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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy, by G. W. Leibniz
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Theodicy
+       Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil
+
+Author: G. W. Leibniz
+
+Commentator: Austin Farrer
+
+Translator: E.M. Huggard
+
+Release Date: November 24, 2005 [EBook #17147]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEODICY ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by John Hagerson, Juliet Sutherland, Keith Edkins
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+Theodicy
+
+Essays on
+the Goodness of God
+the Freedom of Man and
+the Origin of Evil
+
+G.W. LEIBNIZ
+
+Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, Fellow of Trinity College,
+Oxford
+
+Translated by E.M. Huggard from C.J. Gerhardt's Edition of the Collected
+Philosophical Works, 1875-90
+
+Open [Logo] Court
+
+La Salle, Illinois 61301
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[Logo]
+
+OPEN COURT and the above logo are registered in the U.S. Patent & Trademark
+Office.
+
+  Published 1985 by Open Court Publishing Company, Peru, Illinois 61354.
+  This edition first published 1951 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited,
+      London.
+  Second printing 1988
+  Third printing 1990
+  Fourth printing 1993
+  Fifth printing 1996
+
+Printed and bound in the United States of America.
+
+LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
+
+  Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716.
+    Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the
+  freedom of man, and the origin of evil.
+
+    Translation of: Essais de Theodicee.
+    Includes index.
+    1. Theodicy--Early works to 1800. I. Title.
+  B2590.E5 1985 231'.8 85-8833
+  ISBN O-87548-437-9
+
+                                                                        [5]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CONTENTS
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION                                                page 7
+PREFACE                                                                  49
+PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH                 73
+REASON
+ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE    123, 182, 276
+ORIGIN OF EVIL, IN THREE PARTS
+                                APPENDICES
+SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY, REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS                 377
+EXCURSUS ON THEODICY, Sec. 392                                             389
+REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN                     393
+ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE'
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL',               405
+PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON
+CAUSA DEI ASSERTA                                                       443
+INDEX                                                                   445
+
+                                                                        [7]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+I
+
+Leibniz was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that his
+head was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences lacked interest for
+him. Not at all--he felt a lively concern for theological debate, he was a
+mathematician of the first rank, he made original contributions to physics,
+he gave a realistic attention to moral psychology. But he was incapable of
+looking at the objects of any special enquiry without seeing them as
+aspects or parts of one intelligible universe. He strove constantly after
+system, and the instrument on which his effort relied was the speculative
+reason. He embodied in an extreme form the spirit of his age. Nothing could
+be less like the spirit of ours. To many people now alive metaphysics means
+a body of wild and meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument. A
+professor of metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with the
+duties of his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements at
+all, though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them, by showing
+them up as confused forms of something else. A chair in metaphysical
+philosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases: what is
+taught from it is not the propagation but the cure.
+
+Confidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed through
+philosophical history; periods of speculation have been followed by periods
+of criticism. The tide will flow again, but it has not turned yet, and  [8]
+such metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue a
+case for the possibility of their art. It would be an embarrassing task to
+open an approach to Leibnitian metaphysics from the present metaphysical
+position, if there is a present position. If we want an agreed
+starting-point, it will have to be historical.
+
+The historical importance of Leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable. If
+metaphysical thinking is nonsensical, its empire over the human imagination
+must still be confessed; if it is as chimerical a science as alchemy, it is
+no less fertile in by-products of importance. And if we are to consider
+Leibniz historically, we cannot do better than take up his _Theodicy_, for
+two reasons. It was the only one of his main philosophical works to be
+published in his lifetime, so that it was a principal means of his direct
+influence; the Leibniz his own age knew was the Leibniz of the _Theodicy_.
+Then in the second place, the _Theodicy_ itself is peculiarly rich in
+historical material. It reflects the world of men and books which Leibniz
+knew; it expresses the theological setting of metaphysical speculation
+which still predominated in the first years of the eighteenth century.
+
+Leibniz is remembered for his philosophy; he was not a professional
+philosopher. He was offered academic chairs, but he declined them. He was a
+gentleman, a person of means, librarian to a reigning prince, and
+frequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance. The librarian
+might at any moment become the political secretary, and offer his own
+contributions to policy. Leibniz was for the greater part of his active
+life the learned and confidential servant of the House of Brunswick; when
+the Duke had nothing better to do with him, he set him to research into
+ducal history. If Leibniz had a profession in literature, it was history
+rather than philosophy. He was even more closely bound to the interests of
+his prince than John Locke was to those of the Prince of Orange. The Houses
+of Orange and of Brunswick were on the same side in the principal contest
+which divided Europe, the battle between Louis XIV and his enemies. It was
+a turning-point of the struggle when the Prince of Orange supplanted
+Louis's Stuart friends on the English throne. It was a continuation of the
+same movement, when Leibniz's master, George I, succeeded to the same
+throne, and frustrated the restoration of the Stuart heir. Locke returned
+to England in the wake of the Prince of Orange, and became the          [9]
+representative thinker of the regime. Leibniz wished to come to the English
+court of George I, but was unkindly ordered to attend to the duties of his
+librarianship. So he remained in Hanover. He was then an old man, and
+before the tide of favour had turned, he died.
+
+Posterity has reckoned Locke and Leibniz the heads of rival sects, but
+politically they were on the same side. As against Louis's political
+absolutism and enforced religious uniformity, both championed religious
+toleration and the freedom of the mind. Their theological liberalism was
+political prudence; it was not necessarily for that reason the less
+personally sincere. They had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with bigotry,
+or set Protestant intolerance against Catholic absolutism. But they had too
+much sympathy with the spirit of Europe to react into free thinking or to
+make a frontal attack on revealed truth. They took their stand on a
+fundamental Christian theism, the common religion of all good men; they
+repudiated the negative enormities of Hobbes and Spinoza.
+
+The Christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of defences.
+The base line was to be the substance of Christian theism and of Christian
+morals, and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason, without aid
+from scriptural revelation. The middle line was laid down by the general
+sense of Scripture, and the defence of it was this. 'Scriptural doctrine is
+reconcilable with the findings of sheer reason, but it goes beyond them. We
+believe the Scriptures, because they are authenticated by marks of
+supernatural intervention in the circumstances of their origin. We believe
+them, but reason controls our interpretation of them.' There remained the
+most forward and the most hazardous line: the special positions which a
+Church, a sect, or an individual might found upon the scriptural
+revelation. A prudent man would not hold his advance positions in the same
+force or defend them with the same obstinacy as either of the lines behind
+them. He could argue for them, but he could not require assent to them.
+
+One cannot help feeling, indeed, the readiness of these writers to fall
+back, not only from the front line to the middle line, but from the middle
+line itself to the base line. Leibniz, for example, writes with perfect
+seriousness and decency about the Christian scheme of redemption, but it
+hardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from perdition. It is
+not the intervention of Mercy, by which alone He possesses himself of  [10]
+us: it is one of the ways in which supreme Benevolence carries out a cosmic
+policy; and God's benevolence is known by pure reason, and apart from
+Christian revelation.
+
+In one politically important particular the theological attitude of Leibniz
+differed from that of Locke. Both stood for toleration and for the
+minimizing of the differences between the sects. This was a serious enough
+matter in England, but it was an even more serious matter in Germany. For
+Germany was divided between Catholics and Protestants; effective toleration
+must embrace them both. English toleration might indulge a harmless
+Catholic minority, while rejecting the Catholic regime as the embodiment of
+intolerance. But this was not practical politics on the Continent; you must
+tolerate Catholicism on an equal footing, and come to terms with Catholic
+regimes. Leibniz was not going to damn the Pope with true Protestant
+fervour. It was his consistent aim to show that his theological principles
+were as serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his own
+church. On some points, indeed, he found his most solid support from
+Catholics; in other places there are hints of a joint Catholic-Lutheran
+front against Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's writings suggest that
+the important decisions cut across all the Churches, and not between them.
+
+Leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by the
+religious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the political
+weakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV's
+highest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in Catholic
+Austria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear.
+Leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could not
+the Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel?
+And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement?
+Hence Leibniz's famous negotiation with Bossuet for a basis of
+Catholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly destined to fail; and it was
+bound to recoil upon its author. How could he be a true Protestant who
+treated the differences with the Catholics as non-essentials? How could he
+have touched pitch and taken no defilement? Leibniz was generally admired,
+but he was not widely trusted. As a mere politician, he may be judged to
+have over-reached himself.
+
+It has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that Leibniz[11]
+the politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the same person; not
+at all to suggest that his rational theology was just political expediency.
+We may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine, the pre-established
+harmony between nature and grace. Everything happens as though Leibniz were
+a liberal politician, and his theology expressed his politics. Yes, but
+equally, everything happens as though Leibniz were a philosophical
+theologian, and his politics expressed his theology. His appreciation of
+Catholic speculation was natural and sincere; his dogmatic ancestry is to
+be looked for in Thomism and Catholic humanism as much as anywhere. Above
+all, he had himself a liberal and generous mind. It gave him pleasure to
+appreciate good wherever he could see it, and to discover a soul of truth
+in every opinion.
+
+From the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an independent
+thinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called it 'my
+principles', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes 'pre-established
+harmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was always ready to
+oblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a letter or an
+enclosed memorandum, and several such have come down to us. The doctrine
+may have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was applicable to every
+department of human speculation or enquiry. It provided a new alphabet of
+philosophical ideas, and everything in heaven and earth could be expressed
+in it; not only could be, but ought to be, and Leibniz showed tireless
+energy in working out restatements of standing problems.
+
+As a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may be
+compared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that Leibniz
+was a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there is no
+comparison between the two men in the width of their range. About many
+things Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the most
+surprising instance of his neglect--he assured the world that his whole
+doctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a theology?
+He scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it. He preferred to
+keep on defending and explaining his _esse est percipi_. With Leibniz it is
+wholly different; he carries his new torch into every corner, to illuminate
+the dark questions.
+
+The wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to its
+inventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will find it less[12]
+surprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in view from the
+start. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed upon
+him? What was he _not_ thinking of? He had a many-sided mind. If the
+origins of the principle were complex, little wonder that its applications
+were manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz who does not wish to be endlessly
+tedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of Leibniz's principle,
+and one source of its origin. We will here give an account of the matter
+which, we trust, will go most directly to the heart of it, but we will make
+no claims to sufficient interpretation of Leibniz's thought-processes.
+
+Leibniz, then, like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century, was
+reforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science. The science
+was mathematical in its form, mechanistical in its doctrine, and
+unanswerable in its evidence--it got results. But it was metaphysically
+intractable, and the doctrines of infinite and finite substance which it
+generated furnish a gallery of metaphysical grotesques; unless we are to
+except Leibniz; his system is, if nothing else, a miracle of ingenuity, and
+there are moments when we are in danger of believing it.
+
+It is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought to
+underestimate the tenacity of scholastic Aristotelianism. Descartes, we all
+know, was reared in it, but then Descartes overthrew it; and he had done
+his work and died by the time that Leibniz was of an age to philosophize at
+all. We expect to see Leibniz starting on his shoulders and climbing on
+from there. We are disappointed. Leibniz himself tells us that he was
+raised in the scholastic teaching. His acquaintance with Descartes's
+opinions was second-hand, and they were retailed to him only that they
+might be derided. He agreed, like an amiable youth, with his preceptors.
+
+The next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of Cartesian
+writings, and of other modern books beside, such as those of the atomist
+Gassendi. He was delighted with what he read, because of its fertility in
+the field of physics and mathematics; and for a short time he was an
+enthusiastic modern. But presently he became dissatisfied. The new systems
+did not go far enough, they were still scientifically inadequate. At the
+same time they went too far, and carried metaphysical paradox beyond the
+limits of human credulity.
+
+                                                                       [13]
+There is no mystery about Leibniz's scientific objections to the new
+philosophers. If he condemned them here, it was on the basis of scientific
+thought and observation. Descartes's formulation of the laws of motion
+could, for example, be refuted by physical experiment; and if his general
+view of physical nature was bound up with it, then so much the worse for
+the Cartesian philosophy. But whence came Leibniz's more strictly
+metaphysical objections? Where had he learned that standard of metaphysical
+adequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians? His own
+disciples might be satisfied to reply, that he learnt it from Reason
+herself; but the answer will not pass with us. Leibniz reasoned, indeed,
+but he did not reason from nowhere, nor would he have got anywhere if he
+had. His conception of metaphysical reason was what his early scholastic
+training had made it.
+
+There are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been taught,
+although, when put to it, we find it hard to name the teacher. Among them
+is something of this sort. 'Leibniz was a scholarly and sympathetic
+thinker. He had more sense of history than his contemporaries, and he was
+instinctively eclectic. He believed he could learn something from each of
+his great predecessors. We see him reaching back to cull a notion from
+Plato or from Aristotle; he even found something of use in the scholastics.
+In particular, he picked out the Aristotelian "entelechy" to stop a gap in
+the philosophy of his own age.' What this form of statement ignores is that
+Leibniz _was_ a scholastic: a scholastic endeavouring, like Descartes
+before him, to revolutionize scholasticism. The word 'entelechy' was,
+indeed, a piece of antiquity which Leibniz revived, but the thing for which
+it stood was the most familiar of current scholastic conceptions.
+'Entelechy' means active principle of wholeness or completion in an
+individual thing. Scholasticism was content to talk about it under the name
+of 'substantial form' or 'formal cause'. But the scholastic interpretation
+of the idea was hopelessly discredited by the new science, and the
+scholastic terms shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine. Leibniz
+wanted a term with a more general sound. 'There is an _X_', he wanted to
+say, 'which scholasticism has defined as substantial form, but I am going
+to give a new definition of it.' Entelechy was a useful name for _X_, the
+more so as it had the authority of Aristotle, the master of scholasticism.
+
+Under the name of entelechy Leibniz was upholding the soul of          [14]
+scholastic doctrine, while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes.
+The doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had
+_something_ in it; he could not settle down in the principles of Descartes
+or of Gassendi, because both ignored this vital _something_. Since the
+requirements of a new science would not allow a return to sheer
+scholasticism, it was necessary to find a fresh philosophy, in which
+entelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side by side.
+
+If one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the
+'ancient' doctrine he most abominated, he would most likely have replied,
+'Substantial form'. Let us recall what was rejected under this name, and
+why.
+
+The medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we may
+call common-sense biology. Biology, indeed, is the science of the living,
+and the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all physical
+bodies with life. What they did do was to take living bodies as typical,
+and to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them. Such an
+approach was _a priori_ reasonable enough. For we may be expected to know
+best the physical being closest to our own; and we, at any rate, are alive.
+Why not argue from the better known to the less known, from the nearer to
+the more remote, interpreting other things by the formula of our own being,
+and allowing whatever discount is necessary for their degree of unlikeness
+to us?
+
+Common-sense biology reasons as follows. In a living body there is a
+certain pattern of organized parts, a certain rhythm of successive motions,
+and a certain range of characteristic activities. The pattern, the sheer
+anatomy, is basic; but it cannot long continue to exist (outside a
+refrigerator) without accompanying vital rhythms in heart, respiration and
+digestion. Nor do these perform their parts without the intermittent
+support of variable but still characteristic activities: dogs not only
+breathe and digest, they run about, hunt their food, look for mates, bark
+at cats, and so on. The anatomical pattern, the vital rhythm, and the
+characteristic acts together express dogginess; they reveal the specific
+form of the dog. They _reveal_ it; exactly what the specific form
+_consisted in_ was the subject of much medieval speculation. It need not
+concern us here.
+
+Taking the form of the species for granted, common-sense biology proceeds
+to ask how it comes to be in a given instance, say in the dog Toby.    [15]
+Before this dog was born or thought of, his form or species was displayed
+in each of his parents. And now it looks as though the form of dog had
+detached itself from them through the generative act, and set up anew on
+its own account. How does it do that? By getting hold of some materials in
+which to express itself. At first it takes them from the body of the
+mother, afterwards it collects them from a wider environment, and what the
+dog eats becomes the dog.
+
+What, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog-form
+which assimilates them? Before assimilation, they have their own form.
+Before the dog eats the leg of mutton, it has the form given to it by its
+place in the body of a sheep. What happens to the mutton? Is it without
+remainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? It loses all its
+distinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some more
+basically material characteristics which it preserves. They underlay the
+structure of the mutton, and they continue to underlie the structure of the
+dog's flesh which supplants it. Whatever these characteristics may be, let
+us call them common material characteristics, and let us say that they
+belong to or compose a common material nature.
+
+The common material nature has its own way of existing, and perhaps its own
+principles of physical action. We may suppose that we know much or that we
+know little about it. This one thing at least we know, that it is capable
+of becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh. It is not essential
+to it to be mutton, or mutton it would always be; nor dog's flesh, or it
+would always be dog's flesh. It is capable of becoming either, according as
+it is captured by one or other system of formal organization. So the voters
+who are to go to the polls are, by their common nature, Englishmen; they
+are essentially neither Socialist curs nor Conservative sheep, but
+intrinsically capable of becoming either, if they become captured by either
+system of party organization.
+
+According to this way of thinking, there is a certain _looseness_ about the
+relation of the common material nature to the higher forms of organization
+capable of capturing it. Considered in itself alone, it is perhaps to be
+seen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own. It is heavy,
+then it will fall unless obstructed; it is solid, then it will resist
+intrusions. But considered as material for organization by higher forms, it
+is indeterminate. It acts in one sort of way under the persuasion of the
+sheep-form, and in another sort of way under the persuasion of the     [16]
+dog-form, and we cannot tell how it will act until we know which form is
+going to capture it. No amount of study bestowed on the common material
+nature will enable us to judge how it will behave under the persuasion of
+the higher organizing form. The only way to discover that is to examine the
+higher form itself.
+
+Every form, then, will really be the object of a distinct science. The form
+of the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common, but that merely
+happens to be so; we cannot depend upon it, or risk inferences from sheep
+to dog: we must examine each in itself; we shall really need a science of
+probatology about sheep, and cynology about dogs. Again, the common
+material nature has its own principles of being and action, so it will need
+a science of itself, which we may call hylology. Each of these sciences is
+mistress in her own province; but how many there are, and how puzzlingly
+they overlap! So long as we remain within the province of a single science,
+we may be able to think rigorously, everything will be 'tight'. But as soon
+as we consider border-issues between one province and another, farewell to
+exactitude: everything will be 'loose'. We can think out hylology till we
+are blue in the face, but we shall never discover anything about the entry
+of material elements into higher organizations, or how they behave when
+they get there. We may form perfect definitions and descriptions of the
+form of the dog as such, and still derive no rules for telling what
+elements of matter will enter into the body of a given dog or how they will
+be placed when they do. All we can be sure of is, that the dog-form will
+keep itself going in, and by means of, the material it embodies--unless the
+dog dies. But what happens to the matter in the body of the dog is
+'accidental' to the nature of the matter; and the use of this matter,
+rather than of some other equally suitable, is accidental to the nature of
+the dog.
+
+No account of material events can dispense with accidental relations
+altogether. We must at least recognize that there are accidental relations
+between particular things. Accident in the sense of brute fact had to be
+acknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of the last
+century. That atomism must allow it to be accidental, in this sense, that
+the space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other atoms in a given
+manner. It belonged neither to the nature of space to be occupied by just
+those atoms in just those places, nor to the nature of the atoms to be [17]
+distributed just like that over space; and so in a certain sense the
+environment of any atom was an accidental environment. That is, the
+particular arrangement of the environment was accidental. The nature of the
+environment was not accidental at all. It was proper to the nature of the
+atom to be in interaction with other atoms over a spatial field, and it
+never encountered in the fellow-denizens of space any other nature but its
+own. It was not subject to the accident of meeting strange natures, nor of
+becoming suddenly subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction. All
+interactions, being with its own kind, were reciprocal and obedient to a
+single set of calculable laws.
+
+But the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations between
+distinct sorts of _natures_, the form of living dog and the form of dead
+matter, for example. No one could know _a priori_ what effect an accidental
+relation would produce, and all accidental relations between different
+pairs of natures were different: at the most there was analogy between
+them. Every different nature had to be separately observed, and when you
+had observed them all, you could still simply write an inventory of them,
+you could not hope to rationalize your body of knowledge. Let us narrow the
+field and consider what this doctrine allows us to know about the wood of a
+certain kind of tree. We shall begin by observing the impressions it makes
+on our several senses, and we shall attribute to it a substantial form such
+as naturally to give rise to these impressions, without, perhaps, being so
+rash as to claim a knowledge of what this substantial form is. Still we do
+not know what its capacities of physical action and passion may be. We
+shall find them out by observing it in relation to different 'natures'. It
+turns out to be combustible by fire, resistant to water, tractable to the
+carpenter's tools, intractable to his digestive organs, harmless to
+ostriches, nourishing to wood-beetles. Each of these capacities of the wood
+is distinct; we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another, nor deduce
+them from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'.
+
+We can now see why 'substantial forms' were the _betes noires_ of the
+seventeenth-century philosophers. It was because they turned nature into an
+unmanageable jungle, in which trees, bushes, and parasites of a thousand
+kinds wildly interlaced. There was nothing for it, if science was to
+proceed, but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows: to
+postulate a single uniform nature, of which there should be a single
+science. Now neither probatology nor cynology could hope to be         [18]
+universal--the world is not all sheep nor all dog: it would have to be
+hylology; for the world is, in its spatial aspect, all material. Let us
+say, then, that there is one uniform material nature of things, and that
+everything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material nature;
+as the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply from an
+arrangement of vapours. And let us suppose that the interactions of the
+parts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead manipulable
+bodies--in mechanism, in fact. Such was the postulate of the new
+philosophers, and it yielded them results.
+
+It yielded them results, and that was highly gratifying. But what,
+meanwhile, had happened to those palpable facts of common experience from
+which the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise? Is the
+wholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations of
+its parts? Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is? Is the life of
+a living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch, except
+in degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance? And if an animal's
+body, say my own, is simply an agglomerate of minute interacting material
+units, and its wholeness is merely accidental and apparent, how is my
+conscious mind to be adjusted to it? For my consciousness appears to
+identify itself with that whole vital pattern which used to be called the
+substantial form. We are now told that the pattern is nothing real or
+active, but the mere accidental resultant of distinct interacting forces:
+it does no work, it exercises no influence or control, it _is_ nothing. How
+then can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? It cannot.
+Then is my soul homeless? Or is it to be identified with the activity and
+fortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in the
+animal clockwork? If so, how irrational! For the soul does not experience
+itself as the soul of one minute part, but as the soul of the body.
+
+Such questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the seventeenth-century
+philosophers. It will cause us no great surprise that Leibniz should have
+quickly felt that the Formal Principle of Aristotle and of the Scholastic
+philosophy must be by hook or by crook reintroduced--not as the detested
+_substantial form_, but under a name by which it might hope to smell more
+sweet, _entelechy_.
+
+Nothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy in[19]
+dealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions Descartes
+had proposed. He had boldly declared the unity of animal life to be purely
+mechanical, and denied that brutes had souls at all, or any sensation. He
+had to admit soul in man, but he still denied the substantial unity of the
+human body. It was put together like a watch, it was many things, not one:
+if Descartes had lived in our time, he would have been delighted to compare
+it with a telephone system, the nerves taking the place of the wires, and
+being so arranged that all currents of 'animal spirit' flowing in them
+converged upon a single unit, a gland at the base of the brain. In this
+unit, or in the convergence of all the motions upon it, the 'unity' of the
+body virtually consisted; and the soul was incarnate, not in the plurality
+of members (for how could it, being one, indwell many things?), but in the
+single gland.
+
+Even so, the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutely
+unintelligible, as Descartes disarmingly confessed. Incarnation was all
+very well in the old philosophy: those who had allowed the interaction of
+disparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particular
+difficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation. Why should
+not a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be dead
+matter as to 'indwell' it? But the very principle of the new philosophy
+disallowed the interaction of disparate natures, because such an
+interaction did not allow of exact formulation, it was a 'loose' and not a
+'tight' relation.
+
+From a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland theory
+would serve. If we could be content to view Descartes as a man who wanted
+to make the world safe for physical science, then there would be a good
+deal to be said for his doctrine. In the old philosophy exact science had
+been frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over the field of
+nature. Descartes had cleared them from as much of the field as science was
+then in a position to investigate; he allowed only one such relation to
+subsist, the one which experience appeared unmistakably to force upon
+us--that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle. He had exorcized the
+spirits from the rest of nature; and though there was a spirit here which
+could not be exorcized, the philosophic conjurer had nevertheless confined
+it and its unaccountable pranks within a minutely narrow magic circle: all
+mind could do was to turn the one tiny switch at the centre of its     [20]
+animal telephone system. It could create no energy--it could merely
+redirect the currents actually flowing.
+
+Practically this might do, but speculatively it was most disturbing. For if
+the 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance, it was admitted in
+principle; and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it would turn up
+elsewhere, and that the banishment of it from every other field represented
+a convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid metaphysical truth.
+Moreover, the correlation of the unitary soul with the unitary gland might
+do justice to a mechanistical philosophy, but it did not do justice to the
+soul's own consciousness of itself. The soul's consciousness is the 'idea'
+or 'representation' of the life of the whole body, certainly not of the
+life of the pineal gland nor, as the unreflective nowadays would say, of
+the brain. I am not conscious in, or of, my brain except when I have a
+headache; consciousness is in my eyes and finger-tips and so on. It is
+physically true, no doubt, that consciousness in and of my finger-tips is
+not possible without the functioning of my brain; but that is a poor reason
+for locating the consciousness in the brain. The filament of the electric
+bulb will not be incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo; but
+that is a poor reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo.
+
+Certainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply equivalent
+to the area of our body. But in so far as the confines of mental
+representation part company with the confines of the body, it is not that
+they may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland, but that they may
+expand and advance over the surrounding world. The mind does not represent
+its own body merely, it represents the world in so far as the world affects
+that body or is physically reproduced in it. The mind has no observable
+natural relation to the pineal gland. It has only two natural relations: to
+its body as a whole and to its effective environment. What Descartes had
+really done was to pretend that the soul was related to the pineal gland as
+it is in fact related to its whole body; and then that it was related to
+the bodily members as in fact it is related to outer environment. The
+members became an inner environment, known only in so far as they affected
+the pineal gland; just as the outer environment in its turn was to be known
+only in so far as it affected the members.
+
+                                                                       [21]
+This doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial. It was forced
+on Descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science: if the members
+were simply a plurality of things, they must really be parts of
+environment; the body which the soul indwelt must be _a_ body; presumably,
+then, the pineal gland. An untenable compromise, surely, between admitting
+and denying the reality of the soul's incarnation.
+
+What, then, was to be done? Descartes's rivals and successors attempted
+several solutions, which it would be too long to examine here. They
+dissatisfied Leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfied
+posterity. It will be enough for us here to consider what Leibniz did. He
+admitted, to begin with, the psychological fact. The unity of consciousness
+is the representation of a plurality--the plurality of the members, and
+through them the plurality of the world. Here, surely, was the very
+principle the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation of substantial
+unity with mechanical plurality of parts. For it is directly evident to us
+that consciousness focuses the plurality of environing things in a unity of
+representation. This is no philosophical theory, it is a simple fact. Our
+body, then, as a physical system is a mechanical plurality; as focused in
+consciousness it is a unity of 'idea'.
+
+Very well: but we have not got far yet. For the old difficulty still
+remains--it is purely arbitrary, after all, that a unitary consciousness
+should be attached to, and represent, a mechanical collection of things
+which happen to interact in a sort of pattern. If there is a consciousness
+attached to human bodies, then why not to systems of clockwork? If the body
+is _represented_ as unity, it must surely be because it _is_ unity, as the
+old philosophy had held. But how can we reintroduce unity into the body
+without reintroducing substantial form, and destroying the mechanistical
+plurality which the new science demanded?
+
+It is at this point that Leibniz produces the speculative postulate of his
+system. Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent the
+mind as the mind represents the members? For then the unity of person
+represented in the mind will become something actual in the members also.
+
+Representation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of traffic. If
+my mind represents my bodily members, something happens to my mind, for it
+becomes a representation of such members in such a state; but nothing
+happens to the members by their being so represented in the mind. The  [22]
+mental representation obeys the bodily facts; the bodily facts do not obey
+the mental representation. It seems nonsense to say that my members obey my
+mind _because_ they are mirrored in it. And yet my members do obey my mind,
+or at least common sense supposes so. Sometimes my mind, instead of
+representing the state my members are in, represents a state which it
+intends that they shall be in, for example, that my hand should go through
+the motion of writing these words. And my hand obeys; its action becomes
+the moving diagram of my thought, my thought is represented or expressed in
+the manual act. Here the relation of mind and members appears to be
+reversed: instead of its representing them, they represent it. With this
+representation it is the opposite of what it was with the other. By the
+members' being represented in the mind, something happened to the mind, and
+nothing to the members; by the mind's being represented in the members
+something happens to the members and nothing to the mind.
+
+Why should not we take this seriously? Why not allow that there is two-way
+traffic--by one relation the mind represents the members, by another the
+members represent the mind? But then again, how can we take it seriously?
+For representation, in the required sense, is a mental act; brute matter
+can represent nothing, only mind can represent. And the members are brute
+matter. But are they? How do we know that? By brute matter we understand
+extended lumps of stuff, interacting with one another mechanically, as do,
+for example, two cogs in a piece of clockwork. But this is a large-scale
+view. The cogs are themselves composed of interrelated parts and those
+parts of others, and so on _ad infinitum_. Who knows what the ultimate
+constituents really are? The 'modern' philosophers, certainly, have
+proposed no hypothesis about them which even looks like making sense. They
+have supposed that the apparently inert lumps, the cogs, are composed of
+parts themselves equally inert, and that by subdivision we shall still
+reach nothing but the inert. But this supposition is in flat contradiction
+with what physical theory demands. We have to allow the reality of _force_
+in physics. Now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily be
+the block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents. If not,
+where does it come from? Let it be supposed, then, that these minute real
+constituents are active because they are alive, because they are minds; for
+indeed we have no notion of activity other than the perception we have [23]
+of our own. We have no notion of it except as something mental. On the
+hypothesis that the constituents of active body are also mental, this
+limitation in our conception of activity need cause us neither sorrow nor
+surprise.
+
+The mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and fully
+conscious minds like yours or mine, and it is only for want of a better
+word that we call them minds at all. They will be mere unselfconscious
+representations of their physical environment, as it might be seen from the
+physical point to which they belong by a human mind paying no attention at
+all to its own seeing. How many of these rudimentary 'minds' will there be
+in my body? As many as you like--as many as it is possible there should
+be--say an infinite number and have done with it.
+
+We may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity without
+prejudicing mechanical plurality. Each of the mind-units in my body is
+itself and substantially distinct. But since each, in its own way and
+according to its own position, represents the superior and more developed
+mind which I call 'me', they will order themselves according to a common
+form. The order is real, not accidental: it is like the order of troops on
+a parade-ground. Each man is a distinct active unit, but each is really
+expressing by his action the mind of the officer in command. He is
+expressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks--to obey the
+officer is to keep in step with them. So the metaphysical units of the
+body, being all minds, represent one another as well as the dominant mind:
+one another co-ordinately, the dominant mind subordinately.
+
+But if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of mind,
+then _the_ mind is a mind among minds, a spirit-atom among spirit-atoms.
+What then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and makes it a mind
+_par excellence_? Well, what constitutes the officer an officer? Two
+things: a more developed mentality and the fact of being obeyed. In
+military life these two factors are not always perfectly proportioned to
+one another, but in the order of Leibniz's universe they are. A fuller
+power to represent the universe is necessarily combined with dominance over
+an organized troop of members; for the mind knows the universe only in so
+far as the universe is expressed in its body. That is what the         [24]
+_finitude_ of the mind means. Only an infinite mind appreciates the whole
+plurality of things in themselves; a finite mind perceives them in so far
+as mirrored in the physical being of an organized body of members. The more
+adequate the mirror, the more adequate the representation: the more highly
+organized the body, the more developed the mind.
+
+The developed mind has an elaborate body; but the least developed mind has
+still some body, or it would lack any mirror whatever through which to
+represent the world. This means, in effect, that Leibniz's system is not an
+unmitigated spiritual atomism. For though the spiritual atoms, or monads,
+are the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed, they stand
+composed together from the beginning in a minimal order which cannot be
+broken up. Each monad, if it is to be anything at all, must be a continuing
+finite representation of the universe, and to be that it must have a body,
+that is to say, it must have other monads in a permanent relation of mutual
+correspondence with it. And if you said to Leibniz, 'But surely any
+physical body can be broken up, and this must mean the dissolution of the
+organic relation between its monadical constituents,' he would take refuge
+in the infinitesimal. The wonders revealed by that new miracle, the
+microscope, suggested what the intrinsic divisibility of space itself
+suggests--whatever organization is broken up, there will still be a minute
+organization within each of the fragments which remains unbroken--and so
+_ad infinitum_. You will never come down to loose monads, monads out of all
+organization. You will never disembody the monads, and so remove their
+representative power; you will only reduce their bodies and so impoverish
+their representative power. In this sense no animal dies and no animal is
+generated. Death is the reduction and generation the enrichment of some
+existing monad's body; and, by being that, is the enrichment or the
+reduction of the monad's mental life.
+
+'But,' our common sense protests, 'it is too great a strain on our
+credulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from what
+sense and science make of them. If the real universe is what you say it is,
+why do our minds represent it to us as they do?' The philosopher's answer
+is, 'Because they _represent_ it. According to the truth of things, each
+monad is simply its own mental life, its own world-view, its own thoughts
+and desires. To know things as they are would be simultaneously to live
+over, as though from within and by a miracle of sympathy, the          [25]
+biographies of an infinite number of distinct monads. This is absolutely
+impossible. Our senses represent the coexistent families of monads _in the
+gross_, and therefore conventionally; what is in fact the mutual
+representation of monads in ordered systems, is represented as the
+mechanical interaction of spatially extended and material parts.' This does
+not mean that science is overthrown. The physical world-view is in terms of
+the convention of representation, but it is not, for all that, illusory. It
+can, ideally, be made as true as it is capable of being. There is no reason
+whatever for confusing the 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparent
+physical world with the fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination.
+
+So far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from the
+simplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation. The nature of
+idea, it is assumed, is to represent plurality in a unified view. If idea
+did not represent, it would not be idea. And since there _is_ idea (for our
+minds at least exist and are made up of idea) there is representation. It
+belongs to idea to represent, and since the whole world has now been
+interpreted as a system of mutually representing ideations, or ideators, it
+might seem that all their mutual relations are perfectly natural, a harmony
+of agreement which could not be other than it is. But if so, why does
+Leibniz keep saying that the harmony is _pre-established_, by special and
+infinitely elaborate divine decrees?
+
+Leibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludes
+interaction. By representing environment a mind does not do anything to
+environment, that is plain. But it is no less plain that environment does
+nothing to it, either. The act of representing is simply the act of the
+mind; it represents _in view of_ environment, of course, but not under the
+causal influence of environment. Representation is a business carried on by
+the mind on its own account, and in virtue of its innate power to
+represent.
+
+Very well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? Is
+not Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely stated
+alternatives? '_Either_ finite beings interact _or else_ they do not
+directly condition one another. Monads do not interact, therefore they do
+not directly condition one another. How then explain the actual conformity
+of their mutual representation, without recourse to divine fore-ordaining?'
+It seems sufficient to introduce a further alternative in the first line of
+the argument, and we are rid of the theology. Things may condition the [26]
+action of a further thing, without acting upon it. It acts of itself, but
+it acts in view of what they are. We are tempted to conclude that Leibniz
+has introduced the _Deus ex machina_ with the fatal facility of his age.
+'Where a little further meditation on the characters in the play would
+furnish a natural _denouement_, he swings divine intervention on to the
+scene by wires from the ceiling. It is easy for us to reconstruct for him
+the end of the piece without recourse to stage-machines.'
+
+Is it? No, I fear it is not. There is really no avoiding the
+pre-established harmony. And so we shall discover, if we pursue our train
+of reflexion a little further. It is natural, we were saying, than an idea
+should represent an environment; indeed, it _is_ the representation of one.
+Given no environment to represent, it would be empty, a mere capacity for
+representation. Then every idea or ideator, taken merely in itself, _is_ an
+empty capacity. But of what is the environment of each made up? According
+to the Leibnitian theory, of further ideas or ideators: of empty
+capacities, therefore. Then no idea will either be anything in itself, or
+find anything in its neighbours to represent. An unhappy predicament, like
+that of a literary clique in which all the members are adepts at discussing
+one another's ideas--only that unfortunately none of them are provided with
+any; or like the shaky economics of the fabled Irish village where they all
+lived by taking in one another's washing.
+
+It is useless, then, to conceive representations as simply coming into
+existence in response to environment, and modelling themselves on
+environment. They must all mutually reflect environment or they would not
+be representations; but they must also exist as themselves and in their own
+right or there would be no environment for them mutually to represent.
+Since the world is infinitely various, each representor must have its own
+distinct character or nature, as our minds have: that is to say, it must
+represent in its own individual way; and all these endlessly various
+representations must be so constituted as to form a mutually reflecting
+harmony. Considered as a representation, each monadical existence simply
+reflects the universe after its own manner. But considered as something to
+be represented by the others, it is a self-existent mental life, or world
+of ideas. Now when we are considering the fact of representation, that
+which is to be represented comes first and the representation follows upon
+it. Thus in considering the Leibnitian universe, we must begin with the[27]
+monads as self-existent mental lives, or worlds of ideas; their
+representation of one another comes second. Nothing surely, then, but
+omnipotent creative wisdom could have pre-established between so many
+distinct given mental worlds that harmony which constitutes their mutual
+representation.
+
+Our common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of the
+pre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do. Let
+the world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order, with room
+to manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another. Then, by good luck or
+good management, through friction and disaster, by trial and error, by
+accident or invention, they may work out for themselves a harmony of
+_action_. There is no need for divine preordaining here. But on Leibniz's
+view what the monads do is to represent, and what they are is
+representation; there is no ultimate distinction between what they are and
+what they do: all that they do belongs to what they are. The whole system
+of action in each monad, which fits with such infinite complexity the
+system of action in each other monad, is precisely the existence of that
+monad, and apart from it the monad is not. The monads do not _achieve_ a
+harmony, they _are_ a harmony, and therefore they are pre-established in
+harmony.
+
+Leibniz denied that he invoked God to intervene in nature, or that there
+was anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology. He was
+simply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutual
+representation; he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to be
+of its nature intrinsically pre-established, and therefore God-dependent.
+He was not adding anything to mutual representation, he was just showing
+what it necessarily contained or implied. At least he was doing nothing
+worse than recognized scholastic practice. Scholastic Aristotelianism
+explained all natural causality as response to stimulus, and then had to
+postulate a stimulus which stimulated without being stimulated, and this
+was God. Apart from this supreme and first stimulus nothing would in fact
+be moving. The Aristotelians claimed simply to be analysing the nature of
+physical motion as they perceived it, and to find the necessity of
+perpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it. No violence was
+thereby done to the system of physical motion nor was anything brought in
+from without to patch it up; it was simply found to be of its own      [28]
+nature God-dependent.
+
+It seems as though the reproachful description _'Deus ex machina'_ should
+be reserved for more arbitrary expedients than Aristotle's or Leibniz's,
+say for the occasionalist theory. Occasionalism appeared to introduce God
+that he might make physical matter do what it had no natural tendency to
+do, viz. to obey the volitions of finite mind. Ideas, on the other hand,
+have a natural tendency to represent one another, for to be an idea is to
+be a representation; God is not introduced by Leibniz to make them
+correspond, he is introduced to work a system in which they shall
+correspond. This may not be _Deus-ex-machina philosophy_, but it is
+_physical theology_; that is to say, it treats divine action as one factor
+among the factors which together constitute the working of the natural
+system. And this appears to be perhaps unscientific, certainly blasphemous:
+God's action cannot be a factor among factors; the Creator works through
+and in all creaturely action equally; we can never say 'This is the
+creature, and that is God' of distinguishable causalities in the natural
+world. The creature is, in its creaturely action, self-sufficient: but
+because a creature, insufficient to itself throughout, and sustained by its
+Creator both in existence and in action.
+
+The only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to the
+religious consciousness, and builds upon the insufficiency of finite
+existence throughout, because it is finite. All arguments to God's
+existence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites are
+to be rejected. They do not indicate God, they indicate the failure of our
+power to analyse the world-order. When Leibniz discovered that his system
+of mutual representations needed to be pre-established, he ought to have
+seen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out; he ought not to have
+said, 'With the help of God I will leap over the wall.'
+
+If we condemn Leibniz for writing physical theology, we condemn not him but
+his age. No contemporary practice was any better, and much of it a good
+deal worse, as Leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out. And
+because he comes to theology through physical theology, that does not mean
+that all his theology was physical theology and as such to be written off.
+On the contrary, Leibniz is led to wrestle with many problems which beset
+any philosophical theism of the Christian type. This is particularly so[29]
+in the _Theodicy_, as its many citations of theologians suggest. His
+discussions never lack ingenuity, and the system of creation and providence
+in which they result has much of that luminous serenity which colours the
+best works of the Age of Reason.
+
+Every theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to conceive
+God by the analogy of the human mind. When Leibniz declares the harmony of
+monads to be pre-established by God, he is invoking the image of
+intelligent human pre-arrangement. Nor is he content simply to leave it at
+that: he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act by which
+God pre-arranges; and this involves the detailed adaptation for theological
+purposes of Leibnitian doctrine about the human mind.
+
+The human mind, as we have seen, is the mind predominant in a certain
+system of 'minds', viz. in those which constitute the members of the human
+body. If we call it predominant, we mean that its system of ideas is more
+developed than theirs, so that there are more points in which each of them
+conforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them. The conception
+of a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous. It will be the
+conception of a mind _absolutely_ dominant, to whose ideas, that is to say,
+the whole system simply corresponds, without any reciprocating
+correspondence on his side. In a certain sense this is to make God the
+'Mind of the World'; and yet the associations of the phrase are misleading.
+It suggests that the world is an organism or body in which the divine mind
+is incarnate, and on which he relies for his representations. But that is
+nonsense; the world is not _a_ body, nor is it organic to God. Absolute
+dominance involves absolute transcendence: if everything in the world
+without remainder simply obeys the divine thoughts, that is only another
+way of saying that the world is the creature of God; the whole system is
+pre-established by him who is absolute Being and perfectly independent of
+the world.
+
+Of createdness, or pre-establishedness, there is no more to be said: we can
+think of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection to
+dominant mind. It is no use asking further _how_ God's thoughts are obeyed
+in the existence and action of things. What we can and must enquire into
+further, is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus obeyed. They
+must be understood to be volitions or decrees. There are indeed two ways in
+which things obey the divine thought, and correspondingly two sorts of
+divine thoughts that they obey. In so far as created things conform to [30]
+the mere universal principles of reason, they obey a reasonableness which
+is an inherent characteristic of the divine mind itself. If God wills the
+existence of any creature, that creature's existence must observe the
+limits prescribed by eternal reason: it cannot, for example, both have and
+lack a certain characteristic in the same sense and at the same time; nor
+can it contain two parts and two parts which are not also countable as one
+part and three parts. Finite things, if they exist at all, must thus
+conform to the reasonableness of the divine nature, but what the divine
+reasonableness thus prescribes is highly general: we can deduce from it
+only certain laws which any finite things must obey, we can never deduce
+from it which finite things there are to be, nor indeed that there are to
+be any. Finite things are particular and individual: each of them might
+have been other than it is or, to speak more properly, instead of any one
+of them there might have existed something else; it was, according to the
+mere principles of eternal reason, equally possible. But if so, the whole
+universe, being made up of things each of which might be otherwise, might
+as a whole be otherwise. Therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys by
+existing have the nature of _choices_ or _decrees_.
+
+What material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of the
+infinite mind making choices or decrees? If we use such language of God, we
+are using language which has its first and natural application to
+ourselves. We all of us choose, and those of us who are in authority make
+decrees. What is to choose? It involves a real freedom in the mind. A
+finite mind, let us remember, is nothing but a self-operating succession of
+perceptions, ideas, or representations. With regard to some of our ideas we
+have no freedom, those, for example, which represent to us our body. We
+think of them as constituting our given substance. They are sheer datum for
+us, and so are those reflexions of our environment which they mediate to
+us. They make up a closely packed and confused mass; they persevere in
+their being with an obstinate innate force, the spiritual counterpart of
+the force which we have to recognize in things as physically interpreted.
+Being real spiritual force, it is quasi-voluntary, and indeed do we not
+love our own existence and, in a sense, will it in all its necessary
+circumstances? But if we can be said to will to be ourselves and to enact
+with native force what our body and its environment makes us, we are   [31]
+merely willing to conform to the conditions of our existence; we are making
+no choice. When, however, we think freely or perform deliberate acts, there
+is not only force but choice in our activity. Choice between what? Between
+alternative possibilities arising out of our situation. And choice in
+virtue of what? In virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as
+seemingly better.
+
+Can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God's creative
+decrees? We will take the second point in it first: our choice is in virtue
+of the appeal of the seeming best. Surely the only corrective necessary in
+applying this to God is the omission of the word 'seeming'. His choice is
+in virtue of the appeal of the simply best. The other point causes more
+trouble. We choose between possibilities which arise for us out of our
+situation in the system of the existing world. But as the world does not
+exist before God's creative choices, he is in no world-situation, and no
+alternative possibilities can arise out of it, between which he should have
+to choose. But if God does not choose between intrinsic possibilities of
+some kind, his choice becomes something absolutely meaningless to us--it is
+not a choice at all, it is an arbitrary and unintelligible _fiat_.
+
+Leibniz's solution is this: what are mere possibilities of thought for us
+are possibilities of action for God. For a human subject, possibilities of
+action are limited to what arises out of his actual situation, but
+possibilities for thought are not so limited. I can conceive a world
+different in many respects from this world, in which, for example,
+vegetables should be gifted with thought and speech; but I can do nothing
+towards bringing it about. My imaginary world is practically impossible but
+speculatively possible, in the sense that it contradicts no single
+principle of necessary and immutable reason. I, indeed, can explore only a
+very little way into the region of sheer speculative possibility; God does
+not explore it, he simply possesses it all: the whole region of the
+possible is but a part of the content of his infinite mind. So among all
+possible creatures he chooses the best and creates it.
+
+But the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas. Out of
+the consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a choice?
+Why not? His mind is not, of course, discursive; he does not successively
+turn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds, for then he
+would never come to the end of it. Embracing infinite possibility in   [32]
+the single act of his mind, he settles his will with intuitive immediacy
+upon the best. The inferior, the monstrous, the absurd is not a wilderness
+through which he painfully threads his way, it is that from which he
+immediately turns; his wisdom is his elimination of it.
+
+But in so applying the scheme of choice to God's act, have we not
+invalidated its application to our own? For if God has chosen the whole
+form and fabric of the world, he has chosen everything in it, including the
+choices we shall make. And if our choices have already been chosen for us
+by God, it would seem to follow that they are not real open choices on our
+part at all, but are pre-determined. And if they are pre-determined, it
+would seem that they are not really even choices, for a determined choice
+is not a choice. But if we do not ourselves exercise real choice in any
+degree, then we have no clue to what any choice would be: and if so, we
+have no power of conceiving divine choice, either; and so the whole
+argument cuts its own throat.
+
+There are two possible lines of escape from this predicament. One is to
+define human choice in such a sense that it allows of pre-determination
+without ceasing to be choice; and this is Leibniz's method, and it can be
+studied at length in the _Theodicy_. He certainly makes the very best he
+can of it, and it hardly seems that any of those contemporaries whose views
+he criticizes was in a position to answer him. The alternative method is to
+make the most of the negative element involved in all theology. After all,
+we do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinite
+creative will. Perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divine
+freedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments. But so
+mystical a paradox is not the sort of thing we can expect to appeal to a
+late-seventeenth-century philosopher.
+
+One criticism of Leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making. He
+allows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative to
+a choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal is a
+choice of mere caprice. There is a sort of choice Leibniz never so much as
+considers and which appears at least to fall quite outside his categories,
+and that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic creativity. In such
+choice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme, we do not arbitrate
+simply between shaped and given possible schemes. And perhaps some such
+element enters into all our choices, since our life is to some extent  [33]
+freely designed by ourselves. If so, our minds are even more akin to the
+divine mind than Leibniz realized. For the sort of choice we are now
+referring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an infinite, or at
+least indefinite, range of less attractive possibility. And such is the
+nature of the divine creative choice. The consequence of such a line of
+speculation would be, that the divine mind designs more through us, and
+less simply for us, than Leibniz allowed: the 'harmony' into which we enter
+would be no longer simply 'pre-established'. Leibniz, in fact, could have
+nothing to do with such a suggestion, and he would have found it easy to be
+ironical about it if his contemporaries had proposed it.
+
+II
+
+Leibniz wrote two books; a considerable number of articles in learned
+periodicals; and an enormous number of unpublished notes, papers and
+letters, preserved in the archives of the Electors of Hanover not because
+of the philosophical significance of some of them, but because of the
+political importance of most of them. From among this great mass various
+excerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors of
+Leibniz's works. It may be that the most profound understanding of his mind
+is to be derived from some of these pieces, but if we wish to consider the
+public history of Leibniz, we may set them aside.
+
+Of the two books, one was published, and the other never was. The _New
+Essays_ remained in Leibniz's desk, the _Theodicy_ saw the light. And so,
+to his own and the succeeding generation, Leibniz was known as the author
+of the _Theodicy_.
+
+The articles in journals form the immediate background to the two books. In
+1696 Leibniz heard that a French translation of Locke's _Essay concerning
+Human Understanding_ was being prepared at Amsterdam. He wrote some polite
+comments on Locke's great work, and published them. He also sent them to
+Locke, hoping that Locke would write a reply, and that Leibniz's reflexions
+and Locke's reply might be appended to the projected French translation.
+But Locke set Leibniz's comments aside. Leibniz, not to be defeated, set to
+work upon the _New Essays_, in which the whole substance of Locke's book is
+systematically discussed in dialogue. The _New Essays_ were written in
+1703. But meanwhile a painful dispute had broken out between Leibniz   [34]
+and the disciples of Locke and Newton, in which the English, and perhaps
+Newton himself, were much to blame, and Leibniz thought it impolitic to
+publish his book. It was not issued until long after his death, in the
+middle of the century.
+
+The discussion with Locke was a failure: Locke would not play, and the book
+in which the whole controversy was to be systematized never appeared. The
+discussion with Bayle, on the other hand, was a model of what a discussion
+should be. Bayle played up tirelessly, and was never embarrassingly
+profound; he provided just the sort of objections most useful for drawing
+forth illuminating expositions; he was as good as a fictitious character in
+a philosophical dialogue. And the book in which the controversy was
+systematized duly appeared with great eclat.
+
+Here is the history of the controversy. In 1695 Leibniz was forty-nine
+years old. He had just emerged from a period of close employment under his
+prince's commands, and he thought fit to try his metaphysical principles
+upon the polite world and see what would come of it. He therefore published
+an article in the _Journal des Savants_ under the title: 'New System of
+Nature and of the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Union
+between Soul and Body'. In the same year Foucher published an article in
+the _Journal_ controverting Leibniz; and in the next year Leibniz replied
+with an 'Explanation'. A second explanation in the same year appeared in
+Basnage's _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, in answer to reflexions by
+the editor. M. Pierre Bayle had all these articles before him when he
+inserted a note on Leibniz's doctrine in his article on 'Rorarius', in the
+first edition of his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_. The point of
+connexion between Rorarius and Leibniz was no more than this, that both
+held views about the souls of beasts.
+
+Pierre Bayle was the son of a Calvinist pastor, early converted to
+Catholicism, but recovered to his old faith after a short time. He held
+academic employments in Switzerland and Holland; he promoted and edited the
+_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, and he produced that
+extraordinary work the _Historical and Critical Dictionary._ The notices it
+contains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs upon which Bayle
+could hang his philosophical reflexions. He could write an intelligent
+discussion on any opinion; what he could not do was to reconcile the points
+of view from which he felt impelled to write upon this author and that.[35]
+His was not a systematic mind. So far as he had a philosophical opinion, he
+was a Cartesian; in theology he was an orthodox Calvinist. He could not
+reconcile his theology with his Cartesianism and he did not try to. He made
+a merit of the oppositions of faith to reason and reason to itself, so that
+he could throw himself upon a meritorious and voluntary faith.
+
+There is nothing original in this position. It was characteristic of
+decadent scholasticism, it squared with Luther's exaggerations about the
+impotence of reason in fallen man, and Pascal had given his own highly
+personal twist to it. Bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of Voltairean
+scepticism. It would be truer to say that a Voltairean sceptic could read
+Bayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he wished.
+But Bayle was not a sceptic. It is hard to say what he was; his whole
+position as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused. He was a
+scholar, a wit, and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectly
+convenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality, we
+might have suspected Leibniz of inventing him.
+
+In the first edition of his _Dictionary_, under the article 'Rorarius',
+Bayle gave a very fair account of Leibniz's doctrine concerning the souls
+of animals, as it could be collected from his article in the _Journal des
+Savants_, 27 June 1695. He then proceeded to comment upon it in the
+following terms:
+
+'There are some things in Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to some
+difficulties, though they show the great extent of his genius. He will have
+it, for example, that the soul of a dog acts independently of outward
+bodies; that _it stands upon its own bottom, by a perfect _spontaneity_
+with respect to itself, and yet with a perfect _conformity_ to outward
+things_.... That _its internal perceptions arise from its original
+constitution, that is to say, the representative constitution (capable of
+expressing beings outside itself in relation to its organs) which was
+bestowed upon it from the time of its creation, and makes its individual
+character_ (_Journal des Savants_, 4 July 1695). From whence it results
+that it would feel hunger and thirst at such and such an hour, though there
+were not any one body in the universe, and _though nothing should exist but
+God and that soul_. He has explained (_Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_,
+Feb. 1696) his thought by the example of two pendulums that should
+perfectly agree: that is, he supposes that according to the particular laws
+which put the soul upon action, it must feel hunger at such an hour;   [36]
+and that according to the particular laws which direct the motion of
+matter, the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that same
+hour as it is modified when the soul is hungry. I will forbear preferring
+this system to that of occasional causes till the learned author has
+perfected it. I cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and spontaneous
+actions which would have this effect, that the soul of a dog would feel
+pain immediately after having felt joy, though it were alone in the
+universe. I understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure to pain
+when, being very hungry and eating a piece of bread, he is suddenly struck
+with a cudgel. But I cannot apprehend that his soul should be so framed
+that at the very moment of his being beaten he should feel pain though he
+were not beaten, and though he should continue to eat bread without any
+trouble or hindrance. Nor do I see how the spontaneity of that soul should
+be consistent with the sense of pain, and in general with any unpleasing
+perceptions.
+
+'Besides, the reason why this learned man does not like the Cartesian
+system seems to me to be a false supposition; for it cannot be said that
+the system of occasional causes brings in God acting by a miracle (ibid.),
+_Deum ex machina_, in the mutual dependency of the body and soul: for since
+God does only intervene according to general laws, he cannot be said to act
+in an extraordinary manner. Does the internal and active virtue
+communicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz know the train
+of actions which it is to produce? By no means; for we know by experience
+that we are ignorant whether we shall have such and such perceptions in an
+hour's time. It were therefore necessary that the forms should be directed
+by some internal principle in the production of their acts. But this would
+be _Deus ex machina,_ as much as in the system of occasional causes. In
+fine, as he supposes with great reason that all souls are simple and
+indivisible, it cannot be apprehended how they can be compared with a
+pendulum, that is, how by their original constitution they can diversify
+their operations by using the spontaneous activity bestowed upon them by
+their Creator. It may clearly be conceived that a simple being will always
+act in a uniform manner, if no external cause hinders it. If it were
+composed of several pieces, as a machine, it would act different ways,
+because the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment the
+progress of others; but how will you find in a simple substance the    [37]
+cause of a change of operation?'
+
+Leibniz published a reply to Bayle in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des
+Savants_ for July 1698. As in all his references to Bayle, he is studiously
+polite and repays compliment for compliment. The following are perhaps the
+principal points of his answer.
+
+1. On the example of the dog:
+
+(_a_) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since everything left
+to itself continues in the state in which it is? Because the state may be a
+state of _change_, as in a moving body which, unless hindered, continues to
+move. And such is the nature of simple substances--they continue to evolve
+steadily.
+
+(_b_) Would it really feel as though beaten if it were not beaten, since
+Leibniz says that the action of every substance takes place as though
+nothing existed but God and itself? Leibniz replies that his remark refers
+to the causality behind an action, not to the reasons for it. The
+spontaneous action of the dog, which leads to the feeling of pain, is only
+decreed to be what it is, for the reason that the dog is part of a world of
+mutually reflecting substances, a world which also includes the cudgel.
+
+(_c_) Why should the dog ever be displeased _spontaneously_? Leibniz
+distinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary: many things occur in the
+mind, of itself, but not chosen by it.
+
+2. On Cartesianism and miracle:
+
+Cartesianism in the form of occasionalism _does_ involve miracle, for
+though God is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body and
+mind to one another, he thereby causes them to act beyond their natural
+capacities.
+
+3. On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly?
+
+Leibniz distinguishes: some uniform action is monotonous, but some is not.
+A point moves uniformly in describing a parabola, for it constantly fulfils
+the formula of the curve. But it does not move monotonously, for the curve
+constantly varies. Such is the uniformity of the action of simple
+substances.
+
+Bayle read this reply, and was pleased but not satisfied with it. In the
+second edition of the dictionary, under the same article 'Rorarius', he
+added the following note:
+
+'I declare first of all that I am very glad I have proposed some small
+difficulties against the system of that great philosopher, since they  [38]
+have occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer to
+me, and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to be
+admired in it. I look now upon that new system as an important conquest,
+which enlarges the bounds of philosophy. We had only two hypotheses, that
+of the Schools and that of the Cartesians: the one was a _way of influence_
+of the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body; the other was a
+_way of assistance_ or occasional causality. But here is a new acquisition,
+a new hypothesis, which may be called, as Fr. Lami styles it, a _way of
+pre-established harmony_. We are beholden for it to M. Leibniz, and it is
+impossible to conceive anything that gives us a nobler idea of the power
+and wisdom of the Author of all things. This, together with the advantage
+of setting aside all notions of a miraculous conduct, would engage me to
+prefer this new system to that of the Cartesians, if I could conceive any
+possibility in the _way of pre-established harmony_.
+
+'I desire the reader to take notice that though I confess that this way
+removes all notions of a miraculous conduct, yet I do not retract what I
+have said formerly, that the system of occasional causes does not bring in
+God acting miraculously. (See M. Leibniz's article in _Histoire des
+Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698.) I am as much persuaded as ever I was
+that an action cannot be said to be miraculous, unless God produces it as
+an exception to the general laws; and that everything of which he is
+immediately the author according to those laws is distinct from a miracle
+properly so called. But being willing to cut off from this dispute as many
+things as I possibly can, I consent it should be said that the surest way
+of removing all notions that include a miracle is to suppose that all
+created substances are actively the immediate causes of the effects of
+nature. I will therefore lay aside what I might reply to that part of M.
+Leibniz's answer.
+
+'I will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his opinion
+than to that of some other philosophers. I will not therefore propose the
+difficulties that may be raised against the supposition that a creature can
+receive from God the power of moving itself. They are strong and almost
+unanswerable, but M. Leibniz's system does not lie more open to them than
+that of the Aristotelians; nay, I do not know whether the Cartesians would
+presume to say that God cannot communicate to our souls a power of acting.
+If they say so, how can they own that Adam sinned? And if they dare not[39]
+say so they weaken the arguments whereby they endeavour to prove that
+matter is not capable of any activity. Nor do I believe that it is more
+difficult for M. Leibniz than for the Cartesians or other philosophers, to
+free himself from the objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys human
+liberty. Wherefore, waiving this, I shall only speak of what is peculiar to
+the system of the _pre-established harmony_.
+
+'I. My first observation shall be, that it raises the power and wisdom of
+the divine art above everything that can be conceived. Fancy to yourself a
+ship which, without having any sense or knowledge, and without being
+directed by any created or uncreated being, has the power of moving itself
+so seasonably as to have always the wind favourable, to avoid currents and
+rocks, to cast anchor where it ought to be done, and to retire into a
+harbour precisely when it is necessary. Suppose such a ship sails in that
+manner for several years successively, being always turned and situated as
+it ought to be, according to the several changes of the air and the
+different situations of seas and lands; you will acknowledge that God,
+notwithstanding his infinite power, cannot communicate such a faculty to a
+ship; or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is not capable of
+receiving it from God. And yet what M. Leibniz supposes about the machine
+of a human body is more admirable and more surprising than all this. Let us
+apply his system concerning the union of the soul with the body to the
+person of Julius Caesar.
+
+'II. We must say according to this system that the body of Julius Caesar
+did so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its death it went
+through continual changes which did most exactly answer the perpetual
+changes of a certain soul which it did not know and which made no
+impression on it. We must say that the rule according to which that faculty
+of Caesar's body performed such actions was such, that he would have gone
+to the Senate upon such a day and at such an hour, that he would have
+spoken there such and such words, etc., though God had willed to annihilate
+his soul the next day after it was created. We must say that this moving
+power did change and modify itself exactly according to the volubility of
+the thoughts of that ambitious man, and that it was affected precisely in a
+certain manner rather than in another, because the soul of Caesar passed
+from a certain thought to another. Can a blind power modify itself so
+exactly by virtue of an impression communicated thirty or forty years  [40]
+before and never renewed since, but left to itself, without ever knowing
+what it is to do? Is not this much more incomprehensible than the
+navigation I spoke of in the foregoing paragraph?
+
+'III. The difficulty will be greater still, if it be considered that the
+human machine contains an almost infinite number of organs, and that it is
+continually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it,[1] and
+which by an innumerable variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sorts
+of modifications. How is it possible to conceive that this _pre-established
+harmony_ should never be disordered, but go on still during the longest
+life of a man, notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocal
+action of so many organs upon one another, which are surrounded on all
+sides with infinite corpuscles, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, sometimes
+dry and sometimes moist, and always acting, and pricking the nerves a
+thousand different ways? Suppose that the multiplicity of organs and of
+external agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety of
+changes in a human body: will that variety have the exactness here
+required? Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with
+the changes of the soul? This seems to be altogether impossible.
+
+[1] 'According to M. Leibniz what is active in every substance ought to be
+reduced to a true unity. Since therefore the body of every man is composed
+of several substances, each of them ought to have a principle of action
+really distinct from the principle of each of the others. He will have the
+action of every principle to be spontaneous. Now this must vary the effects
+_ad infinitum_, and confound them. For the impression of the neighbouring
+bodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of every
+one of them.'
+
+'IV. It is in vain to have recourse to the power of God, in order to
+maintain that brutes are mere machines; it is in vain to say that God was
+able to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man, the
+reflected light of an object, etc., will strike them exactly where it is
+necessary, that they may move in a given manner. This supposition is
+rejected by everybody except some Cartesians; and no Cartesian would admit
+it if it were to be extended to man; that is, if anyone were to assert that
+God was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do whatever we see
+other men do. By denying this we do not pretend to limit the power and
+knowledge of God: we only mean that the nature of things does not permit
+that the faculties imparted to a creature should not be necessarily
+confined within certain bounds. The actions of creatures must be       [41]
+necessarily proportioned to their essential state, and performed according
+to the character belonging to each machine; for according to the maxim of
+the philosophers, whatever is received is proportionate to the capacity of
+the subject that receives it. We may therefore reject M. Leibniz's
+hypothesis as being impossible, since it is liable to greater difficulties
+than that of the Cartesians, which makes beasts to be mere machines. It
+puts a perpetual harmony between two beings, which do not act one upon
+another; whereas if servants were mere machines, and should punctually obey
+their masters' command, it could not be said that they do it without a real
+action of their masters upon them; for their masters would speak words and
+make signs which would really shake and move the organs of the servants.
+
+'V. Now let us consider the soul of Julius Caesar, and we shall find the
+thing more impossible still. That soul was in the world without being
+exposed to the influence of any spirit. The power it received from God was
+the only principle of the actions it produced at every moment: and if those
+actions were different one from another, it was not because some of them
+were produced by the united influence of some springs which did not
+contribute to the production of others, for the soul of man is simple,
+indivisible and immaterial. M. Leibniz owns it; and if he did not
+acknowledge it, but if, on the contrary, he should suppose with most
+philosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age (Mr.
+Locke, for instance) that a compound of several material parts placed and
+disposed in a certain manner, is capable of thinking, his hypothesis would
+appear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible, and I could refute
+it several other ways; which I need not mention since he acknowledges the
+immateriality of our soul and builds upon it.
+
+'Let us return to the soul of Julius Caesar, and call it an immaterial
+automaton (M. Leibniz's own phrase), and compare it with an atom of
+Epicurus; I mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides, and which
+will never meet any other atom. This is a very just comparison: for this
+atom, on the one hand, has a natural power of moving itself and exerts it
+without any assistance, and without being retarded or hindered by anything:
+and, on the other hand, the soul of Caesar is a spirit which has received
+the faculty of producing thoughts, and exerts it without the influence [42]
+of any other spirit or of any body. It is neither assisted nor thwarted by
+anything whatsoever. If you consult the common notions and the ideas of
+order, you will find that this atom can never stop, and that having been in
+motion in the foregoing moment, it will continue in it at the present
+moment and in all the moments that shall follow, and that it will always
+move in the same manner. This is the consequence of an axiom approved by M.
+Leibniz: _since a thing does always remain in the same state wherein it
+happens to be, unless it receives some alteration from some other thing ...
+we conclude_, says he, _not only that a body which is at rest will always
+be at rest, but that a body in motion will always keep that motion or
+change, that is, the same swiftness and the same direction, unless
+something happens to hinder it_. (M. Leibniz, ibid.)
+
+'Everyone clearly sees that this atom, whether it moves by an innate power,
+as Democritus and Epicurus would have it, or by a power received from the
+Creator, will always move in the same line equally and after a uniform
+manner, without ever turning or going back. Epicurus was laughed at, when
+he invented the motion of declination; it was a needless supposition, which
+he wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a fatal necessity; and he
+could give no reason for this new part of his system. It was inconsistent
+with the clearest notions of our minds: for it is evident that an atom
+which describes a straight line for the space of two days cannot turn away
+at the beginning of a third, unless it meets with some obstacle, or has a
+mind all of a sudden to go out of its road, or contains some spring which
+begins to play at that very moment. The first of these reasons cannot be
+admitted in a vacuum. The second is impossible, since an atom has not the
+faculty of thinking. And the third is likewise impossible in a corpuscle
+that is a perfect unity. I must make some use of all this.
+
+'VI. Caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict sense. The
+faculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature (so M. Leibniz),
+which it has received from God, both as to possession and exercise. If the
+first thought it produces is a sense of pleasure, there is no reason why
+the second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure; for when the total
+cause of an effect remains the same, the effect cannot be altered. Now this
+soul, at the second moment of its existence, does not receive a new faculty
+of thinking; it only preserves the faculty it had at the first moment, and
+it is as independent of the concourse of any other cause at the second [43]
+moment as it was at the first. It must therefore produce again at the
+second moment the same thought it had produced just before. If it be
+objected that it ought to be in a state of change, and that it would not be
+in such a state, in the case that I have supposed; I answer that its change
+will be like the change of the atom; for an atom which continually moves in
+the same line acquires a new situation at every moment, but it is like the
+preceding situation. A soul may therefore continue in its state of change,
+if it does but produce a new thought like the preceding.
+
+'But suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds; it must be
+granted at least that its going from one thought to another implies some
+reason of affinity. If I suppose that in a certain moment the soul of
+Caesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms, I can conceive that it does
+immediately desire to see one that has only leaves, and then one that has
+only blossoms, and that it will thus successively produce several images
+arising from one another; but one cannot conceive the odd change of
+thoughts, which have no affinity with, but are even contrary to, one
+another, and which are so common in men's souls. One cannot apprehend how
+God could place in the soul of Julius Caesar the principle of what I am
+going to say. He was without doubt pricked with a pin more than once, when
+he was sucking; and therefore according to M. Leibniz's hypothesis which I
+am here considering, his soul must have produced in itself a sense of pain
+immediately after the pleasant sensations of the sweetness of the milk,
+which it had enjoyed for the space of two or three minutes. By what springs
+was it determined to interrupt its pleasures and to give itself all of a
+sudden a sense of pain, without receiving any intimation of preparing
+itself to change, and without any new alteration in its substance? If you
+run over the life of that Roman emperor, every page will afford you matter
+for a stronger objection than this is.
+
+'VII. The thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed that the
+soul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits, each of
+which has its functions, that begin and end precisely as the changes made
+in a human body require. By virtue of this supposition it should be said
+that something analogous to a great number of wheels and springs, or of
+matters that ferment, disposed according to the changes of our machine,
+awakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of each of those
+spirits. But then the soul of man would be no longer a single substance[44]
+but an _ens per aggregationem_, a collection and heap of substances just
+like all material beings. We are here in quest of a single being, which
+produces in itself sometimes joy, sometimes pain, etc., and not of many
+beings, one of which produces hope, another despair, etc.
+
+'In these observations I have merely cleared and unfolded those which M.
+Leibniz has done me the honour to examine: and now I shall make some
+reflexions upon his answers.
+
+'VIII. He says (ibid., p. 332) that _the law of the change which happens in
+the substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to pain at the
+very moment that a solution of continuity is made in his body; because the
+law of the indivisible substance of that animal is to represent what is
+done in his body as we experience it, and even to represent in some manner,
+and with respect to that body, whatever is done in the world_. These words
+are a very good explication of the grounds of this system; they are, as it
+were, the unfolding and key of it; but at the same time they are the very
+things at which the objections of those who take this system to be
+impossible are levelled. The law M. Leibniz speaks of supposes a decree of
+God, and shows wherein this system agrees with that of occasional causes.
+Those two systems agree in this point, that there are laws according to
+which the soul of man is _to represent what is done in the body of man, as
+we experience it_. But they disagree as to the manner of executing those
+laws. The Cartesians say that God executes them; M. Leibniz will have it,
+that the soul itself does it; which appears to me impossible, because the
+soul has not the necessary instruments for such an execution. Now however
+infinite the power and knowledge of God be, he cannot perform with a
+machine deprived of a certain piece, what requires the concourse of such a
+piece. He must supply that defect; but then the effect would be produced by
+him and not by the machine. I shall show that the soul has not the
+instruments requisite for the divine law we speak of, and in order to do it
+I shall make use of a comparison.
+
+'Fancy to yourself an animal created by God and designed to sing
+continually. It will always sing, that is most certain; but if God designs
+him a certain tablature, he must necessarily either put it before his eyes
+or imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a manner that
+according to the laws of mechanism one certain note will always come after
+another, agreeably to the order of the tablature. Without this one cannot
+apprehend that the animal can always follow the whole set of the notes [45]
+appointed him by God. Let us apply this to man's soul. M. Leibniz will have
+it that it has received not only the power of producing thoughts
+continually, but also the faculty of following always a certain set of
+thoughts, which answers the continual changes that happen in the machine of
+the body. This set of thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to the
+singing animal above mentioned. Can the soul change its perceptions or
+modifications at every moment according to such a set of thoughts, without
+knowing the series of the notes, and actually thinking upon them? But
+experience teaches us that it knows nothing of it. Were it not at least
+necessary that in default of such a knowledge, there should be in the soul
+a set of particular instruments, each of which would be a necessary cause
+of such and such a thought? Must they not be so placed and disposed as to
+operate precisely one after another, according to the correspondence
+_pre-established_ between the changes of the body and the thoughts of the
+soul? but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and indivisible
+substance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude of particular
+instruments placed one before another, according to the order of the
+tablature in question. It is not therefore possible that a human soul
+should execute that law.
+
+'M. Leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its future
+perceptions, _but that it perceives them confusedly_, and that _there are
+in each substance traces of whatever hath happened, or shall happen to it:
+but that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us from
+distinguishing them. The present state of each substance is a natural
+consequence of its preceding state. The soul, though never so simple, has
+always a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one time: which
+answers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces, like a
+machine. For each foregoing perception has an influence on those that
+follow agreeably to a law of order, which is in perceptions as well as in
+motions...The perceptions that are together in one and the same soul at the
+same time, including an infinite multitude of little and indistinguishable
+sentiments that are to be unfolded, we need not wonder at the infinite
+variety of what is to result from it in time. This is only a consequence of
+the representative nature of the soul, which is, to express what happens
+and what will happen in its body, by the connexion and correspondence of
+all the parts of the world_. I have but little to say in answer to this: I
+shall only observe that this supposition when sufficiently cleared is the
+right way of solving all the difficulties. M. Leibniz, through the     [46]
+penetration of his great genius, has very well conceived the extent and
+strength of this objection, and what remedy ought to be applied to the main
+inconveniency. I do not doubt but that he will smooth the rough parts of
+his system, and teach us some excellent things about the nature of spirits.
+Nobody can travel more usefully or more safely than he in the intellectual
+world. I hope that his curious explanations will remove all the
+impossibilities which I have hitherto found in his system, and that he will
+solidly remove my difficulties, as well as those of Father Lami. And these
+hopes made me say before, without designing to pass a compliment upon that
+learned man, that his system ought to be looked upon as an important
+conquest.
+
+'He will not be much embarrassed by this, viz. that whereas according to
+the supposition of the Cartesians there is but one general law for the
+union of spirits and bodies, he will have it that God gives a particular
+law to each spirit; from whence it seems to result that the primitive
+constitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others. Do
+not the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals in
+angelic nature?'
+
+Leibniz acknowledged Bayle's note in a further reply, which is written as
+though for publication. It was communicated to Bayle, but it was not in
+fact published. It is dated 1702. It may be found in the standard
+collections of Leibniz's philosophical works. It reads almost like a sketch
+for the _Theodicy_.
+
+The principal point developed by Leibniz is the richness of content which,
+according to him, is to be found in each 'simple substance'. Its simplicity
+is more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine Being, than like
+the simplicity of the atom of Epicurus, with which Bayle had chosen to
+compare it. It contains a condensation in confused idea of the whole
+universe: and its essence is from the first defined by the part it is to
+play in the total harmony.
+
+As to the musical score ('tablature of notes') which the individual soul
+plays from, in order to perform its ordained part in the universal harmony,
+this 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at any moment
+present, from which an omniscient observer could always deduce what is to
+happen next. To the objection 'But the created soul is not an omniscient
+observer, and if it cannot read the score, the score is useless to it',[47]
+Leibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous action arises from
+subjective and yet unperceived reasons, as we are all perfectly aware, once
+we attend to the relevant facts. All he claims to be doing is to generalize
+this observation. All events whatsoever arise from the 'interpretation of
+the score' by monads, but very little of this 'interpretation' is in the
+least conscious.
+
+Leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article
+'Rorarius' to other articles of Bayle's dictionary, and touches the
+question of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive their
+fuller treatment in the _Theodicy_.
+
+In the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle himself,
+offering further explanations of disputed points. He concluded it with a
+paragraph of some personal interest, comparing himself the
+historian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, and
+revealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history:
+
+'We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your striking
+reflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by your
+boundless researches into matters of fact. I too am not always able to
+excuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged to
+descend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, were
+it not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them. I have
+worked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon these
+countries, a study which has furnished me with some observations belonging
+to general history. So I have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheer
+facts. But if the choice were open to me, I should prefer natural history
+to political, and the customs and laws God has established in nature, to
+what is observed among mankind.'
+
+Leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in
+Bayle's works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer to
+them. Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died. The work
+nevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in _Theodicy_.
+
+                                                                       [49]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PREFACE
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms
+for the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, light
+and virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not wonder
+at this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are impressed
+by what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires
+consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As true
+piety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion
+imitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonial
+practices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies resemble
+virtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth and
+approach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would be
+commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to
+maintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies,
+ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human laws were always
+like a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from any approach to
+vice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue. That was
+the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who founded
+religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the
+purest and most enlightened religion. It is just the same with the
+formularies of belief: they would be valid provided there were nothing [50]
+in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though the full truth
+concerned were not there. But it happens only too often that religion is
+choked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions
+of men.
+
+The pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, had
+only one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, but
+they had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up
+formularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their gods
+were real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, the
+planets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas
+but in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those who
+were not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very often
+ridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order to
+guard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: they
+boasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries,
+portents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of the
+goodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended to
+sway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the great
+future of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to impart
+to men true notions of God and of the soul.
+
+Of all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public dogmas
+for their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in one God,
+source of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of him in a
+manner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at seeing the
+inhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the rest
+of the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other nations have
+sometimes said the same, but they have not had the good fortune to find a
+sufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. Nevertheless Moses
+had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: it
+was consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it was
+not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil,
+and, without having force in his hand, taught with all the force of a
+lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shall
+receive the wages of their deeds. Moses had already expressed the beautiful
+conceptions of the greatness and the goodness of God, whereto many
+civilized peoples to-day assent; but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully   [51]
+the results of these ideas, proclaiming that divine goodness and justice
+are shown forth to perfection in God's designs for the souls of men.
+
+I refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian doctrine,
+and I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the conversion of
+natural religion into law, and gained for it the authority of a public
+dogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vain
+to do; and Christians having at last gained the upper hand in the Roman
+Empire, the master of the greater part of the known earth, the religion of
+the wise men became that of the nations. Later also Mahomet showed no
+divergence from the great dogmas of natural theology: his followers spread
+them abroad even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whither
+Christianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countries
+heathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity
+of God and the immortality of souls.
+
+It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that
+the Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but
+also of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, and
+gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there is
+nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that
+mental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object
+of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor any greater
+delight than in him. To love him it suffices to contemplate his
+perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of these within
+ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses
+them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have
+been granted; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but
+in God they are all in their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight
+us; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he always
+keeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is an
+effusion of his rays.
+
+It follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in the
+love of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended by
+insight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which gives
+relief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the centre, transports the
+human to the divine. For in doing one's duty, in obeying reason, one   [52]
+carries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs all one's intentions
+to the common good, which is no other than the glory of God. Thus one finds
+that there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of the
+community, and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in the
+acquisition of true benefits for men. Whether one succeeds therein or not,
+one is content with what comes to pass, being once resigned to the will of
+God and knowing that what he wills is best. But before he declares his will
+by the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears most
+in accord with his commands. When we are in this state of mind, we are not
+disheartened by ill success, we regret only our faults; and the ungrateful
+ways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition.
+Our charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer;
+attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are
+inclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of
+others. We must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. There
+is no piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly and
+beneficent one cannot show sincere religion.
+
+Good disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious and
+virtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition
+for our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by good
+principles. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour,
+that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting of
+our will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be the
+effect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when virtue
+is reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme reason of
+things, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without knowing his
+perfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety. The
+purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls:
+but in some strange way it has happened all too often that men, that
+teachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. Contrary to the
+intention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced to ceremonies and
+doctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often these ceremonies
+have not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue, and the
+formulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe it? Some Christians
+have imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour,[53]
+and pious without loving God; or else people have thought that they could
+love their neighbour without serving him and could love God without knowing
+him. Many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by the
+people at large; and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness.
+There are divers persons who speak much of piety, of devotion, of religion,
+who are even busied with the teaching of such things, and who yet prove to
+be by no means versed in the divine perfections. They ill understand the
+goodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine a
+God who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemed
+to me dangerous in its effect, since it is of serious moment that the very
+source of piety should be preserved from infection. The old errors of those
+who arraigned the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been
+renewed sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistible
+power of God when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme
+goodness; and they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather
+have conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I have
+observed that these opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confused
+notions which had been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny;
+and I have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give
+explanations on these important matters. But finally I have been compelled
+to gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impart
+them to the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I
+offer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of
+Evil.
+
+There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray:
+one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in
+the production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion
+of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements
+thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. The
+first perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophers
+only. I shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declare
+myself on the second, and to point out that, for lack of a true conception
+of the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false positions
+leading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properly
+be applied to the overthrow of these very positions. But if the        [54]
+knowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that of
+necessity is none the less so for practical application; and it, together
+with the questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and the
+justice of God, forms the object of this treatise.
+
+Men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the
+ancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing nothing,
+or at least towards being careful for nothing and only following
+inclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the future
+is necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Now
+the future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinity
+foresees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of all
+things in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, through
+the concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature of truth,
+which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events,
+as it is in all assertions, since the assertion must always be true or
+false in itself, even though we know not always which it is. And all these
+reasons for determination which appear different converge finally like
+lines upon one and the same centre; for there is a truth in the future
+event which is predetermined by the causes, and God pre-establishes it in
+establishing the causes.
+
+The false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has given
+rise to what I call _Fatum Mahometanum_, fate after the Turkish fashion,
+because it is said of the Turks that they do not shun danger or even
+abandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of such reasoning
+as that just recorded. For what is called _Fatum Stoicum_ was not so black
+as it is painted: it did not divert men from the care of their affairs, but
+it tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events, through the
+consideration of necessity, which renders our anxieties and our vexations
+needless. In which respect these philosophers were not far removed from the
+teaching of our Lord, who deprecates these anxieties in regard to the
+morrow, comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himself
+in labouring to increase his stature.
+
+It is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of some
+famous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this alleged
+necessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspires
+thoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining
+contentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and   [55]
+wise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair of
+our head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should see,
+if we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even possible to
+wish for anything better (as much in general as for ourselves) than what he
+does. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty and be content with that
+which shall come of it, not only because you cannot resist divine
+providence, or the nature of things (which may suffice for tranquillity,
+but not for contentment), but also because you have to do with a good
+master. And that is what may be called _Fatum Christianum_.
+
+Nevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce into
+their dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, although
+they do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they are not
+inactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopes
+present themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that is about
+to fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path; and they
+will burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered, without
+waiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the good or the evil is
+remote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste, the
+lazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when it is a question of
+preserving one's health and even one's life by good diet, people to whom
+one gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered and
+that it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which God destines
+for us. But these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies when
+the evil they had neglected draws near. One reasons in somewhat the same
+way when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instance
+when one asks oneself, _quod vitae sectabor iter_? what profession one must
+choose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being
+undertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be
+inclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to
+fate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy
+cases. One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although
+this way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality
+occurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazy
+reason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of the
+need to reason properly. One will thus overlook the fact that if this  [56]
+argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would always
+hold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This laziness is to
+some extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers,
+which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher's
+stone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of
+happiness without trouble.
+
+I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they
+have been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein. Their
+argument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the
+principles of astrology and of other kinds of divination. They overlook the
+fact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, _una marea_, as
+Italians playing basset are wont to call it. With regard to this they make
+their own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counsel
+none to trust too much. Yet this confidence that people have in their
+fortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, and
+causes them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves.
+Even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold,
+as it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them
+resolute. Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally as
+providing a remedy for other errors: and truth is unquestionably better.
+
+But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to
+employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often heard
+it said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that it
+is useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward and
+fears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that what
+is written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein.
+Thus, they would say, it were best to follow one's inclination, dwelling
+only upon such things as may content us in the present. They did not
+reflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would prove
+too much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take a
+pleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned. For the same reason
+(if it were valid) I could say: if it is written in the records of the
+Parcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm, this will happen
+even though I were not to take this beverage; and if this is not written,
+it will not happen even though I should take this same beverage;
+consequently I shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to [57]
+take what is pleasing, however injurious it may be; the result of which
+reasoning is an obvious absurdity. This objection disconcerted them a
+little, but they always reverted to their argument, phrased in different
+ways, until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophism
+lies. It is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do: it will
+happen because one does what leads thereto; and if the event is written
+beforehand, the cause that will make it happen is written also. Thus the
+connexion of effects and causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of a
+necessity detrimental to conduct, serves to overthrow it.
+
+Yet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one may
+envisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity,
+considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to
+the morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise and blame,
+punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and nobody will
+be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what is
+absolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this consideration
+in order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not escape
+embarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging the actions
+of others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which there are some
+even concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will speak presently. And
+as an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety, whether through
+the impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt to
+resist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it, it is important to
+note the different degrees of necessity, and to show that there are some
+which cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted without
+giving rise to evil consequences.
+
+Some go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity to
+prove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the hardihood
+to make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, and they
+imitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of their
+crimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy of
+Christians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients the
+dependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with all
+the actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Some
+able men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to     [58]
+creatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinary
+opinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles,
+or two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma were a better
+solution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet again he
+acknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of the
+Principle is incontestably founded on _a priori_ reasons; but he wishes to
+infer that our Reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections, and
+that one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas, which
+teach us the existence of one God altogether good, altogether powerful and
+altogether wise. But many readers, convinced of the irrefutable nature of
+his objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofs
+for the truth of religion, would draw dangerous conclusions.
+
+Even though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one could
+not help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that,
+being able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits them.
+This is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosen
+to deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above all, of
+future events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness.
+The Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and Thomas
+Bonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedingly
+learned, who wrote a book _De Concordia Scientiae cum Fide_, of which I
+will speak later, appears to hint at this also.
+
+They are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, convinced
+that nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of God, ascribe
+to him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best of
+all beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogma
+which recognizes God's justice and goodness. They thought that, being
+supreme Master of the universe, he could without any detriment to his
+holiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will and pleasure, or in
+order that he might have the pleasure of punishing; and even that he could
+take pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing any
+injustice, because no one has the right or the power to control his
+actions. Some even have gone so far as to say that God acts thus indeed;
+and on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him, they liken
+us to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk, or in
+general to animals that are not of our species and which we do not     [59]
+scruple to ill-treat.
+
+I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by
+these ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of their
+consequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice is
+thus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only
+will for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by the
+rules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the idea
+contained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, which
+designated as _just_ that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is the
+position taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligation
+upon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right. But
+one will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good and
+charitable through the imitation of God. For one will reflect that a God
+who would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguished
+from the evil principle of the Manichaeans, assuming that this principle
+had become sole master of the universe; and that in consequence one must
+attribute to the true God sentiments that render him worthy to be called
+the good Principle.
+
+Happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among
+theologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to make
+difficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by uniting
+the controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes of
+philosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, of
+freedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto those of
+original sin, of grace and of predestination. The original corruption of
+the human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to have imposed a
+natural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace: but necessity
+being incompatible with punishment, it will be inferred that a sufficient
+grace ought to have been given to all men; which does not seem to be in
+conformity with experience.
+
+But the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's dispositions
+for the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; therefore the
+choice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is admitted that
+those whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, and are not even
+fundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have coming only from the
+gift of God, the difficulty is increased. Where is, then, his justice  [60]
+(people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? Partiality, or
+respect of persons, goes against justice, and he who without cause sets
+bounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure. It is true
+that those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault: they lack good
+will or living faith; but it rested with God alone to grant it them. We
+know that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstances
+which distinguish men, and that training, conversation, example often
+correct or corrupt natural disposition. Now that God should call forth
+circumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences which
+contribute to their misfortune, will not that give us cause for
+astonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say with some that
+inward grace is universal and equal for all. For these same authors are
+obliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and to say: 'O the
+depth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may call
+outward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the diversity of
+circumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the masters, and
+which have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns their
+salvation.
+
+Nor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being involved
+in the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left them all in
+their misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver some
+of them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemn
+anyone, but there still remains the question why God does not deliver
+all--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference to
+others. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and just master; his
+power is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that power
+in an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed.
+
+Moreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God's
+permission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he had
+considered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of the
+human race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the abandonment
+of all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one's
+view to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of oneself, go back to
+the knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, preceding the decree
+whereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted simultaneously that [61]
+the damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not be
+delivered: for God and the sage make no resolve without considering its
+consequences.
+
+I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolute
+necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes
+geometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, does
+not exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only from
+constraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself,
+although he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity,
+and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness of
+things, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and
+arbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have not
+sufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifference
+in freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the
+other; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise.
+And I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity
+beyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plain
+that the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions
+are open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism.
+
+Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a
+vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his
+justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his
+independence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God,
+for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will,
+to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be the
+author of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of
+evil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has a
+source other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to say
+of moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most important
+of all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and
+misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to
+his holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, he
+could have avoided all these evils.
+
+Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable
+assertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the    [62]
+prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid;
+that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those
+whose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they
+wish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of
+election, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that
+they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet
+it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and that
+this very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faith
+likewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect,
+for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and
+circumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom.
+
+Now, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was as
+great as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, had
+applied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the
+difficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I found
+a fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail. I
+acknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak of him) has
+on his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter, but I
+hope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our side) by its
+very plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will prevail over
+all the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for success therein
+is all the greater because it is the cause of God I plead, and because one
+of the maxims here upheld states that God's help is never lacking for those
+that lack not good will. The author of this discourse believes that he has
+given proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear upon
+this subject. He has meditated upon it since his youth; he has conferred
+with some of the foremost men of the time; and he has schooled himself by
+the reading of good authors. And the success which God has given him
+(according to the opinion of sundry competent judges) in certain other
+profound meditations, of which some have much influence on this subject,
+gives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers who
+love truth and are fitted to search after it.
+
+The author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him to
+take pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which he had
+concerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany and in
+France, and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished  [63]
+of princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. He had had the
+honour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon divers passages of
+the admirable _Dictionary_ of M. Bayle, wherein religion and reason appear
+as adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to silence reason after having
+made it speak too loud: which he calls the triumph of faith. The present
+author declared there and then that he was of a different opinion, but that
+he was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius had
+brought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects, subjects as
+important as they are difficult. He admitted having examined them also for
+some long time already, and having sometimes been minded to publish upon
+this matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of God
+as is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue. This Princess exhorted
+and urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention, and some friends
+added their persuasions. He was all the more tempted to accede to their
+requests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to his
+investigation M. Bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subject
+such illumination as it might receive with his support. But divers
+obstacles intervened, and the death of the incomparable Queen was not the
+least. It happened, however, that M. Bayle was attacked by excellent men
+who set themselves to examine the same subject; he answered them fully and
+always ingeniously. I followed their dispute, and was even on the point of
+being involved therein. This is how it came about.
+
+I had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain the
+union of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even from
+those who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent persons
+testified that they had already been of my opinion, without having reached
+so distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had written on the
+matter. M. Bayle examined it in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_,
+article 'Rorarius'. He thought that my expositions were worthy of further
+development; he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions,
+and he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty. I could not but
+reply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions so
+instructive as his. In order to turn them to greater account, I published
+some elucidations in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698. M.
+Bayle replied to them in the second edition of his _Dictionary_. I sent[64]
+him a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether he
+ever made a further reply.
+
+Meanwhile it happened that M. le Clerc had inserted in his _Select Library_
+an extract from the _Intellectual System_ of the late Mr. Cudworth, and had
+explained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable author
+applied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle believed (see the
+continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 21, art. 11) that,
+these natures being without cognition, in establishing them one weakened
+the argument which proves, through the marvellous formation of things, that
+the universe must have an intelligent Cause. M. le Clerc replied (4th art.
+of the 5th vol. of his _Select Library_) that these natures required to be
+directed by divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the _Histoire
+des Ouvrages des Savants_, August 1704) that direction alone was not
+sufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to be
+a mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. My
+system was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to send
+a short essay to the illustrious author of the _Histoire des Ouvrages des
+Savants_, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, art. 9. In this I
+endeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient to
+produce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of other plastic
+natures, provided there be added thereto the _preformation_ already
+completely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence,
+contained in those of the bodies whence they spring, right back to the
+primary seeds. This could only proceed from the Author of things,
+infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating all in the beginning
+in due order, had _pre-established_ there all order and artifice that was
+to be. There is no chaos in the inward nature of things, and there is
+organism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from God. More
+and more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination of
+the anatomy of bodies; and we should continue to observe it even if we
+could go on to infinity, like Nature, and make subdivision as continuous in
+our knowledge as Nature has made it in fact.
+
+In order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made use of
+a Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had used to
+explain another marvel, namely the correspondence of soul with body,   [65]
+wherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles I had
+employed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my system of accounting
+for this correspondence, which he had examined formerly. He declared (in
+chapter 180 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p.
+1253) that he did not believe God could give to matter or to any other
+cause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the idea
+and the knowledge of organic nature. Also he was not yet disposed to
+believe that God, with all his power over Nature and with all the
+foreknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive, could have
+so disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel (for
+instance) should go to its port of destination without being steered during
+its passage by some intelligent guide. I was surprised to see that limits
+were placed on the power of God, without the adduction of any proof and
+without indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on the
+side of the object or any imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shown
+before in my Rejoinder that even men often produce through automata
+something like the movements that come from reason, and that even a finite
+mind (but one far above ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinks
+impossible to the Divinity. Moreover, as God orders all things at once
+beforehand, the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no more
+strange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks, since the
+whole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them by
+means of their influence one upon the other.
+
+This declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore purposed
+to point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms organic bodies
+himself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted this care to
+intelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, we must hold the
+opinion that God _preformed_ things in such sort that new organisms are
+only a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution. Even so
+do butterflies come out of silkworms, an instance where M. Swammerdam has
+shown that there is nothing but development. And I would have added that
+nothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animals
+to confirm my System of Pre-established Harmony between the soul and the
+body. For in this the body is prompted by its original constitution to
+carry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordance
+with the will of the soul. So the seeds by their original constitution [66]
+carry out naturally the intentions of God, by an artifice greater still
+than that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity with
+our will. And since M. Bayle himself deems with reason that there is more
+artifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the
+world or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable,
+it follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is
+as intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. For
+this opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom of
+God has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to form
+animals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibility
+of it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there will be no cause
+for surprise that God has so made the body that by virtue of its own laws
+it can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul: for all that the
+reasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than the
+organization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. Bayle says (_Reply to
+the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 182, p. 1294) that it is only very
+recently there have been people who have understood that the formation of
+living bodies cannot be a natural process. This he could say also (in
+accordance with his principles) of the communication between the soul and
+the body, since God effects this whole communication in the system of
+occasional causes to which this author subscribes. But I admit the
+supernatural here only in the beginning of things, in respect of the first
+formation of animals or in respect of the original constitution of
+pre-established harmony between the soul and the body. Once that has come
+to pass, I hold that the formation of animals and the relation between the
+soul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinary
+operations of Nature. A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary
+thinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. One
+recognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them. I
+am, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my
+explanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample
+range, to that opinion.
+
+Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of
+M. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which
+I had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67]
+in opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith in
+regard to the existence of evil. Indeed, there are perhaps few persons who
+have toiled more than I in this matter. Hardly had I gained some tolerable
+understanding of Latin writings when I had an opportunity of turning over
+books in a library. I flitted from book to book, and since subjects for
+meditation pleased me as much as histories and fables, I was charmed by the
+work of Laurentius Valla against Boethius and by that of Luther against
+Erasmus, although I was well aware that they had need of some mitigation. I
+did not omit books of controversy, and amongst other writings of this
+nature the records of the Montbeliard Conversation, which had revived the
+dispute, appeared to me instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of our
+theologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me,
+served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the
+Augsburg Confession. I had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some
+excellent men of different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter von
+Wallenburg, Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premier
+theologian of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. To
+him I even tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon this
+subject, about the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God,
+having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted by
+his wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which still
+did not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that
+could be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors on
+these subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge
+that seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea
+of supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have not
+neglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended furthest
+the doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes and
+Spinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in
+his _Physical Elements_ and elsewhere, but also in a special book against
+Bishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancient
+Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the first
+cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, with
+complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understanding
+in this first source of things.
+
+                                                                       [68]
+I have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the contrary in
+a way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter.
+For having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the laws
+of motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical necessity, as Spinoza
+appears to have believed they had. Neither, as I have made plain, are they
+purely arbitrary, even though this be the opinion of M. Bayle and of some
+modern philosophers: but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as I
+have already pointed out above, or upon that which I call the 'principle of
+the best'. Moreover one recognizes therein, as in every other thing, the
+marks of the first substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme
+wisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that this
+harmony connects both the future with the past and the present with the
+absent. The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places.
+This second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body,
+and in general in the communication of true substances with one another and
+with material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation of
+organic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organism
+everywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pond
+may very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it is
+not itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them.
+Thus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in a
+conclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that
+reason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts were
+properly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficulties
+of the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence formed for
+myself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperation
+of God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offend
+reason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny of M. Bayle,
+as well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he has departed
+from us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose learning and
+acumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under consideration and
+men of talent are still occupied with it, while the public also follows it
+attentively, I take this to be a fitting moment for the publication of
+certain of my ideas.
+
+It will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing this
+preface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the   [69]
+body or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one to
+disturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one with
+the other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is something
+metaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is what I have
+already said in reply to the objection raised against me, in the _Memoires
+de Trevoux_, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, whose wit and learning
+are of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one may say also in a
+metaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon the
+soul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active
+principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only
+the passive. Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have
+explained more than once in the _Leipzig Journal_. More especially does
+this appear in my answer to the late Herr Sturm, philosopher and
+mathematician of Altorf, where I have even demonstrated that, if bodies
+contained only the passive, their different conditions would be
+indistinguishable. Also I take this opportunity to say that, having heard
+of some objections made by the gifted author of the book on
+_Self-knowledge_, in that same book, to my System of Pre-established
+Harmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing that he has attributed to me
+opinions I am far from holding. On another matter recently I met with like
+treatment at the hands of an anonymous Doctor of the Sorbonne. And these
+misconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if my
+own words, which were being taken in evidence, had been quoted.
+
+This tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of others
+leads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man helps himself
+in conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only that he derives
+advantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome, but
+without any cooperation on his part: just as there is no co-operation in
+ice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work of God's grace,
+wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more
+or less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances
+also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise
+in the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the
+strength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the
+operation of grace, although not rendering it necessary. I have expounded
+sufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation        [70]
+unregenerate man is to be considered as dead; and I greatly approve the
+manner wherein the theologians of the Augsburg Confession declare
+themselves on this subject. Yet this corruption of unregenerate man is, it
+must be added, no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and his
+performance of good actions in his civic life, actions which spring from a
+good principle, without any evil intention and without mixture of actual
+sin. Wherein I hope I shall be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge from
+the opinion of St. Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirable
+intelligence, but inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things,
+above all in the heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some persons
+who profess to be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the Reverend
+Father Quenel, a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit of
+controversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies.
+But I have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous
+merit (of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there is
+right on both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in the
+matter of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of the
+human heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than
+defence. I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Society
+credit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine,
+will give us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of his
+acumen and his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And one
+must believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there
+will arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one is
+justified in thinking that men like Usserius or Daille will again appear
+among the Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove the
+misconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall be
+well pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the
+objections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the small
+treatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I have
+endeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, for
+instance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will as
+preliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others;
+how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of all
+the saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, despite  [71]
+that there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has been
+permitted as a _conditio sine qua non_ of good, I mean not according to the
+principle of necessity, but according to the principle of the fitness of
+things. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit is such as
+always to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God will not
+refuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of that
+which they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to give on
+some difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, moreover,
+followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that I should
+add two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on between
+Mr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, the other of
+the learned work on _The Origin of Evil_, published a short time ago in
+England.
+
+Finally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and if I
+have conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it necessary
+to relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement. It is with
+that in view that I have introduced into this dissertation the pleasing
+chimera of a certain astronomical theology, having no ground for
+apprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it and
+refute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, instead of imagining that
+the planets were suns, one might conceive that they were masses melted in
+the sun and thrown out, and that would destroy the foundation of this
+hypothetical theology. The ancient error of the two principles, which the
+Orientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes and Arimanius, caused me to
+explain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples. It appears indeed
+probable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes, the
+one monarch of a part of upper Asia, where there have since been others of
+this name, the other king of the Scythian Celts who made incursions into
+the states of the former, and who was also named amongst the divinities of
+Germania. It seems, indeed, that Zoroaster used the names of these princes
+as symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemble
+in the ideas of Asiatics. Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arab
+authors, who in this might well be better informed than the Greeks, it
+appears from detailed records of ancient oriental history, that this
+Zerdust or Zoroaster, whom they make contemporary with the great Darius,
+did not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and     [72]
+independent, but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle. They
+relate that he believed, in conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, that
+God, who is without an equal, created all and separated the light from the
+darkness; that the light conformed with his original design, but that the
+darkness came as a consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, and
+that this is nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancient
+author of the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning caused
+the Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptians
+and Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin to
+this same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury,
+was called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by the
+Asiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and the
+Persians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by the
+Slavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the Luneburg
+region, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the Orientals. These
+observations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious. And I flatter
+myself that the small dialogue ending the Essays written to oppose M. Bayle
+will give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficult
+but important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way. I have written
+in a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it, because that
+language has been recently used by others in treating of my subject, and
+because it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefit
+by this small work. It is to be hoped that the language errors will be
+pardoned: they are to be attributed not only to the printer and the
+copyist, but also to the haste of the author, who has been much distracted
+from his task. If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed,
+the author will be the first to correct it, once he has been better
+informed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that
+he hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase.
+
+                                                                       [73]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH REASON
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+1. I begin with the preliminary question of the _conformity of faith with
+reason_, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has much
+influence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayle
+introduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict each
+other; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an
+extraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, but
+especially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind
+can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. This
+definition of reason (that is to say of strict and true reason) has
+surprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a
+vague sense. They gave me the answer that they had never heard of any such
+explanation of it: the truth is that they have never conferred with people
+who expressed themselves clearly on these subjects. They have confessed to
+me, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, understood in
+the sense which I gave to it. It is in the same sense that sometimes reason
+is contrasted with experience. Reason, since it consists in the linking
+together of truths, is entitled to connect also those wherewith experience
+has furnished it, in order thence to draw mixed conclusions; but reason
+pure and simple, as distinct from experience, only has to do with truths
+independent of the senses. And one may compare faith with experience, since
+faith (in respect of the motives that give it justification) depends   [74]
+upon the experience of those who have seen the miracles whereon revelation
+is founded, and upon the trustworthy tradition which has handed them down
+to us, whether through the Scriptures or by the account of those who have
+preserved them. It is rather as we rely upon the experience of those who
+have seen China and on the credibility of their account when we give
+credence to the wonders that are told us of that distant country. Yet I
+would also take into account the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who
+takes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good, that
+is, to faith and to charity, without always having need of motives.
+
+2. Now the truths of reason are of two kinds: the one kind is of those
+called the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether necessary, so that the
+opposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths whose necessity is
+logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without being
+led into absurdities. There are others which may be called _positive_,
+because they are the laws which it has pleased God to give to Nature, or
+because they depend upon those. We learn them either by experience, that
+is, _a posteriori_, or by reason and _a priori_, that is, by considerations
+of the fitness of things which have caused their choice. This fitness of
+things has also its rules and reasons, but it is the free choice of God,
+and not a geometrical necessity, which causes preference for what is
+fitting and brings it into existence. Thus one may say that physical
+necessity is founded on moral necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice
+which is worthy of his wisdom; and that both of these ought to be
+distinguished from geometrical necessity. It is this physical necessity
+that makes order in Nature and lies in the rules of motion and in some
+other general laws which it pleased God to lay down for things when he gave
+them being. It is therefore true that God gave such laws not without
+reason, for he chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in
+pure indifference; but the general reasons of good and of order, which have
+prompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases by stronger
+reasons of a superior order.
+
+3. Thus it is made clear that God can exempt creatures from the laws he has
+prescribed for them, and produce in them that which their nature does not
+bear by performing a miracle. When they have risen to perfections and
+faculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain, the
+Schoolmen call this faculty an 'Obediential Power', that is to say, a  [75]
+power which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can give
+that which the thing has not. The Schoolmen, however, usually give
+instances of this power which to me appear impossible: they maintain, for
+example, that God can give the creature the faculty to create. It may be
+that there are miracles which God performs through the ministry of angels,
+where the laws of Nature are not violated, any more than when men assist
+Nature by art, the skill of angels differing from ours only by degree of
+perfection. Nevertheless it still remains true that the laws of Nature are
+subject to be dispensed from by the Law-giver; whereas the eternal
+verities, as for instance those of geometry, admit no dispensation, and
+faith cannot contradict them. Thus it is that there cannot be any
+invincible objection to truth. For if it is a question of proof which is
+founded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linking
+together of eternal verities, the conclusion is certain and essential, and
+that which is contrary to it must be false; otherwise two contradictories
+might be true at the same time. If the objection is not conclusive, it can
+only form a probable argument, which has no force against faith, since it
+is agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances. Now
+M. Bayle declares, in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc, that he does not
+claim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith: and as
+a result all these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars between
+reason and faith, vanish away.
+
+  _Hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta,_
+  _Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt._
+
+4. Protestant theologians as well as those of the Roman confession admit
+the maxims which I have just laid down, when they handle the matter with
+attention; and all that is said against reason has no force save against a
+kind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false appearances. It
+is the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of God, which
+are spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition of
+their nature. But in that case we should have no ground for ascribing these
+attributes to him, or lauding him for them. His goodness and his justice as
+well as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely more
+perfect. Thus the simple notions, the necessary truths and the conclusive
+results of philosophy cannot be contrary to revelation. And when some  [76]
+philosophical maxims are rejected in theology, the reason is that they are
+considered to have only a physical or moral necessity, which speaks only of
+that which takes place usually, and is consequently founded on appearances,
+but which may be withheld if God so pleases.
+
+5. It seems, according to what I have just said, that there is often some
+confusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy and
+theology, or faith and reason: they confuse the terms 'explain',
+'comprehend', 'prove', 'uphold'. And I find that M. Bayle, shrewd as he is,
+is not always free from this confusion. Mysteries may be _explained_
+sufficiently to justify belief in them; but one cannot _comprehend_ them,
+nor give understanding of how they come to pass. Thus even in natural
+philosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities,
+but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is it
+possible for us, either, to prove Mysteries by reason; for all that which
+can be proved _a priori_, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All that
+remains for us then, after having believed in the Mysteries by reason of
+the proofs of the truth of religion (which are called 'motives of
+credibility') is to be able to _uphold_ them against objections. Without
+that our belief in them would have no firm foundation; for all that which
+can be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false. And
+such proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a _moral certainty_
+would be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an
+_absolute certainty_, provided they were convincing and altogether
+conclusive. This little might suffice me to remove the difficulties
+concerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if one
+had not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons. But as the subject
+is important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will be well
+to take it in greater detail.
+
+6. The question of the _conformity of faith with reason_ has always been a
+great problem. In the primitive Church the ablest Christian authors adapted
+themselves to the ideas of the Platonists, which were the most acceptable
+to them, and were at that time most generally in favour. Little by little
+Aristotle took the place of Plato, when the taste for systems began to
+prevail, and when theology itself became more systematic, owing to the
+decisions of the General Councils, which provided precise and positive
+formularies. St. Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus in the West, and  [77]
+St. John of Damascus in the East contributed most towards reducing theology
+to scientific form, not to mention Bede, Alcuin, St. Anselm and some other
+theologians versed in philosophy. Finally came the Schoolmen. The leisure
+of the cloisters giving full scope for speculation, which was assisted by
+Aristotle's philosophy translated from the Arabic, there was formed at last
+a compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arose
+from the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason. But this
+had not met with the full success hoped for, because theology had been much
+corrupted by the unhappiness of the times, by ignorance and obstinacy.
+Moreover, philosophy, in addition to its own faults, which were very great,
+found itself burdened with those of theology, which in its turn was
+suffering from association with a philosophy that was very obscure and very
+imperfect. One must confess, notwithstanding, with the incomparable
+Grotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of the
+monks' barbarous Latin. I have therefore oft-times wished that a man of
+talent, whose office had necessitated his learning the language of the
+Schoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth, and that
+another Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the Schoolmen what these
+two learned men have done in respect of the Fathers. It would be a very
+curious work, and very important for ecclesiastical history, and it would
+continue the History of Dogmas up to the time of the Revival of Letters
+(owing to which the aspect of things has changed) and even beyond that
+point. For sundry dogmas, such as those of physical predetermination, of
+mediate knowledge, philosophical sin, objective precisions, and many other
+dogmas in speculative theology and even in the practical theology of cases
+of conscience, came into currency even after the Council of Trent.
+
+7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the West
+that still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers which
+disputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They were
+dubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author,
+who was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, and who appeared to be the
+one of all his race that penetrated furthest into Aristotle's meaning. This
+Commentator, extending what Greek expositors had already taught, maintained
+that according to Aristotle, and even according to reason (and at that time
+the two were considered almost identical) there was no case for the    [78]
+immortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The human kind is eternal,
+according to Aristotle, therefore if individual souls die not, one must
+resort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher. Or, if there are
+always new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls existing from
+all eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, according to the doctrine
+of the same Aristotle. Therefore it is a necessary conclusion that the
+souls, that is, the forms of organic bodies, must perish with the bodies,
+or at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs to
+each one individually. Thus there will only remain the active understanding
+common to all men, which according to Aristotle comes from outside, and
+which must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as the
+wind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ
+pipes.
+
+8. Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof. It is not true
+that Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity of
+the human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinity
+is impossible. Yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst Aristotelians,
+and induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunary
+intelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation in
+it. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so far as to advocate a
+universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this
+universal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are
+born and die. According to this opinion the souls of animals are born by
+being separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body which
+they can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when
+the body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. Many even went so
+far as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thought
+that this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very
+ancient and apt to dazzle the common herd. It is expressed in these
+beautiful lines of Vergil (_Aen._, VI, v. 724):
+
+  _Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes,_
+  _Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra,_
+  _Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus_
+  _Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet._
+  _Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum._
+
+                                                                       [79]
+And again elsewhere (_Georg._, IV, v. 221):
+
+      _Deum namque ire per omnes_
+  _Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:_
+  _Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,_
+  _Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas._
+  _Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri._
+
+9. Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, but
+there is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soul
+which swallows all the rest. Those who are of this opinion might be called
+'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only one soul
+that subsists. M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion almost
+universally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States of the
+Grand Mogul; it appears even that it has gained a footing with the
+Cabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth,
+converted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name Moses
+Germanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinoza
+revived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confuted
+this proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. It is known that
+Spinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual souls
+are but transient modifications. Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau in
+Saxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have it
+that he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; as was
+also a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain quite
+pleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of epigrams, which
+have just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' doctrine of deification
+was liable to such a sinister interpretation. Gerson already has written
+opposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose intention was evidently good
+and whose expressions are excusable. But it would be better to write in a
+manner that has no need of excuses: although I confess that oft-times
+expressions which are extravagant, and as it were poetical, have greater
+force to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement.
+
+10. The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, carried to
+great lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled irreligion in
+certain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the Quietism of Foe,
+originator of a great Chinese sect. After having preached his religion [80]
+for forty years, when he felt death was approaching, he declared to his
+disciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil of
+metaphors, and that all reduced itself to Nothingness, which he said was
+the first source of all things. That was still worse, so it would seem,
+than the opinion of the Averroists. Both of these doctrines are
+indefensible and even extravagant; nevertheless some moderns have made no
+difficulty about adopting this one and universal Soul that engulfs the
+rest. It has met with only too much applause amongst the so-called
+freethinkers, and M. de Preissac, a soldier and man of wit, who dabbled in
+philosophy, at one time aired it publicly in his discourses. The System of
+Pre-established Harmony is the one best qualified to cure this evil. For it
+shows that there are of necessity substances which are simple and without
+extension, scattered throughout all Nature; that these substances must
+subsist independently of every other except God; and that they are never
+wholly separated from organic body. Those who believe that souls capable of
+feeling but incapable of reason are mortal, or who maintain that none but
+reasoning souls can have feeling, offer a handle to the Monopsychites. For
+it will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing; and
+once the admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling can
+die, it is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of our
+souls.
+
+11. I have made this short digression because it appeared to me seasonable
+at a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow natural
+religion to its very foundations. I return then to the Averroists, who were
+persuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively in accordance with
+reason. As a result they declared that man's soul is, according to
+philosophy, mortal, while they protested their acquiescence in Christian
+theology, which declares the soul's immortality. But this distinction was
+held suspect, and this divorce between faith and reason was vehemently
+rejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time, and condemned in the
+last Lateran Council under Leo X. On that occasion also, scholars were
+urged to work for the removal of the difficulties that appeared to set
+theology and philosophy at variance. The doctrine of their incompatibility
+continued to hold its ground _incognito_. Pomponazzi was suspected of it,
+although he declared himself otherwise; and that very sect of the
+Averroists survived as a school. It is thought that Caesar Cremoninus, [81]
+a philosopher famous in his time, was one of its mainstays. Andreas
+Cisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who came nearest after
+Michael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood), was
+accused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled _Alpes Caesae_) of belonging
+to these anti-religious Peripatetics. Traces of this doctrine are found
+also in the _Circulus Pisanus Claudii Berigardi_, an author of French
+nationality who migrated to Italy and taught philosophy at Pisa: but
+especially the writings and the letters of Gabriel Naude, as well as the
+_Naudaeana_, show that Averroism still lived on when this learned physician
+was in Italy. Corpuscular philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears to
+have extinguished this excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to have
+been intermixed with its teaching. It may be indeed that there have been
+Atomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of the
+Averroists, if circumstances so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm such
+good as there is in Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combined
+with all that is sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both into
+harmony with true theology.
+
+12. The Reformers, and especially Luther, as I have already observed, spoke
+sometimes as if they rejected philosophy, and deemed it inimical to faith.
+But, properly speaking, Luther understood by philosophy only that which is
+in conformity with the ordinary course of Nature, or perhaps even
+philosophy as it was taught in the schools. Thus for example he says that
+it is impossible in philosophy, that is, in the order of Nature, that the
+word be made flesh; and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true in
+natural philosophy might be false in ethics. Aristotle was the object of
+his anger; and so far back as the year 1516 he contemplated the purging of
+philosophy, when he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the Church.
+But at last he curbed his vehemence and in the _Apology for the Augsburg
+Confession_ allowed a favourable mention of Aristotle and his _Ethics_.
+Melanchthon, a man of sound and moderate ideas, made little systems from
+the several parts of philosophy, adapted to the truths of revelation and
+useful in civic life, which deserve to be read even now. After him, Pierre
+de la Ramee entered the lists. His philosophy was much in favour: the sect
+of the Ramists was powerful in Germany, gaining many adherents among the
+Protestants, and even concerning itself with theology, until the revival of
+Corpuscular philosophy, which caused that of Ramee to fall into        [82]
+oblivion and weakened the authority of the Peripatetics.
+
+13. Meanwhile sundry Protestant theologians, deviating as far as they could
+from Scholastic philosophy, which prevailed in the opposite party, went so
+far as to despise philosophy itself, which to them was suspect. The
+controversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of Daniel Hoffmann. He
+was an able theologian, who had previously gained a reputation at the
+Conference of Quedlinburg, when Tilemann Heshusius and he had supported
+Duke Julius of Brunswick in his refusal to accept the Formula of Concord.
+For some reason or other Dr. Hoffmann flew into a passion with philosophy,
+instead of being content to find fault with the wrong uses made thereof by
+philosophers. He was, however, aiming at the famous Caselius, a man
+esteemed by the princes and scholars of his time; and Henry Julius, Duke of
+Brunswick (son of Julius, founder of the University), having taken the
+trouble himself to investigate the matter, condemned the theologian. There
+have been some small disputes of the kind since, but it has always been
+found that they were misunderstandings. Paul Slevogt, a famous Professor at
+Jena in Thuringia, whose still extant treatises prove how well versed he
+was in Scholastic philosophy, as also in Hebrew literature, had published
+in his youth under the title of _Pervigilium_ a little book 'de dissidio
+Theologi et Philosophi in utriusque principiis fundato', bearing on the
+question whether God is accidentally the cause of sin. But it was easy to
+see that his aim was to demonstrate that theologians sometimes misuse
+philosophical terms.
+
+14. To come now to the events of my own time, I remember that when in 1666
+Louis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the book
+entitled _Philosophia Scripturae Interpres_ (by many persons wrongly
+attributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland bestirred
+themselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to great
+disputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the Cartesians,
+in confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much to
+philosophy. Jean de Labadie (before he had seceded from the Reformed
+Church, his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into public
+observance and which he considered intolerable) attacked the book by Herr
+von Wollzogen, and called it pernicious. On the other hand Herr Vogelsang,
+Herr van der Weye and some other anti-Cocceians also assailed the same [83]
+book with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod.
+Afterwards in Holland people spoke of 'rational' and 'non-rational'
+theologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. Bayle, who finally
+declared himself against the former. But there is no indication that any
+precise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept or
+reject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of Holy
+Scripture.
+
+15. A like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in the
+Churches of the Augsburg Confession. Some Masters of Arts in the University
+of Leipzig gave private lessons at their homes, to students who sought them
+out in order to learn what is called 'Sacra Philologia', according to the
+practice of this university and of some others where this kind of study is
+not restricted to the Faculty of Theology. These masters pressed the study
+of the Holy Scriptures and the practice of piety further than their fellows
+had been wont to do. It is alleged that they had carried certain things to
+excess, and aroused suspicions of certain doctrinal innovations. This
+caused them to be dubbed 'Pietists', as though they were a new sect; and
+this name is one which has since caused a great stir in Germany. It has
+been applied somehow or other to those whom one suspected, or pretended to
+suspect, of fanaticism, or even of hypocrisy, concealed under some
+semblance of reform. Now some of the students attending these masters had
+become conspicuous for behaviour which gave general offence, and amongst
+other things for their scorn of philosophy, even, so it was said, burning
+their notebooks. In consequence the belief arose that their masters
+rejected philosophy: but they justified themselves very well; nor could
+they be convicted either of this error or of the heresies that were being
+imputed to them.
+
+16. The question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated much
+amongst Christians, and difficulty was experienced over settling the limits
+of its use when it came to detailed consideration. The Mysteries of the
+Trinity, of the Incarnation and of the Holy Communion gave most occasion
+for dispute. The new Photinians, disputing the first two Mysteries, made
+use of certain philosophic maxims which Andreas Kessler, a theologian of
+the Augsburg Confession, summarized in the various treatises that he
+published on the parts of the Socinian philosophy. But as to their
+metaphysics, one might instruct oneself better therein by reading the  [84]
+work of Christopher Stegmann the Socinian. It is not yet in print; but I
+saw it in my youth and it has been recently again in my hands.
+
+17. Calovius and Scherzer, authors well versed in Scholastic philosophy,
+and sundry other able theologians answered the Socinians at great length,
+and often with success: for they would not content themselves with the
+general and somewhat cavalier answers that were commonly used against that
+sect. The drift of such answers was: that their maxims were good in
+philosophy and not in theology; that it was the fault of heterogeneousness
+called [Greek: metabasis eis allo genos] to apply those maxims to a matter
+transcending reason; and that philosophy should be treated as a servant and
+not a mistress in relation to theology, according to the title of the book
+by a Scot named Robert Baronius, _Philosophia Theologiae ancillans_. In
+fine, philosophy was a Hagar beside Sara and must be driven from the house
+with her Ishmael when she was refractory. There is something good in these
+answers: but one might abuse them, and set natural truths and truths of
+revelation at variance. Scholars therefore applied themselves to
+distinguishing between what is necessary and indispensable in natural or
+philosophic truths and that which is not so.
+
+18. The two Protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is a
+question of making war on the Socinians; and as the philosophy of these
+sectaries is not of the most exact, in most cases the attack succeeded in
+reducing it. But the Protestants themselves had dissensions on the matter
+of the Eucharistic Sacrament. A section of those who are called Reformed
+(namely those who on that point follow rather Zwingli than Calvin) seemed
+to reduce the participation in the body of Jesus Christ in the Holy
+Communion to a mere figurative representation, employing the maxim of the
+philosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time.
+Contrariwise the Evangelicals (who name themselves thus in a particular
+sense to distinguish themselves from the Reformed), being more attached to
+the literal sense of Scripture, opined with Luther that this participation
+was real, and that here there lay a supernatural Mystery. They reject, in
+truth, the dogma of Transubstantiation, which they believe to be without
+foundation in the Text; neither do they approve that of Consubstantiation
+or of Impanation, which one could only impute to them if one were
+ill-informed on their opinion. For they admit no inclusion of the body [85]
+of Jesus Christ in the bread, nor do they even require any union of the one
+with the other: but they demand at least a concomitance, so that these two
+substances be received both at the same time. They believe that the
+ordinary sense of the words of Jesus Christ on an occasion so important as
+that which concerned the expression of his last wishes ought to be
+preserved. Thus in order to show that this sense is free from all absurdity
+which could make it repugnant to us, they maintain that the philosophic
+maxim restricting the existence of, and partaking in, bodies to one place
+alone is simply a consequence of the ordinary course of Nature. They make
+that no obstacle to the presence, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the
+body of our Saviour in such form as may be in keeping with the most
+glorified body. They do not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity, which
+would disperse the body and leave it nowhere in particular; nor do they
+admit the multiple-reduplication theory of some Schoolmen, as if to say one
+and the same body could be at the same time seated here and standing
+elsewhere. In fine, they so express themselves that many consider the
+opinion of Calvin, authorized by sundry confessions of faith from the
+Churches that have accepted his teaching, to be not so far removed from the
+Augsburg Confession as one might think: for he affirmed a partaking in the
+substance. The divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that Calvin
+demands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols, and
+consequently excludes the unworthy.
+
+19. Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation can
+be supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some Schoolmen)
+by a properly understood analogy between _immediate operation_ and
+_presence_. Many philosophers have deemed that, even in the order of
+Nature, a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remote
+bodies at the same time. So do they believe, all the more, that nothing can
+prevent divine Omnipotence from causing one body to be present in many
+bodies together, since the transition from immediate operation to presence
+is but slight, the one perhaps depending upon the other. It is true that
+modern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate natural
+operation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I am
+of their opinion. Meanwhile remote operation has just been revived in
+England by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the nature of
+bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another, in proportion[86]
+to the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives.
+Accordingly the famous Mr. Locke, in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet,
+declares that having seen Mr. Newton's book he retracts what he himself
+said, following the opinion of the moderns, in his _Essay concerning Human
+Understanding_, to wit, that a body cannot operate immediately upon another
+except by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion. He
+acknowledges that God can put properties into matter which cause it to
+operate from a distance. Thus the theologians of the Augsburg Confession
+claim that God may ordain not only that a body operate immediately on
+divers bodies remote from one another, but that it even exist in their
+neighbourhood and be received by them in a way with which distances of
+place and dimensions of space have nothing to do. Although this effect
+transcends the forces of Nature, they do not think it possible to show that
+it surpasses the power of the Author of Nature. For him it is easy to annul
+the laws that he has given or to dispense with them as seems good to him,
+in the same way as he was able to make iron float upon water and to stay
+the operation of fire upon the human body.
+
+20. I found in comparing the _Rationale Theologicum_ of Nicolaus Vedelius
+with the refutation by Johann Musaeus that these two authors, of whom one
+died while a Professor at Franecker after having taught at Geneva and the
+other finally became the foremost theologian at Jena, are more or less in
+agreement on the principal rules for the use of reason, but that it is in
+the application of these rules they disagree. For they both agree that
+revelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose necessity is called by
+philosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical', that is to say, whose opposite
+implies contradiction. They both admit also that revelation will be able to
+combat maxims whose necessity is called 'physical' and is founded only upon
+the laws that the will of God has prescribed for Nature. Thus the question
+whether the presence of one and the same body in divers places is possible
+in the supernatural order only touches the application of the rule; and in
+order to decide this question conclusively by reason, one must needs
+explain exactly wherein the essence of body consists. Even the Reformed
+disagree thereon amongst themselves; the Cartesians confine it to
+extension, but their adversaries oppose that; and I think I have even
+observed that Gisbertus Voetius, a famous theologian of Utrecht,       [87]
+doubted the alleged impossibility of plurality of locations.
+
+21. Furthermore, although the two Protestant parties agree that one must
+distinguish these two necessities which I have just indicated, namely
+metaphysical necessity and physical necessity, and that the first excludes
+exceptions even in the case of Mysteries, they are not yet sufficiently
+agreed upon the rules of interpretation, which serve to determine in what
+cases it is permitted to desert the letter of Scripture when one is not
+certain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths. It is agreed that
+there are cases where one must reject a literal interpretation that is not
+absolutely impossible, when it is otherwise unsuitable. For instance, all
+commentators agree that when our Lord said that Herod was a fox he meant it
+metaphorically; and one must accept that, unless one imagine with some
+fanatics that for the time the words of our Lord lasted Herod was actually
+changed into a fox. But it is not the same with the texts on which
+Mysteries are founded, where the theologians of the Augsburg Confession
+deem that one must keep to the literal sense. Since, moreover, this
+discussion belongs to the art of interpretation and not to that which is
+the proper sphere of logic, we will not here enter thereon, especially as
+it has nothing in common with the disputes that have arisen recently upon
+the conformity of faith with reason.
+
+22. Theologians of all parties, I believe (fanatics alone excepted), agree
+at least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or contravene
+proofs as exact as those of mathematics, where the opposite of the
+conclusion can be reduced _ad absurdum_, that is, to contradiction. St.
+Athanasius with good reason made sport of the preposterous ideas of some
+writers of his time, who maintained that God had suffered without any
+suffering. _'Passus est impassibiliter. O ludicram doctrinam aedificantem
+simul et demolientem!'_ It follows thence that certain writers have been
+too ready to grant that the Holy Trinity is contrary to that great
+principle which states that two things which are the same as a third are
+also the same as each other: that is to say, if A is the same as B, and if
+C is the same as B, then A and C must also be the same as each other. For
+this principle is a direct consequence of that of contradiction, and forms
+the basis of all logic; and if it ceases, we can no longer reason with
+certainty. Thus when one says that the Father is God, that the Son is God
+and that the Holy Spirit is God, and that nevertheless there is only   [88]
+one God, although these three Persons differ from one another, one must
+consider that this word _God_ has not the same sense at the beginning as at
+the end of this statement. Indeed it signifies now the Divine Substance and
+now a Person of the Godhead. In general, one must take care never to
+abandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholding
+Mysteries, lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion for
+decrying both religion and Mysteries.
+
+23. The distinction which is generally drawn between that which is _above_
+reason and that which is _against_ reason is tolerably in accord with the
+distinction which has just been made between the two kinds of necessity.
+For what is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain and
+inevitable truths; and what is above reason is in opposition only to what
+one is wont to experience or to understand. That is why I am surprised that
+there are people of intelligence who dispute this distinction, and that M.
+Bayle should be of this number. The distinction is assuredly very well
+founded. A truth is above reason when our mind (or even every created mind)
+cannot comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; such
+are the miracles reserved for God alone, as for instance Creation; such is
+the choice of the order of the universe, which depends upon universal
+harmony, and upon the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once. But
+a truth can never be contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed
+and refuted by reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may say
+that nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity.
+For I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not mean the
+opinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they have formed of
+judging things according to the usual course of Nature, but rather the
+inviolable linking together of truths.
+
+24. I must come now to the great question which M. Bayle brought up
+recently, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can
+prove to be subject to irrefutable objections. This excellent author
+appears to answer with a bold affirmative: he quotes theologians of repute
+in his party, and even in the Church of Rome, who appear to say the same as
+he affirms; and he cites philosophers who have believed that there are even
+philosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the objections that are
+brought up against them. He believes that the theological doctrine of  [89]
+predestination is of this nature, and in philosophy that of the composition
+of the _Continuum_. These are, indeed, the two labyrinths which have ever
+exercised theologians and philosophers. Libertus Fromondus, a theologian of
+Louvain (a great friend of Jansenius, whose posthumous book entitled
+_Augustinus_ he in fact published), who also wrote a book entitled
+explicitly _Labyrinthus de Compositione Continui_, experienced in full
+measure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines; and the renowned
+Ochino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths of
+predestination'.
+
+25. But these writers have not denied the possibility of finding thread in
+the labyrinth; they have recognized the difficulty, but they have surely
+not turned difficulty into sheer impossibility. As for me, I confess that I
+cannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can admit of irrefutable
+objections: for is an _objection_ anything but an argument whose conclusion
+contradicts our thesis? And is not an irrefutable argument a
+_demonstration_? And how can one know the certainty of demonstrations
+except by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, in
+order to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is either
+admitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able to
+make do with admitted premisses alone? Now if there is such an objection
+against our thesis we must say that the falsity of this thesis is
+demonstrated, and that it is impossible for us to have reasons sufficient
+to prove it; otherwise two contradictories would be true at once. One must
+always yield to proofs, whether they be proposed in positive form or
+advanced in the shape of objections. And it is wrong and fruitless to try
+to weaken opponents' proofs, under the pretext that they are only
+objections, since the opponent can play the same game and can reverse the
+denominations, exalting his arguments by naming them 'proofs' and sinking
+ours under the blighting title of 'objections'.
+
+26. It is another question whether we are always obliged to examine the
+objections we may have to face, and to retain some doubt in respect of our
+own opinion, or what is called _formido oppositi_, until this examination
+has been made. I would venture to say no, for otherwise one would never
+attain to certainty and our conclusion would be always provisional. I
+believe that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by the objections
+of Joseph Scaliger against Archimedes, or by those of Mr. Hobbes       [90]
+against Euclid; but that is because they have fully understood and are sure
+of the proofs. Nevertheless it is sometimes well to show oneself ready to
+examine certain objections. On the one hand it may serve to rescue people
+from their error, while on the other we ourselves may profit by it; for
+specious fallacies often contain some useful solution and bring about the
+removal of considerable difficulties. That is why I have always liked
+ingenious objections made against my own opinions, and I have never
+examined them without profit: witness those which M. Bayle formerly made
+against my System of Pre-established Harmony, not to mention those which M.
+Arnauld, M. l'Abbe Foucher and Father Lami, O.S.B., made to me on the same
+subject. But to return to the principal question, I conclude from reasons I
+have just set forth that when an objection is put forward against some
+truth, it is always possible to answer it satisfactorily.
+
+27. It may be also that M. Bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' in
+the sense that I have just explained. I observe that he varies, at least in
+his expressions: for in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc he does not
+admit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of faith. It
+appears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble only in
+respect of our present degree of enlightenment; and in this Reply, p. 35,
+he even does not despair of the possibility that one day a solution
+hitherto unknown may be found by someone. Concerning that more will be said
+later. I hold an opinion, however, that will perchance cause surprise,
+namely that this solution has been discovered entire, and is not even
+particularly difficult. Indeed a mediocre intelligence capable of
+sufficient care, and using correctly the rules of common logic, is in a
+position to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth, when
+the objection is only taken from reason, and when it is claimed to be a
+'demonstration'. Whatever scorn the generality of moderns have to-day for
+the logic of Aristotle, one must acknowledge that it teaches infallible
+ways of resisting error in these conjunctures. For one has only to examine
+the argument according to the rules and it will always be possible to see
+whether it is lacking in form or whether there are premisses such as are
+not yet proved by a good argument.
+
+28. It is quite another matter when there is only a question of
+_probabilities_, for the art of judging from probable reasons is not yet
+well established; so that our logic in this connexion is still very    [91]
+imperfect, and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judging
+from demonstrations. But this art is sufficient here: for when it is a
+question of opposing reason to an article of our faith, one is not
+disturbed by objections that only attain probability. Everyone agrees that
+appearances are against Mysteries, and that they are by no means probable
+when regarded only from the standpoint of reason; but it suffices that they
+have in them nothing of absurdity. Thus demonstrations are required if they
+are to be refuted.
+
+29. And doubtless we are so to understand it when Holy Scripture warns us
+that the wisdom of God is foolishness before men, and when St. Paul
+observed that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is foolishness unto the Greeks, as
+well as unto the Jews a stumbling-block. For, after all, one truth cannot
+contradict another, and the light of reason is no less a gift of God than
+that of revelation. Also it is a matter of no difficulty among theologians
+who are expert in their profession, that the motives of credibility
+justify, once for all, the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunal
+of reason, so that reason in consequence gives way before it, as before a
+new light, and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities. It is more or less
+as if a new president sent by the prince must show his letters patent in
+the assembly where he is afterwards to preside. That is the tendency of
+sundry good books that we have on the truth of religion, such as those of
+Augustinus Steuchus, of Du Plessis-Mornay or of Grotius: for the true
+religion must needs have marks that the false religions have not, else
+would Zoroaster, Brahma, Somonacodom and Mahomet be as worthy of belief as
+Moses and Jesus Christ. Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it is
+kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and depends not
+upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advances
+beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to
+make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. Then we have
+no further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of
+argument which the mind may anticipate.
+
+30. Thus what we have just said of human reason, which is extolled and
+decried by turns, and often without rule or measure, may show our lack of
+exactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors. Nothing would
+be so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and of
+reason if men would make use of the commonest rules of logic and reason[92]
+with even a modicum of attention. Instead of that, they become involved in
+oblique and ambiguous phrases, which give them a fine field for
+declamation, to make the most of their wit and their learning. It would
+seem, indeed, that they have no wish to see the naked truth, peradventure
+because they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error: for they
+know not the beauty of the Author of all things, who is the source of
+truth.
+
+31. This negligence is a general defect of humanity, and one not to be laid
+to the charge of any particular person. _Abundamus dulcibus vitiis_, as
+Quintilian said of the style of Seneca, and we take pleasure in going
+astray. Exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as puerilities. Thus
+it is that common logic (although it is more or less sufficient for the
+examination of arguments that tend towards certainty) is relegated to
+schoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic which
+should determine the balance between probabilities, and would be so
+necessary in deliberations of importance. So true is it that our mistakes
+for the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of thinking: for
+nothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessary
+arguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, such as the authors
+of _The Art of Thinking_, of _The Search for Truth_ and of the _Essay
+concerning Human Understanding_, have been very far from indicating to us
+the true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make us
+weigh the probabilities of the true and the false: not to mention the art
+of discovery, in which success is still more difficult of attainment, and
+whereof we have nothing beyond very imperfect samples in mathematics.
+
+32. One thing which might have contributed most towards M. Bayle's belief
+that the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be obviated
+is that he seems to demand that God be justified in some such manner as
+that commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused before his
+judge. But he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men, which cannot
+always penetrate to the truth, one is often compelled to be guided by signs
+and probabilities, and above all by presumptions or prejudices; whereas it
+is agreed, as we have already observed, that Mysteries are not probable.
+For instance, M. Bayle will not have it that one can justify the goodness
+of God in the permission of sin, because probability would be against a man
+that should happen to be in circumstances comparable in our eyes to    [93]
+this permission. God foresees that Eve will be deceived by the serpent if
+he places her in the circumstances wherein she later found herself; and
+nevertheless he placed her there. Now if a father or a guardian did the
+same in regard to his child or his ward, if a friend did so in regard to a
+young person whose behaviour was his concern, the judge would not be
+satisfied by the excuses of an advocate who said that the man only
+permitted the evil, without doing it or willing it: he would rather take
+this permission as a sign of ill intention, and would regard it as a sin of
+omission, which would render the one convicted thereof accessary in
+another's sin of commission.
+
+33. But it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil and
+has not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so with
+ease, and one has even done things that have facilitated it, it does not
+follow on that account _necessarily_ that one is accessary thereto. It is
+only a very strong presumption, such as commonly replaces truth in human
+affairs, but which would be destroyed by an exact consideration of the
+facts, supposing we were capable of that in relation to God. For amongst
+lawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass for
+truth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than
+'conjecture', although the _Dictionary_ of the Academy has not sifted the
+difference. Now there is every reason to conclude unquestionably that one
+would find through this consideration, if only it were attainable, that
+reasons most just, and stronger than those which appear contrary to them,
+have compelled the All-Wise to permit the evil, and even to do things which
+have facilitated it. Of this some instances will be given later.
+
+34. It is none too easy, I confess, for a father, a guardian, a friend to
+have such reasons in the case under consideration. Yet the thing is not
+absolutely impossible, and a skilled writer of fiction might perchance find
+an extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the circumstances I
+have just indicated. But in reference to God there is no need to suppose or
+to establish particular reasons such as may have induced him to permit the
+evil; general reasons suffice. One knows that he takes care of the whole
+universe, whereof all the parts are connected; and one must thence infer
+that he has had innumerable considerations whose result made him deem it
+inadvisable to prevent certain evils.
+
+35. It should even be concluded that there must have been great or     [94]
+rather invincible reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to the
+permission of the evil that surprises us, from the mere fact that this
+permission has occurred: for nothing can come from God that is not
+altogether consistent with goodness, justice and holiness. Thus we can
+judge by the event (or _a posteriori_) that the permission was
+indispensable, although it be not possible for us to show this (_a priori_)
+by the detailed reasons that God can have had therefor; as it is not
+necessary either that we show this to justify him. M. Bayle himself aptly
+says concerning that (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,
+ch. 165, p. 1067): Sin made its way into the world; God therefore was able
+to permit it without detriment to his perfections; _ab actu ad potentiam
+valet consequentia._ In God this conclusion holds good: he did this,
+therefore he did it well. It is not, then, that we have no notion of
+justice in general fit to be applied also to God's justice; nor is it that
+God's justice has other rules than the justice known of men, but that the
+case in question is quite different from those which are common among men.
+Universal right is the same for God and for men; but the question of fact
+is quite different in their case and his.
+
+36. We may even assume or pretend (as I have already observed) that there
+is something similar among men to this circumstance in God's actions. A man
+might give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and his holiness that
+all the most apparent reasons one could put forward against him to charge
+him with an alleged crime, for instance a larceny or murder, would deserve
+to be rejected as the calumnies of false witnesses or as an extraordinary
+play of chance which sometimes throws suspicion on the most innocent. Thus
+in a case where every other would run the risk of being condemned or put to
+the torture (according to the laws of the country), this man would be
+absolved by his judges unanimously. Now in this case, which indeed is rare,
+but which is not impossible, one might say in a sense (_sano sensu_) that
+there is a conflict between reason and faith, and that the rules of law are
+other in respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainder
+of mankind. But that, when explained, will signify only that appearances of
+reason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and the
+integrity of this great and holy man, and that he is privileged above other
+men; not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for him,
+nor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to him.
+It is rather because the rules of universal justice do not find here   [95]
+the application that they receive elsewhere, or because they favour him
+instead of accusing him, since there are in this personage qualities so
+admirable, that by virtue of a good logic of probabilities one should place
+more faith in his word than in that of many others.
+
+37. Since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases, may one not
+suppose this incomparable man to be the Adept or the Possessor of
+
+                  _'that blessed Stone_
+  _Able to enrich all earthly Kings alone'_
+
+and that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to rescue
+from distress countless numbers of poor men? Be there never so many
+witnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this great
+benefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny, is it not
+true that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation, however
+specious it might be? Now God is infinitely above the goodness and the
+power of this man, and consequently there are no reasons at all, however
+apparent they be, that can hold good against faith, that is, against the
+assurance or the confidence in God wherewith we can and ought to say that
+God has done all things well. The objections are therefore not insoluble.
+They only involve prejudices and probabilities, which are, however,
+overthrown by reasons incomparably stronger. One must not say either that
+what we call _justice_ is nothing in relation to God, that he is the
+absolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn
+the innocent without violating his justice, or finally that justice is
+something arbitrary where he is concerned. Those are rash and dangerous
+expressions, whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of the
+attributes of God. For if such were the case there would be no reason for
+praising his goodness and his justice: rather would it be as if the most
+wicked spirit, the Prince of evil genii, the evil principle of the
+Manichaeans, were the sole master of the universe, just as I observed
+before. What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from the
+false God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an
+arbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anything
+whatever?
+
+38. It is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to commit
+ourselves to a doctrine so strange, since it suffices to say that we   [96]
+have not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question of
+answering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice and
+the goodness of God, and which would vanish away if the facts were well
+known to us. We need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faith
+nor blind ourselves in order to see clearly, as Queen Christine used to
+say: it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary to
+Mysteries; and this is not contrary to reason, since even in natural things
+we are very often undeceived about appearances either by experience or by
+superior reasons. All that has been set down here in advance, only with the
+object of showing more plainly wherein the fault of the objections and the
+abuse of reason consists in the present case, where the claim is made that
+reason has greatest force against faith: we shall come afterwards to a more
+exact discussion of that which concerns the origin of evil and the
+permission of sin with its consequences.
+
+39. For now, it will be well to continue our examination of the important
+question of the use of reason in theology, and to make reflexions upon what
+M. Bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his works. As he paid
+particular attention in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_ to
+expounding the objections of the Manichaeans and those of the Pyrrhonians,
+and as this procedure had been criticized by some persons zealous for
+religion, he placed a dissertation at the end of the second edition of this
+_Dictionary_, which aimed at showing, by examples, by authorities and by
+reasons, the innocence and usefulness of his course of action. I am
+persuaded (as I have said above) that the specious objections one can urge
+against truth are very useful, and that they serve to confirm and to
+illumine it, giving opportunity to intelligent persons to find new openings
+or to turn the old to better account. But M. Bayle seeks therein a
+usefulness quite the reverse of this: it would be that of displaying the
+power of faith by showing that the truths it teaches cannot sustain the
+attacks of reason and that it nevertheless holds its own in the heart of
+the faithful. M. Nicole seems to call that 'the triumph of God's authority
+over human reason', in the words of his quoted by M. Bayle in the third
+volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (ch. 177, p. 120).
+But since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention between
+them would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of
+reason against any article of faith are insoluble, then it must be said
+that this alleged article will be false and not revealed: this will be [97]
+a chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capable
+of comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat. Such is the doctrine of
+the damnation of unbaptized children, which M. Nicole would have us assume
+to be a consequence of original sin; such would be the eternal damnation of
+adults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of salvation.
+
+40. Yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions; and persons
+whose condition allows not of exact researches should be content with
+instruction on faith, without being disturbed by the objections; and if
+some exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them, it is
+permitted to them to avert the mind from it, offering to God a sacrifice of
+their curiosity: for when one is assured of a truth one has no need to
+listen to the objections. As there are many people whose faith is rather
+small and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests, I think one must not
+present them with that which might be poisonous for them; or, if one cannot
+hide from them what is only too public, the antidote must be added to it;
+that is to say, one must try to add the answer to the objection, certainly
+not withhold it as unobtainable.
+
+41. The passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this triumph
+of faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the principles I
+have just affirmed. There appear in some objects of faith two great
+qualities capable of making it triumph over reason, the one is
+_incomprehensibility_, the other is _the lack of probability_. But one must
+beware of adding thereto the third quality whereof M. Bayle speaks, and of
+saying that what one believes is _indefensible_: for that would be to cause
+reason in its turn to triumph in a manner that would destroy faith.
+Incomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing even natural truths.
+For instance (as I have already pointed out) we do not comprehend the
+nature of odours and savours, and yet we are persuaded, by a kind of faith
+which we owe to the evidence of the senses, that these perceptible
+qualities are founded upon the nature of things and that they are not
+illusions.
+
+42. There are also things contrary to appearances, which we admit when they
+are sufficiently verified. There is a little romance of Spanish origin,
+whose title states that one must not always believe what one sees. What was
+there more specious than the lie of the false Martin Guerre, who was
+acknowledged as the true Martin by the true Martin's wife and          [98]
+relatives, and caused the judges and the relatives to waver for a long time
+even after the arrival of the other? Nevertheless the truth was known in
+the end. It is the same with faith. I have already observed that all one
+can oppose to the goodness and the justice of God is nothing but
+appearances, which would be strong against a man, but which are nullified
+when they are applied to God and when they are weighed against the proofs
+that assure us of the infinite perfection of his attributes. Thus faith
+triumphs over false reasons by means of sound and superior reasons that
+have made us embrace it; but it would not triumph if the contrary opinion
+had for it reasons as strong as or even stronger than those which form the
+foundation of faith, that is, if there were invincible and conclusive
+objections against faith.
+
+43. It is well also to observe here that what M. Bayle calls a 'triumph of
+faith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative reason against apparent and
+deceptive reasons which are improperly set against the demonstrations. For
+it must be taken into consideration that the objections of the Manichaeans
+are hardly less contrary to natural theology than to revealed theology. And
+supposing one surrendered to them Holy Scripture, original sin, the grace
+of God in Jesus Christ, the pains of hell and the other articles of our
+religion, one would not even so be delivered from their objections: for one
+cannot deny that there is in the world physical evil (that is, suffering)
+and moral evil (that is, crime) and even that physical evil is not always
+distributed here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil, as it
+seems that justice demands. There remains, then, this question of natural
+theology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has
+been able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could
+resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?
+
+44. Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a sole
+Principle of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this by
+infallible proofs; and in consequence all the objections taken from the
+course of things, in which we observe imperfections, are only based on
+false appearances. For, if we were capable of understanding the universal
+harmony, we should see that what we are tempted to find fault with is
+connected with the plan most worthy of being chosen; in a word, we _should
+see_, and should not _believe_ only, that what God has done is the best. I
+call 'seeing' here what one knows _a priori_ by the causes; and        [99]
+'believing' what one only judges by the effects, even though the one be as
+certainly known as the other. And one can apply here too the saying of St.
+Paul (2 Cor. v. 7), that we walk by _faith_ and not by _sight_. For the
+infinite wisdom of God being known to us, we conclude that the evils we
+experience had to be permitted, and this we conclude from the effect or _a
+posteriori_, that is to say, because they exist. It is what M. Bayle
+acknowledges; and he ought to content himself with that, and not claim that
+one must put an end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto. It
+is as if one asked that there should be no more dreams or optical
+illusions.
+
+45. And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in God,
+who gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for his
+love, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us, are an
+admirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology, when the divine
+grace in Jesus Christ arouses these motions within us. That is what Luther
+aptly observed in opposition to Erasmus, saying that it is love in the
+highest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so unlovable, so
+harsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn, and to condemn for
+evils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary, at least in the
+eyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false reasons. One may
+therefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined by divine grace is
+at the same time the triumph of faith and love.
+
+46. M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he declares
+himself against reason, when he might have been content to censure its
+abuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero, where he goes so far as to
+say that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would be to blame for
+having given it, since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle also thinks that
+human reason is a source of destruction and not of edification (_Historical
+and Critical Dictionary_, p. 2026, col. 2), that it is a runner who knows
+not where to stop, and who, like another Penelope, herself destroys her own
+work.
+
+  _Destruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis._
+
+(_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 725). But he takes
+pains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other, in order
+to show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason just as he
+does, and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as oppose
+religion only that they may sacrifice them to faith by a mere         [100]
+repudiation, answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument that is
+brought against them. He begins with the New Testament. Jesus Christ was
+content to say: 'Follow Me' (Luke v. 27; ix. 59). The Apostles said:
+'Believe, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts xvi. 3). St. Paul acknowledges
+that his 'doctrine is obscure' (1 Cor. xiii. 12), that 'one can comprehend
+nothing therein' unless God impart a spiritual discernment, and without
+that it only passes for foolishness (1 Cor. ii. 14). He exhorts the
+faithful 'to beware of philosophy' (Col. ii. 8) and to avoid disputations
+in that science, which had caused many persons to lose faith.
+
+47. As for the Fathers of the Church, M. Bayle refers us to the collection
+of passages from them against the use of philosophy and of reason which M.
+de Launoy made (_De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna,_ cap. 2) and especially to
+the passages from St. Augustine collected by M. Arnauld (against Mallet),
+which state: that the judgements of God are inscrutable; that they are not
+any the less just for that they are unknown to us; that it is a deep abyss,
+which one cannot fathom without running the risk of falling down the
+precipice; that one cannot without temerity try to elucidate that which God
+willed to keep hidden; that his will cannot but be just; that many men,
+having tried to explain this incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vain
+imaginations and opinions full of error and bewilderment.
+
+48. The Schoolmen have spoken in like manner. M. Bayle quotes a beautiful
+passage from Cardinal Cajetan (Part I, _Summ._, qu. 22, art. 4) to this
+effect: 'Our mind', he says, 'rests not upon the evidence of known truth
+but upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth. And as St. Gregory says:
+He who believes touching the Divinity only that which he can gauge with his
+mind belittles the idea of God. Yet I do not surmise that it is necessary
+to deny any of the things which we know, or which we see as appertaining to
+the immutability, the actuality, the certainty, the universality, etc., of
+God: but I think that there is here some secret, either in regard to the
+relation which exists between God and the event, or in respect of what
+connects the event itself with his prevision. Thus, reflecting that the
+understanding of our soul is the eye of the owl, I find the soul's repose
+only in ignorance. For it is better both for the Catholic Faith and for
+Philosophic Faith to confess our blindness, than to affirm as evident what
+does not afford our mind the contentment which self-evidence gives. I do
+not accuse of presumption, on that account, all the learned men who   [101]
+stammeringly have endeavoured to suggest, as far as in them lay, the
+immobility and the sovereign and eternal efficacy of the understanding, of
+the will and of the power of God, through the infallibility of divine
+election and divine relation to all events. Nothing of all that interferes
+with my surmise that there is some depth which is hidden from us.' This
+passage of Cajetan is all the more notable since he was an author competent
+to reach the heart of the matter.
+
+49. Luther's book against Erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile to
+those who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our reason.
+Calvin often speaks in the same tone, against the inquisitive daring of
+those who seek to penetrate into the counsels of God. He declares in his
+treatise on predestination that God had just causes for damning some men,
+but causes unknown to us. Finally M. Bayle quotes sundry modern writers who
+have spoken to the same effect (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_,
+ch. 161 et seq.).
+
+50. But all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not prove
+that the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as M. Bayle supposes.
+It is true that the counsels of God are inscrutable, but there is no
+invincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are unjust.
+What appears injustice on the part of God, and foolishness in our faith,
+only appears so. The famous passage of Tertullian (_De Carne Christi_),
+'mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultus
+revixit, certum est, quia impossibile', is a sally that can only be meant
+to concern appearances of absurdity. There are others like them in Luther's
+book on _Freewill in Bondage_, as when he says (ch. 174): 'Si placet tibi
+Deus indignos coronans, non debet displicere immeritos damnans.' Which
+being reduced to more temperate phrasing, means: If you approve that God
+give eternal glory to those who are not better than the rest, you should
+not disapprove that he abandon those who are not worse than the rest. And
+to judge that he speaks only of appearances of injustice, one only has to
+weigh these words of the same author taken from the same book: 'In all the
+rest', he says, 'we recognize in God a supreme majesty; there is only
+justice that we dare to question: and we will not believe provisionally
+[tantisper] that he is just, albeit he has promised us that the time shall
+come when his glory being revealed all men shall see clearly that he has
+been and that he is just.'
+
+                                                                      [102]
+51. It will be found also that when the Fathers entered into a discussion
+they did not simply reject reason. And, in disputations with the pagans,
+they endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to reason, and how
+the Christian religion has the better of it on that side also. Origen
+showed Celsus how reasonable Christianity is and why, notwithstanding, the
+majority of Christians should believe without examination. Celsus had
+jeered at the behaviour of Christians, 'who, willing', he said, 'neither to
+listen to your reasons nor to give you any for what they believe, are
+content to say to you: Examine not, only believe, or: Your faith will save
+you; and they hold this as a maxim, that the wisdom of the world is an
+evil.'
+
+52. Origen gives the answer of a wise man, and in conformity with the
+principles we have established in the matter. For reason, far from being
+contrary to Christianity, serves as a foundation for this religion, and
+will bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination of
+it. But, as few people are capable of this, the heavenly gift of plain
+faith tending towards good suffices for men in general. 'If it were
+possible', he says, 'for all men, neglecting the affairs of life, to apply
+themselves to study and meditation, one need seek no other way to make them
+accept the Christian religion. For, to say nothing likely to offend anyone'
+(he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd, but he will not say so
+explicitly), 'there will be found therein no less exactitude than
+elsewhere, whether in the discussion of its dogmas, or in the elucidation
+of the enigmatical expressions of its prophets, or in the interpretation of
+the parables of its gospels and of countless other things happening or
+ordained symbolically. But since neither the necessities of life nor the
+infirmities of men permit of this application to study, save for a very
+small number of persons, what means could one find more qualified to
+benefit everyone else in the world than those Jesus Christ wished to be
+used for the conversion of the nations? And I would fain ask with regard to
+the great number of those who believe, and who thereby have withdrawn
+themselves from the quagmire of vices wherein before they were plunged,
+which would be the better: to have thus changed one's morals and reformed
+one's life, believing without examination that there are punishments for
+sin and rewards for good actions; or to have waited for one's conversion
+until one not only believed but had examined with care the foundations of
+these dogmas? It is certain that, were this method to be followed, few[103]
+indeed would reach that point whither they are led by their plain and
+simple faith, but the majority would remain in their corruption.'
+
+53. M. Bayle (in his explanation concerning the objections of the
+Manichaeans, placed at the end of the second edition of the _Dictionary_)
+takes those words where Origen points out that religion can stand the test
+of having her dogmas discussed, as if it were not meant in relation to
+philosophy, but only in relation to the accuracy wherewith the authority
+and the true meaning of Holy Scripture is established. But there is nothing
+to indicate this restriction. Origen wrote against a philosopher whom such
+a restriction would not have suited. And it appears that this Father wished
+to point out that among Christians there was no less exactitude than among
+the Stoics and some other philosophers, who established their doctrine as
+much by reason as by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, who
+found his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity.
+
+54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the same
+place. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their "Examine not,
+only believe", they must tell me at least what are the things they wish me
+to believe.' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells against those
+who would say that God is good and just, and who yet would maintain that we
+have no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute these
+perfections to him. But one must not always demand what I call 'adequate
+notions', involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptible
+qualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such notions. Thus
+we agreed that Mysteries should receive an explanation, but this
+explanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to have some analogical
+understanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to the
+end that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of
+meaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we would
+wish, that is, to the extent of comprehension and to the _how_.
+
+55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of
+_common notions_ (in the third volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a
+Provincial_, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not consult the idea of
+goodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had declared himself
+quite differently in his _Dictionary_. Of necessity there must be agreement
+upon the meaning of _good_ and _bad_, amongst those who are in dispute[104]
+over the question whether there is only one principle, altogether good, or
+whether there are two, the one good and the other bad. We understand
+something by union when we are told of the union of one body with another
+or of a substance with its accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of the
+place with the moving body, of the act with the potency; we also mean
+something when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to make
+thereof one single person. For albeit I do not hold that the soul changes
+the laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul, and I
+have introduced the Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, I
+nevertheless admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makes
+thereof a suppositum. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas a
+union of influence would belong to the physical. But when we speak of the
+union of the Word of God with human nature we should be content with an
+analogical knowledge, such as the comparison of the union of the soul with
+the body is capable of giving us. We should, moreover, be content to say
+that the Incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the
+Creator and the creature; and further we should not want to go.
+
+56. It is the same with the other Mysteries, where moderate minds will ever
+find an explanation sufficient for belief, but never such as would be
+necessary for understanding. A certain _what it is_ ([Greek: ti esti]) is
+enough for us, but the _how_ ([Greek: pos]) is beyond us, and is not
+necessary for us. One may say concerning the explanations of Mysteries
+which are given out here and there, what the Queen of Sweden inscribed upon
+a medal concerning the crown she had abandoned, 'Non mi bisogna, e non mi
+basta.' Nor have we any need either (as I have already observed) to prove
+the Mysteries _a priori_, or to give a reason for them; it suffices us
+_that the thing is thus_ ([Greek: to hoti]) even though we know not the
+_why_ ([Greek: to dioti]), which God has reserved for himself. These lines,
+written on that theme by Joseph Scaliger, are beautiful and renowned:
+
+  _Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium,_
+  _Quaecumque libris vis Prophetarum indidit_
+  _Afflata caelo, plena veraci Deo:_
+  _Nec operta sacri supparo silentii_
+  _Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri._
+  [Page 105]
+  _Nescire velle, quae Magister optimus_
+  _Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est._
+
+M. Bayle, who quotes them (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol.
+III, p. 1055), holds the likely opinion that Scaliger made them upon the
+disputes between Arminius and Gomarus. I think M. Bayle repeated them from
+memory, for he put _sacrata_ instead of _afflata_. But it is apparently the
+printer's fault that _prudenter_ stands in place of _pudenter_ (that is,
+modestly) which the metre requires.
+
+57. Nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines contain; and
+M. Bayle is right in saying (p. 729) that those who claim that the
+behaviour of God with respect to sin and the consequences of sin contains
+nothing but what they can account for, deliver themselves up to the mercy
+of their adversary. But he is not right in combining here two very
+different things, 'to account for a thing', and 'to uphold it against
+objections'; as he does when he presently adds: 'They are obliged to follow
+him [their adversary] everywhere whither he shall wish to lead them, and it
+would be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter, if they were to admit
+that our intelligence is too weak to remove completely all the objections
+advanced by a philosopher.'
+
+58. It seems here that, according to M. Bayle, 'accounting for' comes short
+of 'answering objections', since he threatens one who should undertake the
+first with the resulting obligation to pass on to the second. But it is
+quite the opposite: he who maintains a thesis (the _respondens_) is not
+bound to account for it, but he is bound to meet the objections of an
+opponent. A defendant in law is not bound (as a general rule) to prove his
+right or to produce his title to possession; but he is obliged to reply to
+the arguments of the plaintiff. I have marvelled many times that a writer
+so precise and so shrewd as M. Bayle so often here confuses things where so
+much difference exists as between these three acts of reason: to
+comprehend, to prove, and to answer objections; as if when it is a question
+of the use of reason in theology one term were as good as another. Thus he
+says in his posthumous Conversations, p. 73: 'There is no principle which
+M. Bayle has more often inculcated than this, that the incomprehensibility
+of a dogma and the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide no
+legitimate reason for rejecting it.' This is true as regards the
+incomprehensibility, but it is not the same with the insolubility. And it
+is indeed just as if one said that an invincible reason against a     [106]
+thesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it. For what other
+legitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an invincible
+opposing argument is not such an one? And what means shall one have
+thereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of any
+opinion?
+
+59. It is well to observe also that he who proves a thing _a priori_
+accounts for it through the efficient cause; and whosoever can thus account
+for it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a position to comprehend
+the thing. Therefore it was that the Scholastic theologians had already
+censured Raymond Lully for having undertaken to demonstrate the Trinity by
+philosophy. This so-called demonstration is to be found in his _Works_; and
+Bartholomaeus Keckermann, a writer renowned in the Reformed party, having
+made an attempt of just the same kind upon the same Mystery, has been no
+less censured for it by some modern theologians. Therefore censure will
+fall upon those who shall wish to account for this Mystery and make it
+comprehensible, but praise will be given to those who shall toil to uphold
+it against the objections of adversaries.
+
+60. I have said already that theologians usually distinguish between what
+is above reason and what is against reason. They place _above_ reason that
+which one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for. But _against_
+reason will be all opinion that is opposed by invincible reasons, or the
+contrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner. They avow,
+therefore, that the Mysteries are above reason, but they do not admit that
+they are contrary to it. The English author of a book which is ingenious,
+but has met with disapproval, entitled _Christianity not Mysterious_,
+wished to combat this distinction; but it does not seem to me that he has
+at all weakened it. M. Bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepted
+distinction. This is what he says on the matter (vol. III of the _Reply to
+the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 158). Firstly (p. 998) he
+distinguishes, together with M. Saurin, between these two theses: the one,
+_all the dogmas of Christianity are in conformity with reason_; the other,
+_human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason_. He affirms
+the first and denies the second. I am of the same opinion, if in saying
+'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to account
+for it or to explain its _how_ by reason; for God could doubtless do so,
+and we cannot. But I think that one must affirm both theses if by     [107]
+'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that we can
+demonstrate, if need be, that there is no contradiction between this dogma
+and reason, repudiating the objections of those who maintain that this
+dogma is an absurdity.
+
+61. M. Bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing. He
+acknowledges fully that our Mysteries are in accordance with the supreme
+and universal reason that is in the divine understanding, or with reason in
+general; yet he denies that they are in accordance with that part of reason
+which man employs to judge things. But this portion of reason which we
+possess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural light that has
+remained with us in the midst of corruption; thus it is in accordance with
+the whole, and it differs from that which is in God only as a drop of water
+differs from the ocean or rather as the finite from the infinite. Therefore
+Mysteries may transcend it, but they cannot be contrary to it. One cannot
+be contrary to one part without being contrary to the whole. That which
+contradicts a proposition of Euclid is contrary to the _Elements_ of
+Euclid. That which in us is contrary to the Mysteries is not reason nor is
+it the natural light or the linking together of truths; it is corruption,
+or error, or prejudice, or darkness.
+
+62. M. Bayle (p. 1002) is not satisfied with the opinion of Josua Stegman
+and of M. Turretin, Protestant theologians who teach that the Mysteries are
+contrary only to corrupt reason. He asks, mockingly, whether by right
+reason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian and by corrupt
+reason that of an heretic; and he urges the objection that the evidence of
+the Mystery of the Trinity was no greater in the soul of Luther than in the
+soul of Socinius. But as M. Descartes has well observed, good sense is
+distributed to all: thus one must believe that both the orthodox and
+heretics are endowed therewith. Right reason is a linking together of
+truths, corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and passions. And in order
+to discriminate between the two, one need but proceed in good order, admit
+no thesis without proof, and admit no proof unless it be in proper form,
+according to the commonest rules of logic. One needs neither any other
+criterion nor other arbitrator in questions of reason. It is only through
+lack of this consideration that a handle has been given to the sceptics,
+and that even in theology Francois Veron and some others, who         [108]
+exacerbated the dispute with the Protestants, even to the point of
+dishonesty, plunged headlong into scepticism in order to prove the
+necessity of accepting an infallible external judge. Their course meets
+with no approval from the most expert, even in their own party: Calixtus
+and Daille derided it as it deserved, and Bellarmine argued quite
+otherwise.
+
+63. Now let us come to what M. Bayle says (p. 999) on the distinction we
+are concerned with. 'It seems to me', he says, 'that an ambiguity has crept
+into the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above reason
+and things that are against reason. The Mysteries of the Gospel are above
+reason, so it is usually said, but they are not contrary to reason. I think
+that the same sense is not given to the word reason in the first part of
+this axiom as in the second: by the first is understood rather the reason
+of man, or reason _in concreto_ and by the second reason in general, or
+reason _in abstracto_. For supposing that it is understood always as reason
+in general or the supreme reason, the universal reason that is in God, it
+is equally true that the Mysteries of the Gospels are not above reason and
+that they are not against reason. But if in both parts of the axiom human
+reason is meant, I do not clearly see the soundness of the distinction: for
+the most orthodox confess that we know not how our Mysteries can conform to
+the maxims of philosophy. It seems to us, therefore, that they are not in
+conformity with our reason. Now that which appears to us not to be in
+conformity with our reason appears contrary to our reason, just as that
+which appears to us not in conformity with truth appears contrary to truth.
+Thus why should not one say, equally, that the Mysteries are against our
+feeble reason, and that they are above our feeble reason?' I answer, as I
+have done already, that 'reason' here is the linking together of the truths
+that we know by the light of nature, and in this sense the axiom is true
+and without any ambiguity. The Mysteries transcend our reason, since they
+contain truths that are not comprised in this sequence; but they are not
+contrary to our reason, and they do not contradict any of the truths
+whereto this sequence can lead us. Accordingly there is no question here of
+the universal reason that is in God, but of our reason. As for the question
+whether we know the Mysteries to conform with our reason, I answer that at
+least we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between the
+Mysteries and reason. Moreover, we can always abolish such alleged    [109]
+opposition, and so, if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing faith
+with reason, or recognizing the conformity between them, it must be said
+that we can recognize this conformity and this harmony. But if the
+conformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the _how_, we cannot
+recognize it.
+
+64. M. Bayle makes one more ingenious objection, which he draws from the
+example of the sense of sight. 'When a square tower', he says, 'from a
+distance appears to us round, our eyes testify very clearly not only that
+they perceive nothing square in this tower, but also that they discover
+there a round shape, incompatible with the square shape. One may therefore
+say that the truth which is the square shape is not only above, but even
+against, the witness of our feeble sight.' It must be admitted that this
+observation is correct, and although it be true that the appearance of
+roundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles, which distance
+causes to disappear, it is true, notwithstanding, that the round and the
+square are opposites. Therefore my answer to this objection is that the
+representation of the senses, even when they do all that in them lies, is
+often contrary to the truth; but it is not the same with the faculty of
+reasoning, when it does its duty, since a strictly reasoned argument is
+nothing but a linking together of truths. And as for the sense of sight in
+particular, it is well to consider that there are yet other false
+appearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our eyes' nor from the
+loss of visibility brought about by distance, but from the very _nature of
+vision_, however perfect it be. It is thus, for instance, that the circle
+seen sideways is changed into that kind of oval which among geometricians
+is known as an ellipse, and sometimes even into a parabola or a hyperbola,
+or actually into a straight line, witness the ring of Saturn.
+
+65. The _external_ senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. It is our
+inner sense which often makes us go too fast. That occurs also in brute
+beasts, as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror: for beasts have
+_consecutions_ of perception which resemble reasoning, and which occur also
+in the inner sense of men, when their actions have only an empirical
+quality. But beasts do nothing which compels us to believe that they have
+what deserves to be properly called a _reasoning_ sense, as I have shown
+elsewhere. Now when the understanding uses and follows the false decision
+of the inner sense (as when the famous Galileo thought that Saturn had[110]
+two handles) it is deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect of
+appearances, and it infers from them more than they imply. For the
+appearances of the senses do not promise us absolutely the truth of things,
+any more than dreams do. It is we who deceive ourselves by the use we make
+of them, that is, by our consecutions. Indeed we allow ourselves to be
+deluded by probable arguments, and we are inclined to think that phenomena
+such as we have found linked together often are so always. Thus, as it
+happens usually that that which appears without angles has none, we readily
+believe it to be always thus. Such an error is pardonable, and sometimes
+inevitable, when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that which
+appearances recommend; but when we have the leisure and the time to collect
+our thoughts, we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so.
+It is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth, but our
+reasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rules
+of the art of reasoning. If by _reason_ one meant generally the faculty of
+reasoning whether well or ill, I confess that it might deceive us, and does
+indeed deceive us, and the appearances of our understanding are often as
+deceptive as those of the senses: but here it is a question of the linking
+together of truths and of objections in due form, and in this sense it is
+impossible for reason to deceive us.
+
+66. Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle carries too
+far _the being above reason_, as if it included the insoluble nature of
+objections: for according to him (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_,
+vol. III, ch. 130, p. 651) 'once a dogma is above reason, philosophy can
+neither explain it nor comprehend it, nor meet the difficulties that are
+urged against it'. I agree with regard to comprehension, but I have already
+shown that the Mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation, to the end
+that the terms employed be not _sine mente soni_, words signifying nothing.
+I have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answering
+the objections, and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis.
+
+67. He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize the
+insoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries. Luther is one of
+the chief of these; but I have already replied, in Sec. 12, to the passage
+where he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology. There is
+another passage (_De Servo Arbitrio_, ch. 246) where he says that the
+apparent injustice of God is proved by arguments taken from the       [111]
+adversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked, an argument
+irresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence ('Argumentis
+talibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere').
+But soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who know
+nothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospel
+dissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where
+that which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive
+its due. The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without
+the aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There is
+also quoted (_Reply_, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz,
+criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous
+theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God
+which are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passage
+must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in
+accordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it.
+
+68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who are
+more favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This great man
+says positively (Part I of his _Principles_, art. 41) 'that we shall have
+not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' (which
+one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the
+eternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our thought is finite, and
+that the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only
+known from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also has
+willed it, is infinite. We have therefore quite enough intelligence to
+recognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are in
+God; but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can know
+how they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined. Yet the
+Power and the Knowledge of God must not prevent us from believing that we
+have a free will; for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are
+inwardly conscious, and which we know by experience to be within us, simply
+because we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to be
+incomprehensible in its nature.'
+
+69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who rarely
+think of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to me. Not
+content with saying that, as for him, he sees no way of reconciling   [112]
+the two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all rational
+creatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that there is
+no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For such an
+objection could only be a necessary linking together of other truths whose
+result would be contrary to the truth that one maintains; and consequently
+there would be contradiction between the truths, which would be an utter
+absurdity. Moreover, albeit our mind is finite and cannot comprehend the
+infinite, of the infinite nevertheless it has proofs whose strength or
+weakness it comprehends; why then should it not have the same comprehension
+in regard to the objections? And since the power and the wisdom of God are
+infinite and comprehend everything, there is no pretext for doubting their
+scope. Further, M. Descartes demands a freedom which is not needed, by his
+insistence that the actions of the will of man are altogether undetermined,
+a thing which never happens. Finally, M. Bayle himself maintains that this
+experience or this inward sense of our independence, upon which M.
+Descartes founds the proof of our freedom, does not prove it: for from the
+fact that we are not conscious of the causes whereon we depend, it does not
+follow, according to M. Bayle, that we are independent. But that is
+something we will speak of in its proper place.
+
+70. It seems that M. Descartes confesses also, in a passage of his
+_Principles_, that it is impossible to find an answer to the difficulties
+on the division of matter to infinity, which he nevertheless recognizes as
+actual. Arriaga and other Schoolmen make well-nigh the same confession: but
+if they took the trouble to give to the objections the form these ought to
+have, they would see that there are faults in the reasoning, and sometimes
+false assumptions which cause confusion. Here is an example. A man of parts
+one day brought up to me an objection in the following form: Let the
+straight line BA be cut in two equal parts at the point C, and the part CA
+at the point D, and the part DA at the point E, and so on to infinity; all
+the halves, BC, CD, DE, etc., together make the whole BA; therefore there
+must be a last half, since the straight line BA finishes at A. But this
+last half is absurd: for since it is a line, it will be possible again to
+cut it in two. Therefore division to infinity cannot be admitted. But I
+pointed out to him that one is not justified in the inference that there
+must be a last half, although there be a last point A, for this last point
+belongs to all the halves of its side. And my friend acknowledged it  [113]
+himself when he endeavoured to prove this deduction by a formal argument;
+on the contrary, just because the division goes on to infinity, there is no
+last half. And although the straight line AB be finite, it does not follow
+that the process of dividing it has any final end. The same confusion
+arises with the series of numbers going on to infinity. One imagines a
+final end, a number that is infinite, or infinitely small; but that is all
+simple fiction. Every number is finite and specific; every line is so
+likewise, and the infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes that
+one may take as great or as small as one wishes, to show that an error is
+smaller than that which has been specified, that is to say, that there is
+no error; or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitude
+at its vanishing point or its beginning, conceived after the pattern of
+magnitudes already actualized.
+
+71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle puts
+forward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposes
+to the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. 3140 of the
+second edition of his _Dictionary_). 'It is enough for me', he says, 'that
+it be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of the Gospel are above
+reason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible to
+settle the difficulties raised by the philosophers, and in consequence that
+a dispute where only the light of Nature is followed will always end
+unfavourably for the theologians, and that they will see themselves forced
+to give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light.' I
+am surprised that M. Bayle speaks in such general terms, since he has
+acknowledged himself that the light of Nature is against the Manichaeans,
+and for the oneness of the Principle, and that the goodness of God is
+proved incontrovertibly by reason. Yet this is how he continues:
+
+72. 'It is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above it.
+Now if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to the
+dogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to those
+two Mysteries, it would have them in subjection and submit them to the
+strictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or with the
+aphorisms that spring from common notions, and proceed until finally it had
+drawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with natural light. It
+would therefore do what exceeds its powers, it would soar above its   [114]
+confines, and that is a formal contradiction. One must therefore say that
+it cannot provide answers to its own objections, and that thus they remain
+victorious, so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of God
+and to the necessity of subjugating one's understanding to the obedience of
+faith.' I do not find that there is any force in this reasoning. We can
+attain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining
+it; as we can attain to the sky by sight, and not by touch. Nor is it
+necessary that, in order to answer the objections which are made against
+the Mysteries, one should have them in subjection to oneself, and submit
+them to examination by comparison with the first principles that spring
+from common notions. For if he who answers the objections had to go so far,
+he who proposes the objections needs must do it first. It is the part of
+the objection to open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answers
+to say Yes or No. He is not obliged to counter with a distinction: it will
+do, in case of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition in
+the objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these things
+without penetrating beyond the objection. When someone offers me a proof
+which he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel him
+merely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward,
+and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful. For the purpose
+of doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the matter; on
+the contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be justified in
+doubting. M. Bayle continues thus:
+
+73. 'Let us endeavour to clarify that. If some doctrines are above reason
+they are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot attain to
+them, it cannot comprehend them.' (He could have begun here with the
+'comprehend', saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it.)
+'If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea' (_Non valet
+consequentia_: for, to 'comprehend' something, it is not enough that one
+have some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of everything that
+goes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, distinct,
+_adequate_. There are a thousand objects in Nature in which we understand
+something, but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend. We have
+some ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon them up to a certain
+point; but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we do
+not yet comprehend the whole nature of light.) 'nor any principle such[115]
+as may give rise to a solution;' (Why should not evident principles be
+found mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) 'and consequently the
+objections that reason has made will remain unanswered;' (By no means; the
+difficulty is rather on the side of the opposer. It is for him to seek an
+evident principle such as may give rise to some objection; and the more
+obscure the subject, the more trouble he will have in finding such a
+principle. Moreover, when he has found it he will have still more trouble
+in demonstrating an opposition between the principle and the Mystery: for,
+if it happened that the Mystery was evidently contrary to an evident
+principle, it would not be an obscure Mystery, it would be a manifest
+absurdity.) 'or what is the same thing, answer will be made with some
+distinction as obscure as the very thesis that will have been attacked.'
+(One can do without distinctions, if need be, by denying either some
+premiss or some conclusion; and when one is doubtful of the meaning of some
+term used by the opposer one may demand of him its definition. Thus the
+defender has no need to incommode himself when it is a question of
+answering an adversary who claims that he is offering us an invincible
+proof. But even supposing that the defender, perchance being kindly
+disposed, or for the sake of brevity, or because he feels himself strong
+enough, should himself vouchsafe to show the ambiguity concealed in the
+objection, and to remove it by making some distinction, this distinction
+need not of necessity lead to anything clearer than the first thesis, since
+the defender is not obliged to elucidate the Mystery itself.)
+
+74. 'Now it is certain', so M. Bayle continues, 'that an objection which is
+founded on distinct notions remains equally victorious, whether you give to
+it no answer, or you make an answer where none can comprehend anything. Can
+the contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection to you that
+which you and he very clearly conceive, and you, who can only defend
+yourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything?' (It is
+not enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct notions, it is
+necessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the thesis. And when I
+answer someone by denying some premiss, in order to compel him to prove it,
+or some conclusion, to compel him to put it in good form, it cannot be said
+that I answer nothing or that I answer nothing intelligible. For as it is
+the doubtful premiss of the adversary that I deny, my denial will be  [116]
+as intelligible as his affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as to
+explain myself by means of some distinction, it suffices that the terms I
+employ have some meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in my
+answer will be comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend all
+that it involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also.)
+
+75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that the
+disputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be desirable,
+but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point,
+if the necessity arises.) 'and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, and
+the signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything lies
+in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or
+immediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is done by means
+of the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether the premisses of a
+proof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the conclusion is
+properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether
+some aphorism of the chapter _de oppositis_ or _de sophisticis elenchis_,
+etc., has not been violated.' (It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny
+some premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained
+some ambiguous term.) 'One comes off victorious either by showing that the
+subject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been
+agreed upon' (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing,
+and then the defender wins the case), 'or by reducing the defender to
+absurdity' (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well
+proved). 'Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that
+the conclusions of his thesis are "yes" and "no" at once, or by
+constraining him to say only intelligible things in answer.' (This last
+embarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance new
+theses.) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon
+obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.' (It is the aim of the opposer,
+for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot
+here be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that
+one cannot demonstrate it.) 'This leads to the opinion that during the
+course of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or
+with the opposer, according to whether there is more or less clarity in the
+propositions of the one than in the propositions of the other.' (That [117]
+is speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected;
+but the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defence
+works, and it is for the attacker to destroy them. The defender has no need
+here of self-evidence, and he seeks it not: but it is for the opposer to
+find it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order that
+the defender may be no longer protected.)
+
+76. 'Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are
+such that one comprehends nothing in them,' (It is a very equivocal sign of
+victory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend
+anything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided.
+The order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to
+answer them by denying or making a distinction.) 'and who confesses that
+they are incomprehensible.' (It is permitted to him who maintains the truth
+of a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if this
+confession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no
+need of objection. It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible,
+but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing
+at all therein. It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called
+_Scindapsus_ or _Blityri_ (Clem. Alex., _Stromateis_, 8), that is, words
+devoid of meaning.) 'He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding
+victory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has
+covered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his
+antagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an
+army which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the
+victor only under cover of night.' (Matching allegory with allegory, I will
+say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by
+his entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it is
+permitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blame
+for that.)
+
+77. I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. Bayle
+has put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements in
+support of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how this
+excellent man has been misled. That happens all too easily to the ablest
+and shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without
+exercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundations
+of their systems. The details we have entered into here will serve as [118]
+answer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed through
+the works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says in his _Reply to the
+Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 133, p. 685): 'To prove that one
+has brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only that
+one has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith, but also that the
+particular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with our
+Catechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way.' I
+do not see that one has need of all that, unless one aspire to press
+reasoning as far as the _how_ of the Mystery. When one is content to uphold
+its truth, without attempting to render it comprehensible, one has no need
+to resort to philosophic maxims, general or particular, for the proof; and
+when another brings up some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for us
+to prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our
+dogma, but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto.
+
+78. M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we need
+an answer as clearly evident as the objection.' I have already shown that
+it is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest it is
+not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always to
+advance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning the
+Mystery itself is not evident. He adds further: 'If we must make reply and
+rejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that we have
+accomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make answer with
+things as evident as our reasons can be.' But it is not for the defender to
+adduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent.
+
+79. Finally the author draws the conclusion: 'If it were claimed that, on
+making an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer which
+we can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us, that
+would be unfair.' He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, against M.
+Jacquelot, p. 69. I am not of this opinion. If the objection were
+completely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown.
+But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of
+the most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw from
+it a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery may
+answer with the instance of a bare possibility. For such an instance  [119]
+suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, is
+neither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds the
+Mystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that it
+is probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries are
+against appearances. He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce such
+an instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work of
+supererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to the
+adversary.
+
+80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to
+M. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. Bayle'
+(according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his _Dictionary_, whenever
+the subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting and
+destroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely any
+philosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create
+great difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one desired to follow it in a
+disputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to a
+state of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainly
+true, which it disputes with insoluble objections.' I think that what is
+said here in reproach of reason is to its advantage. When it overthrows
+some thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis. And when it seems to be
+overthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that it
+promises us something profound, provided that we follow it _as far as it
+can go_, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search
+out and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great
+measure of success.
+
+81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections,
+recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.' And I think, on the other
+hand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind,
+which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are new
+openings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greater
+light: I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology. But
+when these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that one
+be able to repel them, provided that one do so in a submissive and zealous
+spirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of God. And when we
+succeed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by his
+greatness and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves through
+the clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward            [120]
+appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to that
+which to us is invisible, but none the less sure.
+
+82. 'Thus' (to continue with M. Bayle) 'reason will be compelled to lay
+down its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, which
+it can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims.
+Thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless in
+accordance with that which it is, that is to say, in reason.' But one must
+know 'that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are only
+those which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinary
+course of things.' This reason enjoins upon us even in philosophical
+subjects, when there are invincible proofs to the contrary. It is thus
+that, being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the
+justice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and injustice
+which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our
+gaze. Hitherto we have been illumined by the _light of Nature_ and by that
+of _grace_, but not yet by that of _glory_. Here on earth we see apparent
+injustice, and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice of
+God; but we shall see that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shall
+show himself as he is.
+
+83. It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning those
+ostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; for he
+acknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith. In these
+posthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of being
+accused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against reason, and
+(p. 9, against M. le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who acknowledges
+that a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by a
+necessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine. Nevertheless one would
+be justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than an
+outward appearance.
+
+84. It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. Bayle
+on the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his opinions
+were not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, which have
+provided matter for our considerations, have led one to believe. It is true
+that frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer the
+objections of reason against faith, and that he asserts the necessity of
+comprehending, in order to achieve such an end, how the Mystery comes [121]
+to be or exists. Yet there are passages where he becomes milder, and
+contents himself with saying that the answers to these objections are
+unknown to him. Here is a very precise passage, taken from the excursus on
+the Manichaeans, which is found at the end of the second edition of his
+_Dictionary_: 'For the greater satisfaction of the most punctilious
+readers, I desire to declare here' (he says, p. 3148) 'that wherever the
+statement is to be met with in my _Dictionary_ that such and such arguments
+are irrefutable I do not wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality.
+I mean naught else than that they appear to me irrefutable. That is of no
+consequence: each one will be able to imagine, if he pleases, that if I
+deem thus of a matter it is owing to my lack of acumen.' I do not imagine
+such a thing; his great acumen is too well known to me: but I think that,
+after having applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections, he had
+not enough attention left over for the purpose of answering them.
+
+85. M. Bayle confesses, moreover, in his posthumous work against M. le
+Clerc, that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs. It
+is therefore _ad hominem_ only, or rather _ad homines_, that is, in
+relation to the existing state of the human race, that he deems these
+objections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable. There is even a
+passage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that the
+answer or the explanation may be found, and even in our time. For here is
+what he says in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc (p. 35): 'M. Bayle
+dared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those great
+men of genius who create new systems, and that they could discover a
+solution hitherto unknown.' It seems that by this 'solution' he means such
+an explanation of Mystery as would penetrate to the _how_: but that is not
+necessary for replying to the objections.
+
+86. Many have undertaken to render this _how_ comprehensible, and to prove
+the possibility of Mysteries. A certain writer named Thomas Bonartes
+Nordtanus Anglus, in his _Concordia Scientiae cum Fide,_ claimed to do so.
+This work seemed to me ingenious and learned, but crabbed and involved, and
+it even contains indefensible opinions. I learned from the _Apologia
+Cyriacorum_ of the Dominican Father Vincent Baron that that book was
+censured in Rome, that the author was a Jesuit, and that he suffered for
+having published it. The Reverend Father des Bosses, who now teaches
+Theology in the Jesuit College of Hildesheim, and who has combined    [122]
+rare erudition with great acumen, which he displays in philosophy and
+theology, has informed me that the real name of Bonartes was Thomas Barton,
+and that after leaving the Society he retired to Ireland, where the manner
+of his death brought about a favourable verdict on his last opinions. I
+pity the men of talent who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil and
+their zeal. Something of like nature happened in time past to Pierre
+Abelard, to Gilbert de la Porree, to John Wyclif, and in our day to the
+Englishman Thomas Albius, as well as to some others who plunged too far
+into the explanation of the Mysteries.
+
+87. St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of the
+possibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but this
+Father believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiar
+grace: 'Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus
+sanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' (in
+_De Genesi ad Literam_, lib. 11, c. 4). Luther reserves the knowledge of
+the Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. _De Servo
+Arbitrio_, c. 174): 'Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam spargit in
+indignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; utrobique nimius et
+iniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se ipsum. Nam quomodo hoc
+justum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile est modo, videbimus
+autem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed revelata facie
+videbitur. Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos damnet,
+incomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur filius
+hominis.' It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself surrounded by
+that light which is lacking to us here below, since there is reason to
+suppose that he was not lacking in good will.
+
+  VIRGIL
+    _Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi,_
+    _Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis._
+
+  LUCAN
+    _...Illic postquam se lumine vero_
+    _Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra_
+    _Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret_
+    _Nostra dies._
+
+                                                                      [123]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PART ONE
+
+1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place
+reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how
+they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of
+nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation
+to evil. The _difficulties_ are distinguishable into two classes. The one
+kind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompatible with the divine
+nature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man may
+be deemed guilty and open to punishment. The other kind concerns the
+conduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence
+of evil, even though man be free and participate also therein. And this
+conduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice of
+God, since God co-operates in evil as well physical as moral, and
+co-operates in each of them both morally and physically; and since it seems
+that these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in that
+of grace, and in the future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, in
+this transitory life.
+
+2. To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that freedom
+is opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of any kind
+whatever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states that
+the truth of contingent futurities is determined. The foreknowledge of[124]
+God renders all the future certain and determined, but his providence and
+his foreordinance, whereon foreknowledge itself appears founded, do much
+more: for God is not as a man, able to look upon events with unconcern and
+to suspend his judgement, since nothing exists save as a result of the
+decrees of his will and through the action of his power. And even though
+one leave out of account the co-operation of God, all is perfectly
+connected in the order of things, since nothing can come to pass unless
+there be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, this taking place no
+less in voluntary than in all other actions. According to which it appears
+that man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and in
+consequence that he deserves therefor neither recompense nor chastisement:
+thus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice, divine and
+human, shaken.
+
+3. But even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he arrays
+himself to his own hurt, the conduct of God could not but provide matter
+for a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men, who would
+wish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense of God. It is
+objected that all the reality and what is termed the substance of the act
+in sin itself is a production of God, since all creatures and all their
+actions derive from him that reality they have. Whence one could infer not
+only that he is the physical cause of sin, but also that he is its moral
+cause, since he acts with perfect freedom and does nothing without a
+complete knowledge of the thing and the consequences that it may have. Nor
+is it enough to say that God has made for himself a law to co-operate with
+the wills or resolutions of man, whether we express ourselves in terms of
+the common opinion or in terms of the system of occasional causes. Not only
+will it be found strange that he should have made such a law for himself,
+of whose results he was not ignorant, but the principal difficulty is that
+it seems the evil will itself cannot exist without co-operation, and even
+without some predetermination, on his part, which contributes towards
+begetting this will in man or in some other rational creature. For an
+action is not, for being evil, the less dependent on God. Whence one will
+come at last to the conclusion that God does all, the good and the evil,
+indifferently; unless one pretend with the Manichaeans that there are two
+principles, the one good and the other evil. Moreover, according to the
+general opinion of theologians and philosophers, conservation being a [125]
+perpetual creation, it will be said that man is perpetually created corrupt
+and erring. There are, furthermore, modern Cartesians who claim that God is
+the sole agent, of whom created beings are only the purely passive organs;
+and M. Bayle builds not a little upon that idea.
+
+4. But even granting that God should co-operate in actions only with a
+general co-operation, or even not at all, at least in those that are bad,
+it suffices, so it is said, to inculpate him and to render him the moral
+cause that nothing comes to pass without his permission. To say nothing of
+the fall of the angels, he knows all that which will come to pass, if,
+having created man, he places him in such and such circumstances; and he
+places him there notwithstanding. Man is exposed to a temptation to which
+it is known that he will succumb, thereby causing an infinitude of
+frightful evils, by which the whole human race will be infected and brought
+as it were into a necessity of sinning, a state which is named 'original
+sin'. Thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion, by this
+means death and diseases being introduced, with a thousand other
+misfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad;
+wickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth, so
+that it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs. But it is
+much worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number of
+men will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally. Furthermore
+these men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn from the corrupt
+mass through an unreasoning election, whether it be said that God in
+choosing them has had regard to their future actions, to their faith or to
+their works, or one claim that he has been pleased to give them these good
+qualities and these actions because he has predestined them to salvation.
+For though it be said in the most lenient system that God wished to save
+all men, and though in the other systems commonly accepted it be granted,
+that he has made his Son take human nature upon him to expiate their sins,
+so that all they who shall believe in him with a lively and final faith
+shall be saved, it still remains true that this lively faith is a gift of
+God; that we are dead to all good works; that even our will itself must be
+aroused by a prevenient grace, and that God gives us the power to will and
+to do. And whether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself, that
+is to say, through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our [126]
+will to the good that it does; or whether there be only a sufficient grace,
+but such as does not fail to attain its end, and to become efficacious in
+the inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed
+by God: one must return to the same conclusion that God is the final reason
+of salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus Christ. And be
+the election the cause or the result of God's design to give faith, it
+still remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases,
+without any discernible reason for his choice, which falls upon but few
+men.
+
+5. So it is a terrible judgement that God, giving his only Son for the
+whole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of
+men, yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his
+enemy, who torments them eternally and makes them curse their Creator,
+though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness,
+his justice and his other perfections. And this outcome inspires all the
+more horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all
+eternity is God's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew
+they would not resist; as this sin is inherent and imputed to men before
+their will has participated in it; as this hereditary vice impels their
+will to commit actual sins; and as countless men, in childhood or maturity,
+that have never heard or have not heard enough of Jesus Christ, Saviour of
+the human race, die before receiving the necessary succour for their
+withdrawal from this abyss of sin. These men too are condemned to be for
+ever rebellious against God and plunged in the most horrible miseries, with
+the wickedest of all creatures, though in essence they have not been more
+wicked than others, and several among them have perchance been less guilty
+than some of that little number of elect, who were saved by a grace without
+reason, and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not
+deserved. Such in brief are the difficulties touched upon by sundry
+persons; but M. Bayle was one who insisted on them the most, as will appear
+subsequently when we examine his passages. I think that now I have recorded
+the main essence of these difficulties: but I have deemed it fitting to
+refrain from some expressions and exaggerations which might have caused
+offence, while not rendering the objections any stronger.
+
+6. Let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be said in
+answer to those objections; and here a course of explanation through  [127]
+fuller dissertation will be necessary: for many difficulties can be opened
+up in few words, but for their discussion one must dilate upon them. Our
+end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an
+absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and
+unworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to God
+inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love
+him above all things: and that cannot come about unless there be knowledge
+of his perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves, and
+which makes the felicity of those that love him. Feeling ourselves animated
+by a zeal such as cannot fail to please him, we have cause to hope that he
+will enlighten us, and that he will himself aid us in the execution of a
+project undertaken for his glory and for the good of men. A cause so good
+gives confidence: if there are plausible appearances against us there are
+proofs on our side, and I would dare to say to an adversary:
+
+  _Aspice, quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum._
+
+7. _God is the first reason of things_: for such things as are bounded, as
+all that which we see and experience, are contingent and have nothing in
+them to render their existence necessary, it being plain that time, space
+and matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything,
+might have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in another
+order. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world,
+which is the whole assemblage of _contingent_ things, and seek it in the
+substance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in
+consequence is _necessary_ and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be
+intelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of
+other worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to
+existence with it, the cause of the world must needs have had regard or
+reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them.
+This regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities
+can be nothing other than the _understanding_ which has the ideas of them,
+while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the
+_will_ which chooses. It is the _power_ of this substance that renders its
+will efficacious. Power relates to _being_, wisdom or understanding to
+_truth_, and will to _good_. And this intelligent cause ought to be
+infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in _power_, in _wisdom_ and in
+_goodness_, since it relates to all that which is possible.           [128]
+Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for
+admitting more than _one_. Its understanding is the source of _essences_,
+and its will is the origin of _existences_. There in few words is the proof
+of one only God with his perfections, and through him of the origin of
+things.
+
+8. Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite,
+cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good,
+even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a
+greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God
+if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no
+maximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done
+equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be
+said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than
+mathematics, that if there were not the best (_optimum_) among all possible
+worlds, God would not have produced any. I call 'World' the whole
+succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be
+said that several worlds could have existed in different times and
+different places. For they must needs be reckoned all together as one world
+or, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one should fill all times
+and all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in
+innumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among
+which God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without
+acting in accordance with supreme reason.
+
+9. Some adversary not being able to answer this argument will perchance
+answer the conclusion by a counter-argument, saying that the world could
+have been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that then it would
+have been _better_. For it must be known that all things are _connected_ in
+each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all
+of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to
+any distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in
+proportion to the distance. Therein God has ordered all things beforehand
+once for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the
+rest; and each thing _as an idea_ has contributed, before its existence, to
+the resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so that
+nothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save its
+essence or, if you will, save its _numerical individuality_. Thus, if the
+smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it  [129]
+would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all
+allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it.
+
+10. It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and without
+unhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Sevarambian romances:
+but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. I
+cannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I present infinities
+to you and compare them together? But you must judge with me _ab effectu_,
+since God has chosen this world as it is. We know, moreover, that often an
+evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that
+evil. Often indeed two evils have made one great good:
+
+  _Et si fata volunt, bina venena juvant_.
+
+Even so two liquids sometimes produce a solid, witness the spirit of wine
+and spirit of urine mixed by Van Helmont; or so do two cold and dark bodies
+produce a great fire, witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil combined
+by Herr Hoffmann. A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake which
+brings about the winning of a great battle; and do they not sing on the eve
+of Easter, in the churches of the Roman rite:
+
+  _O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!_
+  _O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!_
+
+11. The illustrious prelates of the Gallican church who wrote to Pope
+Innocent XII against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination, being of
+the principles of St. Augustine, have said things well fitted to elucidate
+this great point. The cardinal appears to prefer even to the Kingdom of
+Heaven the state of children dying without baptism, because sin is the
+greatest of evils, and they have died innocent of all actual sin. More will
+be said of that below. The prelates have observed that this opinion is ill
+founded. The apostle, they say (Rom. iii. 8), is right to disapprove of the
+doing of evil that good may come, but one cannot disapprove that God,
+through his exceeding power, derive from the permitting of sins greater
+goods than such as occurred before the sins. It is not that we ought to
+take pleasure in sin, God forbid! but that we believe the same apostle when
+he says (Rom. v. 20) that where sin abounded, grace did much more     [130]
+abound; and we remember that we have gained Jesus Christ himself by reason
+of sin. Thus we see that the opinion of these prelates tends to maintain
+that a sequence of things where sin enters in may have been and has been,
+in effect, better than another sequence without sin.
+
+12. Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of the
+senses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain, to prove
+that there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures. A little
+acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; shadows
+enhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place gives relief to
+harmony. We wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point of falling
+and we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep. Do men relish
+health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick?
+And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more
+discernible, that is to say, greater?
+
+13. But it will be said that evils are great and many in number in
+comparison with the good: that is erroneous. It is only want of attention
+that diminishes our good, and this attention must be given to us through
+some admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom in good health,
+we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we should be less
+sensible of our evils. But is it not better, notwithstanding, that health
+should be usual and sickness the exception? Let us then by our reflexion
+supply what is lacking in our perception, in order to make the good of
+health more discernible. Had we not the knowledge of the life to come, I
+believe there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were
+not content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same
+amount of good and evil, provided always that it were not the same kind:
+one would be content with variety, without requiring a better condition
+than that wherein one had been.
+
+14. When one considers also the fragility of the human body, one looks in
+wonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the Author of Nature, who has made
+the body so enduring and its condition so tolerable. That has often made me
+say that I am not astonished men are sometimes sick, but that I am
+astonished they are sick so little and not always. This also ought to make
+us the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of animals,
+whose Author has made machines so fragile and so subject to corruption[131]
+and yet so capable of maintaining themselves: for it is Nature which cures
+us rather than medicine. Now this very fragility is a consequence of the
+nature of things, unless we are to will that this kind of creature,
+reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, be not in the world. But that, to
+all appearance, would be a defect which some philosophers of old would have
+called _vacuum formarum_, a gap in the order of species.
+
+15. Those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with Nature and with
+fortune and not to complain about them, even though they should not be the
+best endowed, appear to me preferable to the other sort; for besides that
+these complaints are ill founded, it is in effect murmuring against the
+orders of providence. One must not readily be among the malcontents in the
+State where one is, and one must not be so at all in the city of God,
+wherein one can only wrongfully be of their number. The books of human
+misery, such as that of Pope Innocent III, to me seem not of the most
+serviceable: evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to be
+averted from them, to be turned towards the good which by far
+preponderates. Even less do I approve books such as that of Abbe Esprit,
+_On the Falsity of Human Virtues_, of which we have lately been given a
+summary: for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side out, and
+cause men to be such as it represents them.
+
+16. It must be confessed, however, that there are disorders in this life,
+which appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in the
+misfortune of many good people. There is a German proverb which even grants
+the advantage to the evil ones, as if they were commonly the most
+fortunate:
+
+  _Je kruemmer Holz, je bessre Kruecke:_
+  _Je aerger Schalck, je groesser Gluecke._
+
+And it were to be desired that this saying of Horace should be true in our
+eyes:
+
+  _Raro antecedentem scelestum_
+  _Deseruit pede poena claudo._
+
+Yet it often comes to pass also, though this perchance not the most often,
+
+                                                                      [132]
+  _That in the world's eyes Heaven is justified,_
+
+and that one may say with Claudian:
+
+  _Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum,_
+  _Absolvitque deos..._
+
+17. But even though that should not happen here, the remedy is all prepared
+in the other life: religion and reason itself teach us that, and we must
+not murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought fit to
+grant to men for repentance. Yet there objections multiply on another side,
+when one considers salvation and damnation: for it appears strange that,
+even in the great future of eternity, evil should have the advantage over
+good, under the supreme authority of him who is the sovereign good, since
+there will be many that are called and few that are chosen or are saved. It
+is true that one sees from some lines of Prudentius (Hymn. ante Somnum),
+
+  _Idem tamen benignus_
+  _Ultor retundit iram,_
+  _Paucosque non piorum_
+  _Patitur perire in aevum,_
+
+that divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked enough
+to be damned would be very small. To some indeed it seems that men believed
+at that time in a sphere between Hell and Paradise; that this same
+Prudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere; that St.
+Gregory of Nyssa also inclines in that direction, and that St. Jerome leans
+towards the opinion according whereunto all Christians would finally be
+taken into grace. A saying of St. Paul which he himself gives out as
+mysterious, stating that all Israel will be saved, has provided much food
+for reflexion. Sundry pious persons, learned also, but daring, have revived
+the opinion of Origen, who maintains that good will predominate in due
+time, in all and everywhere, and that all rational creatures, even the bad
+angels, will become at last holy and blessed. The book of the eternal
+Gospel, published lately in German and supported by a great and learned
+work entitled [Greek: 'Apokatastasis panton], has caused much stir over
+this great paradox. M. le Clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the cause of
+the Origenists, but without declaring himself for them.
+
+                                                                      [133]
+18. There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even to
+arbitrary suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself a
+theology well-nigh astronomical. He believes that the present confusion in
+this world below began when the Presiding Angel of the globe of the earth,
+which was still a sun (that is, a star that was fixed and luminous of
+itself) committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department, perhaps
+rising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun; that
+simultaneously, by the Pre-established Harmony of the Realms of Nature and
+of Grace, and consequently by natural causes occurring at the appointed
+time, our globe was covered with stains, rendered opaque and driven from
+its place; which has made it become a wandering star or planet, that is, a
+Satellite of another sun, and even perhaps of that one whose superiority
+its angel refused to recognize; and that therein consists the fall of
+Lucifer. Now the chief of the bad angels, who in Holy Scripture is named
+the prince, and even the god of this world, being, with the angels of his
+train, envious of that rational animal which walks on the surface of this
+globe, and which God has set up there perhaps to compensate himself for
+their fall, strives to render it accessary in their crimes and a
+participator in their misfortunes. Whereupon Jesus Christ came to save men.
+He is the eternal Son of God, even as he is his only Son; but (according to
+some ancient Christians, and according to the author of this hypothesis)
+having taken upon him at first, from the beginning of things, the most
+excellent nature among created beings, to bring them all to perfection, he
+set himself amongst them: and this is the second filiation, whereby he is
+the first-born of all creatures. This is he whom the Cabalists called Adam
+Kadmon. Haply he had planted his tabernacle in that great sun which
+illumines us; but he came at last into this globe where we are, he was born
+of the Virgin, and took human nature upon him to save mankind from the
+hands of their enemy and his. And when the time of judgement shall draw
+near, when the present face of our globe shall be about to perish, he will
+return to it in visible form, thence to withdraw the good, transplanting
+them, it may be, into the sun, and to punish here the wicked with the
+demons that have allured them; then the globe of the earth will begin to
+burn and will be perhaps a comet. This fire will last for aeons upon aeons.
+The tail of the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly,
+according to the Apocalypse, and this fire will be hell, or the second[134]
+death whereof Holy Scripture speaks. But at last hell will render up its
+dead, death itself will be destroyed; reason and peace will begin to hold
+sway again in the spirits that had been perverted; they will be sensible of
+their error, they will adore their Creator, and will even begin to love him
+all the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they emerge.
+Simultaneously (by virtue of the _harmonic parallelism_ of the Realms of
+Nature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will have purged the
+earth's globe of its stains. It will become again a sun; its Presiding
+Angel will resume his place with the angels of his train; humans that were
+damned shall be with them numbered amongst the good angels; this chief of
+our globe shall render homage to the Messiah, chief of created beings. The
+glory of this angel reconciled shall be greater than it was before his
+fall.
+
+  _Inque Deos iterum factorum lege receptus_
+  _Aureus aeternum noster regnabit Apollo._
+
+The vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower of Origen: but
+we have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a greater
+part than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to account. For it
+does not appear that there is one principal place in the known universe
+deserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of created
+beings; and the sun of our system at least is not it.
+
+19. Holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men damned
+eternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved, we must say
+that the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in comparison with
+the good, when one contemplates the true vastness of the city of God.
+Coelius Secundus Curio wrote a little book, _De Amplitudine Regni
+Coelestis_, which was reprinted not long since; but he is indeed far from
+having apprehended the compass of the kingdom of heaven. The ancients had
+puny ideas on the works of God, and St. Augustine, for want of knowing
+modern discoveries, was at a loss when there was question of explaining the
+prevalence of evil. It seemed to the ancients that there was only one earth
+inhabited, and even of that men held the antipodes in dread: the remainder
+of the world was, according to them, a few shining globes and a few
+crystalline spheres. To-day, whatever bounds are given or not given to the
+universe, it must be acknowledged that there is an infinite number of
+globes, as great as and greater than ours, which have as much right as[135]
+it to hold rational inhabitants, though it follows not at all that they are
+human. It is only one planet, that is to say one of the six principal
+satellites of our sun; and as all fixed stars are suns also, we see how
+small a thing our earth is in relation to visible things, since it is only
+an appendix of one amongst them. It may be that all suns are peopled only
+by blessed creatures, and nothing constrains us to think that many are
+damned, for few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantage
+which good extracts from evil. Moreover, since there is no reason for the
+belief that there are stars everywhere, is it not possible that there may
+be a great space beyond the region of the stars? Whether it be the Empyrean
+Heaven, or not, this immense space encircling all this region may in any
+case be filled with happiness and glory. It can be imagined as like the
+Ocean, whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures, when they shall
+have reached their perfection in the system of the stars. What will become
+of the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? Will it not be
+something incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is as a
+point in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? Thus since the
+proportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost lost in
+nothingness compared with that which is unknown, and which we yet have
+cause to assume, and since all the evils that may be raised in objection
+before us are in this near nothingness, haply it may be that all evils are
+almost nothingness in comparison with the good things which are in the
+universe.
+
+20. But it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and metaphysical
+difficulties which have been mentioned, and which concern the cause of
+evil. The question is asked first of all, whence does evil come? _Si Deus
+est, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?_ The ancients attributed the cause
+of evil to _matter_, which they believed uncreate and independent of God:
+but we, who derive all being from God, where shall we find the source of
+evil? The answer is, that it must be sought in the ideal nature of the
+creature, in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal verities
+which are in the understanding of God, independently of his will. For we
+must consider that there is an _original imperfection in the creature_
+before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues
+that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other
+errors. Plato said in _Timaeus_ that the world originated in          [136]
+Understanding united to Necessity. Others have united God and Nature. This
+can be given a reasonable meaning. God will be the Understanding; and the
+Necessity, that is, the essential nature of things, will be the object of
+the understanding, in so far as this object consists in the eternal
+verities. But this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding.
+And therein is found not only the primitive form of good, but also the
+origin of evil: the Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted for
+matter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things.
+
+This region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of good:
+but, properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no _efficient_
+cause, for it consists in privation, as we shall see, namely, in that which
+the efficient cause does not bring about. That is why the Schoolmen are
+wont to call the cause of evil _deficient_.
+
+21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. _Metaphysical
+evil_ consists in mere imperfection, _physical evil_ in suffering, and
+_moral evil_ in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be not
+necessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they be
+possible. And as this vast Region of Verities contains all possibilities it
+is necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds, that evil
+enter into divers of them, and that even the best of all contain a measure
+thereof. Thus has God been induced to permit evil.
+
+22. But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of 'permitting'? Is it
+not God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? Here it will be necessary
+to explain what 'permission' is, so that it may be seen how this term is
+not employed without reason. But before that one must explain the nature of
+will, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the general sense, one may
+say that _will_ consists in the inclination to do something in proportion
+to the good it contains. This will is called _antecedent_ when it is
+detached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. In
+this sense it may be said that God tends to all good, as good, _ad
+perfectionem simpliciter simplicem_, to speak like the Schoolmen, and that
+by an antecedent will. He is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all
+men, to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said that
+this will is efficacious _of itself (per se)_, that is, in such sort that
+the effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to prevent
+it: for this will does not pass into final exercise (_ad summum conatum_),
+else it would never fail to produce its full effect, God being the    [137]
+master of all things. Success entire and infallible belongs only to the
+_consequent will_, as it is called. This it is which is complete; and in
+regard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to do what one wills,
+when one has the power. Now this consequent will, final and decisive,
+results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills, of those which tend
+towards good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrence
+of all these particular wills comes the total will. So in mechanics
+compound movement results from all the tendencies that concur in one and
+the same moving body, and satisfies each one equally, in so far as it is
+possible to do all at one time. It is as if the moving body took equal
+account of these tendencies, as I once showed in one of the Paris Journals
+(7 Sept. 1693), when giving the general law of the compositions of
+movement. In this sense also it may be said that the antecedent will is
+efficacious in a sense and even effective with success.
+
+23. Thence it follows that God wills _antecedently_ the good and
+_consequently_ the best. And as for evil, God wills moral evil not at all,
+and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. Thus it is that
+there is no absolute predestination to damnation; and one may say of
+physical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, and
+often also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or to
+obtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment and example.
+Evil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes too it
+contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the seed that
+one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate: this
+is a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself used.
+
+24. Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that it
+may serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, it is
+not this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or a
+legitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or
+_permitted_ in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of an
+indispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was determined not to
+permit another's sin were to fail of his own duty, or as if an officer on
+guard at an important post were to leave it, especially in time of danger,
+in order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of the
+garrison who wanted to kill each other.
+
+25. The rule which states, _non esse facienda mala, ut eveniant bona_, and
+which even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the end of     [138]
+obtaining a physical good, far from being violated, is here proved, and its
+source and its reason are demonstrated. One will not approve the action of
+a queen who, under the pretext of saving the State, commits or even permits
+a crime. The crime is certain and the evil for the State is open to
+question. Moreover, this manner of giving sanction to crimes, if it were
+accepted, would be worse than a disruption of some one country, which is
+liable enough to happen in any case, and would perchance happen all the
+more by reason of such means chosen to prevent it. But in relation to God
+nothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to _the rule of the
+best_, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this
+sense that God permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself,
+in what he owes to his wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followed
+not the grand result of all his tendencies to good, and if he chose not
+that which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the evil of guilt, which
+is involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities. Hence
+the conclusion that God wills all good _in himself antecedently_, that he
+wills the best _consequently_ as an _end_, that he wills what is
+indifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a _means_, but that he will
+only permit moral evil as the _sine quo non_ or as a hypothetical necessity
+which connects it with the best. Therefore the _consequent will_ of God,
+which has sin for its object, is only _permissive_.
+
+26. It is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great only
+because it is a source of physical evils, a source existing in one of the
+most powerful of creatures, who is also most capable of causing those
+evils. For an evil will is in its department what the evil principle of the
+Manichaeans would be in the universe; and reason, which is an image of the
+Divinity, provides for evil souls great means of causing much evil. One
+single Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil than an earthquake. An evil
+man takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction, and for that there
+are only too many opportunities. But God being inclined to produce as much
+good as possible, and having all the knowledge and all the power necessary
+for that, it is impossible that in him there be fault, or guilt, or sin;
+and when he permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue.
+
+27. It is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing the
+sin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning ourselves.
+But someone will perhaps bring up the objection that it is God himself[139]
+who acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the creature. This
+objection leads us to consider the _physical co-operation_ of God with the
+creature, after we have examined the _moral co-operation_, which was the
+more perplexing. Some have believed, with the celebrated Durand de
+Saint-Pourcain and Cardinal Aureolus, the famous Schoolman, that the
+co-operation of God with the creature (I mean the physical cooperation) is
+only general and mediate, and that God creates substances and gives them
+the force they need; and that thereafter he leaves them to themselves, and
+does naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. This
+opinion has been refuted by the greater number of Scholastic theologians,
+and it appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings of
+Pelagius. Nevertheless a Capuchin named Louis Pereir of Dole, about the
+year 1630, wrote a book expressly to revive it, at least in relation to
+free actions. Some moderns incline thereto, and M. Bernier supports it in a
+little book on freedom and freewill. But one cannot say in relation to God
+what 'to conserve' is, without reverting to the general opinion. Also it
+must be taken into account that the action of God in conserving should have
+some reference to that which is conserved, according to what it is and to
+the state wherein it is; thus his action cannot be general or
+indeterminate. These generalities are abstractions not to be found in the
+truth of individual things, and the conservation of a man standing is
+different from the conservation of a man seated. This would not be so if
+conservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off some
+foreign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve; as
+often happens when men conserve something. But apart from the fact that we
+are obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve, we must
+bear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual immediate
+influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependence
+attaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and one can
+perhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians and
+philosophers in general, that it is a continued creation.
+
+28. The objection will be made that God therefore now creates man a sinner,
+he that in the beginning created him innocent. But here it must be said,
+with regard to the moral aspect, that God being supremely wise cannot fail
+to observe certain laws, and to act according to the rules, as well   [140]
+physical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose. And the same reason
+that has made him create man innocent, but liable to fall, makes him
+re-create man when he falls; for God's knowledge causes the future to be
+for him as the present, and prevents him from rescinding the resolutions
+made.
+
+29. As for physical co-operation, here one must consider the truth which
+has made already so much stir in the Schools since St. Augustine declared
+it, that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends to
+the positive. This answer is accounted a quibble, and even something
+chimerical in the minds of many people. But here is an instance somewhat
+similar, which will serve to disabuse them.
+
+30. The celebrated Kepler and M. Descartes (in his letters) after him have
+spoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'; and it is something which may be
+regarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitation
+of creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal character of
+the imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in its
+actions. Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried
+along with it various boats, which differ among themselves only in the
+cargo, some being laden with wood, others with stone, and some more, the
+others less. That being so, it will come about that the boats most heavily
+laden will go more slowly than the others, provided it be assumed that the
+wind or the oar, or some other similar means, assist them not at all. It is
+not, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this retardation,
+since the boats are going down and not upwards; but it is the same cause
+which also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density, which
+are, that is to say, less porous and more charged with matter that is
+proper to them: for the matter which passes through the pores, not
+receiving the same movement, must not be taken into account. It is
+therefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or
+privation of speed; not indeed of itself to lessen this speed, having once
+received it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivity
+the effect of the impression when it is to receive it. Consequently, since
+more matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is more
+laden, it is necessary that it go more slowly; and experiments on the
+impact of bodies, as well as reason, show that twice as much force    [141]
+must be employed to give equal speed to a body of the same matter but of
+twice the size. But that indeed would not be necessary if the matter were
+absolutely indifferent to repose and to movement, and if it had not this
+natural inertia whereof we have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnance
+to being moved. Let us now compare the force which the current exercises on
+boats, and communicates to them, with the action of God, who produces and
+conserves whatever is positive in creatures, and gives them perfection,
+being and force: let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with the
+natural imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the laden boat with
+the defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature;
+and we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison. The
+current is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation;
+God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the
+creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the
+cause of the defects there are in its action. Thus the Platonists, St.
+Augustine and the Schoolmen were right to say that God is the cause of the
+material element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the formal
+element, which lies in privation. Even so one may say that the current is
+the cause of the material element of the retardation, but not of the
+formal: that is, it is the cause of the boat's speed without being the
+cause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the cause of sin than
+the river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. Force also
+in relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the flesh; the spirit
+is willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits act...
+
+  _quantum non noxia corpora tardant._
+
+31. There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such an
+action of God, and such and such a passion or reception of the creature,
+which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to
+its 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that the
+creature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts,
+and even that conservation is a continual creation, this is true in that
+God gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is
+positive, good and perfect, every perfect gift coming from the Father of
+lights. The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects in operations
+spring from the original limitation that the creature could not but   [142]
+receive with the first beginning of its being, through the ideal reasons
+which restrict it. For God could not give the creature all without making
+of it a God; therefore there must needs be different degrees in the
+perfection of things, and limitations also of every kind.
+
+32. This consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern philosophers
+who go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is true that God is
+the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed
+'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's participation in
+actions, since _the action of the creature_ is a modification of the
+substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in
+the perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the
+limitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we
+see that there is an actual distinction between the substance and its
+modification or accidents, contrary to the opinion of some moderns and in
+particular of the late Duke of Buckingham, who spoke of that in a little
+_Discourse on Religion_ recently reprinted. Evil is therefore like
+darkness, and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formally
+in a certain kind of privation. Here is an example of error which we have
+already employed. I see a tower which from a distance appears round
+although it is square. The thought that the tower is what it appears to be
+flows naturally from that which I see; and when I dwell on this thought it
+is an affirmation, it is a false judgement; but if I pursue the
+examination, if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearances
+deceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my error. To abide in a certain place,
+or not to go further, not to espy some landmark, these are privations.
+
+33. It is the same in respect of malice or ill will. The will tends towards
+good in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits us, and
+the supreme perfection is in God. All pleasures have within themselves some
+feeling of perfection. But when one is limited to the pleasures of the
+senses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good, as of
+health, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it is in this privation
+of a further aspiration that the defect consists. In general perfection is
+positive, it is an absolute reality; defect is privative, it comes from
+limitation and tends towards new privations. This saying is therefore as
+true as it is ancient: _bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu_;
+as also that which states: _malum causam habet non efficientem, sed   [143]
+deficientem_. And I hope that the meaning of these axioms will be better
+apprehended after what I have just said.
+
+34. The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the will
+contributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom. I am of
+opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from
+necessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in
+freedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over
+our actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if
+we were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are
+not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happen
+if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. There is
+_contingency_ in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is no
+judgement in him who acts there is no _freedom_. And if we had judgement
+not accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be an
+understanding without will.
+
+35. It is not to be imagined, however, that our freedom consists in an
+indetermination or an indifference of equipoise, as if one must needs be
+inclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction of
+different courses, when there are several of them to take. This equipoise
+in all directions is impossible: for if we were equally inclined towards
+the courses A, B and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A and
+towards not A. This equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience,
+and in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been some
+cause or reason inclining us towards the course taken, although very often
+we be not aware of that which prompts us: just in the same way one is
+hardly aware why, on issuing from a door, one has placed the right foot
+before the left or the left before the right.
+
+36. But let us pass to the difficulties. Philosophers agree to-day that the
+truth of contingent futurities is determinate, that is to say that
+contingent futurities are future, or that they will be, that they will
+happen: for it is as sure that the future will be, as it is sure that the
+past has been. It was true already a hundred years ago that I should write
+to-day, as it will be true after a hundred years that I have written. Thus
+the contingent is not, because it is future, any the less contingent; and
+_determination_, which would be called certainty if it were known, is not
+incompatible with contingency. Often the certain and the determinate are
+taken as one thing, because a determinate truth is capable of being   [144]
+known: thus it may be said that determination is an objective certainty.
+
+37. This determination comes from the very nature of truth, and cannot
+injure freedom: but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere,
+and in the first place from the foreknowledge of God, which many have held
+to be contrary to freedom. They say that what is foreseen cannot fail to
+exist, and they say so truly; but it follows not that what is foreseen is
+necessary, for _necessary truth_ is that whereof the contrary is impossible
+or implies contradiction. Now this truth which states that I shall write
+tomorrow is not of that nature, it is not necessary. Yet supposing that God
+foresees it, it is necessary that it come to pass; that is, the consequence
+is necessary, namely, that it exist, since it has been foreseen; for God is
+infallible. This is what is termed a _hypothetical necessity_. But our
+concern is not this necessity: it is an _absolute necessity_ that is
+required, to be able to say that an action is necessary, that it is not
+contingent, that it is not the effect of a free choice. Besides it is very
+easily seen that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determination
+of the truth of contingent futurities, save that this determination is
+known: and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' (as
+it is termed) of these events, that whereon we agreed at the outset.
+
+38. This answer is doubtless very correct. It is agreed that foreknowledge
+in itself does not make truth more determinate; truth is foreseen because
+it is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it is
+foreseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not
+also in the knowledge of the past or of the present. But here is what an
+opponent will be able to say: I grant you that foreknowledge in itself does
+not make truth more determinate, but it is the cause of the foreknowledge
+that makes it so. For it needs must be that the foreknowledge of God have
+its foundation in the nature of things, and this foundation, making the
+truth _predeterminate_, will prevent it from being contingent and free.
+
+39. It is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up, one of
+the _predeterminators_, the other of the supporters of _mediate knowledge_.
+The Dominicans and the Augustinians are for predetermination, the
+Franciscans and the modern Jesuits on the other hand are for mediate
+knowledge. These two parties appeared towards the middle of the sixteenth
+century and a little later. Molina himself, who is perhaps one of the [145]
+first, with Fonseca, to have systematized this point, and from whom the
+others derived their name of Molinists, says in the book that he wrote on
+the reconciliation of freewill with grace, about the year 1570, that the
+Spanish doctors (he means principally the Thomists), who had been writing
+then for twenty years, finding no other way to explain how God could have a
+certain knowledge of contingent futurities, had introduced predetermination
+as being necessary to free actions.
+
+40. As for himself, he thought to have found another way. He considers that
+there are three objects of divine knowledge, the possibles, the actual
+events and the conditional events that would happen in consequence of a
+certain condition if it were translated into action. The knowledge of
+possibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'; that
+of events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is called the
+'knowledge of intuition'. And as there is a kind of mean between the merely
+possible and the pure and absolute event, to wit, the conditional event, it
+can be said also, according to Molina, that there is a mediate knowledge
+between that of intuition and that of intelligence. Instance is given of
+the famous example of David asking the divine oracle whether the
+inhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he designed to shut himself in,
+would deliver him to Saul, supposing that Saul should besiege the town. God
+answered yes; whereupon David took a different course. Now some advocates
+of this mediate knowledge are of opinion that God, foreseeing what men
+would do of their own accord, supposing they were placed in such and such
+circumstances, and knowing that they would make ill use of their free will,
+decrees to refuse them grace and favourable circumstances. And he may
+justly so decree, since in any case these circumstances and these aids
+would not have served them aught. But Molina contents himself with finding
+therein generally a reason for the decrees of God, founded on what the free
+creature would do in such and such circumstances.
+
+41. I will not enter into all the detail of this controversy; it will
+suffice for me to give one instance. Certain older writers, not acceptable
+to St. Augustine and his first disciples, appear to have had ideas somewhat
+approaching those of Molina. The Thomists and those who call themselves
+disciples of St. Augustine (but whom their opponents call Jansenists)
+combat this doctrine on philosophical and theological grounds. Some   [146]
+maintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mere
+intelligence. But the principal objection is aimed at the foundation of
+this knowledge. For what foundation can God have for seeing what the people
+of Keilah would do? A simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself
+to yield a principle of certainty, unless one look upon it as predetermined
+by the decrees of God, and by the causes that are dependent upon them.
+Consequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also
+in conditional free actions, that is to say, God will know them only under
+the condition of their causes and of his decrees, which are the first
+causes of things: and it will not be possible to separate such actions from
+those causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent
+of the knowledge of its causes. Therefore all must of necessity be traced
+back to the predetermination of God's decrees, and this mediate knowledge
+(so it will be said) will offer no remedy. The theologians who profess to
+be adherents of St. Augustine claim also that the system of the Molinists
+would discover the source of God's grace in the good qualities of man, and
+this they deem an infringement of God's honour and contrary to St. Paul's
+teaching.
+
+42. It would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and
+rejoinders coming from one side and the other, and it will suffice for me
+to explain how I conceive that there is truth on both sides. For this
+result I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds,
+represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of
+the divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must be
+comprised. For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible
+world, _which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this
+hypothesis_, and the idea of this possible world represents that which
+would happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certain
+knowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or must
+happen in a certain case. For in the region of the possibles they are
+represented as they are, namely, as free contingencies. Therefore neither
+the foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for the
+certainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem to
+prejudice freedom. And though it were true and possible that contingent
+futurities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely
+independent of the decrees of God and of external causes, there would [147]
+still be means of foreseeing them; for God would see them as they are in
+the region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them into
+existence.
+
+43. But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependence
+or independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance of
+God, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, always
+contribute to the determination of the will. And if I am for the Molinists
+in the first point, I am for the predeterminators in the second, provided
+always that predetermination be taken as not necessitating. In a word, I am
+of opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course it
+adopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it. That it
+will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary. The case
+corresponds to that of the famous saying, _Astra inclinant, non
+necessitant_, although here the similarity is not complete. For the event
+towards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there
+were some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass, whereas
+the course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be
+adopted. Moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations that
+co-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater inclination of
+the will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations. It is almost as
+we have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results from all
+the antecedent wills.
+
+44. Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring about
+the necessity of the determinate truth. All philosophers acknowledge this,
+asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, and that
+nevertheless they remain contingent. The thing indeed would imply no
+contradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; and therein lies
+contingency. The better to understand this point, we must take into account
+that there are two great principles of our arguments. The one is the
+principle of _contradiction_, stating that of two contradictory
+propositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is that
+of the _determinant reason_: it states that nothing ever comes to pass
+without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is,
+something to give an _a priori_ reason why it is existent rather than
+non-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other. This great
+principle holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be
+supplied: and although more often than not we are insufficiently      [148]
+acquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that
+there are such. Were it not for this great principle we could never prove
+the existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and
+very profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, it
+suffers no exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened. Besides,
+nothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of
+exceptions. That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system I
+approve, where everything happens in accordance with general rules that at
+most are mutually restrictive.
+
+45. We must therefore not imagine with some Schoolmen, whose ideas tend
+towards the chimerical, that free contingent futurities have the privilege
+of exemption from this general rule of the nature of things. There is
+always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for
+the maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should
+incline without necessitating. That is also the opinion of all the
+ancients, of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is never
+prompted to action save by the representation of the good, which prevails
+over the opposite representations. This is admitted even in relation to
+God, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged that
+they are none the less free in consequence of that. God fails not to choose
+the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no
+necessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is
+equally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent
+of necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will is
+determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object. This is
+therefore not a defect where God and the saints are concerned: on the
+contrary, it would be a great defect, or rather a manifest absurdity, were
+it otherwise, even in men here on earth, and if they were capable of acting
+without any inclining reason. Of such absurdity no example will ever be
+found; and even supposing one takes a certain course out of caprice, to
+demonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure or advantage one thinks to find in
+this conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it.
+
+46. There is therefore a freedom of contingency or, in a way, of
+indifference, provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothing
+necessitates us to one course or the other; but there is never any
+_indifference of equipoise_, that is, where all is completely even on [149]
+both sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great and
+small movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the most
+part unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves a room
+there are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first,
+without pausing to reflect. For there is not everywhere a slave, as in
+Trimalchio's house in Petronius, to cry to us: the right foot first. All
+that we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of the
+philosophers, who teach that a cause cannot act without having a
+disposition towards action. It is this disposition which contains a
+predetermination, whether the doer have received it from without, or have
+had it in consequence of his own antecedent character.
+
+47. Thus we have no need to resort, in company with some new Thomists, to a
+new immediate predetermination by God, such as may cause the free creature
+to abandon his indifference, and to a decree of God for predetermining the
+creature, making it possible for God to know what the creature will do: for
+it suffices that the creature be predetermined by its preceding state,
+which inclines it to one course more than to the other. Moreover, all these
+connexions of the actions of the creature and of all creatures were
+represented in the divine understanding, and known to God through the
+knowledge of mere intelligence, before he had decreed to give them
+existence. Thus we see that, in order to account for the foreknowledge of
+God, one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of the Molinists and
+the predetermination which a Banez or an Alvarez (writers otherwise of
+great profundity) have taught.
+
+48. By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists were
+much embarrassed. They were asked not only how it was possible to know in
+what direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be determined, but
+also how it was possible that there should finally result therefrom a
+determination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it is
+the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant that
+cause the privilege of being chimerical. It is pleasing to see their
+harassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence there is absolutely no
+means of egress. Some teach that the will, before it is determined
+formally, must be determined virtually, in order to emerge from its state
+of equipoise; and Father Louis of Dole, in his book on the _Co-operation of
+God_, quotes Molinists who attempt to take refuge in this expedient:  [150]
+for they are compelled to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposed
+to act. But they gain nothing, they only defer the difficulty: for they
+will still be asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually.
+They will therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging that
+there is a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature,
+which inclines it to be determined.
+
+49. In consequence of this, the case also of Buridan's ass between two
+meadows, impelled equally towards both of them, is a fiction that cannot
+occur in the universe, in the order of Nature, although M. Bayle be of
+another opinion. It is true that, if the case were possible, one must say
+that the ass would starve himself to death: but fundamentally the question
+deals in the impossible, unless it be that God bring the thing about
+expressly. For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through the
+middle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its length, so that all
+is equal and alike on both sides, in the manner wherein an ellipse, and
+every plane figure of the number of those I term 'ambidexter', can be thus
+halved, by any straight line passing through its centre. Neither the parts
+of the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike nor are they evenly
+placed on both sides of this vertical plane. There will therefore always be
+many things in the ass and outside the ass, although they be not apparent
+to us, which will determine him to go on one side rather than the other.
+And although man is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the same
+reason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise
+between two courses is impossible. Furthermore it is true that an angel, or
+God certainly, could always account for the course man has adopted, by
+assigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced him
+to adopt it: yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible to
+ourselves, because the concatenation of causes linked together is very
+long.
+
+50. Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove the
+independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward
+sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our
+independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often
+imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic
+needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that
+it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the
+imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter. Nevertheless we shall [151]
+see later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogether
+its own natural principle in relation to its actions, dependent upon itself
+and independent of all other creatures.
+
+51. As for _volition_ itself, to say that it is an object of free will is
+incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will;
+else we could still say that we will to have the will to will, and that
+would go on to infinity. Besides, we do not always follow the latest
+judgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will; but we always
+follow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that come from
+the direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens without
+an express judgement of the understanding.
+
+52. All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as
+everywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of _spiritual automaton_,
+although contingent actions in general and free action in particular are
+not on that account necessary with an absolute necessity, which would be
+truly incompatible with contingency. Thus neither futurition in itself,
+certain as it is, nor the infallible prevision of God, nor the
+predetermination either of causes or of God's decrees destroys this
+contingency and this freedom. That is acknowledged in respect of futurition
+and prevision, as has already been set forth. Since, moreover, God's decree
+consists solely in the resolution he forms, after having compared all
+possible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it into
+existence together with all that this world contains, by means of the
+all-powerful word _Fiat_, it is plain to see that this decree changes
+nothing in the constitution of things: God leaves them just as they were in
+the state of mere possibility, that is, changing nothing either in their
+essence or nature, or even in their accidents, which are represented
+perfectly already in the idea of this possible world. Thus that which is
+contingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than under
+his prevision.
+
+53. But could God himself (it will be said) then change nothing in the
+world? Assuredly he could not now change it, without derogation to his
+wisdom, since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what it
+contains, and since, likewise, he has formed this resolution to bring it
+into existence: for he cannot be mistaken nor repent, and it did not behove
+him to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not the  [152]
+whole. Thus, all being ordered from the beginning, it is only because of
+this hypothetical necessity, recognized by everyone, that after God's
+prevision or after his resolution nothing can be changed: and yet the
+events in themselves remain contingent. For (setting aside this supposition
+of the futurition of the thing and of the prevision or of the resolution of
+God, a supposition which already lays it down as a fact that the thing will
+happen, and in accordance with which one must say, 'Unumquodque, quando
+est, oportet esse, aut unumquodque, siquidem erit, oportet futurum esse'),
+the event has nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no
+other thing might have happened in its stead. And as for the connexion
+between causes and effects, it only inclined, without necessitating, the
+free agency, as I have just explained; thus it does not produce even a
+hypothetical necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, to
+wit, this very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs.
+
+54. It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then perform
+miracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in the
+world were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same world
+considered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who has since
+performed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed to perform
+them. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, merits and
+demerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing can be changed.
+This objection causes most perplexity to people in general, and yet it is
+purely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these good or bad actions that
+occur to-day were already before God when he formed the resolution to order
+things. Those things which happen in this existing world were represented,
+with their effects and their consequences, in the idea of this same world,
+while it was still possible only; they were represented therein, attracting
+God's grace whether natural or supernatural, requiring punishments or
+rewards, just as it has happened actually in this world since God chose it.
+The prayer or the good action were even then an _ideal cause_ or
+_condition_, that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace
+of God, or to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, all
+is wisely connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeing
+that which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basis
+beforehand, or (what is the same) he chose that possible world in     [153]
+which everything was ordered in this fashion.
+
+55. This consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients called
+the 'Lazy Sophism' ([Greek: logos argos]) which ended in a decision to do
+nothing: for (people would say) if what I ask is to happen it will happen
+even though I should do nothing; and if it is not to happen it will never
+happen, no matter what trouble I take to achieve it. This necessity,
+supposedly existent in events, and detached from their causes, might be
+termed _Fatum Mahometanum_, as I have already observed above, because a
+similar line of reasoning, so it is said, causes the Turks not to shun
+places ravaged by plague. But the answer is quite ready: the effect being
+certain, the cause that shall produce it is certain also; and if the effect
+comes about it will be by virtue of a proportionate cause. Thus your
+laziness perchance will bring it about that you will obtain naught of what
+you desire, and that you will fall into those misfortunes which you would
+by acting with care have avoided. We see, therefore, that the _connexion of
+causes with effects_, far from causing an unendurable fatality, provides
+rather a means of obviating it. There is a German proverb which says that
+death will ever have a cause; and nothing is so true. You will die on that
+day (let us presume it is so, and that God foresees it): yes, without
+doubt; but it will be because you will do what shall lead you thither. It
+is likewise with the chastisements of God, which also depend upon their
+causes. And it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famous
+passage from St. Ambrose (in cap. I _Lucae_), 'Novit Dominus mutare
+sententiam, si tu noveris mutare delictum', which is not to be understood
+as of reprobation, but of denunciation, such as that which Jonah dealt out
+for God to the Ninevites. This common saying: 'Si non es praedestinatus,
+fac ut praedestineris', must not be taken literally, its true sense being
+that he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is required
+for him to obtain it by the grace of God. The sophism which ends in a
+decision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes to
+induce certain people to face danger fearlessly. It has been applied in
+particular to Turkish soldiers: but it seems that hashish is a more
+important factor than this sophism, not to mention the fact that this
+resolute spirit in the Turks has greatly belied itself in our days.
+
+56. A learned physician of Holland named Johan van Beverwyck took the
+trouble to write _De Termino Vitae_ and to collect sundry answers,    [154]
+letters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this subject.
+This collection has been printed, and it is astonishing to see there how
+often people are misled, and how they have confused a problem which,
+properly speaking, is the easiest in the world. After that it is no wonder
+that there are very many doubts which the human race cannot abandon. The
+truth is that people love to lose themselves, and this is a kind of ramble
+of the mind, which is unwilling to subject itself to attention, to order,
+to rules. It seems as though we are so accustomed to games and jesting that
+we play the fool even in the most serious occupations, and when we least
+think to do so.
+
+57. I fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of the
+Augsburg Confession, _De Termino Paenitentiae Peremptorio_, which has
+called forth so many treatises in Germany, some misunderstanding, though of
+a different nature, has slipped in. The terms prescribed by the laws are
+amongst lawyers known as _fatalia_. It may be said, in a sense, that the
+_peremptory term_, prescribed to man for his repentance and amendment, is
+certain in the sight of God, with whom all is certain. God knows when a
+sinner will be so hardened that thereafter nothing can be done for him: not
+indeed that it would be impossible for him to do penance or that sufficient
+grace needs must be refused to him after a certain term, a grace that never
+fails; but because there will be a time whereafter he will no more approach
+the ways of salvation. But we never have certain marks for recognizing this
+term, and we are never justified in considering a man utterly abandoned:
+that would be to pass a rash judgement. It were better always to have room
+for hope; and this is an occasion, with a thousand others, where our
+ignorance is beneficial.
+
+  _Prudens futuri temporis exitum_
+  _Caliginosa nocte premit Deus_.
+
+58. The whole future is doubtless determined: but since we know not what it
+is, nor what is foreseen or resolved, we must do our duty, according to the
+reason that God has given us and according to the rules that he has
+prescribed for us; and thereafter we must have a quiet mind, and leave to
+God himself the care for the outcome. For he will never fail to do that
+which shall be the best, not only in general but also in particular, for
+those who have true confidence in him, that is, a confidence composed [155]
+of true piety, a lively faith and fervent charity, by virtue of which we
+will, as far as in us lies, neglect nothing appertaining to our duty and
+his service. It is true that we cannot 'render service' to him, for he has
+need of nothing: but it is 'serving him', in our parlance, when we strive
+to carry out his presumptive will, co-operating in the good as it is known
+to us, wherever we can contribute thereto. For we must always presume that
+God is prompted towards the good we know, until the event shows us that he
+had stronger reasons, although perhaps unknown to us, which have made him
+subordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his own
+designing, which he has not failed or will not fail to effect.
+
+59. I have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its causes;
+that there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this dependence of
+our actions; and that otherwise one would slip into a preposterous and
+unendurable fatality, namely into the _Fatum Mahometanum_, which is the
+worst of all because it overthrows foresight and good counsel. It is well
+to show, notwithstanding, how this dependence of voluntary actions does not
+fundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful
+_spontaneity_, which in a certain sense makes the soul in its resolves
+independent of the physical influence of all other creatures. This
+spontaneity, hitherto little recognized, which exalts our command over our
+actions to the highest pitch, is a consequence of the System of
+Pre-established Harmony, of which I must give some explanation here. The
+Scholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physical
+influence between body and soul: but since it has been recognized that
+thought and dimensional mass have no mutual connexion, and that they are
+creatures differing _toto genere_, many moderns have acknowledged that
+there is no _physical communication_ between soul and body, despite the
+_metaphysical communication_ always subsisting, which causes soul and body
+to compose one and the same _suppositum_, or what is called a person. This
+physical communication, if there were such, would cause the soul to change
+the degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that are in
+the body, and _vice versa_ the body to change the sequence of the thoughts
+that are in the soul. But this effect cannot be inferred from any notion
+conceived in the body and in the soul; though nothing be better known to us
+than the soul, since it is inmost to us, that is to say inmost to itself.
+
+                                                                      [156]
+60. M. Descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body's
+action dependent upon the soul. He believed in the existence of a rule of
+Nature to the effect, according to him, that the same quantity of movement
+is conserved in bodies. He deemed it not possible that the influence of the
+soul should violate this law of bodies, but he believed that the soul
+notwithstanding might have power to change the direction of the movements
+that are made in the body; much as a rider, though giving no force to the
+horse he mounts, nevertheless controls it by guiding that force in any
+direction he pleases. But as that is done by means of the bridle, the bit,
+the spurs and other material aids, it is conceivable how that can be; there
+are, however, no instruments such as the soul may employ for this result,
+nothing indeed either in the soul or in the body, that is, either in
+thought or in the mass, which may serve to explain this change of the one
+by the other. In a word, that the soul should change the quantity of force
+and that it should change the line of direction, both these things are
+equally inexplicable.
+
+61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been discovered
+since M. Descartes' day. The first is that the quantity of absolute force
+which is in fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement, as I
+have demonstrated elsewhere. The second discovery is that the same
+direction is still conserved in all bodies together that are assumed as
+interacting, in whatever way they come into collision. If this rule had
+been known to M. Descartes, he would have taken the direction of bodies to
+be as independent of the soul as their force; and I believe that that would
+have led direct to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, whither these
+same rules have led me. For apart from the fact that the physical influence
+of one of these substances on the other is inexplicable, I recognized that
+without a complete derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act
+physically upon the body. And I did not believe that one could here listen
+to philosophers, competent in other respects, who produce a God, as it
+were, _ex machina_, to bring about the final solution of the piece,
+maintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soul
+pleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires. For this
+system, which is called that of _occasional causes_ (because it teaches
+that God acts on the body at the instance of the soul, and _vice versa_),
+besides introducing perpetual miracles to establish communication     [157]
+between these two substances, does not obviate the derangement of the
+natural laws obtaining in each of these same substances, which, in the
+general opinion, their mutual influence would cause.
+
+62. Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle of
+Harmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the
+_preformation_ and the Pre-established Harmony of all things amongst
+themselves, of that between nature and grace, between the decrees of God
+and our actions foreseen, between all parts of matter, and even between the
+future and the past, the whole in conformity with the sovereign wisdom of
+God, whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive. Thus I
+could not fail to arrive at the system which declares that God created the
+soul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and represent
+to itself successively that which takes place within the body, and the body
+also in such a fashion that it must do of itself that which the soul
+ordains. Consequently the laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in the
+order of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptions
+must produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of
+bodies on our organs; and likewise the laws of movements in the body, which
+follow one another in the order of efficient causes, meet and so harmonize
+with the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to act at the time
+when the soul wills it.
+
+63. Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to
+freedom than that system. And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in his
+book on the _Conformity of Faith with Reason_, that it is just as if he who
+knows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on the
+morrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry out
+to-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that would
+not prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, although the
+action of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free.
+
+64. Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to this
+system, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only from
+it and from its present state, how can one give it a greater
+_independence_? It is true that there still remains some imperfection in
+the constitution of the soul. All that happens to the soul depends upon it,
+but depends not always upon its will; that were too much. Nor are such[158]
+happenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived with
+distinctness. For there is in the soul not only an order of distinct
+perceptions, forming its dominion, but also a series of confused
+perceptions or passions, forming its bondage: and there is no need for
+astonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity if it had none but
+distinct perceptions. It has nevertheless some power over these confused
+perceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For although it cannot
+change its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end with
+enough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits. It even
+has a like power over the more distinct perceptions, being able to endue
+itself indirectly with opinions and intentions, and to hinder itself from
+having this one or that, and stay or hasten its judgement. For we can seek
+means beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding
+step of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponement
+of our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be
+judged. Although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects
+of our will (as I have already observed), one sometimes, takes measures
+nevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one does
+not will, or believe, now. So great is the profundity of the spirit of man.
+
+65. And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of _spontaneity_, it
+must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it the
+principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that the
+same is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature,
+although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent. In the
+popular sense notwithstanding, speaking in accordance with appearances, we
+must say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon the
+impressions of the senses: much as we speak with Ptolemy and Tycho in
+everyday converse, and think with Copernicus, when it is a question of the
+rising and the setting of the sun.
+
+66. One may however give a true and philosophic sense to this _mutual
+dependence_ which we suppose between the soul and the body. It is that the
+one of these two substances depends upon the other ideally, in so far as
+the reason of that which is done in the one can be furnished by that which
+is in the other. This had already happened when God ordered beforehand the
+harmony that there would be between them. Even so would that          [159]
+automaton, that should fulfil the servant's function, depend upon me
+_ideally_, in virtue of the knowledge of him who, foreseeing my future
+orders, would have rendered it capable of serving me at the right moment
+all through the morrow. The knowledge of my future intentions would have
+actuated this great craftsman, who would accordingly have fashioned the
+automaton: my influence would be objective, and his physical. For in so far
+as the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the
+body to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to
+execute its orders. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its
+perceptions are confused, God has accommodated the soul to the body, in
+such sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal
+representations. This produces the same effect and the same appearance as
+if the one depended immediately upon the other, and by the agency of a
+physical influence. Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts that
+the soul represents the bodies which encompass it. The same thing must
+apply to all that we understand by the actions of simple substances one
+upon another. For each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportion
+to its perfection, although this be only ideally, and in the reasons of
+things, as God in the beginning ordered one substance to accord with
+another in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is in
+each. (Withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures,
+because one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what is
+done, and which have served to bring it into existence, is in the one of
+these substances, and another part of these reasons is in the other,
+perfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared.) Thus it is
+we attribute _action_ to the one, and _passion_ to the other.
+
+67. But after all, whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary actions,
+and even though there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (which
+there is not) it would not follow that there would not be a sufficient
+degree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable. It
+is true that generally we speak as though the necessity of the action put
+an end to all merit and all demerit, all justification for praise and
+blame, for reward and punishment: but it must be admitted that this
+conclusion is not entirely correct. I am very far from sharing the opinions
+of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems,[160]
+this entirely mathematical necessity, which I think I have adequately
+refuted, and perhaps more clearly than is customary. Yet one must always
+bear testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that does
+not result from it. Moreover, these arguments prove too much, since they
+would prove just as much against hypothetical necessity, and would justify
+the lazy sophism. For the absolute necessity of the sequence of causes
+would in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of a
+hypothetical necessity.
+
+68. In the first place, therefore, it must be agreed that it is permitted
+to kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself. It will be
+granted also that it is permitted, and often even necessary, to destroy
+venomous or very noxious animals, although they be not so by their own
+fault.
+
+69. Secondly, one inflicts punishments upon a beast, despite its lack of
+reason and freedom, when one deems that this may serve to correct it: thus
+one punishes dogs and horses, and indeed with much success. Rewards serve
+us no less in the managing of animals: when an animal is hungry, the food
+that is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never be
+obtained from him.
+
+70. Thirdly, one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments (where it
+is no longer a question of correcting the beast that is punished) if this
+punishment could serve as an example, or inspire terror in others, to make
+them cease from evil doing. Rorarius, in his book on reason in beasts, says
+that in Africa they crucified lions, in order to drive away other lions
+from the towns and frequented places, and that he had observed in passing
+through the province of Juelich that they hanged wolves there in order to
+ensure greater safety for the sheepfolds. There are people in the villages
+also who nail birds of prey to the doors of houses, with the idea that
+other birds of the same kind will then not so readily appear. These
+measures would always be justified if they were of any avail.
+
+71. Then, in the fourth place, since experience proves that the fear of
+chastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from evil
+and strive to do good, one would have good reason to avail oneself of such,
+even though men were acting under necessity, whatever the necessity might
+be. The objection will be raised that if good or evil is necessary it is
+useless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to hinder it: but the
+answer has already been given above in the passage combating the lazy [161]
+sophism. If good or evil were a necessity without these means, then such
+means would be unavailing; but it is not so. These goods and evils come
+only with the aid of these means, and if these results were necessary the
+means would be a part of the causes rendering them necessary, since
+experience teaches us that often fear or hope hinders evil or advances
+good. This objection, then, differs hardly at all from the lazy sophism,
+which we raise against the certainty as well as the necessity of future
+events. Thus one may say that these objections are directed equally against
+hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity, and that they prove as much
+against the one as against the other, that is to say, nothing at all.
+
+72. There was a great dispute between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes, which
+began when they were both in Paris, and which was continued after their
+return to England; all the parts of it are to be found collected in a
+quarto volume published in London in the year 1656. They are all in
+English, and have not been translated as far as I know, nor inserted in the
+Collection of Works in Latin by Mr. Hobbes. I had already read these
+writings, and have obtained them again since. And I had observed at the
+outset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all things,
+but had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all the rules
+of divine or human justice, and would not prevent altogether the exercise
+of this virtue.
+
+73. There is, however, a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards and
+of punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act by an
+absolute necessity, supposing such necessity existed. It is that kind of
+justice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example, nor even
+redress of the evil. This justice has its foundation only in the fitness of
+things, which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation of an evil
+action. The Socinians, Hobbes and some others do not admit this punitive
+justice, which properly speaking is avenging justice. God reserves it for
+himself in many cases; but he does not fail to grant it to those who are
+entitled to govern others, and he exercises it through their agency,
+provided that they act under the influence of reason and not of passion.
+The Socinians believe it to be without foundation, but it always has some
+foundation in that fitness of things which gives satisfaction not only to
+the injured but also to the wise who see it; even as a beautiful piece of
+music, or again a good piece of architecture, satisfies cultivated    [162]
+minds. And the wise lawgiver having threatened, and having, so to speak,
+promised a chastisement, it befits his consistency not to leave the action
+completely unpunished, even though the punishment would no longer avail to
+correct anyone. But even though he should have promised nothing, it is
+enough that there is a fitness of things which could have prompted him to
+make this promise, since the wise man likewise promises only that which is
+fitting. And one may even say that there is here a certain compensation of
+the mind, which would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement did
+not contribute towards restoring order. One can also consult what Grotius
+wrote against the Socinians, of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, and the
+answer of Crellius thereto.
+
+74. Thus it is that the pains of the damned continue, even when they no
+longer serve to turn them away from evil, and that likewise the rewards of
+the blessed continue, even when they no longer serve for strengthening them
+in good. One may say nevertheless that the damned ever bring upon
+themselves new pains through new sins, and that the blessed ever bring upon
+themselves new joys by new progress in goodness: for both are founded on
+the _principle of the fitness of things_, which has seen to it that affairs
+were so ordered that the evil action must bring upon itself a chastisement.
+There is good reason to believe, following the parallelism of the two
+realms, that of final causes and that of efficient causes, that God has
+established in the universe a connexion between punishment or reward and
+bad or good action, in accordance wherewith the first should always be
+attracted by the second, and virtue and vice obtain their reward and their
+punishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things, which contains
+still another kind of pre-established harmony than that which appears in
+the communication between the soul and the body. For, in a word, all that
+God does, as I have said already, is harmonious to perfection. Perhaps then
+this principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beings
+acting without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity; and in
+that case corrective justice alone would be administered, and not punitive
+justice. That is the opinion of the famous Conringius, in a dissertation he
+published on what is just. And indeed, the reasons Pomponazzi employed in
+his book on fate, to prove the usefulness of chastisements and rewards,
+even though all should come about in our actions by a fatal necessity,[163]
+concern only amendment and not satisfaction, [Greek: kolasin ou timorian].
+Moreover, it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one destroys
+animals accessary to certain crimes, as one razes the houses of rebels,
+that is, to inspire terror. Thus it is an act of corrective justice,
+wherein punitive justice has no part at all.
+
+75. But we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question more
+curious than necessary, since we have shown sufficiently that there is no
+such necessity in voluntary actions. Nevertheless it was well to show that
+_imperfect freedom_ alone, that is, freedom which is exempt only from
+constraint, would suffice as foundation for chastisements and rewards of
+the kind conducive to the avoidance of evil, and to amendment. One sees
+also from this that some persons of intelligence, who persuade themselves
+that everything is necessary, are wrong in saying that none must be praised
+or blamed, rewarded or punished. Apparently they say so only to exercise
+their wit: the pretext is that all being necessary nothing would be in our
+power. But this pretext is ill founded: necessary actions would be still in
+our power, at least in so far as we could perform them or omit them, when
+the hope or the fear of praise or blame, of pleasure or pain prompted our
+will thereto, whether they prompted it of necessity, or in prompting it
+they left spontaneity, contingency and freedom all alike unimpaired. Thus
+praise and blame, rewards and punishments would preserve always a large
+part of their use, even though there were a true necessity in our actions.
+We can praise and blame also natural good and bad qualities, where the will
+has no part--in a horse, in a diamond, in a man; and he who said of Cato of
+Utica that he acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature, and that
+it was impossible for him to behave otherwise, thought to praise him the
+more.
+
+76. The difficulties which I have endeavoured up to now to remove have been
+almost all common to natural and revealed theology. Now it will be
+necessary to come to a question of revealed theology, concerning the
+election or the reprobation of men, with the dispensation or use of divine
+grace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of God. But
+when I answered the preceding objections, I opened up a way to meet those
+that remain. This confirms the observation I made thereon (_Preliminary
+Dissertation,_ 43) that there is rather a conflict between the true   [164]
+reasons of natural theology and the false reasons of human appearances,
+than between revealed faith and reason. For on this subject scarcely any
+difficulty arises that is new, and not deriving its origin from those which
+can be placed in the way of the truths discerned by reason.
+
+77. Now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on this
+subject of predestination and grace, and often give different answers to
+the same objections, according to their various principles, one cannot
+avoid touching on the differences which prevail among them. One may say in
+general that some look upon God more metaphysically and others more
+morally: and it has already been stated on other occasions that the
+Counter-Remonstrants took the first course and the Remonstrants the second.
+But to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the independence of God
+and the dependence of creatures, and on the other side the justice and
+goodness of God, which makes him dependent upon himself, his will upon his
+understanding or his wisdom.
+
+78. Some gifted and well-intentioned authors, desiring to show the force of
+the reasons advocated by the two principal parties, in order to persuade
+them to a mutual tolerance, deem that the whole controversy is reduced to
+this essential point, namely: What was God's principal aim in making his
+decrees with regard to man? Did he make them solely in order to show forth
+his glory by manifesting his attributes, and forming, to that end, the
+great plan of creation and providence? Or has he had regard rather to the
+voluntary movements of intelligent substances which he designed to create,
+considering what they would will and do in the different circumstances and
+situations wherein he might place them, so as to form a fitting resolve
+thereupon? It appears to me that the two answers to this great question
+thus given as opposites to one another are easy to reconcile, and that in
+consequence the two parties would be agreed in principle, without any need
+of tolerance, if all were reduced to this point. In truth God, in designing
+to create the world, purposed solely to manifest and communicate his
+perfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of his
+greatness, his wisdom and his goodness. But that very purpose pledged him
+to consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of pure
+possibility, that he might form the most fitting plan. He is like a great
+architect whose aim in view is the satisfaction or the glory of having[165]
+built a beautiful palace, and who considers all that is to enter into this
+construction: the form and the materials, the place, the situation, the
+means, the workmen, the expense, before he forms a complete resolve. For a
+wise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he
+does not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means of
+attaining thereto.
+
+79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that,
+God being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer that
+everything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers himself
+alone, without concern for others, and that thus he has made some happy and
+others unhappy without any cause, without choice, without reason. But to
+teach so about God were to deprive him of wisdom and of goodness. We need
+only observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he owes
+to himself, to conclude that he considers his creatures also, and that he
+uses them in the manner most consistent with order. For the more a great
+and good prince is mindful of his glory, the more he will think of making
+his subjects happy, even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs,
+and though his subjects were slaves from birth, bondsmen (in lawyers'
+parlance), people entirely in subjection to arbitrary power. Calvin himself
+and some others of the greatest defenders of the absolute decree rightly
+maintained that God had _great and just reasons_ for his election and the
+dispensation of his grace, although these reasons be unknown to us in
+detail: and we must judge charitably that the most rigid predestinators
+have too much reason and too much piety to depart from this opinion.
+
+80. There will therefore be no argument for debate on that point (as I
+hope) with people who are at all reasonable. But there will always be
+argument among those who are called Universalists and Particularists,
+according to what they teach of the grace and the will of God. Yet I am
+somewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on the
+will of God to save all men, and on that which depends upon it (when one
+keeps separate the doctrine _de Auxiliis_, or of the assistance of grace),
+rests rather in expressions than in things. For it is sufficient to
+consider that God, as well as every wise and beneficent mind, is inclined
+towards all possible good, and that this inclination is proportionate to
+the excellence of the good. Moreover, this results (if we take the    [166]
+matter precisely and in itself) from an 'antecedent will', as it is termed,
+which, however, is not always followed by its complete effect, because this
+wise mind must have many other inclinations besides. Thus it is the result
+of all the inclinations together that makes his will complete and
+decretory, as I have already explained. One may therefore very well say
+with ancient writers that God wills to save all men according to his
+antecedent will, but not according to his consequent will, which never
+fails to be followed by its effect. And if those who deny this universal
+will do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will, they
+are only troubling themselves about a question of name.
+
+81. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination to
+eternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether this
+destination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good and
+destination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of all
+parties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say,
+that none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which is
+damnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: for
+predestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination,
+which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of those
+whom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate are _destined_ to be
+condemned, because they are known to be impenitent. But it cannot so well
+be said that the reprobate are _predestined_ to damnation: for there is no
+_absolute_ reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence.
+
+82. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing to
+manifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy of
+him, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected the
+damned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this resolve
+he thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these two
+virtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some in order to
+save them, while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punish
+them. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', because the decree
+to punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge of the future
+existence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day amongst those who are
+called Reformed, and one that is favoured by the Synod of Dordrecht, is
+that of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding somewhat to the conception of
+St. Augustine. For he asserts that God having resolved to permit the  [167]
+sin of Adam and the corruption of the human race, for reasons just but
+hidden, his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freely
+saved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his justice made him resolve to
+punish the others by the damnation that they deserved. That is why, with
+the Schoolmen, only the saved were called _Praedestinati_ and the damned
+were called _Praesciti_. It must be admitted that some Infralapsarians and
+others speak sometimes of predestination to damnation, following the
+example of Fulgentius and of St. Augustine himself: but that signifies the
+same as destination to them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words.
+That pretext, notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating that
+Godescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and who
+took the name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author.
+
+83. As for the destination of the elect to eternal life, the Protestants,
+as well as those of the Roman Church, dispute much among themselves as to
+whether election is absolute or is founded on the prevision of final living
+faith. Those who are called Evangelicals, that is, those of the Augsburg
+Confession, hold the latter opinion: they believe that one need not go into
+the hidden causes of election while one may find a manifest cause of it
+shown in Holy Scripture, which is faith in Jesus Christ; and it appears to
+them that the prevision of the cause is also the cause of the prevision of
+the effect. Those who are called Reformed are of a different opinion: they
+admit that salvation comes from faith in Jesus Christ, but they observe
+that often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is posterior in
+intention, as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end. Thus
+the question is, whether faith or salvation is anterior in the intention of
+God, that is, whether God's design is rather to save man than to make him a
+believer.
+
+84. Hence we see that the question between the Supralapsarians and the
+Infralapsarians in part, and again between them and the Evangelicals, comes
+back to a right conception of the order that is in God's decrees. Perhaps
+one might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that, properly
+speaking, all the decrees of God that are here concerned are simultaneous,
+not only in respect of time, as everyone agrees, but also _in signo
+rationis_, or in the order of nature. And indeed, the Formula of Concord,
+building upon some passages of St. Augustine, comprised in the same   [168]
+Decree of Election salvation and the means that conduce to it. To
+demonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of decrees with which we
+are concerned, we must revert to the expedient that I have employed more
+than once, which states that God, before decreeing anything, considered
+among other possible sequences of things that one which he afterwards
+approved. In the idea of this is represented how the first parents sin and
+corrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems the human race; how some,
+aided by such and such graces, attain to final faith and to salvation; and
+how others, with or without such or other graces, do not attain thereto,
+continue in sin, and are damned. God grants his sanction to this sequence
+only after having entered into all its detail, and thus pronounces nothing
+final as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered upon
+everything and compared it with other possible sequences. Thus God's
+pronouncement concerns the whole sequence at the same time; he simply
+decrees its existence. In order to save other men, or in a different way,
+he must needs choose an altogether different sequence, seeing that all is
+connected in each sequence. In this conception of the matter, which is that
+most worthy of the All-wise, all whose actions are connected together to
+the highest possible degree, there would be only one total decree, which is
+to create such a world. This total decree comprises equally all the
+particular decrees, without setting one of them before or after another.
+Yet one may say also that each particular act of antecedent will entering
+into the total result has its value and order, in proportion to the good
+whereto this act inclines. But these acts of antecedent will are not called
+decrees, since they are not yet inevitable, the outcome depending upon the
+total result. According to this conception of things, all the difficulties
+that can here be made amount to the same as those I have already stated and
+removed in my inquiry concerning the origin of evil.
+
+85. There remains only one important matter of discussion, which has its
+peculiar difficulties. It is that of the dispensation of the means and
+circumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation. This comprises
+amongst others the subject of the Aids of Grace (_de auxiliis gratiae_), on
+which Rome (since the Congregation _de Auxiliis_ under Clement VIII, when a
+debate took place between the Dominicans and the Jesuits) does not readily
+permit books to be published. Everyone must agree that God is         [169]
+altogether good and just, that his goodness makes him contribute the least
+possible to that which can render men guilty, and the most possible to that
+which serves to save them (possible, I say, subject to the general order of
+things); that his justice prevents him from condemning innocent men, and
+from leaving good actions without reward; and that he even keeps an exact
+proportion in punishments and rewards. Nevertheless, this idea that one
+should have of the goodness and the justice of God does not appear enough
+in what we know of his actions with regard to the salvation and the
+damnation of men: and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sin
+and its remedies.
+
+86. The first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with original
+sin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on God's part in
+exposing the soul thereto. This difficulty has given rise to three opinions
+on the origin of the soul itself. The first is that of the _pre-existence
+of human souls_ in another world or in another life, where they had sinned
+and on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body, an
+opinion of the Platonists which is attributed to Origen and which even
+to-day finds adherents. Henry More, an English scholar, advocated something
+like this dogma in a book written with that express purpose. Some of those
+who affirm this pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis. The
+younger van Helmont held this opinion, and the ingenious author of some
+metaphysical _Meditations_, published in 1678 under the name of William
+Wander, appears to have some leaning towards it. The second opinion is that
+of _Traduction_, as if the soul of children were engendered (_per
+traducem_) from the soul or souls of those from whom the body is
+engendered. St. Augustine inclined to this judgement the better to explain
+original sin. This doctrine is taught also by most of the theologians of
+the Augsburg Confession. Nevertheless it is not completely established
+among them, since the Universities of Jena and Helmstedt, and others
+besides, have long been opposed to it. The third opinion, and that most
+widely accepted to-day, is that of _Creation_: it is taught in the majority
+of the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with the greatest difficulty in
+respect of original sin.
+
+87. Into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human soul
+has entered the philosophic dispute on _the origin of forms._ Aristotle and
+scholastic philosophy after him called _Form_ that which is a         [170]
+principle of action and is found in that which acts. This inward principle
+is either substantial, being then termed 'Soul', when it is in an organic
+body, or accidental, and customarily termed 'Quality'. The same philosopher
+gave to the soul the generic name of 'Entelechy' or _Act_. This word
+'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the Greek word signifying
+'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed it literally
+in Latin by _perfectihabia_: for Act is a realization of potency. And he
+had no need to consult the Devil, as men say he did, in order to learn
+that. Now the Philosopher of Stagira supposes that there are two kinds of
+Act, the permanent act and the successive act. The permanent or lasting act
+is nothing but the Substantial or Accidental Form: the substantial form (as
+for example the soul) is altogether permanent, at least according to my
+judgement, and the accidental is only so for a time. But the altogether
+momentary act, whose nature is transitory, consists in action itself. I
+have shown elsewhere that the notion of Entelechy is not altogether to be
+scorned, and that, being permanent, it carries with it not only a mere
+faculty for action, but also that which is called 'force', 'effort',
+'conatus', from which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it.
+Faculty is only an _attribute_, or rather sometimes a mode; but force, when
+it is not an ingredient of substance itself (that is, force which is not
+primitive but derivative), is a _quality_, which is distinct and separable
+from substance. I have shown also how one may suppose that the soul is a
+primitive force which is modified and varied by derivative forces or
+qualities, and exercised in actions.
+
+88. Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question
+of the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound of form
+and matter is produced and that the form is only _comproduced_ means
+nothing. The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of
+matter, this being called _Eduction_. That also meant in fact nothing, but
+it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a
+statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This
+comparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the
+case of shape. Some have thought that forms were sent from heaven, and even
+created expressly, when bodies were produced. Julius Scaliger hinted that
+it was possible that forms were rather derived from the active potency of
+the efficient cause (that is to say, either from that of God in the   [171]
+case of Creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation),
+than from the passive potency of matter. And that, in the case of
+generation, meant a return to traduction. Daniel Sennert, a famous doctor
+and physicist at Wittenberg, cherished this opinion, particularly in
+relation to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed. A certain
+Julius Caesar della Galla, an Italian living in the Low Countries, and a
+doctor of Groningen named Johan Freitag wrote with much vehemence in
+opposition to Sennert. Johann Sperling, a professor at Wittenberg, made a
+defence of his master, and finally came into conflict with Johann Zeisold,
+a professor at Jena, who upheld the belief that the human soul is created.
+
+89. But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a
+question of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same with
+accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and
+their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of
+limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quite
+another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whose
+beginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain. Sennert and
+Sperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the indestructibility
+of the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms, although they allowed
+that they were indivisible and immaterial. But the fact is that they
+confused indestructibility with immortality, whereby is understood in the
+case of man that not only the soul but also the personality subsists. In
+saying that the soul of man is immortal one implies the subsistence of what
+makes the identity of the person, something which retains its moral
+qualities, conserving the _consciousness_, or the reflective inward
+feeling, of what it is: thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement or
+reward. But this conservation of personality does not occur in the souls of
+beasts: that is why I prefer to say that they are imperishable rather than
+to call them immortal. Yet this misapprehension appears to have been the
+cause of a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the Thomists and of other
+good philosophers: they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility of
+all souls, without being willing to admit their indestructibility, greatly
+to the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul. John Scot, that is,
+the Scotsman (which formerly signified Hibernian or Erigena), a famous
+writer of the time of Louis the Debonair and of his sons, was for the
+conservation of all souls: and I see not why there should be less     [172]
+objection to making the atoms of Epicurus or of Gassendi endure, than to
+affirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible substances,
+which are the sole and true atoms of Nature. And Pythagoras was right in
+saying generally, as Ovid makes him say:
+
+  _Morte carent animae_.
+
+90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest exceptions
+possible, here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in every sense on
+this important question. I consider that souls and simple substances
+altogether cannot begin except by creation, or end except by annihilation.
+Moreover, as the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable in
+the order of nature only when one assumes a _preformation_ already organic,
+I have thence inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only a
+transformation and augmentation. Thus, since the same body was already
+furnished with organs, it is to be supposed that it was already animate,
+and that it had the same soul: so I assume _vice versa_, from the
+conservation of the soul when once it is created, that the animal is also
+conserved, and that apparent death is only an envelopment, there being no
+likelihood that in the order of nature souls exist entirely separated from
+all body, or that what does not begin naturally can cease through natural
+forces.
+
+91. Considering that so admirable an order and rules so general are
+established in regard to animals, it does not appear reasonable that man
+should be completely excluded from that order, and that everything in
+relation to his soul should come about in him by miracle. Besides I have
+pointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of God's wisdom that all
+should be harmonious in his works, and that nature should be parallel with
+grace. It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human
+souls, like those of other species, have been in the seed, and in the
+progenitors as far back as Adam, and have consequently existed since the
+beginning of things, always in a kind of organic body. On this point it
+seems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, Mr. Pitcairne, M.
+Hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion. This
+doctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of
+M. Leeuwenhoek and other good observers. But it also for divers reasons
+appears likely to me that they existed then as sentient or animal     [173]
+souls only, endowed with perception and feeling, and devoid of reason.
+Further I believe that they remained in this state up to the time of the
+generation of the man to whom they were to belong, but that then they
+received reason, whether there be a natural means of raising a sentient
+soul to the degree of a reasoning soul (a thing I find it difficult to
+imagine) or whether God may have given reason to this soul through some
+special operation, or (if you will) by a kind of _transcreation_. This
+latter is easier to admit, inasmuch as revelation teaches much about other
+forms of immediate operation by God upon our souls. This explanation
+appears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy or
+theology. For the difficulty of the origin of forms thus disappears
+completely; and besides it is much more appropriate to divine justice to
+give the soul, already corrupted _physically_ or on the animal side by the
+sin of Adam, a new perfection which is reason, than to put a reasoning
+soul, by creation or otherwise, in a body wherein it is to be corrupted
+_morally_.
+
+92. Now the soul being once under the domination of sin, and ready to
+commit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason, a
+new question arises, to wit: whether this tendency in a man who has not
+been regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him, even though he should
+never come to commit sin, as may happen, and happens often, whether he die
+before reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before he
+has made use of his reason. St. Gregory of Nazianzos is supposed to have
+denied this (_Orat. de Baptismo_); but St. Augustine is for the
+affirmative, and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient to
+earn the flames of hell, although this opinion is, to say the least, very
+harsh. When I speak here of damnation or of hell, I mean pains, and not
+mere deprivation of supreme felicity; I mean _poenam sensus, non damni_.
+Gregory of Rimini, General of the Augustinians, with a few others followed
+St. Augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of the Schools of his
+time, and for that reason he was called the torturer of children, _tortor
+infantum_. The Schoolmen, instead of sending them into the flames of hell,
+have assigned to them a special Limbo, where they do not suffer, and are
+only punished by privation of the beatific vision. The Revelations of St.
+Birgitta (as they are called), much esteemed in Rome, also uphold this
+dogma. Salmeron and Molina, and before them Ambrose Catharin and      [174]
+others, grant them a certain natural bliss; and Cardinal Sfondrati, a man
+of learning and piety, who approves this, latterly went so far as to prefer
+in a sense their state, which is the state of happy innocence, to that of a
+sinner saved, as we may see in his _Nodus Praedestinationis Solutus_. That,
+however, seems to go too far. Certainly a soul truly enlightened would not
+wish to sin, even though it could by this means obtain all imaginable
+pleasures. But the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simply
+chimerical, and it is better to obtain bliss (even after repentance) than
+to be deprived of it for ever.
+
+93. Many prelates and theologians of France who are well pleased to differ
+from Molina, and to join with St. Augustine, seem to incline towards the
+opinion of this great doctor, who condemns to eternal flames children that
+die in the age of innocence before having received baptism. This is what
+appears from the letter mentioned above, written by five distinguished
+prelates of France to Pope Innocent XII, against that posthumous book by
+Cardinal Sfondrati. But therein they did not venture to condemn the
+doctrine of the purely privative punishment of children dying without
+baptism, seeing it approved by the venerable Thomas Aquinas, and by other
+great men. I do not speak of those who are called on one side Jansenists
+and on the other disciples of St. Augustine, for they declare themselves
+entirely and firmly for the opinion of this Father. But it must be
+confessed that this opinion has not sufficient foundation either in reason
+or in Scripture, and that it is outrageously harsh. M. Nicole makes rather
+a poor apology for it in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, written to
+oppose M. Jurieu, although M. Bayle takes his side in chapter 178 of the
+_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III. M. Nicole makes use of
+this pretext, that there are also other dogmas in the Christian religion
+which appear harsh. On the one hand, however, that does not lead to the
+conclusion that these instances of harshness may be multiplied without
+proof; and on the other we must take into account that the other dogmas
+mentioned by M. Nicole, namely original sin and eternity of punishment, are
+only harsh and unjust to outward appearance, while the damnation of
+children dying without actual sin and without regeneration would in truth
+be harsh, since it would be in effect the damning of innocents. For that
+reason I believe that the party which advocates this opinion will never
+altogether have the upper hand in the Roman Church itself. Evangelical[175]
+theologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this question,
+and to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency of their
+Creator. Nor do we know all the wonderful ways that God may choose to
+employ for the illumination of souls.
+
+94. One may say that those who condemn for original sin alone, and who
+consequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the Covenant,
+fall, in a sense, without being aware of it, into a certain attitude to
+man's inclination and God's foreknowledge which they disapprove in others.
+They will not have it that God should refuse his grace to those whose
+resistance to it he foresees, nor that this expectation and this tendency
+should cause the damnation of these persons: and yet they claim that the
+tendency which constitutes original sin, and in which God foresees that the
+child will sin as soon as he shall reach years of discretion, suffices to
+damn this child beforehand. Those who maintain the one and reject the other
+do not preserve enough uniformity and connexion in their dogmas.
+
+95. There is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reach
+years of discretion and plunge into sin, following the inclination of
+corrupt nature, if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary for
+them to stop on the edge of the precipice, or to drag themselves from the
+abyss wherein they have fallen. For it seems hard to damn them eternally
+for having done that which they had no power to prevent themselves from
+doing. Those that damn even children, who are without discretion, trouble
+themselves even less about adults, and one would say that they have become
+callous through the very expectation of seeing people suffer. But it is not
+the same with other theologians, and I would be rather on the side of those
+who grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away from evil,
+provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this succour, and not
+to reject it voluntarily. The objection is made that there has been and
+still is a countless multitude of men, among civilized peoples and among
+barbarians, who have never had this knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ
+which is necessary for those who would tread the wonted paths to salvation.
+But without excusing them on the plea of a sin purely philosophical, and
+without stopping at a mere penalty of privation, things for which there is
+no opportunity of discussion here, one may doubt the fact: for how do we
+know whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of [176]
+kinds unknown to us? This maxim, _Quod facienti, quod in se est, non
+denegatur gratia necessaria_, appears to me to have eternal truth. Thomas
+Aquinas, Archbishop Bradwardine and others have hinted that, in regard to
+this, something comes to pass of which we are not aware. (Thom. quest. XIV,
+_De Veritate_, artic. XI, ad I et alibi. Bradwardine, _De Causa Dei_, non
+procul ab initio.) And sundry theologians of great authority in the Roman
+Church itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of God above all
+things, when the grace of Jesus Christ arouses it, suffices for salvation.
+Father Francis Xavier answered the Japanese that if their ancestors had
+used well their natural light God would have given them the grace necessary
+for salvation; and the Bishop of Geneva, Francis of Sales, gives full
+approval to this answer (Book 4, _On the Love of God,_ ch. 5).
+
+96. This I pointed out some time ago to the excellent M Pelisson, to show
+him that the Roman Church, going further than the Protestants, does not
+damn utterly those who are outside its communion, and even outside
+Christianity, by using as its only criterion explicit faith. Nor did he
+refute it, properly speaking, in the very kind answer he gave me, and which
+he published in the fourth part of his _Reflexions_, also doing me the
+honour of adding to it my letter. I offered him then for consideration what
+a famous Portuguese theologian, by name Jacques Payva Andradius, envoy to
+the Council of Trent, wrote concerning this, in opposition to Chemnitz,
+during this same Council. And now, without citing many other authors of
+eminence, I will content myself with naming Father Friedrich Spee, the
+Jesuit, one of the most excellent in his Society, who also held this common
+opinion upon the efficacy of the love of God, as is apparent in the preface
+to the admirable book which he wrote in Germany on the Christian virtues.
+He speaks of this observation as of a highly important secret of piety, and
+expatiates with great clearness upon the power of divine love to blot out
+sin, even without the intervention of the Sacraments of the Catholic
+Church, provided one scorn them not, for that would not at all be
+compatible with this love. And a very great personage, whose character was
+one of the most lofty to be found in the Roman Church, was the first to
+make me acquainted with it. Father Spee was of a noble family of Westphalia
+(it may be said in passing) and he died in the odour of sanctity, according
+to the testimony of him who published this book in Cologne with the   [177]
+approval of the Superiors.
+
+97. The memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to persons
+of knowledge and good sense, because he is the author of the book entitled:
+_Cautio Criminalis circa Processus contra Sagas_, which has caused much
+stir, and has been translated into several languages. I learnt from the
+Grand Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, uncle of His Highness
+the present Elector, who walks gloriously in the footsteps of that worthy
+predecessor, the story that follows. That Father was in Franconia when
+there was a frenzy there for burning alleged sorcerers. He accompanied even
+to the pyre many of them, all of whom he recognized as being innocent, from
+their confessions and the researches that he had made thereon. Therefore in
+spite of the danger incurred at that time by one telling the truth in this
+matter, he resolved to compile this work, without however naming himself.
+It bore great fruit and on this matter converted that Elector, at that time
+still a simple canon and afterwards Bishop of Wuerzburg, finally also
+Archbishop of Mainz, who, as soon as he came to power, put an end to these
+burnings. Therein he was followed by the Dukes of Brunswick, and finally by
+the majority of the other princes and states of Germany.
+
+98. This digression appeared to me to be seasonable, because that writer
+deserves to be more widely known. Returning now to the subject I make a
+further observation. Supposing that to-day a knowledge of Jesus Christ
+according to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation, as indeed it
+is safest to teach, it will be possible to say that God will give that
+knowledge to all those who do, humanly speaking, that which in them lies,
+even though God must needs give it by a miracle. Moreover, we cannot know
+what passes in souls at the point of death; and if sundry learned and
+serious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a kind of faith,
+although they do not remember it afterwards when they are questioned about
+it, why should one maintain that nothing of a like nature, or even more
+definite, could come about in the dying, whom we cannot interrogate after
+their death? Thus there are countless paths open to God, giving him means
+of satisfying his justice and his goodness: and the only thing one may
+allege against this is that we know not what way he employs; which is far
+from being a valid objection.
+
+                                                                      [178]
+99. Let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend, but good will.
+They are doubtless not to be excused; but there always remains a great
+difficulty concerning God, since it rested with him to give them this same
+good will. He is the master of wills, the hearts of kings and those of all
+other men are in his hand. Holy Scripture goes so far as to say that God at
+times hardened the wicked in order to display his power by punishing them.
+This hardening is not to be taken as meaning that God inspires men with a
+kind of anti-grace, that is, a kind of repugnance to good, or even an
+inclination towards evil, just as the grace that he gives is an inclination
+towards good. It is rather that God, having considered the sequence of
+things that he established, found it fitting, for superior reasons, to
+permit that Pharaoh, for example, should be in such _circumstances_ as
+should increase his wickedness, and divine wisdom willed to derive a good
+from this evil.
+
+100. Thus it all often comes down to _circumstances_, which form a part of
+the combination of things. There are countless examples of small
+circumstances serving to convert or to pervert. Nothing is more widely
+known than the _Tolle, lege_ (Take and read) cry which St. Augustine heard
+in a neighbouring house, when he was pondering on what side he should take
+among the Christians divided into sects, and saying to himself,
+
+  _Quod vitae sectabor iter?_
+
+This brought him to open at random the book of the Holy Scriptures which he
+had before him, and to read what came before his eyes: and these were words
+which finally induced him to give up Manichaeism. The good Steno, a Dane,
+who was titular Bishop of Titianopolis, Vicar Apostolic (as they say) of
+Hanover and the region around, when there was a Duke Regent of his
+religion, told us that something of that kind had happened to him. He was a
+great anatomist and deeply versed in natural science; but he unfortunately
+gave up research therein, and from being a great physicist he became a
+mediocre theologian. He would almost listen to nothing more about the
+marvels of Nature, and an express order from the Pope _in virtute sanctae
+obedientiae_ was needed to extract from him the observations M. Thevenot
+asked of him. He told us then that what had greatly helped towards inducing
+him to place himself on the side of the Roman Church had been the voice of
+a lady in Florence, who had cried out to him from a window: 'Go not on[179]
+the side where you are about to go, sir, go on the other side.' 'That voice
+struck me,' he told us, 'because I was just meditating upon religion.' This
+lady knew that he was seeking a man in the house where she was, and, when
+she saw him making his way to the other house, wished to point out where
+his friend's room was.
+
+101. Father John Davidius, the Jesuit, wrote a book entitled _Veridicus
+Christianus_, which is like a kind of _Bibliomancy_, where one takes
+passages at random, after the pattern of the _Tolle, lege_ of St.
+Augustine, and it is like a devotional game. But the chances to which, in
+spite of ourselves, we are subject, play only too large a part in what
+brings salvation to men, or removes it from them. Let us imagine twin
+Polish children, the one taken by the Tartars, sold to the Turks, brought
+to apostasy, plunged in impiety, dying in despair; the other saved by some
+chance, falling then into good hands to be educated properly, permeated by
+the soundest truths of religion, exercised in the virtues that it commends
+to us, dying with all the feelings of a good Christian. One will lament the
+misfortune of the former, prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance from
+being saved like his brother, and one will marvel that this slight chance
+should have decided his fate for eternity.
+
+102. Someone will perchance say that God foresaw by mediate knowledge that
+the former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained in
+Poland. There are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind takes
+place. But will it therefore be said that this is a general rule, and that
+not one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have been saved
+if he had been amongst Christians? Would that not be to contradict our
+Lord, who said that Tyre and Sidon would have profited better by his
+preaching, if they had had the good fortune to hear it, than Capernaum?
+
+103. But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge against
+all appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers what a man
+would do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains true that
+God could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable, and given
+him inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmal
+wickedness existing in any soul. I shall be told that God is not bound to
+do so, but that is not enough; it must be added that greater reasons
+prevent him from making all his goodness felt by all. Thus there must [180]
+needs be choice; but I do not think one must seek the reason altogether in
+the good or bad nature of men. For if with some people one assume that God,
+choosing the plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin and
+damnation, has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in
+order to make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficiently
+appear to be a free gift. Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind
+of inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles of
+St. Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason.
+
+104. It is true that there are reasons for God's choice, and the
+consideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs enter
+therein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule
+such as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride of
+men. Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and in a
+more favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be less,
+and that he abandons the rest to their self-will. We may readily suppose
+that this is often the case, and this expedient, among those which make man
+distinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is the farthest
+removed from Pelagianism. But I would not venture, notwithstanding, to make
+of it a universal rule. Moreover, that we may not have cause to vaunt
+ourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for God's
+choice. Those reasons are too diverse to become known to us; and it may be
+that God at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the most
+obstinate resistance, to the end that none may have cause either to despair
+or to be puffed up. St. Paul, as it would seem, had this in mind when he
+offered himself as an example. God, he said, has had mercy upon me, to give
+a great example of his patience.
+
+105. It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequently
+incapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good
+or less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way:
+for there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as the
+Pre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or less inclined towards a
+particular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all in
+accordance with their natural dispositions. But since the general plan of
+the universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes men to be in
+different circumstances, those who meet with such as are more         [181]
+favourable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, the
+most virtuous, the most happy; yet it will be always by aid of the
+influence of that inward grace which God unites with the circumstances.
+Sometimes it even comes to pass, in the progress of human life, that a more
+excellent nature succeeds less, for lack of cultivation or opportunities.
+One may say that men are chosen and ranged not so much according to their
+excellence as according to their conformity with God's plan. Even so it may
+occur that a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in a
+group because it proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap.
+
+106. But, in fine, all these attempts to find reasons, where there is no
+need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make clear
+to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God. All
+the disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all the
+difficulties one may raise for oneself, are no hindrance to a belief
+founded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof, as has
+been shown and will later become more apparent, that there is nothing so
+exalted as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgements, nothing so
+pure as his holiness, and nothing more vast than his goodness.
+
+                                                                      [182]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PART TWO
+
+107. Hitherto I have devoted myself to giving a full and clear exposition
+of this whole subject: and although I have not yet spoken of M. Bayle's
+objections in particular, I have endeavoured to anticipate them, and to
+suggest ways of answering them. But as I have taken upon myself the task of
+meeting them in detail, not only because there will perhaps still be
+passages calling for elucidation, but also because his arguments are
+usually full of wit and erudition, and serve to throw greater light on this
+controversy, it will be well to give an account of the chief objections
+that are dispersed through his works, and to add my answers. At the
+beginning I observed 'that God co-operates in moral evil, and in physical
+evil, and in each of them both morally and physically; and that man
+co-operates therein also morally and physically in a free and active way,
+becoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'. I have shown also
+that each point has its own difficulty; but the greatest of these lies in
+maintaining that God co-operates morally in moral evil, that is, in sin,
+without being the originator of the sin, and even without being accessary
+thereto.
+
+108. He does this by _permitting_ it justly, and by _directing_ it wisely
+towards the good, as I have shown in a manner that appears tolerably
+intelligible. But as it is here principally that M. Bayle undertakes  [183]
+to discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot
+be harmonized with reason, it is also here especially I must show that my
+dogmas are fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, even
+of reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries. He
+has ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his _Reply to the Questions of
+a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 812), where he includes the theological
+doctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophic
+maxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart. Let us
+begin with the theological propositions.
+
+109. I. 'God,' he says, 'the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely good,
+holy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a bliss
+that can never either increase or diminish.' This proposition of M. Bayle's
+is no less philosophical than theological. To say that God possesses a
+'glory' when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of the term. One
+may say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being aware
+of one's own perfections; and in this sense God possesses it always. But
+when glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections, one may
+say that God acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligent
+creatures; even though it be true that God thereby gains no new good, and
+it is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage, when they
+apprehend aright the glory of God.
+
+110. II. 'He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he chose
+from among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased him
+to choose, to give them existence, and to compose the universe of them,
+while he left all the rest in nothingness.' This proposition is also, just
+like the preceding one, in close conformity with that part of philosophy
+which is called natural theology. One must dwell a little on what is said
+here, that he chose the possible beings 'whom it pleased him to choose'.
+For it must be borne in mind that when I say, 'that pleases me', it is as
+though I were saying, 'I find it good'. Thus it is the ideal goodness of
+the object which pleases, and which makes me choose it among many others
+which do not please or which please less, that is to say, which contain
+less of that goodness which moves me. Now it is only the genuinely good
+that is capable of pleasing God: and consequently that which pleases God
+most, and which meets his choice, is the best.
+
+                                                                      [184]
+111. III. 'Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed to
+produce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst other
+favours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but he
+threatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave
+them to abstain from a certain fruit.' This proposition is in part
+revealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that _free
+will_ be understood properly, according to the explanation I have given.
+
+112. IV. 'They ate thereof nevertheless, and thenceforth they were
+condemned, they and all their posterity, to the miseries of this life, to
+temporal death and eternal damnation, and made subject to such a tendency
+to sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and without
+ceasing.' There is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itself
+entailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect, and that
+it was for that very reason, and not by a purely arbitrary decree, that God
+had forbidden it: much as one forbids knives to children. The famous Fludde
+or de Fluctibus, an Englishman, once wrote a book _De Vita, Morte et
+Resurrectione_ under the name of R. Otreb, wherein he maintained that the
+fruit of the forbidden tree was a poison: but we cannot enter into this
+detail. It suffices that God forbade a harmful thing; one must not
+therefore suppose that God acted here simply in the character of a
+legislator who enacts a purely positive law, or of a judge who imposes and
+inflicts a punishment by an order of his will, without any connexion
+between the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. And it is not
+necessary to suppose that God in justifiable annoyance deliberately put a
+corruption in the soul and the body of man, by an extraordinary action, in
+order to punish him: much as the Athenians gave hemlock-juice to their
+criminals. M. Bayle takes the matter thus: he speaks as if the original
+corruption had been put in the soul of the first man by an order and
+operation of God. It is that which calls forth his objection (_Reply to the
+Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1218) 'that reason would
+not commend the monarch who, in order to chastise a rebel, condemned him
+and his descendants to have a tendency towards rebellion'. But this
+chastisement happens naturally to the wicked, without any ordinance of a
+legislator, and they become addicted to evil. If drunkards begot children
+inclined to the same vice, by a natural consequence of what takes place in
+bodies, that would be a punishment of their progenitors, but it would [185]
+not be a penalty of law. There is something comparable to this in the
+consequences of the first man's sin. For the contemplation of divine wisdom
+leads us to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace; and that
+God as an Architect has done all in a manner befitting God considered as a
+Monarch. We do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, or
+that of the action, or its effects, to judge of the details of this matter:
+nevertheless we must do God justice so far as to believe that it comprised
+something other than what painters depict for us.
+
+113. V. 'It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few men
+from this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this life to the
+corruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which enable them to
+obtain the never-ending bliss of paradise.' Many in the past have doubted,
+as I have already observed, whether the number of the damned is so great as
+is generally supposed; and it appears that they believed in the existence
+of some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss. But
+we have no need of these opinions, and it is enough to keep to the ideas
+accepted in the Church. In this connexion it is well to observe that this
+proposition of M. Bayle's is conceived in accordance with the principles of
+sufficient grace, given to all men, and sufficing them provided that they
+have good will. Although M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (as
+he states in the margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with a
+system of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events.
+
+114. VI. 'He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he ordered
+all things and placed them each one in its own place, and he guides and
+controls them continually, according to his pleasure. Thus nothing is done
+without his permission or against his will, and he can prevent, as seems
+good to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, all that does not
+please him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing in the world that
+most offends him and that he most detests; and he can produce in each human
+soul all the thoughts that he approves.' This thesis is also purely
+philosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of natural reason. It is
+opportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on _that which pleases_, to
+dwell here upon _that which seems good_, that is, upon that which God finds
+good to do. He can avoid or put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that does
+not please him'. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of
+his aversion, such as certain evils, and especially sin, which his    [186]
+antecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his consequent
+or decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best,
+which the All-wise must choose after having taken all into account. When
+one says 'that sin offends God most, and that he detests it most', these
+are human ways of speaking. God cannot, properly speaking, be _offended_,
+that is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; and he _detests_
+nothing of that which exists, in the sense that to detest something is to
+look upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust, that
+greatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot suffer either vexation, or
+grief or discomfort; he is always altogether content and at ease. Yet these
+expressions in their true sense are justified. The supreme goodness of God
+causes his antecedent will to repel all evil, but moral evil more than any
+other: it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons, and
+with great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage. It
+is true also that God could produce in each human soul all the thoughts
+that he approves: but this would be to act by miracles, more than his most
+perfectly conceived plan admits.
+
+115. VII. 'He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to
+accept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminal
+than they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he assures them
+that it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does not give them
+the grace which he knows they would accept.' It is true that these people
+become more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered them
+nothing, and that God knows this. Yet it is better to permit their crime
+than to act in a way which would render God himself blameworthy, and
+provide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it was
+not possible for them to do better, even though they had or might have
+wished it. God desires that they receive such grace from him as they are
+fit to receive, and that they accept it; and he desires to give them in
+particular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees: but it is
+always by a will antecedent, detached or particular, which cannot always be
+carried out in the general plan of things. This thesis also is among the
+number of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation, like
+three others of the seven that we have just stated here, the third, fourth
+and fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary.
+
+                                                                      [187]
+116. Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle opposes to
+the seven theological propositions.
+
+I. 'As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a bliss
+that can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone has
+determined him to create this universe: neither the ambition to be praised,
+nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and his
+glory, has had any part therein.' This maxim is very good: praises of God
+do him no service, but they are of service to the men who praise him, and
+he desired their good. Nevertheless, when one says that _goodness_ alone
+determined God to create this universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESS
+prompted him _antecedently_ to create and to produce all possible good; but
+that his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to select the best
+_consequently_; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry out
+_actually_ the great design which he had formed.
+
+117. II. 'The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, and
+would not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater than
+this. This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his other
+perfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc., they must be the
+greatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections of the
+_Judgement on Methods_, where he argues constantly upon this principle, as
+upon a primary notion. See also in Wittich, _De Providentia Dei_, n. 12,
+these words of St. Augustine, lib. I, _De Doctrina Christiana_, c. 7: "Cum
+cogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atque
+sublimius. Et paulo post: Nec quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat
+esse, quo melius aliquid est.")'
+
+This maxim is altogether to my liking, and I draw from it this conclusion,
+that God does the very best possible: otherwise the exercise of his
+goodness would be restricted, and that would be restricting his _goodness_
+itself, if it did not prompt him to the best, if he were lacking in good
+will. Or again it would be restricting his _wisdom_ and his _power_, if he
+lacked the knowledge necessary for discerning the best and for finding the
+means to obtain it, or if he lacked the strength necessary for employing
+these means. There is, however, ambiguity in the assertion that love of
+virtue and hatred of vice are infinite in God: if that were absolutely and
+unreservedly true, in practice there would be no vice in the world. But
+although each one of God's perfections is infinite in itself, it is
+exercised only in proportion to the object and as the nature of things
+prompts it. Thus love of the best in the whole carries the day over   [188]
+all other individual inclinations or hatreds; it is the only impulse whose
+very exercise is absolutely infinite, nothing having power to prevent God
+from declaring himself for the best; and some vice being combined with the
+best possible plan, God permits it.
+
+118. III. 'An infinite goodness having guided the Creator in the production
+of the world, all the characteristics of knowledge, skill, power and
+greatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the happiness of
+intelligent creatures. He wished to show forth his perfections only to the
+end that creatures of this kind should find their felicity in the
+knowledge, the admiration and the love of the Supreme Being.'
+
+This maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact. I grant that the happiness
+of intelligent creatures is the principal part of God's design, for they
+are most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can prove that to
+be his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must serve the realm
+of grace: but, since all is connected in God's great design, we must
+believe that the realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that of
+nature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty, to render the
+combination of the two the most perfect that can be. And there is no reason
+to suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, would
+reverse the whole order of nature. Each perfection or imperfection in the
+creature has its value, but there is none that has an infinite value. Thus
+the moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does not
+infinitely exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical, namely
+that which lies in the perfection of the other creatures; and yet one would
+be bound to say this if the present maxim were strictly true. When God
+justified to the Prophet Jonah the pardon that he had granted to the
+inhabitants of Nineveh, he even touched upon the interest of the beasts who
+would have been involved in the ruin of this great city. No substance is
+absolutely contemptible or absolutely precious before God. And the abuse or
+the exaggerated extension of the present maxim appears to be in part the
+source of the difficulties that M. Bayle puts forward. It is certain that
+God sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be
+said with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the
+whole of lion-kind. Even should that be so, it would by no means follow
+that the interest of a certain number of men would prevail over the   [189]
+consideration of a general disorder diffused through an infinite number of
+creatures. This opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhat
+discredited maxim, that all is made solely for man.
+
+119. IV. 'The benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable of
+felicity tend only to their happiness. He therefore does not permit that
+these should serve to make them unhappy, and, if the wrong use that they
+made of them were capable of destroying them, he would give them sure means
+of always using them well. Otherwise they would not be true benefits, and
+his goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of in another
+benefactor. (I mean, in a Cause that united with its gifts the sure skill
+to make good use of them.)'
+
+There already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim. It is
+not strictly true (though it appear plausible) that the benefits God
+imparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to their
+happiness. All is connected in Nature; and if a skilled artisan, an
+engineer, an architect, a wise politician often makes one and the same
+thing serve several ends, if he makes a double hit with a single throw,
+when that can be done conveniently, one may say that God, whose wisdom and
+power are perfect, does so always. That is husbanding the ground, the time,
+the place, the material, which make up as it were his outlay. Thus God has
+more than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rational
+creatures is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his whole aim,
+nor even his final aim. Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some
+of these creatures may come about _by concomitance_, and as a result of
+other greater goods: this I have already explained, and M. Bayle has to
+some extent acknowledged it. The goods as such, considered in themselves,
+are the object of the antecedent will of God. God will produce as much
+reason and knowledge in the universe as his plan can admit. One can
+conceive of a mean between an antecedent will altogether pure and
+primitive, and a consequent and final will. The _primitive antecedent will_
+has as its object each good and each evil in itself, detached from all
+combination, and tends to advance the good and prevent the evil. The
+_mediate will_ relates to combinations, as when one attaches a good to an
+evil: then the will will have some tendency towards this combination when
+the good exceeds the evil therein. But the _final and decisive will_
+results from consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enter
+into our deliberation, it results from a total combination. This shows[190]
+that a mediate will, although it may in a sense pass as consequent in
+relation to a pure and primitive antecedent will, must be considered
+antecedent in relation to the final and decretory will. God gives reason to
+the human race; misfortunes arise thence by concomitance. His pure
+antecedent will tends towards giving reason, as a great good, and
+preventing the evils in question. But when it is a question of the evils
+that accompany this gift which God has made to us of reason, the compound,
+made up of the combination of reason and of these evils, will be the object
+of a mediate will of God, which will tend towards producing or preventing
+this compound, according as the good or the evil prevails therein. But even
+though it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men (which,
+however, I do not admit), whereupon the mediate will of God would discard
+it with all its concomitants, it might still be the case that it was more
+in accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men,
+notwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have with
+reference to them. Consequently, the final will or the decree of God,
+resulting from all the considerations he can have, would be to give it to
+them. And, far from being subject to blame for this, he would be
+blameworthy if he did not so. Thus the evil, or the mixture of goods and
+evils wherein the evil prevails, happens only _by concomitance_, because it
+is connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture. This
+mixture, therefore, or this compound, is not to be conceived as a grace or
+as a gift from God to us; but the good that is found mingled therein will
+nevertheless be good. Such is God's gift of reason to those who make ill
+use thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the combination of this
+good with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard
+to those who in consequence thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be by
+concomitance, because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe.
+And it is doubtless that which prompted God to give reason to those who
+have made it an instrument of their unhappiness. Or, to put it more
+precisely, in accordance with my system God, having found among the
+possible beings some rational creatures who misuse their reason, gave
+existence to those who are included in the best possible plan of the
+universe. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goods
+which turn into evil by the fault of men, this often happening to men in
+just punishment of the misuse they had made of God's grace. Aloysius  [191]
+Novarinus wrote a book _De Occultis Dei Beneficiis_: one could write one
+_De Occultis Dei Poenis_. This saying of Claudian would be in place here
+with regard to some persons:
+
+      _Tolluntur in altum,_ _Ut lapsu graviore ruant_.
+
+But to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will will
+abuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or again to
+say that he should give certain means for preventing it, contrary to this
+same general order: that is to wish (as I have observed already) that God
+himself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so. To
+object, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be smaller than
+that of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift, is to
+overlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by a
+single benefit. It may well be that a gift from a private person is greater
+than one from a prince, but the gifts of this private person all taken
+together will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all together. Thus one
+can esteem fittingly the good things done by God only when one considers
+their whole extent by relating them to the entire universe. Moreover, one
+may say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are the
+gifts of an enemy, [Greek: hechthron dora adora],
+
+    _Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis._
+
+But that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them, as
+there was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good to people
+in order to give them the means of destroying themselves. His design was
+evil, but God's design cannot be better than it is. Must God spoil his
+system, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe,
+because there are people who misuse reason? The common sayings are in place
+here: _Abusus non tollit usum_; there is _scandalum datum et scandalum
+acceptum_.
+
+120. V. 'A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent gifts
+upon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use that will
+destroy them. It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good Being to
+give to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, they would
+make a use that would render them unhappy. Therefore if he gives them free
+will he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely, and
+permits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any         [192]
+conjuncture; and if there were no sure means of determining the good use of
+this free will, he would rather take from them this faculty, than allow it
+to be the cause of their unhappiness. That is the more manifest, as free
+will is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without their
+asking for it; so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness it
+would bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to their
+importunate prayers.'
+
+What was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to be
+repeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim. Moreover,
+the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third,
+stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God. If
+that were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur, even by
+concomitance. God would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all these
+evils would be excluded. But God would fail in what is due to the universe,
+that is, in what he owes to himself. If there were only spirits they would
+be without the required connexion, without the order of time and place.
+This order demands matter, movement and its laws; to adjust these to
+spirits in the best possible way means to return to our world. When one
+looks at things only in the mass, one imagines to be practicable a thousand
+things that cannot properly take place. To wish that God should not give
+free will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of these
+creatures; and to wish that God should prevent them from misusing it is to
+wish that there be none but these creatures alone, together with what was
+made for them only. If God had none but these creatures in view, he would
+doubtless prevent them from destroying themselves. One may say in a sense,
+however, that God has given to these creatures the art of always making
+good use of their free will, for the natural light of reason is this art.
+But it would be necessary always to have the will to do good, and often
+creatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have;
+often they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a
+good will. Of this I have already spoken more than once. This fault must be
+admitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have been
+able to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing to
+prevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be always
+to have good will. But I reply that it is not necessary, and that it was
+not feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection,[193]
+and such as would bring them so close to the Divinity. It may even be that
+that can only be made possible by a special divine grace. But in this case,
+would it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to act
+miraculously in respect of all rational creatures? Nothing would be less
+rational than these perpetual miracles. There are degrees among creatures:
+the general order requires it. And it appears quite consistent with the
+order of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in the
+good should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when they
+were in a more imperfect state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage,
+_in Ecclesia militante, in statu viatorum_. The good angels themselves were
+not created incapable of sin. Nevertheless I would not dare to assert that
+there are no blessed creatures born, or such as are sinless and holy by
+their nature. There are perhaps people who give this privilege to the
+Blessed Virgin, since, moreover, the Roman Church to-day places her above
+the angels. But it suffices us that the universe is very great and very
+varied: to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof. 'But', M.
+Bayle goes on, 'God has given free will to creatures capable of sinning,
+without their having asked him for this grace. And he who gave such a gift
+would be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought upon those who
+made use of it, than if he had granted it only in response to their
+importunate prayers.' But importunity in prayers makes no difference to
+God; he knows better than we what we need, and he only grants what serves
+the interest of the whole. It seems that M. Bayle here makes free will
+consist in the faculty for sinning; yet he acknowledges elsewhere that God
+and the Saints are free, without having this faculty. However that may be,
+I have already shown fully that God, doing what his wisdom and his goodness
+combined ordain, is not answerable for the evil that he permits. Even men,
+when they do their duty, are not answerable for consequences, whether they
+foresee them or not.
+
+121. VI. 'It is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a silk
+cord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to strangle
+himself, as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body. One desires his
+death not less when one makes use of the first way, than when one employs
+the second: it even seems as though one desires it with a more malicious
+intention, since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the whole
+blame of his destruction.'
+
+                                                                      [194]
+Those who write treatises on Duties (De Officiis) as, for instance, Cicero,
+St. Ambrose, Grotius, Opalenius, Sharrok, Rachelius, Pufendorf, as well as
+the Casuists, teach that there are cases where one is not obliged to return
+to its owner a thing deposited: for example, one will not give back a
+dagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is about to stab
+someone. Let us pretend that I have in my hands the fatal draught that
+Meleager's mother will make use of to kill him; the magic javelin that
+Cephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his Procris; the horses of Theseus
+that will tear to pieces Hippolytus, his son: these things are demanded
+back from me, and I am right in refusing them, knowing the use that will be
+made of them. But how will it be if a competent judge orders me to restore
+them, when I cannot prove to him what I know of the evil consequences that
+restitution will have, Apollo perchance having given to me, as to
+Cassandra, the gift of prophecy under the condition that I shall not be
+believed? I should then be compelled to make restitution, having no
+alternative other than my own destruction: thus I cannot escape from
+contributing towards the evil. Another comparison: Jupiter promises Semele,
+the Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to grant whatever favour the other shall ask.
+They swear by the Styx,
+
+  _Di cujus jurare timent et fallere Numen_.
+
+One would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard,
+
+              _Voluit Deus ora loquentis_
+  _Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras_.
+
+One would gladly draw back after the request was made, making vain
+remonstrances; but they press you, they say to you: 'Do you make oaths that
+you will not keep?' The law of the Styx is inviolable, one must needs
+submit to it; if one has erred in making the oath, one would err more in
+not keeping it; the promise must be fulfilled, however harmful it may be to
+him who exacts it. It would be ruinous to you if you did not fulfil it. It
+seems as though the moral of these fables implies that a supreme necessity
+may constrain one to comply with evil. God, in truth, knows no other judge
+that can compel him to give what may turn to evil, he is not like Jupiter
+who fears the Styx. But his own wisdom is the greatest judge that he can
+find, there is no appeal from its judgements: they are the decrees of
+destiny. The eternal verities, objects of his wisdom, are more        [195]
+inviolable than the Styx. These laws and this judge do not constrain: they
+are stronger, for they persuade. Wisdom only shows God the best possible
+exercise of his goodness: after that, the evil that occurs is an inevitable
+result of the best. I will add something stronger: To permit the evil, as
+God permits it, is the greatest goodness.
+
+  _Si mala sustulerat, non erat ille bonus._
+
+One would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this that it
+is more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the whole blame
+of his destruction. When God does leave it to a man, it has belonged to him
+since before his existence; it was already in the idea of him as still
+merely possible, before the decree of God which makes him to exist. Can
+one, then, leave it or give it to another? There is the whole matter.
+
+122. VII. 'A true benefactor gives promptly, and does not wait to give
+until those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of what
+he could have imparted to them at first very easily, and without causing
+any inconvenience to himself. If the limitation of his forces does not
+permit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other inconvenience,
+he acquiesces in this, but only regretfully, and he never employs this way
+of rendering service when he can render it without mingling any kind of
+evil in his favours. If the profit one could derive from the evils he
+inflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good as from those
+evils, he would take the straight road of unalloyed good, and not the
+indirect road that would lead from the evil to the good. If he showers
+riches and honours, it is not to the end that those who have enjoyed them,
+when they come to lose them, should be all the more deeply afflicted in
+proportion to their previous experience of pleasure, and that thus they
+should become more unhappy than the persons who have always been deprived
+of these advantages. A malicious being would shower good things at such a
+price upon the people for whom he had the most hatred.'
+
+(Compare this passage of Aristotle, _Rhetor._, 1. 2, c. 23, p. m. 446:
+[Greek: hoion ei doie an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipesei; hothen kai
+tout' eiretai,]
+
+  [Greek: pollois ho daimon ou kat' eunoian pheron]
+  [Greek: Megala didosin eutychemat', all' hina]
+  [Greek: tas symphoras labosin epiphanesteras.]
+
+                                                                      [196]
+Id est: Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) erepto
+(ipsum) afficiat dolore. Unde etiam illud est dictum:
+
+  _Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus,_
+  _Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo._)
+
+All these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change and
+mutilate the fact, they only half record things: God has care for men, he
+loves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true. Yet he allows men
+to fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods that tend
+towards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it is after
+many sufferings: where is his affection, where is his goodness or again
+where is his power? Vain objections, which suppress the main point, which
+ignore the fact that it is of God one speaks. It is as though one were
+speaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose well-nigh only care is
+concerned with the upbringing, the preservation, the happiness of the
+person in question, and who neglect their duty. God takes care of the
+universe, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best on the whole. If in
+spite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it behoved him to be so.
+God (so they say) could have given happiness to all, he could have given it
+promptly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience, for he
+can do all. But should he? Since he does not so, it is a sign that he had
+to act altogether differently. If we infer from this either that God only
+regretfully, and owing to lack of power, fails to make men happy and to
+give the good first of all and without admixture of evil, or else that he
+lacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all, then we
+are comparing our true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with
+the demon of the poet whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have just
+translated into Latin, who gives good things in order that he may cause
+more affliction by taking them away. That would be trifling with God in
+perpetual anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must give
+himself up completely to one particular business, whose goodness must be
+chiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and who
+lacks either aptitude or good will. God is not lacking therein, he could do
+the good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but
+he must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to
+it. Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually   [197]
+one attains salvation only through many sufferings, and by bearing the
+cross of Jesus Christ. These evils serve to make the elect imitators of
+their master, and to increase their happiness.
+
+123. VIII. 'The greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is the
+master of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue, order, peace,
+contentment of mind. The glory that he would derive from their unhappiness
+can be nothing but a false glory.'
+
+If we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the most
+perfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign there,
+as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; that sin
+and unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons
+of the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there in
+comparison with the good, and even are of service for greater good. Now
+since these evils were to exist, there must needs be some appointed to be
+subject to them, and we are those people. If it were others, would there
+not be the same appearance of evil? Or rather, would not these others be
+those known as We? When God derives some glory from the evil through having
+made it serve a greater good, it was proper that he should derive that
+glory. It is not therefore a false glory, as would be that of a prince who
+overthrew his state in order to have the honour of setting it up again.
+
+124. IX. 'The way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love for
+virtue is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised without any
+mixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure for his subjects this
+advantage, and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head, save that he
+punishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection for
+virtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not infinite.'
+
+I am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am weary
+of refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multiplies
+unnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If things
+connected together may be separated, the parts from their whole, the human
+kind from the universe, God's attributes the one from the other, power from
+wisdom, it may be said that God _can cause_ virtue to be in the world
+without any mixture of vice, and even that he can do so _easily_. But,
+since he has permitted vice, it must be that that order of the universe
+which was found preferable to every other plan required it. One must
+believe that it is not permitted to do otherwise, since it is not     [198]
+possible to do better. It is a hypothetical necessity, a moral necessity,
+which, far from being contrary to freedom, is the effect of its choice.
+_Quae rationi contraria sunt, ea nec fieri a Sapiente posse credendum est_.
+The objection is made here, that God's affection for virtue is therefore
+not the greatest which can be conceived, that it is not _infinite_. To that
+an answer has already been given on the second maxim, in the assertion that
+God's affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to the
+value of the thing. Virtue is the noblest quality of created things, but it
+is not the only good quality of creatures. There are innumerable others
+which attract the inclination of God: from all these inclinations there
+results the most possible good, and it turns out that if there were only
+virtue, if there were only rational creatures, there would be less good.
+Midas proved to be less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdom
+must vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity,
+and poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in one's library,
+always to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break all
+the china in order only to have cups of gold, to have only diamond buttons,
+to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only Hungarian or Shiraz
+wine--would one call that reason? Nature had need of animals, plants,
+inanimate bodies; there are in these creatures, devoid of reason, marvels
+which serve for exercise of the reason. What would an intelligent creature
+do if there were no unintelligent things? What would it think of, if there
+were neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had only distinct
+thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: that is one
+of the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a mixture of confused
+thoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these confused thoughts come
+from the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration and
+extent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational creature
+without some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely detached
+from matter. But these organic bodies vary no less in perfection than the
+spirits to which they belong. Therefore, since God's wisdom must have a
+world of bodies, a world of substances capable of perception and incapable
+of reason; since, in short, it was necessary to choose from all the things
+possible what produced the best effect together, and since vice entered in
+by this door, God would not have been altogether good, altogether wise if
+he had excluded it.
+
+                                                                      [199]
+125. X. 'The way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed to
+allow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it, but to crush it
+before its birth, that is, prevent it from showing itself anywhere. A king,
+for example, who put his finances in such good order that no malversation
+was ever committed, would thus display more hatred for the wrong done by
+factionaries than if, after having suffered them to batten on the blood of
+the people, he had them hanged.'
+
+It is always the same song, it is anthropomorphism pure and simple. A king
+should generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his subjects free
+from oppression. One of his greatest interests is to bring good order into
+his finances. Nevertheless there are times when he is obliged to tolerate
+vice and disorders. He has a great war on his hands, he is in a state of
+exhaustion, he has no choice of generals, it is necessary to humour those
+he has, those possessed of great authority with the soldiers: a Braccio, a
+Sforza, a Wallenstein. He lacks money for the most pressing needs, it is
+necessary to turn to great financiers, who have an established credit, and
+he must at the same time connive at their malversations. It is true that
+this unfortunate necessity arises most often from previous errors. It is
+not the same with God: he has need of no man, he commits no error, he
+always does the best. One cannot even wish that things may go better, when
+one understands them: and it would be a vice in the Author of things if he
+wished to change anything whatsoever in them, if he wished to exclude the
+vice that was found there. Is this State with perfect government, where
+good is willed and performed as far as it is possible, where evil even
+serves the greatest good, comparable with the State of a prince whose
+affairs are in ruin and who escapes as best he can? Or with that of a
+prince who encourages oppression in order to punish it, and who delights to
+see the little men with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds?
+
+126. XI. 'A ruler devoted to the interests of virtue, and to the good of
+his subjects, takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey his
+laws; and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience, he sees to
+it that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil, and restores in
+their soul a strong and constant tendency towards good: so far is he from
+any desire that the penalty for the error should incline them more and more
+towards evil.'
+
+                                                                      [200]
+To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be done
+on his side without detriment to what is due. The most usual aim of
+punishment is amendment; but it is not the sole aim, nor that which God
+always intends. I have said a word on that above. Original sin, which
+disposes men towards evil, is not merely a penalty for the first sin; it is
+a natural consequence thereof. On that too a word has been said, in the
+course of an observation on the fourth theological proposition. It is like
+drunkenness, which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the same
+time a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins.
+
+127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whether
+it be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be committed.'
+
+By no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if
+they turned all their efforts in that direction? But other more important
+cares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve upon adjusting
+irregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a great war. And the
+action of an English Parliament in this direction a little before the Peace
+of Ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated. Can one conclude from this
+that the State has no anxiety about this irregularity, or even that it
+desires it? God has a far stronger reason, and one far more worthy of him,
+for tolerating evils. Not only does he derive from them greater goods, but
+he finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that are
+possible: so that it would be a fault not to permit them.
+
+128. XIII. 'It is a very great fault in those who govern, if they do not
+care whether there be disorder in their States or not. The fault is still
+greater if they wish and even desire disorder there. If by hidden and
+indirect, but infallible, ways they stirred up a sedition in their States
+to bring them to the brink of ruin, in order to gain for themselves the
+glory of showing that they have the courage and the prudence necessary for
+saving a great kingdom on the point of perishing, they would be most
+deserving of condemnation. But if they stirred up this sedition because
+there were no other means than that, of averting the total ruin of their
+subjects and of strengthening on new foundations, and for several
+centuries, the happiness of nations, one must needs lament the unfortunate
+necessity (see above, pp. 146, 147, what has been said of the force of[201]
+necessity) to which they were reduced, and praise them for the use that
+they made thereof.'
+
+This maxim, with divers others set forth here, is not applicable to the
+government of God. Not to mention the fact that it is only the disorders of
+a very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in objection, it is
+untrue that he has no anxiety about evils, that he desires them, that he
+brings them into being, to have the glory of allaying them. God wills order
+and good; but it happens sometimes that what is disorder in the part is
+order in the whole. I have already stated this legal axiom: _Incivile est
+nisi tota lege inspecta judicare_. The permission of evils comes from a
+kind of moral necessity: God is constrained to this by his wisdom and by
+his goodness; _this necessity is happy_, whereas that of the prince spoken
+of in the maxim is _unhappy_. His State is one of the most corrupt; and the
+government of God is the best State possible.
+
+129. XIV. 'The permission of a certain evil is only excusable when one
+cannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil; but it cannot be
+excusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against this
+evil, and against all the other evils that could spring from the
+suppression of this one.'
+
+The maxim is true, but it cannot be brought forward against the government
+of God. Supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil. If God chose what
+would not be the best absolutely and in all, that would be a greater evil
+than all the individual evils which he could prevent by this means. This
+wrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his goodness.
+
+130. XV. 'The Being infinitely powerful, Creator of matter and of spirits,
+makes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits. There is no
+situation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits. If he then
+permitted a physical or a moral evil, this would not be for the reason that
+otherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil would be
+altogether inevitable. None of those reasons for the mixture of good and
+evil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of benefactors can
+apply to him.'
+
+It is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; but
+he is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble only
+that which he judges to be the best, and who judges well. God makes of
+matter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of spirits the
+most excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and above all that,
+he establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies,     [202]
+according to the system I have proposed. Now since physical evil and moral
+evil occur in this perfect work, one must conclude (contrary to M. Bayle's
+assurance here) that _otherwise a still greater evil would have been
+altogether inevitable_. This great evil would be that God would have chosen
+ill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen. It is true that God is
+infinitely powerful; but his power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdom
+combined determine him to produce the best. M. Bayle makes elsewhere an
+objection which is peculiar to him, which he derives from the opinions of
+the modern Cartesians. They say that God could have given to souls what
+thoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to the
+body: by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which
+only spring from derangement of the body. More will be said of this later;
+now it is sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a system
+ill-connected and full of dissonances. It is to some extent the nature of
+souls to represent bodies.
+
+131. XVI. 'One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings it
+about in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways. A
+Minister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply by
+utilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all their
+plots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less than
+if he destroyed it by a surprise attack.'
+
+I have nothing to say against this maxim. Evil is always attributed to
+moral causes, and not always to physical causes. Here I observe simply that
+if I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself,
+I should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be accessary
+thereto, or its moral cause. In God, every fault would represent a sin; it
+would be even more than sin, for it would destroy Divinity. And it would be
+a great fault in him not to choose the best. I have said so many times. He
+would then prevent sin by something worse than all sins.
+
+132. XVII. 'It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, or
+employ a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be
+determined. If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to
+ignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will be
+disposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning, I shall be just as much
+the cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as I
+should be in assuming, as is the case, that it is a necessary cause.  [203]
+For where I am concerned it would no longer be a free cause. I should be
+catching it at the moment when I knew it to be necessitated by its own
+choice. It is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with regard
+to that to which it is already determined, and at the time when it is
+determined thereto. All that which exists exists of necessity while it
+exists. [Greek: To einai to on hotan ei, kai to me einai hotan me ei,
+ananke.] "Necesse est id quod est, quando est, esse; et id quod non est,
+quando non est, non esse": Arist., _De Interpret._, cap. 9. The Nominalists
+have adopted this maxim of Aristotle. Scotus and sundry other Schoolmen
+appear to reject it, but fundamentally their distinctions come to the same
+thing. See the Jesuits of Coimbra on this passage from Aristotle, p. 380
+_et seq._)'
+
+This maxim may pass also; I would wish only to change something in the
+phraseology. I would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the same
+thing, and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis. One is
+never altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise; one is
+always more inclined and consequently more determined on one side than on
+another: but one is never necessitated to the choice that one makes. I mean
+here a _necessity_ absolute and metaphysical; for it must be admitted that
+God, that wisdom, is prompted to the best by a _moral_ necessity. It must
+be admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypothetical
+necessity, when one actually makes the choice; and even before one is
+necessitated thereto by the very truth of the futurition, since one will do
+it. These hypothetical necessities do no harm. I have spoken sufficiently
+on this point already.
+
+133. XVIII. 'When a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion, it
+is not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part, and to kill
+all the rest, not excepting even babes and sucklings.'
+
+It seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times more
+damned than saved, and that children dying unbaptized are included among
+the former. Both these points are disputed, and especially the damnation of
+these children. I have spoken of this above. M. Bayle urges the same
+objection elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,
+ch. 178, p. 1223): 'We see clearly', he says, 'that the Sovereign who
+wishes to exercise both justice and clemency when a city has revolted must
+be content with the punishment of a small number of mutineers, and    [204]
+pardon all the rest. For if the number of those who are chastised is as a
+thousand to one, in comparison with those whom he freely pardons, he cannot
+be accounted mild, but, on the contrary, cruel. He would assuredly be
+accounted an abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration,
+and if he eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men would
+prefer death to a miserable life; and if, finally, the desire to take
+revenge were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn to
+the service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almost
+all the rebels. Criminals who are executed are considered to expiate their
+crimes so completely by the loss of their life, that the public requires
+nothing more, and is indignant when executioners are clumsy. These would be
+stoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated strokes of the axe;
+and the judges who are present at the execution would not be immune from
+danger if they were thought to take pleasure in this evil sport of the
+executioners, and to have surreptitiously urged them to practise it.' (Note
+that this is not to be understood as strictly universal. There are cases
+where the people approve of the slow killing of certain criminals, as when
+Francis I thus put to death some persons accused of heresy after the
+notorious Placards of 1534. No pity was shown to Ravaillac, who was
+tortured in divers horrible ways. See the _French Mercury_, vol. I, fol.
+m., 455 _et seq._ See also Pierre Matthieu in his _History of the Death of
+Henry IV_; and do not forget what he says on page m. 99 concerning the
+discussion by the judges with regard to the torture of this parricide.)
+'Finally it is an exceptionally notorious fact that Rulers who should be
+guided by St. Paul, I mean who should condemn to the extreme penalty all
+those whom he condemns to eternal death, would be accounted enemies of the
+human kind and destroyers of their communities. It is incontestable that
+their laws, far from being fitted, in accordance with the aim of
+legislators, to uphold society, would be its complete ruin. (Apply here
+these words of Pliny the Younger, _Epist._, 22, lib. 8: Mandemus memoriae
+quod vir mitissimus, et ob hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea crebro dicere
+solebat, Qui vitia odit, homines odit.)' He adds that it was said of the
+laws of Draco, an Athenian lawgiver, that they had not been written with
+ink, but with blood, because they punished all sins with the extreme
+penalty, and because damnation is a penalty even worse than death. But it
+must be borne in mind that damnation is a consequence of sin. Thus I  [205]
+once answered a friend, who raised as an objection the disproportion
+existing between an eternal punishment and a limited crime, that there is
+no injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result of
+the continuation of the sin. I will speak further on this point later. As
+for the number of the damned, even though it should be incomparably greater
+among men than the number of the saved, that would not preclude the
+possibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely outnumber
+those who are unhappy. Such examples as that of a prince who punishes only
+the leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment decimated, are of
+no importance here. Self-interest compels the prince and the general to
+pardon the guilty, even though they should remain wicked. God only pardons
+those who become better: he can distinguish them; and this severity is more
+consistent with perfect justice. But if anyone asks why God gives not to
+all the grace of conversion, the question is of a different nature, having
+no relation to the present maxim. I have already answered it in a sense,
+not in order to find God's reasons, but to show that he cannot lack such,
+and that there are no opposing reasons of any validity. Moreover, we know
+that sometimes whole cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to the
+sword, to inspire terror in the rest. That may serve to shorten a great war
+or a rebellion, and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding of
+it: there is no decimation there. We cannot assert, indeed, that the wicked
+of our globe are punished so severely in order to intimidate the
+inhabitants of the other globes and to make them better. Yet an abundance
+of reasons in the universal harmony which are unknown to us, because we
+know not sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of the
+general republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, may
+produce the same effect.
+
+134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable of
+curing a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would take
+with enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take,
+would vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it; we should still have just
+cause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him: for if they wished
+to do so, they would choose for him among those good medicines one which
+they knew he would willingly swallow. If, moreover, they knew that
+rejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his sickness to[206]
+the point of making it fatal, one could not help saying that, despite all
+their exhortations, they must certainly be desirous of the sick man's
+death.'
+
+God wishes to save all men: that means that he would save them if men
+themselves did not prevent it, and did not refuse to receive his grace; and
+he is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil will.
+He does so sometimes nevertheless, when superior reasons allow of it, and
+when his consequent and decretory will, which results from all his reasons,
+makes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of men. He gives
+aids to all for their conversion and for perseverance, and these aids
+suffice in those who have good will, but they do not always suffice to give
+good will. Men obtain this good will either through particular aids or
+through circumstances which cause the success of the general aids. God
+cannot refrain from offering other remedies which he knows men will reject,
+bringing upon themselves all the greater guilt: but shall one wish that God
+be unjust in order that man may be less criminal? Moreover, the grace that
+does not serve the one may serve the other, and indeed always serves the
+totality of God's plan, which is the best possible in conception. Shall God
+not give the rain, because there are low-lying places which will be thereby
+incommoded? Shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world in
+general, because there are places which will be too much dried up in
+consequence? In short, all these comparisons, spoken of in these maxims
+that M. Bayle has just given, of a physician, a benefactor, a minister of
+State, a prince, are exceedingly lame, because it is well known what their
+duties are and what can and ought to be the object of their cares: they
+have scarce more than the one affair, and they often fail therein through
+negligence or malice. God's object has in it something infinite, his cares
+embrace the universe: what we know thereof is almost nothing, and we desire
+to gauge his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge. What temerity, or
+rather what absurdity! The objections are on false assumptions; it is
+senseless to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know the
+matter of fact. To say with St. Paul, _O altitudo divitiarum et
+sapientiae,_ is not renouncing reason, it is rather employing the reasons
+that we know, for they teach us that immensity of God whereof the Apostle
+speaks. But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and we
+acknowledge, moreover, before we see it, that God does all the best   [207]
+possible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his actions.
+It is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this,
+when we see something entire, some whole complete in itself, and isolated,
+so to speak, among the works of God. Such a whole, shaped as it were by the
+hand of God, is a plant, an animal, a man. We cannot wonder enough at the
+beauty and the contrivance of its structure. But when we see some broken
+bone, some piece of animal's flesh, some sprig of a plant, there appears to
+be nothing but confusion, unless an excellent anatomist observe it: and
+even he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen like
+pieces attached to their whole. It is the same with the government of God:
+that which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piece
+for recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole. Thus the very
+nature of things implies that this order in the Divine City, which we see
+not yet here on earth, should be an object of our faith, of our hope, of
+our confidence in God. If there are any who think otherwise, so much the
+worse for them, they are malcontents in the State of the greatest and the
+best of all monarchs; and they are wrong not to take advantage of the
+examples he has given them of his wisdom and his infinite goodness, whereby
+he reveals himself as being not only wonderful, but also worthy of love
+beyond all things.
+
+135. I hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in the
+nineteen maxims of M. Bayle, which we have just considered, has been left
+without a necessary answer. It is likely that, having often before
+meditated on this subject, he will have put there all his strongest
+convictions touching the moral cause of moral evil. There are, however,
+still sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well not
+to pass over in silence. Very often he exaggerates the difficulty which he
+assumes with regard to freeing God from the imputation of sin. He observes
+_(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 161, p. 1024) that Molina,
+if he reconciled free will with foreknowledge, did not reconcile the
+goodness and the holiness of God with sin. He praises the sincerity of
+those who bluntly declare (as he claims Piscator did) that everything is to
+be traced back to the will of God, and who maintain that God could not but
+be just, even though he were the author of sin, even though he condemned
+innocence. And on the other side, or in other passages, he seems to show
+more approval of the opinions of those who preserve God's goodness at [208]
+the expense of his greatness, as Plutarch does in his book against the
+Stoics. 'It was more reasonable', he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans)
+'that innumerable parts' (or atoms flying about at haphazard through an
+infinite space) 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and,
+in spite of him and against his nature and will, did many bad and
+irrational things, than to agree that there is neither confusion nor
+wickedness but he is the author thereof.' What may be said for both these
+parties, Stoics and Epicureans, appears to have led M. Bayle to the [Greek:
+epechein] of the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect of
+reason, so long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sincere
+submission.
+
+136. Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attempting
+almost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes, a Persian
+heretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief of
+the Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they were
+named Paulicians. All these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher of
+Upper Asia, known under the name of Zoroaster, had taught, so it is said,
+of two intelligent principles of all things, the one good, the other bad, a
+dogma that had perhaps come from the Indians. Among them numbers of people
+still cling to their error, one that is exceedingly prone to overtake human
+ignorance and superstition, since very many barbarous peoples, even in
+America, have been deluded by it, without having had need of philosophy.
+The Slavs (according to Helmold) had their Zernebog or black God. The
+Greeks and Romans, wise as they seem to be, had a Vejovis or Anti-Jupiter,
+otherwise called Pluto, and numerous other maleficent divinities. The
+Goddess Nemesis took pleasure in abasing those who were too fortunate; and
+Herodotus in some passages hints at his belief that all Divinity is
+envious; which, however, is not in harmony with the doctrine of the two
+principles.
+
+137. Plutarch, in his treatise _On Isis and Osiris_, knows of no writer
+more ancient than Zoroaster the magician, as he calls him, that is likely
+to have taught the two principles. Trogus or Justin makes him a King of the
+Bactrians, who was conquered by Ninus or Semiramis; he attributes to him
+the knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic. But this magic was
+apparently the religion of the fire-worshippers: and it appears that he
+looked upon light and heat as the good principle, while he added the  [209]
+evil, that is to say, opacity, darkness, cold. Pliny cites the testimony of
+a certain Hermippus, an interpreter of Zoroaster's books, according to whom
+Zoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to one named Azonacus; unless
+indeed this be a corruption of Oromases, of whom I shall speak presently,
+and whom Plato in the _Alcibiades_ names as the father of Zoroaster. Modern
+Orientals give the name Zerdust to him whom the Greeks named Zoroaster; he
+is regarded as corresponding to Mercury, because with some nations
+Wednesday _(mercredi)_ takes its name from him. It is difficult to
+disentangle the story of Zoroaster and know exactly when he lived. Suidas
+puts him five hundred years before the taking of Troy. Some Ancients cited
+by Pliny and Plutarch took it to be ten times as far back. But Xanthus the
+Lydian (in the preface to Diogenes Laertius) put him only six hundred years
+before the expedition of Xerxes. Plato declares in the same passage, as M.
+Bayle observes, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing but the study of
+religion. Mr. Hyde in his book on the religion of the ancient Persians
+tries to justify this magic, and to clear it not only of the crime of
+impiety but also of idolatry. Fire-worship prevailed among the Persians and
+the Chaldaeans also; it is thought that Abraham left it when he departed
+from Ur of the Chaldees. Mithras was the sun and he was also the God of the
+Persians; and according to Ovid's account horses were offered in sacrifice
+to him,
+
+  _Placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,_
+  _Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo._
+
+But Mr. Hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in their
+worship as symbols of the Divinity. It may be necessary to distinguish, as
+elsewhere, between the Wise and the Multitude. There are in the splendid
+ruins of Persepolis or of Tschelminaar (which means forty columns)
+sculptured representations of their ceremonies. An ambassador of Holland
+had had them sketched at very great cost by a painter, who had devoted a
+considerable time to the task: but by some chance or other these sketches
+fell into the hands of a well-known traveller, M. Chardin, according to
+what he tells us himself. It would be a pity if they were lost. These ruins
+are one of the most ancient and most beautiful monuments of the earth; and
+in this respect I wonder at such lack of curiosity in a century so curious
+as ours.
+
+                                                                      [210]
+138. The ancient Greeks and the modern Orientals agree in saying that
+Zoroaster called the good God Oromazes, or rather Oromasdes, and the evil
+God Arimanius. When I pondered on the fact that great princes of Upper Asia
+had the name of Hormisdas and that Irminius or Herminius was the name of a
+god or ancient hero of the Scythian Celts, that is, of the Germani, it
+occurred to me that this Arimanius or Irminius might have been a great
+conqueror of very ancient time coming from the west, just as Genghis Khan
+and Tamburlaine were later, coming from the east. Arimanius would therefore
+have come from the north-west, that is, from Germania and Sarmatia, through
+the territory of the Alani and Massagetae, to raid the dominions of one
+Ormisdas, a great king in Upper Asia, just as other Scythians did in the
+days of Cyaxares, King of the Medes, according to the account given by
+Herodotus. The monarch governing civilized peoples, and working to defend
+them against the barbarians, would have gone down to posterity, amongst the
+same peoples, as the good god; but the chief of these devastators will have
+become the symbol of the evil principle: that is altogether reasonable. It
+appears from this same mythology that these two princes contended for long,
+but that neither of them was victorious. Thus they both held their own,
+just as the two principles shared the empire of the world according to the
+hypothesis attributed to Zoroaster.
+
+139. It remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the Germani was
+called Herman, Arimanius or Irminius. Tacitus relates that the three tribes
+which composed Germania, the Ingaevones, the Istaevones and the Herminones
+or Hermiones, were thus named from the three sons of Mannus. Whether that
+be true or not, he wished in any case to indicate that there was a hero
+named Herminius, from whom he was told the Herminones were named.
+Herminones, Hermenner, Hermunduri all mean the same, that is, Soldiers.
+Even in the Dark Ages Arimanni were _viri militares,_ and there is _feudum
+Arimandiae_ in Lombard law.
+
+140. I have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part of
+Germania was given to the whole, and that from these Herminones or
+Hermunduri all the Teutonic peoples were named _Hermanni_ or _Germani_. The
+difference between these two words is only in the force of the aspiration:
+there is the same difference of initial letter between the _Germani_ of the
+Latins and _Hermanos_ of the Spaniards, or in the _Gammarus_ of the Latins
+and the _Hummer_ (that is, marine crayfish) of the Low Germans.       [211]
+Besides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to the
+whole: so all the Germani were called Alemanni by the French, and yet this,
+according to the old nomenclature, only applied to the Suabians and the
+Swiss. Although Tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name of the
+Germani, he said something which supports my opinion, when he observed that
+it was a name which inspired terror, taken or given _ob metum_. In fact it
+signifies a warrior: _Heer_, _Hari_ is army, whence comes _Hariban_, or
+'call to Haro', that is, a general order to be with the army, since
+corrupted into _Arriereban_. Thus Hariman or Ariman, German _Guerre-man_,
+is a soldier. For as _Hari_, _Heer_ means army, so _Wehr_ signifies arms,
+_Wehren_ to fight, to make war, the word _Guerre_, _Guerra_ coming
+doubtless from the same source. I have already spoken of the _feudum
+Arimandiae_: not only did Herminones or Germani signify the same, but also
+that ancient Herman, so-called son of Mannus, appears to have been given
+this name as being pre-eminently a warrior.
+
+141. Now it is not the passage in Tacitus only which indicates for us this
+god or hero: we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among these
+peoples, since Charlemagne found and destroyed near the Weser the column
+called _Irminsaeule_, erected in honour of this god. And that combined with
+the passage in Tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that it was not that
+famous Arminius who was an enemy of the Romans, but a much greater and more
+ancient hero, that this cult concerned. Arminius bore the same name as
+those who are called Hermann to-day. Arminius was not great enough, nor
+fortunate enough, nor well enough known throughout Germania to attain to
+the honour of a public cult, even at the hands of remote tribes, like the
+Saxons, who came long after him into the country of the Cherusci. And our
+Arminius, taken by the Asiatics for the evil God, provides ample
+confirmation of my opinion. For in these matters conjectures confirm one
+another without any logical circle, when their foundations tend towards one
+and the same end.
+
+142. It is not beyond belief that the Hermes (that is, Mercury) of the
+Greeks is the same Herminius or Arimanius. He may have been an inventor or
+promoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his own
+people and in the countries where he held supremacy, while amongst his
+enemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion. Who knows but that
+he may have penetrated even into Egypt, like the Scythians who in     [212]
+pursuit of Sesostris came nearly so far. Theut, Menes and Hermes were known
+and revered in Egypt. They might have been Tuiscon, his son Mannus and
+Herman, son of Mannus, according to the genealogy of Tacitus. Menes is held
+to be the most ancient king of the Egyptians; 'Theut' was with them a name
+for Mercury. At least Theut or Tuiscon, from whom Tacitus derives the
+descent of the Germani, and from whom the Teutons, _Tuitsche_ (that is,
+Germani) even to-day have their name, is the same as that _Teutates_ who
+according to Lucan was worshipped by the Gauls, and whom Caesar took _pro
+Dite Patre_, for Pluto, because of the resemblance between his Latin name
+and that of _Teut_ or _Thiet_, _Titan_, _Theodon_; this in ancient times
+signified men, people, and also an excellent man (like the word 'baron'),
+in short, a prince. There are authorities for all these significations: but
+one must not delay over this point. Herr Otto Sperling, who is well known
+for various learned writings, but has many more in readiness to appear, in
+a special dissertation has treated the question of this Teutates, God of
+the Celts. Some observations which I imparted to him on that subject have
+been published, with his reply, in the _Literary News of the Baltic Sea_.
+He interprets this passage from Lucan somewhat otherwise than I do:
+
+  _Teutates, pollensque feris altaribus Hesus,_
+  _Et Tamaris Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae._
+
+Hesus was, it appears, the God of War, who was called Ares by the Greeks
+and Erich by the ancient Germani, whence still remains _Erichtag_, Tuesday.
+The letters R and S, which are produced by the same organ, are easily
+interchanged, for instance: _Moor_ and _Moos_, _Geren_ and _Gesen_, _Er
+war_ and _Er was_, _Fer_, _Hierro_, _Eiron_, _Eisen_. Likewise _Papisius_,
+_Valesius_, _Fusius_, instead of _Papirius_, _Valerius_, _Furius_, with the
+ancient Romans. As for Taramis or perhaps Taranis, one knows that _Taran_
+was the thunder, or the God of Thunder, with the ancient Celts, called
+_Thor_ by the Germani of the north; whence the English have preserved the
+name 'Thursday', _jeudi_, _diem Jovis_. And the passage from Lucan means
+that the altar of Taran, God of the Celts, was not less cruel than that of
+Diana in Tauris: _Taranis aram non mitiorem ara Dianae Scythicae fuisse_.
+
+143. It is also not impossible that there was a time when the western [213]
+or Celtic princes made themselves masters of Greece, of Egypt and a good
+part of Asia, and that their cult remained in those countries. When one
+considers with what rapidity the Huns, the Saracens and the Tartars gained
+possession of a great part of our continent one will be the less surprised
+at this; and it is confirmed by the great number of words in the Greek and
+German tongues which correspond so closely. Callimachus, in a hymn in
+honour of Apollo, seems to imply that the Celts who attacked the Temple at
+Delphi, under their Brennus, or chief, were descendants of the ancient
+Titans and Giants who made war on Jupiter and the other gods, that is to
+say, on the Princes of Asia and of Greece. It may be that Jupiter is
+himself descended from the Titans or Theodons, that is, from the earlier
+Celto-Scythian princes; and the material collected by the late Abbe de la
+Charmoye in his _Celtic Origins_ conforms to that possibility. Yet there
+are opinions on other matters in this work by this learned writer which to
+me do not appear probable, especially when he excludes the Germani from the
+number of the Celts, not having recalled sufficiently the facts given by
+ancient writers and not being sufficiently aware of the relation between
+the ancient Gallic and Germanic tongues. Now the so-called Giants, who
+wished to scale the heavens, were new Celts who followed the path of their
+ancestors; and Jupiter, although of their kindred, as it were, was
+constrained to resist them. Just so did the Visigoths established in Gallic
+territory resist, together with the Romans, other peoples of Germania and
+Scythia, who succeeded them under Attila their leader, he being at that
+time in control of the Scythian, Sarmatic and Germanic tribes from the
+frontiers of Persia up to the Rhine. But the pleasure one feels when one
+thinks to find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old history
+of fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far, and I know not whether I
+shall have been any more successful than Goropius Becanus, Schrieckius,
+Herr Rudbeck and the Abbe de la Charmoye.
+
+144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and Arimanius, the
+sources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked upon them as two
+eternal principles opposed to each other, although there is reason to doubt
+this assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple of Cerdon, was of
+this opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that these men used
+lamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not sufficiently    [214]
+recognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument,
+which was the difficulty over the origin of evil. He believes that an able
+man on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and it
+seems as though he himself, failing any other, wished to undertake a task
+so unnecessary in the opinion of many people. 'All the hypotheses' (he
+says, _Dictionary_, v., 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians have
+established parry but poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph when
+they act on the offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when they
+have to sustain the attack.' He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr.
+Hyde he calls them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soon
+have been routed by _a priori_ reasons, taken from the nature of God; but
+he thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the _a
+posteriori_ reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil.
+
+145. He treats of the matter with abundant detail in his _Dictionary_,
+article 'Manichaeans', p. 2025, which we must examine a little, in order to
+throw greater light upon this subject: 'The surest and clearest ideas of
+order teach us', he says, 'that a Being who exists through himself, who is
+necessary, who is eternal, must be single, infinite, all powerful, and
+endowed with all kinds of perfections.' This argument deserves to have been
+developed more completely. 'Now it is necessary to see', he goes on, 'if
+the phenomena of nature can be conveniently explained by the hypothesis of
+one single principle.' I have explained it sufficiently by showing that
+there are cases where some disorder in the part is necessary for producing
+the greatest order in the whole. But it appears that M. Bayle asks a little
+too much: he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with
+the best possible scheme for the universe. That would be a complete
+explanation of the phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am I
+bound to do so, for there is no obligation to do that which is impossible
+for us in our existing state. It is sufficient for me to point out that
+there is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with
+what is the best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leaving
+something to be discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answering
+the objections, though not for a comprehension of the matter.
+
+146. 'The heavens and all the rest of the universe', adds M. Bayle, 'preach
+the glory, the power, the oneness of God.' Thence the conclusion      [215]
+should have been drawn that this is the case (as I have already observed
+above) because there is seen in these objects something entire and
+isolated, so to speak. Every time we see such a work of God, we find it so
+perfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty thereof: but
+when we do not see an entire work, when we only look upon scraps and
+fragments, it is no wonder if the good order is not evident there. Our
+planetary system composes such an isolated work, which is complete also
+when it is taken by itself; each plant, each animal, each man furnishes one
+such work, to a certain point of perfection: one recognizes therein the
+wonderful contrivance of the author. But the human kind, so far as it is
+known to us, is only a fragment, only a small portion of the City of God or
+of the republic of Spirits, which has an extent too great for us, and
+whereof we know too little, to be able to observe the wonderful order
+therein. 'Man alone,' says M. Bayle, 'that masterpiece of his Creator among
+things visible, man alone, I say, gives rise to great objections with
+regard to the oneness of God.' Claudian made the same observation,
+unburdening his heart in these well-known lines:
+
+  _Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem_, etc.
+
+But the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong presumption
+that it would exist also in the government of men, and generally in that of
+Spirits, if the whole were known to us. One must judge the works of God as
+wisely as Socrates judged those of Heraclitus in these words: What I have
+understood thereof pleases me; I think that the rest would please me no
+less if I understood it.
+
+147. Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in that
+which concerns man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has
+presented him with an image of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in a
+sense, in his small department, _ut Spartam quam nactus est ornet_. He
+enters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life,
+reason, without showing himself. It is there that free will plays its game:
+and God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods that he has thought
+good to produce, as we make game of children who follow pursuits which we
+secretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us. Thus man is there
+like a little god in his own world or _Microcosm_, which he governs   [216]
+after his own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his art
+often imitates nature.
+
+  _Jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro,_
+    _Risit et ad Superos talia dicta dedit:_
+  _Huccine mortalis progressa potentia, Divi?_
+    _Jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor._
+  _Jura poli rerumque fidem legesque Deorum_
+    _Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte Senex._
+  _Quid falso insontem tonitru Salmonea miror?_
+    _Aemula Naturae est parva reperta manus._
+
+But he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to the
+passions, and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes him
+also for such errors, now like a father or tutor, training or chastising
+children, now like a just judge, punishing those who forsake him: and evil
+comes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their small
+worlds come into collision. Man finds himself the worse for this, in
+proportion to his fault; but God, by a wonderful art, turns all the errors
+of these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great world. It is
+as in those devices of perspective, where certain beautiful designs look
+like mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision or
+one views them by means of a certain glass or mirror. It is by placing and
+using them properly that one makes them serve as adornment for a room. Thus
+the apparent deformities of our little worlds combine to become beauties in
+the great world, and have nothing in them which is opposed to the oneness
+of an infinitely perfect universal principle: on the contrary, they
+increase our wonder at the wisdom of him who makes evil serve the greater
+good.
+
+148. M. Bayle continues: 'that man is wicked and miserable; that there are
+everywhere prisons and hospitals; that history is simply a collection of
+the crimes and calamities of the human race.' I think that there is
+exaggeration in that: there is incomparably more good than evil in the life
+of men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons. With regard to
+virtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails. Machiavelli has already
+observed that there are few very wicked and very good men, and that this
+causes the failure of many great enterprises. I find it a great fault in
+historians that they keep their mind on the evil more than on the     [217]
+good. The chief end of history, as also of poetry, should be to teach
+prudence and virtue by examples, and then to display vice in such a way as
+to create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it, or serve towards
+that end.
+
+149. M. Bayle avows: 'that one finds everywhere both moral good and
+physical good, some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, and
+that this is what makes the difficulty. For if there were only wicked and
+unhappy people', he says, 'there would be no need to resort to the
+hypothesis of the two principles.' I wonder that this admirable man could
+have evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the two
+principles; and I am surprised at his not having taken into account that
+this romance of human life, which makes the universal history of the human
+race, lay fully devised in the divine understanding, with innumerable
+others, and that the will of God only decreed its existence because this
+sequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest of things, to
+bring forth the best result. And these apparent faults in the whole world,
+these spots on a Sun whereof ours is but a ray, rather enhance its beauty
+than diminish it, contributing towards that end by obtaining a greater
+good. There are in truth two principles, but they are both in God, to wit,
+his understanding and his will. The understanding furnishes the principle
+of evil, without being sullied by it, without being evil; it represents
+natures as they exist in the eternal verities; it contains within it the
+reason wherefore evil is permitted: but the will tends only towards good.
+Let us add a third principle, namely power; it precedes even understanding
+and will, but it operates as the one displays it and as the other requires
+it.
+
+150. Some (like Campanella) have called these three perfections of God the
+three primordialities. Many have even believed that there was therein a
+secret connexion with the Holy Trinity: that power relates to the Father,
+that is, to the source of Divinity, wisdom to the Eternal Word, which is
+called _logos_ by the most sublime of the Evangelists, and will or Love to
+the Holy Spirit. Well-nigh all the expressions or comparisons derived from
+the nature of the intelligent substance tend that way.
+
+151. It seems to me that if M. Bayle had taken into account what I have
+just said of the principles of things, he would have answered his own
+questions, or at the least he would not have continued to ask, as he does
+in these which follow: 'If man is the work of a single principle      [218]
+supremely good, supremely holy, supremely powerful, can he be subject to
+diseases, to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, pain, grief? Can he have so many
+evil tendencies? Can he commit so many crimes? Can supreme goodness produce
+an unhappy creature? Shall not supreme power, united to an infinite
+goodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not banish all that
+might offend or grieve?' Prudentius in his _Hamartigenia_ presented the
+same difficulty:
+
+  _Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? inquit._
+  _Non refert auctor fuerit, factorve malorum._
+  _Anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti,_
+  _Cum possit prohibere, sinat; quod si velit omnes_
+  _Innocuos agere Omnipotens, ne sancta voluntas_
+  _Degeneret, facto nec se manus inquinet ullo?_
+  _Condidit ergo malum Dominus, quod spectat ab alto,_
+  _Et patitur fierique probat, tanquam ipse crearit._
+  _Ipse creavit enim, quod si discludere possit,_
+  _Non abolet, longoque sinit grassarier usu._
+
+But I have already answered that sufficiently. Man is himself the source of
+his evils: just as he is, he was in the divine idea. God, prompted by
+essential reasons of wisdom, decreed that he should pass into existence
+just as he is. M. Bayle would perchance have perceived this origin of evil
+in the form in which I demonstrate it here, if he had herein combined the
+wisdom of God with his power, his goodness and his holiness. I will add, in
+passing, that his _holiness_ is nothing other than the highest degree of
+goodness, just as the crime which is its opposite is the worst of all evil.
+
+152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of the
+oneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness of
+substance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator of
+duality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is more
+consistent with order and _a priori_ reasons, but he denies its conformity
+with experience and _a posteriori_ reasons. 'I surpass you', he said, 'in
+the explanation of phenomena, which is the principal mark of a good
+system.' But, in my opinion, it is not a very good explanation of a
+phenomenon to assign to it an _ad hoc_ principle: to evil, a _principium
+maleficum_, to cold, a _primum frigidum_; there is nothing so easy and
+nothing so dull. It is well-nigh as if someone were to say that the   [219]
+Peripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of the
+phenomena of the stars, by giving them _ad hoc_ intelligences to guide
+them. According to that, it is quite easy to conceive why the planets make
+their way with such precision; whereas there is need of much geometry and
+reflexion to understand how from the gravity of the planets, which bears
+them towards the sun, combined with some whirlwind which carries them
+along, or with their own motive force, can spring the elliptic movement of
+Kepler, which satisfies appearances so well. A man incapable of relishing
+deep speculations will at first applaud the Peripatetics and will treat our
+mathematicians as dreamers. Some old Galenist will do the same with regard
+to the faculties of the Schoolmen: he will admit a chylific, a chymific and
+a sanguific, and he will assign one of these _ad hoc_ to each operation; he
+will think he has worked wonders, and will laugh at what he will call the
+chimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain through mechanical structure
+what passes in the body of an animal.
+
+153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, _per
+principium maleficum_, is of the same nature. Evil needs no such
+explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primum
+frigidum_ nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only from privation;
+the positive enters therein only by concomitance, as the active enters by
+concomitance into cold. We see that water in freezing is capable of
+breaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined; and yet cold is a certain
+privation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a movement which
+separates the particles of fluids. When this separating motion becomes
+weakened in the water by the cold, the particles of compressed air
+concealed in the water collect; and, becoming larger, they become more
+capable of acting outwards through their buoyancy. The resistance which the
+surfaces of the proportions of air meet in the water, and which opposes the
+force exerted by these portions towards dilation, is far less, and
+consequently the effect of the air greater, in large air-bubbles than in
+small, even though these small bubbles combined should form as great a mass
+as the large. For the resistances, that is, the surfaces, increase by the
+_square_, and the forces, that is, the contents or the volumes of the
+spheres of compressed air, increase by the _cube_, of their diameters. Thus
+it is _by accident_ that privation involves action and force. I have
+already shown how privation is enough to cause error and malice, and  [220]
+how God is prompted to permit them, despite that there be no malignity in
+him. Evil comes from privation; the positive and action spring from it by
+accident, as force springs from cold.
+
+154. The statement that M. Bayle attributes to the Paulicians, p. 2323, is
+not conclusive, to wit, that free will must come from two principles, to
+the end that it may have power to turn towards good and towards evil: for,
+being simple in itself, it should rather have come from a neutral principle
+if this argument held good. But free will tends towards good, and if it
+meets with evil it is by accident, for the reason that this evil is
+concealed beneath the good, and masked, as it were. These words which Ovid
+ascribes to Medea,
+
+      _Video meliora proboque,_
+  _Deteriora sequor_,
+
+imply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good, which makes
+more impression on souls when they are disturbed by the passions.
+
+155. Furthermore, M. Bayle himself supplies Melissus with a good answer;
+but a little later he disputes it. Here are his words, p. 2025: 'If
+Melissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was not
+wicked when God made him; he will say that man received from God a happy
+state, but that not having followed the light of conscience, which in
+accordance with the intention of its author should have guided him along
+the path of virtue, he has become wicked, and has deserved that God the
+supremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger. It is
+therefore not God who is the cause of moral evil: but he is the cause of
+physical evil, that is, of the punishment of moral evil. And this
+punishment, far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle,
+of necessity emanates from that one of its attributes, I mean its justice,
+which is not less essential to it than its goodness. This answer, the most
+reasonable that Melissus can give, is fundamentally good and sound, but it
+may be disputed by something more specious and more dazzling. For indeed
+Zoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle ought to have created
+man not only without actual evil, but also without the inclination towards
+evil; that God, having foreseen sin with all its consequences, ought to
+have prevented it; that he ought to have impelled man to moral good, and
+not to have allowed him any force for tending towards crime.' That is quite
+easy to say, but it is not practicable if one follows the principles  [221]
+of order: it could not have been accomplished without perpetual miracles.
+Ignorance, error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made as
+we are: should this species, then, have been missing in the universe? I
+have no doubt but that it is too important there, despite all its
+weaknesses, for God to have consented to its abolition.
+
+156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in his
+_Dictionary_, follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on the
+Manichaeans. According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the orthodox seem to admit
+two first principles, in making the devil the originator of sin. M. Becker,
+a former minister of Amsterdam, author of the book entitled _The World
+Bewitched_, has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that one
+should not assign such power and authority to the Devil as would allow of
+his comparison with God. Therein he is right: but he pushes the conclusions
+too far. And the author of the book entitled [Greek: Apokatastasis Panton]
+believes that if the Devil had never been vanquished and despoiled, if he
+had always kept his prey, if the title of invincible had belonged to him,
+that would have done injury to the glory of God. But it is a poor advantage
+to keep those whom one has led astray in order to share their punishment
+for ever. And as for the cause of evil, it is true that the Devil is the
+author of sin. But the origin of sin comes from farther away, its source is
+in the original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable of
+sinning, and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause
+this power to evince itself in action.
+
+157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is
+thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scripture
+is not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the Apocalypse that
+speaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, leaves much in
+doubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the other
+sacred writers is hardly mentioned. It is not in place here to enter into
+this discussion, and one must still admit that the common opinion agrees
+best with the sacred text. M. Bayle examines some replies of St. Basil, of
+Lactantius and others on the origin of evil. As, however, they are
+concerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion thereof, and I will
+proceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause of
+moral evil, which arise in several passages of the works of our gifted
+author.
+
+                                                                      [222]
+158. He disputes the _permission_ of this evil, he would wish one to admit
+that God _wills_ it. He quotes these words of Calvin (on Genesis, ch. 3):
+'The ears of some are offended when one says that God willed it. But I ask
+you, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, or
+rather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?' M. Bayle
+explains these words of Calvin, and those which precede them, as if he
+admitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in so far as it was a crime,
+but under some other conception that is unknown to us. He quotes casuists
+who are somewhat lax, who say that a son can desire the death of his
+father, not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is a
+good for his heirs _(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 147, p.
+850). It seems to me that Calvin only says that God willed man's fall for
+some reason unknown to us. In the main, when it is a question of a decisive
+will, that is, of a decree, these distinctions are useless: one wills the
+action with all its qualities, if it is true that one wills it. But when it
+is a crime, God can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither an
+end nor a means, it is only a _conditio sine qua non_; thus it is not the
+object of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above. God cannot
+prevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doing
+something that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating the
+rule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have already
+observed. God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is in himself,
+to permit moral evil in creatures. There is precisely the case wherein the
+will of a wise mind is only permissive. I have already said this: he is
+bound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it without
+himself failing in that which he owes to himself.
+
+159. 'But among all these infinite combinations', says M. Bayle (p. 853),
+'it pleased God to choose one wherein Adam was to sin, and by his decree he
+made it, in preference to all the others, the plan that should come to
+pass.' Very good; that is speaking my language; so long as one applies it
+to the combinations which compose the whole universe. 'You will therefore
+never make us understand', he adds, 'how God did not will that Eve and Adam
+should sin, since he rejected all the combinations wherein they would not
+have sinned.' But the thing is in general very easy to understand, from all
+that I have just said. This combination that makes the whole universe is
+the best; God therefore could not refrain from choosing it without    [223]
+incurring a lapse, and rather than incur such, a thing altogether
+inappropriate to him, he permits the lapse or the sin of man which is
+involved in this combination.
+
+160. M. Jacquelot, with other able men, does not differ in opinion from me,
+when for example he says, p. 186 of his treatise on the _Conformity of
+Faith with Reason_: 'Those who are puzzled by these difficulties seem to be
+too limited in their outlook, and to wish to reduce all God's designs to
+their own interests. When God formed the universe, his whole prospect was
+himself and his own glory, so that if we had knowledge of all creatures, of
+their diverse combinations and of their different relations, we should
+understand without difficulty that the universe corresponds perfectly to
+the infinite wisdom of the Almighty.' He says elsewhere (p. 232):
+'Supposing the impossible, that God could not prevent the wrong use of free
+will without destroying it, it will be agreed that since his wisdom and his
+glory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must have
+prevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have.' I
+have endeavoured to develop this still further through _the reason of the
+best and the moral necessity_ which led God to make this choice, despite
+the sin of some creatures which is involved therein. I think that I have
+cut down to the root of the difficulty; nevertheless I am well pleased, for
+the sake of throwing more light on the matter, to apply my principle of
+solution to the peculiar difficulties of M. Bayle.
+
+161. Here is one, set forth in these terms (ch. 148, p. 856): 'Would it in
+a prince be a mark of his kindness: 1. To give to a hundred messengers as
+much money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues? 2. To promise
+a recompense to all those who should finish the journey without having
+borrowed anything, and to threaten with imprisonment all those whom their
+money should not have sufficed? 3. To make choice of a hundred persons, of
+whom he would know for certain that there were but two who should earn the
+recompense, the ninety-eight others being destined to find on the way
+either a mistress or a gamester or some other thing which would make them
+incur expenses, and which he would himself have been at pains to dispose in
+certain places along their path? 4. To imprison actually ninety-eight of
+these messengers on the moment of their return? Is it not abundantly
+evident that he would have no kindness for them, and that on the contrary
+he would intend for them, not the proposed recompense, but prison?    [224]
+They would deserve it, certainly; but he who had wished them to deserve it
+and placed them in the sure way towards deserving it, should he be worthy
+of being called kind, on the pretext that he had recompensed the two
+others?' It would doubtless not be on that account that he earned the title
+of 'kind'. Yet other circumstances may contribute, which would avail to
+render him worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order to
+know those people, and to make trial of them; just as Gideon made use of
+some extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the least
+squeamish among his soldiers. And even if the prince were to know already
+the disposition of all these messengers, may he not put them to this test
+in order to make them known also to the others? Even though these reasons
+be not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an action
+like that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from
+the circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that God
+has acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that he
+has done.
+
+162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, letter
+10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with the
+omnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels, and
+who, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will fight, takes
+sure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, they fight:
+their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will, they are
+punishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) concerning some
+free actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite foreknowledge and
+power, certainly does concerning all those of men. Before he sent us into
+this world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be: he
+has endued us therewith, he also has disposed all other things that are
+outside us, to cause such and such objects to present themselves to our
+senses at such and such a time. He knew that as a result of this our free
+will would determine us toward some particular thing, and he has willed it
+thus; but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto. In
+this king one may distinguish two different degrees of will, the one
+whereby he willed that these noblemen should fight, since he brought about
+their meeting, and the other whereby he did not will it, since he forbade
+duels. Even so theologians distinguish in God an absolute and independent
+will, whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done, [225]
+and another which is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit of
+men, whereby he wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 of
+vol. 1, pp. 51, 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld,
+vol. 2, p. 288 _et seqq_. of his _Reflexions on the System of Malebranche_,
+from Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God).
+
+163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (_Reply to the Questions of a
+Provincial_, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much mistaken, it
+seems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree of will, either
+small or great, that these two noblemen should obey the law, and not fight.
+He would will entirely and solely that they should fight. That would not
+exculpate them, they would only follow their passion, they would be unaware
+that they conformed to the will of their sovereign: but he would be in
+truth the moral cause of their encounter, and he would not more entirely
+wish it supposing he were to inspire them with the desire or to give them
+the order for it. Imagine to yourself two princes each of whom wishes his
+eldest son to poison himself. One employs constraint, the other contents
+himself with secretly causing a grief that he knows will be sufficient to
+induce his son to poison himself. Will you be doubtful whether the will of
+the latter is less complete than the will of the former? M. Descartes is
+therefore assuming an unreal fact and does not at all solve the
+difficulty.'
+
+164. One must confess that M. Descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the will
+of God in regard to evil in saying not only that God knew that our free
+will would determine us toward some particular thing, but also _that he
+also wished it_, albeit he did not will to constrain the will thereto. He
+speaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same volume, saying that
+not the slightest thought enters into the mind of a man which God does not
+_will_, and has not willed from all eternity, to enter there. Calvin never
+said anything harsher; and all that can only be excused if it is to be
+understood of a permissive will. M. Descartes' solution amounts to the
+distinction between the will expressed in the sign and the will expressive
+of the good pleasure (_inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti_) which the
+moderns have taken from the Schoolmen as regards the terms, but to which
+they have given a meaning not usual among the ancients. It is true that God
+may command something and yet not will that it be done, as when he
+commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: he willed the obedience, and he did
+not will the action. But when God commands the virtuous action and    [226]
+forbids the sin, he wills indeed that which he ordains, but it is only by
+an antecedent will, as I have explained more than once.
+
+165. M. Descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory; but it may be
+made so. One must make some change in the facts, inventing some reason to
+oblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet. They must,
+for instance, be together in the army or in other obligatory functions, a
+circumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without endangering his
+State. For example, the absence of either of them might be responsible for
+the disappearance of innumerable persons of his party from the army or
+cause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some great disturbance.
+In this case, therefore, one may say that the prince does not will the
+duel: he knows of it, but he permits it notwithstanding, for he prefers
+permitting the sin of others to committing one himself. Thus this corrected
+comparison may serve, provided that one observe the difference between God
+and the prince. The prince is forced into this permission by his
+powerlessness; a more powerful monarch would have no need of all these
+considerations; but God, who has power to do all that is possible, only
+permits sin because it is absolutely impossible to anyone at all to do
+better. The prince's action is peradventure not free from sorrow and
+regret. This regret is due to his imperfection, of which he is sensible;
+therein lies displeasure. God is incapable of such a feeling and finds,
+moreover, no cause therefor; he is infinitely conscious of his own
+perfection, and it may even be said that the imperfection in creatures
+taken individually changes for him into perfection in relation to the
+whole, and that it is an added glory for the Creator. What more can one
+wish, when one possesses a boundless wisdom and when one is as powerful as
+one is wise; when one can do all and when one has the best?
+
+166. Having once understood these things, we are hardened sufficiently, so
+it seems to me, against the strongest and most spirited objections. I have
+not concealed them: but there are some we shall merely touch upon, because
+they are too odious. The Remonstrants and M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions
+of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 152, end page 919) quote St. Augustine,
+saying, '_crudelem esse misericordiam velle aliquem miserum esse ut eius
+miserearis_': in the same sense is cited Seneca _De Benef._, L. 6, c. 36,
+37. I confess that one would have some reason to urge that against those
+who believed that God has no other cause for permitting sin than the  [227]
+design to have something wherewith to exercise punitive justice against the
+majority of men, and his mercy towards a small number of elect. But it must
+be considered that God had reasons for his permission of sin, more worthy
+of him and more profound in relation to us. Someone has dared to compare
+God's course of action with that of a Caligula, who has his edicts written
+in so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not
+possible to read them; with that of a mother who neglects her daughter's
+honour in order to attain her own selfish ends; with that of Queen
+Catherine de Medicis, who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of her
+ladies in order to learn of the intrigues of the great; and even with that
+of Tiberius, who arranged, through the extraordinary services of the
+executioner, that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to capital
+punishment should no longer apply to the case of Sejanus's daughter. This
+last comparison was proposed by Peter Bertius, then an Armenian, but
+finally a member of the Roman communion. And a scandalous comparison has
+been made between God and Tiberius, which is related at length by Andreas
+Caroli in his _Memorabilia Ecclesiastica_ of the last century, as M. Bayle
+observes. Bertius used it against the Gomarists. I think that arguments of
+this kind are only valid against those who maintain that justice is an
+arbitrary thing in relation to God; or that he has a despotic power which
+can go so far as being able to condemn innocents; or, in short, that good
+is not the motive of his actions.
+
+167. At that same time an ingenious satire was composed against the
+Gomarists, entitled _Fur praedestinatus, de gepredestineerdedief_, wherein
+there is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged, who attributes to God
+all the evil he has done; who believes himself predestined to salvation
+notwithstanding his wicked actions; who imagines that this belief is
+sufficient for him, and who defeats by arguments _ad hominem_ a
+Counter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him for death: but this
+thief is finally converted by an old pastor who had been dismissed for his
+Arminianism, whom the gaoler, in pity for the criminal and for the weakness
+of the minister, had brought to him secretly. Replies were made to this
+lampoon, but replies to satires never please as much as the satires
+themselves. M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,
+ch. 154, p. 938) says that this book was printed in England in the    [228]
+time of Cromwell, and he appears not to have been informed that it was only
+a translation of the much older original Flemish. He adds that Dr. George
+Kendal wrote a confutation of it at Oxford in the year 1657, under the
+title of _Fur pro Tribunali_, and that the dialogue is there inserted. This
+dialogue presupposes, contrary to the truth, that the Counter-remonstrants
+make God the cause of evil, and teach a kind of predestination in the
+Mahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one does
+good or evil, and the assumption that one is predestined assures the fact.
+They by no means go so far. Nevertheless it is true that there are among
+them some Supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare themselves
+in clear terms upon the justice of God and the principles of piety and
+morals in man. For they imagine despotism in God, and demand that man be
+convinced, without reason, of the absolute certainty of his election, a
+course that is liable to have dangerous consequences. But all those who
+acknowledge that God produces the best plan, having chosen it from among
+all possible ideas of the universe; that he there finds man inclined by the
+original imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plunge
+into misery; that God prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the
+perfection of the universe, which is an emanation from his, may permit it:
+those, I say, show forth more clearly that God's intention is the one most
+right and holy in the world; that the creature alone is guilty, that his
+original limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness, that
+his evil will is the sole cause of his misery; that one cannot be destined
+to salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children of
+God, and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded upon
+the good will infused into one's heart by the grace of God.
+
+168. _Metaphysical considerations_ also are brought up against my
+explanation of the moral cause of moral evil; but they will trouble me less
+since I have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons, which
+were more impressive. These metaphysical considerations concern the nature
+of the _possible_ and of the _necessary_; they go against my fundamental
+assumption that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. There are
+philosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except that
+which actually happens. These are those same people who thought or could
+have thought that all is necessary unconditionally. Some were of this [229]
+opinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of
+the existence of things: and it is these I have most reason for opposing.
+But there are others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms. They
+confuse moral necessity with metaphysical necessity: they imagine that
+since God cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom,
+and things are endued with that necessity which philosophers and
+theologians endeavour to avoid. With these writers my dispute is only one
+of words, provided they admit in very deed that God chooses and does the
+best. But there are others who go further, they think that God could have
+done better. This is an opinion which must be rejected: for although it
+does not altogether deprive God of wisdom and goodness, as do the advocates
+of blind necessity, it sets bounds thereto, thus derogating from God's
+supreme perfection.
+
+169. The question of the _possibility of things that do not happen_ has
+already been examined by the ancients. It appears that Epicurus, to
+preserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, maintained, after
+Aristotle, that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinate
+truth. For if it was true yesterday that I should write to-day, it could
+therefore not fail to happen, it was already necessary; and, for the same
+reason, it was from all eternity. Thus all that which happens is necessary,
+and it is impossible for anything different to come to pass. But since that
+is not so it would follow, according to him, that contingent futurities
+have no determinate truth. To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far as
+to deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, he
+denied that every assertion was either true or false. Here is the way they
+confounded him: 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should write
+to-day; it was therefore false.' The good man, not being able to admit this
+conclusion, was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. After
+that, he needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself the
+trouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, following
+the account by Cicero in his book _De Fato_: 'Contendit omnes nervos
+Chrysippus ut persuadeat omne [Greek: Axioma] aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut
+enim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, fato fieri
+quaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam
+certum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum
+confirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non obtinuerit omne[230]
+quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato fieri possint ex
+causis aeternis rerum futurarum.' M. Bayle observes (_Dictionary_, article
+'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that neither of these two great philosophers
+[Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that the truth of this maxim, every
+proposition is true or false, is independent of what is called _fatum_: it
+could not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the _fatum_, as
+Chrysippus maintained and as Epicurus feared. Chrysippus could not have
+conceded, without damaging his own position, that there are propositions
+which are neither true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting the
+contrary: for, whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true that
+this proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true or
+false. Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All that
+I shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the faculty
+of prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it would
+yet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should
+predict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippus
+nor Epicurus has taken into consideration.' Cicero, lib. I, _De Nat.
+Deorum_, with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the sound
+opinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) that it
+would be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent,
+than to have recourse to such answers. Yet we shall see that M. Bayle
+himself confused the certain with the necessary, when he maintained that
+the choice of the best rendered things necessary.
+
+170. Let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen, and I
+will give the very words of M. Bayle, albeit they are somewhat discursive.
+This is what he says on the matter in his _Dictionary_ (article
+'Chrysippus', let. S, p. 929): 'The celebrated dispute on things possible
+and things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the Stoics
+concerning fate. The question was to know whether, among the things which
+have never been and never will be, there are some possible; or whether all
+that is not, all that has never been, all that will never be, was
+impossible. A famous dialectician of the Megaric Sect, named Diodorus, gave
+a negative answer to the first of these two questions and an affirmative to
+the second; but Chrysippus vehemently opposed him. Here are two passages of
+Cicero (epist. 4, lib. 9, _Ad Familiar._): "[Greek: peri dynaton] me scito
+[Greek: kata Diodoron krinein]. Quapropter si venturus es, scito      [231]
+necesse esse te venire. Sin autem non es, [Greek: ton adynaton] est te
+venire. Nunc vide utra te [Greek: krisis] magis delectet, [Greek:
+Chrysippeia] ne, an haec; quam noster Diodorus [a Stoic who for a long time
+had lived in Cicero's house] non concoquebat." This is quoted from a letter
+that Cicero wrote to Varro. He sets forth more comprehensively the whole
+state of the question, in the little book _De Fato_. I am going to quote a
+few pieces (Cic., _De Fato_, p. m. 65): "Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam,
+in qua tibi cum Diodoro valente Dialectico magna luctatio est, deseras ...
+omne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. At hoc,
+Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est.
+Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit
+verum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse; et quicquid
+non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu etiam quae non sint futura, posse
+fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit: neque
+necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno
+Apollinis Oraculo editum esset.... Placet Diodoro, id solum fieri posse,
+quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit: qui locus attingit hanc
+quaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit; et quicquid fieri
+possit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse: nec magis commutari ex veris in
+falsa ea posse quae futura sunt, quam ea quae facta sunt: sed in factis
+immutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparent, ne
+inesse quidem videri: ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit, hic
+morietur hoc morbo: at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo tanta vis
+morbi non appareat, nihilominus futurum sit. Ita fit ut commutatio ex vero
+in falsum, ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit." Cicero makes it clear
+enough that Chrysippus often found himself in difficulties in this dispute,
+and that is no matter for astonishment: for the course he had chosen was
+not bound up with his dogma of fate, and, if he had known how, or had
+dared, to reason consistently, he would readily have adopted the whole
+hypothesis of Diodorus. We have seen already that the freedom he assigned
+to the soul, and his comparison of the cylinder, did not preclude the
+possibility that in reality all the acts of the human will were unavoidable
+consequences of fate. Hence it follows that everything which does not
+happen is impossible, and that there is nothing possible but that which
+actually comes to pass. Plutarch (_De Stoicor. Repugn._, pp. 1053, 1054)
+discomfits him completely, on that point as well as on the dispute    [232]
+with Diodorus, and maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogether
+contrary to the doctrine of _fatum_. Observe that the most eminent Stoics
+had written on this matter without following the same path. Arrian (in
+_Epict._, lib. 2, c. 29, p. m. 166) named four of them, who are Chrysippus,
+Cleanthes, Archidemus and Antipater. He evinces great scorn for this
+dispute; and M. Menage need not have cited him as a writer who had spoken
+in commendation of the work of Chrysippus [Greek: peri dynaton] ("citatur
+honorifice apud Arrianum", Menag. in _Laert._, I, 7, 341) for assuredly
+these words, "[Greek: gegraphe de kai Chrysippos thaumastos], etc., de his
+rebus mira scripsit Chrysippus", etc., are not in that connexion a eulogy.
+That is shown by the passages immediately before and after it. Dionysius of
+Halicarnassus (_De Collocat. Verbor._, c. 17, p. m. 11) mentions two
+treatises by Chrysippus, wherein, under a title that promised something
+different, much of the logicians' territory had been explored. The work was
+entitled "[Greek: peri tes syntaxeos ton tou logou meron], de partium
+orationis collocatione", and treated only of propositions true and false,
+possible and impossible, contingent and equivocal, etc., matter that our
+Schoolmen have pounded down and reduced to its essence. Take note that
+Chrysippus recognized that past things were necessarily true, which
+Cleanthes had not been willing to admit. (Arrian, _ubi supra_, p. m. 165.)
+"[Greek: Ou pan de parelelythos alethes anankaion esti, kathaper hoi peri
+Kleanthen pheresthai dokousi]. Non omne praeteritum ex necessitate verum
+est, ut illi qui Cleanthem sequuntur sentiunt." We have already seen (p.
+562, col. 2) that Abelard is alleged to have taught a doctrine which
+resembles that of Diodorus. I think that the Stoics pledged themselves to
+give a wider range to possible things than to future things, for the
+purpose of mitigating the odious and frightful conclusions which were drawn
+from their dogma of fatality.'
+
+It is sufficiently evident that Cicero when writing to Varro the words that
+have just been quoted (lib. 9, Ep. 4, _Ad Familiar._) had not enough
+comprehension of the effect of Diodorus's opinion, since he found it
+preferable. He presents tolerably well in his book _De Fato_ the opinions
+of those writers, but it is a pity that he has not always added the reasons
+which they employed. Plutarch in his treatise on the contradictions of the
+Stoics and M. Bayle are both surprised that Chrysippus was not of the same
+opinion as Diodorus, since he favours fatality. But Chrysippus and even his
+master Cleanthes were on that point more reasonable than is supposed. [233]
+That will be seen as we proceed. It is open to question whether the past is
+more necessary than the future. Cleanthes held the opinion that it is. The
+objection is raised that it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the future to
+happen, as it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the past to have happened.
+But there is this difference, that it is not possible to act on the past
+state, that would be a contradiction; but it is possible to produce some
+effect on the future. Yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same:
+the one cannot be changed, the other will not be; and once that is past, it
+will not be possible for it to be changed either.
+
+171. The famous Pierre Abelard expressed an opinion resembling that of
+Diodorus in the statement that God can do only that which he does. It was
+the third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which were
+censured at the Council of Sens. It had been taken from the third book of
+his _Introduction to Theology_, where he treats especially of the power of
+God. The reason he gave for his statement was that God can do only that
+which he wills. Now God cannot will to do anything other than that which he
+does, because, of necessity, he must will whatever is fitting. Hence it
+follows that all that which he does not, is not fitting, that he cannot
+will to do it, and consequently that he cannot do it. Abelard admits
+himself that this opinion is peculiar to him, that hardly anyone shares in
+it, that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and to reason and
+derogatory to the greatness of God. It appears that this author was a
+little too much inclined to speak and to think differently from others: for
+in reality this was only a dispute about words: he was changing the use of
+terms. Power and will are different faculties, whose objects also are
+different; it is confusing them to say that God can do only that which he
+wills. On the contrary, among various possibles, he wills only that which
+he finds the best. For all possibles are regarded as objects of power, but
+actual and existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretory
+will. Abelard himself acknowledged it. He raises this objection for
+himself: a reprobate can be saved; but he can only be saved if God saves
+him. God can therefore save him, and consequently do something that he does
+not. Abelard answers that it may indeed be said that this man can be saved
+in respect of the possibility of human nature, which is capable of
+salvation: but that it may not be said that God can save him in respect of
+God himself, because it is impossible that God should do that which he[234]
+must not do. But Abelard admits that it may very well be said in a sense,
+speaking absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation, that
+such an one who is reprobate can be saved, and that thus often that which
+God does not can be done. He could therefore have spoken like the rest, who
+mean nothing different when they say that God can save this man, and that
+he can do that which he does not.
+
+172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the Council
+of Constance, seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding. I
+think that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, without
+reason, they bring into use new and displeasing expressions. In our own
+time the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this same opinion, that what does
+not happen is impossible. He proves it by the statement that all the
+conditions requisite for a thing that shall not exist (_omnia rei non
+futurae requisita_) are never found together, and that the thing cannot
+exist otherwise. But who does not see that that only proves a hypothetical
+impossibility? It is true that a thing cannot exist when a requisite
+condition for it is lacking. But as we claim to be able to say that the
+thing can exist although it does not exist, we claim in the same way to be
+able to say that the requisite conditions can exist although they do not
+exist. Thus Mr. Hobbes's argument leaves the matter where it is. The
+opinion which was held concerning Mr. Hobbes, that he taught an absolute
+necessity of all things, brought upon him much discredit, and would have
+done him harm even had it been his only error.
+
+173. Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a blind
+necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will,
+and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not to him. It
+is true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure: for he
+grants God thought, after having divested him of understanding,
+_cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo_. There are even passages where
+he relents on the question of necessity. Nevertheless, as far as one can
+understand him, he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and
+he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine
+nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in
+refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is
+founded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply [235]
+no contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the
+romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still
+exist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such
+as those of Mademoiselle de Scudery, or as _Octavia_, are possible. Let us
+therefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please me
+well, on page 390, 'It is to-day', he says, 'a great embarrassment for the
+Spinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as impossible
+from all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die at The Hague,
+as it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are well aware that
+it is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a conclusion which
+disheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, because of the
+absurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common sense. They are not
+well pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universal
+and so evident as this one: All that which implies contradiction is
+impossible, and all that which implies no contradiction is possible.'
+
+174. One may say of M. Bayle, 'ubi bene, nemo melius', although one cannot
+say of him what was said of Origen, 'ubi male, nemo pejus'. I will only add
+that what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the definition of
+the _possible_ and the _impossible_. M. Bayle, however, adds here towards
+the end a remark which somewhat spoils his eminently reasonable statement.
+'Now what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden? Would
+Nature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?' He confuses
+here what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannot
+happen because it is not meet to be chosen. It is true that there would
+have been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza died in Leyden
+and not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible: the matter
+was therefore indifferent in respect of the power of God. But one must not
+suppose that any event, however small it be, can be regarded as indifferent
+in respect of his wisdom and his goodness. Jesus Christ has said divinely
+well that everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head. Thus the
+wisdom of God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks should
+happen otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have been
+more deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entire
+sequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference. To say that
+what has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of God, and[236]
+thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a false
+assumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion. It is confusing what
+is necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the principle of
+Wisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity,
+which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction. Spinoza, moreover,
+sought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not think that God was
+determined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treated
+as chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of his
+nature; just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles,
+without either knowing or willing this. For Euclid demonstrated that all
+angles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities of
+the diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are of
+necessity right angles, and that the contrary implies contradiction.
+
+175. There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the pretext
+of freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to
+regard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise.
+They did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity is
+preposterous in relation to God's actions _ad extra_, so moral necessity is
+worthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good,
+whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of
+goodness or of wisdom. And besides, the indifference which would keep the
+will in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been already
+shown: it would offend against the great principle of the determinant
+reason.
+
+176. Those who believe that God established good and evil by an arbitrary
+decree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and other
+absurdities still stranger. They deprive God of the designation _good_: for
+what cause could one have to praise him for what he does, if in doing
+something quite different he would have done equally well? And I have very
+often been surprised that divers Supralapsarian theologians, as for
+instance Samuel Rutherford, a Professor of Theology in Scotland, who wrote
+when the controversies with the Remonstrants were at their height, could
+have been deluded by so strange an idea. Rutherford (in his _Exercitationes
+Apologeticae pro Gratia_) says positively that nothing is unjust or morally
+bad in God's eyes before he has forbidden it: thus without this prohibition
+it would be a matter of indifference whether one murdered or saved a  [237]
+man, loved God or hated him, praised or blasphemed him. Nothing is so
+unreasonable as that. One may teach that God established good and evil by a
+positive law, or one may assert that there was something good and just
+before his decree, but that he is not required to conform to it, and that
+nothing prevents him from acting unjustly and from perhaps condemning
+innocence: but it all comes to the same thing, offering almost equal
+dishonour to God. For if justice was established arbitrarily and without
+any cause, if God came upon it by a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots,
+his goodness and his wisdom are not manifested in it, and there is nothing
+at all to attach him to it. If it is by a purely arbitrary decree, without
+any reason, that he has established or created what we call justice and
+goodness, then he can annul them or change their nature. Thus one would
+have no reason to assume that he will observe them always, as it would be
+possible to say he will observe them on the assumption that they are
+founded on reasons. The same would hold good more or less if his justice
+were different from ours, if (for example) it were written in his code that
+it is just to make the innocent eternally unhappy. According to these
+principles also, nothing would compel God to keep his word or would assure
+us of its fulfilment. For why should the law of justice, which states that
+reasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any other
+laws?
+
+177. All these three dogmas, albeit a little different from one another,
+namely, (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) that it is fixed,
+but it is not certain that God will observe it, and finally (3) that the
+justice we know is not that which he observes, destroy the confidence in
+God that gives us tranquillity, and the love of God that makes our
+happiness. There is nothing to prevent such a God from behaving as a tyrant
+and an enemy of honest folk, and from taking pleasure in that which we call
+evil. Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil principle of the
+Manichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox? At least he would
+be neutral and, as it were, suspended between the two, or even sometimes
+the one and sometimes the other. That would be as if someone were to say
+that Oromasdes and Arimanius reign in turns, according to which of the two
+is the stronger or the more adroit. It is like the saying of a certain
+Moghul woman. She, so it seems, having heard it said that formerly under
+Genghis Khan and his successors her nation had had dominion over most [238]
+of the North and East, told the Muscovites recently, when M. Isbrand went
+to China on behalf of the Czar, through the country of those Tartars, that
+the god of the Moghuls had been driven from Heaven, but that one day he
+would take his own place again. The true God is always the same: natural
+religion itself demands that he be essentially as good and wise as he is
+powerful. It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that God
+acts without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which does
+not find the eternal rules of goodness and of justice among its objects, or
+again to say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules.
+
+178. Some theologians who have written of God's right over creatures appear
+to have conceded to him an unrestricted right, an arbitrary and despotic
+power. They thought that would be placing divinity on the most exalted
+level that may be imagined for it, and that it would abase the creature
+before the Creator to such an extent that the Creator is bound by no laws
+of any kind with respect to the creature. There are passages from Twiss,
+Rutherford and some other Supralapsarians which imply that God cannot sin
+whatever he may do, because he is subject to no law. M. Bayle himself
+considers that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to the holiness of
+God (_Dictionary_, v. 'Paulicians', p. 2332 _in initio_); but I suppose
+that the intention of some of these writers was less bad than it seems to
+be. Apparently they meant by the term right, [Greek: anypeuthynian], a
+state wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions. But they will
+not have denied that God owes to himself what goodness and justice demand
+of him. On that matter one may see M. Amyraut's _Apology for Calvin_: it is
+true that Calvin appears orthodox on this subject, and that he is by no
+means one of the extreme Supralapsarians.
+
+179. Thus, when M. Bayle says somewhere that St. Paul extricates himself
+from predestination only through the consideration of God's absolute right,
+and the incomprehensibility of his ways, it is implied that, if one
+understood them, one would find them consistent with justice, God not being
+able to use his power otherwise. St. Paul himself says that it is a
+_depth_, but a depth of wisdom (_altitudo sapientiae_), and _justice_ is
+included in _the goodness of the All-wise_. I find that M. Bayle speaks
+very well elsewhere on the application of our notions of goodness to the
+actions of God (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 81, p. 139):
+'One must not assert here', he says, 'that the goodness of the        [239]
+infinite Being is not subject to the same rules as the goodness of the
+creature. For if there is in God an attribute that can be called goodness,
+the marks of goodness in general must apply to him. Now when we reduce
+goodness to the most general abstraction, we find therein the will to do
+good. Divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this
+general goodness, into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness,
+goodness of a father, goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you will
+find in each, as an inseparable attribute, the will to do good.'
+
+180. I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion of those who
+assert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice of
+God; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by the goodness
+of things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected to necessity in
+his actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is confusing
+metaphysical necessity with moral necessity. Here is what M. Bayle says in
+objection to this error (_Reply_, ch. 89, p. 203): 'The consequence of this
+doctrine will be, that before God resolved upon creating the world he saw
+nothing better in virtue than in vice, and that his ideas did not show him
+that virtue was more worthy of his love than vice. That leaves no
+distinction between natural right and positive right; there will no longer
+be anything unalterable or inevitable in morals; it will have been just as
+possible for God to command people to be vicious as to command them to be
+virtuous; and one will have no certainty that the moral laws will not one
+day be abrogated, as the ceremonial laws of the Jews were. This, in a word,
+leads us straight to the belief that God was the free author, not only of
+goodness and of virtue, but also of truth and of the essence of things.
+That is what certain of the Cartesians assert, and I confess that their
+opinion (see the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, p. 554)
+might be of some avail in certain circumstances. Yet it is open to dispute
+for so many reasons, and subject to consequences so troublesome (see
+chapter 152 of the same Continuation) that there are scarcely any extremes
+it were not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one. It opens the
+door to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion that
+this proposition, three and three make six, is only true where and during
+the time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of the
+universe; and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year.[240]
+All that depends on the free will of God could have been limited to certain
+places and certain times, like the Judaic ceremonies. This conclusion will
+be extended to all the laws of the Decalogue, if the actions they command
+are in their nature divested of all goodness to the same degree as the
+actions they forbid.'
+
+181. To say that God, having resolved to create man just as he is, could
+not but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, because
+it is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbing
+his work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the common opinion.
+Virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent the
+imperfection of those who are virtuous, or even of those who have to do
+with them. And they have that power by their nature and by the nature of
+rational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold a different
+opinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion and
+harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in music
+only when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument. But that is
+exactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules
+belong to it already in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks of
+singing, since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soon
+as one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of the
+rational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that very
+reason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature.
+
+182. M. Bayle has inserted a special chapter in his Continuation of _Divers
+Thoughts on the Comet_ (it is chapter 152) where he shows 'that the
+Christian Doctors teach that there are things which are just antecedently
+to God's decrees'. Some theologians of the Augsburg Confession censured
+some of the Reformed who appeared to be of a different opinion; and this
+error was regarded as if it were a consequence of the absolute decree,
+which doctrine seems to exempt the will of God from any kind of reason,
+_ubi stat pro ratione voluntas_. But, as I have observed already on various
+occasions, Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are in
+conformity with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might prove
+this conformity in detail are unknown to us. Thus, according to him, the
+rules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God. M.
+Bayle, in the same place, quotes a passage from the celebrated M. Turretin
+which draws a distinction between natural divine laws and positive    [241]
+divine laws. Moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial of the second.
+Samuel Desmarests, a celebrated theologian formerly at Groningen, and Herr
+Strinesius, who is still at Frankfort on the Oder, advocated this same
+distinction; and I think that it is the opinion most widely accepted even
+among the Reformed. Thomas Aquinas and all the Thomists were of the same
+opinion, with the bulk of the Schoolmen and the theologians of the Roman
+Church. The Casuists also held to that idea: I count Grotius among the most
+eminent of them, and he was followed in this point by his commentators.
+Herr Pufendorf appeared to be of a different opinion, which he insisted on
+maintaining in the face of censure from some theologians; but he need not
+be taken into account, not having advanced far enough in subjects of this
+kind. He makes a vigorous protest against the absolute decree, in his
+_Fecialis divinus_, and yet he approves what is worst in the opinions of
+the champions of this decree, and without which this decree (as others of
+the Reformed explain) becomes endurable. Aristotle was very orthodox on
+this matter of justice, and the Schoolmen followed him: they distinguish,
+just as Cicero and the Jurists do, between perpetual right, which is
+binding on all and everywhere, and positive right, which is only for
+certain times and certain peoples. I once read with enjoyment the
+_Euthyphro_ of Plato, who makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point,
+and M. Bayle has called attention to the same passage.
+
+183. M. Bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in a
+certain passage, which it will be well to quote here in its entirety, long
+as it is (vol. II of the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_,
+ch. 152, p. 771 _seqq._): 'According to the teaching of countless writers
+of importance', he says, 'there is in nature and in the essence of certain
+things a moral good or evil that precedes the divine decree. They prove
+this doctrine principally through the frightful consequences that attend
+the opposite dogma. Thus from the proposition that to do wrong to no man
+would be a good action, not in itself but by an arbitrary dispensation of
+God's will, it would follow that God could have given to man a law directly
+opposed at all points to the commandments of the Decalogue. That is
+horrifying. But here is a more direct proof, one derived from metaphysics.
+One thing is certain, that the existence of God is not an effect of his
+will. He exists not because he wills his existence, but through the   [242]
+necessity of his infinite nature. His power and his knowledge exist through
+the same necessity. He is all-powerful, he knows all things, not because he
+wills it thus, but because these are attributes necessarily identified with
+him. The dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power, he
+gives effect outside himself only to that which he wills, and he leaves all
+the rest in the state of mere possibility. Thence it comes that this
+dominion extends only over the existence of creatures, and not over their
+essential being. God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leave
+them in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them without giving
+them their essential properties. He had of necessity to make man a rational
+animal and to give the round shape to a circle, since, according to his
+eternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of his will, the essence of
+man lay in the properties of being animal and rational, and since the
+essence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant from
+the centre as to all its parts. This is what has caused the Christian
+philosophers to acknowledge that the essences of things are eternal, and
+that there are propositions of eternal truth; consequently that the
+essences of things and the truth of the first principles are immutable.
+That is to be understood not only of theoretical but also of practical
+first principles, and of all the propositions that contain the true
+definition of creatures. These essences and these truths emanate from the
+same necessity of nature as the knowledge of God. Since therefore it is by
+the nature of things that God exists, that he is all-powerful, and that he
+has perfect knowledge of all things, it is also by the nature of things
+that matter, the triangle, man and certain actions of man, etc., have such
+and such properties essentially. God saw from all eternity and in all
+necessity the essential relations of numbers, and the identity of the
+subject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of each
+thing. He saw likewise that the term just is included in these
+propositions: to esteem what is estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor,
+fulfil the conditions of a contract, and so on, with many others relating
+to morals. One is therefore justified in saying that the precepts of
+natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is
+enjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practise what they contain
+even though God should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that
+respect. Pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts to
+that ideal moment when God has yet decreed nothing, we find in the    [243]
+ideas of God the principles of morals under terms that imply an obligation.
+We understand these maxims as certain, and derived from the eternal and
+immutable order: it beseems the rational creature to conform to reason; a
+rational creature conforming to reason is to be commended, but not
+conforming thereto is blameworthy. You would not dare to deny that these
+truths impose upon man a duty in relation to all acts which are in
+conformity with strict reason, such as these: one must esteem all that is
+estimable; render good for good; do wrong to no man; honour one's father;
+render to every man that which is his due, etc. Now since by the very
+nature of things, and before the divine laws, the truths of morality impose
+upon man certain duties, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius were justified in
+saying that if there were no God we should nevertheless be obliged to
+conform to natural law. Others have said that even supposing all rational
+beings in existence were to perish, true propositions would remain true.
+Cajetan maintained that if he remained alone in the universe, all other
+things without any exception having been destroyed, the knowledge that he
+had of the nature of a rose would nevertheless subsist.'
+
+184. The late Jacob Thomasius, a celebrated Professor at Leipzig, made the
+apt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of Daniel
+Stahl, a Jena professor, that it is not advisable to go altogether beyond
+God, and that one must not say, with some Scotists, that the eternal
+verities would exist even though there were no understanding, not even that
+of God. For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which gives
+reality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein.
+All reality must be founded on something existent. It is true that an
+atheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry would
+have no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent,
+but there would be nothing possible. That, however, does not hinder those
+who do not see the connexion of all things one with another and with God
+from being able to understand certain sciences, without knowing their first
+source, which is in God. Aristotle, although he also scarcely knew that
+source, nevertheless said something of the same kind which was very
+apposite. He acknowledged that the principles of individual forms of
+knowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them;
+and this superior knowledge must have being, and consequently God, the[244]
+source of being, for its object. Herr Dreier of Koenigsberg has aptly
+observed that the true metaphysics which Aristotle sought, and which he
+called [Greek: ten zetoumenen], his _desideratum_, was theology.
+
+185. Yet the same M. Bayle, who says so much that is admirable in order to
+prove that the rules of goodness and justice, and the eternal verities in
+general, exist by their nature, and not by an arbitrary choice of God, has
+spoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage (Continuation of
+_Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, vol. II, ch. 114, towards the end). After
+having given an account of the opinion of M. Descartes and a section of his
+followers, who maintain that God is the free cause of truths and of
+essences, he adds (p. 554): 'I have done all that I could to gain true
+understanding of this dogma and to find the solution of the difficulties
+surrounding it. I confess to you quite simply that I still cannot properly
+fathom it. That does not discourage me; I suppose, as other philosophers in
+other cases have supposed, that time will unfold the meaning of this noble
+paradox. I wish that Father Malebranche had thought fit to defend it, but
+he took other measures.' Is it possible that the enjoyment of doubt can
+have such influence upon a gifted man as to make him wish and hope for the
+power to believe that two contradictories never exist together for the sole
+reason that God forbade them to, and, moreover, that God could have issued
+them an order to ensure that they always walked together? There is indeed a
+noble paradox! Father Malebranche showed great wisdom in taking other
+measures.
+
+186. I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously
+of this opinion, although he had adherents who found this easy to believe,
+and would in all simplicity follow him where he only made pretence to go.
+It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his philosophic feints: he
+prepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he discovered a
+trick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in
+the strictest sense. I suspect that he had in mind here another
+extraordinary manner of speaking, of his own invention, which was to say
+that affirmations and negations, and acts of inner judgement in general,
+are operations of the will. Through this artifice the eternal verities,
+which until the time of Descartes had been named an object of the divine
+understanding, suddenly became an object of God's will. Now the acts of his
+will are free, therefore God is the free cause of the verities. That  [245]
+is the outcome of the matter. _Spectatum admissi._ A slight change in the
+meaning of terms has caused all this commotion. But if the affirmations of
+necessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind, these
+actions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to choose. It
+seems that M. Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the nature
+of freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he
+extended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths
+to be free in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom.
+
+187. M. Bayle, who with others conceives this to be a freedom of
+indifference, that God had had to establish (for instance) the truths of
+numbers, and to ordain that three times three made nine, whereas he could
+have commanded them to make ten, imagines in this strange opinion,
+supposing it were possible to defend it, some kind of advantage gained
+against the Stratonists. Strato was one of the leaders of the School of
+Aristotle, and the successor of Theophrastus; he maintained (according to
+Cicero's account) that this world had been formed such as it is by Nature
+or by a necessary cause devoid of cognition. I admit that that might be so,
+if God had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws of
+motion alone. But without God there would not even have been any reason for
+existence, and still less for any particular existence of things: thus
+Strato's system is not to be feared.
+
+188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not admit
+plastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others had
+introduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the Spinozists,
+take advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with M. le Clerc.
+Under the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent cause can produce
+nothing where contrivance appears, he is far from conceding to me that
+_preformation_ which produces naturally the organs of animals, and _the
+system of a harmony pre-established by God_ in bodies, to make them respond
+in accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls.
+But it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligent
+cause, which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds of
+plants and animals, and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains
+them, was formed by the hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilful
+than a watchmaker, who himself makes machines and automata that are   [246]
+capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed
+intelligence.
+
+189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the Stratonists, in
+case one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of God:
+he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfect
+regularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity springs only from
+the nature and necessity of things, without being directed by any
+cognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato thence infer that the
+world also could have become regular through a blind necessity. But it is
+easy to answer that. In the region of the eternal verities are found all
+the possibles, and consequently the regular as well as the irregular: there
+must be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity,
+and this reason can only be found in understanding. Moreover these very
+truths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of
+them; for they would not exist if there were no divine understanding
+wherein they are realized, so to speak. Hence Strato does not attain his
+end, which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the origin
+of things.
+
+190. The difficulty that M. Bayle has imagined in connexion with Strato
+seems a little too subtle and far-fetched. That is termed: _timere, ubi non
+est timor_. He makes another difficulty, which has just as slight a
+foundation, namely, that God would be subjected to a kind of _fatum_. Here
+are his words (p. 555): 'If they are propositions of eternal truth, which
+are such by their nature and not by God's institution, if they are not true
+by a free decree of his will, but if on the contrary he has recognized them
+as true of necessity, because such was their nature, there is a kind of
+_fatum_ to which he is subjected; there is an absolutely insurmountable
+natural necessity. Thence comes also the result that the divine
+understanding in the infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hit
+upon their perfect conformity with their objects, without the guidance of
+any cognition; for it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplary
+cause had served as a plan for the acts of God's understanding. One would
+never that way find eternal ideas or any first intelligence. One must say,
+then, that a nature which exists of necessity always finds its way, without
+any need for it to be shown. How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a
+Stratonist?'
+
+191. But again it is easy to answer. This so-called _fatum_, which    [247]
+binds even the Divinity, is nothing but God's own nature, his own
+understanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness;
+it is a happy necessity, without which he would be neither good nor wise.
+Is it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy?
+Is our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying? And
+should we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if that
+depended upon us? One must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom to
+destroy oneself and to pity the Divinity for not having that freedom. M.
+Bayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an
+extravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make the
+will independent of reason.
+
+192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the
+infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect
+conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. This
+objection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through its
+distinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinct
+ideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when it
+comes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. Besides, M.
+Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for
+seeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning are in God in a
+transcendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in his
+understanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an order and a
+_priority of nature_, whereas with us there is a _priority of time_. It is
+therefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one
+stroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be said
+that he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition. On the contrary, it
+is because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also
+perfect.
+
+193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of the
+rules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one
+should have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a
+truth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprising
+that there should be people who believe that God only half observes these
+rules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to
+recognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that
+God could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famous
+Alfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by       [248]
+certain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his
+name. This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world
+had consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently the
+Ptolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. He
+believed therefore that something better planned could have been made, and
+he was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with the
+discoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledge of the gravity of the
+planets, he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the true
+system is marvellous. We see, therefore, that here the question concerned
+the more or less only; Alfonso maintained that better could have been done,
+and his opinion was censured by everyone.
+
+194. Yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically such a
+belief; and I have many times wondered that gifted and pious persons should
+have been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and the perfection of
+God. For to assert that he knows what is best, that he can do it and that
+he does it not, is to avow that it rested with his will only to make the
+world better than it is; but that is what one calls lacking goodness. It is
+acting against that axiom already quoted: _Minus bonum habet rationem
+mali_. If some adduce experience to prove that God could have done better,
+they set themselves up as ridiculous critics of his works. To such will be
+given the answer given to all those who criticize God's course of action,
+and who from this same assumption, that is, the alleged defects of the
+world, would infer that there is an evil God, or at least a God neutral
+between good and evil. And if we hold the same opinion as King Alfonso, we
+shall, I say, receive this answer: You have known the world only since the
+day before yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carp
+at the world. Wait until you know more of the world and consider therein
+especially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic bodies);
+and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all
+imagination. Let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and the
+goodness of the author of things, even in things that we know not. We find
+in the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us be
+aware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us if
+we are wise: it will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall be
+happy in it if we wish to be.
+
+                                                                      [249]
+195. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because
+there is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce one
+which would be more perfect. I answer that what can be said of a creature
+or of a particular substance, which can always be surpassed by another, is
+not to be applied to the universe, which, since it must extend through all
+future eternity, is an infinity. Moreover, there is an infinite number of
+creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual
+division of the _continuum_ to infinity. And infinity, that is to say, the
+accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly speaking,
+not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannot
+say whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute those
+who make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world;
+for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as a
+substance.
+
+196. It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the universe; and
+the adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible universe may be
+better than the other, to infinity; but there he would be mistaken, and it
+is that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were true, it would follow
+that God had not produced any universe at all: for he is incapable of
+acting without reason, and that would be even acting against reason. It is
+as if one were to suppose that God had decreed to make a material sphere,
+with no reason for making it of any particular size. This decree would be
+useless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect. It
+would be quite another matter if God decreed to draw from a given point one
+straight line to another given straight line, without any determination of
+the angle, either in the decree or in its circumstances. For in this case
+the determination would spring from the nature of the thing, the line would
+be perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that is
+determined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creation
+of the best of all possible universes, all the more since God not only
+decrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the best of all.
+For God decrees nothing without knowledge, and he makes no separate
+decrees, which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these we
+have sufficiently explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees.
+
+197. M. Diroys, whom I knew in Rome, theologian to Cardinal d'Estrees,
+wrote a book entitled _Proofs and Assumptions in Favour of_ _the      [250]
+Christian Religion_, published in Paris in the year 1683. M. Bayle (_Reply
+to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 165, p. 1058) recounts
+this objection brought up by M. Diroys: 'There is one more difficulty', he
+says, 'which it is no less important to meet than those given earlier,
+since it causes more trouble to those who judge goods and evils by
+considerations founded on the purest and most lofty maxims. This is that
+God being the supreme wisdom and goodness, it seems to them that he ought
+to do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish them to be done,
+following the rules of wisdom and of goodness which God has imprinted in
+them, and as they would be obliged themselves to do these things if they
+depended upon them. Thus, seeing that the affairs of the world do not go so
+well as, in their opinion, they might go, and as they would go if they
+interfered themselves, they conclude that God, who is infinitely better and
+wiser than they, or rather wisdom and goodness itself, does not concern
+himself with these affairs.'
+
+198. M. Diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this, which I will not
+repeat, since I have sufficiently answered the objection in more than one
+passage, and that has been the chief end of all my discourse. But he makes
+one assertion with which I cannot agree. He claims that the objection
+proves too much. One must again quote his own words with M. Bayle, p. 1059:
+'If it does not behove the supreme Wisdom and Goodness to fail to do what
+is best and most perfect, it follows that all Beings are eternally,
+immutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can be, since
+nothing can change except by passing either from a state less good to a
+better, or from a better to a less good. Now that cannot happen if it does
+not behove God to fail to do that which is best and most perfect, when he
+can do it. It will therefore be necessary that all beings be eternally and
+essentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue as perfect as God can give
+them. Now all that which is eternally and essentially as perfect as God can
+make it proceeds essentially from him; in a word, is eternally and
+essentially good as he is, and consequently it is God, as he is. That is
+the bearing of this maxim, that it is repugnant to supreme justice and
+goodness not to make things as good and perfect as they can be. For it is
+essential to essential wisdom and goodness to banish all that is repugnant
+to it altogether. One must therefore assert as a primary truth concerning
+the conduct of God in relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnant
+to this goodness and this wisdom in making things less perfect than   [251]
+they could be, or in permitting the goods that it has produced either
+completely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate. For it causes no
+offence to God that there should be other Beings than he, that is beings
+who can be not what they are, and do not what they do or do what they do
+not.'
+
+199. M. Bayle calls this answer paltry, but I find his counter-objection
+involved. M. Bayle will have those who are for the two principles to take
+their stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme freedom of God: for if
+he were compelled to produce all that which he can, he would produce also
+sins and sorrows. Thus the Dualists could from the existence of evil
+conclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the principle, if this
+principle were as much inclined to evil as to good. There M. Bayle carries
+the notion of freedom too far: for even though God be supremely free, it
+does not follow that he maintains an indifference of equipoise: and even
+though he be inclined to act, it does not follow that he is compelled by
+this inclination to produce all that which he can. He will produce only
+that which he wills, for his inclination prompts him to good. I admit the
+supreme freedom of God, but I do not confuse it with indifference of
+equipoise, as if he could act without reason. M. Diroys therefore imagines
+that the Dualists, in their insistence that the single good principle
+produce no evil, ask too much; for by the same reason, according to M.
+Diroys, they ought also to ask that he should produce the greatest good,
+the less good being a kind of evil. I hold that the Dualists are wrong in
+respect of the first point, and that they would be right in respect of the
+second, where M. Diroys blames them without cause; or rather that one can
+reconcile the evil, or the less good, in some parts with the best in the
+whole. If the Dualists demanded that God should do the best, they would not
+be demanding too much. They are mistaken rather in claiming that the best
+in the whole should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore what
+God has made is not the best.
+
+200. But M. Diroys maintains that if God always produces the best he will
+produce other Gods; otherwise each substance that he produced would not be
+the best nor the most perfect. But he is mistaken, through not taking into
+account the order and connexion of things. If each substance taken
+separately were perfect, all would be alike; which is neither fitting nor
+possible. If they were Gods, it would not have been possible to       [252]
+produce them. The best system of things will therefore not contain Gods; it
+will always be a system of bodies (that is, things arranged according to
+time and place) and of souls which represent and are aware of bodies, and
+in accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed. So, as the
+design of a building may be the best of all in respect of its purpose, of
+expense and of circumstances; and as an arrangement of some figured
+representations of bodies which is given to you may be the best that one
+can find, it is easy to imagine likewise that a structure of the universe
+may be the best of all, without becoming a god. The connexion and order of
+things brings it about that the body of every animal and of every plant is
+composed of other animals and of other plants, or of other living and
+organic beings; consequently there is subordination, and one body, one
+substance serves the other: thus their perfection cannot be equal.
+
+201. M. Bayle thinks (p. 1063) that M. Diroys has confused two different
+propositions. According to the one, God must do all things as wise and
+virtuous persons would wish that they should be done, by the rules of
+wisdom and of goodness that God has imprinted in them, and as they would be
+obliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon them. The other
+is that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and goodness to fail to do
+what is best and most perfect. M. Diroys (in M. Bayle's opinion) sets up
+the first proposition as an objection for himself, and replies to the
+second. But therein he is justified, as it seems to me. For these two
+propositions are connected, the second is a result of the first: to do less
+good than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness. To be the
+best, and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise, comes to
+the same thing. And it may be said that, if we could understand the
+structure and the economy of the universe, we should find that it is made
+and directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it, since God
+cannot fail to do thus. This necessity nevertheless is only of a moral
+nature: and I admit that if God were forced by a metaphysical necessity to
+produce that which he makes, he would produce all the possibles, or
+nothing; and in this sense M. Bayle's conclusion would be fully correct.
+But as all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the same
+world-sequence, for that very reason all the possibles cannot be produced,
+and it must be said that God is not forced, metaphysically speaking,  [253]
+into the creation of this world. One may say that as soon as God has
+decreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles,
+all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united,
+produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. It
+is true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it can
+only be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, which
+cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to choose the
+best. Yet God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in such a
+manner that there can be nothing better: otherwise not only would others
+have cause to criticize what he makes, but, more than that, he would not
+himself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for its
+imperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divine
+nature. This perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection would be to
+him an inevitable source of grief, as M. Bayle says on another occasion
+(p.953).
+
+202. M. Diroys' argument contains a false assumption, in his statement that
+nothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a better or
+from a better to a less good; and that thus, if God makes the best, what he
+has produced cannot be changed: it would be an eternal substance, a god.
+But I do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in relation to good or
+evil, without changing its degree. In the transition from enjoyment of
+music to enjoyment of painting, or _vice versa_ from the pleasure of the
+eyes to that of the ears, the degree of enjoyment may remain the same, the
+latter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty. If the
+quadrature of the circle should come to pass or (what is the same thing)
+the circulature of the square, that is, if the circle were changed into a
+square of the same size, or the square into a circle, it would be difficult
+to say, on the whole, without having regard to some special use, whether
+one would have gained or lost. Thus the best may be changed into another
+which neither yields to it nor surpasses it: but there will always be an
+order among them, and that the best order possible. Taking the whole
+sequence of things, the best has no equal; but one part of the sequence may
+be equalled by another part of the same sequence. Besides it might be said
+that the whole sequence of things to infinity may be the best possible,
+although what exists all through the universe in each portion of time be
+not the best. It might be therefore that the universe became even     [254]
+better and better, if the nature of things were such that it was not
+permitted to attain to the best all at once. But these are problems of
+which it is hard for us to judge.
+
+203. M. Bayle says (p. 1064) that the question whether God could have made
+things more perfect than he made them is also very difficult, and that the
+reasons for and against are very strong. But it is, so it seems to me, as
+if one were to question whether God's actions are consistent with the most
+perfect wisdom and the greatest goodness. It is a very strange thing, that
+by changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon what is, if properly
+understood, as clear as anything can be. The reasons to the contrary have
+no force, being founded only on the semblance of defects; and M. Bayle's
+objection, which tends to prove that the law of the best would impose upon
+God a true metaphysical necessity, is only an illusion that springs from
+the misuse of terms. M. Bayle formerly held a different opinion, when he
+commended that of Father Malebranche, which was akin to mine on this
+subject. But M. Arnauld having written in opposition to Father Malebranche,
+M. Bayle altered his opinion; and I suppose that his tendency towards
+doubt, which increased in him with the years, was conducive to that result.
+M. Arnauld was doubtless a great man, and his authority has great weight:
+he made sundry good observations in his writings against Father
+Malebranche, but he was not justified in contesting those of his statements
+that were akin to mine on the rule of the best.
+
+204. The excellent author of _The Search for Truth_, having passed from
+philosophy to theology, published finally an admirable treatise on Nature
+and Grace. Here he showed in his way (as M. Bayle explained in his _Divers
+Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 234) that the events which spring from the
+enforcement of general laws are not the object of a particular will of God.
+It is true that when one wills a thing one wills also in a sense everything
+that is necessarily attached to it, and in consequence God cannot will
+general laws without also willing in a sense all the particular effects
+that must of necessity be derived from them. But it is always true that
+these particular events are not willed for their own sake, and that is what
+is meant by the expression that they are not willed by a _particular_ and
+direct _will_. There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outside
+himself, he made choice of a manner of action which should be worthy  [255]
+of the supremely perfect Being, that is, which should be infinitely simple
+and uniform, but yet of an infinite productivity. One may even suppose that
+this manner of action by _general acts of will_ appeared to him
+preferable--although there must thence result some superfluous events (and
+even bad if they are taken separately, that is my own addition)--to another
+manner more composed and more regular; such is Father Malebranche's
+opinion. Nothing is more appropriate than this assumption (according to the
+opinion of M. Bayle, when he wrote his _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_) to
+solve a thousand difficulties which are brought up against divine
+providence: 'To ask God', he says, 'why he has made things which serve to
+render men more wicked, that would be to ask why God has carried out his
+plan (which can only be of infinite beauty) by the simplest and most
+uniform methods, and why, by a complexity of decrees that would unceasingly
+cut across one another, he has not prevented the wrong use of man's free
+will.' He adds 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have an
+end worthy of God'.
+
+205. On these foundations he makes some good reflexions (ch. 231)
+concerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of the
+wicked. 'I shall have no scruples', he says, 'about saying that all those
+who are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very little
+upon the nature of God, and that they have reduced the obligations of a
+cause which directs all things, to the scope of a providence altogether
+subordinate; and that is small-minded. What then! Should God, after having
+made free causes and necessary causes, in a mixture infinitely well fitted
+to show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom, have established laws
+consistent with the nature of free causes, but so lacking in firmness that
+the slightest trouble that came upon a man would overthrow them entirely,
+to the ruin of human freedom? A mere city governor will become an object of
+ridicule if he changes his regulations and orders as often as someone is
+pleased to murmur against him. And shall God, whose laws concern a good so
+universal that all of the world that is visible to us perchance enters into
+it as no more than a trifling accessary, be bound to depart from his laws,
+because they to-day displease the one and to-morrow the other? Or again
+because a superstitious person, deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presages
+something deadly, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice? Or
+because a good soul, who yet does not value virtue highly enough to   [256]
+believe that to have none is punishment enough in itself, is shocked that a
+wicked man should become rich and enjoy vigorous health? Can one form any
+falser notions of a universal providence? Everyone agrees that this law of
+nature, the strong prevails over the weak, has been very wisely laid down,
+and that it would be absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on a
+fragile vase which is the delight of its owner, God should depart from this
+law in order to spare that owner vexation. Should one then not confess that
+it is just as absurd to maintain that God must depart from the same law to
+prevent a wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man? The
+more the wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and of
+honour, the more does he exceed the good man in strength, so that if he
+comes to grips with the good man he must, according to the course of
+nature, ruin him. If, moreover, they are both engaged in the business of
+finance, the wicked man must, according to the same course of nature, grow
+richer than the good man, just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than a
+fire of straw. Those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimes
+as unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass should
+not break it: for his organs being arranged as they are, neither the food
+that he takes nor the air that he breathes can, according to natural laws,
+be detrimental to his health. Therefore those who complain about his health
+complain of God's failure to violate the laws which he has established. And
+in this they are all the more unfair because, through combinations and
+concatenations which were in the power of God alone, it happens often
+enough that the course of nature brings about the punishment of sin.'
+
+206. It is a thousand pities that M. Bayle so soon quitted the way he had
+so auspiciously begun, of reasoning on behalf of providence: for his work
+would have been fruitful, and in saying fine things he would have said good
+things as well. I agree with Father Malebranche that God does things in the
+way most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he, with regard to
+'general and particular acts of will'. As God can do nothing without
+reasons, even when he acts miraculously, it follows that he has no will
+about individual events but what results from some general truth or will.
+Thus I would say that God never has a _particular will_ such as this Father
+implies, that is to say, _a particular primitive will_.
+
+                                                                      [257]
+207. I think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from other
+events in this regard: for reasons of an order superior to that of Nature
+prompt God to perform them. Thus I would not say, with this Father, that
+God departs from general laws whenever order requires it: he departs from
+one law only for another law more applicable, and what order requires
+cannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order, which is one of the
+general laws. The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in the strictest
+sense) is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures of created
+things. That is why, should God make a general law causing bodies to be
+attracted the one to the other, he could only achieve its operation by
+perpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the organs of human
+bodies should conform to the will of the soul, according to the _system of
+occasional causes_, this law also would come into operation only through
+perpetual miracles.
+
+208. Thus one must suppose that, among the general rules which are not
+absolutely necessary, God chooses those which are the most natural, which
+it is easiest to explain, and which also are of greatest service for the
+explanation of other things. That is doubtless the conclusion most
+excellent and most pleasing; and even though the System of Pre-established
+Harmony were not necessary otherwise, because it banishes superfluous
+miracles, God would have chosen it as being the most harmonious. The ways
+of God are those most simple and uniform: for he chooses rules that least
+restrict one another. They are also the most _productive_ in proportion to
+the _simplicity of ways and means_. It is as if one said that a certain
+house was the best that could have been constructed at a certain cost. One
+may, indeed, reduce these two conditions, simplicity and productivity, to a
+single advantage, which is to produce as much perfection as is possible:
+thus Father Malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine.
+Even if the effect were assumed to be greater, but the process less simple,
+I think one might say that, when all is said and done, the effect itself
+would be less great, taking into account not only the final effect but also
+the mediate effect. For the wisest mind so acts, as far as it is possible,
+that the _means_ are also in a sense _ends_, that is, they are desirable
+not only on account of what they do, but on account of what they are. The
+more intricate processes take up too much ground, too much space, too much
+place, too much time that might have been better employed.
+
+                                                                      [258]
+209. Now since everything resolves itself into this greatest perfection, we
+return to my law of the best. For perfection includes not only the _moral
+good_ and the _physical good_ of intelligent creatures, but also the good
+which is purely _metaphysical_, and concerns also creatures devoid of
+reason. It follows that the evil that is in rational creatures happens only
+by concomitance, not by antecedent will but by a consequent will, as being
+involved in the best possible plan; and the metaphysical good which
+includes everything makes it necessary sometimes to admit physical evil and
+moral evil, as I have already explained more than once. It so happens that
+the ancient Stoics were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarked
+upon this himself in his _Dictionary_ in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem.
+T. It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to face
+him with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments
+that he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in his
+work on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did the
+nature of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind,
+make also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chief
+design of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in keeping
+with the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and producing many
+great things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, found that some
+drawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in conformity with the
+original design and purpose; they came about as a sequel to the work, they
+existed only as consequences. For the formation of the human body,
+Chrysippus said, the finest idea as well as the very utility of the work
+demanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin, fine bones;
+but because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being able
+to resist blows. Nature made health, and at the same time it was necessary
+by a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up.
+The same thing applies with regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature,
+which brought it forth, produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices. I
+have not translated literally, for which reason I give here the actual
+Latin of Aulus Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand that
+language (Aul. Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1): "Idem Chrysippus in eod. lib.
+(quarto, [Greek: peri pronoias]) tractat consideratque, dignumque esse id
+quaeri putat, [Greek: ei hai ton anthropon nosoi kata physin gignontai]. Id
+est, naturane ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc mundi et [259]
+genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum,
+quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale
+naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios. Nunquam enim hoc
+convenisse naturae auctori parentique rerum omnium bonarum. Sed quum multa,
+inquit, atque magna gigneret, pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia
+quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia:
+eaque non per naturam, sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit,
+quod ipse appellat [Greek: kata parakolouthesin]. Sicut, inquit, quum
+corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis
+postulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. Sed hanc
+utilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est,
+ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis
+fragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus
+paritur. Sic Hercle, inquit, dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturae
+gignitur, vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt." I do not
+think that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable, considering
+his ignorance of the first man's fall, the knowledge of which has only
+reached us through revelation, and which indeed is the true cause of our
+miseries. If we had sundry like extracts from the works of Chrysippus, or
+rather if we had his works, we should have a more favourable idea than we
+have of the beauty of his genius.'
+
+210. Let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered M. Bayle. After
+having quoted in his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III,
+ch. 155, p. 962) these words of M. Jacquelot, which are much to my liking:
+'To change the order of the universe is something of infinitely greater
+consequence than the prosperity of a good man,' he adds: 'This thought has
+something dazzling about it: Father Malebranche has placed it in the best
+possible light; and he has persuaded some of his readers that a system
+which is simple and very productive is more consistent with God's wisdom
+than a system more composite and less productive in proportion, but more
+capable of averting irregularities. M. Bayle was one of those who believed
+that Father Malebranche in that way gave a wonderful solution.' (It is M.
+Bayle himself speaking.) 'But it is almost impossible to be satisfied with
+it after having read M. Arnauld's books against this system, and after
+having contemplated the vast and boundless idea of the supremely      [260]
+perfect Being. This idea shows us that nothing is easier for God than to
+follow a plan which is simple, productive, regular and opportune for all
+creatures simultaneously.'
+
+211. While I was in France I showed to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had composed
+in Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God; it was not only
+before his disputes with Father Malebranche, but even before the book on
+_The Search for Truth_ appeared. That principle which I uphold here, namely
+that sin had been permitted because it had been involved in the best plan
+for the universe, was already applied there; and M. Arnauld did not seem to
+be startled by it. But the slight contentions which he has since had with
+Father Malebranche have given him cause to examine this subject with closer
+attention, and to be more severe in his judgement thereof. Yet I am not
+altogether pleased with M. Bayle's manner of expression here on this
+subject, and I am not of the opinion 'that a more composite and less
+productive plan might be more capable of averting irregularities'. Rules
+are the expression of general will: the more one observes rules, the more
+regularity there is; simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules. I
+shall be met with the objection that a uniform system will be free from
+irregularities. I answer that it would be an irregularity to be too
+uniform, that would offend against the rules of harmony. _Et citharoedus
+Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem_. I believe therefore that God can
+follow a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that the
+best and the most regular is always opportune for all creatures
+simultaneously; and I judge _a posteriori_, for the plan chosen by God is
+not so. I have, however, also shown this _a priori_ in examples taken from
+mathematics, and I will presently give another here. An Origenist who
+maintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be still
+easier to satisfy. He will say, in imitation of St. Paul's saying about the
+sufferings of this life, that those which are finite are not worthy to be
+compared with eternal bliss.
+
+212. What is deceptive in this subject, as I have already observed, is that
+one feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the whole is
+also the best possible in each part. One reasons thus in geometry, when it
+is a question _de maximis et minimis_. If the road from A to B that one
+proposes to take is the shortest possible, and if this road passes by C,
+then the road from A to C, part of the first, must also be the shortest
+possible. But the inference from _quantity_ to _quality_ is not always[261]
+right, any more than that which is drawn from equals to similars. For
+_equals_ are those whose quantity is the same, and _similars_ are those not
+differing according to qualities. The late Herr Sturm, a famous
+mathematician in Altorf, while in Holland in his youth published there a
+small book under the title of _Euclides Catholicus_. Here he endeavoured to
+give exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical, being encouraged
+in the task by the late Herr Erhard Weigel, who had been his tutor. In this
+book he transfers to similars what Euclid had said of equals, and he
+formulates this axiom: _Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt similia_. But
+so many limitations were necessary to justify this new rule, that it would
+have been better, in my opinion, to enounce it at the outset with a
+reservation, by saying, _Si similibus similia addas similiter, tota sunt
+similia_. Moreover, geometricians often require _non tantum similia, sed et
+similiter posita_.
+
+213. This difference between quantity and quality appears also in our case.
+The part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also the
+shortest way between the extreme points of this part; but the part of the
+best Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this
+part. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it
+can be extracted from the whole, or marked out within the whole, in an
+irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always lay in something absolute
+and uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water, and other bodies
+assumed to be homogeneous or similar, one must say that the part of the
+good and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole, since it
+would always have resemblance to the whole: but this is not the case in
+things that have mutual relations. An example taken from geometry will be
+appropriate to explain my idea.
+
+214. There is a kind of geometry which Herr Jung of Hamburg, one of the
+most admirable men of his time, called 'empiric'. It makes use of
+conclusive experiments and proves various propositions of Euclid, but
+especially those which concern the equality of two figures, by cutting the
+one in pieces, and putting the pieces together again to make the other. In
+this manner, by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the two sides of
+the right-angled triangle, and arranging these parts carefully, one makes
+from them the square on the hypotenuse; that is demonstrating empirically
+the 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid. Now supposing that some
+of these pieces taken from the two smaller squares are lost, something[262]
+will be lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them; and
+this defective combination, far from pleasing, will be disagreeably ugly.
+If then the pieces that remained, composing the faulty combination, were
+taken separately without any regard to the large square to whose formation
+they ought to contribute, one would group them together quite differently
+to make a tolerably good combination. But as soon as the lost pieces are
+retrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled, there will ensue
+a beautiful and regular thing, the complete large square: this perfect
+combination will be far more beautiful than the tolerably good combination
+which had been made from the pieces one had not mislaid alone. The perfect
+combination corresponds to the universe in its entirety, and the faulty
+combination that is a part of the perfect one corresponds to some part of
+the universe, where we find defects which the Author of things has allowed,
+because otherwise, if he had wished to re-shape this faulty part and make
+thereof a tolerably good combination, the whole would not then have been so
+beautiful. For the parts of the faulty combination, grouped better to make
+a tolerably good combination, could not have been used properly to form the
+whole and perfect combination. Thomas Aquinas had an inkling of these
+things when he said: _ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet, negligere aliquem
+defectum bonitatis in parte, ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto_ (Thom.,
+_Contra Gentiles_, lib. 2, c. 71). Thomas Gatacre, in his Notes on the book
+of Marcus Aurelius (lib. 5, cap. 8, with M. Bayle), cites also passages
+from authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the good of the
+whole.
+
+215. Let us return to M. Bayle's illustrations. He imagines a prince (p.
+963) who is having a city built, and who, in bad taste, aims rather at airs
+of magnificence therein, and a bold and unusual style of architecture, than
+at the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the inhabitants. But if
+this prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the convenient to the
+magnificent architecture. That is M. Bayle's judgement. I consider,
+however, that there are cases where one will justifiably prefer beauty of
+construction in a palace to the convenience of a few domestics. But I admit
+that the construction would be bad, however beautiful it might be, if it
+were a cause of diseases to the inhabitants; provided it was possible to
+make one that would be better, taking into account beauty, convenience and
+health all together. It may be, indeed, that one cannot have all these[263]
+advantages at once. Thus, supposing one wished to build on the northern and
+more bracing side of the mountain, if the castle were then bound to be of
+an unendurable construction, one would prefer to make it face southward.
+
+216. M. Bayle raises the further objection, that it is true that our
+legislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for all
+individuals, 'Nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est; id modo quaeritur, si
+majori parti et in summam prodest. (Cato apud Livium, L. 34, circa init.)'
+But the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge compels
+them to cling to laws which, when all is taken into account, are more
+advantageous than harmful. Nothing of all that can apply to God, who is as
+infinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true greatness. I
+answer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot tax him with
+any limitation of his perfections; and in the universe not only does the
+good exceed the evil, but also the evil serves to augment the good.
+
+217. He observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from this
+principle, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that they
+were necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of the
+universe, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, who
+directs it. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in the
+eighth chapter of the fifth book of his _Meditations_. 'Duplici ratione',
+he says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod tibi natum
+et tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera quod universi
+gubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsius
+procurandae ([Greek: tes euodias kai tes synteleias kai tes symmones
+autes]) ex parte causa est.' This precept is not the most reasonable of
+those stated by that great emperor. A _diligas oportet_ ([Greek: stergein
+chre]) is of no avail; a thing does not become pleasing just because it is
+necessary, and because it is destined for or attached to someone: and what
+for me would be an evil would not cease to be such because it would be my
+master's good, unless this good reflected back on me. One good thing among
+others in the universe is that the general good becomes in reality the
+individual good of those who love the Author of all good. But the principal
+error of this emperor and of the Stoics was their assumption that the good
+of the universe must please God himself, because they imagined God as the
+soul of the world. This error has nothing in common with my dogma,    [264]
+according to which God is _Intelligentia extramundana_, as Martianus
+Capella calls him, or rather _supramundana_. Further, he acts to do good,
+and not to receive it. _Melius est dare quam accipere_; his bliss is ever
+perfect and can receive no increase, either from within or from without.
+
+218. I come now to the principal objection M. Bayle, after M. Arnauld,
+brings up against me. It is complicated: they maintain that God would be
+under compulsion, that he would act of necessity, if he were bound to
+create the best; or at least that he would have been lacking in power if he
+could not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other evils.
+That is in effect denying that this universe is the best, and that God is
+bound to insist upon the best. I have met this objection adequately in more
+than one passage: I have proved that God cannot fail to produce the best;
+and from that assumption it follows that the evils we experience could not
+have been reasonably excluded from the universe, since they are there. Let
+us see, however, what these two excellent men bring up, or rather let us
+see what M. Bayle's objection is, for he professes to have profited by the
+arguments of M. Arnauld.
+
+219. 'Would it be possible', he says, _Reply to the Questions of a
+Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 158, p. 890, 'that a nature whose goodness,
+holiness, wisdom, knowledge and power are infinite, who loves virtue
+supremely, and hates vice supremely, as our clear and distinct idea of him
+shows us, and as well-nigh every page of Scripture assures us, could have
+found in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends? Would it be
+possible that vice alone had offered him this means? One would have thought
+on the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to establish
+virtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice.' M. Bayle here exaggerates
+things. I agree that some vice was connected with the best plan of the
+universe, but I do not agree with him that God could not find in virtue any
+means suited for his ends. This objection would have been valid if there
+were no virtue, if vice took its place everywhere. He will say it suffices
+that vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in comparison. But I am far
+from agreeing with him there, and I think that in reality, properly
+speaking, there is incomparably more moral good than moral evil in rational
+creatures; and of these we have knowledge of but few.
+
+220. This evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. It[265]
+is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat
+misanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find wickedness
+everywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they
+give to them. I speak of those who do it in all seriousness, to draw thence
+evil conclusions, by which their conduct is tainted; for there are some who
+only do it to show off their own acumen. People have found that fault in
+Tacitus, and that again is the criticism M. Descartes (in one of his
+letters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book _De Cive_, of which only a few copies
+had at that time been printed for distribution among friends, but to which
+some notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have.
+For although M. Descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man of
+talent, he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims, in
+the assumption there made that all men are wicked, or the provision of them
+with motives for being so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in his
+admirable _Tables of Practical Philosophy_ that the [Greek: proton
+pseudos], the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that
+he took _statum legalem pro naturali_, that is to say that the corrupt
+state served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state most
+befitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according to
+Aristotle, that is termed _natural_ which conforms most closely to the
+perfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term
+_natural state_ to that which has least art, perhaps not taking into
+account that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the
+question of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not
+be of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon
+it the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. I
+have said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of human
+Virtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's _De Cive_.
+
+221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, as
+it is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it by no
+means follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in the
+universe: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of God
+must be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed and is
+perpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. This answer
+confirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the conformity of
+faith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest sources of fallacy[266]
+in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real. And here
+by the apparent I mean not simply such as would result from an exact
+discussion of facts, but that which has been derived from the small extent
+of our experiences. It would be senseless to try to bring up appearances so
+imperfect, and having such slight foundation, in opposition to the proofs
+of reason and the revelations of faith.
+
+222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of
+vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to
+prevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as is
+the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from
+misery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the
+antecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the consequent
+will, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it is that love
+for virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, which is undefined
+in itself and goes as far as is possible, receives some slight limitations,
+on account of the heed that must be paid to good in general. Thus one must
+understand that God loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely, and
+that nevertheless some vice is to be permitted.
+
+223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method of
+explaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the
+universe, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit to
+God's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche
+(in his _Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace_, vol. II, p.
+385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvert
+the first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of believing in
+God the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can one maintain,
+without trying to blind oneself, that a course of action which could not
+fail to have this grievous result, namely, that the majority of men perish,
+bears the stamp of God's goodness more than a different course of action,
+which would have caused, if God had followed it, the salvation of all men?'
+And, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from the principles I have just laid
+down, M. Bayle raises like objections in his case (_Reply to the Questions
+of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts such
+explanations', he says, 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the most
+obvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect Being. These teach
+us that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him,   [267]
+that consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does not
+save: for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect
+were greater than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremely
+happy, he has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall we
+understand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? We
+sought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing
+the idea of God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are given
+elucidations that cast us into darkness more dense.'
+
+224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just given. I
+agree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that everything
+implying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding as I do that
+God did the best that was possible, or that he could not have done better
+than he has done, deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon his
+work in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom, I must
+say that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself,
+that indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as if someone
+maintained that God could draw from one point to another a line shorter
+than the straight line, and accused those who deny this of subverting the
+article of faith whereby we believe in God the Father Almighty.
+
+225. The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater than
+that of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say that
+if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the objects
+of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense is
+alone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of the
+infinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its many
+deliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with
+embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them
+one against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or
+imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes even
+beyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites,
+that is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of
+which contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine Wisdom
+distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated separately, into
+so many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other.
+The result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the
+best from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in     [268]
+order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of the
+universe as it is. Moreover, all these operations of the divine
+understanding, although they have among them an order and a priority of
+nature, always take place together, no priority of time existing among
+them.
+
+226. The careful consideration of these things will, I hope, induce a
+different idea of the greatness of the divine perfections, and especially
+of the wisdom and goodness of God, from any that can exist in the minds of
+those who make God act at random, without cause or reason. And I do not see
+how they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange, unless they
+acknowledged that there are reasons for God's choice, and that these
+reasons are derived from his goodness: whence it follows of necessity that
+what was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not chosen, and
+consequently that it is the best of all the possibles. The best cannot be
+surpassed in goodness, and it is no restriction of the power of God to say
+that he cannot do the impossible. Is it possible, said M. Bayle, that there
+is no better plan than that one which God carried out? One answers that it
+is very possible and indeed necessary, namely that there is none: otherwise
+God would have preferred it.
+
+227. It seems to me that I have proved sufficiently that among all the
+possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest, and
+that God has not failed to choose it. But M. Bayle claims to infer thence
+that God is therefore not free. This is how he speaks on that question
+(_ubi supra_, ch. 151, p. 899): 'I thought to argue with a man who assumed
+as I do that the goodness and the power of God are infinite, as well as his
+wisdom; and now I see that in reality this man assumes that God's goodness
+and power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds.' As to that, the
+objection has already been met: I set no bounds to God's power, since I
+recognize that it extends _ad maximum, ad omnia_, to all that implies no
+contradiction; and I set none to his goodness, since it attains to the
+best, _ad optimum_. But M. Bayle goes on: 'There is therefore no freedom in
+God; he is compelled by his wisdom to create, and then to create precisely
+such a work, and finally to create it precisely in such ways. These are
+three servitudes which form a more than Stoic _fatum_, and which render
+impossible all that is not within their sphere. It seems that, according to
+this system, God could have said, even before shaping his decrees: I  [269]
+cannot save such and such a man, nor condemn such and such another, _quippe
+vetor fatis_, my wisdom permits it not.'
+
+228. I answer that it is goodness which prompts God to create with the
+purpose of communicating himself; and this same goodness combined with
+wisdom prompts him to create the best: a best that includes the whole
+sequence, the effect and the process. It prompts him thereto without
+compelling him, for it does not render impossible that which it does not
+cause him to choose. To call that _fatum_ is taking it in a good sense,
+which is not contrary to freedom: _fatum_ comes from _fari_, to speak, to
+pronounce; it signifies a judgement, a decree of God, the award of his
+wisdom. To say that one cannot do a thing, simply because one does not will
+it, is to misuse terms. The wise mind wills only the good: is it then a
+servitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom? And can one be less
+a slave than to act by one's own choice in accordance with the most perfect
+reason? Aristotle used to say that that man is in a natural servitude
+(_natura servus_) who lacks guidance, who has need of being directed.
+Slavery comes from without, it leads to that which offends, and especially
+to that which offends with reason: the force of others and our own passions
+enslave us. God is never moved by anything outside himself, nor is he
+subject to inward passions, and he is never led to that which can cause him
+offence. It appears, therefore, that M. Bayle gives odious names to the
+best things in the world, and turns our ideas upside-down, applying the
+term slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom.
+
+229. He had also said not long before (ch. 151, p. 891): 'If virtue, or any
+other good at all, had been as appropriate as vice for the Creator's ends,
+vice would not have been given preference; it must therefore have been the
+only means that the Creator could have used; it was therefore employed
+purely of necessity. As therefore he loves his glory, not with a freedom of
+indifference, but by necessity, he must by necessity love all the means
+without which he could not manifest his glory. Now if vice, as vice, was
+the only means of attaining to this end, it will follow that God of
+necessity loves vice as vice, a thought which can only inspire us with
+horror; and he has revealed quite the contrary to us.' He observes at the
+same time that certain doctors among the Supralapsarians (like Rutherford,
+for example) denied that God wills sin as sin, whilst they admitted   [270]
+that he wills sin permissively in so far as it is punishable and
+pardonable. But he urges in objection, that an action is only punishable
+and pardonable in so far as it is vicious.
+
+230. M. Bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have just
+read, and draws from them false conclusions. It is not true that God loves
+his glory by necessity, if thereby it is understood that he is led by
+necessity to acquire his glory through his creatures. For if that were so,
+he would acquire his glory always and everywhere. The decree to create is
+free: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best, inclines
+him to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates no
+impossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes no
+implication of contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. There
+is therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but
+also from necessity. I mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity; for
+it is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the best.
+It is the same with the means which God chooses to attain his glory. And as
+for vice, it has been shown in preceding pages that it is not an object of
+God's decree as _means_, but as _conditio sine qua non_, and that for that
+reason alone it is permitted. One is even less justified in saying that
+vice is _the only means_; it would be at most one of the means, but one of
+the least among innumerable others.
+
+231. 'Another frightful consequence,' M. Bayle goes on, 'the fatality of
+all things, ensues: God will not have been free to arrange events in a
+different way, since the means he chose to show forth his glory was the
+only means befitting his wisdom.' This so-called fatality or necessity is
+only moral, as I have just shown: it does not affect freedom; on the
+contrary, it assumes the best use thereof; it does not render impossible
+the objects set aside by God's choice. 'What, then, will become', he adds,
+'of man's free will? Will there not have been necessity and fatality for
+Adam to sin? For if he had not sinned, he would have overthrown the sole
+plan that God had of necessity created.' That is again a misuse of terms.
+Adam sinning freely was seen of God among the ideas of the possibles, and
+God decreed to admit him into existence as he saw him. This decree does not
+change the nature of the objects: it does not render necessary that which
+was contingent in itself, or impossible that which was possible.
+
+                                                                      [271]
+232. M. Bayle goes on (p. 892): 'The subtle Scotus asserts with much
+discernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature could
+have this kind of freedom.' I agree provided it is not meant as an
+indifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to one
+side than the other. M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p.
+1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient
+inclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be no
+metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say,
+it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible.
+
+233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is not
+determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by the
+interests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the only
+thing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the love
+that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through
+the most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it is
+evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the
+obedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible.' Still the same
+error. The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love
+for his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means:
+the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions
+without; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby the
+first parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary.
+Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, 'that God
+resolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'; and I add
+that this same motion prompted him to the best.
+
+234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's (ch.
+165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is of
+necessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases where
+God has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ this
+means, he employed it by necessity.' (He was certainly prompted thereto, he
+was determined, or rather he determined himself thereto: but that which is
+certain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thing
+might have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason.
+God chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysically
+speaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he could
+not morally speaking have done so. Let us make use of a comparison    [272]
+from geometry. The best way from one point to another (leaving out of
+account obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is one
+alone: it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is the
+straight line. Yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another.
+There is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line;
+but as soon as I choose the best, I am determined to go that way, although
+this is only a moral necessity in the wise. That is why the following
+conclusions fail.) 'Therefore he could only do that which he did. Therefore
+that which has not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible.'
+(These conclusions fail, I say: for since there are many things which have
+never happened and never will happen, and which nevertheless are clearly
+conceivable, and imply no contradiction, how can one say they are
+altogether impossible? M. Bayle has refuted that himself in a passage
+opposing the Spinozists, which I have already quoted here, and he has
+frequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that which
+implies contradiction: now he changes style and terminology.) 'Therefore
+Adam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible; therefore his fall
+was altogether inevitable, and even antecedently to God's decree, for it
+implied contradiction that God should be able to will a thing opposed to
+his wisdom: it is, after all, the same thing to say, that it is impossible
+for God, as to say, God could do it, if he so willed, but he cannot will
+it.' (It is misusing terms in a sense to say here: one can will, one will
+will; 'can' here concerns the actions that one does will. Nevertheless it
+implies no contradiction that God should will--directly or permissively--a
+thing not implying contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to say
+that God can will it.)
+
+235. In a word, when one speaks of the _possibility_ of a thing it is not a
+question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual
+existence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and render
+useless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This Abelard
+did, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of which
+they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. That is
+why, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in the
+consideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For God
+chooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he chooses      [273]
+freely, and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor freedom if
+there were but one course possible.
+
+236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none of
+the objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Reply
+to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901).
+
+FIRST SYLLOGISM
+
+'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has
+for his wisdom.
+
+'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which God
+has for his wisdom.
+
+'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.'
+
+The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is
+necessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his
+wisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but
+be free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not
+cease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will the
+salvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet this
+consequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will,
+cannot fail to be free also.
+
+SECOND SYLLOGISM
+
+'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin
+of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men.
+
+'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom.
+
+'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other
+things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of
+men.'
+
+The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are always
+free, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in
+the intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to be
+bound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion in
+the metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I have
+observed so many times, is opposed to freedom.
+
+238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in objection in
+the following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the Supralapsarians,
+and particularly against the oration made by Theodore de Beze at the  [274]
+Conference of Montbeliard in the year 1586. This conference also only
+served to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God created the World to
+his glory: his glory is not known (according to Beze), if his mercy and his
+justice are not declared; for this cause simply by his grace he decreed for
+some men life eternal, and for others by a just judgement eternal
+damnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice presupposes guilt.' (He might
+have added that misery also supposes guilt.) 'Nevertheless God being good,
+indeed goodness itself, he created man good and righteous, but unstable,
+and capable of sinning of his own free will. Man did not fall at random or
+rashly, or through causes ordained by some other God, as the Manichaeans
+hold, but by the providence of God; in such a way notwithstanding, that God
+was not involved in the fault, inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin.'
+
+239. This system is not of the best conceived: it is not well fitted to
+show forth the wisdom, the goodness and the justice of God; and happily it
+is almost abandoned to-day. If there were not other more profound reasons
+capable of inducing God to permit guilt, the source of misery, there would
+be neither guilt nor misery in the world, for the reasons alleged here do
+not suffice. He would declare his mercy better in preventing misery, and he
+would declare his justice better in preventing guilt, in advancing virtue,
+in recompensing it. Besides, one does not see how he who not only causes a
+man to be capable of falling, but who so disposes circumstances that they
+contribute towards causing his fall, is not culpable, if there are no other
+reasons compelling him thereto. But when one considers that God, altogether
+good and wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness, happiness
+whereof the best plan of the universe is capable, and that often an evil in
+some parts may serve the greater good of the whole, one readily concludes
+that God may have given room for unhappiness, and even permitted guilt, as
+he has done, without deserving to be blamed. It is the only remedy that
+supplies what all systems lack, however they arrange the decrees. These
+thoughts have already been favoured by St. Augustine, and one may say of
+Eve what the poet said of the hand of Mucius Scaevola:
+
+  _Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus_.
+
+240. I find that the famous English prelate who wrote an ingenious book on
+the origin of evil, some passages of which were disputed by M. Bayle  [275]
+in the second volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, while
+disagreeing with some of the opinions that I have upheld here and appearing
+to resort sometimes to a despotic power, as if the will of God did not
+follow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or evil, but decreed
+arbitrarily that such and such a thing must be considered good or evil; and
+as if even the will of the creature, in so far as it is free, did not
+choose because the object appears good to him, but by a purely arbitrary
+determination, independent of the representation of the object; this
+bishop, I say, in other passages nevertheless says things which seem more
+in favour of my doctrine than of what appears contrary thereto in his own.
+He says that what an infinitely wise and free cause has chosen is better
+than what it has not chosen. Is not that recognizing that goodness is the
+object and the reason of his choice? In this sense one will here aptly say:
+
+  _Sic placuit superis; quaerere plura, nefas_.
+
+                                                                      [276]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+PART THREE
+
+241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; _physical
+evil_, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be less troublesome to
+explain, since these are results of moral evil. _Poena est malum passionis,
+quod infligitur ob malum actionis_, according to Grotius. One suffers
+because one has acted; one suffers evil because one does evil.
+
+    _Nostrorum causa malorum_
+  _Nos sumus_.
+
+It is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; but
+when one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certainty
+that these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The question of
+_physical evil_, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties in
+common with that of the origin of _metaphysical evil_, examples whereof are
+furnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the
+universe. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are
+part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better
+to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general
+laws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very
+monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of
+will, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is   [277]
+just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics
+which issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom
+of them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to
+my principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences of
+general acts of will.
+
+242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidate
+these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everything
+proceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a close
+contemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision of
+the ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbers
+perfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase and
+diminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knows
+the key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure of
+this succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, being
+properly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, and
+that it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evident
+in lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points of
+reflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, so
+that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking into
+account only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give its
+equation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason and
+the fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we must
+look upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other
+so-called defects in the universe.
+
+243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. 276,
+Ad Eugen., III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri
+aliquid.' It belongs to the great order that there should be some small
+disorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in the
+whole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness of
+those who walk in the ways of order.
+
+244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent defects
+besides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of our
+globe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms.
+That which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect of
+some great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on fire, and that
+the rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remaining
+from a great fusion. In their entrails are found metal and mineral    [278]
+products, which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces: and the
+entire sea may be a kind of _oleum per deliquium_, just as tartaric oil
+forms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface cooled after the great
+conflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell back
+upon the earth, washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solid
+salt that was left in the cinders, finally filling up this great cavity in
+the surface of our globe, to form the ocean filled with salt water.
+
+245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water made
+ravages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, having
+below it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as among
+others Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptly
+observed. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof traces
+and remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day are
+most remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and the globe
+assumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in few words:
+the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by the
+fire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects of
+inundations. But who does not see that these disorders have served to bring
+things to the point where they now are, that we owe to them our riches and
+our comforts, and that through their agency this globe became fit for
+cultivation by us. These disorders passed into order. The disorders, real
+or apparent, that we see from afar are sunspots and comets; but we do not
+know what uses they supply, nor the rules prevailing therein. Time was when
+the planets were held to be wandering stars: now their motion is found to
+be regular. Peradventure it is the same with the comets: posterity will
+know.
+
+246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions, and
+M. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equally
+perfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers? why ants are
+not peacocks? And if there must needs be equality everywhere, the poor man
+would serve notice of appeal against the rich, the servant against the
+master. The pipes of an organ must not be of equal size. M. Bayle will say
+that there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder;
+between a disorder in inanimate things, which is purely metaphysical, and a
+disorder in rational creatures, which is composed of crime and        [279]
+sufferings. He is right in making a distinction between them, and I am
+right in combining them. God does not neglect inanimate things: they do not
+feel, but God feels for them. He does not neglect animals: they have not
+intelligence, but God has it for them. He would reproach himself for the
+slightest actual defect there were in the universe, even though it were
+perceived of none.
+
+247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between the
+disorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the
+peace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to our
+justifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be
+taken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude,
+according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that God
+created the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and
+mechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no part
+in the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself only
+on skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than
+suffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require.'
+M. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the
+system of general harmony which I assume, which states that the realm of
+efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other; that
+God has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatest
+architect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the
+best guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that he has
+attained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical,
+physical and moral goods together.
+
+248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils by
+one small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much extraordinary
+help to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to Eve would have
+prevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective.
+I have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer,
+that God ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosen
+the best, and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto. I had
+answered M. Bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe.
+He replies, that that is an illusion, and that the miracle of the wedding
+at Cana (for instance) made no change in the air of the room, except that
+instead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water, it      [280]
+received corpuscles of wine. But one must bear in mind that once the best
+plan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein.
+
+249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something in
+this work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there are
+many, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry of
+invisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche also
+believes. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinary
+laws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and more
+vigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only so
+by comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be considered
+miraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them. The
+changing of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind. But the
+Creation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all the
+power of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. If,
+nevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of the
+highest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole course of the
+universe, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he would have been
+bound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and cause the bodies not
+concerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened. After the
+miracle was over, it would have been necessary to restore all things in
+those very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached without
+the miracle: whereafter all would have returned to its original course.
+Thus this miracle demanded more than at first appears.
+
+250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. Bayle
+contends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means of
+particular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to this.
+Here I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle insists
+chiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts have
+no feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be in the
+sufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they are
+only machines, _quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser est_: it is
+impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master
+as God. The principle is good, but I do not think it warrants the inference
+that beasts have no feeling, because I think that, properly speaking,
+perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied [281]
+by reflexion. It is the same with happiness: without reflexion there is
+none.
+
+  _O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!_
+
+One cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but it
+seems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are in
+man: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to the
+grief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Men
+are sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they act
+almost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the
+experience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and their
+pains are very slight.
+
+251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. It
+is with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether there
+is more physical evil than physical good in the world? (_Reply to the
+Questions of a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 75.) To settle it aright, one must
+explain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that physical evil
+is simply displeasure and under that heading I include pain, grief, and
+every other kind of discomfort. But does physical good lie solely in
+pleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I consider that it
+lies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One is well enough
+when one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly:
+
+      _Sapientia prima est,_
+  _Stultitia caruisse_.
+
+In the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice be
+blamed:
+
+  _Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit_.
+
+That being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all the
+exercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose prevention
+would incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us no
+pleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we only
+perceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived of
+them. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life goods
+exceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M.
+Descartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural reason
+teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'.
+
+                                                                      [282]
+252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess would
+be a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to the
+falling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying the
+sparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playful
+work. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the niceness
+of a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures are a kind of
+expenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some better than in
+others.
+
+253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the
+instance of M. de la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have been
+willing to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same part
+as providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said that I
+think one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread of
+Fate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should not be better
+than the first. Thus from M. de la Motte le Vayer's saying it does not
+follow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played,
+provided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take it.
+
+254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service in
+making joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content with his
+state that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for the
+state of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant. M. de
+la Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it.
+Knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who have
+not tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that of
+reasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who with all his faults was a
+great man, and would have been incomparable without those faults.
+
+  _Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!_
+  _Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum_
+  _Subjecit pedibus._
+
+It is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not to
+fear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls us.
+Acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite other than
+that the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their philosophy. There is
+as much difference between true morality and theirs as there is       [283]
+between joy and patience: for their tranquillity was founded only on
+necessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things,
+upon our own happiness.
+
+255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not be
+sufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents;
+the Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise.
+M. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in the
+letter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most
+overwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how to
+exercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (_Reply to the Questions of
+a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is saying nothing, that
+it is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyone
+understands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and that men could
+attain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart from the true
+martyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high, there
+have been counterfeits who imitated them. That Spanish slave who killed the
+Carthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced great
+joy in his deed, even in the greatest tortures, may shame the philosophers.
+Why should not one go as far as he? One may say of an advantage, as of a
+disadvantage:
+
+  _Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest_.
+
+256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, the
+Galibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on this
+matter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and
+well-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast them
+over a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain their
+physical superiority and their courage, and combine them with our
+acquirements, they would surpass us in every way,
+
+  _Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis_.
+
+They would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a mountain to
+a hill:
+
+  _Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali_
+  _Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras._
+
+                                                                      [284]
+257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind in
+these savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour,
+might be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned mortifications,
+by an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great practice in preserving
+a certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressions
+most liable to disturb it. Something of this kind is related of the ancient
+Assassins, subjects and pupils of the Old Man or rather the Seigneur
+(_Senior_) of the Mountain. Such a school (for a better purpose) would be
+good for missionaries who would wish to return to Japan. The Gymnosophists
+of the ancient Indians had perhaps something resembling this, and that
+Calanus, who provided for Alexander the Great the spectacle of his burning
+alive, had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his masters
+and trained by great sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these same
+Indians, who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their
+husbands, seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancient
+philosophers of their country. I do not expect that there should
+straightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exalt
+man to that high pitch of perfection: such people would be too much above
+the rest, and too formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens that
+people are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be
+needed, one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our
+usual comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby.
+
+258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedy
+is a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also said:
+
+  [Greek: pleio ta chresta ton kakon einai brotois].
+  _Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis._
+
+Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agree
+with them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention
+rather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is more
+rare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, who
+would have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man is
+the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do not
+agree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285]
+true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparently
+because they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation;
+but they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easily
+satisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on the
+Xenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirable
+sentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having said
+things _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5,
+_De Benefic._) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon
+us. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry
+authorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the
+Collections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin:
+
+  _Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,_
+  _Infundit uno terna pro bono mala._
+
+259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of
+guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the
+advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am not
+opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of
+original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in
+general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so
+much that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I
+am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by
+saying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_,
+splendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in
+holy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing a
+physical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities and
+the adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the
+consideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are
+scarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies that
+have much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes
+us aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I have
+already observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil,
+and the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for the
+spirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit._, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said
+that men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it
+swallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerning
+this, that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the      [286]
+judgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measures
+the extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anything
+rather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant that
+one is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but that does
+not exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, everything
+reckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed the evil.
+
+260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, made
+complaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so weak an
+animal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of old
+Silenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and as the
+price of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that the
+first and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the second, to
+depart from this life with dispatch (Cic., _Tuscul._, lib. 1). Plato
+believed that souls had been in a happier state, and many of the ancients,
+amongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to the account of
+Lactantius), believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies as
+in a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our ills, and asserted their
+prejudices against human life: for there is no such thing as a beautiful
+prison. But quite apart from the consideration that, even according to
+these same pagans, the evils of this life would be counterbalanced and
+exceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I make bold to say that we
+shall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts, that taking all in all
+human life is in general tolerable. And adding thereto the motives of
+religion, we shall be content with the order God has set therein. Moreover,
+for a better judgement of our goods and our evils, it will be well to read
+Cardan, _De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda_, and Novarini, _De Occultis Dei
+Beneficiis_.
+
+261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are thought to
+be the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair aspect of their
+condition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware of evil. Someone
+will say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy the
+advantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? There are
+nevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who know how to profit by
+the favours God has shown them, who are easily consoled for their
+misfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to account. M. Bayle  [287]
+pays no heed to that: he prefers to listen to Pliny, who thinks that
+Augustus, one of the princes most favoured by fortune, experienced at least
+as much evil as good. I admit that he found great causes of trouble in his
+family and that remorse for having crushed the Republic may have tormented
+him; but I think that he was too wise to grieve over the former, and that
+Maecenas apparently made him understand that Rome had need of a master. Had
+not Augustus been converted on this point, Vergil would never have said of
+a lost soul:
+
+  _Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem_
+  _Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit._
+
+Augustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in these
+lines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is every
+indication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which he
+regarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for public
+evils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of the
+kings censured in M. de Cambray's _Telemachus_. Each one considers himself
+within his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, justifies Augustus in two
+words, at the beginning of his _Annals_. But Augustus was better able than
+anyone to judge of his good fortune. He appears to have died content, as
+may be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life: for in
+dying he repeated to his friends a line in Greek, which has the
+signification of that _Plaudite_ that was wont to be spoken at the
+conclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius quotes it:
+
+  [Greek: Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypesate.]
+
+262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kind
+more evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there is
+incomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides (whose
+merit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the first
+of the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise judgement on
+this question of the predominance of good over evil in the world. Here is
+what he says in his _Doctor Perplexorum_ (cap. 12, p. 3): 'There arise
+often in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade them
+there is more evil than good in the world: and one often finds in the poems
+and songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something good
+comes to pass, whereas evils are usual and constant. This error has   [288]
+taken hold not of the common herd only, those very persons who wish to be
+considered wise have been beguiled thereby. A celebrated writer named
+Alrasi, in his _Sepher Elohuth_, or Theosophy, amongst other absurdities
+has stated that there are more evils than goods, and that upon comparison
+of the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillity
+with the pains, the torments, the troubles, faults, cares, griefs and
+afflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a great
+evil, and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us.' Maimonides
+adds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition that
+Nature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account what is
+separate from their person; whence they infer that when something
+unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe.
+
+263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point,
+because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, upon
+consideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulates
+is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one
+particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had
+been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke
+also of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if one
+took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one
+would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it
+prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor
+among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds,
+nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposing
+that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition
+which is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is
+more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointed
+out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good
+than evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor
+prevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most
+perfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil
+which is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence,
+and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good,
+one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of
+all systems.
+
+                                                                      [289]
+264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have
+anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right when
+it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not
+the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed
+being the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reason
+or experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say that
+it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend
+also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the
+account of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein. He
+states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not
+abandon a system. This he advances especially in favour of the methods of
+the strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. For he supposes that one
+can subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties in
+their entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to some
+of the difficulties, cannot meet them all. I hold that the true system I
+have expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, even were that not so, I
+confess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle's, and I should prefer
+a system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to one
+which would meet none of them. And the consideration of the wickedness of
+men, which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes, shows at least
+that they have no right to complain. No justice need trouble itself over
+the origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question of
+punishing him: it is quite another matter when it is a question of
+prevention. One knows well that disposition, upbringing, conversation, and
+often chance itself, have much share in that origin: is the man any the
+less deserving of punishment?
+
+265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is not
+bound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if he owes
+to himself, and to those who honour him and love him, justification for his
+course of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime. But God
+has already given that satisfaction, as far as it is needed here on earth:
+by granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the means
+whereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope that I have made it plain in
+this discourse, and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion of
+these Essays, almost as far as it can be done through general arguments.
+Thereafter, the permission of sin being justified, the other evils    [290]
+that are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also I
+am justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for
+the evil of punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh all
+the Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none may
+say that is only good _per la predica_, it is enough to consider that,
+after the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or more
+exact than this method. For God, having found already among things
+possible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and bringing
+upon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him into
+existence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will no
+longer be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like St.
+Augustine and preach like Pelagius.
+
+266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt,
+cannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for the
+greatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometime
+Professor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in the
+territory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellent
+Aristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, had
+composed a little discourse entitled: _Demonstration against the Eternity
+of Punishment_. It was founded on this somewhat trite principle, that there
+is no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt. It was
+conveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; and I replied that there
+was one thing to be considered which had escaped the late Herr Sonner:
+namely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused the
+duration of the penalty. Since the damned remained wicked they could not be
+withdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify the
+continuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infinite
+weight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God. This
+thesis I had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon. I know that the
+general opinion of the Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences,
+is that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do not
+think that, taken literally, it can pass for an article of faith. Herr
+Fecht, a famous theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on
+_The State of the Damned_. It is quite wrong, he says (Sec. 59); God cannot
+change his nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the door
+of grace, but not that of justice.
+
+                                                                      [291]
+267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for the
+duration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann Gerhard, a
+famous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in _Locis Theol._, loco de
+Inferno, Sec. 60), brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned have
+still an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good. Zacharias
+Ursinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who follows Calvin, having formulated
+this question (in his treatise _De Fide_) why sin merits an eternal
+punishment, advances first the common reason, that the person offended is
+infinite, and then also this second reason, _quod non cessante peccato non
+potest cessare poena_. And the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his book
+entitled _Nicetas, or Incontinence Overcome_ (book 2, ch. 11, Sec. 9): 'Nec
+mirum damnatos semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semper
+peccant, semper ergo plectuntur.' He declares and approves the same reason
+in his work on _Eternity_ (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, nec
+displicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideo
+semper puniuntur.' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is very
+common among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true,
+another more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4,
+Dial. c. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw by
+a kind of _mediate knowledge_ that they would always have sinned if they
+had always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much open to
+question. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant theologians for
+Herr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some who think
+differently.
+
+268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages from
+two able theologians of his party, which have some reference to these
+statements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, in
+opposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same subject, gives the
+opinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot cease
+to be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. Jacquelot in his
+book on _The Conformity of Faith with Reason_ (p. 220) is of opinion 'that
+the damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed, and
+that this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all their
+pains, through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon their
+crimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss. One knows what burning
+regrets, what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of a
+good, of a notable honour which had been offered to them, and which   [292]
+they rejected, especially when they see others invested with it.' This
+position is a little different from that of M. Jurieu, but both agree in
+this sentiment, that the damned are themselves the cause of the
+continuation of their torments. M. le Clerc's Origenist does not entirely
+differ from this opinion when he says in the _Select Library_ (vol. 7, p.
+341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does not condemn him on that
+account, but only because, although he has the power to recover himself, he
+yet does not do so, that is, he freely retains his evil ways to the end of
+his life.' If he carries this reasoning on beyond this life, he will
+ascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation of
+their guilt.
+
+269. M. Bayle says (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 175, p.
+1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teaches
+that damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence':
+but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin? I would not
+simply say, however, that it is because man, having the power to recover
+himself, does not; and would wish to add that it is because man does not
+take advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself. But
+after this life, though one assume that the succour ceases, there is always
+in the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders him
+culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though it
+should never pass into action. And there is no reason why one may not say
+that this degree of freedom, exempt from necessity, but not exempt from
+certainty, remains in the damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, the
+damned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life, for they know
+only too well what one must believe here.
+
+270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published recently
+a book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made some
+observations in the second volume of his _Reply_, speaks with much subtlety
+about the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is presented
+(according to the author of the _Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_,
+June 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feel
+their miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless congratulate themselves
+on their own behaviour, and who will rather choose to be, and to be that
+which they are, than not to be at all. They will love their state, unhappy
+as it will be, even as angry people, lovers, the ambitious, the       [293]
+envious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery.
+Furthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrong
+judgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind, and will
+perpetually pass from one error into another. They will not be able to
+refrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be denied
+them, and, being deprived of which, they will fall into inconceivable
+despair, while experience can never make them wiser for the future. For by
+their own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding,
+and will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on any
+matter.'
+
+271. The ancients already imagined that the Devil dwells remote from God
+voluntarily, in the midst of his torments, and that he is unwilling to
+redeem himself by an act of submission. They invented a tale that an
+anchorite in a vision received a promise from God that he would receive
+into grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault;
+but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner. At the
+least, the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hate
+God and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot but be followed by
+continuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read the learned treatise
+of Herr Fecht on the _State of the Damned_.
+
+272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not impossible
+for a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope Gregory the Great
+is well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul of
+the Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors the
+wish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in good fortune and
+Trajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter the pity of the
+Holy Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but he forbade him to
+make the like prayers in future. According to this fable, the prayers of
+St. Gregory had the force of the remedies of Aesculapius, who recalled
+Hippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued to make such prayers, God
+would have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in Vergil:
+
+  _At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris_
+  _Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae,_
+  _Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis_
+  _Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas._
+
+                                                                      [294]
+Godescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the theologians
+of his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the reprobate should
+pray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is never justified in
+believing oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. The passage in the
+Mass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the abatement of the
+torments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis that I have just
+stated, one must wish for them _meliorem mentem_. Origen having applied the
+passage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will not forget to be gracious,
+neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure, St. Augustine
+replies _(Enchirid._, c. 112) that it is possible that the pains of the
+damned last eternally, and that they may nevertheless be mitigated. If the
+text implied that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on to
+infinity; and yet that abatement would, as regards its extent, have a _non
+plus ultra_. Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an
+infinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth. If the parable of
+the wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul, the
+hypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be
+groundless. But the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the
+parable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which
+is ascribed to the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX _Mor._, 39) thinks
+that the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: but
+it seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the
+disposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of the
+Sentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyone
+damned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation of his
+brothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means sound. On
+the contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have served to
+save many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation of
+others that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnation
+for some more than others; but, generally speaking, he will have no
+inclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may be, one must
+admit that all this detail is problematical, God having revealed to us all
+that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and not
+what is needed for our understanding thereof.
+
+273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of
+free will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils,     [295]
+since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, the
+ordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the same
+time. Now we can seek with confidence _the origin of evil in the freedom of
+creatures_. The first wickedness is well known to us, it is that of the
+Devil and his angels: the Devil sinneth from the beginning, and for this
+purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of
+the Devil (1 John iii. 8). The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was a
+murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44).
+And therefore God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to
+Hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto
+judgement (2 Pet. ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their own
+habitation, he hath reserved in _eternal_ (that is to say everlasting)
+chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6).
+Whence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been
+seen by the author of the other.
+
+274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light upon
+what the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an account
+of a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels fought
+against the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But they
+prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the
+great Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan,
+which deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the earth, and
+his angels were cast out with him' (Rev. xii. 7, 8, 9). For although this
+account is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness, and it
+may have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to the
+Church, it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneously
+the old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy.
+
+275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, [Greek: ek
+ton idion] from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternal
+verities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, that
+this creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is the
+same with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them.
+God gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind (Rom. i. 28), abandoning them
+to themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeed
+ought to deny to them.
+
+276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. iv. 21 and[296]
+vii. 3; Isa. lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii.
+23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. ii. 11); that
+he deceived the prophet (Ezek. xiv. 9); that he commanded Shimei to curse
+(2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not unto the voice of
+their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25); that the
+Lord took away Job's substance, even although that was done through the
+malice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up Pharaoh, to show his
+power in him (Exod. ix. 19; Rom. ix. 17) that he is like a potter who
+maketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. ix. 21); that he hideth the truth from
+the wise and prudent (Matt. xi. 25); that he speaketh in parables unto them
+that are without, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing
+they may hear and not understand, lest at any time they might be converted,
+and their sins might be forgiven them (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); that
+Jesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God
+(Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and Herod with the Gentiles and the
+people of Israel did that which the hand and the counsel of God had
+determined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, 28); that it was of the Lord to
+harden the hearts of the enemy, that they should come against Israel in
+battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no
+favour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled a perverse spirit in the
+midst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its works, like a drunken man
+(Isa. xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people,
+for the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings xii. 15); that he turned the
+hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Ps. cv. 25). But all these and
+other like expressions suggest only that the things God has done are used
+as occasion for ignorance, error, malice and evil deeds, and contribute
+thereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and intending to use it for his ends,
+since superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permit
+these evils, and even to co-operate therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fieri
+male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene', in St. Augustine's
+words. But this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part.
+
+277. God made man in his image (Gen. i. 26); he made him upright (Eccles.
+vii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he has fallen;
+but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. Moses said as
+from God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I
+have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore   [297]
+choose life' (Deut. xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the Lord: Behold, I set before
+you the way of life, and the way of death' (Jer. xxi. 8). He has left man
+in the power of his counsel, giving him his ordinances and his
+commandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments' (or they
+shall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire and water, to stretch forth
+thine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen and
+unregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of Satan, because it
+pleases him so to be; he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust. Thus
+it is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing.
+
+278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, when
+he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. i. 13, 14). And Satan
+contributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' (2
+Cor. iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous desire:
+the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato has said so
+already, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum.'
+Grace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. Augustine observed.
+All _pleasure_ is a feeling of some perfection; one _loves_ an object in
+proportion as one feels its perfections; nothing surpasses the divine
+perfections. Whence it follows that charity and love of God give the
+greatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that proportion in which one is
+penetrated by these feelings, which are not common among men, busied and
+taken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with their
+passions.
+
+279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do not
+necessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must likewise
+be said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however efficacious divine
+grace may be, there is justification for saying that one can resist it. But
+when it indeed proves victorious, it is certain and infallible beforehand
+that one will yield to its allurements, whether it have its strength of
+itself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity of
+circumstances. Thus one must always distinguish between the infallible and
+the necessary.
+
+280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine is
+not far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things,
+whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. In the
+_expressions_ I find that it is principally the use of terms like     [298]
+'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which sometimes
+gives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr Loescher the
+younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the _Paroxysms of the
+Absolute Decree_, Luther desired, in his book _On the Will in Bondage_, to
+find a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word
+necessity. Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fitting
+to say that obedience to God's precepts is always _possible_, even for the
+unregenerate; that the grace of God is always _resistible_, even in those
+most holy, and that _freedom_ is exempt not only from _constraint_ but also
+from _necessity_, although it be never without infallible _certainty_ or
+without inclining _determination_.
+
+281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be
+permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the _power_ to do good is
+often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often _necessary_, even in
+the regenerate; that it is _impossible_ sometimes for one not to sin; that
+grace is _irresistible_; that freedom is not exempt from _necessity_. But
+these expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances
+that prevail about us to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse;
+and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms
+are employed with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances which
+render them acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred and
+orthodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of
+expressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more
+than between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might
+be attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed to
+these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely
+which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that more
+intended by the author (_quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus_).
+For the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the same
+ways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after
+the decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and
+follows. As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunity
+arises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes no
+difference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficient
+explanations of the terms are not added.
+
+282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions,
+such as that I have very often urged between the necessary and the    [299]
+certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the
+same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is
+possible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible is
+necessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potency
+and a remote potency; and, according to these different senses, one says
+now that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It may be said in a
+certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that
+the devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose the
+best; that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most.
+But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind
+called logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies
+contradiction. M. Nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which is
+not amiss. It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate,
+who has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit some
+outrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streets
+naked in order to make people laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with the
+blessed; they are still less capable of sinning, and the necessity that
+forbids them to sin is of the same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' is
+a term as equivocal as potency and necessity. For I have already observed
+that those who employ this axiom, that one does not fail to do what one
+wills when one can, and who thence infer that God therefore does not will
+the salvation of all, imply a _decretory will_. Only in that sense can one
+support this proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among
+the things that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, taking
+will in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use,
+that the wise will is _inclined_ antecedently to all good, although it
+_decrees_ finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would be very
+wrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save all men,
+which Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to him an
+original distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number of
+persons, _odium antecedaneum_. One should rather maintain that the wise
+mind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his knowledge and
+his power, but that he only produces the best that can be achieved. Those
+who admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will to save all men,
+are wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided that they acknowledge,
+besides, that God gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win  [300]
+salvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof.
+
+283. In the _dogmas_ themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine I
+cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in general
+damnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe that God
+condemns those who are without the necessary light. One may believe, with
+many theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were it
+only when they are at the point of death. It does not appear necessary
+either that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace
+efficacious of itself, independently of circumstances. Also I consider it
+unnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that
+all their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not spring
+from faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infected
+with sin, at least virtually. Finally I hold that God cannot act as if at
+random by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent of
+reasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in the
+dispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objects
+participates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grant
+nevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good
+or the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only
+according to these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained already
+here, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other
+circumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme
+wisdom.
+
+284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine
+appears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to
+his system. He states that from the substance of God only a God can
+proceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine
+_De Lib. Arb._, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the creature imperfect,
+faulty and corruptible (_De Genesi ad Lit._, c. 15, _Contra Epistolam
+Manichaei_, c. 36). Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will
+(Augustine, in the whole book _On the Nature of Good_). God can command
+nothing that would be impossible. 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum
+impossibilia non potuisse praecipere' (_Lib. de Nat. et Grat._, c. 43, p.
+69). Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.
+16, 17, _lib._ 1 _Retract._ c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can be
+unhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo miser esse    [301]
+quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carry
+out God's commands without the aid of grace (_Ep. ad Hilar.
+Caesaraugustan._). We know that grace is not given according to deserts
+(Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to
+enable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will,
+'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed non
+adjutorium quo vellet' (_Lib. de Corrept._, c. 11 et c. 10, 12). God let
+angels and men try what they could do by their free will, and after that
+what his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid., c. 10, 11, 12). Sin
+turned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures (lib. 1, qu. 2, _Ad
+Simplicium_). To take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave
+(_Enchirid._, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non
+periit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant'
+(lib. 1, _Ad Bonifac._, c. 2, 3).
+
+285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and
+will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. xxxiii. 19). 'So then it
+is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that
+sheweth mercy' (Rom. ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all those who have
+good will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. But God gives them
+the willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have
+mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. ix. 18). And yet the same
+Apostle says that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the
+knowledge of the truth; which I would not interpret in accordance with some
+passages of St. Augustine, as if it signified that no men are saved except
+those whose salvation he wills, or as if he would save _non singulos
+generum, sed genera singulorum_. But I would rather say that there is none
+whose salvation he willeth not, in so far as this is permitted by greater
+reasons. For these bring it about that God only saves those who accept the
+faith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by the
+grace he has given them, in accordance with what was consistent with the
+plan of his works in its entirety, than which none can be better conceived.
+
+286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according to St.
+Augustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation.
+'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia et praeparatio
+beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' (_Lib.
+de Persev._, c. 14). He does not then understand it there as an       [302]
+absolute decree; he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejected
+by any hardened heart, because it is given in order to remove especially
+the hardness of hearts (_Lib. de Praedest._, c. 8; _Lib. de Grat._, c. 13,
+14). I do not find, however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently that
+this grace, which subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. And
+one might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degree
+of inward grace is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outward
+circumstances, but not in the other.
+
+287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and follows
+the sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horum
+dabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est'
+(in c. 5, _Ad Gal._). I have explained already how, despite all that, we
+have indeed a great power over our will. St. Augustine takes it somewhat
+differently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothing
+is so much within our power as the action of our will. And he gives a
+reason which is almost tautological: for (he says) this action is ready at
+the moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsa
+voluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.
+3; lib. 5, _De Civ. Dei_, c. 10). But that only means that we will when we
+will, and not that we will that which we wish to will. There is more reason
+for saying with him: '_aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est_' (d.
+1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or
+certainly, does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, ut
+ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati
+esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona
+constrictione naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem
+[libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle
+peccare. Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum
+arbitrium habere negandus est?' (_De Nat. et Grat._, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). He
+also says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards
+man acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (_De Corrept._,
+c. 2).
+
+288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of
+guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that
+the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the
+eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause. M. Bayle           [303]
+nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will
+not have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to his
+objections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature
+of freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required
+in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a
+clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we
+determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or
+metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom,
+and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is
+self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the
+understanding, which inclines it without compelling it: and all the
+conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is nevertheless
+well to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our
+spontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in our
+contingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency.
+
+289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinct
+knowledge, or _intelligence_, occurs in the actual use of reason; but the
+senses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immune
+from bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, but that we are
+the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused. In this
+sense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired, and we
+may say with St. Augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom of
+a slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, nevertheless has freedom to choose
+according to the state wherein he is, although more often than not he is
+under the stern necessity of choosing between two evils, because a superior
+force prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires. That which
+in a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected by
+passions, whose violence is sweet, but none the less pernicious. In truth
+we will only that which pleases us: but unhappily what pleases us now is
+often a real evil, which would displease us if we had the eyes of the
+understanding open. Nevertheless that evil state of the slave, which is
+also our own, does not prevent us, any more than him, from making a free
+choice of that which pleases us most, in the state to which we are reduced,
+in proportion to our present strength and knowledge.
+
+290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within us
+the source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. The        [304]
+impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, and
+it was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the
+sources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound to
+speak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one may,
+in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is a
+question of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneity
+suffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence
+upon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical sense.
+
+291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that true
+spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the
+intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. That
+cannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established Harmony,
+which I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out that by
+nature every simple substance has perception, and that its individuality
+consists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of
+perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another,
+to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through its
+instrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of view
+proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive any
+physical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part adapts
+itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently only
+obeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows that
+the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only upon
+God and upon itself in its actions.
+
+292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought for
+emerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were in
+difficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfied
+by the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all the
+actions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without,
+according to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all is
+controlled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose naturally
+the objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. Descartes
+replied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but that we are
+likewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves; and
+that we must believe in both, even though we see not how it is possible to
+reconcile them.
+
+                                                                      [305]
+293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion of an
+argument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument.
+Which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes.
+Notwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves with this,
+albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion, as
+M. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (_Philos._, vol. 1, Metaph., book 2,
+part 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' doctrine: 'Most
+philosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, not being able to
+understand the relation existing between free actions and the providence of
+God, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of free will: but
+that is sacrilegious. The others, not being able to apprehend the relation
+between God's efficacy and free actions, have denied that man was endowed
+with freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The mean to be found between these
+two extremes is to say' (id. ibid., p. 485) 'that, even though we were not
+able to understand all the relations existing between freedom and God's
+providence, we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are free
+and dependent upon God. For both these truths are equally known, the one
+through experience, and the other through reason; and prudence forbids one
+to abandon truths whereof one is assured, under the pretext that one cannot
+apprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths well
+known.'
+
+294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that these
+expressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations
+between man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to be
+incompatible with our freedom.' He adds that these expressions are
+over-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors assume',
+he says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment;
+whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenment
+which we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's opinion) 'with our
+Mysteries.' That is exactly what I said at the beginning of this work, that
+if the Mysteries were irreconcilable with reason, and if there were
+unanswerable objections, far from finding the mystery incomprehensible, we
+should comprehend that it was false. It is true that here there is no
+question of a mystery, but only of natural religion.
+
+295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon   [306]
+the Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which I
+cannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says
+(_Dictionary_, art. 'Helen.', lit. [Greek: TD]), 'of that which passes
+within them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if
+their will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice
+whereof they are the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons who
+have studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions,
+and who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Those
+persons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come to
+persuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to
+resist the force that carries them along where they would not go. It was
+principally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of
+their evil deeds.'
+
+296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that a
+little philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophy
+bringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those who reflect
+upon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we do is only
+impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through
+the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabula
+rasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and
+passions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity.
+
+297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the
+blame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:
+
+      _Frustra, Medea, repugnas,_
+  _Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait._
+
+And a little later Ovid makes her add:
+
+  _Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,_
+  _Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,_
+  _Deteriora sequor_.
+
+But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say
+with far more reason:
+
+  _Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,_
+  _Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_
+
+298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is
+only apparent. For in his _Diss. de providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61)  [307]
+he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that
+present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in
+such a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outward
+force. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act
+with most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's action
+is upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus
+operatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod
+autem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is
+true that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But it
+seems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that
+production of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created
+effect, whose positive elements are actually created continually through
+God's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are
+concerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he
+gives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we
+who produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always
+reasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our
+freedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to
+making will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention,
+_a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite evident that that
+does not interfere with freedom, any more than could a friend who gives
+counsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not supplied an answer
+to the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse to God is of no avail
+here.
+
+299. But let me give another much more reasonable passage from the same M.
+Bayle, where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively sense of
+freedom, which according to the Cartesians is a proof of freedom. His words
+are indeed full of wit, and worthy of consideration, and occur in the
+_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 140, p. 761
+_seqq._). Here they are: 'By the clear and distinct sense we have of our
+existence we do not discern whether we exist through ourselves or derive
+our being from another. We discern that only by reflexion, that is, through
+meditation upon our powerlessness in the matter of conserving ourselves as
+much as we would, and of freeing ourselves from dependence upon the beings
+that surround us, etc. It is indeed certain that the pagans (the same must
+be said of the Socinians, since they deny the creation) never attained[308]
+to the knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing, and
+that we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance.
+They therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universe
+exist of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing, and that thus they
+depend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications, which
+are liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause. Does not
+this error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creative
+action which conserves us, and that we are only conscious of our existence?
+That we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we should for ever
+remain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aid
+us? Let us say also, that the clear and distinct sense we have of the acts
+of our will cannot make us discern whether we give them ourselves to
+ourselves or receive them from that same cause which gives us existence. We
+must have recourse to reflexion or to meditation in order to effect this
+discrimination. Now I assert that one can never by purely philosophical
+meditations arrive at an established certainty that we are the efficient
+cause of our volitions: for every person who makes due investigation will
+recognize clearly, that if we were only passive subjects with regard to
+will we should have the same sensations of experience as we have when we
+think that we are free. Assume, for the sake of argument, that God so
+ordered the laws of the union between soul and body that all the modalities
+of the soul, without a single exception, are of necessity linked together
+with the interposition of the modalities of the brain. You will then
+understand that nothing will happen to us except that of which we are
+conscious: there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from the
+perception of objects of the senses, which is its first step, up to the
+most definite volitions, which are its final step. There will be in this
+sequence the consciousness of ideas, that of affirmations, that of
+irresolutions, that of velleities and that of volitions. For whether the
+act of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring it
+about ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feel
+that we will. Moreover, as this external cause can blend as much pleasure
+as it will with the volition which it impresses upon us, we shall be able
+to feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and that
+they lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations. We shall
+feel no constraint; you know the maxim: _voluntas non potest cogi_. Do[309]
+you not clearly understand that a weather-vane, always having communicated
+to it simultaneously (in such a way, however, that priority of nature or,
+if one will, a real momentary priority, should attach to the desire for
+motion) movement towards a certain point on the horizon, and the wish to
+turn in that direction, would be persuaded that it moved of itself to
+fulfil the desires which it conceived? I assume that it would not know that
+there were winds, or that an external cause changed everything
+simultaneously, both its situation and its desires. That is the state we
+are in by our nature: we know not whether an invisible cause makes us pass
+sufficiently from one thought to another. It is therefore natural that men
+are persuaded that they determine their own acts. But it remains to be
+discovered whether they are mistaken in that, as in countless other things
+they affirm by a kind of instinct and without having made use of
+philosophic meditation. Since therefore there are two hypotheses as to what
+takes place in man: the one that he is only a passive subject, the other
+that he has active virtues, one cannot in reason prefer the second to the
+first, so long as one can only adduce proofs of feeling. For we should feel
+with an equal force that we wish this or that, whether all our volitions
+were imprinted upon our soul by an exterior and invisible cause, or we
+formed them ourselves.'
+
+300. There are here excellent arguments, which are valid against the usual
+systems; but they fail in respect of the System of Pre-established Harmony,
+which takes us further than we were able to go formerly. M. Bayle asserts,
+for instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can never
+attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our
+volitions'. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the
+establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course
+of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it
+is free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the
+customary co-operation of God. And this system shows that our spontaneity
+is real, and not only apparent, as Herr Wittich believed it to be. M. Bayle
+asserts also on the same reasons (ch. 170, p. 1132) that if there were a
+_fatum Astrologicum_ this would not destroy freedom; and I would concede
+that to him, if freedom consisted only in an apparent spontaneity.
+
+301. The spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be questioned;
+and Aristotle has defined it well, saying that an action is           [310]
+_spontaneous_ when its source is in him who acts. 'Spontaneum est, cujus
+principium est in agente.' Thus it is that our actions and our wills depend
+entirely upon us. It is true that we are not directly the masters of our
+will, although we be its cause; for we do not choose volitions, as we
+choose our actions by our volitions. Yet we have a certain power also over
+our will, because we can contribute indirectly towards willing another time
+that which we would fain will now, as I have here already shown: that,
+however, is no _velleity_, properly speaking. There also we have a mastery,
+individual and even perceptible, over our actions and our wills, resulting
+from a combination of spontaneity with intelligence.
+
+302. Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedom
+mentioned by Aristotle, that is, _spontaneity_ and _intelligence_, which
+are found united in us in deliberation, whereas beasts lack the second
+condition. But the Schoolmen demand yet a third, which they call
+_indifference_. And indeed one must admit it, if indifference signifies as
+much as 'contingency'; for I have already said here that freedom must
+exclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity. But, as I have
+declared more than once, this indifference, this contingency, this
+non-necessity, if I may venture so to speak, which is a characteristic
+attribute of freedom, does not prevent one from having stronger
+inclinations towards the course one chooses; nor does it by any means
+require that one be absolutely and equally indifferent towards the two
+opposing courses.
+
+303. I therefore admit indifference only in the one sense, implying the
+same as contingency, or non-necessity. But, as I have declared more than
+once, I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not think that
+one ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a choice would
+be, as it were, mere chance, without determining reason, whether apparent
+or hidden. But such a chance, such an absolute and actual fortuity, is a
+chimera which never occurs in nature. All wise men are agreed that chance
+is only an apparent thing, like fortune: only ignorance of causes gives
+rise to it. But if there were such a vague indifference, or rather if we
+were to choose without having anything to prompt us to the choice, chance
+would then be something actual, resembling what, according to Epicurus,
+took place in that little deviation of the atoms, occurring without cause
+or reason. Epicurus had introduced it in order to evade necessity, and[311]
+Cicero with good reason ridiculed it.
+
+304. This deviation had a final cause in the mind of Epicurus, his aim
+being to free us from fate; but it can have no efficient cause in the
+nature of things, it is one of the most impossible of chimeras. M. Bayle
+himself refutes it admirably, as we shall see presently. And yet it is
+surprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of like
+nature with this supposed deviation: here is what he says, when speaking of
+Buridan's ass (_Dictionary_, art. 'Buridan', lit. 13): 'Those who advocate
+free will properly so called admit in man a power of determining, either to
+the right hand or the left, even when the motives are perfectly uniform on
+the side of each of the two opposing objects. For they maintain that our
+soul can say, without having any reason other than that of using its
+freedom: "I prefer this to that, although I see nothing more worthy of my
+choice in the one than the other".'
+
+305. All those who admit a free will properly so called will not for that
+reason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from an
+indeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all is
+determined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to the
+circumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no means
+approves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employ
+here the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians'
+manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. For
+although I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me
+choose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some
+impression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire to
+make use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us to
+the choice of one course or the other.
+
+306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby man
+can extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I have
+already mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancy
+that he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend upon
+objects.' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play master
+in one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it favour one
+course more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make this Act: I
+will prefer this to that, because it pleases me to behave thus.' But  [312]
+these words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is my pleasure', imply
+already a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'.
+
+307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so that
+which determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive would
+be derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, or of
+their natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or chance: the
+short straw would decide.' This way has an outlet, but it does not reach
+the goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it is not man who
+decides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides by
+lot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because the lot is not, and the
+man has attached himself to it. There are always reasons in Nature which
+cause that which happens by chance or through the lot. I am somewhat
+surprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could have allowed itself to
+be so misled on this point. I have set out elsewhere the true rejoinder to
+the Buridan sophism: it is that the case of perfect equipoise is
+impossible, since the universe can never be halved, so as to make all
+impressions equivalent on both sides.
+
+308. Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimerical
+or absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his book _De
+Fato_) that Carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation of
+atoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefined
+indifference to the voluntary motions of souls, because these motions have
+no need of an external cause, coming as they do from our nature. But M.
+Bayle (_Dictionary_, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly replies that all that
+which springs from the nature of a thing is determined: thus determination
+always remains, and Carneades' evasion is of no avail.
+
+309. He shows elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 90,
+l. 2, p. 229) 'that a freedom far removed from this so-called equipoise is
+incomparably more beneficial. I mean', he says, 'a freedom such as may
+always follow the judgements of the mind, and such as cannot resist objects
+clearly recognized as good. I know of no people who do not agree that truth
+clearly recognized necessitates' (determines rather, unless one speak of a
+moral necessity) 'the assent of the soul; experience teaches us that. In
+the schools they teach constantly that as the true is the object of   [313]
+the understanding, so the good is the object of the will. So likewise they
+teach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that which
+is shown to it under the semblance of truth, the will can never love
+anything which to it does not appear to be good. One never believes the
+false as such, and one never loves evil as evil. There is in the
+understanding a natural determination towards the true in general, and
+towards each individual truth clearly recognized. There is in the will a
+natural determination towards good in general; whence many philosophers
+conclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognized
+by us we are of necessity compelled to love them. The understanding
+suspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely, so
+that there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true. That
+leads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise
+only when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a
+good with regard to it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in the
+affirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements
+of the mind determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in this
+fashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or
+demerit. For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a
+free attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing them
+together, and discriminating between them. I must not forget that there are
+very learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, _De Gratia et Libero
+Arbitrio_, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in _Responsione ad Epistolam Viri
+Docti, id est Episcopii_) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that the
+will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the
+understanding.'
+
+310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clear
+recognition of the best _determines_ the will; but it does not necessitate
+it, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between the necessary
+and the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once,
+and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity. I think also
+that it is only God's will which always follows the judgements of the
+understanding: all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or
+to perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call
+_adequate ideas_. And although in the blessed these passions always tend
+towards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of
+things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always  [314]
+happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It is
+the same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason for
+our instincts. The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we
+are, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct
+knowledge. Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks
+(_Treatise on Prayer_, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered things
+beforehand that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, always
+succeed: that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, in
+addition to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an express
+knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses,
+and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we
+are not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement of the
+practical understanding.
+
+311. As for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to the
+true and that of the will to the good, one must know that a clear and
+distinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the affirmation
+of this truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction.
+But whatever perception one may have of the good, the effort to act in
+accordance with the judgement, which in my opinion forms the essence of the
+will, is distinct from it. Thus, since there is need of time to raise this
+effort to its climax, it may be suspended, and even changed, by a new
+perception or inclination which passes athwart it, which diverts the mind
+from it, and which even causes it sometimes to make a contrary judgement.
+Hence it comes that our soul has so many means of resisting the truth which
+it knows, and that the passage from mind to heart is so long. Especially is
+this so when the understanding to a great extent proceeds only by faint
+_thoughts_, which have only slight power to affect, as I have explained
+elsewhere. Thus the connexion between judgement and will is not so
+necessary as one might think.
+
+312. M. Bayle goes on to say, with truth (p. 221): 'Indeed, it cannot be a
+fault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as regards good
+in general. It would be rather a disorder, an inordinate imperfection, if
+one could say truthfully: It is all one to me whether I am happy or
+unhappy; I have no more determination to love the good than to hate it; I
+can do both equally. Now if it is a praiseworthy and advantageous quality
+to be determinate as regards good in general, it cannot be a fault if [315]
+one is necessitated as regards each individual good recognized plainly as
+for our good. It seems even as though it were a necessary conclusion, that
+if the soul has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general, it
+also has none in respect of particular goods which after due examination it
+judges to be goods in relation to it. What should we think of a soul which,
+having formed that judgement, had, and prided itself on having, the power
+not to love these goods, and even to hate them, and which said: I recognize
+clearly that these are goods for me, I have all the enlightenment necessary
+on that point; nevertheless I will not love them, I will hate them; my
+decision is made, I act upon it; it is not that any reason' (that is, any
+other reason than that which is founded upon 'Such is my good pleasure')
+'urges me thereto, but it pleases me so to behave: what should we think, I
+say, of such a soul? Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy
+than if it had not this freedom of indifference?
+
+313. 'Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final acts
+of the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul,
+but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along that
+road than along the road of indifference. It will suffice to enlighten his
+mind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will comply with the
+judgements that reason shall have pronounced. But if he has a freedom
+independent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized, he
+will be the most intractable of all animals, and it will never be possible
+to rely upon making him choose the right course. All the counsels, all the
+arguments in the world may prove unavailing; you will give him
+explanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will will play the
+haughty madam and remain motionless as a rock. Vergil, _Aen_., lib. 6, v.
+470:
+
+  _Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur,_
+  _Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes_.
+
+A caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all
+kinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it will
+please her to hate it. Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be the
+richest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of our
+happiness? Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? Is there cause for
+boasting in being able to say: "I have scorned all the judgements of  [316]
+my reason, and I have followed an altogether different path, simply from
+considerations of my own good pleasure?" With what regrets would one not be
+torn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result? Such a
+freedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men, because the
+understanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearly
+enough to deprive the will of the power of rejection. It would be therefore
+infinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by the
+judgement of the understanding, than to permit the will to suspend its
+action. For by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease and
+certainty.'
+
+314. Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is very
+true that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any determining
+reason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is impracticable
+and chimerical. The man who wished to behave thus, or at the least appear
+to be acting without due cause, would most certainly be looked upon as
+irrational. But it is very true also that the thing is impossible, when it
+is taken strictly in accordance with the assumption. As soon as one tries
+to give an example of it one misses one's aim and stumbles upon the case of
+a man who, while he does not come to a decision without cause, does so
+rather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement. As
+soon as one says: 'I scorn the judgements of my reason simply from
+considerations of my own good pleasure, it pleases me to behave thus', it
+is as if one were to say: I prefer my inclination to my interest, my
+pleasure to my profit.
+
+315. Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for him
+to follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer the
+satisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from their
+counsel. It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a wise
+man acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart
+another who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may disconcert
+those who watch his steps. It is even well at times to imitate Brutus by
+concealing one's wit, and even to feign madness, as David did before the
+King of the Philistines.
+
+316. M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showing
+that to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a great
+imperfection. He observes (p. 225) that, even according to the        [317]
+Molinists, 'the understanding which does its DUTY well indicates that which
+is THE BEST'. He introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our first
+parents in the Garden of Eden: 'I have given you my knowledge, the faculty
+of judging things, and full power to dispose your wills. I shall give you
+instructions and orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you is
+of such a nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) to
+obey me and to disobey me. You will be tempted: if you make a good use of
+your freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy.
+It is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either that
+I permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, or
+that I prevent you from doing so. Consider carefully, I give you four and
+twenty hours. Do you not clearly understand' (adds M. Bayle) 'that their
+reason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made them
+conclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favours
+wherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves by
+an ill use of their powers? And must one not admit that if Adam, through
+wrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had refused a
+divine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he would have
+been the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus? He would have been
+well-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to conquer
+without the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven would put
+their enemies to flight with such aid.'
+
+317. M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no less,
+or even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from above,
+than for owing one's happiness to one's own choice. And if one does well
+through having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose suddenly, to
+reasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy in this; for
+one assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or something or other
+which one pictures to oneself under the vague name of _good luck_ has
+impelled us thereto. Indeed, Sulla and Caesar boasted more of their good
+luck than of their prudence. The pagans, and particularly the poets (Homer
+especially), determined their heroes' acts by divine promptings. The hero
+of the _Aeneid_ proceeds only under the direction of a God. It was very
+great praise offered to the Emperors if one said that they were victorious
+both through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to    [318]
+their generals: 'Te copias, te consilium et tuos praebente Divos,' said
+Horace. The generals fought under the auspices of the Emperors, as if
+trusting to the Emperor's good luck, for subordinate officers had no rights
+regarding the auspices. One takes credit to oneself for being a favourite
+of heaven, one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune
+than of talent. There are no people that think themselves more fortunate
+than the mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts within
+them.
+
+318. 'On the other hand', M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), 'a Stoic philosopher, who
+attaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as susceptible as
+another man to the pleasure of having chosen well. And every man of sense
+will find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of having
+deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feels
+incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted
+in the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel
+a temptation. A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to
+his duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he is
+incapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is far
+more contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, and
+were for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take.
+One is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one's
+mind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel of
+a good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a good
+choice.' All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement
+has over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeed
+I have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep
+us in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. The
+nearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is
+determined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whom
+Velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable
+action, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of
+wavering.
+
+319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of
+M. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of the
+subject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he ought
+therefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God,  [319]
+of choosing the best way that is possible. For either God will act through
+a vague indifference and at random, or again he will act on caprice or
+through some other passion, or finally he must act through a prevailing
+inclination of reason which prompts him to the best. But passions, which
+come from the confused perception of an apparent good, cannot occur in God;
+and vague indifference is something chimerical. It is therefore only the
+strongest reason that can regulate God's choice. It is an imperfection in
+our freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good, a
+greater evil instead of the lesser evil, the lesser good instead of the
+greater good. That arises from the appearances of good and evil, which
+deceive us; whereas God is always prompted to the true and the greatest
+good, that is, to the absolutely true good, which he cannot fail to know.
+
+320. This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content with
+exempting it, I do not say from constraint, but from necessity itself,
+would also exempt it from certainty and determination, that is, from reason
+and perfection, nevertheless pleased some Schoolmen, people who often
+become entangled in their own subtleties, and take the straw of terms for
+the grain of things. They assume some chimerical notion, whence they think
+to derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain by quibblings.
+Complete indifference is of this nature: to concede it to the will is to
+grant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some mystics find
+in the divine nature, of being able to do the impossible, to produce
+absurdities, to cause two contradictory propositions to be true
+simultaneously. To claim that a determination comes from a complete
+indifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally
+from nothing. Let it be assumed that God does not give this determination:
+it has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul, nor in the body, nor in
+circumstances, since all is assumed to be indeterminate; and yet there it
+is, appearing and existing without preparation, nothing making ready for
+it, no angel, not even God himself, being able to see or to show how it
+exists. That would be not only the emergence of something from nothing, but
+its emergence thence _of itself_. This doctrine introduces something as
+preposterous as the theory already mentioned, of the deviation of atoms,
+whereby Epicurus asserted that one of these small bodies, going in a
+straight line, would turn aside all at once from its path, without any[320]
+reason, simply because the will so commands. Take note moreover that he
+resorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of complete
+indifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancient
+origin; and one may with good reason say: _Chimaera Chimaeram parit_.
+
+321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his admirable
+translation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet been
+published (Book 2):
+
+  _Ma ch'i principii poi non corran punto_
+  _Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?_
+  _Si finalmente ogni lor moto sempre_
+  _Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico_
+  _Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;_
+  _Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno_
+  _Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa_
+  _I decreti del fato, accio non segua_
+  _L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;_
+  _Onde han questa, dich' io_, del fato sciolta
+  Libera volunta, _per cui ciascuno_
+  _Va dove piu l'agrada? I moti ancora_
+  _Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo_
+  _Certo, ne certa region, ma solo_
+  _Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;_
+  _Poiche senz' alcun dubbio a queste cose_
+  _Da sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi_
+  _Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti._
+
+It is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the gods and
+all incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, which he
+himself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over the atoms,
+and diverted them from their path, without its being possible for one to
+say how.
+
+322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find at
+once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference,
+assuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought a
+reason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easily
+deceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject,
+where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier to
+confuse matters, that is to say, from the body to the soul. For most
+philosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. [321]
+Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking the
+origin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of
+the soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so much
+fault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades,
+who is no less irrational. I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was so
+clear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to the
+extent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this
+matter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were more
+capable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or
+cause, internal or external; or as if the great principle which states that
+nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body.
+
+323. It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over matter,
+that it is the source of action, having within itself the principle of
+motion or of change, in a word, [Greek: to autokineton], as Plato calls it;
+whereas matter is simply passive, and has need of being impelled to act,
+_agitur, ut agat_. But if the soul is active of itself (as it indeed is),
+for that very reason it is not of itself absolutely indifferent to the
+action, like matter, and it must find in itself a ground of determination.
+According to the System of Pre-established Harmony the soul finds in
+itself, and in its ideal nature anterior to existence, the reasons for its
+determinations, adjusted to all that shall surround it. That way it was
+determined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to act
+freely, as it does, when it attains to existence.
+
+324. M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such as
+must be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demand
+equipoise. He demonstrates amply enough (_Reply to the Questions of a
+Provincial_, ch. 139, p. 748 _seqq_.) that the soul may be compared to a
+balance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights.
+According to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the
+hypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when the
+weights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either to one
+side or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden.
+A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea shines more brightly than
+the old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure; when two
+passions dispute the ground, it is always the stronger which gains the
+mastery, unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other      [322]
+contributing passion. When one flings away merchandise in order to save
+oneself, the action, which the Schoolmen call mixed, is voluntary and free;
+and yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions. Grief
+arises from remembrance of lost possessions, and one has all the greater
+difficulty in making one's resolve, the nearer the approach to even weight
+in the opposing reasons, as also we see that the balance is determined more
+promptly when there is a great difference between the weights.
+
+325. Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose from,
+one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force which puts
+forth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the
+spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance. For instance,
+air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order
+to escape. It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itself
+upon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all the
+goods that present themselves: they are antecedent acts of will; but the
+consequent will, which is their result, is determined in the direction of
+that which touches most closely.
+
+326. This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man from
+being master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make use of
+his power. His dominion is that of reason: he has only to prepare himself
+in good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of checking the
+vehemence of the most furious. Let us assume that Augustus, about to give
+orders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his wont, upon the
+advice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek alphabet before
+doing anything in the first heat of his anger: this reflexion will be
+capable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of Augustus. But without
+some fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes to a special divine
+mercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, like that of Augustus,
+calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place, passion will
+prevail over reason. The driver is master over the horses if he controls
+them as he should, and as he can; but there are occasions when he becomes
+negligent, and then for a time he will have to let go the reins:
+
+  _Fertur equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas_.
+
+327. One must admit that there is always within us enough power over  [323]
+our will, but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it. That
+shows, as I have observed more than once, that the power of the soul over
+its inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an _indirect_
+manner, almost as Bellarmine would have had the Popes exercise rights over
+the temporal power of kings. In truth, the external actions that do not
+exceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will; but our volitions depend
+upon our will only through certain artful twists which give us means of
+suspending our resolutions, or of changing them. We are masters in our own
+house, not as God is in the world, he having but to speak, but as a wise
+prince is in his dominions or as a good father of a family is in his home.
+M. Bayle sometimes takes the matter differently, as though we must have, in
+order to boast of a free will, an absolute power over ourselves,
+independent of reasons and of means. But even God has not such a power, and
+must not have in this sense, in relation to his will: he cannot change his
+nature, nor act otherwise than according to method; and how could man
+transform himself all of a sudden? I have already said God's dominion, the
+dominion of wisdom, is that of reason. It is only God, however, who always
+wills what is most to be desired, and consequently he has no need of the
+power to change his will. 328. If the soul is mistress in its own house
+(says M. Bayle, p. 753) it has only to will, and straightway that vexation
+and pain which is attendant upon victory over the passions will vanish
+away. For this effect it would suffice, in his opinion, to give oneself
+indifference to the objects of the passions (p. 758). Why, then, do men not
+give themselves this indifference (he says), if they are masters in their
+own house? But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a father
+of a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? He can
+acquire some, but through skill, and not, as in the age of the fairies, or
+of King Midas, through a mere command of the will or by his touch. It would
+not suffice to be master in one's own house; one must be master of all
+things in order to give oneself all that one wishes; for one does not find
+everything in one's own house. Working thus upon oneself, one must do as in
+working upon something else; one must have knowledge of the constitution
+and the qualities of one's object, and adapt one's operations thereto. It
+is therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of the will that one
+corrects oneself, and that one acquires a better will.
+
+                                                                      [324]
+329. Nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and pains
+attendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into pleasure,
+through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the force
+of their mind, and of the divine grace. Ascetics and true mystics can speak
+of this from experience; and even a true philosopher can say something
+thereof. One can attain to that happy state, and it is one of the principal
+means the soul can use to strengthen its dominion.
+
+330. If the Scotists and the Molinists appear to favour vague indifference
+(appear, I say, for I doubt whether they do so in reality, once they have
+learnt to know it), the Thomists and the disciples of Augustine are for
+predetermination. For one must have either the one or the other. Thomas
+Aquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles, and
+the subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often obscures matters
+instead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a general rule follow
+their master, and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without the
+existence of some predetermination which contributes thereto. But the
+predetermination of the new Thomists is not perhaps exactly that which one
+needs. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, who often enough formed a party of his
+own, and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of God, was
+nevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination. He believed that God
+saw in the state of the soul, and of its surroundings, the reason for his
+determinations.
+
+331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the
+Thomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and against
+necessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity to
+everything. Cicero says in his book _De Fato_ that Democritus, Heraclitus,
+Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that others
+were opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); and
+that Chrysippus sought a middle course. I think that Cicero is mistaken as
+regards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and went
+even too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions on
+contingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he was
+justifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher
+of Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events,
+denied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this [325]
+determination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of
+Coimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion
+between things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims
+it, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or
+determination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the
+thing in its causes and in its reasons.
+
+332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by
+Chrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his _Stoic Philosophy_, that
+the passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preserved
+for us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher (_Noct. Att._, lib. 6,
+c. 2). Here it is in epitome. Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion
+of all events. Against this is urged in objection, that it follows that the
+acts of the will would be necessary, and that criminals, being coerced into
+evil, should not be punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from the
+original constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence;
+that souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger
+resistance to the impressions of external causes; but that those whose
+natural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to
+be perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principal
+causes and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whose
+rotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape,
+whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless it
+has need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the
+objects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its own
+constitution.
+
+333. Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, whether he
+will or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is almost of the
+same opinion (_Dictionary_, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. H). He says that this
+philosopher does not get out of the bog, since the cylinder is regular or
+uneven according to what the craftsman has made it; and thus God,
+providence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render it
+necessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to the Stoics, evil came
+from matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said that the stone on which
+the craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce a
+good cylinder. M. Bayle cites against Chrysippus the fragments of Onomaus
+and Diogenianus that Eusebius has preserved for us in the _Praeparatio[326]
+Evangelica_ (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); and above all he relies upon Plutarch's
+refutation in his book against the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit.
+G. But this refutation does not amount to very much. Plutarch maintains
+that it would be better to deny power to God than to impute to him the
+permission of evils; and he will not admit that evil may serve a greater
+good. I have already shown, on the contrary, that God cannot but be
+all-powerful, even though he can do no better than produce the best, which
+includes the permission of evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedly
+that what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the
+perfection of the whole.
+
+334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not only in
+his fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, c. 1)
+where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a reason
+which is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies the
+comparison of a stage play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarch
+quotes it himself). There he says that there are sometimes portions in a
+comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend
+grace to the whole poem. He calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions.
+We have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy for
+full understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; but since Plutarch
+assents to the fact, there is reason to believe that this comparison was
+not a poor one. Plutarch replies in the first place that the world is not
+like a play to provide entertainment. But that is a poor answer: the
+comparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part may make the whole
+better. He replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part of
+the comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. This reply is of no value
+either: for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also a
+very small part of the universe.
+
+335. But let us return to the cylinder of Chrysippus. He is right in saying
+that vice springs from the original constitution of some minds. He was met
+with the objection that God formed them, and he could only reply by
+pointing to the imperfection of matter, which did not permit God to do
+better. This reply is of no value, for matter in itself is indifferent to
+all forms, and God made it. Evil springs rather from the _Forms_ themselves
+in their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has not produced
+by an act of his will, any more than he thus produced numbers and     [327]
+figures, and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal and
+necessary; for they are in the ideal region of the possibles, that is, in
+the divine understanding. God is therefore not the author of essences in so
+far as they are only possibilities. But there is nothing actual to which he
+has not decreed and given existence; and he has permitted evil because it
+is involved in the best plan existing in the region of possibles, a plan
+which supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. This notion satisfies at
+once the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, and yet leaves a way
+open for the entrance of evil. God gives perfection to creatures in so far
+as it is possible in the universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, but
+any roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. This
+comparison made by Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which was
+taken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current, its
+pace becoming slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tend
+towards the same end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed
+concerning the opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find therein
+more reason than is supposed.
+
+336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art.
+'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, where
+this philosopher maintains that evil has come _by concomitance._ That also
+is made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the evil which God
+permitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a means, but simply
+as a condition, since it had to be involved in the best. Yet one must
+confess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection of
+necessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by the
+free choice of God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, that
+rational creatures act freely also, in accordance with their original
+nature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; and lastly, that the
+motive power of good inclines the will without compelling it.
+
+337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt exists
+to an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as it is
+genuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection. For
+to be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage, and to have
+control over the passions is in truth an advantage, but one that
+presupposes an imperfection, namely passion itself, of which God is   [328]
+incapable. Scotus was justified in saying that if God were not free and
+exempt from necessity, no creature would be so. But God is incapable of
+being indeterminate in anything whatsoever: he cannot be ignorant, he
+cannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; his will is always decided,
+and it can only be decided by the best. God can never have a primitive
+particular will, that is, independent of laws or general acts of will; such
+a thing would be unreasonable. He cannot determine upon Adam, Peter, Judas
+or any individual without the existence of a reason for this determination;
+and this reason leads of necessity to some general enunciation. The wise
+mind always acts _according to principles_; always _according to rules_,
+and never _according to exceptions_, save when the rules come into
+collision through opposing tendencies, where the strongest carries the day:
+or else, either they will stop one another or some third course will emerge
+as a result. In all these cases one rule serves as an exception to the
+other, and there are never any _original exceptions_ with one who always
+acts in a regular way.
+
+338. If there are people who believe that election and reprobation are
+accomplished on God's part by a despotic absolute power, not only without
+any apparent reason but actually without any reason, even a concealed one,
+they maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things and the
+divine perfections. Such an _absolutely absolute decree_ (so to speak)
+would be without doubt insupportable. But Luther and Calvin were far from
+such a belief: the former hopes that the life to come will make us
+comprehend the just reasons of God's choice; and the latter protests
+explicitly that these reasons are just and holy, although they be unknown
+to us. I have already in that connexion quoted Calvin's treatise on
+predestination, and here are the actual words: 'God before the fall of Adam
+had reflected upon what he had to do, and that for causes concealed from
+us.... It is evident therefore that he had just causes for the reprobation
+of some of mankind, but causes to us UNKNOWN.'
+
+339. This truth, that all God does is reasonable and cannot be better done,
+strikes at the outset every man of good sense, and extorts, so to speak,
+his approbation. And yet the most subtle of philosophers have a fatal
+propensity for offending sometimes without observing it, during the course
+and in the heat of disputes, against the first principles of good sense,
+when these are shrouded in terms that disguise them. We have here     [329]
+already seen how the excellent M. Bayle, with all his shrewdness, has
+nevertheless combated this principle which I have just indicated, and which
+is a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of God. He thought to
+defend in that way the cause of God and to exempt him from an imaginary
+necessity, by leaving him the freedom to choose from among various goods
+the least. I have already spoken of M. Diroys and others who have also been
+deluded by this strange opinion, one that is far too commonly accepted.
+Those who uphold it do not observe that it implies a wish to preserve for,
+or rather bestow upon, God a false freedom, which is the freedom to act
+unreasonably. That is rendering his works subject to correction, and making
+it impossible for us to say or even to hope that anything reasonable can be
+said upon the permission of evil.
+
+340. This error has much impaired M. Bayle's arguments, and has barred his
+way of escape from many perplexities. That appears again in relation to the
+laws of the realm of Nature: he believes them to be arbitrary and
+indifferent, and he objects that God could better have attained his end in
+the realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws, if he had more often
+dispensed with their observance, or even if he had made others. He believed
+this especially with regard to the law of the union between the soul and
+the body. For he is persuaded, with the modern Cartesians, that the ideas
+of the perceptible qualities that God gives (according to them) to the
+soul, occasioned by movements of the body, have nothing representing these
+movements or resembling them. Accordingly it was a purely arbitrary act on
+God's part to give us the ideas of heat, cold, light and other qualities
+which we experience, rather than to give us quite different ideas
+occasioned in the same way. I have often wondered that people so talented
+should have been capable of relishing notions so unphilosophic and so
+contrary to the fundamental maxims of reason. For nothing gives clearer
+indication of the imperfection of a philosophy than the necessity
+experienced by the philosopher to confess that something comes to pass, in
+accordance with his system, for which there is no reason. That applies to
+the idea of Epicurus on the deviation of atoms. Whether it be God or Nature
+that operates, the operation will always have its reasons. In the
+operations of Nature, these reasons will depend either upon necessary
+truths or upon the laws that God has found the most reasonable; and in the
+operations of God, they will depend upon the choice of the supreme    [330]
+reason which causes them to act.
+
+341. M. Regis, a famous Cartesian, had asserted in his 'Metaphysics' (part
+2, book 2, c. 29) that the faculties God has given to men are the most
+excellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general order of
+nature. 'Considering only', he says, 'the power of God and the nature of
+man by themselves, it is very easy to conceive that God could have made man
+more perfect: but if one will consider man, not in himself and separately
+from all other creatures, but as a member of the universe and a portion
+which is subject to the general laws of motions, one will be bound to
+acknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been.' He adds 'that we
+cannot conceive that God could have employed any other means more
+appropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'. M. Regis is
+right in a general way in saying that God cannot do better than he has done
+in relation to all. And although there be apparently in some places in the
+universe rational animals more perfect than man, one may say that God was
+right to create every kind of species, some more perfect than others. It is
+perhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a species of animals much
+resembling man and more perfect than we are. It may be even that the human
+race will attain in time to a greater perfection than that which we can now
+envisage. Thus the laws of motions do not prevent man from being more
+perfect: but the place God has assigned to man in space and in time limits
+the perfections he was able to receive.
+
+342. I also doubt, with M. Bayle, whether pain be necessary in order to
+warn men of peril. But this writer goes too far (_Reply to the Questions of
+a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 77, p. 104): he seems to think that a feeling
+of pleasure could have the same effect, and that, in order to prevent a
+child from going too near the fire, God could give him ideas of pleasure in
+proportion to the distance he kept from it. This expedient does not appear
+very practicable with regard to all evils, unless a miracle were involved.
+It is more natural that what if it were too near would cause an evil should
+cause some foreboding of evil when it is a little less near. Yet I admit
+that it is possible such a foreboding will be something less than pain, and
+usually this is the case. Thus it indeed appears that pain is not necessary
+for causing one to shun present peril; it is wont rather to serve as a
+penalty for having actually plunged into evil, and a warning against  [331]
+further lapse. There are also many painful evils the avoidance whereof
+rests not with us. As a dissolution of the continuity of our body is a
+consequence of many accidents that may happen to us, it was natural that
+this imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense of
+imperfection in the soul. Nevertheless I would not guarantee that there
+were no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to cause
+a sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of continuity,
+as for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off; or even a sense of
+pleasure, as if one were only scratching oneself. For the imperfection that
+attends the dissolution of the body might lead to the sense of a greater
+perfection, which was suspended or checked by the continuity which is now
+broken: and in this respect the body would be as it were a prison.
+
+343. There is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe of
+animals resembling that one which Cyrano de Bergerac encountered in the
+sun. The body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of innumerable
+small animals, that were capable of ranging themselves in accordance with
+the desires of the great animal, by this means it transformed itself in a
+moment, just as it pleased; and the dissolution of continuity caused it no
+more hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause to the sea. But, after all,
+these animals are not men, they are not in our globe or in our present
+century; and God's plan ensured that there should not be lacking here on
+earth a rational animal clothed in flesh and bones, whose structure
+involves susceptibility to pain.
+
+344. But M. Bayle further opposes this on another principle, one which I
+have already mentioned. It seems that he thinks the ideas which the soul
+conceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary. Thus God
+might have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us pleasure. He
+even maintains that the laws of motion are entirely arbitrary. 'I would
+wish to know', he says (vol. III, ch. 166, p. 1080), 'whether God
+established by an act of his freedom of indifference general laws on the
+communication of movements, and the particular laws on the union of the
+human soul with an organic body? In this case, he could have established
+quite different laws, and adopted a system whose results involved neither
+moral evil nor physical evil. But if the answer is given that God was
+constrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he has
+established, there we have neither more nor less than the _Fatum_ of  [332]
+the Stoics. Wisdom will have marked out a way for God, the abandonment
+whereof will have been as impossible to him as his own self-destruction.'
+This objection has been sufficiently overthrown: it is only a moral
+necessity; and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to act in
+accordance with the rules of perfect wisdom.
+
+345. Moreover, it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by many
+that the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few people
+have properly examined them. It is known now that M. Descartes was much
+mistaken in his statement of them. I have proved conclusively that
+conservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I consider
+that the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or directive
+and respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which carry this
+subject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in full; but I
+have communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, who have
+approved them, and have converted some other persons of acknowledged
+erudition and ability. I discovered at the same time that the laws of
+motion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are not
+in reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be;
+but neither is it necessary that they be so. They do not spring entirely
+from the principle of necessity, but rather from the principle of
+perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of
+God. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but must always assume
+something that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity. Thus these
+admirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as
+opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato
+or Spinoza.
+
+346. I have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that the
+effect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to the same
+thing, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom of higher
+philosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically. One may again apply other
+principles of like nature, for instance the principle that action is always
+equal to reaction, one which assumes in things a distaste for external
+change, and cannot be derived either from extension or impenetrability; and
+that other principle, that a simple movement has the same properties as
+those which might belong to a compound movement such as would produce [333]
+the same phenomena of locomotion. These assumptions are very plausible, and
+are successful as an explanation of the laws of motion: nothing is so
+appropriate, all the more since they are in accord with each other. But
+there is to be found in them no absolute necessity, such as may compel us
+to admit them, in the way one is compelled to admit the rules of logic, of
+arithmetic and geometry.
+
+347. It seems, when one considers the indifference of matter to motion and
+to rest, that the largest body at rest could be carried along without any
+resistance by the smallest body in motion, in which case there would be
+action without reaction and an effect greater than its cause. There is also
+no necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an even,
+horizontal plane, with a certain degree of speed, termed A, that this
+motion must have the properties of that motion which it would have if it
+were going with lesser speed in a boat, itself moving in the same direction
+with the residue of the speed, to ensure that the ball, seen from the bank,
+advance with the same degree A. For, although the same appearance of speed
+and of direction results through this medium of the boat, it is not because
+it is the same thing. Nevertheless it happens that the effects of the
+collision of the balls in the boat, the motion in each one separately
+combined with that of the boat giving the appearance of that which goes on
+outside the boat, also give the appearance of the effects that these same
+balls colliding would have outside the boat. All that is admirable, but one
+does not see its absolute necessity. A movement on the two sides of the
+right-angled triangle composes a movement on the hypotenuse; but it does
+not follow that a ball moving on the hypotenuse must produce the effect of
+two balls of its own size moving on the two sides: yet that is true.
+Nothing is so appropriate as this result, and God has chosen the laws that
+produce it: but one sees no geometrical necessity therein. Yet it is this
+very lack of necessity which enhances the beauty of the laws that God has
+chosen, wherein divers admirable axioms exist in conjunction, and it is
+impossible for one to say which of them is the primary.
+
+348. I have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law of
+continuity, which I have perhaps been the first to state, and which is a
+kind of touchstone whose test the rules of M. Descartes, of Father Fabry,
+Father Pardies, Father de Malebranche and others cannot pass. In virtue of
+this law, one must be able to regard rest as a movement vanishing     [334]
+after having continually diminished, and likewise equality as an inequality
+that vanishes also, as would happen through the continual diminution of the
+greater of two unequal bodies, while the smaller retains its size. As a
+consequence of this consideration, the general rule for unequal bodies, or
+bodies in motion, must apply also to equal bodies or to bodies one of which
+is at rest, as to a particular case of the rule. This does result in the
+true laws of motion, and does not result in certain laws invented by M.
+Descartes and by some other men of talent, which already on that score
+alone prove to be ill-concerted, so that one may predict that experiment
+will not favour them.
+
+349. These considerations make it plain that the laws of Nature regulating
+movements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary. The middle
+course to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom.
+And this great example of the laws of motion shows with the utmost clarity
+how much difference there is between these three cases, to wit, firstly _an
+absolute necessity_, metaphysical or geometrical, which may be called
+blind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in the
+second place, _a moral necessity_, which comes from the free choice of
+wisdom in relation to final causes; and finally in the third place,
+_something absolutely arbitrary_, depending upon an indifference of
+equipoise, which is imagined, but which cannot exist, where there is no
+sufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final cause.
+Consequently one must conclude how mistaken it is to confuse either that
+which is absolutely necessary with that which is determined by the reason
+of the best, or the freedom that is determined by reason with a vague
+indifference.
+
+350. This also settles M. Bayle's difficulty, for he fears that, if God is
+always determinate, Nature could dispense with him and bring about that
+same effect which is attributed to him, through the necessity of the order
+of things. That would be true if the laws of motion for instance, and all
+the rest, had their source in a geometrical necessity of efficient causes;
+but in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to something depending
+upon final causes and upon what is fitting. This also utterly destroys the
+most plausible reasoning of the Naturalists. Dr. Johann Joachim Becher, a
+German physician, well known for his books on chemistry, had composed a
+prayer which looked like getting him into trouble. It began: 'O sancta[335]
+mater natura, aeterne rerum ordo'. And it ended by saying that this Nature
+must forgive him his errors, since she herself was their cause. But the
+nature of things, if taken as without intelligence and without choice, has
+in it nothing sufficiently determinant. Herr Becher did not sufficiently
+take into account that the Author of things (_natura naturans_) must be
+good and wise, and that we can be evil without complicity on his part in
+our acts of wickedness. When a wicked man exists, God must have found in
+the region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that
+sequence of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatest
+perfection of the universe, and in which errors and sins are not only
+punished but even repaired to greater advantage, so that they contribute to
+the greatest good.
+
+351. M. Bayle, however, has extended the free choice of God a little too
+far. Speaking of the Peripatetic Strato (_Reply to the Questions of a
+Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 180, p. 1239), who asserted that everything had
+been brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of intelligence, he
+maintains that this philosopher, on being asked why a tree has not the
+power to form bones and veins, might have asked in his turn: Why has matter
+precisely three dimensions? why should not two have sufficed for it? why
+has it not four? 'If one had answered that there can be neither more nor
+less than three dimensions he would have demanded the cause of this
+impossibility.' These words lead one to believe that M. Bayle suspected
+that the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon God's choice,
+even as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees to produce
+animals. Indeed, how do we know whether there are not planetary globes or
+earths situated in some more remote place in the universe where the fable
+of the Barnacle-geese of Scotland (birds that were said to be born of
+trees) proves true, and even whether there are not countries where one
+could say:
+
+  _... populos umbrosa creavit_
+  _Fraxinus, et foeta viridis puer excidit alno?_
+
+But with the dimensions of matter it is not thus: the ternary number is
+determined for it not by the reason of the best, but by a geometrical
+necessity, because the geometricians have been able to prove that there are
+only three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can intersect
+at one and the same point. Nothing more appropriate could have been   [336]
+chosen to show the difference there is between the moral necessity that
+accounts for the choice of wisdom and the brute necessity of Strato and the
+adherents of Spinoza, who deny to God understanding and will, than a
+consideration of the difference existing between the reason for the laws of
+motion and the reason for the ternary number of the dimensions: for the
+first lies in the choice of the best and the second in a geometrical and
+blind necessity.
+
+352. Having spoken of the laws of bodies, that is, of the rules of motion,
+let us come to the laws of the union between body and soul, where M. Bayle
+believes that he finds again some vague indifference, something absolutely
+arbitrary. Here is the way he speaks of it in his _Reply_ (vol. II, ch. 84,
+p. 163): 'It is a puzzling question whether bodies have some natural
+property of doing harm or good to man's soul. If one answers yes, one
+plunges into an insane labyrinth: for, as man's soul is an immaterial
+substance, one will be bound to say that the local movement of certain
+bodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind, a statement
+contrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to us. If one
+answers no, one will be constrained to admit that the influence of our
+organs upon our thoughts depends neither upon the internal qualities of
+matter, nor upon the laws of motion, but upon an _arbitrary institution_ of
+the creator. One must then admit that it depended altogether upon God's
+freedom to combine particular thoughts of our soul with particular
+modifications of our body, even when he had once established all the laws
+for the action of bodies one upon another. Whence it results that there is
+in the universe no portion of matter which by its proximity can harm us,
+save when God wills it; and consequently, that the earth is as capable as
+any other place of being the abode of the happy man.... In short it is
+evident that there is no need, in order to prevent the wrong choices of
+freedom, to transport man outside the earth. God could do on earth with
+regard to all the acts of the will what he does in respect of the good
+works of the predestined when he settles their outcome, whether by
+efficacious or by sufficient grace: and that grace, without in any way
+impairing freedom, is always followed by the assent of the soul. It would
+be as easy for him on earth as in heaven to bring about the determination
+of our souls to a good choice.'
+
+353. I agree with M. Bayle that God could have so ordered bodies and  [337]
+souls on this globe of earth, whether by ways of nature or by extraordinary
+graces, that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a foretaste of the
+celestial state of the blessed. There is no reason why there should not be
+worlds happier than ours; but God had good reasons for willing that ours
+should be such as it is. Nevertheless, in order to prove that a better
+state would have been possible here, M. Bayle had no need to resort to the
+system of occasional causes: it abounds in miracles and in hypotheses for
+which their very originators confess there is no justification; and these
+are two defects such as will most of all estrange a system from true
+philosophy. It is a cause for surprise, in the first place, that M. Bayle
+did not bethink himself of the System of Pre-established Harmony which he
+had examined before, and which for this matter was so opportune. But as in
+this system all is connected and harmonious, all following from reasons and
+nothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect
+indifference, it seems that it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: for he was
+here somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference, which,
+notwithstanding, he contested so strongly on other occasions. He was much
+given to passing from one extreme to the other, not with an ill intention
+or against his own conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settled
+in his mind on the question concerned. He contented himself with whatever
+suited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being only
+to perplex philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; and never, in
+my opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against with
+more eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for the
+sake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That is
+what I often said to the late Abbe Foucher, a few specimens of whose work
+prove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsius
+and Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, and
+what M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato. It must not be possible for us
+to offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the
+celebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of the
+Sorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for some
+centuries. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them.
+
+354. M. Bayle goes on (p. 166): 'It is true that since the laws of motion
+were instituted in such forms as we see now in the world, it is an
+inevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should break it, and[338]
+that a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or some
+derangement of its parts. But that is all that can follow the action of
+this stone upon the human body. If you want it in addition to cause a
+feeling of pain, then one must assume the institution of a code other than
+that one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one upon
+another; one must, I say, have recourse to the particular system of the
+laws of union between the soul and certain bodies. Now as this system is
+not of necessity connected with the other, the indifference of God does not
+cease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the other. He
+therefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom, like two
+things which did not follow naturally the one from the other. Thus it is by
+an arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the body should
+cause pain in the soul which is united to this body. It therefore only
+rested with him to have chosen another system of union between soul and
+body: he was therefore able to choose one in accordance wherewith wounds
+only evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but agreeable desire to
+apply it. He was able to arrange that all bodies which were on the point of
+breaking a man's head or piercing his heart should evoke a lively sense of
+danger, and that this sense should cause the body to remove itself promptly
+out of reach of the blow. All that would have come to pass without
+miracles, since there would have been general laws on this subject. The
+system which we know by experience teaches us that the determination of the
+movement of certain bodies changes in pursuance of our desires. It was
+therefore possible for a combination to be effected between our desires and
+the movement of certain bodies, whereby the nutritive juices were so
+modified that the good arrangement of our organs was never affected.'
+
+355. It is evident that M. Bayle believes that everything accomplished
+through general laws is accomplished without miracles. But I have shown
+sufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serve
+to explain the event through the nature of things, it can only be put into
+execution by a miracle. If, for example, God had ordained that bodies must
+have a circular motion, he would have needed perpetual miracles, or the
+ministry of angels, to put this order into execution: for that is contrary
+to the nature of motion, whereby the body naturally abandons the circular
+line to continue in the tangent straight line if nothing holds it     [339]
+back. Therefore it is not enough for God to ordain simply that a wound
+should excite an agreeable sensation: natural means must be found for that
+purpose. The real means whereby God causes the soul to be conscious of what
+happens in the body have their origin in the nature of the soul, which
+represents the bodies, and is so made beforehand that the representations
+which are to spring up one from another within it, by a natural sequence of
+thoughts, correspond to the changes in the body.
+
+356. The representation has a natural relation to that which is to be
+represented. If God should have the round shape of a body represented by
+the idea of a square, that would be an unsuitable representation: for there
+would be angles or projections in the representation, while all would be
+even and smooth in the original. The representation often suppresses
+something in the objects when it is imperfect; but it can add nothing: that
+would render it, not more than perfect, but false. Moreover, the
+suppression is never complete in our perceptions, and there is in the
+representation, confused as it is, more than we see there. Thus there is
+reason for supposing that the ideas of heat, cold, colours, etc., also only
+represent the small movements carried out in the organs, when one is
+conscious of these qualities, although the multiplicity and the diminutive
+character of these movements prevents their clear representation. Almost in
+the same way it happens that we do not distinguish the blue and the yellow
+which play their part in the representation as well as in the composition
+of the green, when the microscope shows that what appears to be green is
+composed of yellow and blue parts.
+
+357. It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways;
+but there must always be an exact relation between the representation and
+the thing, and consequently between the different representations of one
+and the same thing. The projections in perspective of the conic sections of
+the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an
+ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight
+line and a point. Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these
+figures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every
+other point. Thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe to
+itself according to its point of view, and through a relation which is
+peculiar to it; but a perfect harmony always subsists therein. God, if he
+wished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of   [340]
+the body by an agreeable sensation in the soul, would not have neglected to
+ensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body,
+by giving it some new relief, as when one is freed of some burden or loosed
+from some bond. But organic bodies of such kinds, although possible, do not
+exist upon our globe, which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that God
+may have put to use elsewhere. Nevertheless it is enough that, due
+allowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe, nothing
+can be done for it better than what God does. He makes the best possible
+use of the laws of nature which he has established and (as M. Regis also
+acknowledged in the same passage) 'the laws that God has established in
+nature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive'.
+
+358. I will add to that the remark from the _Journal des Savants_ of the
+16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the _Reply
+to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 1030). The matter in
+question is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the Origin of
+Evil, to which I have already referred here. It is stated: 'that the
+general solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is that
+the universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces which
+form a whole; that, according to the laws established in nature, some parts
+cannot be better unless others become worse, whence would result a system
+less perfect as a whole. This principle', the writer goes on, 'is good; but
+if nothing is added to it, it does not appear sufficient. Why has God
+established laws that give rise to so many difficulties? philosophers who
+are somewhat precise will say. Could he not have established others of a
+kind not subject to any defects? And to cut the matter short, how comes it
+that he has prescribed laws for himself? Why does he not act without
+general laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness? The
+writer has not carried the difficulty as far as that. By disentangling his
+ideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty, but
+there is no development of the subject in his work.'
+
+359. I suppose that the gifted author of this extract, when he thought the
+difficulty could be solved, had in mind something akin to my principles on
+this matter. If he had vouchsafed to declare himself in this passage, he
+would to all appearance have replied, like M. Regis, that the laws God
+established were the most excellent that could be established. He would
+have acknowledged, at the same time, that God could not have refrained[341]
+from establishing laws and following rules, because laws and rules are what
+makes order and beauty; that to act without rules would be to act without
+reason; and that because God _called into action all his goodness_ the
+exercise of his omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom, to
+secure as much good as was possible of attainment. Finally, he would have
+said, the existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us is
+a sure indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance, and
+that they assist in the achievement of the total good, an argument
+wherewith M. Bayle in more than one place expresses agreement.
+
+360. Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything comes to pass
+according to determinate reasons, there cannot be any more difficulty over
+these principles of God's foreknowledge. Although these determinations do
+not compel, they cannot but be certain, and they foreshadow what shall
+happen. It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence of this
+universe, when he chooses it, and that thus he has no need of the connexion
+of effects and causes in order to foresee these effects. But since his
+wisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion, he cannot but
+see one part of the sequence in the other. It is one of the rules of my
+system of general harmony, _that the present is big with the future_, and
+that he who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be. What is
+more, I have proved conclusively that God sees in each portion of the
+universe the whole universe, owing to the perfect connexion of things. He
+is infinitely more discerning than Pythagoras, who judged the height of
+Hercules by the size of his footprint. There must therefore be no doubt
+that effects follow their causes determinately, in spite of contingency and
+even of freedom, which nevertheless exist together with certainty or
+determination.
+
+361. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, among others, has indicated this clearly in
+saying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in their causes,
+and that God, who knows all, seeing all that shall have power to tempt or
+repel the will, will see therein the course it shall take. I could cite
+many other authors who have said the same thing, and reason does not allow
+the possibility of thinking otherwise. M. Jacquelot implies also
+(_Conformity of Faith with Reason_, p. 318 _et seqq._), as M. Bayle
+observes (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 142, p.
+796), that the dispositions of the human heart and those of circumstances
+acquaint God unerringly with the choice that man shall make. M. Bayle [342]
+adds that some Molinists say the same, and refers us to those who are
+quoted in the _Suavis Concordia_ of Pierre de S. Joseph, the Feuillant (pp.
+579, 580).
+
+362. Those who have confused this determination with necessity have
+fabricated monsters in order to fight them. To avoid a reasonable thing
+which they had disguised under a hideous shape, they have fallen into great
+absurdities. For fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary necessity, or
+at least one different from that in question, they have admitted something
+which happens without the existence of any cause or reason for it. This
+amounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms, which according to
+Epicurus happened without any cause. Cicero, in his book on Divination, saw
+clearly that if the cause could produce an effect towards which it was
+entirely indifferent there would be a true chance, a genuine luck, an
+actual fortuitous case, that is, one which would be so not merely in
+relation to us and our ignorance, according to which one may say:
+
+                                _Sed Te_
+  _Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, caeloque locamus,_
+
+but even in relation to God and to the nature of things. Consequently it
+would be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the past.
+He adds fittingly in the same passage: 'Qui potest provideri, quicquam
+futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur futurum sit?'
+and soon after: 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae, quam
+fortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat quid casu et
+fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet: sin certe eveniet,
+nulla fortuna est.' If the future is certain, there is no such thing as
+luck. But he wrongly adds: 'Est autum fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum
+nulla praesensio est.' There is luck, therefore future events cannot be
+foreseen. He ought rather to have concluded that, events being
+predetermined and foreseen, there is no luck. But he was then speaking
+against the Stoics, in the character of an Academician.
+
+363. The Stoics already derived from the decrees of God the prevision of
+events. For, as Cicero says in the same book: 'Sequitur porro nihil Deos
+ignorare, quod omnia ab iis sint constituta.' And, according to my system,
+God, having seen the possible world that he desired to create, foresaw[343]
+everything therein. Thus one may say that the _divine knowledge of vision
+differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence_ only in that it adds to
+the latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to choose this sequence
+of things which simple intelligence had already presented, but only as
+possible; and this decree now makes the present universe.
+
+364. Thus the Socinians cannot be excused for denying to God the certain
+knowledge of future events, and above all of the future resolves of a free
+creature. For even though they had supposed that there is a freedom of
+complete indifference, so that the will can choose without cause, and that
+thus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is a great
+absurdity), they ought always to take into account that God was able to
+foresee this event in the idea of the possible world that he resolved to
+create. But the idea which they have of God is unworthy of the Author of
+things, and is not commensurate with the skill and wit which the writers of
+this party often display in certain particular discussions. The author of
+the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ was not altogether mistaken
+in saying that the God of the Socinians would be ignorant and powerless,
+like the God of Epicurus, every day confounded by events and living from
+one day to the next, if he only knows by conjecture what the will of men is
+to be.
+
+365. The whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong idea of
+contingency and of freedom, which was thought to have need of a complete
+indifference or equipoise, an imaginary thing, of which neither a notion
+nor an example exists, nor ever can exist. Apparently M. Descartes had been
+imbued with the idea in his youth, at the College of la Fleche. That caused
+him to say (part I of his _Principles_, art. 41): 'Our thought is finite,
+and the knowledge and omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only known
+from all eternity everything that is, or that can be, but also has willed
+it, is infinite. Thus we have enough intelligence to recognize clearly and
+distinctly that this power and this knowledge are in God; but we have not
+enough so to comprehend their extent that we can know how they leave the
+actions of men entirely free and indeterminate.' The continuation has
+already been quoted above. 'Entirely free', that is right; but one spoils
+everything by adding 'entirely indeterminate'. One has no need of infinite
+knowledge in order to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of God
+allow freedom to our actions, since God has foreseen those actions in [344]
+his ideas, just as they are, that is, free. Laurentius Valla indeed, in his
+_Dialogue against Boethius_ (which I will presently quote in epitome) ably
+undertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge, but does not venture to
+hope that he can reconcile it with providence. Yet there is no more
+difficulty in the one than the other, because the decree to give existence
+to this action no more changes its nature than does one's mere
+consciousness thereof. But there is no knowledge, however infinite it be,
+which can reconcile the knowledge and providence of God with actions of an
+indeterminate cause, that is to say, with a chimerical and impossible
+being. The actions of the will are determined in two ways, by the
+foreknowledge or providence of God, and also by the dispositions of the
+particular immediate cause, which lie in the inclinations of the soul. M.
+Descartes followed the Thomists on this point; but he wrote with his usual
+circumspection, so as not to come into conflict with some other
+theologians.
+
+366. M. Bayle relates (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,
+ch. 142, p. 804) that Father Gibieuf of the Oratory published a Latin
+treatise on the freedom of God and of the creature, in the year 1639; that
+he was met with protests, and was shown a collection of seventy
+contradictions taken from the first book of his work; and that, twenty
+years after, Father Annat, Confessor to the King of France, reproached him
+in his book _De Incoacta Libertate_ (ed. Rome, 1654, in 4to.), for the
+silence he still maintained. Who would not think (adds M. Bayle), after the
+uproar of the _de Auxiliis_ Congregations, that the Thomists taught things
+touching the nature of free will which were entirely opposed to the opinion
+of the Jesuits? When, however, one considers the passages that Father Annat
+quoted from the works of the Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: _Jansenius a
+Thomistis, gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus_,
+printed in Paris in the year 1654 in 4to.) one can in reality only see
+verbal controversies between the two sects. The grace efficacious of
+itself, according to the one side, leaves to free will quite as much power
+of resistance as the congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one can
+say almost as much of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man,
+of a methodical mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two years
+at his _Augustinus_. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogma
+of free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejects
+or adopts freedom of indifference. From his work innumerable passages [345]
+are quoted for and against this opinion, as Father Annat has himself shown
+in the work that has just been mentioned, _De Incoacta Libertate_. So easy
+is it to render this subject obscure, as M. Bayle says at the conclusion of
+this discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, it must be admitted that he often
+alters the meaning of his terms, and that consequently he does not answer
+the question in the main, albeit he often writes with good sense.
+
+367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity in
+terms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas
+about them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken,
+contentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and the
+impossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity and
+possibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon this
+question, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it
+implies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account that
+contingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which
+contribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also that
+one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or
+certainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice,
+presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which
+constrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is rid
+of the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in the
+books of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive the
+notion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) one
+will easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy Daedalus was the human
+mind. That labyrinth has caused infinite confusion, as much with the
+ancients as with those of later times, even so far as to lead men into the
+absurd error of the Lazy Sophism, which closely resembles fate after the
+Turkish fashion. I do not wonder if in reality the Thomists and the
+Jesuits, and even the Molinists and the Jansenists, agree together on this
+matter more than is supposed. A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist will
+content himself with certain determination, without going on to necessity:
+and if someone goes so far, the error mayhap will lie only in the word. A
+wise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity,
+but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations.
+
+368. These difficulties, however, have greatly impressed M. Bayle, who[346]
+was more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them, although he might
+perhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit to turn
+his mind in that direction. Here is what he says of them in his
+_Dictionary_, art. 'Jansenius', lit. G, p. 1626: 'Someone has said that the
+subject of Grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom. Perhaps he
+would have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the Strait of
+Messina, where one is always in danger of striking one reef while
+endeavouring to avoid another.
+
+  _Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis_
+  _Obsidet._
+
+Everything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? If you
+answer yes, then you will be told, his fall was not foreseen. If you answer
+no, then you will be told, he is not guilty. You may write a hundred
+volumes against the one or the other of these conclusions, and yet you will
+confess, either that the infallible prevision of a contingent event is a
+mystery impossible to conceive, or that the way in which a creature which
+acts without freedom sins nevertheless is altogether incomprehensible.'
+
+369. Either I am greatly mistaken or these two alleged
+incomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions. Would to God it
+were as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers, and how to avoid
+the perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate, the one from not
+curing the fever, the other from curing it wrongly. When one asserts that a
+free event cannot be foreseen, one is confusing freedom with
+indetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise;
+and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man from
+being guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination or from
+certainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows that the
+dilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage between the
+two perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam sinned freely, and
+that God saw him sinning in the possible state of Adam, which became actual
+in accordance with the decree of the divine permission. It is true that
+Adam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailing
+inclinations: but this determination destroys neither contingency nor
+freedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which exists in man
+does not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning (speaking generally) or,
+since he does sin, prevent him from being guilty and deserving        [347]
+punishment. This is more especially so since the punishment may be of
+service to him or others, to contribute towards determining them another
+time not to sin. There is besides punitive justice, which goes beyond
+compensation and amendment, and wherein also there is nothing liable to be
+shaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of the
+will. It may be said, on the contrary, that the penalties and rewards would
+be to some extent unavailing, and would fail in one of their aims, that of
+amendment, if they could not contribute towards determining the will to do
+better another time.
+
+370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only two
+courses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul,
+and co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; the
+other is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear to
+do so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the other is that
+of the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the Geneva
+Confession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they were not
+Jansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that where
+freedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other hand, the
+Molinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach Jansenism. Thus
+the one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with people
+who were considered heretics, and the other side not wishing to admit that
+they were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were always
+considered orthodox, have both performed a hundred feats of contortion,
+etc.'
+
+371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude a
+third course, according to which the determination of the soul does not
+come solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul,
+but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations which
+mingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or weakening them.
+Now all the internal and external causes taken together bring it about that
+the soul is determined certainly, but not of necessity: for no
+contradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determined
+differently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, but not
+possible for it to be compelled by necessity. I will not venture upon a
+discussion of the difference existing between the Jansenists and the
+Reformed on this matter. They are not perhaps always fully in accord  [348]
+with themselves as regards things, or as regards expressions, on a matter
+where one often loses one's way in bewildering subtleties. Father Theophile
+Raynaud, in his book entitled _Calvinismus Religio Bestiarum_, wished to
+strike at the Dominicans, without naming them. On the other hand, those who
+professed to be followers of St. Augustine reproached the Molinists with
+Pelagianism or at the least semi-Pelagianism. Things were carried to excess
+at times by both sides, whether in their defence of a vague indifference
+and the granting of too much to man, or in their teaching _determinationem
+ad unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam_, that
+is to say, a determination to evil in the non-regenerate, as if they did
+nothing but sin. After all, I think one must not reproach any but the
+adherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency;
+for they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happen
+by a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material and
+subjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God of
+intelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of
+necessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equally
+zealous in refuting an unendurable necessity. Although those who follow the
+Synod of Dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to be
+exempt from constraint, it seems that the necessity they leave in it is
+only hypothetical, or rather that which is more appropriately termed
+certainty and infallibility. Thus it results that very often the
+difficulties only lie in the terms. I say as much with regard to the
+Jansenists, although I do not wish to make excuse for those people in
+everything.
+
+372. With the Hebrew Cabalists, _Malcuth_ or the Kingdom, the last of the
+Sephiroth, signified that God controls everything irresistibly, but gently
+and without violence, so that man thinks he is following his own will while
+he carries out God's. They said that Adam's sin had been _truncatio Malcuth
+a caeteris plantis_, that is to say, that Adam had cut back the last of the
+Sephiroth, by making a dominion for himself within God's dominion, and by
+assuming for himself a freedom independent of God, but that his fall had
+taught him that he could not subsist of himself, and that men must needs be
+redeemed by the Messiah. This doctrine may receive a good interpretation.
+But Spinoza, who was versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, and
+who says (_Tractatus Politicus_, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving of
+freedom as they do, establish a dominion within God's dominion, has   [349]
+gone too far. The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominion
+of necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everything
+emanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and man's
+choice does not exempt him from necessity. He adds that men, in order to
+establish what is termed _Imperium in Imperio_, supposed that their soul
+was a direct creation of God, something which could not be produced by
+natural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination,
+a state of things contrary to experience. Spinoza is right in opposing an
+absolute power of determination, that is, one without any grounds; it does
+not belong even to God. But he is wrong in thinking that a soul, that a
+simple substance, can be produced naturally. It seems, indeed, that the
+soul to him was only a transient modification; and when he pretends to make
+it lasting, and even perpetual, he substitutes for it the idea of the body,
+which is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing.
+
+373. The story M. Bayle relates of Johan Bredenburg, a citizen of Rotterdam
+(_Dictionary_, art. 'Spinoza', lit. H, p. 2774) is curious. He published a
+book against Spinoza, entitled: _Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-politici,
+una cum demonstratione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum,
+cujus effati contrario praedictus Tractatus unice innititur_. One was
+surprised to see that a man who did not follow the profession of letters,
+and who had but slight education (having written his book in Flemish, and
+had it translated into Latin), had been able to penetrate with such
+subtlety all the principles of Spinoza, and succeed in overthrowing them,
+after having reduced them by a candid analysis to a state wherein they
+could appear in their full force. I have been told (adds M. Bayle) that
+this writer after copious reflexion upon his answer, and upon the principle
+of his opponent, finally found that this principle could be reduced to the
+form of a demonstration. He undertook therefore to prove that there is no
+cause of all things other than a nature which exists necessarily, and which
+acts according to an immutable, inevitable and irrevocable necessity. He
+examined the whole system of the geometricians, and after having
+constructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginable
+angle, he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to discover
+any means of destroying it, or even of weakening it. That caused him real
+distress: he groaned over it and begged the most talented of his      [350]
+friends to help him in searching out the defects of this demonstration. For
+all that, he was not well pleased that copies of the book were made. Franz
+Cuper, a Socinian (who had written _Arcana Atheismi Revelata_ against
+Spinoza, Rotterdam, 1676, in 4to.), having obtained a copy, published it
+just as it was, that is, in Flemish, with some reflexions, and accused the
+author of being an atheist. The accused made his defence in the same
+tongue. Orobio, a very able Jewish physician (that one who was refuted by
+M. Limbourg, and who replied, so I have heard say, in a work posthumously
+circulated, but unpublished), brought out a book opposing Bredenburg's
+demonstration, entitled: _Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatae Veritatis
+Divinae ac Naturalis, adversus J.B. principia, Amsterdam_, 1684. M. Aubert
+de Verse also wrote in opposition to him the same year under the name of
+Latinus Serbattus Sartensis. Bredenburg protested that he was convinced of
+free will and of religion, and that he wished he might be shown a
+possibility of refuting his own demonstration.
+
+374. I would desire to see this alleged demonstration, and to know whether
+it tended to prove that primitive Nature, which produces all, acts without
+choice and without knowledge. In this case, I admit that his proof was
+Spinozistic and dangerous. But if he meant perhaps that the divine nature
+is determined toward that which it produces, by its choice and through the
+motive of the best, there was no need for him to grieve about this
+so-called immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity. It is only moral,
+it is a happy necessity; and instead of destroying religion it shows divine
+perfection to the best advantage.
+
+375. I take this opportunity to add that M. Bayle quotes (p. 2773) the
+opinion of those who believe that the book entitled _Lucii Antistii
+Constantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber Singularis_, published in 1665,
+is by Spinoza. But I have reason for doubting this, despite that M.
+Colerus, who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of that
+famous Jew, is also of that opinion. The initial letters L.A.C. lead me to
+believe that the author of this book was M. de la Cour or Van den Hoof,
+famous for works on the _Interest of Holland, Political Equipoise_, and
+numerous other books that he published (some of them under the signature
+V.D.H.) attacking the power of the Governor of Holland, which was at that
+time considered a danger to the Republic; for the memory of Prince William
+the Second's attempt upon the city of Amsterdam was still quite fresh.[351]
+Most of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son,
+who was then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the
+Lowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other
+sects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace
+against them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus
+very natural that M. de la Cour should publish this book. It is true that
+people seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further party
+interests. I will say in passing that a French version of the _Interest of
+Holland_ by M. de la Cour has just been published, under the deceptive
+title of _Memoires de M. le Grand-Pensionnaire de Witt_; as if the thoughts
+of a private individual, who was, to be sure, of de Witt's party, and a man
+of talent, but who had not enough acquaintance with public affairs or
+enough ability to write as that great Minister of State might have written,
+could pass for the production of one of the first men of his time.
+
+376. I saw M. de la Cour as well as Spinoza on my return from France by way
+of England and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good anecdotes on the
+affairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that Spinoza studied Latin
+under a physician named Franz van den Ende. He tells at the same time, on
+the authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who refers to it in the preface to the
+second edition of the book by his late father, _De Tribus Impostoribus,
+Herberto L. B. de Cherbury, Hobbio et Spinoza_) that a girl instructed
+Spinoza in Latin, and that she afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was her
+pupil at the same time as Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that this
+young lady was a daughter of M. van den Ende, and that she assisted her
+father in the work of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A.
+Finibus, later went to Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in the
+Faubourg St. Antoine. He was considered excellent as an instructor, and he
+told me, when I called upon him there, that he would wager that his
+audiences would always pay attention to his words. He had with him as well
+at that time a young girl who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometrical
+demonstrations. He had insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces,
+and the Jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappeared
+shortly afterwards, having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan's
+conspiracy.
+
+377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor
+the providence of God can impair either his justice or his goodness,  [352]
+or our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from God's
+co-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to concern more
+closely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, and our
+freedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. Bayle has
+brought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will endeavour to throw
+light upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then I shall be in a
+position to conclude this work. I have already proved that the co-operation
+of God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our
+actions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is limited
+and imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations which
+are originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of the
+creature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arises
+in the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has
+within itself, and which are diversified by this change.
+
+378. I have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil is a
+consequence of privation, and I think that I have explained that
+intelligibly enough. St. Augustine has already put forward this idea, and
+St. Basil said something of the same kind in his _Hexaemeron_, Homil. 2,
+'that vice is not a living and animate substance, but an affection of the
+soul contrary to virtue, which arises from one's abandoning the good; and
+there is therefore no need to look for an original evil'. M. Bayle, quoting
+this passage in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Paulicians', lit. D, p. 2325)
+commends a remark by Herr Pfanner (whom he calls a German theologian, but
+he is a jurist by profession, Counsellor to the Dukes of Saxony), who
+censures St. Basil for not being willing to admit that God is the author of
+physical evil. Doubtless God is its author, when the moral evil is assumed
+to be already in existence; but speaking generally, one might assert that
+God permitted physical evil by implication, in permitting moral evil which
+is its source. It appears that the Stoics knew also how slender is the
+entity of evil. These words of Epictetus are an indication: 'Sicut
+aberrandi causa meta non ponitur, sic nec natura mali in mundo existit.'
+
+379. There was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of evil,
+as St. Basil aptly observes. Nor is it necessary either to seek the origin
+of evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos before God
+laid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. It was an
+opinion which Plato introduced into his _Timaeus_. Aristotle found fault
+with him for that (in his third book on Heaven, ch. 2) because,       [353]
+according to this doctrine, disorder would be original and natural, and
+order would have been introduced against nature. This Anaxagoras avoided by
+making matter remain at rest until it was stirred by God; and Aristotle in
+the same passage commends him for it. According to Plutarch (_De Iside et
+Osiride_, and _Tr. de Animae Procreatione ex Timaeo_) Plato recognized in
+matter a certain maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it was
+an actual blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believed
+that matter was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in the
+first book of the Physiology of the Stoics.
+
+380. Aristotle was right in rejecting chaos: but it is not always easy to
+disentangle the conceptions of Plato, and such a task would be still less
+easy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost. Kepler, one
+of the most excellent of modern mathematicians, recognized a species of
+imperfection in matter, even when there is no irregular motion: he calls it
+its 'natural inertia', which gives it a resistance to motion, whereby a
+greater mass receives less speed from one and the same force. There is
+soundness in this observation, and I have used it to advantage in this
+work, in order to have a comparison such as should illustrate how the
+original imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to the action of the
+Creator, which tends towards good. But as matter is itself of God's
+creation, it only furnishes a comparison and an example, and cannot be the
+very source of evil and of imperfection. I have already shown that this
+source lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles, for it must be eternal,
+and matter is not so. Now since God made all positive reality that is not
+eternal, he would have made the source of evil, if that did not rather lie
+in the possibility of things or forms, that which alone God did not make,
+since he is not the author of his own understanding.
+
+381. Yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms,
+anterior to the acts of God's will, it is nevertheless true that God
+co-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these forms
+into matter: and this is what causes the difficulty in question here.
+Durand de Saint-Pourcain, Cardinal Aureolus, Nicolas Taurel, Father Louis
+de Dole, M. Bernier and some others, speaking of this co-operation, would
+have it only general, for fear of impairing the freedom of man and the
+holiness of God. They seem to maintain that God, having given to creatures
+the power to act, contents himself with conserving this power. On the [354]
+other hand, M. Bayle, according to some modern writers, carries the
+cooperation of God too far: he seems to fear lest the creature be not
+sufficiently dependent upon God. He goes so far as to deny action to
+creatures; he does not even acknowledge any real distinction between
+accident and substance.
+
+382. He places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of the
+Schoolmen, that conservation is a continued creation. The conclusion to be
+drawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never exists,
+that it is ever newborn and ever dying, like time, movement and other
+transient beings. Plato believed this of material and tangible things,
+saying that they are in a perpetual flux, _semper fluunt, nunquam sunt_.
+But of immaterial substances he judged quite differently, regarding them
+alone as real: nor was he in that altogether mistaken. Yet continued
+creation applies to all creatures without distinction. Sundry good
+philosophers have been opposed to this dogma, and M. Bayle tells that David
+de Rodon, a philosopher renowned among those of the French who have adhered
+to Geneva, deliberately refuted it. The Arminians also do not approve of
+it; they are not much in favour of these metaphysical subtleties. I will
+say nothing of the Socinians, who relish them even less.
+
+383. For a proper enquiry as to _whether conservation is a continued
+creation,_ it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this dogma
+is founded. The Cartesians, after the example of their master, employ in
+order to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough. They say that
+'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one another, it
+does not follow that because I am at this moment I shall exist at the
+moment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me being for this
+moment does not also give it to me for the instant following.' The author
+of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ has made use of this
+argument, and M. Bayle (perhaps the author of this same _Reflexion_) quotes
+it (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 141, p. 771).
+One may answer that in fact it does not follow _of necessity_ that, because
+I am, I shall be; but this follows _naturally_, nevertheless, that is, of
+itself, _per se_, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that can be
+drawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement endures
+naturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, because the
+reason which makes it cease at this instant, if it is no new reason,  [355]
+would have already made it cease sooner.
+
+384. The late Herr Erhard Weigel, a celebrated mathematician and
+philosopher at Jena, well known for his _Analysis Euclidea_, his
+mathematical philosophy, some neat mechanical inventions, and finally the
+trouble he took to induce the Protestant princes of the Empire to undertake
+the last reform of the Almanac, whose success, notwithstanding, he did not
+witness; Herr Weigel, I say, communicated to his friends a certain
+demonstration of the existence of God, which indeed amounted to this idea
+of continued creation. As he was wont to draw parallels between reckoning
+and reasoning--witness his Arithmetical Ethics (_rechenschaftliche
+Sittenlehre_)--he said that the foundation of the demonstration was this
+beginning of the Pythagorean Table, _once one is one_. These repeated
+unities were the moments of the existence of things, each one of them
+depending upon God, who resuscitates, as it were, all things outside
+himself at each moment: falling away as they do at each moment, they must
+ever have one who shall resuscitate them, and that cannot be any other than
+God. But there would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be called
+a demonstration. It would be necessary to prove that the creature always
+emerges from nothingness and relapses thither forthwith. In particular it
+must be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by its
+nature belongs to the necessary being alone. The difficulties on the
+composition of the _continuum_ enter also into this matter. This dogma
+appears to resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments and
+points as mere modalities of the _continuum_, that is, as extremities of
+the parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. But
+this is not the place for entering into that labyrinth.
+
+385. What can be said for certain on the present subject is that the
+creature depends continually upon divine operation, and that it depends
+upon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first
+begins. This dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if God
+did not continue to act; in short, that this action of God is free. For if
+it were a necessary emanation, like that of the properties of the circle,
+which issue from its essence, it must then be said that God in the
+beginning produced the creature by necessity; or else it must be shown how,
+in creating it once, he imposed upon himself the necessity of conserving
+it. Now there is no reason why this conserving action should not be   [356]
+called production, and even creation, if one will: for the dependence being
+as great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic designation of being
+new or not does not change the nature of that action.
+
+386. Let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a continued
+creation, and let us see what M. Bayle seems to infer thence (p. 771) after
+the author of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_, in opposition
+to M. Jurieu. 'It seems to me', this writer says, 'that one must conclude
+that God does all, and that in all creation there are no first or second or
+even occasional causes, as can be easily proved. At this moment when I
+speak, I am such as I am, with all my circumstances, with such thought,
+such action, whether I sit or stand, that if God creates me in this moment
+such as I am, as one must of necessity say in this system, he creates me
+with such thought, such action, such movement and such determination. One
+cannot say that God creates me in the first place, and that once I am
+created he produces with me my movements and my determinations. That is
+indefensible for two reasons. The first is, that when God creates me or
+conserves me at this instant, he does not conserve me as a being without
+form, like a species, or another of the Universals of Logic. I am an
+individual; he creates me and conserves me as such, and as being all that I
+am in this instant, with all my attendant circumstances. The second reason
+is that if God creates me in this instant, and one says that afterwards he
+produces with me my actions, it will be necessary to imagine another
+instant for action: for before acting one must exist. Now that would be two
+instants where we only assume one. It is therefore certain in this
+hypothesis that creatures have neither more connexion nor more relation
+with their actions than they had with their production at the first moment
+of the first creation.' The author of this _Reflexion_ draws thence very
+harsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself; and he testifies at the
+end that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach those
+who approve this system how to extricate themselves from these frightful
+absurdities.
+
+387. M. Bayle carries this still further. 'You know', he says (p. 775),
+'that it is demonstrated in the Scholastic writings' (he cites Arriaga,
+_Disp_. 9, Phys., sect. 6 et praesertim, sub-sect. 3) 'that the creature
+cannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its conservation:
+for if it were, it would exist before existing, which is              [357]
+contradictory. You know that the argument proceeds like this: that which
+conserves itself acts; now that which acts exists, and nothing can act
+before it has attained complete existence; therefore, if a creature
+conserved itself, it would act before being. This argument is not founded
+upon probabilities, but upon the first principles of Metaphysics, _non
+entis nulla sunt accidentia, operari sequitur esse_, axioms as clear as
+daylight. Let us go further. If creatures co-operated with God (here is
+meant an active cooperation, and not co-operation by a passive instrument)
+to conserve themselves they would act before being: that has been
+demonstrated. Now if they co-operated with God for the production of any
+other thing, they would also act before being; it is therefore as
+impossible for them to co-operate with God for the production of any other
+thing (such as local movement, an affirmation, volition, entities actually
+distinct from their substance, so it is asserted) as for their own
+conservation. Since their conservation is a continued creation, and since
+all human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operate
+with God at the first moment of their existence, either to produce
+themselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would be to act
+before being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other Schoolmen teach
+that if the angels had sinned at the first moment of their creation God
+would be the author of the sin: see the Feuillant Pierre de St. Joseph, p.
+318, _et seqq_., of the _Suavis Concordia Humanae Libertatis_; it is a sign
+that they acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act in
+anything whatsoever), it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operate
+with God in any one of the subsequent moments, either to produce themselves
+or to produce any other thing. If they could co-operate therein at the
+second moment of their existence, nothing would prevent their being able to
+cooperate at the first moment.'
+
+388. This is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments. Let us
+assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us grant
+also that the instant excludes all priority of time, being indivisible; but
+let us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature, or what is
+called anteriority _in signo rationis,_ and that this is sufficient. The
+production, or action whereby God produces, is anterior by nature to the
+existence of the creature that is produced; the creature taken in itself,
+with its nature and its necessary properties, is anterior to its accidental
+affections and to its actions; and yet all these things are in being  [358]
+in the same moment. God produces the creature in conformity with the
+exigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom;
+and the creature operates in conformity with that nature which God conveys
+to it in creating it always. The limitations and imperfections arise
+therein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God's
+production; this is the consequence of the original imperfection of
+creatures. Vice and crime, on the other hand, arise there through the free
+inward operation of the creature, in so far as this can occur within the
+instant, repetition afterwards rendering it discernible.
+
+389. This anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy: thus one
+says that the decrees of God have an order among themselves. When one
+ascribes to God (and rightly so) understanding of the arguments and
+conclusions of creatures, in such sort that all their demonstrations and
+syllogisms are known to him, and are found in him in a transcendent way,
+one sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order; but
+there is no order of time or interval, to cause him to advance in knowledge
+and pass from the premisses to the conclusion.
+
+390. I find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which these
+reflexions fail to satisfy. When God produces the thing he produces it as
+an individual and not as a universal of logic (I admit); but he produces
+its essence before its accidents, its nature before its operations,
+following the priority of their nature, and _in signo anteriore rationis_.
+Thus one sees how the creature can be the true cause of the sin, while
+conservation by God does not prevent the sin; God disposes in accordance
+with the preceding state of the same creature, in order to follow the laws
+of his wisdom notwithstanding the sin, which in the first place will be
+produced by the creature. But it is true that God would not in the
+beginning have created the soul in a state wherein it would have sinned
+from the first moment, as the Schoolmen have justly observed: for there is
+nothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have induced him so to do.
+
+391. This law of wisdom brings it about also that God reproduces the same
+substance, the same soul. Such was the answer that could have been given by
+the Abbe whom M. Bayle introduces in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Pyrrhon.' lit.
+B, p. 2432). This wisdom effects the connexion of things. I concede
+therefore that the creature does not co-operate with God to conserve  [359]
+himself (in the sense in which I have just explained conservation). But I
+see nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with God for the
+production of any other thing: and especially might this concern its inward
+operation, as in the case of a thought or a volition, things really
+distinct from the substance.
+
+392. But there I am once more at grips with M. Bayle. He maintains that
+there are no such accidents distinct from the substance. 'The reasons', he
+says, 'which our modern philosophers have employed to demonstrate that the
+accidents are not beings in reality distinct from the substance are not
+mere difficulties; they are arguments which overwhelm one, and which cannot
+be refuted. Take the trouble', he adds, 'to look for them in the writings
+of Father Maignan, or Father Malebranche or M. Calli' (Professor of
+Philosophy at Caen) 'or in the _Accidentia profligata_ of Father Saguens,
+disciple of Father Maignan, the extract from which is to be found in the
+_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, June 1702. Or if you wish one
+author only to suffice you, choose Dom Francois Lami, a Benedictine monk,
+and one of the strongest Cartesians to be found in France. You will find
+among his _Philosophical Letters_, printed at Trevoux in 1703, that one
+wherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates "that God is the sole
+true cause of all that which is real." I would wish to see all these books;
+and as for this last proposition, it may be true in a very good sense: God
+is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of
+perfections. _Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae._ But when one
+comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say
+that the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is
+limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause.
+
+393. It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances with
+accidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall into
+Spinozism, which is an exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not act
+does not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinct
+from the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, like
+movement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the
+same (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if
+it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why
+shall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and  [360]
+that creatures are only accidents or modifications? Hitherto it has been
+supposed that the substance remains, and that the accidents change; and I
+think one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine, for the arguments
+I remember having read do not prove the contrary, and prove more than is
+needed.
+
+394. 'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from the
+so-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and
+their accidents is that creatures, if they produce the accidents, would
+possess a power of creation and annihilation. Accordingly one could not
+perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real
+beings, and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them.
+Merely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as many
+accidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue, and one
+destroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats, which
+lose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc.' This argument is only a
+kind of bugbear. What harm would be done, supposing that an infinity of
+movements, an infinity of figures spring up and disappear at every moment
+in the universe, and even in each part of the universe? It can be
+demonstrated, moreover, that that must be so.
+
+395. As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that
+one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a
+square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of
+the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a
+few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by
+changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of
+modifications has never been called _creation_, and it is an abuse of terms
+to scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the
+substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits.
+
+396. As for the souls or substantial forms, M. Bayle is right in adding:
+'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit substantial
+forms than the objection which is made that they could not be produced save
+by an actual creation, and that the Schoolmen are pitiable in their
+endeavours to answer this.' But there is nothing more convenient for me and
+for my system than this same objection. For I maintain that all the Souls,
+Entelechies or primitive forces, substantial forms, simple substances, or
+Monads, whatever name one may apply to them, can neither spring up    [361]
+naturally nor perish. And the qualities or derivative forces, or what are
+called accidental forms, I take to be modifications of the primitive
+Entelechy, even as shapes are modifications of matter. That is why these
+modifications are perpetually changing, while the simple substance remains.
+
+397. I have shown already (part I, 86 _seqq._) that souls cannot spring up
+naturally, or be derived from one another, and that it is necessary that
+ours either be created or be pre-existent. I have even pointed out a
+certain middle way between a creation and an entire pre-existence. I find
+it appropriate to say that the soul preexisting in the seeds from the
+beginning of things was only sentient, but that it was elevated to the
+superior degree, which is that of reason, when the man to whom this soul
+should belong was conceived, and when the organic body, always accompanying
+this soul from the beginning, but under many changes, was determined for
+forming the human body. I considered also that one might attribute this
+elevation of the sentient soul (which makes it reach a more sublime degree
+of being, namely reason) to the extraordinary operation of God.
+Nevertheless it will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles in
+the generating of man, as in that of the other animals. It will be possible
+to explain that, if one imagines that in this great number of souls and of
+animals, or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds, those
+souls alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature contain
+the reason that shall appear therein one day, and the organic bodies of
+these souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human
+shape, while the other small animals or seminal living beings, in which no
+such thing is pre-established, are essentially different from them and
+possessed only of an inferior nature. This production is a kind of
+_traduction_, but more manageable than that kind which is commonly taught:
+it does not derive the soul from a soul, but only the animate from an
+animate, and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation, which would
+cause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt it.
+
+398. I am, however, of the same opinion as Father Malebranche, that, in
+general, creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as might
+be supposed, and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of the
+dependence of creatures. 'How stupid and ridiculous are the Philosophers!'
+(he exclaims, in his _Christian Meditations_, 9, No. 3). 'They assume that
+Creation is impossible, because they cannot conceive how God's power  [362]
+is great enough to make something from nothing. But can they any better
+conceive how the power of God is capable of stirring a straw?' He adds,
+again with great truth (No. 5), 'If matter were uncreate, God could not
+move it or form anything from it. For God cannot move matter, or arrange it
+wisely, if he does not know it. Now God cannot know it, if he does not give
+it being: he can derive his knowledge only from himself. Nothing can act on
+him or enlighten him.'
+
+399. M. Bayle, not content with saying that we are created continually,
+insists also on this other doctrine which he would fain derive thence: that
+our soul cannot act. This is the way he speaks on that matter (ch. 141, p.
+765): 'He has too much acquaintance with Cartesianism' (it is of an able
+opponent he is speaking) 'not to know with what force it has been
+maintained in our day that there is no creature capable of producing
+motion, and that our soul is a purely passive subject in relation to
+sensations and ideas, and feelings of pain and of pleasure, etc. If this
+has not been carried as far as the volitions, that is on account of the
+existence of revealed truths; otherwise the acts of the will would have
+been found as passive as those of the understanding. The same reasons which
+prove that our soul does not form our ideas, and does not stir our organs,
+would prove also that it cannot form our acts of love and our volitions,
+etc' He might add: our vicious actions, our crimes.
+
+400. The force of these proofs, which he praises, must not be so great as
+he thinks, for if it were they would prove too much. They would make God
+the author of sin. I admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by a
+physical influence; for I think that the body must have been so formed
+beforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to the
+volitions of the soul, although it be true nevertheless that the soul is
+the principle of the operation. But if it be said that the soul does not
+produce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of pleasure,
+that is something for which I see no reason. In my system every simple
+substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause
+of all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in a
+metaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it produces. Those
+who hold a different opinion, and who make God the sole agent, are
+needlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will only with
+difficulty extricate themselves without offence against religion;     [363]
+moreover, they unquestionably offend against reason.
+
+401. Here is, however, the foundation of M. Bayle's argument. He says that
+we do not do that of which we know not the way it is done. But it is a
+principle which I do not concede to him. Let us listen to his dissertation
+(p. 767 seqq.): 'It is an astonishing thing that almost all philosophers
+(with the exception of those who expounded Aristotle, and who admitted a
+universal intelligence distinct from our soul, and cause of our
+perceptions: see in the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Note E of the
+article "Averroes") have shared the popular belief that we form our ideas
+actively. Yet where is the man who knows not on the one hand that he is in
+absolute ignorance as to how ideas are made, and on the other hand, that he
+could not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of how to sew? Is the sewing
+of two stitches in itself a work more difficult than the painting in one's
+mind of a rose, the very first time one's eyes rest upon it, and although
+one has never learnt this kind of painting? Does it not appear on the
+contrary that this mental portrait is in itself a work more difficult than
+tracing on canvas the shape of a flower, a thing we cannot do without
+having learnt it? We are all convinced that a key would be of no use to us
+for opening a chest if we were ignorant as to how to use the key, and yet
+we imagine that our soul is the efficient cause of the movement of our
+arms, despite that it knows neither where the nerves are which must be used
+for this movement, nor whence to obtain the animal spirits that are to flow
+into these nerves. We have the experience every day that the ideas we would
+fain recall do not come, and that they appear of themselves when we are no
+longer thinking of them. If that does not prevent us from thinking that we
+are their efficient cause, what reliance shall one place on the proof of
+feeling, which to M. Jacquelot appears so conclusive? Does our authority
+over our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions?
+If we were to count up carefully, we should find in the course of our life
+more velleities than volitions, that is, more evidences of the servitude of
+our will than of its dominion. How many times does one and the same man not
+experience an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an act of
+love for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a fine sonnet
+that he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act of approval
+of an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak only of inward acts,     [364]
+expressed by an "I will", such as "I will scorn", "approve", etc.) even if
+there were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and he ardently
+desired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired with the ambition
+to convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his own
+domain?
+
+402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just said
+to you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply into
+things, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect,
+and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That is not
+necessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only the passive
+subject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to a
+true agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be strongly
+convinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is just as
+little aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) that after a
+long experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed than
+it was before having willed anything. What is one to conclude from that,
+save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions, any more
+than of its ideas, and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms to
+move? (Take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point here
+absolutely, it is only being considered in relation to the principles of
+the objection.)'
+
+403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is there for
+one always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are salts, metals,
+plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how
+that which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must a drop of oil or
+of fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of
+water? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an end, one must be
+aware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because we will to do so,
+they form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not in
+consequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that of
+things. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wonders
+of nature are produced by a certain _instinct_ that God has placed there,
+that is by virtue of _divine preformation_, which has made these admirable
+automata, adapted to produce mechanically such beautiful effects. Even so
+it is easy to believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still more
+admirable, and that it is through divine preformation that it produces
+these beautiful ideas, wherein our will has no part and to which our  [365]
+art cannot attain. The operation of spiritual automata, that is of souls,
+is not mechanical, but it contains in the highest degree all that is
+beautiful in mechanism. The movements which are developed in bodies are
+concentrated in the soul by representation as in an ideal world, which
+expresses the laws of the actual world and their consequences, but with
+this difference from the perfect ideal world which is in God, that most of
+the perceptions in the other substances are only confused. For it is plain
+that every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confused
+perceptions or sensations, and that the succession of these perceptions is
+regulated by the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner which
+always expresses all the nature in the universe; and every present
+perception leads to a new perception, just as every movement that it
+represents leads to another movement. But it is impossible that the soul
+can know clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable number
+of small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapes
+itself there: to that end it must needs know completely the whole universe
+which is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God.
+
+404. As regards _velleities_, they are only a very imperfect kind of
+conditional will. I would, if I could: _liberet si liceret_; and in the
+case of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, but to be
+able. That explains why there are none in God; and they must not be
+confused with antecedent will. I have explained sufficiently elsewhere that
+our control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly, and that one
+would be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one's own domain to be
+able to will without cause, without rhyme or reason. To complain of not
+having such a control would be to argue like Pliny, who carps at the power
+of God because God cannot destroy himself.
+
+405. I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) all the
+objections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his works. But
+remembering Laurentius Valla's _Dialogue on Free Will,_ in opposition to
+Boethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it would be opportune
+to quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then to continue
+from where it ends, keeping up the fiction it initiated; and that less with
+the purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to explain myself
+towards the end of my dissertation as clearly as I can, and in a way  [366]
+most likely to be generally understood. This Dialogue of Valla and his
+books on Pleasure and the True Good make it plain that he was no less a
+philosopher than a humanist. These four books were opposed to the four
+books on the _Consolation of Philosophy_ by Boethius, and the Dialogue to
+the fifth book. A certain Spaniard named Antonio Glarea requests of him
+elucidation on the difficulty of free will, whereof little is known as it
+is worthy to be known, for upon it depend justice and injustice, punishment
+and reward in this life and in the life to come. Laurentius Valla answers
+him that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the
+whole world, just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings of
+birds.
+
+406. ANTONIO--I know that you can give me those wings, like another
+Daedalus, so that I may emerge from the prison of ignorance, and rise to
+the very region of truth, which is the homeland of souls. The books that I
+have seen have not satisfied me, not even the famous Boethius, who meets
+with general approval. I know not whether he fully understood himself what
+he says of God's understanding, and of eternity superior to time; and I ask
+for your opinion on his way of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom.
+LAURENT--I am fearful of giving offence to many people, if I confute this
+great man; yet I will give preference over this fear to the consideration I
+have for the entreaties of a friend, provided that you make me a promise.
+ANT.--What? LAUR.--It is, that when you have dined with me you do not ask
+me to give you supper, that is to say, I desire that you be content with
+the answer to the question you have put to me, and do not put a further
+question.
+
+407. ANT.--I promise you. Here is the heart of the difficulty. If God
+foresaw the treason of Judas, it was necessary that he should betray, it
+was impossible for him not to betray. There is no obligation to do the
+impossible. He therefore did not sin, he did not deserve to be punished.
+That destroys justice and religion, and the fear of God. LAUR.--God foresaw
+sin; but he did not compel man to commit it; sin is voluntary. ANT.--That
+will was necessary, since it was foreseen. LAUR.--If my knowledge does not
+cause things past or present to exist, neither will my foreknowledge cause
+future things to exist.
+
+408. ANT.--That comparison is deceptive: neither the present nor the past
+can be changed, they are already necessary; but the future, movable in
+itself, becomes fixed and necessary through foreknowledge. Let us     [367]
+pretend that a god of the heathen boasts of knowing the future: I will ask
+him if he knows which foot I shall put foremost, then I will do the
+opposite of that which he shall have foretold. LAUR.--This God knows what
+you are about to do. ANT.--How does he know it, since I will do the
+opposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what he
+thinks? LAUR.--Your supposition is false: God will not answer you; or
+again, if he were to answer you, the veneration you would have for him
+would make you hasten to do what he had said; his prediction would be to
+you an order. But we have changed the question. We are not concerned with
+what God will foretell but with what he foresees. Let us therefore return
+to foreknowledge, and distinguish between the necessary and the certain. It
+is not impossible for what is foreseen not to happen; but it is infallibly
+sure that it will happen. I can become a Soldier or Priest, but I shall not
+become one.
+
+409. ANT.--Here I have you firmly held. The philosophers' rule maintains
+that all that which is possible can be considered as existing. But if that
+which you affirm to be possible, namely an event different from what has
+been foreseen, actually happened, God would have been mistaken. LAUR.--The
+rules of the philosophers are not oracles for me. This one in particular is
+not correct. Two contradictories are often both possible. Can they also
+both exist? But, for your further enlightenment, let us pretend that Sextus
+Tarquinius, coming to Delphi to consult the Oracle of Apollo, receives the
+answer:
+
+  _Exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe._
+  A beggared outcast of the city's rage,
+  Beside a foreign shore cut short thy age.
+
+The young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O Apollo, and
+you proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? Apollo will say to him: Your gift is
+pleasing to me, and I will do that which you ask of me, I will tell you
+what will happen. I know the future, but I do not bring it about. Go make
+your complaint to Jupiter and the Parcae. Sextus would be ridiculous if he
+continued thereafter to complain about Apollo. Is not that true? ANT.--He
+will say: I thank you, O holy Apollo, for not having repaid me with
+silence, for having revealed to me the Truth. But whence comes it that
+Jupiter is so cruel towards me, that he prepares so hard a fate for an[368]
+innocent man, for a devout worshipper of the Gods? LAUR.--You innocent?
+Apollo will say. Know that you will be proud, that you will commit
+adulteries, that you will be a traitor to your country. Could Sextus reply:
+It is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, by
+foreseeing it? ANT.--I admit that he would have taken leave of his senses
+if he were to make this reply. LAUR.--Therefore neither can the traitor
+Judas complain of God's foreknowledge. And there is the answer to your
+question.
+
+410. ANT.--You have satisfied me beyond my hopes, you have done what
+Boethius was not able to do: I shall be beholden to you all my life long.
+LAUR.--Yet let us carry our tale a little further. Sextus will say: No,
+Apollo, I will not do what you say. ANT.--What! the God will say, do you
+mean then that I am a liar? I repeat to you once more, you will do all that
+I have just said. LAUR.--Sextus, mayhap, would pray the Gods to alter fate,
+to give him a better heart. ANT.--He would receive the answer:
+
+  _Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando_.
+
+He cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie. But what then will Sextus say?
+Will he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? Will he not say?
+What? I am then not free? It is not in my power to follow virtue?
+LAUR.--Apollo will say to him perhaps: Know, my poor Sextus, that the Gods
+make each one as he is. Jupiter made the wolf ravening, the hare timid, the
+ass stupid, and the lion courageous. He gave you a soul that is wicked and
+irreclaimable; you will act in conformity with your natural disposition,
+and Jupiter will treat you as your actions shall deserve; he has sworn it
+by the Styx.
+
+411. ANT.--I confess to you, it seems to me that Apollo in excusing himself
+accuses Jupiter more than he accuses Sextus, and Sextus would answer him:
+Jupiter therefore condemns in me his own crime; it is he who is the only
+guilty one. He could have made me altogether different: but, made as I am,
+I must act as he has willed. Why then does he punish me? Could I have
+resisted his will? LAUR.--I confess that I am brought to a pause here as
+you are. I have made the Gods appear on the scene, Apollo and Jupiter, to
+make you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence. I have
+shown that Apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom; but I cannot
+satisfy you on the decrees of Jupiter's will, that is to say, on the orders
+of providence. ANT.--You have dragged me out of one abyss, and you    [369]
+plunge me back into another and greater abyss. LAUR.--Remember our
+contract: I have given you dinner, and you ask me to give you supper also.
+
+412. ANT.--Now I discover your cunning: You have caught me, this is not an
+honest contract. LAUR.--What would you have me do? I have given you wine
+and meats from my home produce, such as my small estate can provide; as for
+nectar and ambrosia, you will ask the Gods for them: that divine nurture is
+not found among men. Let us hearken to St. Paul, that chosen vessel who was
+carried even to the third heaven, who heard there unutterable words: he
+will answer you with the comparison of the potter, with the
+incomprehensibility of the ways of God, and wonder at the depth of his
+wisdom. Nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask why God
+foresees the thing, for that is understood, it is because it will be: but
+one asks why he ordains thus, why he hardens such an one, why he has
+compassion on another. We do not know the reasons which he may have for
+this; but _since he is very good and very wise that is enough to make us
+deem that his reasons are good_. As he is just also, it follows that his
+decrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom. Some men have sought
+some reason therein. They have said that we are made from a corrupt and
+impure mass, indeed of mud. But Adam and the Angels were made of silver and
+gold, and they sinned notwithstanding. One sometimes becomes hardened again
+after regeneration. We must therefore seek another cause for evil, and I
+doubt whether even the Angels are aware of it; yet they cease not to be
+happy and to praise God. Boethius hearkened more to the answer of
+philosophy than to that of St. Paul; that was the cause of his failure. Let
+us believe in Jesus Christ, he is the virtue and the wisdom of God: he
+teaches us that God willeth the salvation of all, that he willeth not the
+death of the sinner. Let us therefore put our trust in the divine mercy,
+and let us not by our vanity and our malice disqualify ourselves to receive
+it.
+
+413. This dialogue of Valla's is excellent, even though one must take
+exception to some points in it: but its chief defect is that it cuts the
+knot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter,
+making him almost the author of sin. Let us therefore carry the little
+fable still further. Sextus, quitting Apollo and Delphi, seeks out Jupiter
+at Dodona. He makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his complaints. Why
+have you condemned me, O great God, to be wicked and unhappy? Change  [370]
+my lot and my heart, or acknowledge your error. Jupiter answers him: If you
+will renounce Rome, the Parcae shall spin for you different fates, you
+shall become wise, you shall be happy. SEXTUS--Why must I renounce the hope
+of a crown? Can I not come to be a good king? JUPITER--No, Sextus; I know
+better what is needful for you. If you go to Rome, you are lost. Sextus,
+not being able to resolve upon so great a sacrifice, went forth from the
+temple, and abandoned himself to his fate. Theodorus, the High Priest, who
+had been present at the dialogue between God and Sextus, addressed these
+words to Jupiter: Your wisdom is to be revered, O great Ruler of the Gods.
+You have convinced this man of his error; he must henceforth impute his
+unhappiness to his evil will; he has not a word to say. But your faithful
+worshippers are astonished; they would fain wonder at your goodness as well
+as at your greatness: it rested with you to give him a different will.
+JUPITER--Go to my daughter Pallas, she will inform you what I was bound to
+do.
+
+414. Theodorus journeyed to Athens: he was bidden to lie down to sleep in
+the temple of the Goddess. Dreaming, he found himself transported into an
+unknown country. There stood a palace of unimaginable splendour and
+prodigious size. The Goddess Pallas appeared at the gate, surrounded by
+rays of dazzling majesty.
+
+          _Qualisque videri_
+  _Coelicolis et quanta solet._
+
+She touched the face of Theodorus with an olive-branch, which she was
+holding in her hand. And lo! he had become able to confront the divine
+radiancy of the daughter of Jupiter, and of all that she should show him.
+Jupiter who loves you (she said to him) has commended you to me to be
+instructed. You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch and
+ward. Here are representations not only of that which happens but also of
+all that which is possible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before the
+beginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into worlds,
+and chose the best of all. He comes sometimes to visit these places, to
+enjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing his own choice,
+which cannot fail to please him. I have only to speak, and we shall see a
+whole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be represented
+anything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also what
+would happen if any particular possibility should attain unto         [371]
+existence. And whenever the conditions are not determinate enough, there
+will be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish,
+which will answer differently the same question, in as many ways as
+possible. You learnt geometry in your youth, like all well-instructed
+Greeks. You know therefore that when the conditions of a required point do
+not sufficiently determine it, and there is an infinite number of them,
+they all fall into what the geometricians call a locus, and this locus at
+least (which is often a line) will be determinate. Thus you can picture to
+yourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each and
+every one the case that is in question, and shall vary its circumstances
+and its consequences. But if you put a case that differs from the actual
+world only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain one
+of those determinate worlds will answer you. These worlds are all here,
+that is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not
+absolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he
+carries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses
+resembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus,
+but not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all
+that shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy and
+noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus,
+indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.
+
+415. Thereupon the Goddess led Theodorus into one of the halls of the
+palace: when he was within, it was no longer a hall, it was a world,
+
+  _Solemque suum, sua sidera norat_.
+
+At the command of Pallas there came within view Dodona with the temple of
+Jupiter, and Sextus issuing thence; he could be heard saying that he would
+obey the God. And lo! he goes to a city lying between two seas, resembling
+Corinth. He buys there a small garden; cultivating it, he finds a treasure;
+he becomes a rich man, enjoying affection and esteem; he dies at a great
+age, beloved of the whole city. Theodorus saw the whole life of Sextus as
+at one glance, and as in a stage presentation. There was a great volume of
+writings in this hall: Theodorus could not refrain from asking what that
+meant. It is the history of this world which we are now visiting, the
+Goddess told him; it is the book of its fates. You have seen a number [372]
+on the forehead of Sextus. Look in this book for the place which it
+indicates. Theodorus looked for it, and found there the history of Sextus
+in a form more ample than the outline he had seen. Put your finger on any
+line you please, Pallas said to him, and you will see represented actually
+in all its detail that which the line broadly indicates. He obeyed, and he
+saw coming into view all the characteristics of a portion of the life of
+that Sextus. They passed into another hall, and lo! another world, another
+Sextus. who, issuing from the temple, and having resolved to obey Jupiter,
+goes to Thrace. There he marries the daughter of the king, who had no other
+children; he succeeds him, and he is adored by his subjects. They went into
+other rooms, and always they saw new scenes.
+
+416. The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as one
+mounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finally
+they reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was the
+most beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could not
+see its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing to
+infinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endless
+number of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not have
+determined to create any; but there is not any one which has not also less
+perfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending to
+infinity. Theodorus, entering this highest hall, became entranced in
+ecstasy; he had to receive succour from the Goddess, a drop of a divine
+liquid placed on his tongue restored him; he was beside himself for joy. We
+are in the real true world (said the Goddess) and you are at the source of
+happiness. Behold what Jupiter makes ready for you, if you continue to
+serve him faithfully. Here is Sextus as he is, and as he will be in
+reality. He issues from the temple in a rage, he scorns the counsel of the
+Gods. You see him going to Rome, bringing confusion everywhere, violating
+the wife of his friend. There he is driven out with his father, beaten,
+unhappy. If Jupiter had placed here a Sextus happy at Corinth or King in
+Thrace, it would be no longer this world. And nevertheless he could not
+have failed to choose this world, which surpasses in perfection all the
+others, and which forms the apex of the pyramid. Else would Jupiter have
+renounced his wisdom, he would have banished me, me his daughter. You see
+that my father did not make Sextus wicked; he was so from all         [373]
+eternity, he was so always and freely. My father only granted him the
+existence which his wisdom could not refuse to the world where he is
+included: he made him pass from the region of the possible to that of the
+actual beings. The crime of Sextus serves for great things: it renders Rome
+free; thence will arise a great empire, which will show noble examples to
+mankind. But that is nothing in comparison with the worth of this whole
+world, at whose beauty you will marvel, when, after a happy passage from
+this mortal state to another and better one, the Gods shall have fitted you
+to know it.
+
+417. At this moment Theodorus wakes up, he gives thanks to the Goddess, he
+owns the justice of Jupiter. His spirit pervaded by what he has seen and
+heard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the zeal of a true
+servant of his God, and with all the joy whereof a mortal is capable. It
+seems to me that this continuation of the tale may elucidate the difficulty
+which Valla did not wish to treat. If Apollo has represented aright God's
+knowledge of vision (that which concerns beings in existence), I hope that
+Pallas will have not discreditably filled the role of what is called
+knowledge of simple intelligence (that which embraces all that is
+possible), wherein at last the source of things must be sought.
+
+                                                                      [377]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+APPENDICES
+
+SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Some persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition. I have
+the more readily deferred to their opinion, because of the opportunity
+thereby gained for meeting certain difficulties, and for making
+observations on certain matters which were not treated in sufficient detail
+in the work itself.
+
+OBJECTION I
+
+Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or
+knowledge, or goodness.
+
+God did not choose the best course in creating this world.
+
+Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this syllogism, and
+the opponent proves it by this
+
+PROSYLLOGISM
+
+Whoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been made
+without any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose the
+best course.
+
+God made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could have
+been made without any evil or which need not have been made at all.
+
+                                                                      [378]
+Therefore God did not choose the best course.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that there is
+evil in this world which God has made, and that it would have been possible
+to make a world without evil or even not to create any world, since its
+creation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, that is,
+the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, and I might content
+myself with asking for its proof. In order, however, to give a clearer
+exposition of the matter, I would justify this denial by pointing out that
+the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil,
+since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good.
+For example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a
+slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. I
+have proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out, through
+instances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the
+part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. I have followed
+therein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times that God
+permitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater
+good; and Thomas Aquinas says (in libr. 2, _Sent. Dist._ 32, qu. 1, art. 1)
+that the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I have
+shown that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed _felix culpa_, a
+fortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the
+incarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something more
+noble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings.
+For the better understanding of the matter I added, following the example
+of many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the general
+good for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity to
+exercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil:
+for God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that in order
+to prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It will
+therefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evil
+may be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still further in
+the work, and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better than
+every other possible universe.
+
+                                                                      [379]
+OBJECTION II
+
+If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is more
+evil than good in all God's work.
+
+Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures.
+
+Therefore there is more evil than good in all God's work.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for the
+major, I do not admit it because this supposed inference from the part to
+the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, assumes tacitly and
+without proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be compared or taken
+into account with those that have reason. But why might not the surplus of
+good in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world compensate for
+and even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in rational creatures? It
+is true that the value of the latter is greater; but by way of compensation
+the others are incomparably greater in number; and it may be that the
+proportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality.
+
+The minor also I cannot admit, namely, that there is more evil than good in
+intelligent creatures. One need not even agree that there is more evil than
+good in the human kind. For it is possible, and even a very reasonable
+thing, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be incomparably
+greater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and that here the
+excellence of the total good in the smaller number may exceed the total
+evil which is in the greater number. The blessed draw near to divinity
+through a divine Mediator, so far as can belong to these created beings,
+and make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make in
+evil, even though they should approach as nearly as may be the nature of
+demons. God is infinite, and the Devil is finite; good can and does go on
+_ad infinitum_, whereas evil has its bounds. It may be therefore, and it is
+probable, that there happens in the comparison between the blessed and the
+damned the opposite of what I said could happen in the comparison between
+the happy and the unhappy, namely that in the latter the proportion of
+degrees surpasses that of numbers, while in the comparison between
+intelligent and non-intelligent the proportion of numbers is greater than
+that of values. One is justified in assuming that a thing may be so as long
+as one does not prove that it is impossible, and indeed what is here  [380]
+put forward goes beyond assumption.
+
+But secondly, even should one admit that there is more evil than good in
+the human kind, one still has every reason for not admitting that there is
+more evil than good in all intelligent creatures. For there is an
+inconceivable number of Spirits, and perhaps of other rational creatures
+besides: and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole City of God,
+composed as much of Spirits as of rational animals without number and of
+endless different kinds, the evil exceeds the good. Although one need not,
+in order to answer an objection, prove that a thing is, when its mere
+possibility suffices, I have nevertheless shown in this present work that
+it is a result of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universe
+that the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all states or
+governments possible, and that in consequence what little evil there is
+should be required to provide the full measure of the vast good existing
+there.
+
+OBJECTION III
+
+If it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to punish.
+
+Now it is always impossible not to sin, or rather all sin is necessary.
+
+Therefore it is always unjust to punish.
+
+The minor of this is proved as follows.
+
+FIRST PROSYLLOGISM
+
+Everything predetermined is necessary.
+
+Every event is predetermined.
+
+Therefore every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary.
+
+Again this second minor is proved thus.
+
+SECOND PROSYLLOGISM
+
+That which is future, that which is foreseen, that which is involved in
+causes is predetermined.
+
+Every event is of this kind.
+
+Therefore every event is predetermined.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, which
+is the minor of the first; but I shall deny the major of the first    [381]
+prosyllogism, namely that everything predetermined is necessary; taking
+'necessity', say the necessity to sin, or the impossibility of not sinning,
+or of not doing some action, in the sense relevant to the argument, that
+is, as a necessity essential and absolute, which destroys the morality of
+action and the justice of punishment. If anyone meant a different necessity
+or impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or hypothetical, which
+will be explained presently) it is plain that we would deny him the major
+stated in the objection. We might content ourselves with this answer, and
+demand the proof of the proposition denied: but I am well pleased to
+justify my manner of procedure in the present work, in order to make the
+matter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject, by explaining
+the necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must be
+allowed. The truth is that the necessity contrary to morality, which must
+be avoided and which would render punishment unjust, is an insuperable
+necessity, which would render all opposition unavailing, even though one
+should wish with all one's heart to avoid the necessary action, and though
+one should make all possible efforts to that end. Now it is plain that this
+is not applicable to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if one
+did not so desire. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not
+absolute, but it presupposes will: if it is certain that one will do them,
+it is no less certain that one will will to do them. These voluntary
+actions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whether
+one will them or not; but they will happen because one will do, and because
+one will will to do, that which leads to them. That is involved in
+prevision and predetermination, and forms the reason thereof. The necessity
+of such events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity of
+consequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites. But
+the necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust and
+reward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one may do
+and whatever one may will to do: in a word, it exists in that which is
+essential. This it is which is called an absolute necessity. Thus it avails
+nothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts or
+commandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to blame or to praise; it
+will come to pass no more and no less. In voluntary actions, on the
+contrary, and in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382]
+punish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order of
+causes that make action exist. Thus it comes about that not only pains and
+effort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers in
+mind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them. That
+is why the precept _Ora et labora_ (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus not
+only those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events)
+maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also
+those who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in
+their time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events by
+their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of
+destroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it.
+For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a
+necessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will
+follow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a
+consequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies
+contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will
+is determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has the
+greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit
+that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only
+that of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have complete
+indifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of
+inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render
+absolutely necessary the resolution taken.
+
+OBJECTION IV
+
+Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather
+contributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary
+thereto.
+
+God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, and
+he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he
+causes, although he is fully cognizant of it.
+
+Therefore, etc.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the sin,
+but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without
+committing a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting
+unreasonably. I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383]
+God himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that one
+even opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do. And
+when one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after full
+consideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsible
+for events, even when one foresees them. One does not will these evils; but
+one is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot in
+reason help preferring to other considerations. This is a _consequent_
+will, resulting from acts of _antecedent_ will, in which one wills the
+good. I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and
+consequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills that
+all men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence of
+persistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin.
+But these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say with
+the same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not,
+and that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is always
+followed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permission
+being a result of superior reasons. One has indeed justification for
+saying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the
+production of good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself, and as
+it were detached (_particulariter et secundum quid_: Thom., I, qu. 19, art.
+6) according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil.
+Likewise one may say that the consequent, or final and total, divine will
+tends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together, whose
+combination thereby becomes determined, and involves also the permission of
+some evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of
+the universe demands. Arminius, in his _Antiperkinsus,_ explained very well
+that the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to the
+action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding,
+but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it is
+enough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from
+Scotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as I
+have made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the
+terms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' or
+'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to wrangle
+about words.
+
+                                                                      [384]
+OBJECTION V
+
+Whoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause.
+
+God produces all that is real in sin.
+
+Therefore God is the cause of sin.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, because the
+term 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering these
+propositions false. But in order to give a better explanation I will make a
+distinction. 'Real' either signifies that which is positive only, or else
+it includes also privative beings: in the first case, I deny the major and
+I admit the minor; in the second case, I do the opposite. I might have
+confined myself to that; but I was willing to go further, in order to
+account for this distinction. I have therefore been well pleased to point
+out that every purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection, and
+that every imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the privative:
+for to limit is to withhold extension, or the more beyond. Now God is the
+cause of all perfections, and consequently of all realities, when they are
+regarded as purely positive. But limitations or privations result from the
+original imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity. It is
+as with a laden boat, which the river carries along more slowly or less
+slowly in proportion to the weight that it bears: thus the speed comes from
+the river, but the retardation which restricts this speed comes from the
+load. Also I have shown in the present work how the creature, in causing
+sin, is a deficient cause; how errors and evil inclinations spring from
+privation; and how privation is efficacious accidentally. And I have
+justified the opinion of St. Augustine (lib. I, _Ad. Simpl._, qu. 2) who
+explains (for example) how God hardens the soul, not in giving it something
+evil, but because the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by the
+resistance of the soul, and by the circumstances contributing to this
+resistance, so that he does not give it all the good that would overcome
+its evil. 'Nec _(inquit)_ ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior,
+sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.' But if God had willed to do more
+here he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures or
+fresh miracles to change their natures, and this the best plan did not
+allow. It is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapid
+than its slope permits or the boats themselves be less laden, if they [385]
+had to be impelled at a greater speed. So the limitation or original
+imperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of the
+universe cannot admit more good, and cannot be exempted from certain evils,
+these, however, being only of such a kind as may tend towards a greater
+good. There are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully enhance the
+beauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, appropriately used,
+render harmony more beautiful. But that depends upon the answer which I
+have already given to the first objection.
+
+OBJECTION VI
+
+Whoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power to do
+is unjust.
+
+God does so.
+
+Therefore, etc.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the minor of this argument. And I believe that God always gives
+sufficient aid and grace to those who have good will, that is to say, who
+do not reject this grace by a fresh sin. Thus I do not admit the damnation
+of children dying unbaptized or outside the Church, or the damnation of
+adult persons who have acted according to the light that God has given
+them. And I believe that, _if anyone has followed the light he had_, he
+will undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he has need, even as
+the late Herr Hulsemann, who was celebrated as a profound theologian at
+Leipzig, has somewhere observed; and if such a man had failed to receive
+light during his life, he would receive it at least in the hour of death.
+
+OBJECTION VII
+
+Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means of producing
+effectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enough
+goodness.
+
+God does so.
+
+Therefore, etc.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the major. It is true that God could overcome the greatest
+resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so,       [386]
+whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly
+influence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this
+distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be
+restricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act
+in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have
+observed already in answering the first objection. The reasons for this
+connexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances than
+the other, are hidden in the depths of God's wisdom: they depend upon the
+universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail
+to choose, required this. One concludes thus from the event itself; since
+God made the universe, it was not possible to do better. Such management,
+far from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supreme
+goodness itself. This objection with its solution might have been inferred
+from what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemed
+advisable to touch upon it separately.
+
+OBJECTION VIII
+
+Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.
+
+God cannot fail to choose the best.
+
+Therefore God is not free.
+
+ANSWER
+
+I deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the most
+perfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and always to
+exercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force or
+by inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our
+souls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree
+of freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one's own
+inclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And to
+object that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism. He
+creates them freely: but when he had set before him an end, that of
+exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most
+appropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a _need_ is to take the
+term in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as
+one does when speaking of the wrath of God.
+
+Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387]
+always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself:
+_semel jussit, semper paret_. But he had better have said, that God always
+commands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always follows the
+tendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will.
+And as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will
+only which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his will is always
+indefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser good
+which he rejects will still be possible in itself. Otherwise the necessity
+of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogether
+absolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would be
+no choice. But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy the
+possibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomes
+effective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which is
+outside them and above them, that is, through the will of God. This
+necessity is called moral, because for the wise what is necessary and what
+is owing are equivalent things; and when it is always followed by its
+effect, as it indeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can say
+that it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, the
+closer do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind
+is not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality,
+reward and commendation. For that which it brings to pass does not happen
+whatever one may do and whatever one may will, but because one desires it.
+A will to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended;
+and it carries with it its own reward, which is supreme happiness. And as
+this constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to him
+who possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable from the point
+of view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God. If the will of God
+had not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend towards evil,
+which would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent somehow to
+good and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will that would always drift
+along at random would scarcely be any better for the government of the
+universe than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles, without the existence
+of divinity. And even though God should abandon himself to chance only in
+some cases, and in a certain way (as he would if he did not always tend
+entirely towards the best, and if he were capable of preferring a lesser
+good to a greater good, that is, an evil to a good, since that which  [388]
+prevents a greater good is an evil) he would be no less imperfect than the
+object of his choice. Then he would not deserve absolute trust; he would
+act without reason in such a case, and the government of the universe would
+be like certain games equally divided between reason and luck. This all
+proves that this objection which is made against the choice of the best
+perverts the notions of free and necessary, and represents the best to us
+actually as evil: but that is either malicious or absurd.
+
+                                                                      [389]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+EXCURSUS ON THEODICY
+
+ 392
+
+published by the author in Memoires de Trevoux
+
+July 1712
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_February_ 1712
+
+I said in my essays, 392, that I wished to see the demonstrations mentioned
+by M. Bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at Trevoux in 1703.
+Father des Bosses has shown me this letter, in which the writer essays to
+demonstrate by the geometrical method that God is the sole true cause of
+all that is real. My perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which I
+indicated in the same passage, namely, that this proposition can be true in
+a very good sense, God being the only cause of pure and absolute realities,
+or perfections; but when one includes limitations or privations under the
+name of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in the
+production of what is limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause of
+sin, and even its sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that the
+gifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me,
+although he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which he
+declares God to be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will not
+admit that God is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explains
+himself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real
+action to creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second
+proposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, although
+determinate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For it
+is love of good in general. It is through the ideas of good appearing [390]
+in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinate
+in relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the power of varying
+its own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love. And for
+that purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of God or
+oppose his action. These determinations of motion towards individual
+objects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which causes the
+mind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all the mind makes
+these changes only through the motion which God gives to it and conserves
+for it.' In my own style I would have said that the perfection which is in
+the action of the creature comes from God, but that the limitations to be
+found there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding
+limitations that occurred in the creature. Further, this is so not only in
+minds but also in all other substances, which thereby are causes
+co-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves; for this
+determination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation.
+
+Now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of the
+letter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions,
+in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. If by 'reality'
+one means only perfections or positive realities, God is the only true
+cause; but if that which involves limitations is included under the
+realities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, and the
+author himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to render the
+matter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the example of a laden
+boat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly carried along by the
+stream. There one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what is
+positive in this motion, of the perfection, the force, the speed of the
+boat, but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force, and
+that it brings about the retardation.
+
+It is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method to
+metaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto success has
+seldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that very great
+skill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less success than
+when he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections. For in
+mathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, figures and
+calculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in metaphysics,
+where one is deprived of this aid (at least in ordinary               [391]
+argumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the argument and in
+the exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack. But in
+neither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen.
+
+The author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour and
+penetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to prove
+that there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according to
+the fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the will of
+God is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is not less
+invincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality and
+force in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and with the same
+argument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion as
+in a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the body be at the place
+A, where it was immediately before, and for that it suffices that there be
+no reason to prompt God to the change. But when God wills that afterwards
+the body be at the place B, there must needs be a new reason, of such a
+kind as to determine God to will that it be in B and not in C or in any
+other place, and that it be there more or less promptly. It is upon these
+reasons, the volitions of God, that we must assess the force and the
+reality existent in things. The author speaks much of the will of God, but
+he does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt God to
+will, and upon which all depends. And these reasons are taken from the
+objects.
+
+I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the first
+proposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. The
+writer affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence of a being,
+that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word for
+word:
+
+'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer exists
+once that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The writer
+endeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove the
+effect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are
+stated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among
+those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) 'Now by
+the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save
+by the will of God. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in this expression,
+that nothing exists save by the will of God. If one means that things [392]
+begin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to the
+preceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is at
+all times a consequence of the will of God, one assumes more or less what
+is in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that the
+existence of things depends upon the will of God, and that it is not only a
+mere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfection
+which things contain; and once that is assumed, they will depend upon God's
+will no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have taken
+the matter in my Essays.
+
+Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made
+observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it
+contains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I
+have just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an
+introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced.
+
+                                                                      [393]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM,
+NECESSITY AND CHANCE'
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions depending
+thereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. John
+Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I have
+deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I have
+already mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since these
+writings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and since
+the works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. The
+Bishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of the
+Marquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into a
+discussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extreme
+restraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My Lord
+Newcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; but
+at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be
+published, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to
+abuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened,
+however, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a French friend, and allowed
+a young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of this
+friend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and published
+it later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop was
+obliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to    [394]
+publish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London in
+the year 1656, in 4to., entitled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity
+and Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of
+Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of the
+year 1684, in a work entitled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found his
+book on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on
+freedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply,
+nor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his
+usual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other
+we stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game.
+The bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr.
+Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests
+rather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the
+Schoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop.
+
+2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the
+opinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinity
+depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that God is no
+more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. He
+maintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none above
+him with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as if
+what is said about God were only compliments, that is to say expressions
+proper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies also
+that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their
+destruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but it
+seems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which asserts that
+bodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence of
+God and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says
+very reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about by
+chance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that
+produce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of
+all the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which,
+manifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they are
+conditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these
+conditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. All
+which amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everything
+comes to pass as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge       [395]
+whereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thing
+has happened and why it did not go otherwise.
+
+3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him
+seek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odious
+conclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolute
+necessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed in
+the answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypothetical
+necessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge
+of God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone
+would be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This was
+also the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De Servo
+Arbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged
+to-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, and
+springs from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing in
+it to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing
+were necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary implied
+contradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral
+necessity either, on the ground that everything really happens through
+physical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a great
+difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and
+which is termed moral, existing even in relation to God, and that blind
+necessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr.
+Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and
+consequently without God. Indeed, there would according to them be no need
+of God, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence
+through its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five.
+And this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it must
+happen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypothetical
+necessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been
+foreseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains an
+obligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the
+wise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted
+by good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would
+subvert piety and morality.
+
+4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396]
+our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we have
+the power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He asserts
+notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power
+that we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good
+pleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does not
+appear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also does
+not develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over our
+volitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This has
+been explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows,
+like others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself,
+if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would not
+prevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise,
+punishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produce
+actions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary,
+they would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since these
+actions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these means
+contribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they are
+indeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute
+necessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as it
+is taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligent
+substances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it
+has is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a
+dyke has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, it
+has not the power to rise above the dyke, although nothing would prevent it
+then from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it from
+rising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itself
+should come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by
+an increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man
+lacks the power, to go his way.
+
+5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points,
+which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_
+(he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present power
+of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_
+said, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objects
+through will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring from
+reasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new  [397]
+reasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and by
+this means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and
+could not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr.
+Hobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it does
+not rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat
+or not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or
+to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating
+beforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even
+though Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the
+manner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there
+is no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear
+that he is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says _non
+concupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition does
+not concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted (2)
+'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing',
+that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, I
+admit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard are
+only appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard
+of them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes.' _Wrong_: they
+have their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these
+are not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, without
+implying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity of
+all things.' _Wrong_: the will of God produces only contingent things,
+which could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are
+indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.
+
+6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) 'That
+man is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but also
+to choose what he wills to will.' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolute
+master of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some
+means or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, the
+will of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That is _well_ said,
+provided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he wills
+to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse
+than these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will or
+not.' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happen
+without necessity by chance.' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398]
+does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes
+and reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will
+happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, not
+as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins _well_,
+and finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of the
+consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future
+is present to God: for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent
+the event or consequent from being contingent in itself.
+
+7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been
+favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important
+ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this
+contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their
+exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a
+discussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who
+had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the
+Presbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions,
+as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the
+extreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that the
+defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others,
+having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince
+Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I.
+But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do not
+spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas
+Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres's
+party.
+
+8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for
+proofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits the
+reasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative,
+and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are
+others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by
+which we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one can honour God by
+expressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with
+Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God and
+the universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the
+necessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is  [399]
+an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr.
+Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence
+to people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on that
+account, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passed
+between the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds that
+it is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, since
+that is to say in effect that God is lacking in power. But he adds also at
+the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to
+attribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and
+would appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore,
+that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be right
+if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeed
+it appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has no
+goodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blind
+nature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematical
+laws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of
+Epicurus. If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would
+not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But God is not as a
+man, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always
+permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God,
+because they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always
+right to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain
+from fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a
+way which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be
+understood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without
+compromising his wisdom and his goodness.
+
+9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes divides
+them into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind are
+neutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which he
+thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the cause
+of our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be not
+grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for God did
+send me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you that
+sent me hither, but God.' And God said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will harden
+Pharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of   [400]
+Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his
+spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy
+hand.' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, because
+the Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, wherefore
+hast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkened
+not unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The
+deceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v.
+24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and
+causeth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger
+like a drunken man.' God said of the King of Assyria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against
+the people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the
+prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah
+said (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself:
+it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' And God said (Ezek.
+iii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and
+commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And
+the Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father
+which hath sent me draw him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having
+been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have
+taken.' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the
+Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do
+whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St.
+Paul (Rom. ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
+runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he
+mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19:
+'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath
+resisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest
+against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast
+thou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from
+another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii.
+6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which
+worketh all in all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created in
+Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should
+walk in them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both to
+will and to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these passages all
+those which make God the author of all grace and of all good          [401]
+inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin.
+
+10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These are
+those where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills,
+or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. xxx. 19: 'I call heaven
+and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life
+and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and
+thy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye will
+serve.' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. 12), 'Go and say unto
+David: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of
+them, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. vii. 16: 'Until the child shall
+know to refuse the evil and choose the good.' Finally the passages which
+Mr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all
+those where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with
+that of God. Thus Isa. v. 4: 'What could have been done more to my
+vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it
+should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5:
+'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire
+for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither
+came it into my mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed
+thyself; but in me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'God will have all men
+to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he
+could quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that God
+willeth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and
+generally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids evil.
+
+11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always will
+that which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to
+sacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full will
+or his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish in
+forty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills the salvation
+of all, that means simply that God commands that all do that which is
+necessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that God wills
+not sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr.
+Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one will
+answer him that it would be to God's discredit that his revealed will [402]
+should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to the
+Ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus the
+condition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites took
+it in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that God in
+commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not will
+action, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that was
+not an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same in
+the case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are in
+fact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity and
+every virtuous action that God commands; of such is omission of sin, a
+thing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is therefore
+incomparably better to explain the will of God as I have explained it in
+this work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness,
+has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause
+to be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to
+see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined
+by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very
+concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each
+good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible
+design of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of
+the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as
+light is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than
+this good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain
+goods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme
+perfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of
+others, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse
+than all the sin of creatures.
+
+12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying,
+article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is
+contrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that Mr.
+Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of the
+power of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledge
+and honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facile
+laudamus, bonos libenter._ This opinion, which despoils God of all goodness
+and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an
+absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and       [403]
+creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without
+any other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, is
+capable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devil
+would be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and
+with God; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that God, when he
+forbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes
+endeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that
+goodness is a part of the power of God, that is to say, the power of making
+himself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, and
+confounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if God does not
+intend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles of
+justice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarily
+that which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is
+possible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he
+make himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind
+power or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the
+intelligent principle or the providence of God, the other attributes to him
+actions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, says
+Mr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in
+distributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is
+not the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them
+reasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of
+God. But, says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only just
+through the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken
+also in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not
+depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom
+and of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in the same
+passage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie in a
+logical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an
+incomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to
+honour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something
+attributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality
+given to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations
+through the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult for
+Mr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since he
+admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would
+beware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404]
+is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mind
+subsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errors
+may not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, it
+is expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one
+who otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways.
+It is true that God does not reason, properly speaking, using time as we
+do, to pass from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one and
+the same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all the
+conclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the
+reasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom is
+perfect.
+
+                                                                      [405]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLY
+IN LONDON
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of this
+admirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read it
+himself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a good
+opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again and
+again like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to become
+confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the
+trouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoning
+performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as
+figures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixing
+our attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is why
+when this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printed
+originally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, I
+judged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required
+an attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreed
+only in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains five
+chapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I have
+observed that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and
+of physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for
+a few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with force
+and eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406]
+had not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections
+(of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the
+moral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to
+mine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible
+to credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to
+show (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifference
+of equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will has
+determined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, either
+in him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases,
+but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be
+pleasing.
+
+2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say,
+divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the
+great privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the source of
+their freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil.
+The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only of
+inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is
+sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the
+most excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow
+fantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts.
+What is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would be harmful.
+This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St.
+Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the
+outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality.
+But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted
+by the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by
+reasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absolute
+indifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantastic
+this choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from calling
+visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our gifted
+author. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would be
+the greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account
+an Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocated
+certain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day.
+
+3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by         [407]
+degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifference
+of choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us any
+inclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could be
+without causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as some
+have denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see
+them. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen
+by showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only
+be set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so we
+must believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can
+only be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when no
+distinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of a
+concourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and
+now sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more
+than another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and
+even Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason
+on that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people
+always have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reason
+and the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But
+finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their
+alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything
+whatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But
+the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties,
+by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always
+assume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As the
+Schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certain
+prime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vague
+indifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy men
+have been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of the
+errors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but he
+is without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it.
+
+              _Si Pergama dextra_
+  _Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent._
+
+He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. He
+knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages,        [408]
+transferring all these to vague indifference: only through this
+indifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure in
+one's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserable
+if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author had
+said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he only
+had to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himself
+that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes
+or tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be a
+degradation of God and men if they were to be made subject to reason; that
+thus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer be
+satisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewith
+to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had not
+within them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable
+by choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of this
+wondrous faculty.
+
+4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well to
+profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of
+things and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points in
+which we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shall
+gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. The
+first chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a being
+the idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not know
+if there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexion
+existing between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not the
+example of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. But
+one may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that after
+all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be
+divested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. He
+explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that
+_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between
+_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known
+through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only
+through relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea
+of God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed
+sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit
+in our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409]
+the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our
+perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the
+idea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at
+least are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of
+Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more
+relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon
+paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is
+arbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I have
+already indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians
+on that point.
+
+5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a
+criterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force
+whereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the
+understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says,
+that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in
+the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of
+a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity
+or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may
+still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He
+appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give
+our assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted
+prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another
+criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I
+have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth
+and Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given
+therein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only
+confusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of
+reason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths
+of reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us,
+such as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be
+indubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed that
+we think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inward
+notions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to objects,
+my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are
+firmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in such
+fashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of   [410]
+reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it is
+the only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, dreams and
+visions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through
+the connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or those
+which spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules of
+logic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility of
+which is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibility
+are only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in analysis are aware what
+difference there is in this respect between several properties by which
+some line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone so
+far, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of him
+already, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking in
+profundity or reflexion.
+
+6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space
+spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible
+to conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of God,
+that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he
+exists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the
+little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that
+God is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soon
+as one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore as
+soon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists of
+necessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which
+we have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion,
+that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present
+movement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another,
+and so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not be
+one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion
+in matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if
+there were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. So
+the rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would
+nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased to
+recount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how
+important, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, if
+it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no
+reason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411]
+saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the
+existence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality
+and the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject.
+It is enough to state that the author believes that space can be
+annihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and
+that we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor
+matter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the
+existence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration that
+in the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is
+not included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that
+there is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all
+things. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blind
+would reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us,
+for our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of some
+attributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, which
+is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered
+aright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that God
+in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst
+things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the
+greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and
+goodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remained
+notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections
+could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away.
+
+7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical,
+physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical
+evil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All these
+evils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is no
+providence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity:
+
+  _Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;_
+
+because there are so many faults in the nature of things,
+
+  _quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa._
+
+Others have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. There
+have also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, and among
+these our author appears to have had M. Bayle in mind. He hopes to    [412]
+show in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to be cut; and
+he says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness of God would
+not be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had been
+banished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III and
+observes, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since they
+are derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect substance
+from his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives him occasion
+for making a little digression against the Socinians. But someone will say,
+why did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfect
+things? The author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness of
+God is the cause. He wished to communicate himself at the expense of a
+certain fastidiousness which we assume in God, imagining that imperfections
+offend him. Thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect rather
+than nothing. But one might have added that God has produced indeed the
+most perfect whole that was possible, one wherewith he had full cause for
+satisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection
+in the whole. Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certain
+things might have been made better, but not without other new and _perhaps_
+greater disadvantages. This _perhaps_ could have been omitted: for the
+author also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of the
+chapter, _that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best_; and
+thus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, that imperfect
+things will be added to those more perfect, so long as they do not preclude
+the existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible. Thus
+bodies were created as well as spirits, since the one does not offer any
+obstacle to the other; and the creation of matter was not unworthy of the
+great God, as some heretics of old believed, attributing this work to a
+certain Demogorgon.
+
+8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter IV.
+Our famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or imperfection,
+springs from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or discomfort,
+springs from matter, or rather from its movement; for without movement
+matter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in these
+movements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, there
+would be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that cause [413]
+generations cause also corruptions, since from the variety of movements
+comes concussion between bodies, by which they are often dissipated and
+destroyed. The Author of Nature however, in order to render bodies more
+enduring, distributed them into _systems_, those which we know being
+composed of luminous and opaque balls, in a manner so excellent and so
+fitting for the display of that which they contain, and for arousing wonder
+thereat, that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful. But the crowning
+point of the work was the construction of animals, to the end that
+everywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition,
+
+  _Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba._
+
+Our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether have
+their denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing that there
+were places without animals, these places might have uses necessary for
+other places which are inhabited. So for example the mountains, which
+render the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren,
+are of use for the production of rivers and of winds; and we have no cause
+to complain of sands and marshes, since there are so many places still
+remaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be supposed that all is
+made for man alone: and the author is persuaded that there are not only
+pure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits,
+that is, animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptible
+matter. But it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial,
+composed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein, and whose motion is
+terminated by the breaking of the vessels. Thence the author is led to
+believe that the immortality granted to Adam, if he had been obedient,
+would not have been an effect of his nature, but of the grace of God.
+
+9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals that
+they should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger,
+and giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is about to
+cause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force the
+animal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of this
+discomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death helps
+also to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if the
+dissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals would
+take no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their [414]
+body to perish, and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for a
+whole day.
+
+God has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to feed and
+maintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappears
+imperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them to work, in
+order to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, and which may
+avail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by the Author of
+things that one animal very often should serve as food for another. This
+hardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused by diseases is
+generally just as painful as a violent death, if not more so; and animals
+subject to being preyed upon by others, having neither foresight nor
+anxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when they are not in
+danger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, thunderbolts and
+other disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and which men have
+ordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that suffer thereby.
+
+10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, which
+happen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary and
+constant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the taking
+of nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal's
+powers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way,
+restoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most intense
+is that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken care to
+ensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual cannot be
+so here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great tenderness
+for their little ones, even to the point of endangering themselves for
+their preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear,
+cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable, although
+it may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill: one must
+say as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other hurtful things, namely
+that these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system. As
+for ignorance and errors, it must be taken into account that the most
+perfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, and that knowledge is
+wont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it is necessary that one be
+exposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and accidents of such kinds
+are inevitable. One must often be mistaken in one's judgement, because it
+is not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact           [415]
+consideration. These disadvantages are inseparable from the system of
+things: for things must very often resemble one another in a certain
+situation, the one being taken for the other. But the inevitable errors are
+not the most usual, nor the most pernicious. Those which cause us the most
+harm are wont to arise through our fault; and consequently one would be
+wrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life, since one
+finds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to such
+action by voluntary evils.
+
+11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken come
+accidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer concerning all
+we do not know, from all we do know, that one could not have done away with
+them without falling into greater troubles. For the better understanding of
+this the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building. There
+must be not only apartments, halls, galleries, gardens, grottoes, but also
+the kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, stables, drainage. Thus it would
+not have been proper to make only suns in the world, or to make an earth
+all of gold and of diamonds, but not habitable. If man had been all eye or
+all ear, he would not have been fitted for feeding himself. If God had made
+him without passions, he would have made him stupid; and if he had wished
+to make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses, or
+give him powers of sensation through some other means than organs, that is
+to say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here
+upon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate,
+namely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are
+injurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here
+only in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what
+Revelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been
+exempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of
+divine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly
+indicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are:
+
+1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality.
+
+2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of itself,
+save in evil or useless herbs.
+
+3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance.
+
+4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband.
+
+                                                                      [416]
+5. The pains of childbirth.
+
+6. The enmity between man and the serpent.
+
+7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placed
+him.
+
+But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of
+matter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to him
+that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, and
+that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of
+life has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might have
+something to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our author
+on the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I have
+judged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subject
+of our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom.
+
+12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing to
+explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up half
+of the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that of
+physical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For,
+as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes rather
+from that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common,
+according to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power of
+choosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It is
+a very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection, namely sin,
+springs from perfection itself. But it is no less a paradox to present as a
+perfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world, the
+advantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason. And
+that, after all, rather than pointing out the source of the evil, would be
+to contend that it has none. For if the will makes its resolve without the
+existence of anything, either in the person who chooses or in the object
+which is chosen, to prompt it to the choice, there will be neither cause
+nor reason for this election; and as moral evil consists in the wrong
+choice, that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all. Thus in the
+rules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in Nature;
+and also for the same reason there would be no moral good either, and all
+morality would be destroyed. But we must listen to our gifted author, from
+whom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the
+Schoolmen, and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his[417]
+wit and his eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages contained
+therein. In setting forth the position reached in the controversy, he
+divides the writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content to
+say that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and the
+other sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But this
+exposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that is
+absolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral
+necessity, as I have already explained in many places.
+
+13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice.
+The author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe
+that the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, or by
+anterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course that it
+adopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that the will
+is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintain
+that the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is, he
+confuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the admissions and the
+odious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay them to the charge
+of those who are infinitely far removed from them, and who take great care
+to refute them. He lays these things to their charge because they believe,
+as Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save for some doctors who are
+enveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by the
+representation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion that
+there is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected
+by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet he
+adds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since if
+there were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can
+cause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the world
+censures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harm
+without necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate
+and by no means culpable; that there would be no difference between
+physical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true cause
+of an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be either
+blamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action may
+serve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one would
+find fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418]
+threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further,
+according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the
+prevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evil
+already done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitude
+would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without which
+the mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient
+reason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives the
+resolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true,
+one must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, and
+would depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground
+for hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree
+together in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to
+us, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusions
+hold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makes
+its resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an
+opinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders
+the soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countless
+serious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in the same
+class with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other discredited authors,
+whose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable. As for me, I do not
+require the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding,
+because I distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring from
+insensible perceptions and inclinations. But I hold that the will always
+follows the most advantageous representation, whether distinct or confused,
+of the good or the evil resulting from reasons, passions and inclinations,
+although it may also find motives for suspending its judgement. But it is
+always upon motives that it acts.
+
+14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before
+proceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of my
+opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary
+absolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence which
+is founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect. To
+put it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon the
+principle of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths,
+and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which   [419]
+applies also to contingent truths. I have already elsewhere stated this
+proposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing out
+that there are two great principles, namely, _that of identicals or of
+contradiction_, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one
+is true and the other false, and _that of the sufficient reason_, which
+states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by
+one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding.
+Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent
+truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason
+should not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles are
+contained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, when
+in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon
+truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is
+absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest
+extent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must
+say that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason
+which inclines without necessitating. Once that is granted, it is seen how
+we can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that the
+thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing
+representation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, but
+not necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitating
+it. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves and
+through their reasons, remain contingent. God was led infallibly by his
+wisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and to
+give it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity,
+and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme
+wisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions we
+have just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency and
+freedom.
+
+15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent.
+In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together with
+freedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, but
+also because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, a
+wicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principle
+of the Manichaeans would be in the universe. Moreover, the author has
+observed (ch. 4, sect. 4, Sec. 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbidden
+actions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils.[420]
+It is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable. But
+there is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the
+force of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that have
+prompted man to do ill: else anyone stealing a great sum of money or
+killing a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less
+deserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug
+of beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog, since these latter were
+tempted less. But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice
+which is authorized in the world: for the greater is the temptation to sin,
+the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement.
+Besides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer,
+the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the
+more readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment.
+Thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called _stellionate_,
+and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very
+foundations of our security in written documents. But one will have greater
+indulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. The Romans
+punished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when these
+had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to
+distraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough to
+send the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil deeds without
+apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be
+tempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was given
+to committing such extravagances often: this might tend towards reduction
+of the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and
+punishment. So far removed are the principles of our opponents from the
+practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men.
+
+16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will
+still remain, although there be this in common between them, that they have
+their reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for oneself
+concerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in the
+solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account
+for voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one could not
+have prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the   [421]
+constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every
+turn. It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness,
+and even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to say
+that men are wicked and deserving of punishment: else one must needs say
+that the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because they
+spring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin.
+Fourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true
+cause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects,
+as our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1,
+sub-sect. 3, Sec. 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms. When the
+ancients spoke of that which is [Greek: eph' hemin], or when we speak of
+that which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our
+actions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for these
+representations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modifications
+of this active principle which is within us. No agent is capable of acting
+without being _predisposed_ to what the action demands; and the reasons or
+inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the
+soul to decide between various courses. One will have it that the will is
+alone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen
+seated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, while
+the passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence
+often prevail over the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that the
+understanding speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillate
+between the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the
+favourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and
+giving them audience or not as seems good to her. But it is a
+personification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is to
+judge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the
+understanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding in
+itself, to understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, or
+the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations,
+and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying
+its active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need here to
+apply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence to
+the best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects. For
+what I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection. Our      [422]
+author, even though he admits with people in general this physical
+influence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacity
+that the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas,
+much less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to draw
+out that which is within us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes'
+belief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it at
+least some direction. It is a mean between one side and the other, between
+physical influence and Pre-established Harmony.
+
+17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin would
+neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because the
+censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas men
+demand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though it
+should serve neither for amendment nor for example. So do men with reason
+demand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past
+benefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit. This
+objection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strike
+at me. I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the
+motive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he
+should find in good actions: else one has not yet reached the degree of
+virtue that one must endeavour to attain. That is what one means by saying
+that justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is also
+what I explained in justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before the
+opening of the controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I consider
+that wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as
+when a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or because
+he fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing
+them, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree of
+wickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with it
+finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than
+he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear. I have
+also observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according to
+the celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of _medicinal_
+penalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or at
+least to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of those
+who do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity. True      [423]
+retributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes
+something more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because
+the harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of
+suffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil
+whereto it has consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has
+rejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves
+the condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian
+party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom.
+
+18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for
+felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and
+evil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I think
+it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put
+upon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most
+astounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external things, if
+it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil. It is
+therefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground for
+hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure. This
+argument is halting from every aspect. _There is no force in the inference:
+one might grant the conclusion: the argument may be retorted upon the
+author_. Let us begin with the retort, which is easy. For are men any
+happier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument,
+or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason?
+Have they less bodily suffering? Have they less tendency toward true or
+apparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? Are they any less
+enslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive?
+less envious? Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a method
+of counting or assessment. I would rather he had proved it by experience;
+but let us see this proof by counting. Suppose that by my choice, which
+enables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the
+object chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were two
+degrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with
+perfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good.
+Doubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible. For
+what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the
+object? To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, or
+the things, as we please. That would be almost as if I could say to   [424]
+lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be
+diamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like the
+common explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that the
+desert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. They
+only had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be a
+partridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the
+object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I am. But
+if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness
+conceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of
+goodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents
+of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means of
+this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events.
+The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3,
+Sec. 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be
+overcome by any of them; and he regards it (Sec.Sec. 20, 21, 22) as the soundest
+foundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable of
+limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason,
+and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this
+goodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in
+objects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power is
+independent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosen
+object, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. For
+whence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, if
+it is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it the
+goodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances?
+It seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious,
+which contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, non
+invenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction
+cannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that
+when men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they
+do so through other desires, which always have their foundation in the
+representation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the
+conclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does not
+depend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human
+life: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand
+accidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I  [425]
+avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, by
+an earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also deny
+the inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only
+actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not
+depend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God,
+if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that for
+the attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if the
+soul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is assured of
+its happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in this
+life.
+
+19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my
+hypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. He
+believes that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all our
+felicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our evils,
+and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete. These
+advantages have almost all been already disproved. We have shown that for
+the securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goods
+and of evils, and other inward or outward dispositions, should incline us
+without constraining us. Moreover one does not see how pure indifference
+can contribute to felicity; on the contrary, the more indifferent one is,
+the more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will one
+prove to be. Besides the hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferent
+power could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itself
+the most perfect happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifest
+that there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits
+would withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author
+alleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been.
+Finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies:
+on the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge
+and goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules,
+and no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still some
+advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. He
+considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our
+actions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsion
+of external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to
+oneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with        [426]
+oneself. But the exact opposite is the case: for when one happens upon the
+action through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result of
+one's good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happen
+upon it blindly by chance or hazard? Why then should one boast of a good
+action, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or
+blame redounds to fortune or hazard? I think that one is more worthy of
+praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and the more
+culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evil
+qualities. To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities
+whence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable
+something in the place of causes. Thus, if this chance or this indefinable
+something were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural or
+acquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not be
+possible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of
+others, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or to
+conjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant
+indifference will drive the vessel of the will.
+
+20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our
+learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so
+much good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are
+active in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be
+determined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must not
+be determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far as
+it is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge from
+this indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the object
+pleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have their
+stumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the other
+substances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts are not
+free, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, with
+the Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is not necessary
+that in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself, since
+a thing may receive direction without receiving force. So it is that the
+horse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm; and
+M. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in itself, receives
+only some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing may receive from
+outside some determination or direction, capable of changing that     [427]
+direction which it would take of itself. Finally, even though an active
+substance is determined only by itself, it does not follow that it is not
+moved by objects: for it is the representation of the object within it
+which contributes towards the determination. Now the representation does
+not come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity.
+Objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical
+causes, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his
+wisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects,
+but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus
+this kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of
+the substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though
+free power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferent
+to the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must have
+its origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything from
+anything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for us
+to imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere
+indifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must
+needs be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently,
+however far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifference
+in the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true that
+these dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usually
+to the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously
+_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one
+object is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is more
+acceptable at one time than at another.
+
+21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and he
+undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, and
+even that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothing
+is to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, to
+be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is therefore
+absolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neither
+be helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it were
+an appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish to
+abide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural
+inclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings.
+That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their   [428]
+nature, but by the will of God: whereas if that will be excluded neither
+good nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writers
+of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason
+which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems to
+me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the
+consideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that
+they cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instance
+of self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by
+the goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is
+necessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us
+that it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, or
+rather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and
+influenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that his
+understanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how
+everything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him
+the good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder,
+the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness
+makes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by
+himself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized
+and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his
+understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his
+inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be
+deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it
+possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas
+before the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas
+which are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author so
+strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would
+subvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent of
+will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be
+independent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it
+not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than
+others of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others
+for forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that
+the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that
+are called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh?
+that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that      [429]
+certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted for
+harmony? Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring
+from the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would imply
+contradiction? Can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentient
+creatures, and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligent
+substances, are a matter of indifference to God? And what shall be said of
+his justice? Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely
+and justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? I know that there
+have been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and
+so liable to overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustrious
+author is far from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though this
+hypothesis tends in that direction, if there is nothing in objects save
+what is indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true that
+God has need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly that
+God's goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. There
+was therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I have
+said so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even by
+necessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of his
+inclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprising
+that our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, Sec. 5) that
+there is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect and
+happy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according to
+the author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, Sec.Sec. 8, 9), God acts for
+an end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore not
+altogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or not
+create, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a matter of
+indifference to him either, whether he should create one world rather than
+another; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. Thus the
+qualities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason for God's
+choice.
+
+22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty and
+fittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that would
+reconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of all
+consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifference
+of God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as God
+has chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all   [430]
+that which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerable
+possible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them is
+purely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once having
+chosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to human
+nature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with his
+hypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the proposition
+that when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same
+time, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possible
+advantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing could
+be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to
+overthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with
+incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the
+way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just
+been said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not,
+and wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in
+order to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of
+indifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is
+asked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs
+answer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the
+best, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following
+his own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that
+there is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towards
+creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that
+our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5,
+sub-sect. 4, Sec. 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of
+equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures.
+Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more
+perfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or
+less with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there
+will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus
+comes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordance
+with his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certain
+creatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them. He will
+then just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen,
+mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere,         [431]
+scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the whole
+universe, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, upright
+persons, good angels! No, the author will say, God, when once he had
+resolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all the
+advantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard to
+creatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage were connected
+of necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordance
+with his hypothesis. That not being so, however, he must admit that God's
+resolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election
+independent of that one which prompted God to make men. But whence comes
+this new election? Does it also come from mere indifference? If such is the
+case, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimes
+comes to do it, it will be merely by accident. But the author maintains
+that God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good and
+ill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in him
+primary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him. He chooses
+not only to create men, but also to create men as happy as it is possible
+to be in this system. After that not the least vestige of mere indifference
+will be left, for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have
+reasoned concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but he
+was bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world
+as should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity,
+virtue, happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God was
+prompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as
+perfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same good
+intention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to the
+goodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act without
+cause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author,
+with whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter was reached,
+prevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit of any
+application to the reality of things.
+
+23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who knows
+all degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who penetrates at
+one and the same time all their possible connexions, let us see whether at
+least the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutely
+indifferent in his choice. The author regales us with this pure       [432]
+indifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it which he
+gives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within ourselves of
+its marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other causes which might
+determine our will are insufficient. As for the first point, he asserts
+that in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pure
+indifference. But I do not agree that we feel such indifference, or that
+this alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. We feel usually within
+us something which inclines us to our choice. At times it happens, however,
+that we cannot account for all our dispositions. If we give our mind to the
+question, we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and of
+bodies in our environment, the present or previous temper of our soul,
+together with countless small things included under these comprehensive
+headings, may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection for
+certain objects, and the variation of our opinions from one time to
+another. At the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute this
+to mere indifference, or to some indefinable force of the soul which has
+the same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon the
+chameleon. Thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of
+the people: he does so, saying that in many things the people reason better
+than the philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have been
+misled by chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered
+among chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does not
+exist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populace
+cannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by the
+senses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by the
+wind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid which
+causes weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of atoms and
+other indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things are not
+because the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be able to
+say also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or
+inclination contributing towards the production of its act, because there
+are many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceived
+by the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. Secondly, as to the
+marks of the power in question, I have already refuted the claim advanced
+for it, that it possesses the advantage of making one active, the real
+cause of one's action, and subject to responsibility and morality:    [433]
+these are not genuine marks of its existence. Here is one the author
+adduces, which is not genuine either, namely, that we have within us a
+power of resisting natural appetites, that is to say of resisting not only
+the senses, but also the reason. But I have already stated this fact: one
+resists natural appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimes
+endures inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account of
+some hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and
+exceeds it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it.
+The author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances
+which he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what at
+first displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, that
+application and attention to the object and custom change our disposition
+and consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a rather
+high degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did,
+and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. Time is
+needed, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather that
+callosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree of
+heat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author invokes,
+guess correctly the cause of this effect, although they sometimes apply it
+in a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close to the fire in the
+kitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: Oh, my dear, who will
+be able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other answers: Don't be
+absurd, my good woman, one grows used to everything.
+
+24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to be
+indifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at our
+own free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third proof,
+namely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without having
+recourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the entreaties
+of their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the reproaches of their
+conscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath of God, hell itself,
+for the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good or
+tolerable, save as being freely chosen by such people. All is well in this
+argument, with the exception of the last words only. For when one takes an
+actual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which led
+the man to his choice, and that there are very strong bonds to fasten [434]
+him thereto. A love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mere
+indifference: inclination or passion will have played its part; but habit
+and stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than
+separation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author:
+an atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him,
+whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini in
+his works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather
+than renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truth
+is that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted of
+having published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism.
+When he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, saying:
+
+  _Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum._
+
+But since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired to
+cause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini was
+granted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if indeed he
+was not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the inquisition was
+carried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was no chance of
+pardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for what he was, an
+atheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in that. But supposing
+there were an atheist who gave himself up for torture, vanity might be in
+his case a strong enough motive, as in that of the Gymnosophist, Calanus,
+and of the Sophist who, according to Lucian's account, was burnt to death
+of his own will. But the author thinks that that very vanity, that
+stubbornness, those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem to
+have quite good sense, cannot be explained by the appetites that arise from
+the representation of good and evil, and that they compel us to have
+recourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil, and
+evil into good, and the indifferent into good or into evil. But we do not
+need to go so far, and the causes of our errors are only too visible.
+Indeed, we can make these transformations, but it is not as with the
+Fairies, by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring and
+suppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualities
+which are naturally attached to certain objects, and by contemplating only
+such representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices; or    [435]
+again, because one attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them,
+certain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally or
+through our habitual contemplation of them. For example, all my life long I
+detest a certain kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in it
+something distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the other
+hand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it will
+revive within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem or
+love. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been
+showered upon him after some successful public action; the impression of
+this great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation;
+he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion,
+and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end.
+For although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said of
+him after his death, the representation he makes of it for himself
+beforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there are always
+motives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd to
+those who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a strong or
+oft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination,
+our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, by dint of
+having often related something untrue, which he has perhaps invented,
+finally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often represents to
+oneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, and one thinks it
+also easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one persuades oneself
+easily of what one wishes.
+
+  _Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt._
+
+25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, although
+the will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing to the
+pleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or owing to
+the aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book will help
+towards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner of a speaker
+will win the audience for him. One will be inclined to despise doctrines
+coming from a man one despises or hates, or from another who resembles him
+in some point that strikes us. I have already said why one is readily
+disposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable, and I have known
+people who at first had changed their religion for worldly            [436]
+considerations, but who have been persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwards
+that they had taken the right course. One sees also that stubbornness is
+not simply wrong choice persevering, but also a disposition to persevere
+therein, which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice,
+or some evil imagined as arising from a change. The first choice has
+perchance been made in mere levity, but the intention to abide by it
+springs from certain stronger reasons or impressions. There are even some
+writers on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choice
+so as not to be inconstant or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when one
+despises the warnings of reason, especially when the subject is important
+enough to be examined carefully; but when the thought of change is
+unpleasant, one readily averts one's attention from it, and that is the way
+which most frequently leads one to stubbornness. The author wished to
+connect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference. He might then
+have taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would be
+need of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especially
+if this choice has been made lightly, and all the more lightly in
+proportion to the indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readily
+inclined to reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or some
+other motive makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed either
+that vengeance pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponder
+upon it day and night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression of
+the wrong or the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves a
+very great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes
+upon them every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter
+than life itself.
+
+  _Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa._
+
+The author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or our
+aversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, we have
+given to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, through the
+alleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish.
+One has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives oneself six degrees of
+artificial good through the power that can choose without cause. Thus one
+will have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. 2, Sec. 7). If that could be
+carried out it would take us far, as I have already said here. The    [437]
+author even thinks that ambition, avarice, the gambling mania and other
+frivolous passions derive all their force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5,
+sub-sect. 6). But there are besides so many false appearances in things, so
+many imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects, so many
+unjustified connexions in our arguments, that there is no need of this
+little Fairy, that is, of this inward power operating as it were by
+enchantment, to whom the author attributes all these disorders. Indeed, I
+have already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contrary
+to acknowledged reason, we are prompted to it by another reason stronger to
+outward appearance, such as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearing
+independent and of performing an extraordinary action. There was in days
+past at the Court of Osnabrueck a tutor to the pages, who, like a second
+Mucius Scaevola, held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a
+gangrene, in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a
+very acute pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even know
+if a writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existence
+of a power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason,
+would be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing some
+good benefice or some high office, simply in order to display this
+superiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that an
+intelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someone
+would nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply
+imitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held his
+book on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a thing
+may easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense with
+his office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day people
+are found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, that is to
+say, actual goods to the mere semblance of them.
+
+26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author,
+which often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry,
+usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I should be
+obliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to avoid doing
+so, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The best thing is
+that with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. After having
+advanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth chapter, [438]
+that we approach God through the capacity to choose without reason, and
+that this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capable
+of making one happy, things in the highest degree paradoxical, since it is
+reason which leads us to imitate God and our happiness lies in following
+reason: after that, I say, the author provides an excellent corrective, for
+he says rightly (Sec. 5) that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to
+things, since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and that
+this is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that is
+well said, but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far as
+possible by the reality of the objects, and by true representations of good
+and evil. Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to
+freedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering to
+our happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it is
+happily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being of
+reasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not even
+possible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings of
+non-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrong
+elections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that are
+impossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or already
+taken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that by
+prejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will,
+which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will say as
+much of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source of wrong
+elections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness in changing
+too readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad habits; finally
+there is the importunity of the appetites, which often drive us
+inopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is designed to
+reconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of God; and
+this section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. The author
+has cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he asserts that
+without a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choice
+there would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse to creatures
+a power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be actuated by the
+representations of goods and evils; it was therefore easy, according to the
+author's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To extricate himself from this
+difficulty, he has no other resource than to state that if this power [439]
+were removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passive
+machine. But that is the very thing which I have disproved. If this power
+were missing in the world (as in fact it is), one would hardly complain of
+the fact. Souls will be well content with the representations of goods and
+evils for the making of their choice, and the world will remain as
+beautiful as it is. The author comes back to what he had already put
+forward here, that without this power there would be no happiness. But I
+have given a sufficient answer to that, and there is not the slightest
+probability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he puts
+forward here to support his principal paradox.
+
+27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that those
+who pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it seems
+as though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, men
+will be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling themselves as
+to whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, or not. Indeed,
+if they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the
+general order of things. Also this opinion of our author is a very
+reasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, just as
+there is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have communication
+with one another, even as bodies do. God employs the ministry of angels in
+his rule of mankind, without any detriment to the order of nature.
+Nevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than to
+explain them, unless one have recourse to my system of Harmony. But the
+author goes somewhat further. He believes that the mission of the Holy
+Spirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that now his operations
+within us are natural. I leave it to him to explain his opinion, and to
+settle the matter with other theologians. Yet I observe that he finds the
+natural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better,
+of overcoming the passions, and of winning for oneself a certain degree of
+new grace. I can say almost the same things on my hypothesis, which
+represents the will as acting only in accordance with motives; and I am
+immune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved over
+his power of choosing without cause. He is in great embarrassment also with
+regard to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectly
+indifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? and
+what sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440]
+thing, if there is no reason for its existence? The author puts off to some
+other occasion the solution of this difficulty, which would require
+(according to him) an entire work. For the rest, he sometimes speaks
+pertinently, and in conformity with my principles, on the subject of moral
+evil. He says, for example (sub-sect. 6), that vices and crimes do not
+detract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to it, just as
+certain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were
+heard quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony more
+pleasing. He also points out divers goods involved in evils, for instance,
+the usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor; indeed
+it serves to make the arts flourish. We must also bear in mind that we are
+not to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that is
+known to us. For the stains and defects in it may be found as useful for
+enhancing the beauty of the rest as patches, which have nothing beautiful
+in themselves, are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole
+face, although they disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book,
+had compared providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physician
+who allows wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse
+which will be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. The
+author replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, and
+that the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not given
+reason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like a
+physician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One may
+add that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence of
+reason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, but not
+adequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed to
+ourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed.
+The author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the book by
+Lactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are more or less
+as follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so,
+in which case he would be weak; or he can abolish them, and will not, which
+would be a sign of malignity in him; or again he lacks power and also will,
+which would make him appear both weak and jealous; or finally he can and
+will, but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil,
+if he exists? The author replies that God cannot banish evil, that he does
+not wish to either, and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious  [441]
+nor weak. I should have preferred to say that he can banish evil, but that
+he does not wish to do so absolutely, and rightly so, because he would then
+banish good at the same time, and he would banish more good than evil.
+Finally our author, having finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, in
+which he speaks of the Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws into
+natural and positive. He observes that the particular laws of the nature of
+animals must give way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not in
+reality angered when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that he
+who sins should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violence
+to others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that the
+positive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its
+infliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation
+of the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, and
+which nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although the
+wicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, that
+these punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people. He
+is doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing:
+for it might be that the damned are fools, capable of clinging to their
+state of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which, he maintains,
+makes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midst
+of their misery, and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of God.
+For every day one sees peevish, malicious, envious people who enjoy the
+thought of their ills, and seek to bring affliction upon themselves. These
+ideas are not worthy of contempt, and I have sometimes had the like myself,
+but I am far from passing final judgement on them. I related, in 271 of the
+essays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of the
+pardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron Andre Taifel, an Austrian
+nobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria who became
+the second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which appears to
+mean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, with this
+Spanish motto, _Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido_, the more lost, the less
+repentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot free
+oneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the Spanish Count of
+Villamediana when he was said to be in love with the Queen. Coming to the
+question why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked,   [442]
+our illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered, and
+that hardly any doubt remains on that point. He observes nevertheless that
+one may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not been
+made good by their very misfortune, and whether the fortunate wicked have
+not perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. He adds that we are often bad
+judges, when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man, but
+also a happy man. One often honours a hypocrite, and one despises another
+whose solid virtue is without pretence. We are poor judges of happiness
+also, and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented
+poor man, while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the
+great. Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here on
+earth lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that to
+the wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or
+chastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greater
+good. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and one can say
+nothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work.
+
+                                                                      [443]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+CAUSA DEI ASSERTA
+PER JUSTITIAM EJUS
+
+_cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam._
+
+The original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under this
+title. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the positive
+doctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the academic
+requirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of interest to many
+modern readers, and is consequently omitted here.
+
+                                                                      [445]
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+INDEX
+
+  Abelard, 122, 232-4, 272
+  Abraham, 209
+  Adam, 222, 270-2, 346-7
+  Adam Kadmon, 133
+  Albius, Thomas, 122
+  Alcuin, 77
+  Alfonso, King of Castile, 247-8
+  Aloysius Novarinus, 191
+  Alrasi, 288
+  Alvarez, 149
+  Ambrose, St., 153, 194
+  Amyraut, 238
+  Anaxagoras, 353
+  Andradius, Jacques Payva, 176
+  Andreas Cisalpinus, 81
+  Angelus Silesius, Johann, 79
+  Annat, 344-5
+  Anselm, St., 77
+  Antipater, 232
+  Aquinas, Thomas, _see_ Thomas
+  Arcesilaus, 337
+  Archidemus, 232
+  Aristotelians, 27-8
+  Aristotle, 13, 76-8, 81, 148, 170, 195, 203, 229, 241, 243-4, 265, 269,
+      283, 304, 309-10, 324, 352, 353, 409
+  Arminius, _see_ Irminius
+  Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), 383, 398
+  Arnauld, 67, 89, 225, 254, 260, 264-6, 351
+  Arriaga, 112, 356
+  Arrian, 232
+  Assassins, 284
+  Athanasius, St., 87
+  Augustine (of Hippo), St., 60, 100, 122, 134, 148, 166, 173, 187, 226,
+      274, 285, 294, 296-7, 300-3, 347, 352-3, 378, 384, 409, 412
+  ----, his disciples, 145, 297, 300, 324, 330, 348
+  Augustus (Emperor), 287
+  Aulus Gellius, 258-9, 325, 327
+  Aureolus, Cardinal, 139, 353
+  Averroes, Averroists, 77 ff.
+
+  Bacon, Francis, 306
+  Banez, 149
+  Barbaro, Ermolao, 170
+  Baron, Vincent, 121
+  Baronius, Robert, 84
+  Barton, Thomas, 122
+  Basil, St., 221, 352
+  Bayle, P., 34 ff. _et passim_
+  Becher, Johann Joachim, 334-5
+  Becker, 221
+  Bede, 77
+  Bellarmine, St. Robert, 107, 313, 323
+  Berigardus, Claudius, 81
+  Berkeley, Bp., 11
+  Bernard, St., 277
+  Bernier, 139, 353
+  Bertius, 227
+  de Beze, Theodore, 274
+  _Birgitta, Revelations of St._, 173
+  Boethius, 76, 365-6
+  Bonartes, Thomas, 58, 121-2
+  Bonaventura, St., 294
+  des Bosses, Fr., 121, 389
+  Bossuet, 10
+  Bradwardine, Abp., 159, 176
+  Bramhall, Bp. John, 161, 393
+  Bredenburg, Johan, 349-50
+  Brunswick, Duke of, 8, 82
+  Buckingham, Duke of, 142
+  Buridan's ass, 150, 311, 312
+  Burnet, Thomas, 278
+
+  Cabalists, 79, 133, 347
+  Caesar Cremoninus, 81
+  Cajetan, Cardinal, 100, 243
+  Calanus, 284, 434
+  Caligula, 227
+  Calixtus, 108
+  Calli, 359
+  Callimachus, 213
+  Calovius, 84
+  Calvin, 84-5, 101, 165, 222, 238, 240, 328
+  Cameron, 313
+  Campanella, 217
+  Capella, Martianus, 264
+  Cardan, Jerome, 282, 286
+  Carneades, 312, 320-1, 337
+  Caroli, Andreas, 227
+  Casaubon, Meric, 285
+  Caselius, 82
+  Cassiodorus, 76
+  [Page 446]
+  Casuists, 194, 222, 241
+  Catharin, Ambrose, 173
+  Catherine de Medicis, 227
+  Cato, 263, 318
+  Celsus, 102-3
+  Chardin, 209
+  de la Charmoye, Abbe, 213
+  Chemnitz, Martin, 111, 176
+  Christine, Queen of Sweden, 96, 104
+  Chrysippus, 229-32, 258-9, 324-7
+  Cicero, 99, 194, 229-32, 241, 286, 297, 312, 321, 324-5, 342
+  Claudian, 132, 191, 215
+  Cleanthes, 233, 324
+  Coelius Secundus Curio, 134
+  Coimbra, Fathers of, 325
+  Colerus, 350
+  Conringius, 161, 422
+  Constance, Council of, 234
+  de la Cour, 350-1
+  Crellius, 161
+  Cudworth, Ralph, 64, 245
+  Cuper, Franz, 350
+  Cyrano de Bergerac, 331
+
+  Dacier, 337
+  Daille, 70, 107
+  Davidius, John, 179
+  _De Auxiliis_, 168
+  Democritus, 324
+  Descartes, 12-13, 19-21, 107, 111-12, 140, 150, 156, 224 ff., 239, 244,
+      265, 281, 304, 331, 333, 334, 343, 390, 409, 426
+  Desmarests, Samuel, 241
+  Diodorus, 230-2
+  Diogenianus, 325
+  Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 232
+  Diphilus, 285
+  Diroys, 249-53, 329
+  Dominicans, 348
+  Dreier, 244
+  Drexler, 291
+  Dualists, 251
+  du Plessis-Mornay, 91
+  Durand de Saint-Pourcain, 139, 324, 341, 353
+
+  Empedocles, 324
+  Epictetus, 352
+  Epicureans, 282-3
+  Epicurus, 229-30, 310-11, 319, 320, 324, 395
+  Esprit, Abbe, 131
+  Euclid, 261
+  Euripides, 284, 285
+  Eusebius, 326
+  Eutrapelus, 191
+
+  Fabricius, Johann Ludwig, 67
+  Fabry, 333
+  Fecht, 290, 291, 293
+  Fenelon, 287
+  Fludde, 184
+  Fonseca, 145
+  Foucher, 34, 89, 337
+  Francis I of France, 204
+  Francis of Sales, St., 176
+  Francis Xavier, St., 176
+  Freitag, Johann, 171
+  Fromondus, Libertus, 89
+  Fulgentius, 167
+  _Fur praedestinatus_, 227
+
+  della Galla, Julius Caesar, 171
+  Gassendi, 12, 337
+  Gatacre, Thomas, 262
+  Gerhard, Johann, 291
+  Gerson, 79
+  Gibieuf, 344-5
+  Glarea, Antonio, 366
+  Godescalc, 167, 294
+  Gomarists, 227
+  Gregory, St., the Great, 100, 291, 293, 294
+  Gregory, St., of Nazianzus, 173
+  Gregory, St., of Nyssa, 132
+  Gregory of Rimini, 173
+  Grotius, 77, 91, 161, 194, 241, 243, 276
+  Guerre, Martin, 97-8
+  Gymnosophists, 284
+
+  Hartsoeker, 172
+  Heliodorus of Larissa, 437
+  Heraclitus, 324
+  Herminius, _see_ Irminius
+  Hermippus, 209
+  Herodotus, 196, 208, 210
+  Heshusius, Tilemann, 82
+  Hobbes, Thomas, 67, 89, 159, 161, 234, 265, 348, 393 ff., 410
+  Hoffmann, Daniel, 82
+  Horace, 131, 318
+  Homer, 284
+  Hyde, 209
+
+  Innocent III, Pope, 131
+  Irminius, 209
+  Isbrand, 238
+
+  Jansenists, 145, 346-7
+  Jansenius, 344
+  Jacquelot, 157, 223, 259, 265, 278, 341
+  Jerome, St., 132
+  John of Damascus, St., 77
+  [Page 447]
+  John Scot, 171
+  Jung, 261
+  Jupiter, 213
+  Jurieu, 174, 187, 290-2, 356
+  Justin, 208
+
+  Keckermann, Bartholomaeus, 106
+  Keilah, siege of, 145-6
+  Kendal, George, 228
+  Kepler, 140, 353
+  Kerkering, 351
+  Kessler, Andreas, 83
+  Kortholt, Sebastian, 351
+  Krell, Nicolas, 398
+
+  de Labadie, Jean, 82
+  Lactantius, 221, 285, 286, 440
+  Lami, Francois, 89, 359
+  Lateran Council, 80
+  Laud, Abp., 398
+  de Launoy, 100
+  Lazarus, 294
+  le Clerc, 64, 121, 132, 245, 292
+  Leeuwenhoek, 172
+  Limbourg, 350
+  Lipsius, Justus, 325, 337, 353
+  Livy, 263
+  Locke, John, 8, 9, 33-4, 86, 409
+  Loescher, 298
+  Louis of Dole, 149, 353
+  Lucan, 122, 212
+  Lucian, 265, 434
+  Lucretius, 320
+  Lully, Raymond, 106
+  Luther, 67, 81, 99, 101, 110-11, 122, 298, 328, 395
+
+  Machiavelli, 216
+  Maignan, 359
+  Maimonides, 287-8
+  Malebranche, 172, 244, 254 ff., 276, 280, 333, 359, 361
+  Manichaeans, 59, 98, 113, 124, 208, 274, 419
+  Marchetti, 320
+  Marcion, 213
+  Marcus Aurelius, 263
+  Mary, Blessed Virgin, 193
+  Matthieu, Pierre, 204
+  Maurice, Prince, 398
+  Melanchthon, 81
+  Melissus, 218, 220
+  Menage, 232
+  Meyer, Louis, 82
+  Mithras, 209
+  Molina, 145, 173, 207
+  Molinists, 145, 317, 324, 342
+  More, Henry, 169
+  Moses Germanus, 79
+  de la Motte le Vayer, 282
+  Musaeus, Johann, 86, 111
+
+  Naude, Gabriel, 81
+  Newcastle, Duke of, 393 ff.
+  Newton, Isaac, 34, 85-6
+  Nicole, 96-7, 174, 291, 299
+  Nominalists, 203
+  Novarini, 286
+
+  Ochino, Bernardino, 89
+  Onomaus, 325
+  Opalenius, 194
+  Origen, 102-3, 132, 235, 294
+  Origenists, 260, 292
+  Orobio, 350
+  Ovid, 209, 220, 306
+
+  Pardies, 333
+  Pascal, 35
+  Paul, St., 129-30, 238, 260
+  Paulicians, _see_ Manichaeans
+  Pelagius, 139
+  Pelisson, 176
+  Pereir, Louis, 139
+  Peter Lombard, 290
+  Pfanner, 352
+  Pierre de Saint-Joseph, 342, 357
+  Pietists, Leipzig, 83
+  Piscator, 207
+  Pitcairne, 172
+  Plato, 59, 76, 135, 148, 209, 241, 286, 297, 321, 352-4
+  Pliny the Younger, 204, 209, 284, 287, 365
+  Plutarch, 208, 231, 326, 353
+  Pomponazzi, 80, 161
+  de la Porree, Gilbert, 122
+  de Preissac, 80
+  Prudentius, 132, 218
+  Ptolomei, Fr., 70
+  Pufendorf, 194, 241, 403
+  Pythagoras, 172
+
+  Quenel, Fr., 70
+  Quietists, 79
+
+  Rachelius, 194
+  de la Ramee, Pierre, 81
+  Ravaillac, 204
+  Regis, 305, 330, 340
+  Remonstrants, 226
+  Reynaud, Theophile, 348
+  [Page 448]
+  Rodon, David de, 354
+  Rorarius, 160
+  Rutherford, Samuel, 236, 238, 269
+  Ruysbroek, 79
+
+  Saguens, 359
+  Salmeron, 173
+  Saurin, 106
+  Scaliger, Joseph, 89, 104-5
+  Scaliger, Julius, 170
+  Scherzer, 84
+  Schoolmen, 75, 77, 100, 241, 290, 310, 354, 407
+  Scioppius, 337
+  Scotists, 243, 324
+  Scotus, Duns, 203, 271, 328, 383
+  Seneca, 226, 285
+  Sennert, Daniel, 171
+  Sentences, Master of the, _see_ Peter Lombard
+  Servetus, Michael, 81
+  Sfondrati, Cardinal, 129, 173
+  Sharrok, 194
+  Silenus, 286
+  Slevogt, Paul, 82
+  Socinians, 58, 83-4, 161-2, 307, 343, 394, 412, 423
+  Sonner, Ernst, 290
+  Spee, Friedrich, 176-7
+  Sperling, Johann, 171
+  Sperling, Otto, 212
+  Spinoza, 67, 68, 79, 82, 159, 234-6, 331, 348-51, 359, 418
+  Stahl, Daniel, 243
+  Stegman, Josua, 107
+  Stegmann, Christopher, 84
+  Steno, 178
+  Steuchus, Augustinus, 91
+  Stoics, 79, 232, 263, 282-3, 324 ff., 342
+  Strato, 67, 245-6, 331, 335, 336, 349, 395
+  Strinesius, 241
+  Sturm, 69, 261
+  Suarez, 314
+  Suetonius, 287
+  Supralapsarians, 166, 228, 236, 238, 269, 273-4, 289
+  Swammerdam, 172
+
+  Tacitus, 210, 211, 265, 287
+  Taifel, Baron Andre, 441
+  Taurel, Nicolas, 81, 353
+  Tertullian, 101
+  Thomas Aquinas, St., 174, 176, 241, 243, 262, 324, 357, 378, 383
+  Thomasius, Jacob, 243, 265
+  Thomists, 145, 149, 241, 311, 324, 344, 347
+  Tiberius, 227
+  Timon, 265
+  Tiresias, 230
+  Toland, John, 106
+  de Tournemine, Fr., 69
+  Trajan, 293
+  Trogus, 208
+  Turretin, 240
+  Twiss, 238
+
+  Ursinus, Zacharias, 291
+  Usserius, 70
+
+  Valla, Laurentius, 67, 344, 365 ff.
+  van Beverwyck, Johan, 153-4
+  van den Ende, Franz, 351
+  van den Hoof, 350
+  van der Weye, 82
+  van Helmont, 169
+  Vanini, Lucilio, 434
+  Vedelius, Nicolaus, 86, 111
+  Velleius Paterculus, 318
+  Vergil, 78-9, 122, 287, 293, 306, 315
+  Veron, Francois, 107
+  Verse, Aubert de, 350
+  Voetius, Gisbertus, 86
+  Vorstius, Conrad, 58
+  Vogelsang, 82
+
+  von Wallenberg, Bp. Peter, 67
+  Wander, William, 169
+  Weigel, Erhard, 261, 355
+  Weigel, Valentine, 79
+  de Witt, 351
+  Wittich, 187, 306-7, 309
+  von Wollzogen, 82
+  Wyclif, John, 122, 159, 234, 272, 395
+
+  Xanthus, 209
+
+  Zeisold, Johann, 171
+  Zoroaster, 71, 208-10, 218
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy, by G. W. Leibniz
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