; and the +government of God is the best State possible. + +129. XIV. 'The permission of a certain evil is only excusable when one +cannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil; but it cannot be +excusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against this +evil, and against all the other evils that could spring from the +suppression of this one.' + +The maxim is true, but it cannot be brought forward against the government +of God. Supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil. If God chose what +would not be the best absolutely and in all, that would be a greater evil +than all the individual evils which he could prevent by this means. This +wrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his goodness. + +130. XV. 'The Being infinitely powerful, Creator of matter and of spirits, +makes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits. There is no +situation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits. If he then +permitted a physical or a moral evil, this would not be for the reason that +otherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil would be +altogether inevitable. None of those reasons for the mixture of good and +evil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of benefactors can +apply to him.' + +It is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; but +he is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble only +that which he judges to be the best, and who judges well. God makes of +matter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of spirits the +most excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and above all that, +he establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies, [202] +according to the system I have proposed. Now since physical evil and moral +evil occur in this perfect work, one must conclude (contrary to M. Bayle's +assurance here) that _otherwise a still greater evil would have been +altogether inevitable_. This great evil would be that God would have chosen +ill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen. It is true that God is +infinitely powerful; but his power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdom +combined determine him to produce the best. M. Bayle makes elsewhere an +objection which is peculiar to him, which he derives from the opinions of +the modern Cartesians. They say that God could have given to souls what +thoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to the +body: by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which +only spring from derangement of the body. More will be said of this later; +now it is sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a system +ill-connected and full of dissonances. It is to some extent the nature of +souls to represent bodies. + +131. XVI. 'One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings it +about in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways. A +Minister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply by +utilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all their +plots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less than +if he destroyed it by a surprise attack.' + +I have nothing to say against this maxim. Evil is always attributed to +moral causes, and not always to physical causes. Here I observe simply that +if I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself, +I should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be accessary +thereto, or its moral cause. In God, every fault would represent a sin; it +would be even more than sin, for it would destroy Divinity. And it would be +a great fault in him not to choose the best. I have said so many times. He +would then prevent sin by something worse than all sins. + +132. XVII. 'It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, or +employ a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be +determined. If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to +ignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will be +disposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning, I shall be just as much +the cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as I +should be in assuming, as is the case, that it is a necessary cause. [203] +For where I am concerned it would no longer be a free cause. I should be +catching it at the moment when I knew it to be necessitated by its own +choice. It is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with regard +to that to which it is already determined, and at the time when it is +determined thereto. All that which exists exists of necessity while it +exists. [Greek: To einai to on hotan ei, kai to me einai hotan me ei, +ananke.] "Necesse est id quod est, quando est, esse; et id quod non est, +quando non est, non esse": Arist., _De Interpret._, cap. 9. The Nominalists +have adopted this maxim of Aristotle. Scotus and sundry other Schoolmen +appear to reject it, but fundamentally their distinctions come to the same +thing. See the Jesuits of Coimbra on this passage from Aristotle, p. 380 +_et seq._)' + +This maxim may pass also; I would wish only to change something in the +phraseology. I would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the same +thing, and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis. One is +never altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise; one is +always more inclined and consequently more determined on one side than on +another: but one is never necessitated to the choice that one makes. I mean +here a _necessity_ absolute and metaphysical; for it must be admitted that +God, that wisdom, is prompted to the best by a _moral_ necessity. It must +be admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypothetical +necessity, when one actually makes the choice; and even before one is +necessitated thereto by the very truth of the futurition, since one will do +it. These hypothetical necessities do no harm. I have spoken sufficiently +on this point already. + +133. XVIII. 'When a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion, it +is not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part, and to kill +all the rest, not excepting even babes and sucklings.' + +It seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times more +damned than saved, and that children dying unbaptized are included among +the former. Both these points are disputed, and especially the damnation of +these children. I have spoken of this above. M. Bayle urges the same +objection elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, +ch. 178, p. 1223): 'We see clearly', he says, 'that the Sovereign who +wishes to exercise both justice and clemency when a city has revolted must +be content with the punishment of a small number of mutineers, and [204] +pardon all the rest. For if the number of those who are chastised is as a +thousand to one, in comparison with those whom he freely pardons, he cannot +be accounted mild, but, on the contrary, cruel. He would assuredly be +accounted an abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration, +and if he eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men would +prefer death to a miserable life; and if, finally, the desire to take +revenge were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn to +the service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almost +all the rebels. Criminals who are executed are considered to expiate their +crimes so completely by the loss of their life, that the public requires +nothing more, and is indignant when executioners are clumsy. These would be +stoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated strokes of the axe; +and the judges who are present at the execution would not be immune from +danger if they were thought to take pleasure in this evil sport of the +executioners, and to have surreptitiously urged them to practise it.' (Note +that this is not to be understood as strictly universal. There are cases +where the people approve of the slow killing of certain criminals, as when +Francis I thus put to death some persons accused of heresy after the +notorious Placards of 1534. No pity was shown to Ravaillac, who was +tortured in divers horrible ways. See the _French Mercury_, vol. I, fol. +m., 455 _et seq._ See also Pierre Matthieu in his _History of the Death of +Henry IV_; and do not forget what he says on page m. 99 concerning the +discussion by the judges with regard to the torture of this parricide.) +'Finally it is an exceptionally notorious fact that Rulers who should be +guided by St. Paul, I mean who should condemn to the extreme penalty all +those whom he condemns to eternal death, would be accounted enemies of the +human kind and destroyers of their communities. It is incontestable that +their laws, far from being fitted, in accordance with the aim of +legislators, to uphold society, would be its complete ruin. (Apply here +these words of Pliny the Younger, _Epist._, 22, lib. 8: Mandemus memoriae +quod vir mitissimus, et ob hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea crebro dicere +solebat, Qui vitia odit, homines odit.)' He adds that it was said of the +laws of Draco, an Athenian lawgiver, that they had not been written with +ink, but with blood, because they punished all sins with the extreme +penalty, and because damnation is a penalty even worse than death. But it +must be borne in mind that damnation is a consequence of sin. Thus I [205] +once answered a friend, who raised as an objection the disproportion +existing between an eternal punishment and a limited crime, that there is +no injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result of +the continuation of the sin. I will speak further on this point later. As +for the number of the damned, even though it should be incomparably greater +among men than the number of the saved, that would not preclude the +possibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely outnumber +those who are unhappy. Such examples as that of a prince who punishes only +the leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment decimated, are of +no importance here. Self-interest compels the prince and the general to +pardon the guilty, even though they should remain wicked. God only pardons +those who become better: he can distinguish them; and this severity is more +consistent with perfect justice. But if anyone asks why God gives not to +all the grace of conversion, the question is of a different nature, having +no relation to the present maxim. I have already answered it in a sense, +not in order to find God's reasons, but to show that he cannot lack such, +and that there are no opposing reasons of any validity. Moreover, we know +that sometimes whole cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to the +sword, to inspire terror in the rest. That may serve to shorten a great war +or a rebellion, and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding of +it: there is no decimation there. We cannot assert, indeed, that the wicked +of our globe are punished so severely in order to intimidate the +inhabitants of the other globes and to make them better. Yet an abundance +of reasons in the universal harmony which are unknown to us, because we +know not sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of the +general republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, may +produce the same effect. + +134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable of +curing a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would take +with enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take, +would vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it; we should still have just +cause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him: for if they wished +to do so, they would choose for him among those good medicines one which +they knew he would willingly swallow. If, moreover, they knew that +rejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his sickness to[206] +the point of making it fatal, one could not help saying that, despite all +their exhortations, they must certainly be desirous of the sick man's +death.' + +God wishes to save all men: that means that he would save them if men +themselves did not prevent it, and did not refuse to receive his grace; and +he is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil will. +He does so sometimes nevertheless, when superior reasons allow of it, and +when his consequent and decretory will, which results from all his reasons, +makes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of men. He gives +aids to all for their conversion and for perseverance, and these aids +suffice in those who have good will, but they do not always suffice to give +good will. Men obtain this good will either through particular aids or +through circumstances which cause the success of the general aids. God +cannot refrain from offering other remedies which he knows men will reject, +bringing upon themselves all the greater guilt: but shall one wish that God +be unjust in order that man may be less criminal? Moreover, the grace that +does not serve the one may serve the other, and indeed always serves the +totality of God's plan, which is the best possible in conception. Shall God +not give the rain, because there are low-lying places which will be thereby +incommoded? Shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world in +general, because there are places which will be too much dried up in +consequence? In short, all these comparisons, spoken of in these maxims +that M. Bayle has just given, of a physician, a benefactor, a minister of +State, a prince, are exceedingly lame, because it is well known what their +duties are and what can and ought to be the object of their cares: they +have scarce more than the one affair, and they often fail therein through +negligence or malice. God's object has in it something infinite, his cares +embrace the universe: what we know thereof is almost nothing, and we desire +to gauge his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge. What temerity, or +rather what absurdity! The objections are on false assumptions; it is +senseless to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know the +matter of fact. To say with St. Paul, _O altitudo divitiarum et +sapientiae,_ is not renouncing reason, it is rather employing the reasons +that we know, for they teach us that immensity of God whereof the Apostle +speaks. But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and we +acknowledge, moreover, before we see it, that God does all the best [207] +possible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his actions. +It is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this, +when we see something entire, some whole complete in itself, and isolated, +so to speak, among the works of God. Such a whole, shaped as it were by the +hand of God, is a plant, an animal, a man. We cannot wonder enough at the +beauty and the contrivance of its structure. But when we see some broken +bone, some piece of animal's flesh, some sprig of a plant, there appears to +be nothing but confusion, unless an excellent anatomist observe it: and +even he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen like +pieces attached to their whole. It is the same with the government of God: +that which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piece +for recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole. Thus the very +nature of things implies that this order in the Divine City, which we see +not yet here on earth, should be an object of our faith, of our hope, of +our confidence in God. If there are any who think otherwise, so much the +worse for them, they are malcontents in the State of the greatest and the +best of all monarchs; and they are wrong not to take advantage of the +examples he has given them of his wisdom and his infinite goodness, whereby +he reveals himself as being not only wonderful, but also worthy of love +beyond all things. + +135. I hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in the +nineteen maxims of M. Bayle, which we have just considered, has been left +without a necessary answer. It is likely that, having often before +meditated on this subject, he will have put there all his strongest +convictions touching the moral cause of moral evil. There are, however, +still sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well not +to pass over in silence. Very often he exaggerates the difficulty which he +assumes with regard to freeing God from the imputation of sin. He observes +_(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 161, p. 1024) that Molina, +if he reconciled free will with foreknowledge, did not reconcile the +goodness and the holiness of God with sin. He praises the sincerity of +those who bluntly declare (as he claims Piscator did) that everything is to +be traced back to the will of God, and who maintain that God could not but +be just, even though he were the author of sin, even though he condemned +innocence. And on the other side, or in other passages, he seems to show +more approval of the opinions of those who preserve God's goodness at [208] +the expense of his greatness, as Plutarch does in his book against the +Stoics. 'It was more reasonable', he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans) +'that innumerable parts' (or atoms flying about at haphazard through an +infinite space) 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and, +in spite of him and against his nature and will, did many bad and +irrational things, than to agree that there is neither confusion nor +wickedness but he is the author thereof.' What may be said for both these +parties, Stoics and Epicureans, appears to have led M. Bayle to the [Greek: +epechein] of the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect of +reason, so long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sincere +submission. + +136. Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attempting +almost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes, a Persian +heretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief of +the Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they were +named Paulicians. All these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher of +Upper Asia, known under the name of Zoroaster, had taught, so it is said, +of two intelligent principles of all things, the one good, the other bad, a +dogma that had perhaps come from the Indians. Among them numbers of people +still cling to their error, one that is exceedingly prone to overtake human +ignorance and superstition, since very many barbarous peoples, even in +America, have been deluded by it, without having had need of philosophy. +The Slavs (according to Helmold) had their Zernebog or black God. The +Greeks and Romans, wise as they seem to be, had a Vejovis or Anti-Jupiter, +otherwise called Pluto, and numerous other maleficent divinities. The +Goddess Nemesis took pleasure in abasing those who were too fortunate; and +Herodotus in some passages hints at his belief that all Divinity is +envious; which, however, is not in harmony with the doctrine of the two +principles. + +137. Plutarch, in his treatise _On Isis and Osiris_, knows of no writer +more ancient than Zoroaster the magician, as he calls him, that is likely +to have taught the two principles. Trogus or Justin makes him a King of the +Bactrians, who was conquered by Ninus or Semiramis; he attributes to him +the knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic. But this magic was +apparently the religion of the fire-worshippers: and it appears that he +looked upon light and heat as the good principle, while he added the [209] +evil, that is to say, opacity, darkness, cold. Pliny cites the testimony of +a certain Hermippus, an interpreter of Zoroaster's books, according to whom +Zoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to one named Azonacus; unless +indeed this be a corruption of Oromases, of whom I shall speak presently, +and whom Plato in the _Alcibiades_ names as the father of Zoroaster. Modern +Orientals give the name Zerdust to him whom the Greeks named Zoroaster; he +is regarded as corresponding to Mercury, because with some nations +Wednesday _(mercredi)_ takes its name from him. It is difficult to +disentangle the story of Zoroaster and know exactly when he lived. Suidas +puts him five hundred years before the taking of Troy. Some Ancients cited +by Pliny and Plutarch took it to be ten times as far back. But Xanthus the +Lydian (in the preface to Diogenes Laertius) put him only six hundred years +before the expedition of Xerxes. Plato declares in the same passage, as M. +Bayle observes, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing but the study of +religion. Mr. Hyde in his book on the religion of the ancient Persians +tries to justify this magic, and to clear it not only of the crime of +impiety but also of idolatry. Fire-worship prevailed among the Persians and +the Chaldaeans also; it is thought that Abraham left it when he departed +from Ur of the Chaldees. Mithras was the sun and he was also the God of the +Persians; and according to Ovid's account horses were offered in sacrifice +to him, + + _Placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,_ + _Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo._ + +But Mr. Hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in their +worship as symbols of the Divinity. It may be necessary to distinguish, as +elsewhere, between the Wise and the Multitude. There are in the splendid +ruins of Persepolis or of Tschelminaar (which means forty columns) +sculptured representations of their ceremonies. An ambassador of Holland +had had them sketched at very great cost by a painter, who had devoted a +considerable time to the task: but by some chance or other these sketches +fell into the hands of a well-known traveller, M. Chardin, according to +what he tells us himself. It would be a pity if they were lost. These ruins +are one of the most ancient and most beautiful monuments of the earth; and +in this respect I wonder at such lack of curiosity in a century so curious +as ours. + + [210] +138. The ancient Greeks and the modern Orientals agree in saying that +Zoroaster called the good God Oromazes, or rather Oromasdes, and the evil +God Arimanius. When I pondered on the fact that great princes of Upper Asia +had the name of Hormisdas and that Irminius or Herminius was the name of a +god or ancient hero of the Scythian Celts, that is, of the Germani, it +occurred to me that this Arimanius or Irminius might have been a great +conqueror of very ancient time coming from the west, just as Genghis Khan +and Tamburlaine were later, coming from the east. Arimanius would therefore +have come from the north-west, that is, from Germania and Sarmatia, through +the territory of the Alani and Massagetae, to raid the dominions of one +Ormisdas, a great king in Upper Asia, just as other Scythians did in the +days of Cyaxares, King of the Medes, according to the account given by +Herodotus. The monarch governing civilized peoples, and working to defend +them against the barbarians, would have gone down to posterity, amongst the +same peoples, as the good god; but the chief of these devastators will have +become the symbol of the evil principle: that is altogether reasonable. It +appears from this same mythology that these two princes contended for long, +but that neither of them was victorious. Thus they both held their own, +just as the two principles shared the empire of the world according to the +hypothesis attributed to Zoroaster. + +139. It remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the Germani was +called Herman, Arimanius or Irminius. Tacitus relates that the three tribes +which composed Germania, the Ingaevones, the Istaevones and the Herminones +or Hermiones, were thus named from the three sons of Mannus. Whether that +be true or not, he wished in any case to indicate that there was a hero +named Herminius, from whom he was told the Herminones were named. +Herminones, Hermenner, Hermunduri all mean the same, that is, Soldiers. +Even in the Dark Ages Arimanni were _viri militares,_ and there is _feudum +Arimandiae_ in Lombard law. + +140. I have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part of +Germania was given to the whole, and that from these Herminones or +Hermunduri all the Teutonic peoples were named _Hermanni_ or _Germani_. The +difference between these two words is only in the force of the aspiration: +there is the same difference of initial letter between the _Germani_ of the +Latins and _Hermanos_ of the Spaniards, or in the _Gammarus_ of the Latins +and the _Hummer_ (that is, marine crayfish) of the Low Germans. [211] +Besides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to the +whole: so all the Germani were called Alemanni by the French, and yet this, +according to the old nomenclature, only applied to the Suabians and the +Swiss. Although Tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name of the +Germani, he said something which supports my opinion, when he observed that +it was a name which inspired terror, taken or given _ob metum_. In fact it +signifies a warrior: _Heer_, _Hari_ is army, whence comes _Hariban_, or +'call to Haro', that is, a general order to be with the army, since +corrupted into _Arriereban_. Thus Hariman or Ariman, German _Guerre-man_, +is a soldier. For as _Hari_, _Heer_ means army, so _Wehr_ signifies arms, +_Wehren_ to fight, to make war, the word _Guerre_, _Guerra_ coming +doubtless from the same source. I have already spoken of the _feudum +Arimandiae_: not only did Herminones or Germani signify the same, but also +that ancient Herman, so-called son of Mannus, appears to have been given +this name as being pre-eminently a warrior. + +141. Now it is not the passage in Tacitus only which indicates for us this +god or hero: we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among these +peoples, since Charlemagne found and destroyed near the Weser the column +called _Irminsaeule_, erected in honour of this god. And that combined with +the passage in Tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that it was not that +famous Arminius who was an enemy of the Romans, but a much greater and more +ancient hero, that this cult concerned. Arminius bore the same name as +those who are called Hermann to-day. Arminius was not great enough, nor +fortunate enough, nor well enough known throughout Germania to attain to +the honour of a public cult, even at the hands of remote tribes, like the +Saxons, who came long after him into the country of the Cherusci. And our +Arminius, taken by the Asiatics for the evil God, provides ample +confirmation of my opinion. For in these matters conjectures confirm one +another without any logical circle, when their foundations tend towards one +and the same end. + +142. It is not beyond belief that the Hermes (that is, Mercury) of the +Greeks is the same Herminius or Arimanius. He may have been an inventor or +promoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his own +people and in the countries where he held supremacy, while amongst his +enemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion. Who knows but that +he may have penetrated even into Egypt, like the Scythians who in [212] +pursuit of Sesostris came nearly so far. Theut, Menes and Hermes were known +and revered in Egypt. They might have been Tuiscon, his son Mannus and +Herman, son of Mannus, according to the genealogy of Tacitus. Menes is held +to be the most ancient king of the Egyptians; 'Theut' was with them a name +for Mercury. At least Theut or Tuiscon, from whom Tacitus derives the +descent of the Germani, and from whom the Teutons, _Tuitsche_ (that is, +Germani) even to-day have their name, is the same as that _Teutates_ who +according to Lucan was worshipped by the Gauls, and whom Caesar took _pro +Dite Patre_, for Pluto, because of the resemblance between his Latin name +and that of _Teut_ or _Thiet_, _Titan_, _Theodon_; this in ancient times +signified men, people, and also an excellent man (like the word 'baron'), +in short, a prince. There are authorities for all these significations: but +one must not delay over this point. Herr Otto Sperling, who is well known +for various learned writings, but has many more in readiness to appear, in +a special dissertation has treated the question of this Teutates, God of +the Celts. Some observations which I imparted to him on that subject have +been published, with his reply, in the _Literary News of the Baltic Sea_. +He interprets this passage from Lucan somewhat otherwise than I do: + + _Teutates, pollensque feris altaribus Hesus,_ + _Et Tamaris Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae._ + +Hesus was, it appears, the God of War, who was called Ares by the Greeks +and Erich by the ancient Germani, whence still remains _Erichtag_, Tuesday. +The letters R and S, which are produced by the same organ, are easily +interchanged, for instance: _Moor_ and _Moos_, _Geren_ and _Gesen_, _Er +war_ and _Er was_, _Fer_, _Hierro_, _Eiron_, _Eisen_. Likewise _Papisius_, +_Valesius_, _Fusius_, instead of _Papirius_, _Valerius_, _Furius_, with the +ancient Romans. As for Taramis or perhaps Taranis, one knows that _Taran_ +was the thunder, or the God of Thunder, with the ancient Celts, called +_Thor_ by the Germani of the north; whence the English have preserved the +name 'Thursday', _jeudi_, _diem Jovis_. And the passage from Lucan means +that the altar of Taran, God of the Celts, was not less cruel than that of +Diana in Tauris: _Taranis aram non mitiorem ara Dianae Scythicae fuisse_. + +143. It is also not impossible that there was a time when the western [213] +or Celtic princes made themselves masters of Greece, of Egypt and a good +part of Asia, and that their cult remained in those countries. When one +considers with what rapidity the Huns, the Saracens and the Tartars gained +possession of a great part of our continent one will be the less surprised +at this; and it is confirmed by the great number of words in the Greek and +German tongues which correspond so closely. Callimachus, in a hymn in +honour of Apollo, seems to imply that the Celts who attacked the Temple at +Delphi, under their Brennus, or chief, were descendants of the ancient +Titans and Giants who made war on Jupiter and the other gods, that is to +say, on the Princes of Asia and of Greece. It may be that Jupiter is +himself descended from the Titans or Theodons, that is, from the earlier +Celto-Scythian princes; and the material collected by the late Abbe de la +Charmoye in his _Celtic Origins_ conforms to that possibility. Yet there +are opinions on other matters in this work by this learned writer which to +me do not appear probable, especially when he excludes the Germani from the +number of the Celts, not having recalled sufficiently the facts given by +ancient writers and not being sufficiently aware of the relation between +the ancient Gallic and Germanic tongues. Now the so-called Giants, who +wished to scale the heavens, were new Celts who followed the path of their +ancestors; and Jupiter, although of their kindred, as it were, was +constrained to resist them. Just so did the Visigoths established in Gallic +territory resist, together with the Romans, other peoples of Germania and +Scythia, who succeeded them under Attila their leader, he being at that +time in control of the Scythian, Sarmatic and Germanic tribes from the +frontiers of Persia up to the Rhine. But the pleasure one feels when one +thinks to find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old history +of fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far, and I know not whether I +shall have been any more successful than Goropius Becanus, Schrieckius, +Herr Rudbeck and the Abbe de la Charmoye. + +144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and Arimanius, the +sources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked upon them as two +eternal principles opposed to each other, although there is reason to doubt +this assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple of Cerdon, was of +this opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that these men used +lamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not sufficiently [214] +recognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument, +which was the difficulty over the origin of evil. He believes that an able +man on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and it +seems as though he himself, failing any other, wished to undertake a task +so unnecessary in the opinion of many people. 'All the hypotheses' (he +says, _Dictionary_, v., 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians have +established parry but poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph when +they act on the offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when they +have to sustain the attack.' He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr. +Hyde he calls them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soon +have been routed by _a priori_ reasons, taken from the nature of God; but +he thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the _a +posteriori_ reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil. + +145. He treats of the matter with abundant detail in his _Dictionary_, +article 'Manichaeans', p. 2025, which we must examine a little, in order to +throw greater light upon this subject: 'The surest and clearest ideas of +order teach us', he says, 'that a Being who exists through himself, who is +necessary, who is eternal, must be single, infinite, all powerful, and +endowed with all kinds of perfections.' This argument deserves to have been +developed more completely. 'Now it is necessary to see', he goes on, 'if +the phenomena of nature can be conveniently explained by the hypothesis of +one single principle.' I have explained it sufficiently by showing that +there are cases where some disorder in the part is necessary for producing +the greatest order in the whole. But it appears that M. Bayle asks a little +too much: he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with +the best possible scheme for the universe. That would be a complete +explanation of the phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am I +bound to do so, for there is no obligation to do that which is impossible +for us in our existing state. It is sufficient for me to point out that +there is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with +what is the best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leaving +something to be discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answering +the objections, though not for a comprehension of the matter. + +146. 'The heavens and all the rest of the universe', adds M. Bayle, 'preach +the glory, the power, the oneness of God.' Thence the conclusion [215] +should have been drawn that this is the case (as I have already observed +above) because there is seen in these objects something entire and +isolated, so to speak. Every time we see such a work of God, we find it so +perfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty thereof: but +when we do not see an entire work, when we only look upon scraps and +fragments, it is no wonder if the good order is not evident there. Our +planetary system composes such an isolated work, which is complete also +when it is taken by itself; each plant, each animal, each man furnishes one +such work, to a certain point of perfection: one recognizes therein the +wonderful contrivance of the author. But the human kind, so far as it is +known to us, is only a fragment, only a small portion of the City of God or +of the republic of Spirits, which has an extent too great for us, and +whereof we know too little, to be able to observe the wonderful order +therein. 'Man alone,' says M. Bayle, 'that masterpiece of his Creator among +things visible, man alone, I say, gives rise to great objections with +regard to the oneness of God.' Claudian made the same observation, +unburdening his heart in these well-known lines: + + _Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem_, etc. + +But the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong presumption +that it would exist also in the government of men, and generally in that of +Spirits, if the whole were known to us. One must judge the works of God as +wisely as Socrates judged those of Heraclitus in these words: What I have +understood thereof pleases me; I think that the rest would please me no +less if I understood it. + +147. Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in that +which concerns man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has +presented him with an image of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in a +sense, in his small department, _ut Spartam quam nactus est ornet_. He +enters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life, +reason, without showing himself. It is there that free will plays its game: +and God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods that he has thought +good to produce, as we make game of children who follow pursuits which we +secretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us. Thus man is there +like a little god in his own world or _Microcosm_, which he governs [216] +after his own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his art +often imitates nature. + + _Jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro,_ + _Risit et ad Superos talia dicta dedit:_ + _Huccine mortalis progressa potentia, Divi?_ + _Jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor._ + _Jura poli rerumque fidem legesque Deorum_ + _Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte Senex._ + _Quid falso insontem tonitru Salmonea miror?_ + _Aemula Naturae est parva reperta manus._ + +But he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to the +passions, and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes him +also for such errors, now like a father or tutor, training or chastising +children, now like a just judge, punishing those who forsake him: and evil +comes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their small +worlds come into collision. Man finds himself the worse for this, in +proportion to his fault; but God, by a wonderful art, turns all the errors +of these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great world. It is +as in those devices of perspective, where certain beautiful designs look +like mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision or +one views them by means of a certain glass or mirror. It is by placing and +using them properly that one makes them serve as adornment for a room. Thus +the apparent deformities of our little worlds combine to become beauties in +the great world, and have nothing in them which is opposed to the oneness +of an infinitely perfect universal principle: on the contrary, they +increase our wonder at the wisdom of him who makes evil serve the greater +good. + +148. M. Bayle continues: 'that man is wicked and miserable; that there are +everywhere prisons and hospitals; that history is simply a collection of +the crimes and calamities of the human race.' I think that there is +exaggeration in that: there is incomparably more good than evil in the life +of men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons. With regard to +virtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails. Machiavelli has already +observed that there are few very wicked and very good men, and that this +causes the failure of many great enterprises. I find it a great fault in +historians that they keep their mind on the evil more than on the [217] +good. The chief end of history, as also of poetry, should be to teach +prudence and virtue by examples, and then to display vice in such a way as +to create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it, or serve towards +that end. + +149. M. Bayle avows: 'that one finds everywhere both moral good and +physical good, some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, and +that this is what makes the difficulty. For if there were only wicked and +unhappy people', he says, 'there would be no need to resort to the +hypothesis of the two principles.' I wonder that this admirable man could +have evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the two +principles; and I am surprised at his not having taken into account that +this romance of human life, which makes the universal history of the human +race, lay fully devised in the divine understanding, with innumerable +others, and that the will of God only decreed its existence because this +sequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest of things, to +bring forth the best result. And these apparent faults in the whole world, +these spots on a Sun whereof ours is but a ray, rather enhance its beauty +than diminish it, contributing towards that end by obtaining a greater +good. There are in truth two principles, but they are both in God, to wit, +his understanding and his will. The understanding furnishes the principle +of evil, without being sullied by it, without being evil; it represents +natures as they exist in the eternal verities; it contains within it the +reason wherefore evil is permitted: but the will tends only towards good. +Let us add a third principle, namely power; it precedes even understanding +and will, but it operates as the one displays it and as the other requires +it. + +150. Some (like Campanella) have called these three perfections of God the +three primordialities. Many have even believed that there was therein a +secret connexion with the Holy Trinity: that power relates to the Father, +that is, to the source of Divinity, wisdom to the Eternal Word, which is +called _logos_ by the most sublime of the Evangelists, and will or Love to +the Holy Spirit. Well-nigh all the expressions or comparisons derived from +the nature of the intelligent substance tend that way. + +151. It seems to me that if M. Bayle had taken into account what I have +just said of the principles of things, he would have answered his own +questions, or at the least he would not have continued to ask, as he does +in these which follow: 'If man is the work of a single principle [218] +supremely good, supremely holy, supremely powerful, can he be subject to +diseases, to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, pain, grief? Can he have so many +evil tendencies? Can he commit so many crimes? Can supreme goodness produce +an unhappy creature? Shall not supreme power, united to an infinite +goodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not banish all that +might offend or grieve?' Prudentius in his _Hamartigenia_ presented the +same difficulty: + + _Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? inquit._ + _Non refert auctor fuerit, factorve malorum._ + _Anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti,_ + _Cum possit prohibere, sinat; quod si velit omnes_ + _Innocuos agere Omnipotens, ne sancta voluntas_ + _Degeneret, facto nec se manus inquinet ullo?_ + _Condidit ergo malum Dominus, quod spectat ab alto,_ + _Et patitur fierique probat, tanquam ipse crearit._ + _Ipse creavit enim, quod si discludere possit,_ + _Non abolet, longoque sinit grassarier usu._ + +But I have already answered that sufficiently. Man is himself the source of +his evils: just as he is, he was in the divine idea. God, prompted by +essential reasons of wisdom, decreed that he should pass into existence +just as he is. M. Bayle would perchance have perceived this origin of evil +in the form in which I demonstrate it here, if he had herein combined the +wisdom of God with his power, his goodness and his holiness. I will add, in +passing, that his _holiness_ is nothing other than the highest degree of +goodness, just as the crime which is its opposite is the worst of all evil. + +152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of the +oneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness of +substance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator of +duality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is more +consistent with order and _a priori_ reasons, but he denies its conformity +with experience and _a posteriori_ reasons. 'I surpass you', he said, 'in +the explanation of phenomena, which is the principal mark of a good +system.' But, in my opinion, it is not a very good explanation of a +phenomenon to assign to it an _ad hoc_ principle: to evil, a _principium +maleficum_, to cold, a _primum frigidum_; there is nothing so easy and +nothing so dull. It is well-nigh as if someone were to say that the [219] +Peripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of the +phenomena of the stars, by giving them _ad hoc_ intelligences to guide +them. According to that, it is quite easy to conceive why the planets make +their way with such precision; whereas there is need of much geometry and +reflexion to understand how from the gravity of the planets, which bears +them towards the sun, combined with some whirlwind which carries them +along, or with their own motive force, can spring the elliptic movement of +Kepler, which satisfies appearances so well. A man incapable of relishing +deep speculations will at first applaud the Peripatetics and will treat our +mathematicians as dreamers. Some old Galenist will do the same with regard +to the faculties of the Schoolmen: he will admit a chylific, a chymific and +a sanguific, and he will assign one of these _ad hoc_ to each operation; he +will think he has worked wonders, and will laugh at what he will call the +chimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain through mechanical structure +what passes in the body of an animal. + +153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, _per +principium maleficum_, is of the same nature. Evil needs no such +explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primum +frigidum_ nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only from privation; +the positive enters therein only by concomitance, as the active enters by +concomitance into cold. We see that water in freezing is capable of +breaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined; and yet cold is a certain +privation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a movement which +separates the particles of fluids. When this separating motion becomes +weakened in the water by the cold, the particles of compressed air +concealed in the water collect; and, becoming larger, they become more +capable of acting outwards through their buoyancy. The resistance which the +surfaces of the proportions of air meet in the water, and which opposes the +force exerted by these portions towards dilation, is far less, and +consequently the effect of the air greater, in large air-bubbles than in +small, even though these small bubbles combined should form as great a mass +as the large. For the resistances, that is, the surfaces, increase by the +_square_, and the forces, that is, the contents or the volumes of the +spheres of compressed air, increase by the _cube_, of their diameters. Thus +it is _by accident_ that privation involves action and force. I have +already shown how privation is enough to cause error and malice, and [220] +how God is prompted to permit them, despite that there be no malignity in +him. Evil comes from privation; the positive and action spring from it by +accident, as force springs from cold. + +154. The statement that M. Bayle attributes to the Paulicians, p. 2323, is +not conclusive, to wit, that free will must come from two principles, to +the end that it may have power to turn towards good and towards evil: for, +being simple in itself, it should rather have come from a neutral principle +if this argument held good. But free will tends towards good, and if it +meets with evil it is by accident, for the reason that this evil is +concealed beneath the good, and masked, as it were. These words which Ovid +ascribes to Medea, + + _Video meliora proboque,_ + _Deteriora sequor_, + +imply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good, which makes +more impression on souls when they are disturbed by the passions. + +155. Furthermore, M. Bayle himself supplies Melissus with a good answer; +but a little later he disputes it. Here are his words, p. 2025: 'If +Melissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was not +wicked when God made him; he will say that man received from God a happy +state, but that not having followed the light of conscience, which in +accordance with the intention of its author should have guided him along +the path of virtue, he has become wicked, and has deserved that God the +supremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger. It is +therefore not God who is the cause of moral evil: but he is the cause of +physical evil, that is, of the punishment of moral evil. And this +punishment, far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle, +of necessity emanates from that one of its attributes, I mean its justice, +which is not less essential to it than its goodness. This answer, the most +reasonable that Melissus can give, is fundamentally good and sound, but it +may be disputed by something more specious and more dazzling. For indeed +Zoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle ought to have created +man not only without actual evil, but also without the inclination towards +evil; that God, having foreseen sin with all its consequences, ought to +have prevented it; that he ought to have impelled man to moral good, and +not to have allowed him any force for tending towards crime.' That is quite +easy to say, but it is not practicable if one follows the principles [221] +of order: it could not have been accomplished without perpetual miracles. +Ignorance, error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made as +we are: should this species, then, have been missing in the universe? I +have no doubt but that it is too important there, despite all its +weaknesses, for God to have consented to its abolition. + +156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in his +_Dictionary_, follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on the +Manichaeans. According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the orthodox seem to admit +two first principles, in making the devil the originator of sin. M. Becker, +a former minister of Amsterdam, author of the book entitled _The World +Bewitched_, has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that one +should not assign such power and authority to the Devil as would allow of +his comparison with God. Therein he is right: but he pushes the conclusions +too far. And the author of the book entitled [Greek: Apokatastasis Panton] +believes that if the Devil had never been vanquished and despoiled, if he +had always kept his prey, if the title of invincible had belonged to him, +that would have done injury to the glory of God. But it is a poor advantage +to keep those whom one has led astray in order to share their punishment +for ever. And as for the cause of evil, it is true that the Devil is the +author of sin. But the origin of sin comes from farther away, its source is +in the original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable of +sinning, and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause +this power to evince itself in action. + +157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is +thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scripture +is not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the Apocalypse that +speaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, leaves much in +doubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the other +sacred writers is hardly mentioned. It is not in place here to enter into +this discussion, and one must still admit that the common opinion agrees +best with the sacred text. M. Bayle examines some replies of St. Basil, of +Lactantius and others on the origin of evil. As, however, they are +concerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion thereof, and I will +proceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause of +moral evil, which arise in several passages of the works of our gifted +author. + + [222] +158. He disputes the _permission_ of this evil, he would wish one to admit +that God _wills_ it. He quotes these words of Calvin (on Genesis, ch. 3): +'The ears of some are offended when one says that God willed it. But I ask +you, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, or +rather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?' M. Bayle +explains these words of Calvin, and those which precede them, as if he +admitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in so far as it was a crime, +but under some other conception that is unknown to us. He quotes casuists +who are somewhat lax, who say that a son can desire the death of his +father, not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is a +good for his heirs _(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 147, p. +850). It seems to me that Calvin only says that God willed man's fall for +some reason unknown to us. In the main, when it is a question of a decisive +will, that is, of a decree, these distinctions are useless: one wills the +action with all its qualities, if it is true that one wills it. But when it +is a crime, God can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither an +end nor a means, it is only a _conditio sine qua non_; thus it is not the +object of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above. God cannot +prevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doing +something that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating the +rule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have already +observed. God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is in himself, +to permit moral evil in creatures. There is precisely the case wherein the +will of a wise mind is only permissive. I have already said this: he is +bound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it without +himself failing in that which he owes to himself. + +159. 'But among all these infinite combinations', says M. Bayle (p. 853), +'it pleased God to choose one wherein Adam was to sin, and by his decree he +made it, in preference to all the others, the plan that should come to +pass.' Very good; that is speaking my language; so long as one applies it +to the combinations which compose the whole universe. 'You will therefore +never make us understand', he adds, 'how God did not will that Eve and Adam +should sin, since he rejected all the combinations wherein they would not +have sinned.' But the thing is in general very easy to understand, from all +that I have just said. This combination that makes the whole universe is +the best; God therefore could not refrain from choosing it without [223] +incurring a lapse, and rather than incur such, a thing altogether +inappropriate to him, he permits the lapse or the sin of man which is +involved in this combination. + +160. M. Jacquelot, with other able men, does not differ in opinion from me, +when for example he says, p. 186 of his treatise on the _Conformity of +Faith with Reason_: 'Those who are puzzled by these difficulties seem to be +too limited in their outlook, and to wish to reduce all God's designs to +their own interests. When God formed the universe, his whole prospect was +himself and his own glory, so that if we had knowledge of all creatures, of +their diverse combinations and of their different relations, we should +understand without difficulty that the universe corresponds perfectly to +the infinite wisdom of the Almighty.' He says elsewhere (p. 232): +'Supposing the impossible, that God could not prevent the wrong use of free +will without destroying it, it will be agreed that since his wisdom and his +glory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must have +prevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have.' I +have endeavoured to develop this still further through _the reason of the +best and the moral necessity_ which led God to make this choice, despite +the sin of some creatures which is involved therein. I think that I have +cut down to the root of the difficulty; nevertheless I am well pleased, for +the sake of throwing more light on the matter, to apply my principle of +solution to the peculiar difficulties of M. Bayle. + +161. Here is one, set forth in these terms (ch. 148, p. 856): 'Would it in +a prince be a mark of his kindness: 1. To give to a hundred messengers as +much money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues? 2. To promise +a recompense to all those who should finish the journey without having +borrowed anything, and to threaten with imprisonment all those whom their +money should not have sufficed? 3. To make choice of a hundred persons, of +whom he would know for certain that there were but two who should earn the +recompense, the ninety-eight others being destined to find on the way +either a mistress or a gamester or some other thing which would make them +incur expenses, and which he would himself have been at pains to dispose in +certain places along their path? 4. To imprison actually ninety-eight of +these messengers on the moment of their return? Is it not abundantly +evident that he would have no kindness for them, and that on the contrary +he would intend for them, not the proposed recompense, but prison? [224] +They would deserve it, certainly; but he who had wished them to deserve it +and placed them in the sure way towards deserving it, should he be worthy +of being called kind, on the pretext that he had recompensed the two +others?' It would doubtless not be on that account that he earned the title +of 'kind'. Yet other circumstances may contribute, which would avail to +render him worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order to +know those people, and to make trial of them; just as Gideon made use of +some extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the least +squeamish among his soldiers. And even if the prince were to know already +the disposition of all these messengers, may he not put them to this test +in order to make them known also to the others? Even though these reasons +be not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an action +like that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from +the circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that God +has acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that he +has done. + +162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, letter +10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with the +omnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels, and +who, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will fight, takes +sure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, they fight: +their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will, they are +punishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) concerning some +free actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite foreknowledge and +power, certainly does concerning all those of men. Before he sent us into +this world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be: he +has endued us therewith, he also has disposed all other things that are +outside us, to cause such and such objects to present themselves to our +senses at such and such a time. He knew that as a result of this our free +will would determine us toward some particular thing, and he has willed it +thus; but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto. In +this king one may distinguish two different degrees of will, the one +whereby he willed that these noblemen should fight, since he brought about +their meeting, and the other whereby he did not will it, since he forbade +duels. Even so theologians distinguish in God an absolute and independent +will, whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done, [225] +and another which is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit of +men, whereby he wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 of +vol. 1, pp. 51, 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld, +vol. 2, p. 288 _et seqq_. of his _Reflexions on the System of Malebranche_, +from Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God). + +163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (_Reply to the Questions of a +Provincial_, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much mistaken, it +seems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree of will, either +small or great, that these two noblemen should obey the law, and not fight. +He would will entirely and solely that they should fight. That would not +exculpate them, they would only follow their passion, they would be unaware +that they conformed to the will of their sovereign: but he would be in +truth the moral cause of their encounter, and he would not more entirely +wish it supposing he were to inspire them with the desire or to give them +the order for it. Imagine to yourself two princes each of whom wishes his +eldest son to poison himself. One employs constraint, the other contents +himself with secretly causing a grief that he knows will be sufficient to +induce his son to poison himself. Will you be doubtful whether the will of +the latter is less complete than the will of the former? M. Descartes is +therefore assuming an unreal fact and does not at all solve the +difficulty.' + +164. One must confess that M. Descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the will +of God in regard to evil in saying not only that God knew that our free +will would determine us toward some particular thing, but also _that he +also wished it_, albeit he did not will to constrain the will thereto. He +speaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same volume, saying that +not the slightest thought enters into the mind of a man which God does not +_will_, and has not willed from all eternity, to enter there. Calvin never +said anything harsher; and all that can only be excused if it is to be +understood of a permissive will. M. Descartes' solution amounts to the +distinction between the will expressed in the sign and the will expressive +of the good pleasure (_inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti_) which the +moderns have taken from the Schoolmen as regards the terms, but to which +they have given a meaning not usual among the ancients. It is true that God +may command something and yet not will that it be done, as when he +commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: he willed the obedience, and he did +not will the action. But when God commands the virtuous action and [226] +forbids the sin, he wills indeed that which he ordains, but it is only by +an antecedent will, as I have explained more than once. + +165. M. Descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory; but it may be +made so. One must make some change in the facts, inventing some reason to +oblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet. They must, +for instance, be together in the army or in other obligatory functions, a +circumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without endangering his +State. For example, the absence of either of them might be responsible for +the disappearance of innumerable persons of his party from the army or +cause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some great disturbance. +In this case, therefore, one may say that the prince does not will the +duel: he knows of it, but he permits it notwithstanding, for he prefers +permitting the sin of others to committing one himself. Thus this corrected +comparison may serve, provided that one observe the difference between God +and the prince. The prince is forced into this permission by his +powerlessness; a more powerful monarch would have no need of all these +considerations; but God, who has power to do all that is possible, only +permits sin because it is absolutely impossible to anyone at all to do +better. The prince's action is peradventure not free from sorrow and +regret. This regret is due to his imperfection, of which he is sensible; +therein lies displeasure. God is incapable of such a feeling and finds, +moreover, no cause therefor; he is infinitely conscious of his own +perfection, and it may even be said that the imperfection in creatures +taken individually changes for him into perfection in relation to the +whole, and that it is an added glory for the Creator. What more can one +wish, when one possesses a boundless wisdom and when one is as powerful as +one is wise; when one can do all and when one has the best? + +166. Having once understood these things, we are hardened sufficiently, so +it seems to me, against the strongest and most spirited objections. I have +not concealed them: but there are some we shall merely touch upon, because +they are too odious. The Remonstrants and M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions +of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 152, end page 919) quote St. Augustine, +saying, '_crudelem esse misericordiam velle aliquem miserum esse ut eius +miserearis_': in the same sense is cited Seneca _De Benef._, L. 6, c. 36, +37. I confess that one would have some reason to urge that against those +who believed that God has no other cause for permitting sin than the [227] +design to have something wherewith to exercise punitive justice against the +majority of men, and his mercy towards a small number of elect. But it must +be considered that God had reasons for his permission of sin, more worthy +of him and more profound in relation to us. Someone has dared to compare +God's course of action with that of a Caligula, who has his edicts written +in so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not +possible to read them; with that of a mother who neglects her daughter's +honour in order to attain her own selfish ends; with that of Queen +Catherine de Medicis, who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of her +ladies in order to learn of the intrigues of the great; and even with that +of Tiberius, who arranged, through the extraordinary services of the +executioner, that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to capital +punishment should no longer apply to the case of Sejanus's daughter. This +last comparison was proposed by Peter Bertius, then an Armenian, but +finally a member of the Roman communion. And a scandalous comparison has +been made between God and Tiberius, which is related at length by Andreas +Caroli in his _Memorabilia Ecclesiastica_ of the last century, as M. Bayle +observes. Bertius used it against the Gomarists. I think that arguments of +this kind are only valid against those who maintain that justice is an +arbitrary thing in relation to God; or that he has a despotic power which +can go so far as being able to condemn innocents; or, in short, that good +is not the motive of his actions. + +167. At that same time an ingenious satire was composed against the +Gomarists, entitled _Fur praedestinatus, de gepredestineerdedief_, wherein +there is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged, who attributes to God +all the evil he has done; who believes himself predestined to salvation +notwithstanding his wicked actions; who imagines that this belief is +sufficient for him, and who defeats by arguments _ad hominem_ a +Counter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him for death: but this +thief is finally converted by an old pastor who had been dismissed for his +Arminianism, whom the gaoler, in pity for the criminal and for the weakness +of the minister, had brought to him secretly. Replies were made to this +lampoon, but replies to satires never please as much as the satires +themselves. M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, +ch. 154, p. 938) says that this book was printed in England in the [228] +time of Cromwell, and he appears not to have been informed that it was only +a translation of the much older original Flemish. He adds that Dr. George +Kendal wrote a confutation of it at Oxford in the year 1657, under the +title of _Fur pro Tribunali_, and that the dialogue is there inserted. This +dialogue presupposes, contrary to the truth, that the Counter-remonstrants +make God the cause of evil, and teach a kind of predestination in the +Mahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one does +good or evil, and the assumption that one is predestined assures the fact. +They by no means go so far. Nevertheless it is true that there are among +them some Supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare themselves +in clear terms upon the justice of God and the principles of piety and +morals in man. For they imagine despotism in God, and demand that man be +convinced, without reason, of the absolute certainty of his election, a +course that is liable to have dangerous consequences. But all those who +acknowledge that God produces the best plan, having chosen it from among +all possible ideas of the universe; that he there finds man inclined by the +original imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plunge +into misery; that God prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the +perfection of the universe, which is an emanation from his, may permit it: +those, I say, show forth more clearly that God's intention is the one most +right and holy in the world; that the creature alone is guilty, that his +original limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness, that +his evil will is the sole cause of his misery; that one cannot be destined +to salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children of +God, and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded upon +the good will infused into one's heart by the grace of God. + +168. _Metaphysical considerations_ also are brought up against my +explanation of the moral cause of moral evil; but they will trouble me less +since I have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons, which +were more impressive. These metaphysical considerations concern the nature +of the _possible_ and of the _necessary_; they go against my fundamental +assumption that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. There are +philosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except that +which actually happens. These are those same people who thought or could +have thought that all is necessary unconditionally. Some were of this [229] +opinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of +the existence of things: and it is these I have most reason for opposing. +But there are others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms. They +confuse moral necessity with metaphysical necessity: they imagine that +since God cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom, +and things are endued with that necessity which philosophers and +theologians endeavour to avoid. With these writers my dispute is only one +of words, provided they admit in very deed that God chooses and does the +best. But there are others who go further, they think that God could have +done better. This is an opinion which must be rejected: for although it +does not altogether deprive God of wisdom and goodness, as do the advocates +of blind necessity, it sets bounds thereto, thus derogating from God's +supreme perfection. + +169. The question of the _possibility of things that do not happen_ has +already been examined by the ancients. It appears that Epicurus, to +preserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, maintained, after +Aristotle, that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinate +truth. For if it was true yesterday that I should write to-day, it could +therefore not fail to happen, it was already necessary; and, for the same +reason, it was from all eternity. Thus all that which happens is necessary, +and it is impossible for anything different to come to pass. But since that +is not so it would follow, according to him, that contingent futurities +have no determinate truth. To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far as +to deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, he +denied that every assertion was either true or false. Here is the way they +confounded him: 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should write +to-day; it was therefore false.' The good man, not being able to admit this +conclusion, was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. After +that, he needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself the +trouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, following +the account by Cicero in his book _De Fato_: 'Contendit omnes nervos +Chrysippus ut persuadeat omne [Greek: Axioma] aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut +enim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, fato fieri +quaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam +certum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum +confirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non obtinuerit omne[230] +quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato fieri possint ex +causis aeternis rerum futurarum.' M. Bayle observes (_Dictionary_, article +'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that neither of these two great philosophers +[Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that the truth of this maxim, every +proposition is true or false, is independent of what is called _fatum_: it +could not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the _fatum_, as +Chrysippus maintained and as Epicurus feared. Chrysippus could not have +conceded, without damaging his own position, that there are propositions +which are neither true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting the +contrary: for, whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true that +this proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true or +false. Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All that +I shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the faculty +of prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it would +yet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should +predict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippus +nor Epicurus has taken into consideration.' Cicero, lib. I, _De Nat. +Deorum_, with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the sound +opinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) that it +would be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent, +than to have recourse to such answers. Yet we shall see that M. Bayle +himself confused the certain with the necessary, when he maintained that +the choice of the best rendered things necessary. + +170. Let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen, and I +will give the very words of M. Bayle, albeit they are somewhat discursive. +This is what he says on the matter in his _Dictionary_ (article +'Chrysippus', let. S, p. 929): 'The celebrated dispute on things possible +and things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the Stoics +concerning fate. The question was to know whether, among the things which +have never been and never will be, there are some possible; or whether all +that is not, all that has never been, all that will never be, was +impossible. A famous dialectician of the Megaric Sect, named Diodorus, gave +a negative answer to the first of these two questions and an affirmative to +the second; but Chrysippus vehemently opposed him. Here are two passages of +Cicero (epist. 4, lib. 9, _Ad Familiar._): "[Greek: peri dynaton] me scito +[Greek: kata Diodoron krinein]. Quapropter si venturus es, scito [231] +necesse esse te venire. Sin autem non es, [Greek: ton adynaton] est te +venire. Nunc vide utra te [Greek: krisis] magis delectet, [Greek: +Chrysippeia] ne, an haec; quam noster Diodorus [a Stoic who for a long time +had lived in Cicero's house] non concoquebat." This is quoted from a letter +that Cicero wrote to Varro. He sets forth more comprehensively the whole +state of the question, in the little book _De Fato_. I am going to quote a +few pieces (Cic., _De Fato_, p. m. 65): "Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, +in qua tibi cum Diodoro valente Dialectico magna luctatio est, deseras ... +omne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. At hoc, +Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. +Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit +verum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse; et quicquid +non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu etiam quae non sint futura, posse +fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit: neque +necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno +Apollinis Oraculo editum esset.... Placet Diodoro, id solum fieri posse, +quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit: qui locus attingit hanc +quaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit; et quicquid fieri +possit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse: nec magis commutari ex veris in +falsa ea posse quae futura sunt, quam ea quae facta sunt: sed in factis +immutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparent, ne +inesse quidem videri: ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit, hic +morietur hoc morbo: at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo tanta vis +morbi non appareat, nihilominus futurum sit. Ita fit ut commutatio ex vero +in falsum, ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit." Cicero makes it clear +enough that Chrysippus often found himself in difficulties in this dispute, +and that is no matter for astonishment: for the course he had chosen was +not bound up with his dogma of fate, and, if he had known how, or had +dared, to reason consistently, he would readily have adopted the whole +hypothesis of Diodorus. We have seen already that the freedom he assigned +to the soul, and his comparison of the cylinder, did not preclude the +possibility that in reality all the acts of the human will were unavoidable +consequences of fate. Hence it follows that everything which does not +happen is impossible, and that there is nothing possible but that which +actually comes to pass. Plutarch (_De Stoicor. Repugn._, pp. 1053, 1054) +discomfits him completely, on that point as well as on the dispute [232] +with Diodorus, and maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogether +contrary to the doctrine of _fatum_. Observe that the most eminent Stoics +had written on this matter without following the same path. Arrian (in +_Epict._, lib. 2, c. 29, p. m. 166) named four of them, who are Chrysippus, +Cleanthes, Archidemus and Antipater. He evinces great scorn for this +dispute; and M. Menage need not have cited him as a writer who had spoken +in commendation of the work of Chrysippus [Greek: peri dynaton] ("citatur +honorifice apud Arrianum", Menag. in _Laert._, I, 7, 341) for assuredly +these words, "[Greek: gegraphe de kai Chrysippos thaumastos], etc., de his +rebus mira scripsit Chrysippus", etc., are not in that connexion a eulogy. +That is shown by the passages immediately before and after it. Dionysius of +Halicarnassus (_De Collocat. Verbor._, c. 17, p. m. 11) mentions two +treatises by Chrysippus, wherein, under a title that promised something +different, much of the logicians' territory had been explored. The work was +entitled "[Greek: peri tes syntaxeos ton tou logou meron], de partium +orationis collocatione", and treated only of propositions true and false, +possible and impossible, contingent and equivocal, etc., matter that our +Schoolmen have pounded down and reduced to its essence. Take note that +Chrysippus recognized that past things were necessarily true, which +Cleanthes had not been willing to admit. (Arrian, _ubi supra_, p. m. 165.) +"[Greek: Ou pan de parelelythos alethes anankaion esti, kathaper hoi peri +Kleanthen pheresthai dokousi]. Non omne praeteritum ex necessitate verum +est, ut illi qui Cleanthem sequuntur sentiunt." We have already seen (p. +562, col. 2) that Abelard is alleged to have taught a doctrine which +resembles that of Diodorus. I think that the Stoics pledged themselves to +give a wider range to possible things than to future things, for the +purpose of mitigating the odious and frightful conclusions which were drawn +from their dogma of fatality.' + +It is sufficiently evident that Cicero when writing to Varro the words that +have just been quoted (lib. 9, Ep. 4, _Ad Familiar._) had not enough +comprehension of the effect of Diodorus's opinion, since he found it +preferable. He presents tolerably well in his book _De Fato_ the opinions +of those writers, but it is a pity that he has not always added the reasons +which they employed. Plutarch in his treatise on the contradictions of the +Stoics and M. Bayle are both surprised that Chrysippus was not of the same +opinion as Diodorus, since he favours fatality. But Chrysippus and even his +master Cleanthes were on that point more reasonable than is supposed. [233] +That will be seen as we proceed. It is open to question whether the past is +more necessary than the future. Cleanthes held the opinion that it is. The +objection is raised that it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the future to +happen, as it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the past to have happened. +But there is this difference, that it is not possible to act on the past +state, that would be a contradiction; but it is possible to produce some +effect on the future. Yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same: +the one cannot be changed, the other will not be; and once that is past, it +will not be possible for it to be changed either. + +171. The famous Pierre Abelard expressed an opinion resembling that of +Diodorus in the statement that God can do only that which he does. It was +the third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which were +censured at the Council of Sens. It had been taken from the third book of +his _Introduction to Theology_, where he treats especially of the power of +God. The reason he gave for his statement was that God can do only that +which he wills. Now God cannot will to do anything other than that which he +does, because, of necessity, he must will whatever is fitting. Hence it +follows that all that which he does not, is not fitting, that he cannot +will to do it, and consequently that he cannot do it. Abelard admits +himself that this opinion is peculiar to him, that hardly anyone shares in +it, that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and to reason and +derogatory to the greatness of God. It appears that this author was a +little too much inclined to speak and to think differently from others: for +in reality this was only a dispute about words: he was changing the use of +terms. Power and will are different faculties, whose objects also are +different; it is confusing them to say that God can do only that which he +wills. On the contrary, among various possibles, he wills only that which +he finds the best. For all possibles are regarded as objects of power, but +actual and existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretory +will. Abelard himself acknowledged it. He raises this objection for +himself: a reprobate can be saved; but he can only be saved if God saves +him. God can therefore save him, and consequently do something that he does +not. Abelard answers that it may indeed be said that this man can be saved +in respect of the possibility of human nature, which is capable of +salvation: but that it may not be said that God can save him in respect of +God himself, because it is impossible that God should do that which he[234] +must not do. But Abelard admits that it may very well be said in a sense, +speaking absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation, that +such an one who is reprobate can be saved, and that thus often that which +God does not can be done. He could therefore have spoken like the rest, who +mean nothing different when they say that God can save this man, and that +he can do that which he does not. + +172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the Council +of Constance, seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding. I +think that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, without +reason, they bring into use new and displeasing expressions. In our own +time the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this same opinion, that what does +not happen is impossible. He proves it by the statement that all the +conditions requisite for a thing that shall not exist (_omnia rei non +futurae requisita_) are never found together, and that the thing cannot +exist otherwise. But who does not see that that only proves a hypothetical +impossibility? It is true that a thing cannot exist when a requisite +condition for it is lacking. But as we claim to be able to say that the +thing can exist although it does not exist, we claim in the same way to be +able to say that the requisite conditions can exist although they do not +exist. Thus Mr. Hobbes's argument leaves the matter where it is. The +opinion which was held concerning Mr. Hobbes, that he taught an absolute +necessity of all things, brought upon him much discredit, and would have +done him harm even had it been his only error. + +173. Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a blind +necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will, +and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not to him. It +is true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure: for he +grants God thought, after having divested him of understanding, +_cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo_. There are even passages where +he relents on the question of necessity. Nevertheless, as far as one can +understand him, he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and +he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine +nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in +refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is +founded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply [235] +no contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the +romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still +exist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such +as those of Mademoiselle de Scudery, or as _Octavia_, are possible. Let us +therefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please me +well, on page 390, 'It is to-day', he says, 'a great embarrassment for the +Spinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as impossible +from all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die at The Hague, +as it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are well aware that +it is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a conclusion which +disheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, because of the +absurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common sense. They are not +well pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universal +and so evident as this one: All that which implies contradiction is +impossible, and all that which implies no contradiction is possible.' + +174. One may say of M. Bayle, 'ubi bene, nemo melius', although one cannot +say of him what was said of Origen, 'ubi male, nemo pejus'. I will only add +that what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the definition of +the _possible_ and the _impossible_. M. Bayle, however, adds here towards +the end a remark which somewhat spoils his eminently reasonable statement. +'Now what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden? Would +Nature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?' He confuses +here what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannot +happen because it is not meet to be chosen. It is true that there would +have been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza died in Leyden +and not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible: the matter +was therefore indifferent in respect of the power of God. But one must not +suppose that any event, however small it be, can be regarded as indifferent +in respect of his wisdom and his goodness. Jesus Christ has said divinely +well that everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head. Thus the +wisdom of God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks should +happen otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have been +more deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entire +sequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference. To say that +what has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of God, and[236] +thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a false +assumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion. It is confusing what +is necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the principle of +Wisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity, +which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction. Spinoza, moreover, +sought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not think that God was +determined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treated +as chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of his +nature; just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles, +without either knowing or willing this. For Euclid demonstrated that all +angles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities of +the diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are of +necessity right angles, and that the contrary implies contradiction. + +175. There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the pretext +of freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to +regard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise. +They did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity is +preposterous in relation to God's actions _ad extra_, so moral necessity is +worthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good, +whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of +goodness or of wisdom. And besides, the indifference which would keep the +will in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been already +shown: it would offend against the great principle of the determinant +reason. + +176. Those who believe that God established good and evil by an arbitrary +decree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and other +absurdities still stranger. They deprive God of the designation _good_: for +what cause could one have to praise him for what he does, if in doing +something quite different he would have done equally well? And I have very +often been surprised that divers Supralapsarian theologians, as for +instance Samuel Rutherford, a Professor of Theology in Scotland, who wrote +when the controversies with the Remonstrants were at their height, could +have been deluded by so strange an idea. Rutherford (in his _Exercitationes +Apologeticae pro Gratia_) says positively that nothing is unjust or morally +bad in God's eyes before he has forbidden it: thus without this prohibition +it would be a matter of indifference whether one murdered or saved a [237] +man, loved God or hated him, praised or blasphemed him. Nothing is so +unreasonable as that. One may teach that God established good and evil by a +positive law, or one may assert that there was something good and just +before his decree, but that he is not required to conform to it, and that +nothing prevents him from acting unjustly and from perhaps condemning +innocence: but it all comes to the same thing, offering almost equal +dishonour to God. For if justice was established arbitrarily and without +any cause, if God came upon it by a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots, +his goodness and his wisdom are not manifested in it, and there is nothing +at all to attach him to it. If it is by a purely arbitrary decree, without +any reason, that he has established or created what we call justice and +goodness, then he can annul them or change their nature. Thus one would +have no reason to assume that he will observe them always, as it would be +possible to say he will observe them on the assumption that they are +founded on reasons. The same would hold good more or less if his justice +were different from ours, if (for example) it were written in his code that +it is just to make the innocent eternally unhappy. According to these +principles also, nothing would compel God to keep his word or would assure +us of its fulfilment. For why should the law of justice, which states that +reasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any other +laws? + +177. All these three dogmas, albeit a little different from one another, +namely, (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) that it is fixed, +but it is not certain that God will observe it, and finally (3) that the +justice we know is not that which he observes, destroy the confidence in +God that gives us tranquillity, and the love of God that makes our +happiness. There is nothing to prevent such a God from behaving as a tyrant +and an enemy of honest folk, and from taking pleasure in that which we call +evil. Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil principle of the +Manichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox? At least he would +be neutral and, as it were, suspended between the two, or even sometimes +the one and sometimes the other. That would be as if someone were to say +that Oromasdes and Arimanius reign in turns, according to which of the two +is the stronger or the more adroit. It is like the saying of a certain +Moghul woman. She, so it seems, having heard it said that formerly under +Genghis Khan and his successors her nation had had dominion over most [238] +of the North and East, told the Muscovites recently, when M. Isbrand went +to China on behalf of the Czar, through the country of those Tartars, that +the god of the Moghuls had been driven from Heaven, but that one day he +would take his own place again. The true God is always the same: natural +religion itself demands that he be essentially as good and wise as he is +powerful. It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that God +acts without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which does +not find the eternal rules of goodness and of justice among its objects, or +again to say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules. + +178. Some theologians who have written of God's right over creatures appear +to have conceded to him an unrestricted right, an arbitrary and despotic +power. They thought that would be placing divinity on the most exalted +level that may be imagined for it, and that it would abase the creature +before the Creator to such an extent that the Creator is bound by no laws +of any kind with respect to the creature. There are passages from Twiss, +Rutherford and some other Supralapsarians which imply that God cannot sin +whatever he may do, because he is subject to no law. M. Bayle himself +considers that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to the holiness of +God (_Dictionary_, v. 'Paulicians', p. 2332 _in initio_); but I suppose +that the intention of some of these writers was less bad than it seems to +be. Apparently they meant by the term right, [Greek: anypeuthynian], a +state wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions. But they will +not have denied that God owes to himself what goodness and justice demand +of him. On that matter one may see M. Amyraut's _Apology for Calvin_: it is +true that Calvin appears orthodox on this subject, and that he is by no +means one of the extreme Supralapsarians. + +179. Thus, when M. Bayle says somewhere that St. Paul extricates himself +from predestination only through the consideration of God's absolute right, +and the incomprehensibility of his ways, it is implied that, if one +understood them, one would find them consistent with justice, God not being +able to use his power otherwise. St. Paul himself says that it is a +_depth_, but a depth of wisdom (_altitudo sapientiae_), and _justice_ is +included in _the goodness of the All-wise_. I find that M. Bayle speaks +very well elsewhere on the application of our notions of goodness to the +actions of God (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 81, p. 139): +'One must not assert here', he says, 'that the goodness of the [239] +infinite Being is not subject to the same rules as the goodness of the +creature. For if there is in God an attribute that can be called goodness, +the marks of goodness in general must apply to him. Now when we reduce +goodness to the most general abstraction, we find therein the will to do +good. Divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this +general goodness, into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness, +goodness of a father, goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you will +find in each, as an inseparable attribute, the will to do good.' + +180. I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion of those who +assert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice of +God; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by the goodness +of things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected to necessity in +his actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is confusing +metaphysical necessity with moral necessity. Here is what M. Bayle says in +objection to this error (_Reply_, ch. 89, p. 203): 'The consequence of this +doctrine will be, that before God resolved upon creating the world he saw +nothing better in virtue than in vice, and that his ideas did not show him +that virtue was more worthy of his love than vice. That leaves no +distinction between natural right and positive right; there will no longer +be anything unalterable or inevitable in morals; it will have been just as +possible for God to command people to be vicious as to command them to be +virtuous; and one will have no certainty that the moral laws will not one +day be abrogated, as the ceremonial laws of the Jews were. This, in a word, +leads us straight to the belief that God was the free author, not only of +goodness and of virtue, but also of truth and of the essence of things. +That is what certain of the Cartesians assert, and I confess that their +opinion (see the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, p. 554) +might be of some avail in certain circumstances. Yet it is open to dispute +for so many reasons, and subject to consequences so troublesome (see +chapter 152 of the same Continuation) that there are scarcely any extremes +it were not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one. It opens the +door to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion that +this proposition, three and three make six, is only true where and during +the time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of the +universe; and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year.[240] +All that depends on the free will of God could have been limited to certain +places and certain times, like the Judaic ceremonies. This conclusion will +be extended to all the laws of the Decalogue, if the actions they command +are in their nature divested of all goodness to the same degree as the +actions they forbid.' + +181. To say that God, having resolved to create man just as he is, could +not but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, because +it is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbing +his work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the common opinion. +Virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent the +imperfection of those who are virtuous, or even of those who have to do +with them. And they have that power by their nature and by the nature of +rational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold a different +opinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion and +harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in music +only when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument. But that is +exactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules +belong to it already in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks of +singing, since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soon +as one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of the +rational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that very +reason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature. + +182. M. Bayle has inserted a special chapter in his Continuation of _Divers +Thoughts on the Comet_ (it is chapter 152) where he shows 'that the +Christian Doctors teach that there are things which are just antecedently +to God's decrees'. Some theologians of the Augsburg Confession censured +some of the Reformed who appeared to be of a different opinion; and this +error was regarded as if it were a consequence of the absolute decree, +which doctrine seems to exempt the will of God from any kind of reason, +_ubi stat pro ratione voluntas_. But, as I have observed already on various +occasions, Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are in +conformity with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might prove +this conformity in detail are unknown to us. Thus, according to him, the +rules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God. M. +Bayle, in the same place, quotes a passage from the celebrated M. Turretin +which draws a distinction between natural divine laws and positive [241] +divine laws. Moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial of the second. +Samuel Desmarests, a celebrated theologian formerly at Groningen, and Herr +Strinesius, who is still at Frankfort on the Oder, advocated this same +distinction; and I think that it is the opinion most widely accepted even +among the Reformed. Thomas Aquinas and all the Thomists were of the same +opinion, with the bulk of the Schoolmen and the theologians of the Roman +Church. The Casuists also held to that idea: I count Grotius among the most +eminent of them, and he was followed in this point by his commentators. +Herr Pufendorf appeared to be of a different opinion, which he insisted on +maintaining in the face of censure from some theologians; but he need not +be taken into account, not having advanced far enough in subjects of this +kind. He makes a vigorous protest against the absolute decree, in his +_Fecialis divinus_, and yet he approves what is worst in the opinions of +the champions of this decree, and without which this decree (as others of +the Reformed explain) becomes endurable. Aristotle was very orthodox on +this matter of justice, and the Schoolmen followed him: they distinguish, +just as Cicero and the Jurists do, between perpetual right, which is +binding on all and everywhere, and positive right, which is only for +certain times and certain peoples. I once read with enjoyment the +_Euthyphro_ of Plato, who makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point, +and M. Bayle has called attention to the same passage. + +183. M. Bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in a +certain passage, which it will be well to quote here in its entirety, long +as it is (vol. II of the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, +ch. 152, p. 771 _seqq._): 'According to the teaching of countless writers +of importance', he says, 'there is in nature and in the essence of certain +things a moral good or evil that precedes the divine decree. They prove +this doctrine principally through the frightful consequences that attend +the opposite dogma. Thus from the proposition that to do wrong to no man +would be a good action, not in itself but by an arbitrary dispensation of +God's will, it would follow that God could have given to man a law directly +opposed at all points to the commandments of the Decalogue. That is +horrifying. But here is a more direct proof, one derived from metaphysics. +One thing is certain, that the existence of God is not an effect of his +will. He exists not because he wills his existence, but through the [242] +necessity of his infinite nature. His power and his knowledge exist through +the same necessity. He is all-powerful, he knows all things, not because he +wills it thus, but because these are attributes necessarily identified with +him. The dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power, he +gives effect outside himself only to that which he wills, and he leaves all +the rest in the state of mere possibility. Thence it comes that this +dominion extends only over the existence of creatures, and not over their +essential being. God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leave +them in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them without giving +them their essential properties. He had of necessity to make man a rational +animal and to give the round shape to a circle, since, according to his +eternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of his will, the essence of +man lay in the properties of being animal and rational, and since the +essence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant from +the centre as to all its parts. This is what has caused the Christian +philosophers to acknowledge that the essences of things are eternal, and +that there are propositions of eternal truth; consequently that the +essences of things and the truth of the first principles are immutable. +That is to be understood not only of theoretical but also of practical +first principles, and of all the propositions that contain the true +definition of creatures. These essences and these truths emanate from the +same necessity of nature as the knowledge of God. Since therefore it is by +the nature of things that God exists, that he is all-powerful, and that he +has perfect knowledge of all things, it is also by the nature of things +that matter, the triangle, man and certain actions of man, etc., have such +and such properties essentially. God saw from all eternity and in all +necessity the essential relations of numbers, and the identity of the +subject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of each +thing. He saw likewise that the term just is included in these +propositions: to esteem what is estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor, +fulfil the conditions of a contract, and so on, with many others relating +to morals. One is therefore justified in saying that the precepts of +natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is +enjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practise what they contain +even though God should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that +respect. Pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts to +that ideal moment when God has yet decreed nothing, we find in the [243] +ideas of God the principles of morals under terms that imply an obligation. +We understand these maxims as certain, and derived from the eternal and +immutable order: it beseems the rational creature to conform to reason; a +rational creature conforming to reason is to be commended, but not +conforming thereto is blameworthy. You would not dare to deny that these +truths impose upon man a duty in relation to all acts which are in +conformity with strict reason, such as these: one must esteem all that is +estimable; render good for good; do wrong to no man; honour one's father; +render to every man that which is his due, etc. Now since by the very +nature of things, and before the divine laws, the truths of morality impose +upon man certain duties, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius were justified in +saying that if there were no God we should nevertheless be obliged to +conform to natural law. Others have said that even supposing all rational +beings in existence were to perish, true propositions would remain true. +Cajetan maintained that if he remained alone in the universe, all other +things without any exception having been destroyed, the knowledge that he +had of the nature of a rose would nevertheless subsist.' + +184. The late Jacob Thomasius, a celebrated Professor at Leipzig, made the +apt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of Daniel +Stahl, a Jena professor, that it is not advisable to go altogether beyond +God, and that one must not say, with some Scotists, that the eternal +verities would exist even though there were no understanding, not even that +of God. For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which gives +reality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein. +All reality must be founded on something existent. It is true that an +atheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry would +have no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent, +but there would be nothing possible. That, however, does not hinder those +who do not see the connexion of all things one with another and with God +from being able to understand certain sciences, without knowing their first +source, which is in God. Aristotle, although he also scarcely knew that +source, nevertheless said something of the same kind which was very +apposite. He acknowledged that the principles of individual forms of +knowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them; +and this superior knowledge must have being, and consequently God, the[244] +source of being, for its object. Herr Dreier of Koenigsberg has aptly +observed that the true metaphysics which Aristotle sought, and which he +called [Greek: ten zetoumenen], his _desideratum_, was theology. + +185. Yet the same M. Bayle, who says so much that is admirable in order to +prove that the rules of goodness and justice, and the eternal verities in +general, exist by their nature, and not by an arbitrary choice of God, has +spoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage (Continuation of +_Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, vol. II, ch. 114, towards the end). After +having given an account of the opinion of M. Descartes and a section of his +followers, who maintain that God is the free cause of truths and of +essences, he adds (p. 554): 'I have done all that I could to gain true +understanding of this dogma and to find the solution of the difficulties +surrounding it. I confess to you quite simply that I still cannot properly +fathom it. That does not discourage me; I suppose, as other philosophers in +other cases have supposed, that time will unfold the meaning of this noble +paradox. I wish that Father Malebranche had thought fit to defend it, but +he took other measures.' Is it possible that the enjoyment of doubt can +have such influence upon a gifted man as to make him wish and hope for the +power to believe that two contradictories never exist together for the sole +reason that God forbade them to, and, moreover, that God could have issued +them an order to ensure that they always walked together? There is indeed a +noble paradox! Father Malebranche showed great wisdom in taking other +measures. + +186. I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously +of this opinion, although he had adherents who found this easy to believe, +and would in all simplicity follow him where he only made pretence to go. +It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his philosophic feints: he +prepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he discovered a +trick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in +the strictest sense. I suspect that he had in mind here another +extraordinary manner of speaking, of his own invention, which was to say +that affirmations and negations, and acts of inner judgement in general, +are operations of the will. Through this artifice the eternal verities, +which until the time of Descartes had been named an object of the divine +understanding, suddenly became an object of God's will. Now the acts of his +will are free, therefore God is the free cause of the verities. That [245] +is the outcome of the matter. _Spectatum admissi._ A slight change in the +meaning of terms has caused all this commotion. But if the affirmations of +necessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind, these +actions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to choose. It +seems that M. Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the nature +of freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he +extended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths +to be free in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom. + +187. M. Bayle, who with others conceives this to be a freedom of +indifference, that God had had to establish (for instance) the truths of +numbers, and to ordain that three times three made nine, whereas he could +have commanded them to make ten, imagines in this strange opinion, +supposing it were possible to defend it, some kind of advantage gained +against the Stratonists. Strato was one of the leaders of the School of +Aristotle, and the successor of Theophrastus; he maintained (according to +Cicero's account) that this world had been formed such as it is by Nature +or by a necessary cause devoid of cognition. I admit that that might be so, +if God had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws of +motion alone. But without God there would not even have been any reason for +existence, and still less for any particular existence of things: thus +Strato's system is not to be feared. + +188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not admit +plastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others had +introduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the Spinozists, +take advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with M. le Clerc. +Under the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent cause can produce +nothing where contrivance appears, he is far from conceding to me that +_preformation_ which produces naturally the organs of animals, and _the +system of a harmony pre-established by God_ in bodies, to make them respond +in accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls. +But it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligent +cause, which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds of +plants and animals, and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains +them, was formed by the hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilful +than a watchmaker, who himself makes machines and automata that are [246] +capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed +intelligence. + +189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the Stratonists, in +case one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of God: +he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfect +regularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity springs only from +the nature and necessity of things, without being directed by any +cognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato thence infer that the +world also could have become regular through a blind necessity. But it is +easy to answer that. In the region of the eternal verities are found all +the possibles, and consequently the regular as well as the irregular: there +must be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity, +and this reason can only be found in understanding. Moreover these very +truths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of +them; for they would not exist if there were no divine understanding +wherein they are realized, so to speak. Hence Strato does not attain his +end, which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the origin +of things. + +190. The difficulty that M. Bayle has imagined in connexion with Strato +seems a little too subtle and far-fetched. That is termed: _timere, ubi non +est timor_. He makes another difficulty, which has just as slight a +foundation, namely, that God would be subjected to a kind of _fatum_. Here +are his words (p. 555): 'If they are propositions of eternal truth, which +are such by their nature and not by God's institution, if they are not true +by a free decree of his will, but if on the contrary he has recognized them +as true of necessity, because such was their nature, there is a kind of +_fatum_ to which he is subjected; there is an absolutely insurmountable +natural necessity. Thence comes also the result that the divine +understanding in the infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hit +upon their perfect conformity with their objects, without the guidance of +any cognition; for it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplary +cause had served as a plan for the acts of God's understanding. One would +never that way find eternal ideas or any first intelligence. One must say, +then, that a nature which exists of necessity always finds its way, without +any need for it to be shown. How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a +Stratonist?' + +191. But again it is easy to answer. This so-called _fatum_, which [247] +binds even the Divinity, is nothing but God's own nature, his own +understanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness; +it is a happy necessity, without which he would be neither good nor wise. +Is it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy? +Is our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying? And +should we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if that +depended upon us? One must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom to +destroy oneself and to pity the Divinity for not having that freedom. M. +Bayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an +extravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make the +will independent of reason. + +192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the +infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect +conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. This +objection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through its +distinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinct +ideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when it +comes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. Besides, M. +Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for +seeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning are in God in a +transcendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in his +understanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an order and a +_priority of nature_, whereas with us there is a _priority of time_. It is +therefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one +stroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be said +that he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition. On the contrary, it +is because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also +perfect. + +193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of the +rules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one +should have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a +truth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprising +that there should be people who believe that God only half observes these +rules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to +recognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that +God could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famous +Alfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by [248] +certain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his +name. This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world +had consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently the +Ptolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. He +believed therefore that something better planned could have been made, and +he was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with the +discoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledge of the gravity of the +planets, he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the true +system is marvellous. We see, therefore, that here the question concerned +the more or less only; Alfonso maintained that better could have been done, +and his opinion was censured by everyone. + +194. Yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically such a +belief; and I have many times wondered that gifted and pious persons should +have been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and the perfection of +God. For to assert that he knows what is best, that he can do it and that +he does it not, is to avow that it rested with his will only to make the +world better than it is; but that is what one calls lacking goodness. It is +acting against that axiom already quoted: _Minus bonum habet rationem +mali_. If some adduce experience to prove that God could have done better, +they set themselves up as ridiculous critics of his works. To such will be +given the answer given to all those who criticize God's course of action, +and who from this same assumption, that is, the alleged defects of the +world, would infer that there is an evil God, or at least a God neutral +between good and evil. And if we hold the same opinion as King Alfonso, we +shall, I say, receive this answer: You have known the world only since the +day before yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carp +at the world. Wait until you know more of the world and consider therein +especially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic bodies); +and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all +imagination. Let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and the +goodness of the author of things, even in things that we know not. We find +in the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us be +aware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us if +we are wise: it will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall be +happy in it if we wish to be. + + [249] +195. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because +there is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce one +which would be more perfect. I answer that what can be said of a creature +or of a particular substance, which can always be surpassed by another, is +not to be applied to the universe, which, since it must extend through all +future eternity, is an infinity. Moreover, there is an infinite number of +creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual +division of the _continuum_ to infinity. And infinity, that is to say, the +accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly speaking, +not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannot +say whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute those +who make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world; +for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as a +substance. + +196. It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the universe; and +the adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible universe may be +better than the other, to infinity; but there he would be mistaken, and it +is that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were true, it would follow +that God had not produced any universe at all: for he is incapable of +acting without reason, and that would be even acting against reason. It is +as if one were to suppose that God had decreed to make a material sphere, +with no reason for making it of any particular size. This decree would be +useless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect. It +would be quite another matter if God decreed to draw from a given point one +straight line to another given straight line, without any determination of +the angle, either in the decree or in its circumstances. For in this case +the determination would spring from the nature of the thing, the line would +be perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that is +determined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creation +of the best of all possible universes, all the more since God not only +decrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the best of all. +For God decrees nothing without knowledge, and he makes no separate +decrees, which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these we +have sufficiently explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees. + +197. M. Diroys, whom I knew in Rome, theologian to Cardinal d'Estrees, +wrote a book entitled _Proofs and Assumptions in Favour of_ _the [250] +Christian Religion_, published in Paris in the year 1683. M. Bayle (_Reply +to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 165, p. 1058) recounts +this objection brought up by M. Diroys: 'There is one more difficulty', he +says, 'which it is no less important to meet than those given earlier, +since it causes more trouble to those who judge goods and evils by +considerations founded on the purest and most lofty maxims. This is that +God being the supreme wisdom and goodness, it seems to them that he ought +to do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish them to be done, +following the rules of wisdom and of goodness which God has imprinted in +them, and as they would be obliged themselves to do these things if they +depended upon them. Thus, seeing that the affairs of the world do not go so +well as, in their opinion, they might go, and as they would go if they +interfered themselves, they conclude that God, who is infinitely better and +wiser than they, or rather wisdom and goodness itself, does not concern +himself with these affairs.' + +198. M. Diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this, which I will not +repeat, since I have sufficiently answered the objection in more than one +passage, and that has been the chief end of all my discourse. But he makes +one assertion with which I cannot agree. He claims that the objection +proves too much. One must again quote his own words with M. Bayle, p. 1059: +'If it does not behove the supreme Wisdom and Goodness to fail to do what +is best and most perfect, it follows that all Beings are eternally, +immutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can be, since +nothing can change except by passing either from a state less good to a +better, or from a better to a less good. Now that cannot happen if it does +not behove God to fail to do that which is best and most perfect, when he +can do it. It will therefore be necessary that all beings be eternally and +essentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue as perfect as God can give +them. Now all that which is eternally and essentially as perfect as God can +make it proceeds essentially from him; in a word, is eternally and +essentially good as he is, and consequently it is God, as he is. That is +the bearing of this maxim, that it is repugnant to supreme justice and +goodness not to make things as good and perfect as they can be. For it is +essential to essential wisdom and goodness to banish all that is repugnant +to it altogether. One must therefore assert as a primary truth concerning +the conduct of God in relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnant +to this goodness and this wisdom in making things less perfect than [251] +they could be, or in permitting the goods that it has produced either +completely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate. For it causes no +offence to God that there should be other Beings than he, that is beings +who can be not what they are, and do not what they do or do what they do +not.' + +199. M. Bayle calls this answer paltry, but I find his counter-objection +involved. M. Bayle will have those who are for the two principles to take +their stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme freedom of God: for if +he were compelled to produce all that which he can, he would produce also +sins and sorrows. Thus the Dualists could from the existence of evil +conclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the principle, if this +principle were as much inclined to evil as to good. There M. Bayle carries +the notion of freedom too far: for even though God be supremely free, it +does not follow that he maintains an indifference of equipoise: and even +though he be inclined to act, it does not follow that he is compelled by +this inclination to produce all that which he can. He will produce only +that which he wills, for his inclination prompts him to good. I admit the +supreme freedom of God, but I do not confuse it with indifference of +equipoise, as if he could act without reason. M. Diroys therefore imagines +that the Dualists, in their insistence that the single good principle +produce no evil, ask too much; for by the same reason, according to M. +Diroys, they ought also to ask that he should produce the greatest good, +the less good being a kind of evil. I hold that the Dualists are wrong in +respect of the first point, and that they would be right in respect of the +second, where M. Diroys blames them without cause; or rather that one can +reconcile the evil, or the less good, in some parts with the best in the +whole. If the Dualists demanded that God should do the best, they would not +be demanding too much. They are mistaken rather in claiming that the best +in the whole should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore what +God has made is not the best. + +200. But M. Diroys maintains that if God always produces the best he will +produce other Gods; otherwise each substance that he produced would not be +the best nor the most perfect. But he is mistaken, through not taking into +account the order and connexion of things. If each substance taken +separately were perfect, all would be alike; which is neither fitting nor +possible. If they were Gods, it would not have been possible to [252] +produce them. The best system of things will therefore not contain Gods; it +will always be a system of bodies (that is, things arranged according to +time and place) and of souls which represent and are aware of bodies, and +in accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed. So, as the +design of a building may be the best of all in respect of its purpose, of +expense and of circumstances; and as an arrangement of some figured +representations of bodies which is given to you may be the best that one +can find, it is easy to imagine likewise that a structure of the universe +may be the best of all, without becoming a god. The connexion and order of +things brings it about that the body of every animal and of every plant is +composed of other animals and of other plants, or of other living and +organic beings; consequently there is subordination, and one body, one +substance serves the other: thus their perfection cannot be equal. + +201. M. Bayle thinks (p. 1063) that M. Diroys has confused two different +propositions. According to the one, God must do all things as wise and +virtuous persons would wish that they should be done, by the rules of +wisdom and of goodness that God has imprinted in them, and as they would be +obliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon them. The other +is that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and goodness to fail to do +what is best and most perfect. M. Diroys (in M. Bayle's opinion) sets up +the first proposition as an objection for himself, and replies to the +second. But therein he is justified, as it seems to me. For these two +propositions are connected, the second is a result of the first: to do less +good than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness. To be the +best, and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise, comes to +the same thing. And it may be said that, if we could understand the +structure and the economy of the universe, we should find that it is made +and directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it, since God +cannot fail to do thus. This necessity nevertheless is only of a moral +nature: and I admit that if God were forced by a metaphysical necessity to +produce that which he makes, he would produce all the possibles, or +nothing; and in this sense M. Bayle's conclusion would be fully correct. +But as all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the same +world-sequence, for that very reason all the possibles cannot be produced, +and it must be said that God is not forced, metaphysically speaking, [253] +into the creation of this world. One may say that as soon as God has +decreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles, +all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, +produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. It +is true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it can +only be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, which +cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to choose the +best. Yet God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in such a +manner that there can be nothing better: otherwise not only would others +have cause to criticize what he makes, but, more than that, he would not +himself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for its +imperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divine +nature. This perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection would be to +him an inevitable source of grief, as M. Bayle says on another occasion +(p.953). + +202. M. Diroys' argument contains a false assumption, in his statement that +nothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a better or +from a better to a less good; and that thus, if God makes the best, what he +has produced cannot be changed: it would be an eternal substance, a god. +But I do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in relation to good or +evil, without changing its degree. In the transition from enjoyment of +music to enjoyment of painting, or _vice versa_ from the pleasure of the +eyes to that of the ears, the degree of enjoyment may remain the same, the +latter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty. If the +quadrature of the circle should come to pass or (what is the same thing) +the circulature of the square, that is, if the circle were changed into a +square of the same size, or the square into a circle, it would be difficult +to say, on the whole, without having regard to some special use, whether +one would have gained or lost. Thus the best may be changed into another +which neither yields to it nor surpasses it: but there will always be an +order among them, and that the best order possible. Taking the whole +sequence of things, the best has no equal; but one part of the sequence may +be equalled by another part of the same sequence. Besides it might be said +that the whole sequence of things to infinity may be the best possible, +although what exists all through the universe in each portion of time be +not the best. It might be therefore that the universe became even [254] +better and better, if the nature of things were such that it was not +permitted to attain to the best all at once. But these are problems of +which it is hard for us to judge. + +203. M. Bayle says (p. 1064) that the question whether God could have made +things more perfect than he made them is also very difficult, and that the +reasons for and against are very strong. But it is, so it seems to me, as +if one were to question whether God's actions are consistent with the most +perfect wisdom and the greatest goodness. It is a very strange thing, that +by changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon what is, if properly +understood, as clear as anything can be. The reasons to the contrary have +no force, being founded only on the semblance of defects; and M. Bayle's +objection, which tends to prove that the law of the best would impose upon +God a true metaphysical necessity, is only an illusion that springs from +the misuse of terms. M. Bayle formerly held a different opinion, when he +commended that of Father Malebranche, which was akin to mine on this +subject. But M. Arnauld having written in opposition to Father Malebranche, +M. Bayle altered his opinion; and I suppose that his tendency towards +doubt, which increased in him with the years, was conducive to that result. +M. Arnauld was doubtless a great man, and his authority has great weight: +he made sundry good observations in his writings against Father +Malebranche, but he was not justified in contesting those of his statements +that were akin to mine on the rule of the best. + +204. The excellent author of _The Search for Truth_, having passed from +philosophy to theology, published finally an admirable treatise on Nature +and Grace. Here he showed in his way (as M. Bayle explained in his _Divers +Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 234) that the events which spring from the +enforcement of general laws are not the object of a particular will of God. +It is true that when one wills a thing one wills also in a sense everything +that is necessarily attached to it, and in consequence God cannot will +general laws without also willing in a sense all the particular effects +that must of necessity be derived from them. But it is always true that +these particular events are not willed for their own sake, and that is what +is meant by the expression that they are not willed by a _particular_ and +direct _will_. There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outside +himself, he made choice of a manner of action which should be worthy [255] +of the supremely perfect Being, that is, which should be infinitely simple +and uniform, but yet of an infinite productivity. One may even suppose that +this manner of action by _general acts of will_ appeared to him +preferable--although there must thence result some superfluous events (and +even bad if they are taken separately, that is my own addition)--to another +manner more composed and more regular; such is Father Malebranche's +opinion. Nothing is more appropriate than this assumption (according to the +opinion of M. Bayle, when he wrote his _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_) to +solve a thousand difficulties which are brought up against divine +providence: 'To ask God', he says, 'why he has made things which serve to +render men more wicked, that would be to ask why God has carried out his +plan (which can only be of infinite beauty) by the simplest and most +uniform methods, and why, by a complexity of decrees that would unceasingly +cut across one another, he has not prevented the wrong use of man's free +will.' He adds 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have an +end worthy of God'. + +205. On these foundations he makes some good reflexions (ch. 231) +concerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of the +wicked. 'I shall have no scruples', he says, 'about saying that all those +who are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very little +upon the nature of God, and that they have reduced the obligations of a +cause which directs all things, to the scope of a providence altogether +subordinate; and that is small-minded. What then! Should God, after having +made free causes and necessary causes, in a mixture infinitely well fitted +to show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom, have established laws +consistent with the nature of free causes, but so lacking in firmness that +the slightest trouble that came upon a man would overthrow them entirely, +to the ruin of human freedom? A mere city governor will become an object of +ridicule if he changes his regulations and orders as often as someone is +pleased to murmur against him. And shall God, whose laws concern a good so +universal that all of the world that is visible to us perchance enters into +it as no more than a trifling accessary, be bound to depart from his laws, +because they to-day displease the one and to-morrow the other? Or again +because a superstitious person, deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presages +something deadly, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice? Or +because a good soul, who yet does not value virtue highly enough to [256] +believe that to have none is punishment enough in itself, is shocked that a +wicked man should become rich and enjoy vigorous health? Can one form any +falser notions of a universal providence? Everyone agrees that this law of +nature, the strong prevails over the weak, has been very wisely laid down, +and that it would be absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on a +fragile vase which is the delight of its owner, God should depart from this +law in order to spare that owner vexation. Should one then not confess that +it is just as absurd to maintain that God must depart from the same law to +prevent a wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man? The +more the wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and of +honour, the more does he exceed the good man in strength, so that if he +comes to grips with the good man he must, according to the course of +nature, ruin him. If, moreover, they are both engaged in the business of +finance, the wicked man must, according to the same course of nature, grow +richer than the good man, just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than a +fire of straw. Those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimes +as unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass should +not break it: for his organs being arranged as they are, neither the food +that he takes nor the air that he breathes can, according to natural laws, +be detrimental to his health. Therefore those who complain about his health +complain of God's failure to violate the laws which he has established. And +in this they are all the more unfair because, through combinations and +concatenations which were in the power of God alone, it happens often +enough that the course of nature brings about the punishment of sin.' + +206. It is a thousand pities that M. Bayle so soon quitted the way he had +so auspiciously begun, of reasoning on behalf of providence: for his work +would have been fruitful, and in saying fine things he would have said good +things as well. I agree with Father Malebranche that God does things in the +way most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he, with regard to +'general and particular acts of will'. As God can do nothing without +reasons, even when he acts miraculously, it follows that he has no will +about individual events but what results from some general truth or will. +Thus I would say that God never has a _particular will_ such as this Father +implies, that is to say, _a particular primitive will_. + + [257] +207. I think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from other +events in this regard: for reasons of an order superior to that of Nature +prompt God to perform them. Thus I would not say, with this Father, that +God departs from general laws whenever order requires it: he departs from +one law only for another law more applicable, and what order requires +cannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order, which is one of the +general laws. The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in the strictest +sense) is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures of created +things. That is why, should God make a general law causing bodies to be +attracted the one to the other, he could only achieve its operation by +perpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the organs of human +bodies should conform to the will of the soul, according to the _system of +occasional causes_, this law also would come into operation only through +perpetual miracles. + +208. Thus one must suppose that, among the general rules which are not +absolutely necessary, God chooses those which are the most natural, which +it is easiest to explain, and which also are of greatest service for the +explanation of other things. That is doubtless the conclusion most +excellent and most pleasing; and even though the System of Pre-established +Harmony were not necessary otherwise, because it banishes superfluous +miracles, God would have chosen it as being the most harmonious. The ways +of God are those most simple and uniform: for he chooses rules that least +restrict one another. They are also the most _productive_ in proportion to +the _simplicity of ways and means_. It is as if one said that a certain +house was the best that could have been constructed at a certain cost. One +may, indeed, reduce these two conditions, simplicity and productivity, to a +single advantage, which is to produce as much perfection as is possible: +thus Father Malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine. +Even if the effect were assumed to be greater, but the process less simple, +I think one might say that, when all is said and done, the effect itself +would be less great, taking into account not only the final effect but also +the mediate effect. For the wisest mind so acts, as far as it is possible, +that the _means_ are also in a sense _ends_, that is, they are desirable +not only on account of what they do, but on account of what they are. The +more intricate processes take up too much ground, too much space, too much +place, too much time that might have been better employed. + + [258] +209. Now since everything resolves itself into this greatest perfection, we +return to my law of the best. For perfection includes not only the _moral +good_ and the _physical good_ of intelligent creatures, but also the good +which is purely _metaphysical_, and concerns also creatures devoid of +reason. It follows that the evil that is in rational creatures happens only +by concomitance, not by antecedent will but by a consequent will, as being +involved in the best possible plan; and the metaphysical good which +includes everything makes it necessary sometimes to admit physical evil and +moral evil, as I have already explained more than once. It so happens that +the ancient Stoics were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarked +upon this himself in his _Dictionary_ in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem. +T. It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to face +him with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments +that he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in his +work on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did the +nature of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind, +make also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chief +design of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in keeping +with the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and producing many +great things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, found that some +drawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in conformity with the +original design and purpose; they came about as a sequel to the work, they +existed only as consequences. For the formation of the human body, +Chrysippus said, the finest idea as well as the very utility of the work +demanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin, fine bones; +but because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being able +to resist blows. Nature made health, and at the same time it was necessary +by a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up. +The same thing applies with regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature, +which brought it forth, produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices. I +have not translated literally, for which reason I give here the actual +Latin of Aulus Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand that +language (Aul. Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1): "Idem Chrysippus in eod. lib. +(quarto, [Greek: peri pronoias]) tractat consideratque, dignumque esse id +quaeri putat, [Greek: ei hai ton anthropon nosoi kata physin gignontai]. Id +est, naturane ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc mundi et [259] +genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, +quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale +naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios. Nunquam enim hoc +convenisse naturae auctori parentique rerum omnium bonarum. Sed quum multa, +inquit, atque magna gigneret, pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia +quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia: +eaque non per naturam, sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, +quod ipse appellat [Greek: kata parakolouthesin]. Sicut, inquit, quum +corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis +postulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. Sed hanc +utilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est, +ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis +fragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus +paritur. Sic Hercle, inquit, dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturae +gignitur, vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt." I do not +think that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable, considering +his ignorance of the first man's fall, the knowledge of which has only +reached us through revelation, and which indeed is the true cause of our +miseries. If we had sundry like extracts from the works of Chrysippus, or +rather if we had his works, we should have a more favourable idea than we +have of the beauty of his genius.' + +210. Let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered M. Bayle. After +having quoted in his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, +ch. 155, p. 962) these words of M. Jacquelot, which are much to my liking: +'To change the order of the universe is something of infinitely greater +consequence than the prosperity of a good man,' he adds: 'This thought has +something dazzling about it: Father Malebranche has placed it in the best +possible light; and he has persuaded some of his readers that a system +which is simple and very productive is more consistent with God's wisdom +than a system more composite and less productive in proportion, but more +capable of averting irregularities. M. Bayle was one of those who believed +that Father Malebranche in that way gave a wonderful solution.' (It is M. +Bayle himself speaking.) 'But it is almost impossible to be satisfied with +it after having read M. Arnauld's books against this system, and after +having contemplated the vast and boundless idea of the supremely [260] +perfect Being. This idea shows us that nothing is easier for God than to +follow a plan which is simple, productive, regular and opportune for all +creatures simultaneously.' + +211. While I was in France I showed to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had composed +in Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God; it was not only +before his disputes with Father Malebranche, but even before the book on +_The Search for Truth_ appeared. That principle which I uphold here, namely +that sin had been permitted because it had been involved in the best plan +for the universe, was already applied there; and M. Arnauld did not seem to +be startled by it. But the slight contentions which he has since had with +Father Malebranche have given him cause to examine this subject with closer +attention, and to be more severe in his judgement thereof. Yet I am not +altogether pleased with M. Bayle's manner of expression here on this +subject, and I am not of the opinion 'that a more composite and less +productive plan might be more capable of averting irregularities'. Rules +are the expression of general will: the more one observes rules, the more +regularity there is; simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules. I +shall be met with the objection that a uniform system will be free from +irregularities. I answer that it would be an irregularity to be too +uniform, that would offend against the rules of harmony. _Et citharoedus +Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem_. I believe therefore that God can +follow a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that the +best and the most regular is always opportune for all creatures +simultaneously; and I judge _a posteriori_, for the plan chosen by God is +not so. I have, however, also shown this _a priori_ in examples taken from +mathematics, and I will presently give another here. An Origenist who +maintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be still +easier to satisfy. He will say, in imitation of St. Paul's saying about the +sufferings of this life, that those which are finite are not worthy to be +compared with eternal bliss. + +212. What is deceptive in this subject, as I have already observed, is that +one feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the whole is +also the best possible in each part. One reasons thus in geometry, when it +is a question _de maximis et minimis_. If the road from A to B that one +proposes to take is the shortest possible, and if this road passes by C, +then the road from A to C, part of the first, must also be the shortest +possible. But the inference from _quantity_ to _quality_ is not always[261] +right, any more than that which is drawn from equals to similars. For +_equals_ are those whose quantity is the same, and _similars_ are those not +differing according to qualities. The late Herr Sturm, a famous +mathematician in Altorf, while in Holland in his youth published there a +small book under the title of _Euclides Catholicus_. Here he endeavoured to +give exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical, being encouraged +in the task by the late Herr Erhard Weigel, who had been his tutor. In this +book he transfers to similars what Euclid had said of equals, and he +formulates this axiom: _Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt similia_. But +so many limitations were necessary to justify this new rule, that it would +have been better, in my opinion, to enounce it at the outset with a +reservation, by saying, _Si similibus similia addas similiter, tota sunt +similia_. Moreover, geometricians often require _non tantum similia, sed et +similiter posita_. + +213. This difference between quantity and quality appears also in our case. +The part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also the +shortest way between the extreme points of this part; but the part of the +best Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this +part. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it +can be extracted from the whole, or marked out within the whole, in an +irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always lay in something absolute +and uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water, and other bodies +assumed to be homogeneous or similar, one must say that the part of the +good and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole, since it +would always have resemblance to the whole: but this is not the case in +things that have mutual relations. An example taken from geometry will be +appropriate to explain my idea. + +214. There is a kind of geometry which Herr Jung of Hamburg, one of the +most admirable men of his time, called 'empiric'. It makes use of +conclusive experiments and proves various propositions of Euclid, but +especially those which concern the equality of two figures, by cutting the +one in pieces, and putting the pieces together again to make the other. In +this manner, by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the two sides of +the right-angled triangle, and arranging these parts carefully, one makes +from them the square on the hypotenuse; that is demonstrating empirically +the 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid. Now supposing that some +of these pieces taken from the two smaller squares are lost, something[262] +will be lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them; and +this defective combination, far from pleasing, will be disagreeably ugly. +If then the pieces that remained, composing the faulty combination, were +taken separately without any regard to the large square to whose formation +they ought to contribute, one would group them together quite differently +to make a tolerably good combination. But as soon as the lost pieces are +retrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled, there will ensue +a beautiful and regular thing, the complete large square: this perfect +combination will be far more beautiful than the tolerably good combination +which had been made from the pieces one had not mislaid alone. The perfect +combination corresponds to the universe in its entirety, and the faulty +combination that is a part of the perfect one corresponds to some part of +the universe, where we find defects which the Author of things has allowed, +because otherwise, if he had wished to re-shape this faulty part and make +thereof a tolerably good combination, the whole would not then have been so +beautiful. For the parts of the faulty combination, grouped better to make +a tolerably good combination, could not have been used properly to form the +whole and perfect combination. Thomas Aquinas had an inkling of these +things when he said: _ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet, negligere aliquem +defectum bonitatis in parte, ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto_ (Thom., +_Contra Gentiles_, lib. 2, c. 71). Thomas Gatacre, in his Notes on the book +of Marcus Aurelius (lib. 5, cap. 8, with M. Bayle), cites also passages +from authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the good of the +whole. + +215. Let us return to M. Bayle's illustrations. He imagines a prince (p. +963) who is having a city built, and who, in bad taste, aims rather at airs +of magnificence therein, and a bold and unusual style of architecture, than +at the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the inhabitants. But if +this prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the convenient to the +magnificent architecture. That is M. Bayle's judgement. I consider, +however, that there are cases where one will justifiably prefer beauty of +construction in a palace to the convenience of a few domestics. But I admit +that the construction would be bad, however beautiful it might be, if it +were a cause of diseases to the inhabitants; provided it was possible to +make one that would be better, taking into account beauty, convenience and +health all together. It may be, indeed, that one cannot have all these[263] +advantages at once. Thus, supposing one wished to build on the northern and +more bracing side of the mountain, if the castle were then bound to be of +an unendurable construction, one would prefer to make it face southward. + +216. M. Bayle raises the further objection, that it is true that our +legislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for all +individuals, 'Nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est; id modo quaeritur, si +majori parti et in summam prodest. (Cato apud Livium, L. 34, circa init.)' +But the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge compels +them to cling to laws which, when all is taken into account, are more +advantageous than harmful. Nothing of all that can apply to God, who is as +infinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true greatness. I +answer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot tax him with +any limitation of his perfections; and in the universe not only does the +good exceed the evil, but also the evil serves to augment the good. + +217. He observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from this +principle, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that they +were necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of the +universe, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, who +directs it. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in the +eighth chapter of the fifth book of his _Meditations_. 'Duplici ratione', +he says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod tibi natum +et tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera quod universi +gubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsius +procurandae ([Greek: tes euodias kai tes synteleias kai tes symmones +autes]) ex parte causa est.' This precept is not the most reasonable of +those stated by that great emperor. A _diligas oportet_ ([Greek: stergein +chre]) is of no avail; a thing does not become pleasing just because it is +necessary, and because it is destined for or attached to someone: and what +for me would be an evil would not cease to be such because it would be my +master's good, unless this good reflected back on me. One good thing among +others in the universe is that the general good becomes in reality the +individual good of those who love the Author of all good. But the principal +error of this emperor and of the Stoics was their assumption that the good +of the universe must please God himself, because they imagined God as the +soul of the world. This error has nothing in common with my dogma, [264] +according to which God is _Intelligentia extramundana_, as Martianus +Capella calls him, or rather _supramundana_. Further, he acts to do good, +and not to receive it. _Melius est dare quam accipere_; his bliss is ever +perfect and can receive no increase, either from within or from without. + +218. I come now to the principal objection M. Bayle, after M. Arnauld, +brings up against me. It is complicated: they maintain that God would be +under compulsion, that he would act of necessity, if he were bound to +create the best; or at least that he would have been lacking in power if he +could not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other evils. +That is in effect denying that this universe is the best, and that God is +bound to insist upon the best. I have met this objection adequately in more +than one passage: I have proved that God cannot fail to produce the best; +and from that assumption it follows that the evils we experience could not +have been reasonably excluded from the universe, since they are there. Let +us see, however, what these two excellent men bring up, or rather let us +see what M. Bayle's objection is, for he professes to have profited by the +arguments of M. Arnauld. + +219. 'Would it be possible', he says, _Reply to the Questions of a +Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 158, p. 890, 'that a nature whose goodness, +holiness, wisdom, knowledge and power are infinite, who loves virtue +supremely, and hates vice supremely, as our clear and distinct idea of him +shows us, and as well-nigh every page of Scripture assures us, could have +found in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends? Would it be +possible that vice alone had offered him this means? One would have thought +on the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to establish +virtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice.' M. Bayle here exaggerates +things. I agree that some vice was connected with the best plan of the +universe, but I do not agree with him that God could not find in virtue any +means suited for his ends. This objection would have been valid if there +were no virtue, if vice took its place everywhere. He will say it suffices +that vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in comparison. But I am far +from agreeing with him there, and I think that in reality, properly +speaking, there is incomparably more moral good than moral evil in rational +creatures; and of these we have knowledge of but few. + +220. This evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. It[265] +is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat +misanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find wickedness +everywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they +give to them. I speak of those who do it in all seriousness, to draw thence +evil conclusions, by which their conduct is tainted; for there are some who +only do it to show off their own acumen. People have found that fault in +Tacitus, and that again is the criticism M. Descartes (in one of his +letters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book _De Cive_, of which only a few copies +had at that time been printed for distribution among friends, but to which +some notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have. +For although M. Descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man of +talent, he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims, in +the assumption there made that all men are wicked, or the provision of them +with motives for being so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in his +admirable _Tables of Practical Philosophy_ that the [Greek: proton +pseudos], the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that +he took _statum legalem pro naturali_, that is to say that the corrupt +state served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state most +befitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according to +Aristotle, that is termed _natural_ which conforms most closely to the +perfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term +_natural state_ to that which has least art, perhaps not taking into +account that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the +question of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not +be of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon +it the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. I +have said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of human +Virtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's _De Cive_. + +221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, as +it is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it by no +means follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in the +universe: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of God +must be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed and is +perpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. This answer +confirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the conformity of +faith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest sources of fallacy[266] +in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real. And here +by the apparent I mean not simply such as would result from an exact +discussion of facts, but that which has been derived from the small extent +of our experiences. It would be senseless to try to bring up appearances so +imperfect, and having such slight foundation, in opposition to the proofs +of reason and the revelations of faith. + +222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of +vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to +prevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as is +the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from +misery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the +antecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the consequent +will, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it is that love +for virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, which is undefined +in itself and goes as far as is possible, receives some slight limitations, +on account of the heed that must be paid to good in general. Thus one must +understand that God loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely, and +that nevertheless some vice is to be permitted. + +223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method of +explaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the +universe, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit to +God's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche +(in his _Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace_, vol. II, p. +385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvert +the first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of believing in +God the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can one maintain, +without trying to blind oneself, that a course of action which could not +fail to have this grievous result, namely, that the majority of men perish, +bears the stamp of God's goodness more than a different course of action, +which would have caused, if God had followed it, the salvation of all men?' +And, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from the principles I have just laid +down, M. Bayle raises like objections in his case (_Reply to the Questions +of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts such +explanations', he says, 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the most +obvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect Being. These teach +us that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him, [267] +that consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does not +save: for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect +were greater than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremely +happy, he has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall we +understand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? We +sought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing +the idea of God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are given +elucidations that cast us into darkness more dense.' + +224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just given. I +agree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that everything +implying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding as I do that +God did the best that was possible, or that he could not have done better +than he has done, deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon his +work in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom, I must +say that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself, +that indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as if someone +maintained that God could draw from one point to another a line shorter +than the straight line, and accused those who deny this of subverting the +article of faith whereby we believe in God the Father Almighty. + +225. The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater than +that of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say that +if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the objects +of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense is +alone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of the +infinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its many +deliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with +embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them +one against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or +imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes even +beyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites, +that is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of +which contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine Wisdom +distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated separately, into +so many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other. +The result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the +best from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in [268] +order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of the +universe as it is. Moreover, all these operations of the divine +understanding, although they have among them an order and a priority of +nature, always take place together, no priority of time existing among +them. + +226. The careful consideration of these things will, I hope, induce a +different idea of the greatness of the divine perfections, and especially +of the wisdom and goodness of God, from any that can exist in the minds of +those who make God act at random, without cause or reason. And I do not see +how they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange, unless they +acknowledged that there are reasons for God's choice, and that these +reasons are derived from his goodness: whence it follows of necessity that +what was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not chosen, and +consequently that it is the best of all the possibles. The best cannot be +surpassed in goodness, and it is no restriction of the power of God to say +that he cannot do the impossible. Is it possible, said M. Bayle, that there +is no better plan than that one which God carried out? One answers that it +is very possible and indeed necessary, namely that there is none: otherwise +God would have preferred it. + +227. It seems to me that I have proved sufficiently that among all the +possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest, and +that God has not failed to choose it. But M. Bayle claims to infer thence +that God is therefore not free. This is how he speaks on that question +(_ubi supra_, ch. 151, p. 899): 'I thought to argue with a man who assumed +as I do that the goodness and the power of God are infinite, as well as his +wisdom; and now I see that in reality this man assumes that God's goodness +and power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds.' As to that, the +objection has already been met: I set no bounds to God's power, since I +recognize that it extends _ad maximum, ad omnia_, to all that implies no +contradiction; and I set none to his goodness, since it attains to the +best, _ad optimum_. But M. Bayle goes on: 'There is therefore no freedom in +God; he is compelled by his wisdom to create, and then to create precisely +such a work, and finally to create it precisely in such ways. These are +three servitudes which form a more than Stoic _fatum_, and which render +impossible all that is not within their sphere. It seems that, according to +this system, God could have said, even before shaping his decrees: I [269] +cannot save such and such a man, nor condemn such and such another, _quippe +vetor fatis_, my wisdom permits it not.' + +228. I answer that it is goodness which prompts God to create with the +purpose of communicating himself; and this same goodness combined with +wisdom prompts him to create the best: a best that includes the whole +sequence, the effect and the process. It prompts him thereto without +compelling him, for it does not render impossible that which it does not +cause him to choose. To call that _fatum_ is taking it in a good sense, +which is not contrary to freedom: _fatum_ comes from _fari_, to speak, to +pronounce; it signifies a judgement, a decree of God, the award of his +wisdom. To say that one cannot do a thing, simply because one does not will +it, is to misuse terms. The wise mind wills only the good: is it then a +servitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom? And can one be less +a slave than to act by one's own choice in accordance with the most perfect +reason? Aristotle used to say that that man is in a natural servitude +(_natura servus_) who lacks guidance, who has need of being directed. +Slavery comes from without, it leads to that which offends, and especially +to that which offends with reason: the force of others and our own passions +enslave us. God is never moved by anything outside himself, nor is he +subject to inward passions, and he is never led to that which can cause him +offence. It appears, therefore, that M. Bayle gives odious names to the +best things in the world, and turns our ideas upside-down, applying the +term slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom. + +229. He had also said not long before (ch. 151, p. 891): 'If virtue, or any +other good at all, had been as appropriate as vice for the Creator's ends, +vice would not have been given preference; it must therefore have been the +only means that the Creator could have used; it was therefore employed +purely of necessity. As therefore he loves his glory, not with a freedom of +indifference, but by necessity, he must by necessity love all the means +without which he could not manifest his glory. Now if vice, as vice, was +the only means of attaining to this end, it will follow that God of +necessity loves vice as vice, a thought which can only inspire us with +horror; and he has revealed quite the contrary to us.' He observes at the +same time that certain doctors among the Supralapsarians (like Rutherford, +for example) denied that God wills sin as sin, whilst they admitted [270] +that he wills sin permissively in so far as it is punishable and +pardonable. But he urges in objection, that an action is only punishable +and pardonable in so far as it is vicious. + +230. M. Bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have just +read, and draws from them false conclusions. It is not true that God loves +his glory by necessity, if thereby it is understood that he is led by +necessity to acquire his glory through his creatures. For if that were so, +he would acquire his glory always and everywhere. The decree to create is +free: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best, inclines +him to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates no +impossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes no +implication of contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. There +is therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but +also from necessity. I mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity; for +it is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the best. +It is the same with the means which God chooses to attain his glory. And as +for vice, it has been shown in preceding pages that it is not an object of +God's decree as _means_, but as _conditio sine qua non_, and that for that +reason alone it is permitted. One is even less justified in saying that +vice is _the only means_; it would be at most one of the means, but one of +the least among innumerable others. + +231. 'Another frightful consequence,' M. Bayle goes on, 'the fatality of +all things, ensues: God will not have been free to arrange events in a +different way, since the means he chose to show forth his glory was the +only means befitting his wisdom.' This so-called fatality or necessity is +only moral, as I have just shown: it does not affect freedom; on the +contrary, it assumes the best use thereof; it does not render impossible +the objects set aside by God's choice. 'What, then, will become', he adds, +'of man's free will? Will there not have been necessity and fatality for +Adam to sin? For if he had not sinned, he would have overthrown the sole +plan that God had of necessity created.' That is again a misuse of terms. +Adam sinning freely was seen of God among the ideas of the possibles, and +God decreed to admit him into existence as he saw him. This decree does not +change the nature of the objects: it does not render necessary that which +was contingent in itself, or impossible that which was possible. + + [271] +232. M. Bayle goes on (p. 892): 'The subtle Scotus asserts with much +discernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature could +have this kind of freedom.' I agree provided it is not meant as an +indifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to one +side than the other. M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p. +1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient +inclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be no +metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say, +it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible. + +233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is not +determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by the +interests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the only +thing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the love +that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through +the most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it is +evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the +obedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible.' Still the same +error. The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love +for his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means: +the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions +without; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby the +first parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary. +Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, 'that God +resolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'; and I add +that this same motion prompted him to the best. + +234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's (ch. +165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is of +necessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases where +God has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ this +means, he employed it by necessity.' (He was certainly prompted thereto, he +was determined, or rather he determined himself thereto: but that which is +certain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thing +might have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason. +God chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysically +speaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he could +not morally speaking have done so. Let us make use of a comparison [272] +from geometry. The best way from one point to another (leaving out of +account obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is one +alone: it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is the +straight line. Yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another. +There is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line; +but as soon as I choose the best, I am determined to go that way, although +this is only a moral necessity in the wise. That is why the following +conclusions fail.) 'Therefore he could only do that which he did. Therefore +that which has not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible.' +(These conclusions fail, I say: for since there are many things which have +never happened and never will happen, and which nevertheless are clearly +conceivable, and imply no contradiction, how can one say they are +altogether impossible? M. Bayle has refuted that himself in a passage +opposing the Spinozists, which I have already quoted here, and he has +frequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that which +implies contradiction: now he changes style and terminology.) 'Therefore +Adam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible; therefore his fall +was altogether inevitable, and even antecedently to God's decree, for it +implied contradiction that God should be able to will a thing opposed to +his wisdom: it is, after all, the same thing to say, that it is impossible +for God, as to say, God could do it, if he so willed, but he cannot will +it.' (It is misusing terms in a sense to say here: one can will, one will +will; 'can' here concerns the actions that one does will. Nevertheless it +implies no contradiction that God should will--directly or permissively--a +thing not implying contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to say +that God can will it.) + +235. In a word, when one speaks of the _possibility_ of a thing it is not a +question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual +existence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and render +useless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This Abelard +did, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of which +they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. That is +why, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in the +consideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For God +chooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he chooses [273] +freely, and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor freedom if +there were but one course possible. + +236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none of +the objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Reply +to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901). + +FIRST SYLLOGISM + +'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has +for his wisdom. + +'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which God +has for his wisdom. + +'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.' + +The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is +necessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his +wisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but +be free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not +cease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will the +salvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet this +consequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will, +cannot fail to be free also. + +SECOND SYLLOGISM + +'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin +of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men. + +'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom. + +'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other +things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of +men.' + +The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are always +free, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in +the intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to be +bound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion in +the metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I have +observed so many times, is opposed to freedom. + +238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in objection in +the following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the Supralapsarians, +and particularly against the oration made by Theodore de Beze at the [274] +Conference of Montbeliard in the year 1586. This conference also only +served to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God created the World to +his glory: his glory is not known (according to Beze), if his mercy and his +justice are not declared; for this cause simply by his grace he decreed for +some men life eternal, and for others by a just judgement eternal +damnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice presupposes guilt.' (He might +have added that misery also supposes guilt.) 'Nevertheless God being good, +indeed goodness itself, he created man good and righteous, but unstable, +and capable of sinning of his own free will. Man did not fall at random or +rashly, or through causes ordained by some other God, as the Manichaeans +hold, but by the providence of God; in such a way notwithstanding, that God +was not involved in the fault, inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin.' + +239. This system is not of the best conceived: it is not well fitted to +show forth the wisdom, the goodness and the justice of God; and happily it +is almost abandoned to-day. If there were not other more profound reasons +capable of inducing God to permit guilt, the source of misery, there would +be neither guilt nor misery in the world, for the reasons alleged here do +not suffice. He would declare his mercy better in preventing misery, and he +would declare his justice better in preventing guilt, in advancing virtue, +in recompensing it. Besides, one does not see how he who not only causes a +man to be capable of falling, but who so disposes circumstances that they +contribute towards causing his fall, is not culpable, if there are no other +reasons compelling him thereto. But when one considers that God, altogether +good and wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness, happiness +whereof the best plan of the universe is capable, and that often an evil in +some parts may serve the greater good of the whole, one readily concludes +that God may have given room for unhappiness, and even permitted guilt, as +he has done, without deserving to be blamed. It is the only remedy that +supplies what all systems lack, however they arrange the decrees. These +thoughts have already been favoured by St. Augustine, and one may say of +Eve what the poet said of the hand of Mucius Scaevola: + + _Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus_. + +240. I find that the famous English prelate who wrote an ingenious book on +the origin of evil, some passages of which were disputed by M. Bayle [275] +in the second volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, while +disagreeing with some of the opinions that I have upheld here and appearing +to resort sometimes to a despotic power, as if the will of God did not +follow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or evil, but decreed +arbitrarily that such and such a thing must be considered good or evil; and +as if even the will of the creature, in so far as it is free, did not +choose because the object appears good to him, but by a purely arbitrary +determination, independent of the representation of the object; this +bishop, I say, in other passages nevertheless says things which seem more +in favour of my doctrine than of what appears contrary thereto in his own. +He says that what an infinitely wise and free cause has chosen is better +than what it has not chosen. Is not that recognizing that goodness is the +object and the reason of his choice? In this sense one will here aptly say: + + _Sic placuit superis; quaerere plura, nefas_. + + [276] + * * * * * + +ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL + + * * * * * + +PART THREE + +241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; _physical +evil_, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be less troublesome to +explain, since these are results of moral evil. _Poena est malum passionis, +quod infligitur ob malum actionis_, according to Grotius. One suffers +because one has acted; one suffers evil because one does evil. + + _Nostrorum causa malorum_ + _Nos sumus_. + +It is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; but +when one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certainty +that these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The question of +_physical evil_, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties in +common with that of the origin of _metaphysical evil_, examples whereof are +furnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the +universe. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are +part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better +to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general +laws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very +monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of +will, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is [277] +just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics +which issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom +of them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to +my principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences of +general acts of will. + +242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidate +these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everything +proceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a close +contemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision of +the ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbers +perfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase and +diminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knows +the key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure of +this succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, being +properly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, and +that it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evident +in lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points of +reflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, so +that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking into +account only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give its +equation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason and +the fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we must +look upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other +so-called defects in the universe. + +243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. 276, +Ad Eugen., III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri +aliquid.' It belongs to the great order that there should be some small +disorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in the +whole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness of +those who walk in the ways of order. + +244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent defects +besides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of our +globe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms. +That which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect of +some great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on fire, and that +the rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remaining +from a great fusion. In their entrails are found metal and mineral [278] +products, which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces: and the +entire sea may be a kind of _oleum per deliquium_, just as tartaric oil +forms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface cooled after the great +conflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell back +upon the earth, washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solid +salt that was left in the cinders, finally filling up this great cavity in +the surface of our globe, to form the ocean filled with salt water. + +245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water made +ravages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, having +below it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as among +others Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptly +observed. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof traces +and remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day are +most remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and the globe +assumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in few words: +the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by the +fire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects of +inundations. But who does not see that these disorders have served to bring +things to the point where they now are, that we owe to them our riches and +our comforts, and that through their agency this globe became fit for +cultivation by us. These disorders passed into order. The disorders, real +or apparent, that we see from afar are sunspots and comets; but we do not +know what uses they supply, nor the rules prevailing therein. Time was when +the planets were held to be wandering stars: now their motion is found to +be regular. Peradventure it is the same with the comets: posterity will +know. + +246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions, and +M. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equally +perfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers? why ants are +not peacocks? And if there must needs be equality everywhere, the poor man +would serve notice of appeal against the rich, the servant against the +master. The pipes of an organ must not be of equal size. M. Bayle will say +that there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder; +between a disorder in inanimate things, which is purely metaphysical, and a +disorder in rational creatures, which is composed of crime and [279] +sufferings. He is right in making a distinction between them, and I am +right in combining them. God does not neglect inanimate things: they do not +feel, but God feels for them. He does not neglect animals: they have not +intelligence, but God has it for them. He would reproach himself for the +slightest actual defect there were in the universe, even though it were +perceived of none. + +247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between the +disorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the +peace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to our +justifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be +taken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude, +according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that God +created the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and +mechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no part +in the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself only +on skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than +suffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require.' +M. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the +system of general harmony which I assume, which states that the realm of +efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other; that +God has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatest +architect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the +best guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that he has +attained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical, +physical and moral goods together. + +248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils by +one small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much extraordinary +help to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to Eve would have +prevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective. +I have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer, +that God ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosen +the best, and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto. I had +answered M. Bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe. +He replies, that that is an illusion, and that the miracle of the wedding +at Cana (for instance) made no change in the air of the room, except that +instead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water, it [280] +received corpuscles of wine. But one must bear in mind that once the best +plan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein. + +249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something in +this work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there are +many, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry of +invisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche also +believes. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinary +laws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and more +vigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only so +by comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be considered +miraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them. The +changing of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind. But the +Creation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all the +power of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. If, +nevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of the +highest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole course of the +universe, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he would have been +bound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and cause the bodies not +concerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened. After the +miracle was over, it would have been necessary to restore all things in +those very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached without +the miracle: whereafter all would have returned to its original course. +Thus this miracle demanded more than at first appears. + +250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. Bayle +contends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means of +particular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to this. +Here I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle insists +chiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts have +no feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be in the +sufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they are +only machines, _quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser est_: it is +impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master +as God. The principle is good, but I do not think it warrants the inference +that beasts have no feeling, because I think that, properly speaking, +perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied [281] +by reflexion. It is the same with happiness: without reflexion there is +none. + + _O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!_ + +One cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but it +seems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are in +man: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to the +grief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Men +are sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they act +almost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the +experience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and their +pains are very slight. + +251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. It +is with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether there +is more physical evil than physical good in the world? (_Reply to the +Questions of a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 75.) To settle it aright, one must +explain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that physical evil +is simply displeasure and under that heading I include pain, grief, and +every other kind of discomfort. But does physical good lie solely in +pleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I consider that it +lies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One is well enough +when one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly: + + _Sapientia prima est,_ + _Stultitia caruisse_. + +In the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice be +blamed: + + _Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit_. + +That being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all the +exercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose prevention +would incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us no +pleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we only +perceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived of +them. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life goods +exceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M. +Descartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural reason +teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'. + + [282] +252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess would +be a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to the +falling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying the +sparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playful +work. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the niceness +of a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures are a kind of +expenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some better than in +others. + +253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the +instance of M. de la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have been +willing to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same part +as providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said that I +think one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread of +Fate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should not be better +than the first. Thus from M. de la Motte le Vayer's saying it does not +follow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played, +provided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take it. + +254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service in +making joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content with his +state that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for the +state of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant. M. de +la Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it. +Knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who have +not tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that of +reasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who with all his faults was a +great man, and would have been incomparable without those faults. + + _Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!_ + _Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum_ + _Subjecit pedibus._ + +It is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not to +fear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls us. +Acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite other than +that the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their philosophy. There is +as much difference between true morality and theirs as there is [283] +between joy and patience: for their tranquillity was founded only on +necessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things, +upon our own happiness. + +255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not be +sufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents; +the Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise. +M. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in the +letter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most +overwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how to +exercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (_Reply to the Questions of +a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is saying nothing, that +it is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyone +understands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and that men could +attain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart from the true +martyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high, there +have been counterfeits who imitated them. That Spanish slave who killed the +Carthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced great +joy in his deed, even in the greatest tortures, may shame the philosophers. +Why should not one go as far as he? One may say of an advantage, as of a +disadvantage: + + _Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest_. + +256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, the +Galibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on this +matter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and +well-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast them +over a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain their +physical superiority and their courage, and combine them with our +acquirements, they would surpass us in every way, + + _Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis_. + +They would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a mountain to +a hill: + + _Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali_ + _Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras._ + + [284] +257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind in +these savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour, +might be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned mortifications, +by an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great practice in preserving +a certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressions +most liable to disturb it. Something of this kind is related of the ancient +Assassins, subjects and pupils of the Old Man or rather the Seigneur +(_Senior_) of the Mountain. Such a school (for a better purpose) would be +good for missionaries who would wish to return to Japan. The Gymnosophists +of the ancient Indians had perhaps something resembling this, and that +Calanus, who provided for Alexander the Great the spectacle of his burning +alive, had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his masters +and trained by great sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these same +Indians, who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their +husbands, seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancient +philosophers of their country. I do not expect that there should +straightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exalt +man to that high pitch of perfection: such people would be too much above +the rest, and too formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens that +people are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be +needed, one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our +usual comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby. + +258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedy +is a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also said: + + [Greek: pleio ta chresta ton kakon einai brotois]. + _Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis._ + +Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agree +with them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention +rather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is more +rare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, who +would have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man is +the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do not +agree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285] +true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparently +because they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation; +but they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easily +satisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on the +Xenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirable +sentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having said +things _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5, +_De Benefic._) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon +us. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry +authorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the +Collections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin: + + _Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,_ + _Infundit uno terna pro bono mala._ + +259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of +guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the +advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am not +opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of +original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in +general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so +much that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I +am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by +saying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_, +splendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in +holy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing a +physical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities and +the adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the +consideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are +scarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies that +have much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes +us aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I have +already observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil, +and the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for the +spirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit._, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said +that men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it +swallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerning +this, that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the [286] +judgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measures +the extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anything +rather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant that +one is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but that does +not exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, everything +reckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed the evil. + +260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, made +complaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so weak an +animal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of old +Silenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and as the +price of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that the +first and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the second, to +depart from this life with dispatch (Cic., _Tuscul._, lib. 1). Plato +believed that souls had been in a happier state, and many of the ancients, +amongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to the account of +Lactantius), believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies as +in a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our ills, and asserted their +prejudices against human life: for there is no such thing as a beautiful +prison. But quite apart from the consideration that, even according to +these same pagans, the evils of this life would be counterbalanced and +exceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I make bold to say that we +shall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts, that taking all in all +human life is in general tolerable. And adding thereto the motives of +religion, we shall be content with the order God has set therein. Moreover, +for a better judgement of our goods and our evils, it will be well to read +Cardan, _De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda_, and Novarini, _De Occultis Dei +Beneficiis_. + +261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are thought to +be the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair aspect of their +condition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware of evil. Someone +will say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy the +advantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? There are +nevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who know how to profit by +the favours God has shown them, who are easily consoled for their +misfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to account. M. Bayle [287] +pays no heed to that: he prefers to listen to Pliny, who thinks that +Augustus, one of the princes most favoured by fortune, experienced at least +as much evil as good. I admit that he found great causes of trouble in his +family and that remorse for having crushed the Republic may have tormented +him; but I think that he was too wise to grieve over the former, and that +Maecenas apparently made him understand that Rome had need of a master. Had +not Augustus been converted on this point, Vergil would never have said of +a lost soul: + + _Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem_ + _Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit._ + +Augustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in these +lines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is every +indication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which he +regarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for public +evils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of the +kings censured in M. de Cambray's _Telemachus_. Each one considers himself +within his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, justifies Augustus in two +words, at the beginning of his _Annals_. But Augustus was better able than +anyone to judge of his good fortune. He appears to have died content, as +may be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life: for in +dying he repeated to his friends a line in Greek, which has the +signification of that _Plaudite_ that was wont to be spoken at the +conclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius quotes it: + + [Greek: Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypesate.] + +262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kind +more evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there is +incomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides (whose +merit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the first +of the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise judgement on +this question of the predominance of good over evil in the world. Here is +what he says in his _Doctor Perplexorum_ (cap. 12, p. 3): 'There arise +often in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade them +there is more evil than good in the world: and one often finds in the poems +and songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something good +comes to pass, whereas evils are usual and constant. This error has [288] +taken hold not of the common herd only, those very persons who wish to be +considered wise have been beguiled thereby. A celebrated writer named +Alrasi, in his _Sepher Elohuth_, or Theosophy, amongst other absurdities +has stated that there are more evils than goods, and that upon comparison +of the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillity +with the pains, the torments, the troubles, faults, cares, griefs and +afflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a great +evil, and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us.' Maimonides +adds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition that +Nature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account what is +separate from their person; whence they infer that when something +unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe. + +263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point, +because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, upon +consideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulates +is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one +particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had +been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke +also of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if one +took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one +would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it +prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor +among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds, +nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposing +that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition +which is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is +more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointed +out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good +than evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor +prevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most +perfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil +which is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence, +and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good, +one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of +all systems. + + [289] +264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have +anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right when +it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not +the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed +being the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reason +or experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say that +it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend +also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the +account of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein. He +states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not +abandon a system. This he advances especially in favour of the methods of +the strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. For he supposes that one +can subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties in +their entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to some +of the difficulties, cannot meet them all. I hold that the true system I +have expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, even were that not so, I +confess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle's, and I should prefer +a system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to one +which would meet none of them. And the consideration of the wickedness of +men, which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes, shows at least +that they have no right to complain. No justice need trouble itself over +the origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question of +punishing him: it is quite another matter when it is a question of +prevention. One knows well that disposition, upbringing, conversation, and +often chance itself, have much share in that origin: is the man any the +less deserving of punishment? + +265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is not +bound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if he owes +to himself, and to those who honour him and love him, justification for his +course of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime. But God +has already given that satisfaction, as far as it is needed here on earth: +by granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the means +whereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope that I have made it plain in +this discourse, and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion of +these Essays, almost as far as it can be done through general arguments. +Thereafter, the permission of sin being justified, the other evils [290] +that are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also I +am justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for +the evil of punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh all +the Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none may +say that is only good _per la predica_, it is enough to consider that, +after the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or more +exact than this method. For God, having found already among things +possible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and bringing +upon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him into +existence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will no +longer be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like St. +Augustine and preach like Pelagius. + +266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt, +cannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for the +greatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometime +Professor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in the +territory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellent +Aristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, had +composed a little discourse entitled: _Demonstration against the Eternity +of Punishment_. It was founded on this somewhat trite principle, that there +is no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt. It was +conveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; and I replied that there +was one thing to be considered which had escaped the late Herr Sonner: +namely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused the +duration of the penalty. Since the damned remained wicked they could not be +withdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify the +continuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infinite +weight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God. This +thesis I had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon. I know that the +general opinion of the Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences, +is that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do not +think that, taken literally, it can pass for an article of faith. Herr +Fecht, a famous theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on +_The State of the Damned_. It is quite wrong, he says (Sec. 59); God cannot +change his nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the door +of grace, but not that of justice. + + [291] +267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for the +duration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann Gerhard, a +famous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in _Locis Theol._, loco de +Inferno, Sec. 60), brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned have +still an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good. Zacharias +Ursinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who follows Calvin, having formulated +this question (in his treatise _De Fide_) why sin merits an eternal +punishment, advances first the common reason, that the person offended is +infinite, and then also this second reason, _quod non cessante peccato non +potest cessare poena_. And the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his book +entitled _Nicetas, or Incontinence Overcome_ (book 2, ch. 11, Sec. 9): 'Nec +mirum damnatos semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semper +peccant, semper ergo plectuntur.' He declares and approves the same reason +in his work on _Eternity_ (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, nec +displicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideo +semper puniuntur.' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is very +common among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true, +another more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4, +Dial. c. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw by +a kind of _mediate knowledge_ that they would always have sinned if they +had always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much open to +question. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant theologians for +Herr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some who think +differently. + +268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages from +two able theologians of his party, which have some reference to these +statements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, in +opposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same subject, gives the +opinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot cease +to be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. Jacquelot in his +book on _The Conformity of Faith with Reason_ (p. 220) is of opinion 'that +the damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed, and +that this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all their +pains, through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon their +crimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss. One knows what burning +regrets, what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of a +good, of a notable honour which had been offered to them, and which [292] +they rejected, especially when they see others invested with it.' This +position is a little different from that of M. Jurieu, but both agree in +this sentiment, that the damned are themselves the cause of the +continuation of their torments. M. le Clerc's Origenist does not entirely +differ from this opinion when he says in the _Select Library_ (vol. 7, p. +341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does not condemn him on that +account, but only because, although he has the power to recover himself, he +yet does not do so, that is, he freely retains his evil ways to the end of +his life.' If he carries this reasoning on beyond this life, he will +ascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation of +their guilt. + +269. M. Bayle says (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 175, p. +1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teaches +that damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence': +but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin? I would not +simply say, however, that it is because man, having the power to recover +himself, does not; and would wish to add that it is because man does not +take advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself. But +after this life, though one assume that the succour ceases, there is always +in the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders him +culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though it +should never pass into action. And there is no reason why one may not say +that this degree of freedom, exempt from necessity, but not exempt from +certainty, remains in the damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, the +damned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life, for they know +only too well what one must believe here. + +270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published recently +a book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made some +observations in the second volume of his _Reply_, speaks with much subtlety +about the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is presented +(according to the author of the _Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, +June 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feel +their miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless congratulate themselves +on their own behaviour, and who will rather choose to be, and to be that +which they are, than not to be at all. They will love their state, unhappy +as it will be, even as angry people, lovers, the ambitious, the [293] +envious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery. +Furthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrong +judgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind, and will +perpetually pass from one error into another. They will not be able to +refrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be denied +them, and, being deprived of which, they will fall into inconceivable +despair, while experience can never make them wiser for the future. For by +their own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding, +and will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on any +matter.' + +271. The ancients already imagined that the Devil dwells remote from God +voluntarily, in the midst of his torments, and that he is unwilling to +redeem himself by an act of submission. They invented a tale that an +anchorite in a vision received a promise from God that he would receive +into grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault; +but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner. At the +least, the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hate +God and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot but be followed by +continuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read the learned treatise +of Herr Fecht on the _State of the Damned_. + +272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not impossible +for a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope Gregory the Great +is well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul of +the Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors the +wish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in good fortune and +Trajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter the pity of the +Holy Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but he forbade him to +make the like prayers in future. According to this fable, the prayers of +St. Gregory had the force of the remedies of Aesculapius, who recalled +Hippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued to make such prayers, God +would have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in Vergil: + + _At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris_ + _Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae,_ + _Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis_ + _Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas._ + + [294] +Godescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the theologians +of his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the reprobate should +pray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is never justified in +believing oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. The passage in the +Mass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the abatement of the +torments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis that I have just +stated, one must wish for them _meliorem mentem_. Origen having applied the +passage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will not forget to be gracious, +neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure, St. Augustine +replies _(Enchirid._, c. 112) that it is possible that the pains of the +damned last eternally, and that they may nevertheless be mitigated. If the +text implied that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on to +infinity; and yet that abatement would, as regards its extent, have a _non +plus ultra_. Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an +infinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth. If the parable of +the wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul, the +hypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be +groundless. But the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the +parable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which +is ascribed to the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX _Mor._, 39) thinks +that the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: but +it seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the +disposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of the +Sentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyone +damned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation of his +brothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means sound. On +the contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have served to +save many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation of +others that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnation +for some more than others; but, generally speaking, he will have no +inclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may be, one must +admit that all this detail is problematical, God having revealed to us all +that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and not +what is needed for our understanding thereof. + +273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of +free will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils, [295] +since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, the +ordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the same +time. Now we can seek with confidence _the origin of evil in the freedom of +creatures_. The first wickedness is well known to us, it is that of the +Devil and his angels: the Devil sinneth from the beginning, and for this +purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of +the Devil (1 John iii. 8). The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was a +murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44). +And therefore God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to +Hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto +judgement (2 Pet. ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their own +habitation, he hath reserved in _eternal_ (that is to say everlasting) +chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6). +Whence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been +seen by the author of the other. + +274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light upon +what the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an account +of a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels fought +against the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But they +prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the +great Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, +which deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the earth, and +his angels were cast out with him' (Rev. xii. 7, 8, 9). For although this +account is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness, and it +may have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to the +Church, it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneously +the old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy. + +275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, [Greek: ek +ton idion] from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternal +verities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, that +this creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is the +same with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them. +God gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind (Rom. i. 28), abandoning them +to themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeed +ought to deny to them. + +276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. iv. 21 and[296] +vii. 3; Isa. lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii. +23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. ii. 11); that +he deceived the prophet (Ezek. xiv. 9); that he commanded Shimei to curse +(2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not unto the voice of +their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25); that the +Lord took away Job's substance, even although that was done through the +malice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up Pharaoh, to show his +power in him (Exod. ix. 19; Rom. ix. 17) that he is like a potter who +maketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. ix. 21); that he hideth the truth from +the wise and prudent (Matt. xi. 25); that he speaketh in parables unto them +that are without, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing +they may hear and not understand, lest at any time they might be converted, +and their sins might be forgiven them (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); that +Jesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God +(Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and Herod with the Gentiles and the +people of Israel did that which the hand and the counsel of God had +determined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, 28); that it was of the Lord to +harden the hearts of the enemy, that they should come against Israel in +battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no +favour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled a perverse spirit in the +midst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its works, like a drunken man +(Isa. xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people, +for the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings xii. 15); that he turned the +hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Ps. cv. 25). But all these and +other like expressions suggest only that the things God has done are used +as occasion for ignorance, error, malice and evil deeds, and contribute +thereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and intending to use it for his ends, +since superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permit +these evils, and even to co-operate therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fieri +male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene', in St. Augustine's +words. But this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part. + +277. God made man in his image (Gen. i. 26); he made him upright (Eccles. +vii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he has fallen; +but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. Moses said as +from God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I +have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore [297] +choose life' (Deut. xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the Lord: Behold, I set before +you the way of life, and the way of death' (Jer. xxi. 8). He has left man +in the power of his counsel, giving him his ordinances and his +commandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments' (or they +shall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire and water, to stretch forth +thine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen and +unregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of Satan, because it +pleases him so to be; he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust. Thus +it is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing. + +278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, when +he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. i. 13, 14). And Satan +contributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' (2 +Cor. iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous desire: +the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato has said so +already, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum.' +Grace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. Augustine observed. +All _pleasure_ is a feeling of some perfection; one _loves_ an object in +proportion as one feels its perfections; nothing surpasses the divine +perfections. Whence it follows that charity and love of God give the +greatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that proportion in which one is +penetrated by these feelings, which are not common among men, busied and +taken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with their +passions. + +279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do not +necessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must likewise +be said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however efficacious divine +grace may be, there is justification for saying that one can resist it. But +when it indeed proves victorious, it is certain and infallible beforehand +that one will yield to its allurements, whether it have its strength of +itself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity of +circumstances. Thus one must always distinguish between the infallible and +the necessary. + +280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine is +not far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things, +whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. In the +_expressions_ I find that it is principally the use of terms like [298] +'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which sometimes +gives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr Loescher the +younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the _Paroxysms of the +Absolute Decree_, Luther desired, in his book _On the Will in Bondage_, to +find a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word +necessity. Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fitting +to say that obedience to God's precepts is always _possible_, even for the +unregenerate; that the grace of God is always _resistible_, even in those +most holy, and that _freedom_ is exempt not only from _constraint_ but also +from _necessity_, although it be never without infallible _certainty_ or +without inclining _determination_. + +281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be +permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the _power_ to do good is +often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often _necessary_, even in +the regenerate; that it is _impossible_ sometimes for one not to sin; that +grace is _irresistible_; that freedom is not exempt from _necessity_. But +these expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances +that prevail about us to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse; +and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms +are employed with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances which +render them acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred and +orthodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of +expressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more +than between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might +be attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed to +these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely +which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that more +intended by the author (_quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus_). +For the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the same +ways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after +the decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and +follows. As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunity +arises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes no +difference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficient +explanations of the terms are not added. + +282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions, +such as that I have very often urged between the necessary and the [299] +certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the +same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is +possible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible is +necessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potency +and a remote potency; and, according to these different senses, one says +now that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It may be said in a +certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that +the devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose the +best; that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most. +But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind +called logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies +contradiction. M. Nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which is +not amiss. It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate, +who has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit some +outrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streets +naked in order to make people laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with the +blessed; they are still less capable of sinning, and the necessity that +forbids them to sin is of the same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' is +a term as equivocal as potency and necessity. For I have already observed +that those who employ this axiom, that one does not fail to do what one +wills when one can, and who thence infer that God therefore does not will +the salvation of all, imply a _decretory will_. Only in that sense can one +support this proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among +the things that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, taking +will in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use, +that the wise will is _inclined_ antecedently to all good, although it +_decrees_ finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would be very +wrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save all men, +which Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to him an +original distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number of +persons, _odium antecedaneum_. One should rather maintain that the wise +mind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his knowledge and +his power, but that he only produces the best that can be achieved. Those +who admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will to save all men, +are wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided that they acknowledge, +besides, that God gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win [300] +salvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof. + +283. In the _dogmas_ themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine I +cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in general +damnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe that God +condemns those who are without the necessary light. One may believe, with +many theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were it +only when they are at the point of death. It does not appear necessary +either that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace +efficacious of itself, independently of circumstances. Also I consider it +unnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that +all their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not spring +from faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infected +with sin, at least virtually. Finally I hold that God cannot act as if at +random by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent of +reasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in the +dispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objects +participates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grant +nevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good +or the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only +according to these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained already +here, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other +circumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme +wisdom. + +284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine +appears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to +his system. He states that from the substance of God only a God can +proceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine +_De Lib. Arb._, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the creature imperfect, +faulty and corruptible (_De Genesi ad Lit._, c. 15, _Contra Epistolam +Manichaei_, c. 36). Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will +(Augustine, in the whole book _On the Nature of Good_). God can command +nothing that would be impossible. 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum +impossibilia non potuisse praecipere' (_Lib. de Nat. et Grat._, c. 43, p. +69). Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c. +16, 17, _lib._ 1 _Retract._ c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can be +unhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo miser esse [301] +quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carry +out God's commands without the aid of grace (_Ep. ad Hilar. +Caesaraugustan._). We know that grace is not given according to deserts +(Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to +enable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will, +'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed non +adjutorium quo vellet' (_Lib. de Corrept._, c. 11 et c. 10, 12). God let +angels and men try what they could do by their free will, and after that +what his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid., c. 10, 11, 12). Sin +turned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures (lib. 1, qu. 2, _Ad +Simplicium_). To take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave +(_Enchirid._, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non +periit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant' +(lib. 1, _Ad Bonifac._, c. 2, 3). + +285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and +will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. xxxiii. 19). 'So then it +is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that +sheweth mercy' (Rom. ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all those who have +good will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. But God gives them +the willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have +mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. ix. 18). And yet the same +Apostle says that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the +knowledge of the truth; which I would not interpret in accordance with some +passages of St. Augustine, as if it signified that no men are saved except +those whose salvation he wills, or as if he would save _non singulos +generum, sed genera singulorum_. But I would rather say that there is none +whose salvation he willeth not, in so far as this is permitted by greater +reasons. For these bring it about that God only saves those who accept the +faith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by the +grace he has given them, in accordance with what was consistent with the +plan of his works in its entirety, than which none can be better conceived. + +286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according to St. +Augustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation. +'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia et praeparatio +beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' (_Lib. +de Persev._, c. 14). He does not then understand it there as an [302] +absolute decree; he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejected +by any hardened heart, because it is given in order to remove especially +the hardness of hearts (_Lib. de Praedest._, c. 8; _Lib. de Grat._, c. 13, +14). I do not find, however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently that +this grace, which subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. And +one might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degree +of inward grace is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outward +circumstances, but not in the other. + +287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and follows +the sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horum +dabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est' +(in c. 5, _Ad Gal._). I have explained already how, despite all that, we +have indeed a great power over our will. St. Augustine takes it somewhat +differently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothing +is so much within our power as the action of our will. And he gives a +reason which is almost tautological: for (he says) this action is ready at +the moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsa +voluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c. +3; lib. 5, _De Civ. Dei_, c. 10). But that only means that we will when we +will, and not that we will that which we wish to will. There is more reason +for saying with him: '_aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est_' (d. +1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or +certainly, does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, ut +ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati +esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona +constrictione naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem +[libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle +peccare. Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum +arbitrium habere negandus est?' (_De Nat. et Grat._, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). He +also says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards +man acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (_De Corrept._, +c. 2). + +288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of +guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that +the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the +eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause. M. Bayle [303] +nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will +not have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to his +objections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature +of freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required +in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a +clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we +determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or +metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, +and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is +self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the +understanding, which inclines it without compelling it: and all the +conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is nevertheless +well to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our +spontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in our +contingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency. + +289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinct +knowledge, or _intelligence_, occurs in the actual use of reason; but the +senses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immune +from bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, but that we are +the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused. In this +sense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired, and we +may say with St. Augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom of +a slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, nevertheless has freedom to choose +according to the state wherein he is, although more often than not he is +under the stern necessity of choosing between two evils, because a superior +force prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires. That which +in a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected by +passions, whose violence is sweet, but none the less pernicious. In truth +we will only that which pleases us: but unhappily what pleases us now is +often a real evil, which would displease us if we had the eyes of the +understanding open. Nevertheless that evil state of the slave, which is +also our own, does not prevent us, any more than him, from making a free +choice of that which pleases us most, in the state to which we are reduced, +in proportion to our present strength and knowledge. + +290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within us +the source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. The [304] +impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, and +it was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the +sources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound to +speak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one may, +in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is a +question of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneity +suffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence +upon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical sense. + +291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that true +spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the +intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. That +cannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established Harmony, +which I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out that by +nature every simple substance has perception, and that its individuality +consists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of +perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another, +to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through its +instrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of view +proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive any +physical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part adapts +itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently only +obeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows that +the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only upon +God and upon itself in its actions. + +292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought for +emerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were in +difficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfied +by the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all the +actions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without, +according to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all is +controlled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose naturally +the objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. Descartes +replied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but that we are +likewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves; and +that we must believe in both, even though we see not how it is possible to +reconcile them. + + [305] +293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion of an +argument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument. +Which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes. +Notwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves with this, +albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion, as +M. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (_Philos._, vol. 1, Metaph., book 2, +part 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' doctrine: 'Most +philosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, not being able to +understand the relation existing between free actions and the providence of +God, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of free will: but +that is sacrilegious. The others, not being able to apprehend the relation +between God's efficacy and free actions, have denied that man was endowed +with freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The mean to be found between these +two extremes is to say' (id. ibid., p. 485) 'that, even though we were not +able to understand all the relations existing between freedom and God's +providence, we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are free +and dependent upon God. For both these truths are equally known, the one +through experience, and the other through reason; and prudence forbids one +to abandon truths whereof one is assured, under the pretext that one cannot +apprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths well +known.' + +294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that these +expressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations +between man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to be +incompatible with our freedom.' He adds that these expressions are +over-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors assume', +he says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment; +whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenment +which we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's opinion) 'with our +Mysteries.' That is exactly what I said at the beginning of this work, that +if the Mysteries were irreconcilable with reason, and if there were +unanswerable objections, far from finding the mystery incomprehensible, we +should comprehend that it was false. It is true that here there is no +question of a mystery, but only of natural religion. + +295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon [306] +the Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which I +cannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says +(_Dictionary_, art. 'Helen.', lit. [Greek: TD]), 'of that which passes +within them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if +their will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice +whereof they are the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons who +have studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions, +and who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Those +persons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come to +persuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to +resist the force that carries them along where they would not go. It was +principally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of +their evil deeds.' + +296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that a +little philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophy +bringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those who reflect +upon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we do is only +impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through +the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabula +rasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and +passions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity. + +297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the +blame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus: + + _Frustra, Medea, repugnas,_ + _Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait._ + +And a little later Ovid makes her add: + + _Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,_ + _Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,_ + _Deteriora sequor_. + +But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say +with far more reason: + + _Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,_ + _Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_ + +298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is +only apparent. For in his _Diss. de providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61) [307] +he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that +present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in +such a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outward +force. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act +with most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's action +is upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus +operatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod +autem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is +true that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But it +seems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that +production of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created +effect, whose positive elements are actually created continually through +God's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are +concerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he +gives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we +who produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always +reasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our +freedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to +making will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention, +_a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite evident that that +does not interfere with freedom, any more than could a friend who gives +counsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not supplied an answer +to the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse to God is of no avail +here. + +299. But let me give another much more reasonable passage from the same M. +Bayle, where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively sense of +freedom, which according to the Cartesians is a proof of freedom. His words +are indeed full of wit, and worthy of consideration, and occur in the +_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 140, p. 761 +_seqq._). Here they are: 'By the clear and distinct sense we have of our +existence we do not discern whether we exist through ourselves or derive +our being from another. We discern that only by reflexion, that is, through +meditation upon our powerlessness in the matter of conserving ourselves as +much as we would, and of freeing ourselves from dependence upon the beings +that surround us, etc. It is indeed certain that the pagans (the same must +be said of the Socinians, since they deny the creation) never attained[308] +to the knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing, and +that we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance. +They therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universe +exist of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing, and that thus they +depend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications, which +are liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause. Does not +this error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creative +action which conserves us, and that we are only conscious of our existence? +That we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we should for ever +remain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aid +us? Let us say also, that the clear and distinct sense we have of the acts +of our will cannot make us discern whether we give them ourselves to +ourselves or receive them from that same cause which gives us existence. We +must have recourse to reflexion or to meditation in order to effect this +discrimination. Now I assert that one can never by purely philosophical +meditations arrive at an established certainty that we are the efficient +cause of our volitions: for every person who makes due investigation will +recognize clearly, that if we were only passive subjects with regard to +will we should have the same sensations of experience as we have when we +think that we are free. Assume, for the sake of argument, that God so +ordered the laws of the union between soul and body that all the modalities +of the soul, without a single exception, are of necessity linked together +with the interposition of the modalities of the brain. You will then +understand that nothing will happen to us except that of which we are +conscious: there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from the +perception of objects of the senses, which is its first step, up to the +most definite volitions, which are its final step. There will be in this +sequence the consciousness of ideas, that of affirmations, that of +irresolutions, that of velleities and that of volitions. For whether the +act of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring it +about ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feel +that we will. Moreover, as this external cause can blend as much pleasure +as it will with the volition which it impresses upon us, we shall be able +to feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and that +they lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations. We shall +feel no constraint; you know the maxim: _voluntas non potest cogi_. Do[309] +you not clearly understand that a weather-vane, always having communicated +to it simultaneously (in such a way, however, that priority of nature or, +if one will, a real momentary priority, should attach to the desire for +motion) movement towards a certain point on the horizon, and the wish to +turn in that direction, would be persuaded that it moved of itself to +fulfil the desires which it conceived? I assume that it would not know that +there were winds, or that an external cause changed everything +simultaneously, both its situation and its desires. That is the state we +are in by our nature: we know not whether an invisible cause makes us pass +sufficiently from one thought to another. It is therefore natural that men +are persuaded that they determine their own acts. But it remains to be +discovered whether they are mistaken in that, as in countless other things +they affirm by a kind of instinct and without having made use of +philosophic meditation. Since therefore there are two hypotheses as to what +takes place in man: the one that he is only a passive subject, the other +that he has active virtues, one cannot in reason prefer the second to the +first, so long as one can only adduce proofs of feeling. For we should feel +with an equal force that we wish this or that, whether all our volitions +were imprinted upon our soul by an exterior and invisible cause, or we +formed them ourselves.' + +300. There are here excellent arguments, which are valid against the usual +systems; but they fail in respect of the System of Pre-established Harmony, +which takes us further than we were able to go formerly. M. Bayle asserts, +for instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can never +attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our +volitions'. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the +establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course +of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it +is free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the +customary co-operation of God. And this system shows that our spontaneity +is real, and not only apparent, as Herr Wittich believed it to be. M. Bayle +asserts also on the same reasons (ch. 170, p. 1132) that if there were a +_fatum Astrologicum_ this would not destroy freedom; and I would concede +that to him, if freedom consisted only in an apparent spontaneity. + +301. The spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be questioned; +and Aristotle has defined it well, saying that an action is [310] +_spontaneous_ when its source is in him who acts. 'Spontaneum est, cujus +principium est in agente.' Thus it is that our actions and our wills depend +entirely upon us. It is true that we are not directly the masters of our +will, although we be its cause; for we do not choose volitions, as we +choose our actions by our volitions. Yet we have a certain power also over +our will, because we can contribute indirectly towards willing another time +that which we would fain will now, as I have here already shown: that, +however, is no _velleity_, properly speaking. There also we have a mastery, +individual and even perceptible, over our actions and our wills, resulting +from a combination of spontaneity with intelligence. + +302. Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedom +mentioned by Aristotle, that is, _spontaneity_ and _intelligence_, which +are found united in us in deliberation, whereas beasts lack the second +condition. But the Schoolmen demand yet a third, which they call +_indifference_. And indeed one must admit it, if indifference signifies as +much as 'contingency'; for I have already said here that freedom must +exclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity. But, as I have +declared more than once, this indifference, this contingency, this +non-necessity, if I may venture so to speak, which is a characteristic +attribute of freedom, does not prevent one from having stronger +inclinations towards the course one chooses; nor does it by any means +require that one be absolutely and equally indifferent towards the two +opposing courses. + +303. I therefore admit indifference only in the one sense, implying the +same as contingency, or non-necessity. But, as I have declared more than +once, I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not think that +one ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a choice would +be, as it were, mere chance, without determining reason, whether apparent +or hidden. But such a chance, such an absolute and actual fortuity, is a +chimera which never occurs in nature. All wise men are agreed that chance +is only an apparent thing, like fortune: only ignorance of causes gives +rise to it. But if there were such a vague indifference, or rather if we +were to choose without having anything to prompt us to the choice, chance +would then be something actual, resembling what, according to Epicurus, +took place in that little deviation of the atoms, occurring without cause +or reason. Epicurus had introduced it in order to evade necessity, and[311] +Cicero with good reason ridiculed it. + +304. This deviation had a final cause in the mind of Epicurus, his aim +being to free us from fate; but it can have no efficient cause in the +nature of things, it is one of the most impossible of chimeras. M. Bayle +himself refutes it admirably, as we shall see presently. And yet it is +surprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of like +nature with this supposed deviation: here is what he says, when speaking of +Buridan's ass (_Dictionary_, art. 'Buridan', lit. 13): 'Those who advocate +free will properly so called admit in man a power of determining, either to +the right hand or the left, even when the motives are perfectly uniform on +the side of each of the two opposing objects. For they maintain that our +soul can say, without having any reason other than that of using its +freedom: "I prefer this to that, although I see nothing more worthy of my +choice in the one than the other".' + +305. All those who admit a free will properly so called will not for that +reason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from an +indeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all is +determined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to the +circumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no means +approves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employ +here the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians' +manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. For +although I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me +choose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some +impression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire to +make use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us to +the choice of one course or the other. + +306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby man +can extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I have +already mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancy +that he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend upon +objects.' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play master +in one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it favour one +course more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make this Act: I +will prefer this to that, because it pleases me to behave thus.' But [312] +these words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is my pleasure', imply +already a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'. + +307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so that +which determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive would +be derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, or of +their natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or chance: the +short straw would decide.' This way has an outlet, but it does not reach +the goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it is not man who +decides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides by +lot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because the lot is not, and the +man has attached himself to it. There are always reasons in Nature which +cause that which happens by chance or through the lot. I am somewhat +surprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could have allowed itself to +be so misled on this point. I have set out elsewhere the true rejoinder to +the Buridan sophism: it is that the case of perfect equipoise is +impossible, since the universe can never be halved, so as to make all +impressions equivalent on both sides. + +308. Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimerical +or absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his book _De +Fato_) that Carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation of +atoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefined +indifference to the voluntary motions of souls, because these motions have +no need of an external cause, coming as they do from our nature. But M. +Bayle (_Dictionary_, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly replies that all that +which springs from the nature of a thing is determined: thus determination +always remains, and Carneades' evasion is of no avail. + +309. He shows elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 90, +l. 2, p. 229) 'that a freedom far removed from this so-called equipoise is +incomparably more beneficial. I mean', he says, 'a freedom such as may +always follow the judgements of the mind, and such as cannot resist objects +clearly recognized as good. I know of no people who do not agree that truth +clearly recognized necessitates' (determines rather, unless one speak of a +moral necessity) 'the assent of the soul; experience teaches us that. In +the schools they teach constantly that as the true is the object of [313] +the understanding, so the good is the object of the will. So likewise they +teach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that which +is shown to it under the semblance of truth, the will can never love +anything which to it does not appear to be good. One never believes the +false as such, and one never loves evil as evil. There is in the +understanding a natural determination towards the true in general, and +towards each individual truth clearly recognized. There is in the will a +natural determination towards good in general; whence many philosophers +conclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognized +by us we are of necessity compelled to love them. The understanding +suspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely, so +that there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true. That +leads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise +only when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a +good with regard to it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in the +affirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements +of the mind determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in this +fashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or +demerit. For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a +free attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing them +together, and discriminating between them. I must not forget that there are +very learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, _De Gratia et Libero +Arbitrio_, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in _Responsione ad Epistolam Viri +Docti, id est Episcopii_) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that the +will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the +understanding.' + +310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clear +recognition of the best _determines_ the will; but it does not necessitate +it, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between the necessary +and the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once, +and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity. I think also +that it is only God's will which always follows the judgements of the +understanding: all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or +to perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call +_adequate ideas_. And although in the blessed these passions always tend +towards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of +things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always [314] +happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It is +the same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason for +our instincts. The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we +are, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct +knowledge. Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks +(_Treatise on Prayer_, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered things +beforehand that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, always +succeed: that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, in +addition to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an express +knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses, +and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we +are not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement of the +practical understanding. + +311. As for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to the +true and that of the will to the good, one must know that a clear and +distinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the affirmation +of this truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction. +But whatever perception one may have of the good, the effort to act in +accordance with the judgement, which in my opinion forms the essence of the +will, is distinct from it. Thus, since there is need of time to raise this +effort to its climax, it may be suspended, and even changed, by a new +perception or inclination which passes athwart it, which diverts the mind +from it, and which even causes it sometimes to make a contrary judgement. +Hence it comes that our soul has so many means of resisting the truth which +it knows, and that the passage from mind to heart is so long. Especially is +this so when the understanding to a great extent proceeds only by faint +_thoughts_, which have only slight power to affect, as I have explained +elsewhere. Thus the connexion between judgement and will is not so +necessary as one might think. + +312. M. Bayle goes on to say, with truth (p. 221): 'Indeed, it cannot be a +fault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as regards good +in general. It would be rather a disorder, an inordinate imperfection, if +one could say truthfully: It is all one to me whether I am happy or +unhappy; I have no more determination to love the good than to hate it; I +can do both equally. Now if it is a praiseworthy and advantageous quality +to be determinate as regards good in general, it cannot be a fault if [315] +one is necessitated as regards each individual good recognized plainly as +for our good. It seems even as though it were a necessary conclusion, that +if the soul has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general, it +also has none in respect of particular goods which after due examination it +judges to be goods in relation to it. What should we think of a soul which, +having formed that judgement, had, and prided itself on having, the power +not to love these goods, and even to hate them, and which said: I recognize +clearly that these are goods for me, I have all the enlightenment necessary +on that point; nevertheless I will not love them, I will hate them; my +decision is made, I act upon it; it is not that any reason' (that is, any +other reason than that which is founded upon 'Such is my good pleasure') +'urges me thereto, but it pleases me so to behave: what should we think, I +say, of such a soul? Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy +than if it had not this freedom of indifference? + +313. 'Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final acts +of the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul, +but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along that +road than along the road of indifference. It will suffice to enlighten his +mind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will comply with the +judgements that reason shall have pronounced. But if he has a freedom +independent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized, he +will be the most intractable of all animals, and it will never be possible +to rely upon making him choose the right course. All the counsels, all the +arguments in the world may prove unavailing; you will give him +explanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will will play the +haughty madam and remain motionless as a rock. Vergil, _Aen_., lib. 6, v. +470: + + _Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur,_ + _Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes_. + +A caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all +kinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it will +please her to hate it. Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be the +richest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of our +happiness? Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? Is there cause for +boasting in being able to say: "I have scorned all the judgements of [316] +my reason, and I have followed an altogether different path, simply from +considerations of my own good pleasure?" With what regrets would one not be +torn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result? Such a +freedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men, because the +understanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearly +enough to deprive the will of the power of rejection. It would be therefore +infinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by the +judgement of the understanding, than to permit the will to suspend its +action. For by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease and +certainty.' + +314. Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is very +true that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any determining +reason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is impracticable +and chimerical. The man who wished to behave thus, or at the least appear +to be acting without due cause, would most certainly be looked upon as +irrational. But it is very true also that the thing is impossible, when it +is taken strictly in accordance with the assumption. As soon as one tries +to give an example of it one misses one's aim and stumbles upon the case of +a man who, while he does not come to a decision without cause, does so +rather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement. As +soon as one says: 'I scorn the judgements of my reason simply from +considerations of my own good pleasure, it pleases me to behave thus', it +is as if one were to say: I prefer my inclination to my interest, my +pleasure to my profit. + +315. Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for him +to follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer the +satisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from their +counsel. It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a wise +man acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart +another who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may disconcert +those who watch his steps. It is even well at times to imitate Brutus by +concealing one's wit, and even to feign madness, as David did before the +King of the Philistines. + +316. M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showing +that to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a great +imperfection. He observes (p. 225) that, even according to the [317] +Molinists, 'the understanding which does its DUTY well indicates that which +is THE BEST'. He introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our first +parents in the Garden of Eden: 'I have given you my knowledge, the faculty +of judging things, and full power to dispose your wills. I shall give you +instructions and orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you is +of such a nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) to +obey me and to disobey me. You will be tempted: if you make a good use of +your freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy. +It is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either that +I permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, or +that I prevent you from doing so. Consider carefully, I give you four and +twenty hours. Do you not clearly understand' (adds M. Bayle) 'that their +reason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made them +conclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favours +wherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves by +an ill use of their powers? And must one not admit that if Adam, through +wrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had refused a +divine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he would have +been the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus? He would have been +well-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to conquer +without the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven would put +their enemies to flight with such aid.' + +317. M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no less, +or even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from above, +than for owing one's happiness to one's own choice. And if one does well +through having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose suddenly, to +reasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy in this; for +one assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or something or other +which one pictures to oneself under the vague name of _good luck_ has +impelled us thereto. Indeed, Sulla and Caesar boasted more of their good +luck than of their prudence. The pagans, and particularly the poets (Homer +especially), determined their heroes' acts by divine promptings. The hero +of the _Aeneid_ proceeds only under the direction of a God. It was very +great praise offered to the Emperors if one said that they were victorious +both through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to [318] +their generals: 'Te copias, te consilium et tuos praebente Divos,' said +Horace. The generals fought under the auspices of the Emperors, as if +trusting to the Emperor's good luck, for subordinate officers had no rights +regarding the auspices. One takes credit to oneself for being a favourite +of heaven, one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune +than of talent. There are no people that think themselves more fortunate +than the mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts within +them. + +318. 'On the other hand', M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), 'a Stoic philosopher, who +attaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as susceptible as +another man to the pleasure of having chosen well. And every man of sense +will find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of having +deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feels +incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted +in the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel +a temptation. A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to +his duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he is +incapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is far +more contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, and +were for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take. +One is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one's +mind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel of +a good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a good +choice.' All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement +has over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeed +I have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep +us in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. The +nearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is +determined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whom +Velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable +action, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of +wavering. + +319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of +M. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of the +subject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he ought +therefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God, [319] +of choosing the best way that is possible. For either God will act through +a vague indifference and at random, or again he will act on caprice or +through some other passion, or finally he must act through a prevailing +inclination of reason which prompts him to the best. But passions, which +come from the confused perception of an apparent good, cannot occur in God; +and vague indifference is something chimerical. It is therefore only the +strongest reason that can regulate God's choice. It is an imperfection in +our freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good, a +greater evil instead of the lesser evil, the lesser good instead of the +greater good. That arises from the appearances of good and evil, which +deceive us; whereas God is always prompted to the true and the greatest +good, that is, to the absolutely true good, which he cannot fail to know. + +320. This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content with +exempting it, I do not say from constraint, but from necessity itself, +would also exempt it from certainty and determination, that is, from reason +and perfection, nevertheless pleased some Schoolmen, people who often +become entangled in their own subtleties, and take the straw of terms for +the grain of things. They assume some chimerical notion, whence they think +to derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain by quibblings. +Complete indifference is of this nature: to concede it to the will is to +grant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some mystics find +in the divine nature, of being able to do the impossible, to produce +absurdities, to cause two contradictory propositions to be true +simultaneously. To claim that a determination comes from a complete +indifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally +from nothing. Let it be assumed that God does not give this determination: +it has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul, nor in the body, nor in +circumstances, since all is assumed to be indeterminate; and yet there it +is, appearing and existing without preparation, nothing making ready for +it, no angel, not even God himself, being able to see or to show how it +exists. That would be not only the emergence of something from nothing, but +its emergence thence _of itself_. This doctrine introduces something as +preposterous as the theory already mentioned, of the deviation of atoms, +whereby Epicurus asserted that one of these small bodies, going in a +straight line, would turn aside all at once from its path, without any[320] +reason, simply because the will so commands. Take note moreover that he +resorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of complete +indifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancient +origin; and one may with good reason say: _Chimaera Chimaeram parit_. + +321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his admirable +translation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet been +published (Book 2): + + _Ma ch'i principii poi non corran punto_ + _Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?_ + _Si finalmente ogni lor moto sempre_ + _Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico_ + _Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;_ + _Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno_ + _Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa_ + _I decreti del fato, accio non segua_ + _L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;_ + _Onde han questa, dich' io_, del fato sciolta + Libera volunta, _per cui ciascuno_ + _Va dove piu l'agrada? I moti ancora_ + _Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo_ + _Certo, ne certa region, ma solo_ + _Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;_ + _Poiche senz' alcun dubbio a queste cose_ + _Da sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi_ + _Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti._ + +It is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the gods and +all incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, which he +himself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over the atoms, +and diverted them from their path, without its being possible for one to +say how. + +322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find at +once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference, +assuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought a +reason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easily +deceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject, +where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier to +confuse matters, that is to say, from the body to the soul. For most +philosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. [321] +Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking the +origin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of +the soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so much +fault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades, +who is no less irrational. I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was so +clear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to the +extent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this +matter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were more +capable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or +cause, internal or external; or as if the great principle which states that +nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body. + +323. It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over matter, +that it is the source of action, having within itself the principle of +motion or of change, in a word, [Greek: to autokineton], as Plato calls it; +whereas matter is simply passive, and has need of being impelled to act, +_agitur, ut agat_. But if the soul is active of itself (as it indeed is), +for that very reason it is not of itself absolutely indifferent to the +action, like matter, and it must find in itself a ground of determination. +According to the System of Pre-established Harmony the soul finds in +itself, and in its ideal nature anterior to existence, the reasons for its +determinations, adjusted to all that shall surround it. That way it was +determined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to act +freely, as it does, when it attains to existence. + +324. M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such as +must be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demand +equipoise. He demonstrates amply enough (_Reply to the Questions of a +Provincial_, ch. 139, p. 748 _seqq_.) that the soul may be compared to a +balance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights. +According to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the +hypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when the +weights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either to one +side or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden. +A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea shines more brightly than +the old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure; when two +passions dispute the ground, it is always the stronger which gains the +mastery, unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other [322] +contributing passion. When one flings away merchandise in order to save +oneself, the action, which the Schoolmen call mixed, is voluntary and free; +and yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions. Grief +arises from remembrance of lost possessions, and one has all the greater +difficulty in making one's resolve, the nearer the approach to even weight +in the opposing reasons, as also we see that the balance is determined more +promptly when there is a great difference between the weights. + +325. Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose from, +one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force which puts +forth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the +spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance. For instance, +air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order +to escape. It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itself +upon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all the +goods that present themselves: they are antecedent acts of will; but the +consequent will, which is their result, is determined in the direction of +that which touches most closely. + +326. This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man from +being master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make use of +his power. His dominion is that of reason: he has only to prepare himself +in good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of checking the +vehemence of the most furious. Let us assume that Augustus, about to give +orders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his wont, upon the +advice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek alphabet before +doing anything in the first heat of his anger: this reflexion will be +capable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of Augustus. But without +some fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes to a special divine +mercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, like that of Augustus, +calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place, passion will +prevail over reason. The driver is master over the horses if he controls +them as he should, and as he can; but there are occasions when he becomes +negligent, and then for a time he will have to let go the reins: + + _Fertur equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas_. + +327. One must admit that there is always within us enough power over [323] +our will, but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it. That +shows, as I have observed more than once, that the power of the soul over +its inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an _indirect_ +manner, almost as Bellarmine would have had the Popes exercise rights over +the temporal power of kings. In truth, the external actions that do not +exceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will; but our volitions depend +upon our will only through certain artful twists which give us means of +suspending our resolutions, or of changing them. We are masters in our own +house, not as God is in the world, he having but to speak, but as a wise +prince is in his dominions or as a good father of a family is in his home. +M. Bayle sometimes takes the matter differently, as though we must have, in +order to boast of a free will, an absolute power over ourselves, +independent of reasons and of means. But even God has not such a power, and +must not have in this sense, in relation to his will: he cannot change his +nature, nor act otherwise than according to method; and how could man +transform himself all of a sudden? I have already said God's dominion, the +dominion of wisdom, is that of reason. It is only God, however, who always +wills what is most to be desired, and consequently he has no need of the +power to change his will. 328. If the soul is mistress in its own house +(says M. Bayle, p. 753) it has only to will, and straightway that vexation +and pain which is attendant upon victory over the passions will vanish +away. For this effect it would suffice, in his opinion, to give oneself +indifference to the objects of the passions (p. 758). Why, then, do men not +give themselves this indifference (he says), if they are masters in their +own house? But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a father +of a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? He can +acquire some, but through skill, and not, as in the age of the fairies, or +of King Midas, through a mere command of the will or by his touch. It would +not suffice to be master in one's own house; one must be master of all +things in order to give oneself all that one wishes; for one does not find +everything in one's own house. Working thus upon oneself, one must do as in +working upon something else; one must have knowledge of the constitution +and the qualities of one's object, and adapt one's operations thereto. It +is therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of the will that one +corrects oneself, and that one acquires a better will. + + [324] +329. Nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and pains +attendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into pleasure, +through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the force +of their mind, and of the divine grace. Ascetics and true mystics can speak +of this from experience; and even a true philosopher can say something +thereof. One can attain to that happy state, and it is one of the principal +means the soul can use to strengthen its dominion. + +330. If the Scotists and the Molinists appear to favour vague indifference +(appear, I say, for I doubt whether they do so in reality, once they have +learnt to know it), the Thomists and the disciples of Augustine are for +predetermination. For one must have either the one or the other. Thomas +Aquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles, and +the subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often obscures matters +instead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a general rule follow +their master, and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without the +existence of some predetermination which contributes thereto. But the +predetermination of the new Thomists is not perhaps exactly that which one +needs. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, who often enough formed a party of his +own, and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of God, was +nevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination. He believed that God +saw in the state of the soul, and of its surroundings, the reason for his +determinations. + +331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the +Thomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and against +necessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity to +everything. Cicero says in his book _De Fato_ that Democritus, Heraclitus, +Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that others +were opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); and +that Chrysippus sought a middle course. I think that Cicero is mistaken as +regards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and went +even too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions on +contingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he was +justifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher +of Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events, +denied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this [325] +determination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of +Coimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion +between things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims +it, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or +determination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the +thing in its causes and in its reasons. + +332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by +Chrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his _Stoic Philosophy_, that +the passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preserved +for us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher (_Noct. Att._, lib. 6, +c. 2). Here it is in epitome. Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion +of all events. Against this is urged in objection, that it follows that the +acts of the will would be necessary, and that criminals, being coerced into +evil, should not be punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from the +original constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence; +that souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger +resistance to the impressions of external causes; but that those whose +natural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to +be perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principal +causes and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whose +rotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape, +whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless it +has need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the +objects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its own +constitution. + +333. Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, whether he +will or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is almost of the +same opinion (_Dictionary_, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. H). He says that this +philosopher does not get out of the bog, since the cylinder is regular or +uneven according to what the craftsman has made it; and thus God, +providence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render it +necessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to the Stoics, evil came +from matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said that the stone on which +the craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce a +good cylinder. M. Bayle cites against Chrysippus the fragments of Onomaus +and Diogenianus that Eusebius has preserved for us in the _Praeparatio[326] +Evangelica_ (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); and above all he relies upon Plutarch's +refutation in his book against the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit. +G. But this refutation does not amount to very much. Plutarch maintains +that it would be better to deny power to God than to impute to him the +permission of evils; and he will not admit that evil may serve a greater +good. I have already shown, on the contrary, that God cannot but be +all-powerful, even though he can do no better than produce the best, which +includes the permission of evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedly +that what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the +perfection of the whole. + +334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not only in +his fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, c. 1) +where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a reason +which is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies the +comparison of a stage play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarch +quotes it himself). There he says that there are sometimes portions in a +comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend +grace to the whole poem. He calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions. +We have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy for +full understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; but since Plutarch +assents to the fact, there is reason to believe that this comparison was +not a poor one. Plutarch replies in the first place that the world is not +like a play to provide entertainment. But that is a poor answer: the +comparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part may make the whole +better. He replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part of +the comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. This reply is of no value +either: for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also a +very small part of the universe. + +335. But let us return to the cylinder of Chrysippus. He is right in saying +that vice springs from the original constitution of some minds. He was met +with the objection that God formed them, and he could only reply by +pointing to the imperfection of matter, which did not permit God to do +better. This reply is of no value, for matter in itself is indifferent to +all forms, and God made it. Evil springs rather from the _Forms_ themselves +in their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has not produced +by an act of his will, any more than he thus produced numbers and [327] +figures, and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal and +necessary; for they are in the ideal region of the possibles, that is, in +the divine understanding. God is therefore not the author of essences in so +far as they are only possibilities. But there is nothing actual to which he +has not decreed and given existence; and he has permitted evil because it +is involved in the best plan existing in the region of possibles, a plan +which supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. This notion satisfies at +once the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, and yet leaves a way +open for the entrance of evil. God gives perfection to creatures in so far +as it is possible in the universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, but +any roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. This +comparison made by Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which was +taken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current, its +pace becoming slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tend +towards the same end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed +concerning the opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find therein +more reason than is supposed. + +336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art. +'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, where +this philosopher maintains that evil has come _by concomitance._ That also +is made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the evil which God +permitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a means, but simply +as a condition, since it had to be involved in the best. Yet one must +confess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection of +necessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by the +free choice of God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, that +rational creatures act freely also, in accordance with their original +nature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; and lastly, that the +motive power of good inclines the will without compelling it. + +337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt exists +to an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as it is +genuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection. For +to be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage, and to have +control over the passions is in truth an advantage, but one that +presupposes an imperfection, namely passion itself, of which God is [328] +incapable. Scotus was justified in saying that if God were not free and +exempt from necessity, no creature would be so. But God is incapable of +being indeterminate in anything whatsoever: he cannot be ignorant, he +cannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; his will is always decided, +and it can only be decided by the best. God can never have a primitive +particular will, that is, independent of laws or general acts of will; such +a thing would be unreasonable. He cannot determine upon Adam, Peter, Judas +or any individual without the existence of a reason for this determination; +and this reason leads of necessity to some general enunciation. The wise +mind always acts _according to principles_; always _according to rules_, +and never _according to exceptions_, save when the rules come into +collision through opposing tendencies, where the strongest carries the day: +or else, either they will stop one another or some third course will emerge +as a result. In all these cases one rule serves as an exception to the +other, and there are never any _original exceptions_ with one who always +acts in a regular way. + +338. If there are people who believe that election and reprobation are +accomplished on God's part by a despotic absolute power, not only without +any apparent reason but actually without any reason, even a concealed one, +they maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things and the +divine perfections. Such an _absolutely absolute decree_ (so to speak) +would be without doubt insupportable. But Luther and Calvin were far from +such a belief: the former hopes that the life to come will make us +comprehend the just reasons of God's choice; and the latter protests +explicitly that these reasons are just and holy, although they be unknown +to us. I have already in that connexion quoted Calvin's treatise on +predestination, and here are the actual words: 'God before the fall of Adam +had reflected upon what he had to do, and that for causes concealed from +us.... It is evident therefore that he had just causes for the reprobation +of some of mankind, but causes to us UNKNOWN.' + +339. This truth, that all God does is reasonable and cannot be better done, +strikes at the outset every man of good sense, and extorts, so to speak, +his approbation. And yet the most subtle of philosophers have a fatal +propensity for offending sometimes without observing it, during the course +and in the heat of disputes, against the first principles of good sense, +when these are shrouded in terms that disguise them. We have here [329] +already seen how the excellent M. Bayle, with all his shrewdness, has +nevertheless combated this principle which I have just indicated, and which +is a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of God. He thought to +defend in that way the cause of God and to exempt him from an imaginary +necessity, by leaving him the freedom to choose from among various goods +the least. I have already spoken of M. Diroys and others who have also been +deluded by this strange opinion, one that is far too commonly accepted. +Those who uphold it do not observe that it implies a wish to preserve for, +or rather bestow upon, God a false freedom, which is the freedom to act +unreasonably. That is rendering his works subject to correction, and making +it impossible for us to say or even to hope that anything reasonable can be +said upon the permission of evil. + +340. This error has much impaired M. Bayle's arguments, and has barred his +way of escape from many perplexities. That appears again in relation to the +laws of the realm of Nature: he believes them to be arbitrary and +indifferent, and he objects that God could better have attained his end in +the realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws, if he had more often +dispensed with their observance, or even if he had made others. He believed +this especially with regard to the law of the union between the soul and +the body. For he is persuaded, with the modern Cartesians, that the ideas +of the perceptible qualities that God gives (according to them) to the +soul, occasioned by movements of the body, have nothing representing these +movements or resembling them. Accordingly it was a purely arbitrary act on +God's part to give us the ideas of heat, cold, light and other qualities +which we experience, rather than to give us quite different ideas +occasioned in the same way. I have often wondered that people so talented +should have been capable of relishing notions so unphilosophic and so +contrary to the fundamental maxims of reason. For nothing gives clearer +indication of the imperfection of a philosophy than the necessity +experienced by the philosopher to confess that something comes to pass, in +accordance with his system, for which there is no reason. That applies to +the idea of Epicurus on the deviation of atoms. Whether it be God or Nature +that operates, the operation will always have its reasons. In the +operations of Nature, these reasons will depend either upon necessary +truths or upon the laws that God has found the most reasonable; and in the +operations of God, they will depend upon the choice of the supreme [330] +reason which causes them to act. + +341. M. Regis, a famous Cartesian, had asserted in his 'Metaphysics' (part +2, book 2, c. 29) that the faculties God has given to men are the most +excellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general order of +nature. 'Considering only', he says, 'the power of God and the nature of +man by themselves, it is very easy to conceive that God could have made man +more perfect: but if one will consider man, not in himself and separately +from all other creatures, but as a member of the universe and a portion +which is subject to the general laws of motions, one will be bound to +acknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been.' He adds 'that we +cannot conceive that God could have employed any other means more +appropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'. M. Regis is +right in a general way in saying that God cannot do better than he has done +in relation to all. And although there be apparently in some places in the +universe rational animals more perfect than man, one may say that God was +right to create every kind of species, some more perfect than others. It is +perhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a species of animals much +resembling man and more perfect than we are. It may be even that the human +race will attain in time to a greater perfection than that which we can now +envisage. Thus the laws of motions do not prevent man from being more +perfect: but the place God has assigned to man in space and in time limits +the perfections he was able to receive. + +342. I also doubt, with M. Bayle, whether pain be necessary in order to +warn men of peril. But this writer goes too far (_Reply to the Questions of +a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 77, p. 104): he seems to think that a feeling +of pleasure could have the same effect, and that, in order to prevent a +child from going too near the fire, God could give him ideas of pleasure in +proportion to the distance he kept from it. This expedient does not appear +very practicable with regard to all evils, unless a miracle were involved. +It is more natural that what if it were too near would cause an evil should +cause some foreboding of evil when it is a little less near. Yet I admit +that it is possible such a foreboding will be something less than pain, and +usually this is the case. Thus it indeed appears that pain is not necessary +for causing one to shun present peril; it is wont rather to serve as a +penalty for having actually plunged into evil, and a warning against [331] +further lapse. There are also many painful evils the avoidance whereof +rests not with us. As a dissolution of the continuity of our body is a +consequence of many accidents that may happen to us, it was natural that +this imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense of +imperfection in the soul. Nevertheless I would not guarantee that there +were no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to cause +a sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of continuity, +as for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off; or even a sense of +pleasure, as if one were only scratching oneself. For the imperfection that +attends the dissolution of the body might lead to the sense of a greater +perfection, which was suspended or checked by the continuity which is now +broken: and in this respect the body would be as it were a prison. + +343. There is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe of +animals resembling that one which Cyrano de Bergerac encountered in the +sun. The body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of innumerable +small animals, that were capable of ranging themselves in accordance with +the desires of the great animal, by this means it transformed itself in a +moment, just as it pleased; and the dissolution of continuity caused it no +more hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause to the sea. But, after all, +these animals are not men, they are not in our globe or in our present +century; and God's plan ensured that there should not be lacking here on +earth a rational animal clothed in flesh and bones, whose structure +involves susceptibility to pain. + +344. But M. Bayle further opposes this on another principle, one which I +have already mentioned. It seems that he thinks the ideas which the soul +conceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary. Thus God +might have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us pleasure. He +even maintains that the laws of motion are entirely arbitrary. 'I would +wish to know', he says (vol. III, ch. 166, p. 1080), 'whether God +established by an act of his freedom of indifference general laws on the +communication of movements, and the particular laws on the union of the +human soul with an organic body? In this case, he could have established +quite different laws, and adopted a system whose results involved neither +moral evil nor physical evil. But if the answer is given that God was +constrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he has +established, there we have neither more nor less than the _Fatum_ of [332] +the Stoics. Wisdom will have marked out a way for God, the abandonment +whereof will have been as impossible to him as his own self-destruction.' +This objection has been sufficiently overthrown: it is only a moral +necessity; and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to act in +accordance with the rules of perfect wisdom. + +345. Moreover, it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by many +that the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few people +have properly examined them. It is known now that M. Descartes was much +mistaken in his statement of them. I have proved conclusively that +conservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I consider +that the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or directive +and respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which carry this +subject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in full; but I +have communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, who have +approved them, and have converted some other persons of acknowledged +erudition and ability. I discovered at the same time that the laws of +motion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are not +in reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be; +but neither is it necessary that they be so. They do not spring entirely +from the principle of necessity, but rather from the principle of +perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of +God. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but must always assume +something that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity. Thus these +admirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as +opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato +or Spinoza. + +346. I have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that the +effect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to the same +thing, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom of higher +philosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically. One may again apply other +principles of like nature, for instance the principle that action is always +equal to reaction, one which assumes in things a distaste for external +change, and cannot be derived either from extension or impenetrability; and +that other principle, that a simple movement has the same properties as +those which might belong to a compound movement such as would produce [333] +the same phenomena of locomotion. These assumptions are very plausible, and +are successful as an explanation of the laws of motion: nothing is so +appropriate, all the more since they are in accord with each other. But +there is to be found in them no absolute necessity, such as may compel us +to admit them, in the way one is compelled to admit the rules of logic, of +arithmetic and geometry. + +347. It seems, when one considers the indifference of matter to motion and +to rest, that the largest body at rest could be carried along without any +resistance by the smallest body in motion, in which case there would be +action without reaction and an effect greater than its cause. There is also +no necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an even, +horizontal plane, with a certain degree of speed, termed A, that this +motion must have the properties of that motion which it would have if it +were going with lesser speed in a boat, itself moving in the same direction +with the residue of the speed, to ensure that the ball, seen from the bank, +advance with the same degree A. For, although the same appearance of speed +and of direction results through this medium of the boat, it is not because +it is the same thing. Nevertheless it happens that the effects of the +collision of the balls in the boat, the motion in each one separately +combined with that of the boat giving the appearance of that which goes on +outside the boat, also give the appearance of the effects that these same +balls colliding would have outside the boat. All that is admirable, but one +does not see its absolute necessity. A movement on the two sides of the +right-angled triangle composes a movement on the hypotenuse; but it does +not follow that a ball moving on the hypotenuse must produce the effect of +two balls of its own size moving on the two sides: yet that is true. +Nothing is so appropriate as this result, and God has chosen the laws that +produce it: but one sees no geometrical necessity therein. Yet it is this +very lack of necessity which enhances the beauty of the laws that God has +chosen, wherein divers admirable axioms exist in conjunction, and it is +impossible for one to say which of them is the primary. + +348. I have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law of +continuity, which I have perhaps been the first to state, and which is a +kind of touchstone whose test the rules of M. Descartes, of Father Fabry, +Father Pardies, Father de Malebranche and others cannot pass. In virtue of +this law, one must be able to regard rest as a movement vanishing [334] +after having continually diminished, and likewise equality as an inequality +that vanishes also, as would happen through the continual diminution of the +greater of two unequal bodies, while the smaller retains its size. As a +consequence of this consideration, the general rule for unequal bodies, or +bodies in motion, must apply also to equal bodies or to bodies one of which +is at rest, as to a particular case of the rule. This does result in the +true laws of motion, and does not result in certain laws invented by M. +Descartes and by some other men of talent, which already on that score +alone prove to be ill-concerted, so that one may predict that experiment +will not favour them. + +349. These considerations make it plain that the laws of Nature regulating +movements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary. The middle +course to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom. +And this great example of the laws of motion shows with the utmost clarity +how much difference there is between these three cases, to wit, firstly _an +absolute necessity_, metaphysical or geometrical, which may be called +blind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in the +second place, _a moral necessity_, which comes from the free choice of +wisdom in relation to final causes; and finally in the third place, +_something absolutely arbitrary_, depending upon an indifference of +equipoise, which is imagined, but which cannot exist, where there is no +sufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final cause. +Consequently one must conclude how mistaken it is to confuse either that +which is absolutely necessary with that which is determined by the reason +of the best, or the freedom that is determined by reason with a vague +indifference. + +350. This also settles M. Bayle's difficulty, for he fears that, if God is +always determinate, Nature could dispense with him and bring about that +same effect which is attributed to him, through the necessity of the order +of things. That would be true if the laws of motion for instance, and all +the rest, had their source in a geometrical necessity of efficient causes; +but in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to something depending +upon final causes and upon what is fitting. This also utterly destroys the +most plausible reasoning of the Naturalists. Dr. Johann Joachim Becher, a +German physician, well known for his books on chemistry, had composed a +prayer which looked like getting him into trouble. It began: 'O sancta[335] +mater natura, aeterne rerum ordo'. And it ended by saying that this Nature +must forgive him his errors, since she herself was their cause. But the +nature of things, if taken as without intelligence and without choice, has +in it nothing sufficiently determinant. Herr Becher did not sufficiently +take into account that the Author of things (_natura naturans_) must be +good and wise, and that we can be evil without complicity on his part in +our acts of wickedness. When a wicked man exists, God must have found in +the region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that +sequence of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatest +perfection of the universe, and in which errors and sins are not only +punished but even repaired to greater advantage, so that they contribute to +the greatest good. + +351. M. Bayle, however, has extended the free choice of God a little too +far. Speaking of the Peripatetic Strato (_Reply to the Questions of a +Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 180, p. 1239), who asserted that everything had +been brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of intelligence, he +maintains that this philosopher, on being asked why a tree has not the +power to form bones and veins, might have asked in his turn: Why has matter +precisely three dimensions? why should not two have sufficed for it? why +has it not four? 'If one had answered that there can be neither more nor +less than three dimensions he would have demanded the cause of this +impossibility.' These words lead one to believe that M. Bayle suspected +that the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon God's choice, +even as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees to produce +animals. Indeed, how do we know whether there are not planetary globes or +earths situated in some more remote place in the universe where the fable +of the Barnacle-geese of Scotland (birds that were said to be born of +trees) proves true, and even whether there are not countries where one +could say: + + _... populos umbrosa creavit_ + _Fraxinus, et foeta viridis puer excidit alno?_ + +But with the dimensions of matter it is not thus: the ternary number is +determined for it not by the reason of the best, but by a geometrical +necessity, because the geometricians have been able to prove that there are +only three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can intersect +at one and the same point. Nothing more appropriate could have been [336] +chosen to show the difference there is between the moral necessity that +accounts for the choice of wisdom and the brute necessity of Strato and the +adherents of Spinoza, who deny to God understanding and will, than a +consideration of the difference existing between the reason for the laws of +motion and the reason for the ternary number of the dimensions: for the +first lies in the choice of the best and the second in a geometrical and +blind necessity. + +352. Having spoken of the laws of bodies, that is, of the rules of motion, +let us come to the laws of the union between body and soul, where M. Bayle +believes that he finds again some vague indifference, something absolutely +arbitrary. Here is the way he speaks of it in his _Reply_ (vol. II, ch. 84, +p. 163): 'It is a puzzling question whether bodies have some natural +property of doing harm or good to man's soul. If one answers yes, one +plunges into an insane labyrinth: for, as man's soul is an immaterial +substance, one will be bound to say that the local movement of certain +bodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind, a statement +contrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to us. If one +answers no, one will be constrained to admit that the influence of our +organs upon our thoughts depends neither upon the internal qualities of +matter, nor upon the laws of motion, but upon an _arbitrary institution_ of +the creator. One must then admit that it depended altogether upon God's +freedom to combine particular thoughts of our soul with particular +modifications of our body, even when he had once established all the laws +for the action of bodies one upon another. Whence it results that there is +in the universe no portion of matter which by its proximity can harm us, +save when God wills it; and consequently, that the earth is as capable as +any other place of being the abode of the happy man.... In short it is +evident that there is no need, in order to prevent the wrong choices of +freedom, to transport man outside the earth. God could do on earth with +regard to all the acts of the will what he does in respect of the good +works of the predestined when he settles their outcome, whether by +efficacious or by sufficient grace: and that grace, without in any way +impairing freedom, is always followed by the assent of the soul. It would +be as easy for him on earth as in heaven to bring about the determination +of our souls to a good choice.' + +353. I agree with M. Bayle that God could have so ordered bodies and [337] +souls on this globe of earth, whether by ways of nature or by extraordinary +graces, that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a foretaste of the +celestial state of the blessed. There is no reason why there should not be +worlds happier than ours; but God had good reasons for willing that ours +should be such as it is. Nevertheless, in order to prove that a better +state would have been possible here, M. Bayle had no need to resort to the +system of occasional causes: it abounds in miracles and in hypotheses for +which their very originators confess there is no justification; and these +are two defects such as will most of all estrange a system from true +philosophy. It is a cause for surprise, in the first place, that M. Bayle +did not bethink himself of the System of Pre-established Harmony which he +had examined before, and which for this matter was so opportune. But as in +this system all is connected and harmonious, all following from reasons and +nothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect +indifference, it seems that it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: for he was +here somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference, which, +notwithstanding, he contested so strongly on other occasions. He was much +given to passing from one extreme to the other, not with an ill intention +or against his own conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settled +in his mind on the question concerned. He contented himself with whatever +suited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being only +to perplex philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; and never, in +my opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against with +more eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for the +sake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That is +what I often said to the late Abbe Foucher, a few specimens of whose work +prove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsius +and Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, and +what M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato. It must not be possible for us +to offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the +celebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of the +Sorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for some +centuries. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them. + +354. M. Bayle goes on (p. 166): 'It is true that since the laws of motion +were instituted in such forms as we see now in the world, it is an +inevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should break it, and[338] +that a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or some +derangement of its parts. But that is all that can follow the action of +this stone upon the human body. If you want it in addition to cause a +feeling of pain, then one must assume the institution of a code other than +that one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one upon +another; one must, I say, have recourse to the particular system of the +laws of union between the soul and certain bodies. Now as this system is +not of necessity connected with the other, the indifference of God does not +cease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the other. He +therefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom, like two +things which did not follow naturally the one from the other. Thus it is by +an arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the body should +cause pain in the soul which is united to this body. It therefore only +rested with him to have chosen another system of union between soul and +body: he was therefore able to choose one in accordance wherewith wounds +only evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but agreeable desire to +apply it. He was able to arrange that all bodies which were on the point of +breaking a man's head or piercing his heart should evoke a lively sense of +danger, and that this sense should cause the body to remove itself promptly +out of reach of the blow. All that would have come to pass without +miracles, since there would have been general laws on this subject. The +system which we know by experience teaches us that the determination of the +movement of certain bodies changes in pursuance of our desires. It was +therefore possible for a combination to be effected between our desires and +the movement of certain bodies, whereby the nutritive juices were so +modified that the good arrangement of our organs was never affected.' + +355. It is evident that M. Bayle believes that everything accomplished +through general laws is accomplished without miracles. But I have shown +sufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serve +to explain the event through the nature of things, it can only be put into +execution by a miracle. If, for example, God had ordained that bodies must +have a circular motion, he would have needed perpetual miracles, or the +ministry of angels, to put this order into execution: for that is contrary +to the nature of motion, whereby the body naturally abandons the circular +line to continue in the tangent straight line if nothing holds it [339] +back. Therefore it is not enough for God to ordain simply that a wound +should excite an agreeable sensation: natural means must be found for that +purpose. The real means whereby God causes the soul to be conscious of what +happens in the body have their origin in the nature of the soul, which +represents the bodies, and is so made beforehand that the representations +which are to spring up one from another within it, by a natural sequence of +thoughts, correspond to the changes in the body. + +356. The representation has a natural relation to that which is to be +represented. If God should have the round shape of a body represented by +the idea of a square, that would be an unsuitable representation: for there +would be angles or projections in the representation, while all would be +even and smooth in the original. The representation often suppresses +something in the objects when it is imperfect; but it can add nothing: that +would render it, not more than perfect, but false. Moreover, the +suppression is never complete in our perceptions, and there is in the +representation, confused as it is, more than we see there. Thus there is +reason for supposing that the ideas of heat, cold, colours, etc., also only +represent the small movements carried out in the organs, when one is +conscious of these qualities, although the multiplicity and the diminutive +character of these movements prevents their clear representation. Almost in +the same way it happens that we do not distinguish the blue and the yellow +which play their part in the representation as well as in the composition +of the green, when the microscope shows that what appears to be green is +composed of yellow and blue parts. + +357. It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways; +but there must always be an exact relation between the representation and +the thing, and consequently between the different representations of one +and the same thing. The projections in perspective of the conic sections of +the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an +ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight +line and a point. Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these +figures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every +other point. Thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe to +itself according to its point of view, and through a relation which is +peculiar to it; but a perfect harmony always subsists therein. God, if he +wished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of [340] +the body by an agreeable sensation in the soul, would not have neglected to +ensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body, +by giving it some new relief, as when one is freed of some burden or loosed +from some bond. But organic bodies of such kinds, although possible, do not +exist upon our globe, which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that God +may have put to use elsewhere. Nevertheless it is enough that, due +allowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe, nothing +can be done for it better than what God does. He makes the best possible +use of the laws of nature which he has established and (as M. Regis also +acknowledged in the same passage) 'the laws that God has established in +nature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive'. + +358. I will add to that the remark from the _Journal des Savants_ of the +16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the _Reply +to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 1030). The matter in +question is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the Origin of +Evil, to which I have already referred here. It is stated: 'that the +general solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is that +the universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces which +form a whole; that, according to the laws established in nature, some parts +cannot be better unless others become worse, whence would result a system +less perfect as a whole. This principle', the writer goes on, 'is good; but +if nothing is added to it, it does not appear sufficient. Why has God +established laws that give rise to so many difficulties? philosophers who +are somewhat precise will say. Could he not have established others of a +kind not subject to any defects? And to cut the matter short, how comes it +that he has prescribed laws for himself? Why does he not act without +general laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness? The +writer has not carried the difficulty as far as that. By disentangling his +ideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty, but +there is no development of the subject in his work.' + +359. I suppose that the gifted author of this extract, when he thought the +difficulty could be solved, had in mind something akin to my principles on +this matter. If he had vouchsafed to declare himself in this passage, he +would to all appearance have replied, like M. Regis, that the laws God +established were the most excellent that could be established. He would +have acknowledged, at the same time, that God could not have refrained[341] +from establishing laws and following rules, because laws and rules are what +makes order and beauty; that to act without rules would be to act without +reason; and that because God _called into action all his goodness_ the +exercise of his omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom, to +secure as much good as was possible of attainment. Finally, he would have +said, the existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us is +a sure indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance, and +that they assist in the achievement of the total good, an argument +wherewith M. Bayle in more than one place expresses agreement. + +360. Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything comes to pass +according to determinate reasons, there cannot be any more difficulty over +these principles of God's foreknowledge. Although these determinations do +not compel, they cannot but be certain, and they foreshadow what shall +happen. It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence of this +universe, when he chooses it, and that thus he has no need of the connexion +of effects and causes in order to foresee these effects. But since his +wisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion, he cannot but +see one part of the sequence in the other. It is one of the rules of my +system of general harmony, _that the present is big with the future_, and +that he who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be. What is +more, I have proved conclusively that God sees in each portion of the +universe the whole universe, owing to the perfect connexion of things. He +is infinitely more discerning than Pythagoras, who judged the height of +Hercules by the size of his footprint. There must therefore be no doubt +that effects follow their causes determinately, in spite of contingency and +even of freedom, which nevertheless exist together with certainty or +determination. + +361. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, among others, has indicated this clearly in +saying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in their causes, +and that God, who knows all, seeing all that shall have power to tempt or +repel the will, will see therein the course it shall take. I could cite +many other authors who have said the same thing, and reason does not allow +the possibility of thinking otherwise. M. Jacquelot implies also +(_Conformity of Faith with Reason_, p. 318 _et seqq._), as M. Bayle +observes (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 142, p. +796), that the dispositions of the human heart and those of circumstances +acquaint God unerringly with the choice that man shall make. M. Bayle [342] +adds that some Molinists say the same, and refers us to those who are +quoted in the _Suavis Concordia_ of Pierre de S. Joseph, the Feuillant (pp. +579, 580). + +362. Those who have confused this determination with necessity have +fabricated monsters in order to fight them. To avoid a reasonable thing +which they had disguised under a hideous shape, they have fallen into great +absurdities. For fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary necessity, or +at least one different from that in question, they have admitted something +which happens without the existence of any cause or reason for it. This +amounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms, which according to +Epicurus happened without any cause. Cicero, in his book on Divination, saw +clearly that if the cause could produce an effect towards which it was +entirely indifferent there would be a true chance, a genuine luck, an +actual fortuitous case, that is, one which would be so not merely in +relation to us and our ignorance, according to which one may say: + + _Sed Te_ + _Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, caeloque locamus,_ + +but even in relation to God and to the nature of things. Consequently it +would be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the past. +He adds fittingly in the same passage: 'Qui potest provideri, quicquam +futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur futurum sit?' +and soon after: 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae, quam +fortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat quid casu et +fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet: sin certe eveniet, +nulla fortuna est.' If the future is certain, there is no such thing as +luck. But he wrongly adds: 'Est autum fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum +nulla praesensio est.' There is luck, therefore future events cannot be +foreseen. He ought rather to have concluded that, events being +predetermined and foreseen, there is no luck. But he was then speaking +against the Stoics, in the character of an Academician. + +363. The Stoics already derived from the decrees of God the prevision of +events. For, as Cicero says in the same book: 'Sequitur porro nihil Deos +ignorare, quod omnia ab iis sint constituta.' And, according to my system, +God, having seen the possible world that he desired to create, foresaw[343] +everything therein. Thus one may say that the _divine knowledge of vision +differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence_ only in that it adds to +the latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to choose this sequence +of things which simple intelligence had already presented, but only as +possible; and this decree now makes the present universe. + +364. Thus the Socinians cannot be excused for denying to God the certain +knowledge of future events, and above all of the future resolves of a free +creature. For even though they had supposed that there is a freedom of +complete indifference, so that the will can choose without cause, and that +thus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is a great +absurdity), they ought always to take into account that God was able to +foresee this event in the idea of the possible world that he resolved to +create. But the idea which they have of God is unworthy of the Author of +things, and is not commensurate with the skill and wit which the writers of +this party often display in certain particular discussions. The author of +the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ was not altogether mistaken +in saying that the God of the Socinians would be ignorant and powerless, +like the God of Epicurus, every day confounded by events and living from +one day to the next, if he only knows by conjecture what the will of men is +to be. + +365. The whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong idea of +contingency and of freedom, which was thought to have need of a complete +indifference or equipoise, an imaginary thing, of which neither a notion +nor an example exists, nor ever can exist. Apparently M. Descartes had been +imbued with the idea in his youth, at the College of la Fleche. That caused +him to say (part I of his _Principles_, art. 41): 'Our thought is finite, +and the knowledge and omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only known +from all eternity everything that is, or that can be, but also has willed +it, is infinite. Thus we have enough intelligence to recognize clearly and +distinctly that this power and this knowledge are in God; but we have not +enough so to comprehend their extent that we can know how they leave the +actions of men entirely free and indeterminate.' The continuation has +already been quoted above. 'Entirely free', that is right; but one spoils +everything by adding 'entirely indeterminate'. One has no need of infinite +knowledge in order to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of God +allow freedom to our actions, since God has foreseen those actions in [344] +his ideas, just as they are, that is, free. Laurentius Valla indeed, in his +_Dialogue against Boethius_ (which I will presently quote in epitome) ably +undertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge, but does not venture to +hope that he can reconcile it with providence. Yet there is no more +difficulty in the one than the other, because the decree to give existence +to this action no more changes its nature than does one's mere +consciousness thereof. But there is no knowledge, however infinite it be, +which can reconcile the knowledge and providence of God with actions of an +indeterminate cause, that is to say, with a chimerical and impossible +being. The actions of the will are determined in two ways, by the +foreknowledge or providence of God, and also by the dispositions of the +particular immediate cause, which lie in the inclinations of the soul. M. +Descartes followed the Thomists on this point; but he wrote with his usual +circumspection, so as not to come into conflict with some other +theologians. + +366. M. Bayle relates (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, +ch. 142, p. 804) that Father Gibieuf of the Oratory published a Latin +treatise on the freedom of God and of the creature, in the year 1639; that +he was met with protests, and was shown a collection of seventy +contradictions taken from the first book of his work; and that, twenty +years after, Father Annat, Confessor to the King of France, reproached him +in his book _De Incoacta Libertate_ (ed. Rome, 1654, in 4to.), for the +silence he still maintained. Who would not think (adds M. Bayle), after the +uproar of the _de Auxiliis_ Congregations, that the Thomists taught things +touching the nature of free will which were entirely opposed to the opinion +of the Jesuits? When, however, one considers the passages that Father Annat +quoted from the works of the Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: _Jansenius a +Thomistis, gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus_, +printed in Paris in the year 1654 in 4to.) one can in reality only see +verbal controversies between the two sects. The grace efficacious of +itself, according to the one side, leaves to free will quite as much power +of resistance as the congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one can +say almost as much of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man, +of a methodical mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two years +at his _Augustinus_. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogma +of free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejects +or adopts freedom of indifference. From his work innumerable passages [345] +are quoted for and against this opinion, as Father Annat has himself shown +in the work that has just been mentioned, _De Incoacta Libertate_. So easy +is it to render this subject obscure, as M. Bayle says at the conclusion of +this discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, it must be admitted that he often +alters the meaning of his terms, and that consequently he does not answer +the question in the main, albeit he often writes with good sense. + +367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity in +terms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas +about them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken, +contentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and the +impossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity and +possibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon this +question, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it +implies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account that +contingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which +contribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also that +one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or +certainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice, +presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which +constrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is rid +of the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in the +books of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive the +notion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) one +will easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy Daedalus was the human +mind. That labyrinth has caused infinite confusion, as much with the +ancients as with those of later times, even so far as to lead men into the +absurd error of the Lazy Sophism, which closely resembles fate after the +Turkish fashion. I do not wonder if in reality the Thomists and the +Jesuits, and even the Molinists and the Jansenists, agree together on this +matter more than is supposed. A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist will +content himself with certain determination, without going on to necessity: +and if someone goes so far, the error mayhap will lie only in the word. A +wise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity, +but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations. + +368. These difficulties, however, have greatly impressed M. Bayle, who[346] +was more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them, although he might +perhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit to turn +his mind in that direction. Here is what he says of them in his +_Dictionary_, art. 'Jansenius', lit. G, p. 1626: 'Someone has said that the +subject of Grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom. Perhaps he +would have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the Strait of +Messina, where one is always in danger of striking one reef while +endeavouring to avoid another. + + _Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis_ + _Obsidet._ + +Everything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? If you +answer yes, then you will be told, his fall was not foreseen. If you answer +no, then you will be told, he is not guilty. You may write a hundred +volumes against the one or the other of these conclusions, and yet you will +confess, either that the infallible prevision of a contingent event is a +mystery impossible to conceive, or that the way in which a creature which +acts without freedom sins nevertheless is altogether incomprehensible.' + +369. Either I am greatly mistaken or these two alleged +incomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions. Would to God it +were as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers, and how to avoid +the perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate, the one from not +curing the fever, the other from curing it wrongly. When one asserts that a +free event cannot be foreseen, one is confusing freedom with +indetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise; +and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man from +being guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination or from +certainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows that the +dilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage between the +two perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam sinned freely, and +that God saw him sinning in the possible state of Adam, which became actual +in accordance with the decree of the divine permission. It is true that +Adam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailing +inclinations: but this determination destroys neither contingency nor +freedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which exists in man +does not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning (speaking generally) or, +since he does sin, prevent him from being guilty and deserving [347] +punishment. This is more especially so since the punishment may be of +service to him or others, to contribute towards determining them another +time not to sin. There is besides punitive justice, which goes beyond +compensation and amendment, and wherein also there is nothing liable to be +shaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of the +will. It may be said, on the contrary, that the penalties and rewards would +be to some extent unavailing, and would fail in one of their aims, that of +amendment, if they could not contribute towards determining the will to do +better another time. + +370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only two +courses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul, +and co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; the +other is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear to +do so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the other is that +of the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the Geneva +Confession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they were not +Jansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that where +freedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other hand, the +Molinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach Jansenism. Thus +the one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with people +who were considered heretics, and the other side not wishing to admit that +they were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were always +considered orthodox, have both performed a hundred feats of contortion, +etc.' + +371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude a +third course, according to which the determination of the soul does not +come solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul, +but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations which +mingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or weakening them. +Now all the internal and external causes taken together bring it about that +the soul is determined certainly, but not of necessity: for no +contradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determined +differently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, but not +possible for it to be compelled by necessity. I will not venture upon a +discussion of the difference existing between the Jansenists and the +Reformed on this matter. They are not perhaps always fully in accord [348] +with themselves as regards things, or as regards expressions, on a matter +where one often loses one's way in bewildering subtleties. Father Theophile +Raynaud, in his book entitled _Calvinismus Religio Bestiarum_, wished to +strike at the Dominicans, without naming them. On the other hand, those who +professed to be followers of St. Augustine reproached the Molinists with +Pelagianism or at the least semi-Pelagianism. Things were carried to excess +at times by both sides, whether in their defence of a vague indifference +and the granting of too much to man, or in their teaching _determinationem +ad unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam_, that +is to say, a determination to evil in the non-regenerate, as if they did +nothing but sin. After all, I think one must not reproach any but the +adherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency; +for they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happen +by a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material and +subjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God of +intelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of +necessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equally +zealous in refuting an unendurable necessity. Although those who follow the +Synod of Dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to be +exempt from constraint, it seems that the necessity they leave in it is +only hypothetical, or rather that which is more appropriately termed +certainty and infallibility. Thus it results that very often the +difficulties only lie in the terms. I say as much with regard to the +Jansenists, although I do not wish to make excuse for those people in +everything. + +372. With the Hebrew Cabalists, _Malcuth_ or the Kingdom, the last of the +Sephiroth, signified that God controls everything irresistibly, but gently +and without violence, so that man thinks he is following his own will while +he carries out God's. They said that Adam's sin had been _truncatio Malcuth +a caeteris plantis_, that is to say, that Adam had cut back the last of the +Sephiroth, by making a dominion for himself within God's dominion, and by +assuming for himself a freedom independent of God, but that his fall had +taught him that he could not subsist of himself, and that men must needs be +redeemed by the Messiah. This doctrine may receive a good interpretation. +But Spinoza, who was versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, and +who says (_Tractatus Politicus_, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving of +freedom as they do, establish a dominion within God's dominion, has [349] +gone too far. The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominion +of necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everything +emanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and man's +choice does not exempt him from necessity. He adds that men, in order to +establish what is termed _Imperium in Imperio_, supposed that their soul +was a direct creation of God, something which could not be produced by +natural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination, +a state of things contrary to experience. Spinoza is right in opposing an +absolute power of determination, that is, one without any grounds; it does +not belong even to God. But he is wrong in thinking that a soul, that a +simple substance, can be produced naturally. It seems, indeed, that the +soul to him was only a transient modification; and when he pretends to make +it lasting, and even perpetual, he substitutes for it the idea of the body, +which is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing. + +373. The story M. Bayle relates of Johan Bredenburg, a citizen of Rotterdam +(_Dictionary_, art. 'Spinoza', lit. H, p. 2774) is curious. He published a +book against Spinoza, entitled: _Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-politici, +una cum demonstratione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum, +cujus effati contrario praedictus Tractatus unice innititur_. One was +surprised to see that a man who did not follow the profession of letters, +and who had but slight education (having written his book in Flemish, and +had it translated into Latin), had been able to penetrate with such +subtlety all the principles of Spinoza, and succeed in overthrowing them, +after having reduced them by a candid analysis to a state wherein they +could appear in their full force. I have been told (adds M. Bayle) that +this writer after copious reflexion upon his answer, and upon the principle +of his opponent, finally found that this principle could be reduced to the +form of a demonstration. He undertook therefore to prove that there is no +cause of all things other than a nature which exists necessarily, and which +acts according to an immutable, inevitable and irrevocable necessity. He +examined the whole system of the geometricians, and after having +constructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginable +angle, he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to discover +any means of destroying it, or even of weakening it. That caused him real +distress: he groaned over it and begged the most talented of his [350] +friends to help him in searching out the defects of this demonstration. For +all that, he was not well pleased that copies of the book were made. Franz +Cuper, a Socinian (who had written _Arcana Atheismi Revelata_ against +Spinoza, Rotterdam, 1676, in 4to.), having obtained a copy, published it +just as it was, that is, in Flemish, with some reflexions, and accused the +author of being an atheist. The accused made his defence in the same +tongue. Orobio, a very able Jewish physician (that one who was refuted by +M. Limbourg, and who replied, so I have heard say, in a work posthumously +circulated, but unpublished), brought out a book opposing Bredenburg's +demonstration, entitled: _Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatae Veritatis +Divinae ac Naturalis, adversus J.B. principia, Amsterdam_, 1684. M. Aubert +de Verse also wrote in opposition to him the same year under the name of +Latinus Serbattus Sartensis. Bredenburg protested that he was convinced of +free will and of religion, and that he wished he might be shown a +possibility of refuting his own demonstration. + +374. I would desire to see this alleged demonstration, and to know whether +it tended to prove that primitive Nature, which produces all, acts without +choice and without knowledge. In this case, I admit that his proof was +Spinozistic and dangerous. But if he meant perhaps that the divine nature +is determined toward that which it produces, by its choice and through the +motive of the best, there was no need for him to grieve about this +so-called immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity. It is only moral, +it is a happy necessity; and instead of destroying religion it shows divine +perfection to the best advantage. + +375. I take this opportunity to add that M. Bayle quotes (p. 2773) the +opinion of those who believe that the book entitled _Lucii Antistii +Constantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber Singularis_, published in 1665, +is by Spinoza. But I have reason for doubting this, despite that M. +Colerus, who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of that +famous Jew, is also of that opinion. The initial letters L.A.C. lead me to +believe that the author of this book was M. de la Cour or Van den Hoof, +famous for works on the _Interest of Holland, Political Equipoise_, and +numerous other books that he published (some of them under the signature +V.D.H.) attacking the power of the Governor of Holland, which was at that +time considered a danger to the Republic; for the memory of Prince William +the Second's attempt upon the city of Amsterdam was still quite fresh.[351] +Most of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son, +who was then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the +Lowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other +sects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace +against them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus +very natural that M. de la Cour should publish this book. It is true that +people seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further party +interests. I will say in passing that a French version of the _Interest of +Holland_ by M. de la Cour has just been published, under the deceptive +title of _Memoires de M. le Grand-Pensionnaire de Witt_; as if the thoughts +of a private individual, who was, to be sure, of de Witt's party, and a man +of talent, but who had not enough acquaintance with public affairs or +enough ability to write as that great Minister of State might have written, +could pass for the production of one of the first men of his time. + +376. I saw M. de la Cour as well as Spinoza on my return from France by way +of England and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good anecdotes on the +affairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that Spinoza studied Latin +under a physician named Franz van den Ende. He tells at the same time, on +the authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who refers to it in the preface to the +second edition of the book by his late father, _De Tribus Impostoribus, +Herberto L. B. de Cherbury, Hobbio et Spinoza_) that a girl instructed +Spinoza in Latin, and that she afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was her +pupil at the same time as Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that this +young lady was a daughter of M. van den Ende, and that she assisted her +father in the work of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A. +Finibus, later went to Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in the +Faubourg St. Antoine. He was considered excellent as an instructor, and he +told me, when I called upon him there, that he would wager that his +audiences would always pay attention to his words. He had with him as well +at that time a young girl who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometrical +demonstrations. He had insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces, +and the Jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappeared +shortly afterwards, having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan's +conspiracy. + +377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor +the providence of God can impair either his justice or his goodness, [352] +or our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from God's +co-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to concern more +closely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, and our +freedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. Bayle has +brought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will endeavour to throw +light upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then I shall be in a +position to conclude this work. I have already proved that the co-operation +of God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our +actions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is limited +and imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations which +are originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of the +creature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arises +in the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has +within itself, and which are diversified by this change. + +378. I have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil is a +consequence of privation, and I think that I have explained that +intelligibly enough. St. Augustine has already put forward this idea, and +St. Basil said something of the same kind in his _Hexaemeron_, Homil. 2, +'that vice is not a living and animate substance, but an affection of the +soul contrary to virtue, which arises from one's abandoning the good; and +there is therefore no need to look for an original evil'. M. Bayle, quoting +this passage in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Paulicians', lit. D, p. 2325) +commends a remark by Herr Pfanner (whom he calls a German theologian, but +he is a jurist by profession, Counsellor to the Dukes of Saxony), who +censures St. Basil for not being willing to admit that God is the author of +physical evil. Doubtless God is its author, when the moral evil is assumed +to be already in existence; but speaking generally, one might assert that +God permitted physical evil by implication, in permitting moral evil which +is its source. It appears that the Stoics knew also how slender is the +entity of evil. These words of Epictetus are an indication: 'Sicut +aberrandi causa meta non ponitur, sic nec natura mali in mundo existit.' + +379. There was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of evil, +as St. Basil aptly observes. Nor is it necessary either to seek the origin +of evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos before God +laid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. It was an +opinion which Plato introduced into his _Timaeus_. Aristotle found fault +with him for that (in his third book on Heaven, ch. 2) because, [353] +according to this doctrine, disorder would be original and natural, and +order would have been introduced against nature. This Anaxagoras avoided by +making matter remain at rest until it was stirred by God; and Aristotle in +the same passage commends him for it. According to Plutarch (_De Iside et +Osiride_, and _Tr. de Animae Procreatione ex Timaeo_) Plato recognized in +matter a certain maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it was +an actual blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believed +that matter was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in the +first book of the Physiology of the Stoics. + +380. Aristotle was right in rejecting chaos: but it is not always easy to +disentangle the conceptions of Plato, and such a task would be still less +easy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost. Kepler, one +of the most excellent of modern mathematicians, recognized a species of +imperfection in matter, even when there is no irregular motion: he calls it +its 'natural inertia', which gives it a resistance to motion, whereby a +greater mass receives less speed from one and the same force. There is +soundness in this observation, and I have used it to advantage in this +work, in order to have a comparison such as should illustrate how the +original imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to the action of the +Creator, which tends towards good. But as matter is itself of God's +creation, it only furnishes a comparison and an example, and cannot be the +very source of evil and of imperfection. I have already shown that this +source lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles, for it must be eternal, +and matter is not so. Now since God made all positive reality that is not +eternal, he would have made the source of evil, if that did not rather lie +in the possibility of things or forms, that which alone God did not make, +since he is not the author of his own understanding. + +381. Yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms, +anterior to the acts of God's will, it is nevertheless true that God +co-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these forms +into matter: and this is what causes the difficulty in question here. +Durand de Saint-Pourcain, Cardinal Aureolus, Nicolas Taurel, Father Louis +de Dole, M. Bernier and some others, speaking of this co-operation, would +have it only general, for fear of impairing the freedom of man and the +holiness of God. They seem to maintain that God, having given to creatures +the power to act, contents himself with conserving this power. On the [354] +other hand, M. Bayle, according to some modern writers, carries the +cooperation of God too far: he seems to fear lest the creature be not +sufficiently dependent upon God. He goes so far as to deny action to +creatures; he does not even acknowledge any real distinction between +accident and substance. + +382. He places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of the +Schoolmen, that conservation is a continued creation. The conclusion to be +drawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never exists, +that it is ever newborn and ever dying, like time, movement and other +transient beings. Plato believed this of material and tangible things, +saying that they are in a perpetual flux, _semper fluunt, nunquam sunt_. +But of immaterial substances he judged quite differently, regarding them +alone as real: nor was he in that altogether mistaken. Yet continued +creation applies to all creatures without distinction. Sundry good +philosophers have been opposed to this dogma, and M. Bayle tells that David +de Rodon, a philosopher renowned among those of the French who have adhered +to Geneva, deliberately refuted it. The Arminians also do not approve of +it; they are not much in favour of these metaphysical subtleties. I will +say nothing of the Socinians, who relish them even less. + +383. For a proper enquiry as to _whether conservation is a continued +creation,_ it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this dogma +is founded. The Cartesians, after the example of their master, employ in +order to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough. They say that +'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one another, it +does not follow that because I am at this moment I shall exist at the +moment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me being for this +moment does not also give it to me for the instant following.' The author +of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ has made use of this +argument, and M. Bayle (perhaps the author of this same _Reflexion_) quotes +it (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 141, p. 771). +One may answer that in fact it does not follow _of necessity_ that, because +I am, I shall be; but this follows _naturally_, nevertheless, that is, of +itself, _per se_, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that can be +drawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement endures +naturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, because the +reason which makes it cease at this instant, if it is no new reason, [355] +would have already made it cease sooner. + +384. The late Herr Erhard Weigel, a celebrated mathematician and +philosopher at Jena, well known for his _Analysis Euclidea_, his +mathematical philosophy, some neat mechanical inventions, and finally the +trouble he took to induce the Protestant princes of the Empire to undertake +the last reform of the Almanac, whose success, notwithstanding, he did not +witness; Herr Weigel, I say, communicated to his friends a certain +demonstration of the existence of God, which indeed amounted to this idea +of continued creation. As he was wont to draw parallels between reckoning +and reasoning--witness his Arithmetical Ethics (_rechenschaftliche +Sittenlehre_)--he said that the foundation of the demonstration was this +beginning of the Pythagorean Table, _once one is one_. These repeated +unities were the moments of the existence of things, each one of them +depending upon God, who resuscitates, as it were, all things outside +himself at each moment: falling away as they do at each moment, they must +ever have one who shall resuscitate them, and that cannot be any other than +God. But there would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be called +a demonstration. It would be necessary to prove that the creature always +emerges from nothingness and relapses thither forthwith. In particular it +must be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by its +nature belongs to the necessary being alone. The difficulties on the +composition of the _continuum_ enter also into this matter. This dogma +appears to resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments and +points as mere modalities of the _continuum_, that is, as extremities of +the parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. But +this is not the place for entering into that labyrinth. + +385. What can be said for certain on the present subject is that the +creature depends continually upon divine operation, and that it depends +upon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first +begins. This dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if God +did not continue to act; in short, that this action of God is free. For if +it were a necessary emanation, like that of the properties of the circle, +which issue from its essence, it must then be said that God in the +beginning produced the creature by necessity; or else it must be shown how, +in creating it once, he imposed upon himself the necessity of conserving +it. Now there is no reason why this conserving action should not be [356] +called production, and even creation, if one will: for the dependence being +as great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic designation of being +new or not does not change the nature of that action. + +386. Let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a continued +creation, and let us see what M. Bayle seems to infer thence (p. 771) after +the author of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_, in opposition +to M. Jurieu. 'It seems to me', this writer says, 'that one must conclude +that God does all, and that in all creation there are no first or second or +even occasional causes, as can be easily proved. At this moment when I +speak, I am such as I am, with all my circumstances, with such thought, +such action, whether I sit or stand, that if God creates me in this moment +such as I am, as one must of necessity say in this system, he creates me +with such thought, such action, such movement and such determination. One +cannot say that God creates me in the first place, and that once I am +created he produces with me my movements and my determinations. That is +indefensible for two reasons. The first is, that when God creates me or +conserves me at this instant, he does not conserve me as a being without +form, like a species, or another of the Universals of Logic. I am an +individual; he creates me and conserves me as such, and as being all that I +am in this instant, with all my attendant circumstances. The second reason +is that if God creates me in this instant, and one says that afterwards he +produces with me my actions, it will be necessary to imagine another +instant for action: for before acting one must exist. Now that would be two +instants where we only assume one. It is therefore certain in this +hypothesis that creatures have neither more connexion nor more relation +with their actions than they had with their production at the first moment +of the first creation.' The author of this _Reflexion_ draws thence very +harsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself; and he testifies at the +end that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach those +who approve this system how to extricate themselves from these frightful +absurdities. + +387. M. Bayle carries this still further. 'You know', he says (p. 775), +'that it is demonstrated in the Scholastic writings' (he cites Arriaga, +_Disp_. 9, Phys., sect. 6 et praesertim, sub-sect. 3) 'that the creature +cannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its conservation: +for if it were, it would exist before existing, which is [357] +contradictory. You know that the argument proceeds like this: that which +conserves itself acts; now that which acts exists, and nothing can act +before it has attained complete existence; therefore, if a creature +conserved itself, it would act before being. This argument is not founded +upon probabilities, but upon the first principles of Metaphysics, _non +entis nulla sunt accidentia, operari sequitur esse_, axioms as clear as +daylight. Let us go further. If creatures co-operated with God (here is +meant an active cooperation, and not co-operation by a passive instrument) +to conserve themselves they would act before being: that has been +demonstrated. Now if they co-operated with God for the production of any +other thing, they would also act before being; it is therefore as +impossible for them to co-operate with God for the production of any other +thing (such as local movement, an affirmation, volition, entities actually +distinct from their substance, so it is asserted) as for their own +conservation. Since their conservation is a continued creation, and since +all human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operate +with God at the first moment of their existence, either to produce +themselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would be to act +before being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other Schoolmen teach +that if the angels had sinned at the first moment of their creation God +would be the author of the sin: see the Feuillant Pierre de St. Joseph, p. +318, _et seqq_., of the _Suavis Concordia Humanae Libertatis_; it is a sign +that they acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act in +anything whatsoever), it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operate +with God in any one of the subsequent moments, either to produce themselves +or to produce any other thing. If they could co-operate therein at the +second moment of their existence, nothing would prevent their being able to +cooperate at the first moment.' + +388. This is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments. Let us +assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us grant +also that the instant excludes all priority of time, being indivisible; but +let us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature, or what is +called anteriority _in signo rationis,_ and that this is sufficient. The +production, or action whereby God produces, is anterior by nature to the +existence of the creature that is produced; the creature taken in itself, +with its nature and its necessary properties, is anterior to its accidental +affections and to its actions; and yet all these things are in being [358] +in the same moment. God produces the creature in conformity with the +exigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom; +and the creature operates in conformity with that nature which God conveys +to it in creating it always. The limitations and imperfections arise +therein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God's +production; this is the consequence of the original imperfection of +creatures. Vice and crime, on the other hand, arise there through the free +inward operation of the creature, in so far as this can occur within the +instant, repetition afterwards rendering it discernible. + +389. This anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy: thus one +says that the decrees of God have an order among themselves. When one +ascribes to God (and rightly so) understanding of the arguments and +conclusions of creatures, in such sort that all their demonstrations and +syllogisms are known to him, and are found in him in a transcendent way, +one sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order; but +there is no order of time or interval, to cause him to advance in knowledge +and pass from the premisses to the conclusion. + +390. I find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which these +reflexions fail to satisfy. When God produces the thing he produces it as +an individual and not as a universal of logic (I admit); but he produces +its essence before its accidents, its nature before its operations, +following the priority of their nature, and _in signo anteriore rationis_. +Thus one sees how the creature can be the true cause of the sin, while +conservation by God does not prevent the sin; God disposes in accordance +with the preceding state of the same creature, in order to follow the laws +of his wisdom notwithstanding the sin, which in the first place will be +produced by the creature. But it is true that God would not in the +beginning have created the soul in a state wherein it would have sinned +from the first moment, as the Schoolmen have justly observed: for there is +nothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have induced him so to do. + +391. This law of wisdom brings it about also that God reproduces the same +substance, the same soul. Such was the answer that could have been given by +the Abbe whom M. Bayle introduces in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Pyrrhon.' lit. +B, p. 2432). This wisdom effects the connexion of things. I concede +therefore that the creature does not co-operate with God to conserve [359] +himself (in the sense in which I have just explained conservation). But I +see nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with God for the +production of any other thing: and especially might this concern its inward +operation, as in the case of a thought or a volition, things really +distinct from the substance. + +392. But there I am once more at grips with M. Bayle. He maintains that +there are no such accidents distinct from the substance. 'The reasons', he +says, 'which our modern philosophers have employed to demonstrate that the +accidents are not beings in reality distinct from the substance are not +mere difficulties; they are arguments which overwhelm one, and which cannot +be refuted. Take the trouble', he adds, 'to look for them in the writings +of Father Maignan, or Father Malebranche or M. Calli' (Professor of +Philosophy at Caen) 'or in the _Accidentia profligata_ of Father Saguens, +disciple of Father Maignan, the extract from which is to be found in the +_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, June 1702. Or if you wish one +author only to suffice you, choose Dom Francois Lami, a Benedictine monk, +and one of the strongest Cartesians to be found in France. You will find +among his _Philosophical Letters_, printed at Trevoux in 1703, that one +wherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates "that God is the sole +true cause of all that which is real." I would wish to see all these books; +and as for this last proposition, it may be true in a very good sense: God +is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of +perfections. _Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae._ But when one +comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say +that the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is +limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause. + +393. It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances with +accidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall into +Spinozism, which is an exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not act +does not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinct +from the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, like +movement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the +same (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if +it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why +shall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and [360] +that creatures are only accidents or modifications? Hitherto it has been +supposed that the substance remains, and that the accidents change; and I +think one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine, for the arguments +I remember having read do not prove the contrary, and prove more than is +needed. + +394. 'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from the +so-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and +their accidents is that creatures, if they produce the accidents, would +possess a power of creation and annihilation. Accordingly one could not +perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real +beings, and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them. +Merely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as many +accidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue, and one +destroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats, which +lose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc.' This argument is only a +kind of bugbear. What harm would be done, supposing that an infinity of +movements, an infinity of figures spring up and disappear at every moment +in the universe, and even in each part of the universe? It can be +demonstrated, moreover, that that must be so. + +395. As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that +one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a +square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of +the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a +few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by +changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of +modifications has never been called _creation_, and it is an abuse of terms +to scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the +substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits. + +396. As for the souls or substantial forms, M. Bayle is right in adding: +'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit substantial +forms than the objection which is made that they could not be produced save +by an actual creation, and that the Schoolmen are pitiable in their +endeavours to answer this.' But there is nothing more convenient for me and +for my system than this same objection. For I maintain that all the Souls, +Entelechies or primitive forces, substantial forms, simple substances, or +Monads, whatever name one may apply to them, can neither spring up [361] +naturally nor perish. And the qualities or derivative forces, or what are +called accidental forms, I take to be modifications of the primitive +Entelechy, even as shapes are modifications of matter. That is why these +modifications are perpetually changing, while the simple substance remains. + +397. I have shown already (part I, 86 _seqq._) that souls cannot spring up +naturally, or be derived from one another, and that it is necessary that +ours either be created or be pre-existent. I have even pointed out a +certain middle way between a creation and an entire pre-existence. I find +it appropriate to say that the soul preexisting in the seeds from the +beginning of things was only sentient, but that it was elevated to the +superior degree, which is that of reason, when the man to whom this soul +should belong was conceived, and when the organic body, always accompanying +this soul from the beginning, but under many changes, was determined for +forming the human body. I considered also that one might attribute this +elevation of the sentient soul (which makes it reach a more sublime degree +of being, namely reason) to the extraordinary operation of God. +Nevertheless it will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles in +the generating of man, as in that of the other animals. It will be possible +to explain that, if one imagines that in this great number of souls and of +animals, or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds, those +souls alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature contain +the reason that shall appear therein one day, and the organic bodies of +these souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human +shape, while the other small animals or seminal living beings, in which no +such thing is pre-established, are essentially different from them and +possessed only of an inferior nature. This production is a kind of +_traduction_, but more manageable than that kind which is commonly taught: +it does not derive the soul from a soul, but only the animate from an +animate, and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation, which would +cause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt it. + +398. I am, however, of the same opinion as Father Malebranche, that, in +general, creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as might +be supposed, and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of the +dependence of creatures. 'How stupid and ridiculous are the Philosophers!' +(he exclaims, in his _Christian Meditations_, 9, No. 3). 'They assume that +Creation is impossible, because they cannot conceive how God's power [362] +is great enough to make something from nothing. But can they any better +conceive how the power of God is capable of stirring a straw?' He adds, +again with great truth (No. 5), 'If matter were uncreate, God could not +move it or form anything from it. For God cannot move matter, or arrange it +wisely, if he does not know it. Now God cannot know it, if he does not give +it being: he can derive his knowledge only from himself. Nothing can act on +him or enlighten him.' + +399. M. Bayle, not content with saying that we are created continually, +insists also on this other doctrine which he would fain derive thence: that +our soul cannot act. This is the way he speaks on that matter (ch. 141, p. +765): 'He has too much acquaintance with Cartesianism' (it is of an able +opponent he is speaking) 'not to know with what force it has been +maintained in our day that there is no creature capable of producing +motion, and that our soul is a purely passive subject in relation to +sensations and ideas, and feelings of pain and of pleasure, etc. If this +has not been carried as far as the volitions, that is on account of the +existence of revealed truths; otherwise the acts of the will would have +been found as passive as those of the understanding. The same reasons which +prove that our soul does not form our ideas, and does not stir our organs, +would prove also that it cannot form our acts of love and our volitions, +etc' He might add: our vicious actions, our crimes. + +400. The force of these proofs, which he praises, must not be so great as +he thinks, for if it were they would prove too much. They would make God +the author of sin. I admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by a +physical influence; for I think that the body must have been so formed +beforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to the +volitions of the soul, although it be true nevertheless that the soul is +the principle of the operation. But if it be said that the soul does not +produce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of pleasure, +that is something for which I see no reason. In my system every simple +substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause +of all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in a +metaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it produces. Those +who hold a different opinion, and who make God the sole agent, are +needlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will only with +difficulty extricate themselves without offence against religion; [363] +moreover, they unquestionably offend against reason. + +401. Here is, however, the foundation of M. Bayle's argument. He says that +we do not do that of which we know not the way it is done. But it is a +principle which I do not concede to him. Let us listen to his dissertation +(p. 767 seqq.): 'It is an astonishing thing that almost all philosophers +(with the exception of those who expounded Aristotle, and who admitted a +universal intelligence distinct from our soul, and cause of our +perceptions: see in the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Note E of the +article "Averroes") have shared the popular belief that we form our ideas +actively. Yet where is the man who knows not on the one hand that he is in +absolute ignorance as to how ideas are made, and on the other hand, that he +could not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of how to sew? Is the sewing +of two stitches in itself a work more difficult than the painting in one's +mind of a rose, the very first time one's eyes rest upon it, and although +one has never learnt this kind of painting? Does it not appear on the +contrary that this mental portrait is in itself a work more difficult than +tracing on canvas the shape of a flower, a thing we cannot do without +having learnt it? We are all convinced that a key would be of no use to us +for opening a chest if we were ignorant as to how to use the key, and yet +we imagine that our soul is the efficient cause of the movement of our +arms, despite that it knows neither where the nerves are which must be used +for this movement, nor whence to obtain the animal spirits that are to flow +into these nerves. We have the experience every day that the ideas we would +fain recall do not come, and that they appear of themselves when we are no +longer thinking of them. If that does not prevent us from thinking that we +are their efficient cause, what reliance shall one place on the proof of +feeling, which to M. Jacquelot appears so conclusive? Does our authority +over our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions? +If we were to count up carefully, we should find in the course of our life +more velleities than volitions, that is, more evidences of the servitude of +our will than of its dominion. How many times does one and the same man not +experience an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an act of +love for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a fine sonnet +that he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act of approval +of an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak only of inward acts, [364] +expressed by an "I will", such as "I will scorn", "approve", etc.) even if +there were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and he ardently +desired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired with the ambition +to convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his own +domain? + +402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just said +to you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply into +things, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect, +and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That is not +necessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only the passive +subject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to a +true agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be strongly +convinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is just as +little aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) that after a +long experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed than +it was before having willed anything. What is one to conclude from that, +save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions, any more +than of its ideas, and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms to +move? (Take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point here +absolutely, it is only being considered in relation to the principles of +the objection.)' + +403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is there for +one always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are salts, metals, +plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how +that which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must a drop of oil or +of fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of +water? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an end, one must be +aware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because we will to do so, +they form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not in +consequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that of +things. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wonders +of nature are produced by a certain _instinct_ that God has placed there, +that is by virtue of _divine preformation_, which has made these admirable +automata, adapted to produce mechanically such beautiful effects. Even so +it is easy to believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still more +admirable, and that it is through divine preformation that it produces +these beautiful ideas, wherein our will has no part and to which our [365] +art cannot attain. The operation of spiritual automata, that is of souls, +is not mechanical, but it contains in the highest degree all that is +beautiful in mechanism. The movements which are developed in bodies are +concentrated in the soul by representation as in an ideal world, which +expresses the laws of the actual world and their consequences, but with +this difference from the perfect ideal world which is in God, that most of +the perceptions in the other substances are only confused. For it is plain +that every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confused +perceptions or sensations, and that the succession of these perceptions is +regulated by the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner which +always expresses all the nature in the universe; and every present +perception leads to a new perception, just as every movement that it +represents leads to another movement. But it is impossible that the soul +can know clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable number +of small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapes +itself there: to that end it must needs know completely the whole universe +which is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God. + +404. As regards _velleities_, they are only a very imperfect kind of +conditional will. I would, if I could: _liberet si liceret_; and in the +case of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, but to be +able. That explains why there are none in God; and they must not be +confused with antecedent will. I have explained sufficiently elsewhere that +our control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly, and that one +would be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one's own domain to be +able to will without cause, without rhyme or reason. To complain of not +having such a control would be to argue like Pliny, who carps at the power +of God because God cannot destroy himself. + +405. I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) all the +objections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his works. But +remembering Laurentius Valla's _Dialogue on Free Will,_ in opposition to +Boethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it would be opportune +to quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then to continue +from where it ends, keeping up the fiction it initiated; and that less with +the purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to explain myself +towards the end of my dissertation as clearly as I can, and in a way [366] +most likely to be generally understood. This Dialogue of Valla and his +books on Pleasure and the True Good make it plain that he was no less a +philosopher than a humanist. These four books were opposed to the four +books on the _Consolation of Philosophy_ by Boethius, and the Dialogue to +the fifth book. A certain Spaniard named Antonio Glarea requests of him +elucidation on the difficulty of free will, whereof little is known as it +is worthy to be known, for upon it depend justice and injustice, punishment +and reward in this life and in the life to come. Laurentius Valla answers +him that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the +whole world, just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings of +birds. + +406. ANTONIO--I know that you can give me those wings, like another +Daedalus, so that I may emerge from the prison of ignorance, and rise to +the very region of truth, which is the homeland of souls. The books that I +have seen have not satisfied me, not even the famous Boethius, who meets +with general approval. I know not whether he fully understood himself what +he says of God's understanding, and of eternity superior to time; and I ask +for your opinion on his way of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom. +LAURENT--I am fearful of giving offence to many people, if I confute this +great man; yet I will give preference over this fear to the consideration I +have for the entreaties of a friend, provided that you make me a promise. +ANT.--What? LAUR.--It is, that when you have dined with me you do not ask +me to give you supper, that is to say, I desire that you be content with +the answer to the question you have put to me, and do not put a further +question. + +407. ANT.--I promise you. Here is the heart of the difficulty. If God +foresaw the treason of Judas, it was necessary that he should betray, it +was impossible for him not to betray. There is no obligation to do the +impossible. He therefore did not sin, he did not deserve to be punished. +That destroys justice and religion, and the fear of God. LAUR.--God foresaw +sin; but he did not compel man to commit it; sin is voluntary. ANT.--That +will was necessary, since it was foreseen. LAUR.--If my knowledge does not +cause things past or present to exist, neither will my foreknowledge cause +future things to exist. + +408. ANT.--That comparison is deceptive: neither the present nor the past +can be changed, they are already necessary; but the future, movable in +itself, becomes fixed and necessary through foreknowledge. Let us [367] +pretend that a god of the heathen boasts of knowing the future: I will ask +him if he knows which foot I shall put foremost, then I will do the +opposite of that which he shall have foretold. LAUR.--This God knows what +you are about to do. ANT.--How does he know it, since I will do the +opposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what he +thinks? LAUR.--Your supposition is false: God will not answer you; or +again, if he were to answer you, the veneration you would have for him +would make you hasten to do what he had said; his prediction would be to +you an order. But we have changed the question. We are not concerned with +what God will foretell but with what he foresees. Let us therefore return +to foreknowledge, and distinguish between the necessary and the certain. It +is not impossible for what is foreseen not to happen; but it is infallibly +sure that it will happen. I can become a Soldier or Priest, but I shall not +become one. + +409. ANT.--Here I have you firmly held. The philosophers' rule maintains +that all that which is possible can be considered as existing. But if that +which you affirm to be possible, namely an event different from what has +been foreseen, actually happened, God would have been mistaken. LAUR.--The +rules of the philosophers are not oracles for me. This one in particular is +not correct. Two contradictories are often both possible. Can they also +both exist? But, for your further enlightenment, let us pretend that Sextus +Tarquinius, coming to Delphi to consult the Oracle of Apollo, receives the +answer: + + _Exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe._ + A beggared outcast of the city's rage, + Beside a foreign shore cut short thy age. + +The young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O Apollo, and +you proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? Apollo will say to him: Your gift is +pleasing to me, and I will do that which you ask of me, I will tell you +what will happen. I know the future, but I do not bring it about. Go make +your complaint to Jupiter and the Parcae. Sextus would be ridiculous if he +continued thereafter to complain about Apollo. Is not that true? ANT.--He +will say: I thank you, O holy Apollo, for not having repaid me with +silence, for having revealed to me the Truth. But whence comes it that +Jupiter is so cruel towards me, that he prepares so hard a fate for an[368] +innocent man, for a devout worshipper of the Gods? LAUR.--You innocent? +Apollo will say. Know that you will be proud, that you will commit +adulteries, that you will be a traitor to your country. Could Sextus reply: +It is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, by +foreseeing it? ANT.--I admit that he would have taken leave of his senses +if he were to make this reply. LAUR.--Therefore neither can the traitor +Judas complain of God's foreknowledge. And there is the answer to your +question. + +410. ANT.--You have satisfied me beyond my hopes, you have done what +Boethius was not able to do: I shall be beholden to you all my life long. +LAUR.--Yet let us carry our tale a little further. Sextus will say: No, +Apollo, I will not do what you say. ANT.--What! the God will say, do you +mean then that I am a liar? I repeat to you once more, you will do all that +I have just said. LAUR.--Sextus, mayhap, would pray the Gods to alter fate, +to give him a better heart. ANT.--He would receive the answer: + + _Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando_. + +He cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie. But what then will Sextus say? +Will he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? Will he not say? +What? I am then not free? It is not in my power to follow virtue? +LAUR.--Apollo will say to him perhaps: Know, my poor Sextus, that the Gods +make each one as he is. Jupiter made the wolf ravening, the hare timid, the +ass stupid, and the lion courageous. He gave you a soul that is wicked and +irreclaimable; you will act in conformity with your natural disposition, +and Jupiter will treat you as your actions shall deserve; he has sworn it +by the Styx. + +411. ANT.--I confess to you, it seems to me that Apollo in excusing himself +accuses Jupiter more than he accuses Sextus, and Sextus would answer him: +Jupiter therefore condemns in me his own crime; it is he who is the only +guilty one. He could have made me altogether different: but, made as I am, +I must act as he has willed. Why then does he punish me? Could I have +resisted his will? LAUR.--I confess that I am brought to a pause here as +you are. I have made the Gods appear on the scene, Apollo and Jupiter, to +make you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence. I have +shown that Apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom; but I cannot +satisfy you on the decrees of Jupiter's will, that is to say, on the orders +of providence. ANT.--You have dragged me out of one abyss, and you [369] +plunge me back into another and greater abyss. LAUR.--Remember our +contract: I have given you dinner, and you ask me to give you supper also. + +412. ANT.--Now I discover your cunning: You have caught me, this is not an +honest contract. LAUR.--What would you have me do? I have given you wine +and meats from my home produce, such as my small estate can provide; as for +nectar and ambrosia, you will ask the Gods for them: that divine nurture is +not found among men. Let us hearken to St. Paul, that chosen vessel who was +carried even to the third heaven, who heard there unutterable words: he +will answer you with the comparison of the potter, with the +incomprehensibility of the ways of God, and wonder at the depth of his +wisdom. Nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask why God +foresees the thing, for that is understood, it is because it will be: but +one asks why he ordains thus, why he hardens such an one, why he has +compassion on another. We do not know the reasons which he may have for +this; but _since he is very good and very wise that is enough to make us +deem that his reasons are good_. As he is just also, it follows that his +decrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom. Some men have sought +some reason therein. They have said that we are made from a corrupt and +impure mass, indeed of mud. But Adam and the Angels were made of silver and +gold, and they sinned notwithstanding. One sometimes becomes hardened again +after regeneration. We must therefore seek another cause for evil, and I +doubt whether even the Angels are aware of it; yet they cease not to be +happy and to praise God. Boethius hearkened more to the answer of +philosophy than to that of St. Paul; that was the cause of his failure. Let +us believe in Jesus Christ, he is the virtue and the wisdom of God: he +teaches us that God willeth the salvation of all, that he willeth not the +death of the sinner. Let us therefore put our trust in the divine mercy, +and let us not by our vanity and our malice disqualify ourselves to receive +it. + +413. This dialogue of Valla's is excellent, even though one must take +exception to some points in it: but its chief defect is that it cuts the +knot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter, +making him almost the author of sin. Let us therefore carry the little +fable still further. Sextus, quitting Apollo and Delphi, seeks out Jupiter +at Dodona. He makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his complaints. Why +have you condemned me, O great God, to be wicked and unhappy? Change [370] +my lot and my heart, or acknowledge your error. Jupiter answers him: If you +will renounce Rome, the Parcae shall spin for you different fates, you +shall become wise, you shall be happy. SEXTUS--Why must I renounce the hope +of a crown? Can I not come to be a good king? JUPITER--No, Sextus; I know +better what is needful for you. If you go to Rome, you are lost. Sextus, +not being able to resolve upon so great a sacrifice, went forth from the +temple, and abandoned himself to his fate. Theodorus, the High Priest, who +had been present at the dialogue between God and Sextus, addressed these +words to Jupiter: Your wisdom is to be revered, O great Ruler of the Gods. +You have convinced this man of his error; he must henceforth impute his +unhappiness to his evil will; he has not a word to say. But your faithful +worshippers are astonished; they would fain wonder at your goodness as well +as at your greatness: it rested with you to give him a different will. +JUPITER--Go to my daughter Pallas, she will inform you what I was bound to +do. + +414. Theodorus journeyed to Athens: he was bidden to lie down to sleep in +the temple of the Goddess. Dreaming, he found himself transported into an +unknown country. There stood a palace of unimaginable splendour and +prodigious size. The Goddess Pallas appeared at the gate, surrounded by +rays of dazzling majesty. + + _Qualisque videri_ + _Coelicolis et quanta solet._ + +She touched the face of Theodorus with an olive-branch, which she was +holding in her hand. And lo! he had become able to confront the divine +radiancy of the daughter of Jupiter, and of all that she should show him. +Jupiter who loves you (she said to him) has commended you to me to be +instructed. You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch and +ward. Here are representations not only of that which happens but also of +all that which is possible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before the +beginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into worlds, +and chose the best of all. He comes sometimes to visit these places, to +enjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing his own choice, +which cannot fail to please him. I have only to speak, and we shall see a +whole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be represented +anything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also what +would happen if any particular possibility should attain unto [371] +existence. And whenever the conditions are not determinate enough, there +will be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish, +which will answer differently the same question, in as many ways as +possible. You learnt geometry in your youth, like all well-instructed +Greeks. You know therefore that when the conditions of a required point do +not sufficiently determine it, and there is an infinite number of them, +they all fall into what the geometricians call a locus, and this locus at +least (which is often a line) will be determinate. Thus you can picture to +yourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each and +every one the case that is in question, and shall vary its circumstances +and its consequences. But if you put a case that differs from the actual +world only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain one +of those determinate worlds will answer you. These worlds are all here, +that is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not +absolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he +carries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses +resembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus, +but not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all +that shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy and +noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus, +indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms. + +415. Thereupon the Goddess led Theodorus into one of the halls of the +palace: when he was within, it was no longer a hall, it was a world, + + _Solemque suum, sua sidera norat_. + +At the command of Pallas there came within view Dodona with the temple of +Jupiter, and Sextus issuing thence; he could be heard saying that he would +obey the God. And lo! he goes to a city lying between two seas, resembling +Corinth. He buys there a small garden; cultivating it, he finds a treasure; +he becomes a rich man, enjoying affection and esteem; he dies at a great +age, beloved of the whole city. Theodorus saw the whole life of Sextus as +at one glance, and as in a stage presentation. There was a great volume of +writings in this hall: Theodorus could not refrain from asking what that +meant. It is the history of this world which we are now visiting, the +Goddess told him; it is the book of its fates. You have seen a number [372] +on the forehead of Sextus. Look in this book for the place which it +indicates. Theodorus looked for it, and found there the history of Sextus +in a form more ample than the outline he had seen. Put your finger on any +line you please, Pallas said to him, and you will see represented actually +in all its detail that which the line broadly indicates. He obeyed, and he +saw coming into view all the characteristics of a portion of the life of +that Sextus. They passed into another hall, and lo! another world, another +Sextus. who, issuing from the temple, and having resolved to obey Jupiter, +goes to Thrace. There he marries the daughter of the king, who had no other +children; he succeeds him, and he is adored by his subjects. They went into +other rooms, and always they saw new scenes. + +416. The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as one +mounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finally +they reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was the +most beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could not +see its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing to +infinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endless +number of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not have +determined to create any; but there is not any one which has not also less +perfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending to +infinity. Theodorus, entering this highest hall, became entranced in +ecstasy; he had to receive succour from the Goddess, a drop of a divine +liquid placed on his tongue restored him; he was beside himself for joy. We +are in the real true world (said the Goddess) and you are at the source of +happiness. Behold what Jupiter makes ready for you, if you continue to +serve him faithfully. Here is Sextus as he is, and as he will be in +reality. He issues from the temple in a rage, he scorns the counsel of the +Gods. You see him going to Rome, bringing confusion everywhere, violating +the wife of his friend. There he is driven out with his father, beaten, +unhappy. If Jupiter had placed here a Sextus happy at Corinth or King in +Thrace, it would be no longer this world. And nevertheless he could not +have failed to choose this world, which surpasses in perfection all the +others, and which forms the apex of the pyramid. Else would Jupiter have +renounced his wisdom, he would have banished me, me his daughter. You see +that my father did not make Sextus wicked; he was so from all [373] +eternity, he was so always and freely. My father only granted him the +existence which his wisdom could not refuse to the world where he is +included: he made him pass from the region of the possible to that of the +actual beings. The crime of Sextus serves for great things: it renders Rome +free; thence will arise a great empire, which will show noble examples to +mankind. But that is nothing in comparison with the worth of this whole +world, at whose beauty you will marvel, when, after a happy passage from +this mortal state to another and better one, the Gods shall have fitted you +to know it. + +417. At this moment Theodorus wakes up, he gives thanks to the Goddess, he +owns the justice of Jupiter. His spirit pervaded by what he has seen and +heard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the zeal of a true +servant of his God, and with all the joy whereof a mortal is capable. It +seems to me that this continuation of the tale may elucidate the difficulty +which Valla did not wish to treat. If Apollo has represented aright God's +knowledge of vision (that which concerns beings in existence), I hope that +Pallas will have not discreditably filled the role of what is called +knowledge of simple intelligence (that which embraces all that is +possible), wherein at last the source of things must be sought. + + [377] + * * * * * + +APPENDICES + +SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS + + * * * * * + +Some persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition. I have +the more readily deferred to their opinion, because of the opportunity +thereby gained for meeting certain difficulties, and for making +observations on certain matters which were not treated in sufficient detail +in the work itself. + +OBJECTION I + +Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or +knowledge, or goodness. + +God did not choose the best course in creating this world. + +Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness. + +ANSWER + +I deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this syllogism, and +the opponent proves it by this + +PROSYLLOGISM + +Whoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been made +without any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose the +best course. + +God made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could have +been made without any evil or which need not have been made at all. + + [378] +Therefore God did not choose the best course. + +ANSWER + +I admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that there is +evil in this world which God has made, and that it would have been possible +to make a world without evil or even not to create any world, since its +creation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, that is, +the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, and I might content +myself with asking for its proof. In order, however, to give a clearer +exposition of the matter, I would justify this denial by pointing out that +the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil, +since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good. +For example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a +slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. I +have proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out, through +instances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the +part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. I have followed +therein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times that God +permitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater +good; and Thomas Aquinas says (in libr. 2, _Sent. Dist._ 32, qu. 1, art. 1) +that the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I have +shown that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed _felix culpa_, a +fortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the +incarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something more +noble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings. +For the better understanding of the matter I added, following the example +of many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the general +good for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity to +exercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil: +for God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that in order +to prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It will +therefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evil +may be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still further in +the work, and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better than +every other possible universe. + + [379] +OBJECTION II + +If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is more +evil than good in all God's work. + +Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures. + +Therefore there is more evil than good in all God's work. + +ANSWER + +I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for the +major, I do not admit it because this supposed inference from the part to +the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, assumes tacitly and +without proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be compared or taken +into account with those that have reason. But why might not the surplus of +good in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world compensate for +and even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in rational creatures? It +is true that the value of the latter is greater; but by way of compensation +the others are incomparably greater in number; and it may be that the +proportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality. + +The minor also I cannot admit, namely, that there is more evil than good in +intelligent creatures. One need not even agree that there is more evil than +good in the human kind. For it is possible, and even a very reasonable +thing, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be incomparably +greater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and that here the +excellence of the total good in the smaller number may exceed the total +evil which is in the greater number. The blessed draw near to divinity +through a divine Mediator, so far as can belong to these created beings, +and make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make in +evil, even though they should approach as nearly as may be the nature of +demons. God is infinite, and the Devil is finite; good can and does go on +_ad infinitum_, whereas evil has its bounds. It may be therefore, and it is +probable, that there happens in the comparison between the blessed and the +damned the opposite of what I said could happen in the comparison between +the happy and the unhappy, namely that in the latter the proportion of +degrees surpasses that of numbers, while in the comparison between +intelligent and non-intelligent the proportion of numbers is greater than +that of values. One is justified in assuming that a thing may be so as long +as one does not prove that it is impossible, and indeed what is here [380] +put forward goes beyond assumption. + +But secondly, even should one admit that there is more evil than good in +the human kind, one still has every reason for not admitting that there is +more evil than good in all intelligent creatures. For there is an +inconceivable number of Spirits, and perhaps of other rational creatures +besides: and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole City of God, +composed as much of Spirits as of rational animals without number and of +endless different kinds, the evil exceeds the good. Although one need not, +in order to answer an objection, prove that a thing is, when its mere +possibility suffices, I have nevertheless shown in this present work that +it is a result of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universe +that the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all states or +governments possible, and that in consequence what little evil there is +should be required to provide the full measure of the vast good existing +there. + +OBJECTION III + +If it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to punish. + +Now it is always impossible not to sin, or rather all sin is necessary. + +Therefore it is always unjust to punish. + +The minor of this is proved as follows. + +FIRST PROSYLLOGISM + +Everything predetermined is necessary. + +Every event is predetermined. + +Therefore every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary. + +Again this second minor is proved thus. + +SECOND PROSYLLOGISM + +That which is future, that which is foreseen, that which is involved in +causes is predetermined. + +Every event is of this kind. + +Therefore every event is predetermined. + +ANSWER + +I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, which +is the minor of the first; but I shall deny the major of the first [381] +prosyllogism, namely that everything predetermined is necessary; taking +'necessity', say the necessity to sin, or the impossibility of not sinning, +or of not doing some action, in the sense relevant to the argument, that +is, as a necessity essential and absolute, which destroys the morality of +action and the justice of punishment. If anyone meant a different necessity +or impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or hypothetical, which +will be explained presently) it is plain that we would deny him the major +stated in the objection. We might content ourselves with this answer, and +demand the proof of the proposition denied: but I am well pleased to +justify my manner of procedure in the present work, in order to make the +matter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject, by explaining +the necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must be +allowed. The truth is that the necessity contrary to morality, which must +be avoided and which would render punishment unjust, is an insuperable +necessity, which would render all opposition unavailing, even though one +should wish with all one's heart to avoid the necessary action, and though +one should make all possible efforts to that end. Now it is plain that this +is not applicable to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if one +did not so desire. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not +absolute, but it presupposes will: if it is certain that one will do them, +it is no less certain that one will will to do them. These voluntary +actions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whether +one will them or not; but they will happen because one will do, and because +one will will to do, that which leads to them. That is involved in +prevision and predetermination, and forms the reason thereof. The necessity +of such events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity of +consequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites. But +the necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust and +reward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one may do +and whatever one may will to do: in a word, it exists in that which is +essential. This it is which is called an absolute necessity. Thus it avails +nothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts or +commandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to blame or to praise; it +will come to pass no more and no less. In voluntary actions, on the +contrary, and in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382] +punish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order of +causes that make action exist. Thus it comes about that not only pains and +effort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers in +mind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them. That +is why the precept _Ora et labora_ (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus not +only those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events) +maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also +those who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in +their time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events by +their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of +destroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it. +For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a +necessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will +follow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a +consequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies +contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will +is determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has the +greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit +that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only +that of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have complete +indifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of +inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render +absolutely necessary the resolution taken. + +OBJECTION IV + +Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather +contributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary +thereto. + +God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, and +he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he +causes, although he is fully cognizant of it. + +Therefore, etc. + +ANSWER + +I deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the sin, +but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without +committing a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting +unreasonably. I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383] +God himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that one +even opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do. And +when one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after full +consideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsible +for events, even when one foresees them. One does not will these evils; but +one is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot in +reason help preferring to other considerations. This is a _consequent_ +will, resulting from acts of _antecedent_ will, in which one wills the +good. I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and +consequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills that +all men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence of +persistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin. +But these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say with +the same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not, +and that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is always +followed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permission +being a result of superior reasons. One has indeed justification for +saying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the +production of good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself, and as +it were detached (_particulariter et secundum quid_: Thom., I, qu. 19, art. +6) according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil. +Likewise one may say that the consequent, or final and total, divine will +tends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together, whose +combination thereby becomes determined, and involves also the permission of +some evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of +the universe demands. Arminius, in his _Antiperkinsus,_ explained very well +that the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to the +action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, +but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it is +enough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from +Scotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as I +have made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the +terms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' or +'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to wrangle +about words. + + [384] +OBJECTION V + +Whoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause. + +God produces all that is real in sin. + +Therefore God is the cause of sin. + +ANSWER + +I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, because the +term 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering these +propositions false. But in order to give a better explanation I will make a +distinction. 'Real' either signifies that which is positive only, or else +it includes also privative beings: in the first case, I deny the major and +I admit the minor; in the second case, I do the opposite. I might have +confined myself to that; but I was willing to go further, in order to +account for this distinction. I have therefore been well pleased to point +out that every purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection, and +that every imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the privative: +for to limit is to withhold extension, or the more beyond. Now God is the +cause of all perfections, and consequently of all realities, when they are +regarded as purely positive. But limitations or privations result from the +original imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity. It is +as with a laden boat, which the river carries along more slowly or less +slowly in proportion to the weight that it bears: thus the speed comes from +the river, but the retardation which restricts this speed comes from the +load. Also I have shown in the present work how the creature, in causing +sin, is a deficient cause; how errors and evil inclinations spring from +privation; and how privation is efficacious accidentally. And I have +justified the opinion of St. Augustine (lib. I, _Ad. Simpl._, qu. 2) who +explains (for example) how God hardens the soul, not in giving it something +evil, but because the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by the +resistance of the soul, and by the circumstances contributing to this +resistance, so that he does not give it all the good that would overcome +its evil. 'Nec _(inquit)_ ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, +sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.' But if God had willed to do more +here he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures or +fresh miracles to change their natures, and this the best plan did not +allow. It is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapid +than its slope permits or the boats themselves be less laden, if they [385] +had to be impelled at a greater speed. So the limitation or original +imperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of the +universe cannot admit more good, and cannot be exempted from certain evils, +these, however, being only of such a kind as may tend towards a greater +good. There are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully enhance the +beauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, appropriately used, +render harmony more beautiful. But that depends upon the answer which I +have already given to the first objection. + +OBJECTION VI + +Whoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power to do +is unjust. + +God does so. + +Therefore, etc. + +ANSWER + +I deny the minor of this argument. And I believe that God always gives +sufficient aid and grace to those who have good will, that is to say, who +do not reject this grace by a fresh sin. Thus I do not admit the damnation +of children dying unbaptized or outside the Church, or the damnation of +adult persons who have acted according to the light that God has given +them. And I believe that, _if anyone has followed the light he had_, he +will undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he has need, even as +the late Herr Hulsemann, who was celebrated as a profound theologian at +Leipzig, has somewhere observed; and if such a man had failed to receive +light during his life, he would receive it at least in the hour of death. + +OBJECTION VII + +Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means of producing +effectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enough +goodness. + +God does so. + +Therefore, etc. + +ANSWER + +I deny the major. It is true that God could overcome the greatest +resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so, [386] +whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly +influence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this +distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be +restricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act +in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have +observed already in answering the first objection. The reasons for this +connexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances than +the other, are hidden in the depths of God's wisdom: they depend upon the +universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail +to choose, required this. One concludes thus from the event itself; since +God made the universe, it was not possible to do better. Such management, +far from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supreme +goodness itself. This objection with its solution might have been inferred +from what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemed +advisable to touch upon it separately. + +OBJECTION VIII + +Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free. + +God cannot fail to choose the best. + +Therefore God is not free. + +ANSWER + +I deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the most +perfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and always to +exercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force or +by inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our +souls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree +of freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one's own +inclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And to +object that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism. He +creates them freely: but when he had set before him an end, that of +exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most +appropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a _need_ is to take the +term in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as +one does when speaking of the wrath of God. + +Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387] +always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself: +_semel jussit, semper paret_. But he had better have said, that God always +commands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always follows the +tendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will. +And as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will +only which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his will is always +indefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser good +which he rejects will still be possible in itself. Otherwise the necessity +of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogether +absolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would be +no choice. But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy the +possibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomes +effective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which is +outside them and above them, that is, through the will of God. This +necessity is called moral, because for the wise what is necessary and what +is owing are equivalent things; and when it is always followed by its +effect, as it indeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can say +that it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, the +closer do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind +is not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality, +reward and commendation. For that which it brings to pass does not happen +whatever one may do and whatever one may will, but because one desires it. +A will to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended; +and it carries with it its own reward, which is supreme happiness. And as +this constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to him +who possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable from the point +of view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God. If the will of God +had not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend towards evil, +which would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent somehow to +good and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will that would always drift +along at random would scarcely be any better for the government of the +universe than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles, without the existence +of divinity. And even though God should abandon himself to chance only in +some cases, and in a certain way (as he would if he did not always tend +entirely towards the best, and if he were capable of preferring a lesser +good to a greater good, that is, an evil to a good, since that which [388] +prevents a greater good is an evil) he would be no less imperfect than the +object of his choice. Then he would not deserve absolute trust; he would +act without reason in such a case, and the government of the universe would +be like certain games equally divided between reason and luck. This all +proves that this objection which is made against the choice of the best +perverts the notions of free and necessary, and represents the best to us +actually as evil: but that is either malicious or absurd. + + [389] + * * * * * + +EXCURSUS ON THEODICY + + 392 + +published by the author in Memoires de Trevoux + +July 1712 + + * * * * * + +_February_ 1712 + +I said in my essays, 392, that I wished to see the demonstrations mentioned +by M. Bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at Trevoux in 1703. +Father des Bosses has shown me this letter, in which the writer essays to +demonstrate by the geometrical method that God is the sole true cause of +all that is real. My perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which I +indicated in the same passage, namely, that this proposition can be true in +a very good sense, God being the only cause of pure and absolute realities, +or perfections; but when one includes limitations or privations under the +name of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in the +production of what is limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause of +sin, and even its sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that the +gifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me, +although he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which he +declares God to be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will not +admit that God is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explains +himself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real +action to creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second +proposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, although +determinate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For it +is love of good in general. It is through the ideas of good appearing [390] +in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinate +in relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the power of varying +its own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love. And for +that purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of God or +oppose his action. These determinations of motion towards individual +objects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which causes the +mind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all the mind makes +these changes only through the motion which God gives to it and conserves +for it.' In my own style I would have said that the perfection which is in +the action of the creature comes from God, but that the limitations to be +found there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding +limitations that occurred in the creature. Further, this is so not only in +minds but also in all other substances, which thereby are causes +co-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves; for this +determination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation. + +Now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of the +letter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions, +in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. If by 'reality' +one means only perfections or positive realities, God is the only true +cause; but if that which involves limitations is included under the +realities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, and the +author himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to render the +matter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the example of a laden +boat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly carried along by the +stream. There one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what is +positive in this motion, of the perfection, the force, the speed of the +boat, but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force, and +that it brings about the retardation. + +It is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method to +metaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto success has +seldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that very great +skill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less success than +when he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections. For in +mathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, figures and +calculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in metaphysics, +where one is deprived of this aid (at least in ordinary [391] +argumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the argument and in +the exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack. But in +neither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen. + +The author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour and +penetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to prove +that there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according to +the fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the will of +God is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is not less +invincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality and +force in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and with the same +argument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion as +in a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the body be at the place +A, where it was immediately before, and for that it suffices that there be +no reason to prompt God to the change. But when God wills that afterwards +the body be at the place B, there must needs be a new reason, of such a +kind as to determine God to will that it be in B and not in C or in any +other place, and that it be there more or less promptly. It is upon these +reasons, the volitions of God, that we must assess the force and the +reality existent in things. The author speaks much of the will of God, but +he does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt God to +will, and upon which all depends. And these reasons are taken from the +objects. + +I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the first +proposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. The +writer affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence of a being, +that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word for +word: + +'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer exists +once that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The writer +endeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove the +effect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are +stated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among +those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) 'Now by +the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save +by the will of God. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in this expression, +that nothing exists save by the will of God. If one means that things [392] +begin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to the +preceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is at +all times a consequence of the will of God, one assumes more or less what +is in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that the +existence of things depends upon the will of God, and that it is not only a +mere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfection +which things contain; and once that is assumed, they will depend upon God's +will no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have taken +the matter in my Essays. + +Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made +observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it +contains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I +have just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an +introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced. + + [393] + * * * * * + +REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, +NECESSITY AND CHANCE' + + * * * * * + +1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions depending +thereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. John +Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I have +deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I have +already mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since these +writings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and since +the works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. The +Bishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of the +Marquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into a +discussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extreme +restraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My Lord +Newcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; but +at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be +published, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to +abuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened, +however, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a French friend, and allowed +a young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of this +friend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and published +it later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop was +obliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to [394] +publish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London in +the year 1656, in 4to., entitled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity +and Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of +Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of the +year 1684, in a work entitled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found his +book on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on +freedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply, +nor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his +usual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other +we stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game. +The bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr. +Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests +rather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the +Schoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop. + +2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the +opinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinity +depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that God is no +more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. He +maintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none above +him with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as if +what is said about God were only compliments, that is to say expressions +proper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies also +that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their +destruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but it +seems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which asserts that +bodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence of +God and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says +very reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about by +chance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that +produce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of +all the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which, +manifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they are +conditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these +conditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. All +which amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everything +comes to pass as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge [395] +whereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thing +has happened and why it did not go otherwise. + +3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him +seek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odious +conclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolute +necessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed in +the answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypothetical +necessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge +of God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone +would be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This was +also the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De Servo +Arbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged +to-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, and +springs from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing in +it to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing +were necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary implied +contradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral +necessity either, on the ground that everything really happens through +physical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a great +difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and +which is termed moral, existing even in relation to God, and that blind +necessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr. +Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and +consequently without God. Indeed, there would according to them be no need +of God, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence +through its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five. +And this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it must +happen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypothetical +necessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been +foreseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains an +obligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the +wise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted +by good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would +subvert piety and morality. + +4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396] +our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we have +the power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He asserts +notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power +that we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good +pleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does not +appear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also does +not develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over our +volitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This has +been explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows, +like others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself, +if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would not +prevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise, +punishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produce +actions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary, +they would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since these +actions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these means +contribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they are +indeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute +necessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as it +is taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligent +substances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it +has is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a +dyke has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, it +has not the power to rise above the dyke, although nothing would prevent it +then from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it from +rising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itself +should come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by +an increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man +lacks the power, to go his way. + +5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points, +which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_ +(he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present power +of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_ +said, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objects +through will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring from +reasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new [397] +reasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and by +this means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and +could not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr. +Hobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it does +not rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat +or not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or +to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating +beforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even +though Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the +manner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there +is no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear +that he is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says _non +concupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition does +not concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted (2) +'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing', +that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, I +admit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard are +only appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard +of them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes.' _Wrong_: they +have their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these +are not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, without +implying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity of +all things.' _Wrong_: the will of God produces only contingent things, +which could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are +indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement. + +6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) 'That +man is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but also +to choose what he wills to will.' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolute +master of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some +means or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, the +will of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That is _well_ said, +provided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he wills +to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse +than these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will or +not.' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happen +without necessity by chance.' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398] +does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes +and reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will +happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, not +as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins _well_, +and finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of the +consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future +is present to God: for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent +the event or consequent from being contingent in itself. + +7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been +favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important +ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this +contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their +exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a +discussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who +had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the +Presbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions, +as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the +extreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that the +defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others, +having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince +Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I. +But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do not +spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas +Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres's +party. + +8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for +proofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits the +reasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative, +and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are +others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by +which we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one can honour God by +expressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with +Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God and +the universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the +necessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is [399] +an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr. +Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence +to people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on that +account, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passed +between the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds that +it is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, since +that is to say in effect that God is lacking in power. But he adds also at +the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to +attribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and +would appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore, +that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be right +if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeed +it appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has no +goodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blind +nature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematical +laws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of +Epicurus. If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would +not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But God is not as a +man, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always +permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God, +because they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always +right to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain +from fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a +way which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be +understood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without +compromising his wisdom and his goodness. + +9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes divides +them into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind are +neutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which he +thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the cause +of our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be not +grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for God did +send me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you that +sent me hither, but God.' And God said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will harden +Pharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of [400] +Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his +spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy +hand.' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, because +the Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, wherefore +hast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkened +not unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The +deceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v. +24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and +causeth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger +like a drunken man.' God said of the King of Assyria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against +the people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the +prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah +said (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself: +it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' And God said (Ezek. +iii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and +commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And +the Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father +which hath sent me draw him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having +been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have +taken.' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the +Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do +whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St. +Paul (Rom. ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that +runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he +mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19: +'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath +resisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest +against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast +thou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from +another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii. +6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which +worketh all in all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created in +Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should +walk in them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both to +will and to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these passages all +those which make God the author of all grace and of all good [401] +inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin. + +10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These are +those where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills, +or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. xxx. 19: 'I call heaven +and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life +and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and +thy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye will +serve.' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. 12), 'Go and say unto +David: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of +them, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. vii. 16: 'Until the child shall +know to refuse the evil and choose the good.' Finally the passages which +Mr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all +those where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with +that of God. Thus Isa. v. 4: 'What could have been done more to my +vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it +should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5: +'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire +for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither +came it into my mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed +thyself; but in me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'God will have all men +to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he +could quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that God +willeth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and +generally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids evil. + +11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always will +that which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to +sacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full will +or his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish in +forty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills the salvation +of all, that means simply that God commands that all do that which is +necessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that God wills +not sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr. +Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one will +answer him that it would be to God's discredit that his revealed will [402] +should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to the +Ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus the +condition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites took +it in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that God in +commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not will +action, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that was +not an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same in +the case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are in +fact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity and +every virtuous action that God commands; of such is omission of sin, a +thing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is therefore +incomparably better to explain the will of God as I have explained it in +this work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness, +has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause +to be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to +see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined +by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very +concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each +good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible +design of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of +the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as +light is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than +this good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain +goods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme +perfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of +others, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse +than all the sin of creatures. + +12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying, +article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is +contrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that Mr. +Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of the +power of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledge +and honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facile +laudamus, bonos libenter._ This opinion, which despoils God of all goodness +and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an +absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and [403] +creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without +any other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, is +capable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devil +would be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and +with God; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that God, when he +forbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes +endeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that +goodness is a part of the power of God, that is to say, the power of making +himself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, and +confounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if God does not +intend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles of +justice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarily +that which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is +possible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he +make himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind +power or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the +intelligent principle or the providence of God, the other attributes to him +actions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, says +Mr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in +distributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is +not the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them +reasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of +God. But, says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only just +through the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken +also in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not +depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom +and of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in the same +passage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie in a +logical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an +incomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to +honour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something +attributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality +given to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations +through the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult for +Mr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since he +admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would +beware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404] +is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mind +subsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errors +may not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, it +is expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one +who otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways. +It is true that God does not reason, properly speaking, using time as we +do, to pass from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one and +the same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all the +conclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the +reasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom is +perfect. + + [405] + * * * * * + +OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLY +IN LONDON + + * * * * * + +1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of this +admirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read it +himself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a good +opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again and +again like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to become +confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the +trouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoning +performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as +figures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixing +our attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is why +when this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printed +originally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, I +judged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required +an attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreed +only in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains five +chapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I have +observed that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and +of physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for +a few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with force +and eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406] +had not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections +(of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the +moral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to +mine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible +to credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to +show (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifference +of equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will has +determined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, either +in him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases, +but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be +pleasing. + +2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say, +divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the +great privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the source of +their freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil. +The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only of +inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is +sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the +most excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow +fantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts. +What is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would be harmful. +This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St. +Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the +outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality. +But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted +by the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by +reasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absolute +indifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantastic +this choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from calling +visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our gifted +author. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would be +the greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account +an Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocated +certain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day. + +3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by [407] +degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifference +of choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us any +inclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could be +without causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as some +have denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see +them. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen +by showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only +be set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so we +must believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can +only be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when no +distinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of a +concourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and +now sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more +than another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and +even Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason +on that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people +always have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reason +and the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But +finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their +alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything +whatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But +the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties, +by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always +assume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As the +Schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certain +prime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vague +indifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy men +have been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of the +errors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but he +is without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it. + + _Si Pergama dextra_ + _Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent._ + +He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. He +knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages, [408] +transferring all these to vague indifference: only through this +indifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure in +one's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserable +if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author had +said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he only +had to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himself +that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes +or tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be a +degradation of God and men if they were to be made subject to reason; that +thus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer be +satisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewith +to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had not +within them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable +by choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of this +wondrous faculty. + +4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well to +profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of +things and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points in +which we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shall +gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. The +first chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a being +the idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not know +if there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexion +existing between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not the +example of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. But +one may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that after +all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be +divested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. He +explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that +_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between +_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known +through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only +through relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea +of God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed +sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit +in our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409] +the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our +perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the +idea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at +least are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of +Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more +relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon +paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is +arbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I have +already indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians +on that point. + +5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a +criterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force +whereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the +understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says, +that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in +the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of +a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity +or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may +still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He +appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give +our assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted +prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another +criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I +have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth +and Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given +therein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only +confusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of +reason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths +of reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us, +such as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be +indubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed that +we think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inward +notions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to objects, +my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are +firmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in such +fashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of [410] +reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it is +the only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, dreams and +visions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through +the connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or those +which spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules of +logic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility of +which is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibility +are only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in analysis are aware what +difference there is in this respect between several properties by which +some line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone so +far, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of him +already, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking in +profundity or reflexion. + +6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space +spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible +to conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of God, +that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he +exists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the +little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that +God is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soon +as one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore as +soon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists of +necessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which +we have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion, +that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present +movement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another, +and so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not be +one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion +in matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if +there were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. So +the rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would +nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased to +recount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how +important, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, if +it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no +reason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411] +saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the +existence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality +and the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject. +It is enough to state that the author believes that space can be +annihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and +that we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor +matter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the +existence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration that +in the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is +not included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that +there is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all +things. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blind +would reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us, +for our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of some +attributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, which +is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered +aright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that God +in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst +things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the +greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and +goodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remained +notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections +could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away. + +7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical, +physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical +evil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All these +evils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is no +providence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity: + + _Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;_ + +because there are so many faults in the nature of things, + + _quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa._ + +Others have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. There +have also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, and among +these our author appears to have had M. Bayle in mind. He hopes to [412] +show in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to be cut; and +he says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness of God would +not be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had been +banished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III and +observes, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since they +are derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect substance +from his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives him occasion +for making a little digression against the Socinians. But someone will say, +why did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfect +things? The author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness of +God is the cause. He wished to communicate himself at the expense of a +certain fastidiousness which we assume in God, imagining that imperfections +offend him. Thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect rather +than nothing. But one might have added that God has produced indeed the +most perfect whole that was possible, one wherewith he had full cause for +satisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection +in the whole. Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certain +things might have been made better, but not without other new and _perhaps_ +greater disadvantages. This _perhaps_ could have been omitted: for the +author also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of the +chapter, _that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best_; and +thus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, that imperfect +things will be added to those more perfect, so long as they do not preclude +the existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible. Thus +bodies were created as well as spirits, since the one does not offer any +obstacle to the other; and the creation of matter was not unworthy of the +great God, as some heretics of old believed, attributing this work to a +certain Demogorgon. + +8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter IV. +Our famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or imperfection, +springs from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or discomfort, +springs from matter, or rather from its movement; for without movement +matter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in these +movements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, there +would be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that cause [413] +generations cause also corruptions, since from the variety of movements +comes concussion between bodies, by which they are often dissipated and +destroyed. The Author of Nature however, in order to render bodies more +enduring, distributed them into _systems_, those which we know being +composed of luminous and opaque balls, in a manner so excellent and so +fitting for the display of that which they contain, and for arousing wonder +thereat, that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful. But the crowning +point of the work was the construction of animals, to the end that +everywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition, + + _Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba._ + +Our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether have +their denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing that there +were places without animals, these places might have uses necessary for +other places which are inhabited. So for example the mountains, which +render the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren, +are of use for the production of rivers and of winds; and we have no cause +to complain of sands and marshes, since there are so many places still +remaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be supposed that all is +made for man alone: and the author is persuaded that there are not only +pure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits, +that is, animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptible +matter. But it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial, +composed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein, and whose motion is +terminated by the breaking of the vessels. Thence the author is led to +believe that the immortality granted to Adam, if he had been obedient, +would not have been an effect of his nature, but of the grace of God. + +9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals that +they should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger, +and giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is about to +cause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force the +animal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of this +discomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death helps +also to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if the +dissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals would +take no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their [414] +body to perish, and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for a +whole day. + +God has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to feed and +maintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappears +imperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them to work, in +order to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, and which may +avail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by the Author of +things that one animal very often should serve as food for another. This +hardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused by diseases is +generally just as painful as a violent death, if not more so; and animals +subject to being preyed upon by others, having neither foresight nor +anxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when they are not in +danger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, thunderbolts and +other disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and which men have +ordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that suffer thereby. + +10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, which +happen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary and +constant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the taking +of nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal's +powers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way, +restoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most intense +is that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken care to +ensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual cannot be +so here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great tenderness +for their little ones, even to the point of endangering themselves for +their preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear, +cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable, although +it may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill: one must +say as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other hurtful things, namely +that these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system. As +for ignorance and errors, it must be taken into account that the most +perfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, and that knowledge is +wont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it is necessary that one be +exposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and accidents of such kinds +are inevitable. One must often be mistaken in one's judgement, because it +is not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact [415] +consideration. These disadvantages are inseparable from the system of +things: for things must very often resemble one another in a certain +situation, the one being taken for the other. But the inevitable errors are +not the most usual, nor the most pernicious. Those which cause us the most +harm are wont to arise through our fault; and consequently one would be +wrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life, since one +finds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to such +action by voluntary evils. + +11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken come +accidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer concerning all +we do not know, from all we do know, that one could not have done away with +them without falling into greater troubles. For the better understanding of +this the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building. There +must be not only apartments, halls, galleries, gardens, grottoes, but also +the kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, stables, drainage. Thus it would +not have been proper to make only suns in the world, or to make an earth +all of gold and of diamonds, but not habitable. If man had been all eye or +all ear, he would not have been fitted for feeding himself. If God had made +him without passions, he would have made him stupid; and if he had wished +to make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses, or +give him powers of sensation through some other means than organs, that is +to say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here +upon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate, +namely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are +injurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here +only in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what +Revelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been +exempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of +divine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly +indicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are: + +1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality. + +2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of itself, +save in evil or useless herbs. + +3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance. + +4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband. + + [416] +5. The pains of childbirth. + +6. The enmity between man and the serpent. + +7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placed +him. + +But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of +matter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to him +that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, and +that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of +life has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might have +something to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our author +on the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I have +judged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subject +of our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom. + +12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing to +explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up half +of the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that of +physical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For, +as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes rather +from that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common, +according to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power of +choosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It is +a very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection, namely sin, +springs from perfection itself. But it is no less a paradox to present as a +perfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world, the +advantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason. And +that, after all, rather than pointing out the source of the evil, would be +to contend that it has none. For if the will makes its resolve without the +existence of anything, either in the person who chooses or in the object +which is chosen, to prompt it to the choice, there will be neither cause +nor reason for this election; and as moral evil consists in the wrong +choice, that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all. Thus in the +rules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in Nature; +and also for the same reason there would be no moral good either, and all +morality would be destroyed. But we must listen to our gifted author, from +whom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the +Schoolmen, and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his[417] +wit and his eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages contained +therein. In setting forth the position reached in the controversy, he +divides the writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content to +say that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and the +other sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But this +exposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that is +absolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral +necessity, as I have already explained in many places. + +13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice. +The author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe +that the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, or by +anterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course that it +adopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that the will +is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintain +that the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is, he +confuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the admissions and the +odious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay them to the charge +of those who are infinitely far removed from them, and who take great care +to refute them. He lays these things to their charge because they believe, +as Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save for some doctors who are +enveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by the +representation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion that +there is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected +by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet he +adds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since if +there were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can +cause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the world +censures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harm +without necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate +and by no means culpable; that there would be no difference between +physical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true cause +of an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be either +blamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action may +serve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one would +find fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418] +threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further, +according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the +prevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evil +already done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitude +would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without which +the mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient +reason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives the +resolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true, +one must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, and +would depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground +for hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree +together in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to +us, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusions +hold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makes +its resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an +opinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders +the soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countless +serious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in the same +class with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other discredited authors, +whose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable. As for me, I do not +require the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding, +because I distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring from +insensible perceptions and inclinations. But I hold that the will always +follows the most advantageous representation, whether distinct or confused, +of the good or the evil resulting from reasons, passions and inclinations, +although it may also find motives for suspending its judgement. But it is +always upon motives that it acts. + +14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before +proceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of my +opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary +absolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence which +is founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect. To +put it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon the +principle of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths, +and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which [419] +applies also to contingent truths. I have already elsewhere stated this +proposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing out +that there are two great principles, namely, _that of identicals or of +contradiction_, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one +is true and the other false, and _that of the sufficient reason_, which +states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by +one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding. +Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent +truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason +should not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles are +contained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, when +in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon +truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is +absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest +extent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must +say that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason +which inclines without necessitating. Once that is granted, it is seen how +we can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that the +thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing +representation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, but +not necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitating +it. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves and +through their reasons, remain contingent. God was led infallibly by his +wisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and to +give it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity, +and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme +wisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions we +have just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency and +freedom. + +15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent. +In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together with +freedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, but +also because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, a +wicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principle +of the Manichaeans would be in the universe. Moreover, the author has +observed (ch. 4, sect. 4, Sec. 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbidden +actions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils.[420] +It is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable. But +there is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the +force of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that have +prompted man to do ill: else anyone stealing a great sum of money or +killing a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less +deserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug +of beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog, since these latter were +tempted less. But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice +which is authorized in the world: for the greater is the temptation to sin, +the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement. +Besides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer, +the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the +more readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment. +Thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called _stellionate_, +and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very +foundations of our security in written documents. But one will have greater +indulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. The Romans +punished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when these +had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to +distraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough to +send the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil deeds without +apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be +tempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was given +to committing such extravagances often: this might tend towards reduction +of the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and +punishment. So far removed are the principles of our opponents from the +practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men. + +16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will +still remain, although there be this in common between them, that they have +their reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for oneself +concerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in the +solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account +for voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one could not +have prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the [421] +constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every +turn. It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness, +and even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to say +that men are wicked and deserving of punishment: else one must needs say +that the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because they +spring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin. +Fourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true +cause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects, +as our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1, +sub-sect. 3, Sec. 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms. When the +ancients spoke of that which is [Greek: eph' hemin], or when we speak of +that which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our +actions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for these +representations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modifications +of this active principle which is within us. No agent is capable of acting +without being _predisposed_ to what the action demands; and the reasons or +inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the +soul to decide between various courses. One will have it that the will is +alone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen +seated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, while +the passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence +often prevail over the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that the +understanding speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillate +between the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the +favourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and +giving them audience or not as seems good to her. But it is a +personification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is to +judge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the +understanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding in +itself, to understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, or +the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, +and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying +its active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need here to +apply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence to +the best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects. For +what I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection. Our [422] +author, even though he admits with people in general this physical +influence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacity +that the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas, +much less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to draw +out that which is within us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes' +belief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it at +least some direction. It is a mean between one side and the other, between +physical influence and Pre-established Harmony. + +17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin would +neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because the +censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas men +demand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though it +should serve neither for amendment nor for example. So do men with reason +demand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past +benefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit. This +objection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strike +at me. I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the +motive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he +should find in good actions: else one has not yet reached the degree of +virtue that one must endeavour to attain. That is what one means by saying +that justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is also +what I explained in justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before the +opening of the controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I consider +that wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as +when a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or because +he fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing +them, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree of +wickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with it +finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than +he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear. I have +also observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according to +the celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of _medicinal_ +penalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or at +least to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of those +who do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity. True [423] +retributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes +something more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because +the harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of +suffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil +whereto it has consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has +rejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves +the condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian +party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom. + +18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for +felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and +evil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I think +it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put +upon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most +astounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external things, if +it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil. It is +therefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground for +hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure. This +argument is halting from every aspect. _There is no force in the inference: +one might grant the conclusion: the argument may be retorted upon the +author_. Let us begin with the retort, which is easy. For are men any +happier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument, +or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason? +Have they less bodily suffering? Have they less tendency toward true or +apparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? Are they any less +enslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive? +less envious? Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a method +of counting or assessment. I would rather he had proved it by experience; +but let us see this proof by counting. Suppose that by my choice, which +enables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the +object chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were two +degrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with +perfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good. +Doubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible. For +what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the +object? To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, or +the things, as we please. That would be almost as if I could say to [424] +lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be +diamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like the +common explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that the +desert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. They +only had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be a +partridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the +object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I am. But +if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness +conceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of +goodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents +of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means of +this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events. +The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3, +Sec. 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be +overcome by any of them; and he regards it (Sec.Sec. 20, 21, 22) as the soundest +foundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable of +limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason, +and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this +goodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in +objects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power is +independent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosen +object, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. For +whence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, if +it is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it the +goodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances? +It seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious, +which contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, non +invenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction +cannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that +when men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they +do so through other desires, which always have their foundation in the +representation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the +conclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does not +depend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human +life: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand +accidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I [425] +avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, by +an earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also deny +the inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only +actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not +depend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God, +if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that for +the attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if the +soul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is assured of +its happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in this +life. + +19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my +hypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. He +believes that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all our +felicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our evils, +and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete. These +advantages have almost all been already disproved. We have shown that for +the securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goods +and of evils, and other inward or outward dispositions, should incline us +without constraining us. Moreover one does not see how pure indifference +can contribute to felicity; on the contrary, the more indifferent one is, +the more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will one +prove to be. Besides the hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferent +power could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itself +the most perfect happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifest +that there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits +would withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author +alleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been. +Finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies: +on the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge +and goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules, +and no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still some +advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. He +considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our +actions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsion +of external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to +oneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with [426] +oneself. But the exact opposite is the case: for when one happens upon the +action through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result of +one's good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happen +upon it blindly by chance or hazard? Why then should one boast of a good +action, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or +blame redounds to fortune or hazard? I think that one is more worthy of +praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and the more +culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evil +qualities. To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities +whence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable +something in the place of causes. Thus, if this chance or this indefinable +something were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural or +acquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not be +possible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of +others, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or to +conjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant +indifference will drive the vessel of the will. + +20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our +learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so +much good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are +active in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be +determined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must not +be determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far as +it is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge from +this indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the object +pleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have their +stumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the other +substances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts are not +free, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, with +the Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is not necessary +that in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself, since +a thing may receive direction without receiving force. So it is that the +horse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm; and +M. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in itself, receives +only some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing may receive from +outside some determination or direction, capable of changing that [427] +direction which it would take of itself. Finally, even though an active +substance is determined only by itself, it does not follow that it is not +moved by objects: for it is the representation of the object within it +which contributes towards the determination. Now the representation does +not come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity. +Objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical +causes, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his +wisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects, +but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus +this kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of +the substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though +free power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferent +to the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must have +its origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything from +anything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for us +to imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere +indifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must +needs be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently, +however far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifference +in the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true that +these dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usually +to the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously +_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one +object is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is more +acceptable at one time than at another. + +21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and he +undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, and +even that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothing +is to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, to +be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is therefore +absolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neither +be helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it were +an appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish to +abide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural +inclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings. +That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their [428] +nature, but by the will of God: whereas if that will be excluded neither +good nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writers +of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason +which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems to +me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the +consideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that +they cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instance +of self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by +the goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is +necessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us +that it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, or +rather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and +influenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that his +understanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how +everything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him +the good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder, +the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness +makes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by +himself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized +and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his +understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his +inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be +deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it +possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas +before the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas +which are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author so +strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would +subvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent of +will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be +independent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it +not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than +others of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others +for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that +the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that +are called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh? +that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that [429] +certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted for +harmony? Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring +from the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would imply +contradiction? Can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentient +creatures, and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligent +substances, are a matter of indifference to God? And what shall be said of +his justice? Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely +and justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? I know that there +have been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and +so liable to overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustrious +author is far from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though this +hypothesis tends in that direction, if there is nothing in objects save +what is indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true that +God has need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly that +God's goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. There +was therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I have +said so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even by +necessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of his +inclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprising +that our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, Sec. 5) that +there is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect and +happy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according to +the author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, Sec.Sec. 8, 9), God acts for +an end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore not +altogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or not +create, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a matter of +indifference to him either, whether he should create one world rather than +another; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. Thus the +qualities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason for God's +choice. + +22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty and +fittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that would +reconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of all +consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifference +of God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as God +has chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all [430] +that which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerable +possible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them is +purely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once having +chosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to human +nature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with his +hypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the proposition +that when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same +time, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possible +advantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing could +be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to +overthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with +incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the +way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just +been said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not, +and wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in +order to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of +indifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is +asked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs +answer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the +best, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following +his own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that +there is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towards +creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that +our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5, +sub-sect. 4, Sec. 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of +equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures. +Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more +perfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or +less with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there +will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus +comes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordance +with his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certain +creatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them. He will +then just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen, +mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere, [431] +scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the whole +universe, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, upright +persons, good angels! No, the author will say, God, when once he had +resolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all the +advantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard to +creatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage were connected +of necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordance +with his hypothesis. That not being so, however, he must admit that God's +resolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election +independent of that one which prompted God to make men. But whence comes +this new election? Does it also come from mere indifference? If such is the +case, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimes +comes to do it, it will be merely by accident. But the author maintains +that God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good and +ill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in him +primary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him. He chooses +not only to create men, but also to create men as happy as it is possible +to be in this system. After that not the least vestige of mere indifference +will be left, for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have +reasoned concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but he +was bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world +as should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity, +virtue, happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God was +prompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as +perfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same good +intention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to the +goodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act without +cause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author, +with whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter was reached, +prevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit of any +application to the reality of things. + +23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who knows +all degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who penetrates at +one and the same time all their possible connexions, let us see whether at +least the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutely +indifferent in his choice. The author regales us with this pure [432] +indifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it which he +gives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within ourselves of +its marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other causes which might +determine our will are insufficient. As for the first point, he asserts +that in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pure +indifference. But I do not agree that we feel such indifference, or that +this alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. We feel usually within +us something which inclines us to our choice. At times it happens, however, +that we cannot account for all our dispositions. If we give our mind to the +question, we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and of +bodies in our environment, the present or previous temper of our soul, +together with countless small things included under these comprehensive +headings, may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection for +certain objects, and the variation of our opinions from one time to +another. At the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute this +to mere indifference, or to some indefinable force of the soul which has +the same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon the +chameleon. Thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of +the people: he does so, saying that in many things the people reason better +than the philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have been +misled by chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered +among chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does not +exist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populace +cannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by the +senses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by the +wind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid which +causes weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of atoms and +other indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things are not +because the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be able to +say also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or +inclination contributing towards the production of its act, because there +are many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceived +by the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. Secondly, as to the +marks of the power in question, I have already refuted the claim advanced +for it, that it possesses the advantage of making one active, the real +cause of one's action, and subject to responsibility and morality: [433] +these are not genuine marks of its existence. Here is one the author +adduces, which is not genuine either, namely, that we have within us a +power of resisting natural appetites, that is to say of resisting not only +the senses, but also the reason. But I have already stated this fact: one +resists natural appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimes +endures inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account of +some hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and +exceeds it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it. +The author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances +which he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what at +first displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, that +application and attention to the object and custom change our disposition +and consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a rather +high degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did, +and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. Time is +needed, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather that +callosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree of +heat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author invokes, +guess correctly the cause of this effect, although they sometimes apply it +in a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close to the fire in the +kitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: Oh, my dear, who will +be able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other answers: Don't be +absurd, my good woman, one grows used to everything. + +24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to be +indifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at our +own free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third proof, +namely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without having +recourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the entreaties +of their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the reproaches of their +conscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath of God, hell itself, +for the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good or +tolerable, save as being freely chosen by such people. All is well in this +argument, with the exception of the last words only. For when one takes an +actual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which led +the man to his choice, and that there are very strong bonds to fasten [434] +him thereto. A love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mere +indifference: inclination or passion will have played its part; but habit +and stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than +separation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author: +an atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him, +whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini in +his works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather +than renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truth +is that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted of +having published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism. +When he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, saying: + + _Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum._ + +But since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired to +cause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini was +granted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if indeed he +was not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the inquisition was +carried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was no chance of +pardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for what he was, an +atheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in that. But supposing +there were an atheist who gave himself up for torture, vanity might be in +his case a strong enough motive, as in that of the Gymnosophist, Calanus, +and of the Sophist who, according to Lucian's account, was burnt to death +of his own will. But the author thinks that that very vanity, that +stubbornness, those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem to +have quite good sense, cannot be explained by the appetites that arise from +the representation of good and evil, and that they compel us to have +recourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil, and +evil into good, and the indifferent into good or into evil. But we do not +need to go so far, and the causes of our errors are only too visible. +Indeed, we can make these transformations, but it is not as with the +Fairies, by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring and +suppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualities +which are naturally attached to certain objects, and by contemplating only +such representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices; or [435] +again, because one attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them, +certain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally or +through our habitual contemplation of them. For example, all my life long I +detest a certain kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in it +something distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the other +hand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it will +revive within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem or +love. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been +showered upon him after some successful public action; the impression of +this great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation; +he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion, +and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end. +For although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said of +him after his death, the representation he makes of it for himself +beforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there are always +motives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd to +those who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a strong or +oft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination, +our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, by dint of +having often related something untrue, which he has perhaps invented, +finally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often represents to +oneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, and one thinks it +also easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one persuades oneself +easily of what one wishes. + + _Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt._ + +25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, although +the will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing to the +pleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or owing to +the aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book will help +towards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner of a speaker +will win the audience for him. One will be inclined to despise doctrines +coming from a man one despises or hates, or from another who resembles him +in some point that strikes us. I have already said why one is readily +disposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable, and I have known +people who at first had changed their religion for worldly [436] +considerations, but who have been persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwards +that they had taken the right course. One sees also that stubbornness is +not simply wrong choice persevering, but also a disposition to persevere +therein, which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice, +or some evil imagined as arising from a change. The first choice has +perchance been made in mere levity, but the intention to abide by it +springs from certain stronger reasons or impressions. There are even some +writers on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choice +so as not to be inconstant or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when one +despises the warnings of reason, especially when the subject is important +enough to be examined carefully; but when the thought of change is +unpleasant, one readily averts one's attention from it, and that is the way +which most frequently leads one to stubbornness. The author wished to +connect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference. He might then +have taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would be +need of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especially +if this choice has been made lightly, and all the more lightly in +proportion to the indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readily +inclined to reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or some +other motive makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed either +that vengeance pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponder +upon it day and night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression of +the wrong or the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves a +very great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes +upon them every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter +than life itself. + + _Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa._ + +The author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or our +aversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, we have +given to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, through the +alleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish. +One has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives oneself six degrees of +artificial good through the power that can choose without cause. Thus one +will have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. 2, Sec. 7). If that could be +carried out it would take us far, as I have already said here. The [437] +author even thinks that ambition, avarice, the gambling mania and other +frivolous passions derive all their force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5, +sub-sect. 6). But there are besides so many false appearances in things, so +many imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects, so many +unjustified connexions in our arguments, that there is no need of this +little Fairy, that is, of this inward power operating as it were by +enchantment, to whom the author attributes all these disorders. Indeed, I +have already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contrary +to acknowledged reason, we are prompted to it by another reason stronger to +outward appearance, such as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearing +independent and of performing an extraordinary action. There was in days +past at the Court of Osnabrueck a tutor to the pages, who, like a second +Mucius Scaevola, held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a +gangrene, in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a +very acute pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even know +if a writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existence +of a power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason, +would be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing some +good benefice or some high office, simply in order to display this +superiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that an +intelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someone +would nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply +imitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held his +book on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a thing +may easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense with +his office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day people +are found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, that is to +say, actual goods to the mere semblance of them. + +26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author, +which often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry, +usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I should be +obliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to avoid doing +so, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The best thing is +that with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. After having +advanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth chapter, [438] +that we approach God through the capacity to choose without reason, and +that this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capable +of making one happy, things in the highest degree paradoxical, since it is +reason which leads us to imitate God and our happiness lies in following +reason: after that, I say, the author provides an excellent corrective, for +he says rightly (Sec. 5) that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to +things, since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and that +this is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that is +well said, but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far as +possible by the reality of the objects, and by true representations of good +and evil. Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to +freedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering to +our happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it is +happily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being of +reasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not even +possible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings of +non-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrong +elections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that are +impossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or already +taken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that by +prejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will, +which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will say as +much of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source of wrong +elections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness in changing +too readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad habits; finally +there is the importunity of the appetites, which often drive us +inopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is designed to +reconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of God; and +this section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. The author +has cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he asserts that +without a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choice +there would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse to creatures +a power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be actuated by the +representations of goods and evils; it was therefore easy, according to the +author's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To extricate himself from this +difficulty, he has no other resource than to state that if this power [439] +were removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passive +machine. But that is the very thing which I have disproved. If this power +were missing in the world (as in fact it is), one would hardly complain of +the fact. Souls will be well content with the representations of goods and +evils for the making of their choice, and the world will remain as +beautiful as it is. The author comes back to what he had already put +forward here, that without this power there would be no happiness. But I +have given a sufficient answer to that, and there is not the slightest +probability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he puts +forward here to support his principal paradox. + +27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that those +who pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it seems +as though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, men +will be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling themselves as +to whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, or not. Indeed, +if they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the +general order of things. Also this opinion of our author is a very +reasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, just as +there is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have communication +with one another, even as bodies do. God employs the ministry of angels in +his rule of mankind, without any detriment to the order of nature. +Nevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than to +explain them, unless one have recourse to my system of Harmony. But the +author goes somewhat further. He believes that the mission of the Holy +Spirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that now his operations +within us are natural. I leave it to him to explain his opinion, and to +settle the matter with other theologians. Yet I observe that he finds the +natural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better, +of overcoming the passions, and of winning for oneself a certain degree of +new grace. I can say almost the same things on my hypothesis, which +represents the will as acting only in accordance with motives; and I am +immune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved over +his power of choosing without cause. He is in great embarrassment also with +regard to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectly +indifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? and +what sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440] +thing, if there is no reason for its existence? The author puts off to some +other occasion the solution of this difficulty, which would require +(according to him) an entire work. For the rest, he sometimes speaks +pertinently, and in conformity with my principles, on the subject of moral +evil. He says, for example (sub-sect. 6), that vices and crimes do not +detract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to it, just as +certain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were +heard quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony more +pleasing. He also points out divers goods involved in evils, for instance, +the usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor; indeed +it serves to make the arts flourish. We must also bear in mind that we are +not to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that is +known to us. For the stains and defects in it may be found as useful for +enhancing the beauty of the rest as patches, which have nothing beautiful +in themselves, are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole +face, although they disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book, +had compared providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physician +who allows wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse +which will be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. The +author replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, and +that the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not given +reason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like a +physician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One may +add that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence of +reason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, but not +adequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed to +ourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed. +The author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the book by +Lactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are more or less +as follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so, +in which case he would be weak; or he can abolish them, and will not, which +would be a sign of malignity in him; or again he lacks power and also will, +which would make him appear both weak and jealous; or finally he can and +will, but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil, +if he exists? The author replies that God cannot banish evil, that he does +not wish to either, and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious [441] +nor weak. I should have preferred to say that he can banish evil, but that +he does not wish to do so absolutely, and rightly so, because he would then +banish good at the same time, and he would banish more good than evil. +Finally our author, having finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, in +which he speaks of the Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws into +natural and positive. He observes that the particular laws of the nature of +animals must give way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not in +reality angered when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that he +who sins should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violence +to others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that the +positive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its +infliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation +of the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, and +which nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although the +wicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, that +these punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people. He +is doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing: +for it might be that the damned are fools, capable of clinging to their +state of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which, he maintains, +makes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midst +of their misery, and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of God. +For every day one sees peevish, malicious, envious people who enjoy the +thought of their ills, and seek to bring affliction upon themselves. These +ideas are not worthy of contempt, and I have sometimes had the like myself, +but I am far from passing final judgement on them. I related, in 271 of the +essays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of the +pardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron Andre Taifel, an Austrian +nobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria who became +the second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which appears to +mean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, with this +Spanish motto, _Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido_, the more lost, the less +repentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot free +oneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the Spanish Count of +Villamediana when he was said to be in love with the Queen. Coming to the +question why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked, [442] +our illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered, and +that hardly any doubt remains on that point. He observes nevertheless that +one may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not been +made good by their very misfortune, and whether the fortunate wicked have +not perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. He adds that we are often bad +judges, when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man, but +also a happy man. One often honours a hypocrite, and one despises another +whose solid virtue is without pretence. We are poor judges of happiness +also, and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented +poor man, while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the +great. Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here on +earth lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that to +the wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or +chastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greater +good. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and one can say +nothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work. + + [443] + * * * * * + +CAUSA DEI ASSERTA +PER JUSTITIAM EJUS + +_cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam._ + +The original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under this +title. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the positive +doctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the academic +requirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of interest to many +modern readers, and is consequently omitted here. + + [445] + * * * * * + +INDEX + + Abelard, 122, 232-4, 272 + Abraham, 209 + Adam, 222, 270-2, 346-7 + Adam Kadmon, 133 + Albius, Thomas, 122 + Alcuin, 77 + Alfonso, King of Castile, 247-8 + Aloysius Novarinus, 191 + Alrasi, 288 + Alvarez, 149 + Ambrose, St., 153, 194 + Amyraut, 238 + Anaxagoras, 353 + Andradius, Jacques Payva, 176 + Andreas Cisalpinus, 81 + Angelus Silesius, Johann, 79 + Annat, 344-5 + Anselm, St., 77 + Antipater, 232 + Aquinas, Thomas, _see_ Thomas + Arcesilaus, 337 + Archidemus, 232 + Aristotelians, 27-8 + Aristotle, 13, 76-8, 81, 148, 170, 195, 203, 229, 241, 243-4, 265, 269, + 283, 304, 309-10, 324, 352, 353, 409 + Arminius, _see_ Irminius + Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), 383, 398 + Arnauld, 67, 89, 225, 254, 260, 264-6, 351 + Arriaga, 112, 356 + Arrian, 232 + Assassins, 284 + Athanasius, St., 87 + Augustine (of Hippo), St., 60, 100, 122, 134, 148, 166, 173, 187, 226, + 274, 285, 294, 296-7, 300-3, 347, 352-3, 378, 384, 409, 412 + ----, his disciples, 145, 297, 300, 324, 330, 348 + Augustus (Emperor), 287 + Aulus Gellius, 258-9, 325, 327 + Aureolus, Cardinal, 139, 353 + Averroes, Averroists, 77 ff. + + Bacon, Francis, 306 + Banez, 149 + Barbaro, Ermolao, 170 + Baron, Vincent, 121 + Baronius, Robert, 84 + Barton, Thomas, 122 + Basil, St., 221, 352 + Bayle, P., 34 ff. _et passim_ + Becher, Johann Joachim, 334-5 + Becker, 221 + Bede, 77 + Bellarmine, St. Robert, 107, 313, 323 + Berigardus, Claudius, 81 + Berkeley, Bp., 11 + Bernard, St., 277 + Bernier, 139, 353 + Bertius, 227 + de Beze, Theodore, 274 + _Birgitta, Revelations of St._, 173 + Boethius, 76, 365-6 + Bonartes, Thomas, 58, 121-2 + Bonaventura, St., 294 + des Bosses, Fr., 121, 389 + Bossuet, 10 + Bradwardine, Abp., 159, 176 + Bramhall, Bp. John, 161, 393 + Bredenburg, Johan, 349-50 + Brunswick, Duke of, 8, 82 + Buckingham, Duke of, 142 + Buridan's ass, 150, 311, 312 + Burnet, Thomas, 278 + + Cabalists, 79, 133, 347 + Caesar Cremoninus, 81 + Cajetan, Cardinal, 100, 243 + Calanus, 284, 434 + Caligula, 227 + Calixtus, 108 + Calli, 359 + Callimachus, 213 + Calovius, 84 + Calvin, 84-5, 101, 165, 222, 238, 240, 328 + Cameron, 313 + Campanella, 217 + Capella, Martianus, 264 + Cardan, Jerome, 282, 286 + Carneades, 312, 320-1, 337 + Caroli, Andreas, 227 + Casaubon, Meric, 285 + Caselius, 82 + Cassiodorus, 76 + [Page 446] + Casuists, 194, 222, 241 + Catharin, Ambrose, 173 + Catherine de Medicis, 227 + Cato, 263, 318 + Celsus, 102-3 + Chardin, 209 + de la Charmoye, Abbe, 213 + Chemnitz, Martin, 111, 176 + Christine, Queen of Sweden, 96, 104 + Chrysippus, 229-32, 258-9, 324-7 + Cicero, 99, 194, 229-32, 241, 286, 297, 312, 321, 324-5, 342 + Claudian, 132, 191, 215 + Cleanthes, 233, 324 + Coelius Secundus Curio, 134 + Coimbra, Fathers of, 325 + Colerus, 350 + Conringius, 161, 422 + Constance, Council of, 234 + de la Cour, 350-1 + Crellius, 161 + Cudworth, Ralph, 64, 245 + Cuper, Franz, 350 + Cyrano de Bergerac, 331 + + Dacier, 337 + Daille, 70, 107 + Davidius, John, 179 + _De Auxiliis_, 168 + Democritus, 324 + Descartes, 12-13, 19-21, 107, 111-12, 140, 150, 156, 224 ff., 239, 244, + 265, 281, 304, 331, 333, 334, 343, 390, 409, 426 + Desmarests, Samuel, 241 + Diodorus, 230-2 + Diogenianus, 325 + Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 232 + Diphilus, 285 + Diroys, 249-53, 329 + Dominicans, 348 + Dreier, 244 + Drexler, 291 + Dualists, 251 + du Plessis-Mornay, 91 + Durand de Saint-Pourcain, 139, 324, 341, 353 + + Empedocles, 324 + Epictetus, 352 + Epicureans, 282-3 + Epicurus, 229-30, 310-11, 319, 320, 324, 395 + Esprit, Abbe, 131 + Euclid, 261 + Euripides, 284, 285 + Eusebius, 326 + Eutrapelus, 191 + + Fabricius, Johann Ludwig, 67 + Fabry, 333 + Fecht, 290, 291, 293 + Fenelon, 287 + Fludde, 184 + Fonseca, 145 + Foucher, 34, 89, 337 + Francis I of France, 204 + Francis of Sales, St., 176 + Francis Xavier, St., 176 + Freitag, Johann, 171 + Fromondus, Libertus, 89 + Fulgentius, 167 + _Fur praedestinatus_, 227 + + della Galla, Julius Caesar, 171 + Gassendi, 12, 337 + Gatacre, Thomas, 262 + Gerhard, Johann, 291 + Gerson, 79 + Gibieuf, 344-5 + Glarea, Antonio, 366 + Godescalc, 167, 294 + Gomarists, 227 + Gregory, St., the Great, 100, 291, 293, 294 + Gregory, St., of Nazianzus, 173 + Gregory, St., of Nyssa, 132 + Gregory of Rimini, 173 + Grotius, 77, 91, 161, 194, 241, 243, 276 + Guerre, Martin, 97-8 + Gymnosophists, 284 + + Hartsoeker, 172 + Heliodorus of Larissa, 437 + Heraclitus, 324 + Herminius, _see_ Irminius + Hermippus, 209 + Herodotus, 196, 208, 210 + Heshusius, Tilemann, 82 + Hobbes, Thomas, 67, 89, 159, 161, 234, 265, 348, 393 ff., 410 + Hoffmann, Daniel, 82 + Horace, 131, 318 + Homer, 284 + Hyde, 209 + + Innocent III, Pope, 131 + Irminius, 209 + Isbrand, 238 + + Jansenists, 145, 346-7 + Jansenius, 344 + Jacquelot, 157, 223, 259, 265, 278, 341 + Jerome, St., 132 + John of Damascus, St., 77 + [Page 447] + John Scot, 171 + Jung, 261 + Jupiter, 213 + Jurieu, 174, 187, 290-2, 356 + Justin, 208 + + Keckermann, Bartholomaeus, 106 + Keilah, siege of, 145-6 + Kendal, George, 228 + Kepler, 140, 353 + Kerkering, 351 + Kessler, Andreas, 83 + Kortholt, Sebastian, 351 + Krell, Nicolas, 398 + + de Labadie, Jean, 82 + Lactantius, 221, 285, 286, 440 + Lami, Francois, 89, 359 + Lateran Council, 80 + Laud, Abp., 398 + de Launoy, 100 + Lazarus, 294 + le Clerc, 64, 121, 132, 245, 292 + Leeuwenhoek, 172 + Limbourg, 350 + Lipsius, Justus, 325, 337, 353 + Livy, 263 + Locke, John, 8, 9, 33-4, 86, 409 + Loescher, 298 + Louis of Dole, 149, 353 + Lucan, 122, 212 + Lucian, 265, 434 + Lucretius, 320 + Lully, Raymond, 106 + Luther, 67, 81, 99, 101, 110-11, 122, 298, 328, 395 + + Machiavelli, 216 + Maignan, 359 + Maimonides, 287-8 + Malebranche, 172, 244, 254 ff., 276, 280, 333, 359, 361 + Manichaeans, 59, 98, 113, 124, 208, 274, 419 + Marchetti, 320 + Marcion, 213 + Marcus Aurelius, 263 + Mary, Blessed Virgin, 193 + Matthieu, Pierre, 204 + Maurice, Prince, 398 + Melanchthon, 81 + Melissus, 218, 220 + Menage, 232 + Meyer, Louis, 82 + Mithras, 209 + Molina, 145, 173, 207 + Molinists, 145, 317, 324, 342 + More, Henry, 169 + Moses Germanus, 79 + de la Motte le Vayer, 282 + Musaeus, Johann, 86, 111 + + Naude, Gabriel, 81 + Newcastle, Duke of, 393 ff. + Newton, Isaac, 34, 85-6 + Nicole, 96-7, 174, 291, 299 + Nominalists, 203 + Novarini, 286 + + Ochino, Bernardino, 89 + Onomaus, 325 + Opalenius, 194 + Origen, 102-3, 132, 235, 294 + Origenists, 260, 292 + Orobio, 350 + Ovid, 209, 220, 306 + + Pardies, 333 + Pascal, 35 + Paul, St., 129-30, 238, 260 + Paulicians, _see_ Manichaeans + Pelagius, 139 + Pelisson, 176 + Pereir, Louis, 139 + Peter Lombard, 290 + Pfanner, 352 + Pierre de Saint-Joseph, 342, 357 + Pietists, Leipzig, 83 + Piscator, 207 + Pitcairne, 172 + Plato, 59, 76, 135, 148, 209, 241, 286, 297, 321, 352-4 + Pliny the Younger, 204, 209, 284, 287, 365 + Plutarch, 208, 231, 326, 353 + Pomponazzi, 80, 161 + de la Porree, Gilbert, 122 + de Preissac, 80 + Prudentius, 132, 218 + Ptolomei, Fr., 70 + Pufendorf, 194, 241, 403 + Pythagoras, 172 + + Quenel, Fr., 70 + Quietists, 79 + + Rachelius, 194 + de la Ramee, Pierre, 81 + Ravaillac, 204 + Regis, 305, 330, 340 + Remonstrants, 226 + Reynaud, Theophile, 348 + [Page 448] + Rodon, David de, 354 + Rorarius, 160 + Rutherford, Samuel, 236, 238, 269 + Ruysbroek, 79 + + Saguens, 359 + Salmeron, 173 + Saurin, 106 + Scaliger, Joseph, 89, 104-5 + Scaliger, Julius, 170 + Scherzer, 84 + Schoolmen, 75, 77, 100, 241, 290, 310, 354, 407 + Scioppius, 337 + Scotists, 243, 324 + Scotus, Duns, 203, 271, 328, 383 + Seneca, 226, 285 + Sennert, Daniel, 171 + Sentences, Master of the, _see_ Peter Lombard + Servetus, Michael, 81 + Sfondrati, Cardinal, 129, 173 + Sharrok, 194 + Silenus, 286 + Slevogt, Paul, 82 + Socinians, 58, 83-4, 161-2, 307, 343, 394, 412, 423 + Sonner, Ernst, 290 + Spee, Friedrich, 176-7 + Sperling, Johann, 171 + Sperling, Otto, 212 + Spinoza, 67, 68, 79, 82, 159, 234-6, 331, 348-51, 359, 418 + Stahl, Daniel, 243 + Stegman, Josua, 107 + Stegmann, Christopher, 84 + Steno, 178 + Steuchus, Augustinus, 91 + Stoics, 79, 232, 263, 282-3, 324 ff., 342 + Strato, 67, 245-6, 331, 335, 336, 349, 395 + Strinesius, 241 + Sturm, 69, 261 + Suarez, 314 + Suetonius, 287 + Supralapsarians, 166, 228, 236, 238, 269, 273-4, 289 + Swammerdam, 172 + + Tacitus, 210, 211, 265, 287 + Taifel, Baron Andre, 441 + Taurel, Nicolas, 81, 353 + Tertullian, 101 + Thomas Aquinas, St., 174, 176, 241, 243, 262, 324, 357, 378, 383 + Thomasius, Jacob, 243, 265 + Thomists, 145, 149, 241, 311, 324, 344, 347 + Tiberius, 227 + Timon, 265 + Tiresias, 230 + Toland, John, 106 + de Tournemine, Fr., 69 + Trajan, 293 + Trogus, 208 + Turretin, 240 + Twiss, 238 + + Ursinus, Zacharias, 291 + Usserius, 70 + + Valla, Laurentius, 67, 344, 365 ff. + van Beverwyck, Johan, 153-4 + van den Ende, Franz, 351 + van den Hoof, 350 + van der Weye, 82 + van Helmont, 169 + Vanini, Lucilio, 434 + Vedelius, Nicolaus, 86, 111 + Velleius Paterculus, 318 + Vergil, 78-9, 122, 287, 293, 306, 315 + Veron, Francois, 107 + Verse, Aubert de, 350 + Voetius, Gisbertus, 86 + Vorstius, Conrad, 58 + Vogelsang, 82 + + von Wallenberg, Bp. Peter, 67 + Wander, William, 169 + Weigel, Erhard, 261, 355 + Weigel, Valentine, 79 + de Witt, 351 + Wittich, 187, 306-7, 309 + von Wollzogen, 82 + Wyclif, John, 122, 159, 234, 272, 395 + + Xanthus, 209 + + Zeisold, Johann, 171 + Zoroaster, 71, 208-10, 218 + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy, by G. W. 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