NormalizeHEADmain

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 5102 deletions

diff --git a/old/prmds10.txt b/old/prmds10.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 08985d0..0000000
--- a/old/prmds10.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5102 +0,0 @@
-********Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato********
-#24 in our series by Plato.
-
-Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check
-the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!!
-
-Please take a look at the important information in this header.
-We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an
-electronic path open for the next readers.  Do not remove this.
-
-
-**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts**
-
-**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971**
-
-*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations*
-
-Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and
-further information is included below.  We need your donations.
-
-
-Parmenides
-
-by Plato
-
-March, 1999  [Etext #1687]
-
-
-********Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato********
-******This file should be named prmds10.txt or prmds10.zip*****
-
-Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, prmds11.txt
-VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, prmds10a.txt
-
-
-This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher  <asschers@aia.net.au>
-
-Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions,
-all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a
-copyright notice is included.  Therefore, we do NOT keep these books
-in compliance with any particular paper edition, usually otherwise.
-
-
-We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance
-of the official release dates, for time for better editing.
-
-Please note:  neither this list nor its contents are final till
-midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement.
-The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at
-Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month.  A
-preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment
-and editing by those who wish to do so.  To be sure you have an
-up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes
-in the first week of the next month.  Since our ftp program has
-a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a
-look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a
-new copy has at least one byte more or less.
-
-
-Information about Project Gutenberg (one page)
-
-We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work.  The
-fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take
-to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright
-searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc.  This
-projected audience is one hundred million readers.  If our value
-per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2
-million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-six text
-files per month, or 432 more Etexts in 1999 for a total of 2000+
-If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the
-total should reach over 200 billion Etexts given away this year.
-
-The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext
-Files by the December 31, 2001.  [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion]
-This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers,
-which is only ~5% of the present number of computer users.
-
-At our revised rates of production, we will reach only one-third
-of that goal by the end of 2001, or about 3,333 Etexts unless we
-manage to get some real funding; currently our funding is mostly
-from Michael Hart's salary at Carnegie-Mellon University, and an
-assortment of sporadic gifts; this salary is only good for a few
-more years, so we are looking for something to replace it, as we
-don't want Project Gutenberg to be so dependent on one person.
-
-We need your donations more than ever!
-
-
-All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are
-tax deductible to the extent allowable by law.  (CMU = Carnegie-
-Mellon University).
-
-For these and other matters, please mail to:
-
-Project Gutenberg
-P. O. Box  2782
-Champaign, IL 61825
-
-When all other email fails try our Executive Director:
-Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com>
-
-We would prefer to send you this information by email.
-
-******
-
-To access Project Gutenberg etexts, use any Web browser
-to view http://promo.net/pg.  This site lists Etexts by
-author and by title, and includes information about how
-to get involved with Project Gutenberg.  You could also
-download our past Newsletters, or subscribe here.  This
-is one of our major sites, please email hart@pobox.com,
-for a more complete list of our various sites.
-
-To go directly to the etext collections, use FTP or any
-Web browser to visit a Project Gutenberg mirror (mirror
-sites are available on 7 continents; mirrors are listed
-at http://promo.net/pg).
-
-Mac users, do NOT point and click, typing works better.
-
-Example FTP session:
-
-ftp sunsite.unc.edu
-login: anonymous
-password: your@login
-cd pub/docs/books/gutenberg
-cd etext90 through etext99
-dir [to see files]
-get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files]
-GET GUTINDEX.??  [to get a year's listing of books, e.g., GUTINDEX.99]
-GET GUTINDEX.ALL [to get a listing of ALL books]
-
-***
-
-**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor**
-
-(Three Pages)
-
-
-***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START***
-Why is this "Small Print!" statement here?  You know: lawyers.
-They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with
-your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from
-someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our
-fault.  So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement
-disclaims most of our liability to you.  It also tells you how
-you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to.
-
-*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT
-By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm
-etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept
-this "Small Print!" statement.  If you do not, you can receive
-a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by
-sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person
-you got it from.  If you received this etext on a physical
-medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request.
-
-ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS
-This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG-
-tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor
-Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at
-Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project").  Among other
-things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright
-on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and
-distribute it in the United States without permission and
-without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules, set forth
-below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext
-under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark.
-
-To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable
-efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain
-works.  Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any
-medium they may be on may contain "Defects".  Among other
-things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or
-corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
-intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged
-disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer
-codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.
-
-LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES
-But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below,
-[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this
-etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all
-liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including
-legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR
-UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT,
-INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
-OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE
-POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-
-If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of
-receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any)
-you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that
-time to the person you received it from.  If you received it
-on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and
-such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement
-copy.  If you received it electronically, such person may
-choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to
-receive it electronically.
-
-THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS".  NO OTHER
-WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS
-TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT
-LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
-PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or
-the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the
-above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you
-may have other legal rights.
-
-INDEMNITY
-You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors,
-officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost
-and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or
-indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause:
-[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification,
-or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect.
-
-DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm"
-You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by
-disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this
-"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg,
-or:
-
-[1]  Only give exact copies of it.  Among other things, this
-     requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the
-     etext or this "small print!" statement.  You may however,
-     if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable
-     binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form,
-     including any form resulting from conversion by word pro-
-     cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as
-     *EITHER*:
-
-     [*]  The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and
-          does *not* contain characters other than those
-          intended by the author of the work, although tilde
-          (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may
-          be used to convey punctuation intended by the
-          author, and additional characters may be used to
-          indicate hypertext links; OR
-
-     [*]  The etext may be readily converted by the reader at
-          no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent
-          form by the program that displays the etext (as is
-          the case, for instance, with most word processors);
-          OR
-
-     [*]  You provide, or agree to also provide on request at
-          no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the
-          etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC
-          or other equivalent proprietary form).
-
-[2]  Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this
-     "Small Print!" statement.
-
-[3]  Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the
-     net profits you derive calculated using the method you
-     already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  If you
-     don't derive profits, no royalty is due.  Royalties are
-     payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon
-     University" within the 60 days following each
-     date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare)
-     your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return.
-
-WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO?
-The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time,
-scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty
-free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution
-you can think of.  Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg
-Association / Carnegie-Mellon University".
-
-*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END*
-
-
-
-
-
-This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher  <asschers@aia.net.au>
-
-
-
-
-
-PARMENIDES
-
-by Plato
-
-
-
-
-Translated by Benjamin Jowett
-
-
-
-
-INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
-
-The awe with which Plato regarded the character of 'the great' Parmenides
-has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name.  None of the
-writings of Plato have been more copiously illustrated, both in ancient and
-modern times, and in none of them have the interpreters been more at
-variance with one another.  Nor is this surprising.  For the Parmenides is
-more fragmentary and isolated than any other dialogue, and the design of
-the writer is not expressly stated.  The date is uncertain; the relation to
-the other writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connexion between the
-two parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the two
-we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own sentiments by
-the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of his own mouth, or
-whether he is propounding consequences which would have been admitted by
-Zeno and Parmenides themselves.  The contradictions which follow from the
-hypotheses of the one and many have been regarded by some as transcendental
-mysteries; by others as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new
-method.  They seem to have been inspired by a sort of dialectical frenzy,
-such as may be supposed to have prevailed in the Megarian School (compare
-Cratylus, etc.).  The criticism on his own doctrine of Ideas has also been
-considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance of the
-metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond himself.  To the
-latter part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words in which he
-himself describes the earlier philosophers in the Sophist:  'They went on
-their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.'
-
-The Parmenides in point of style is one of the best of the Platonic
-writings; the first portion of the dialogue is in no way defective in ease
-and grace and dramatic interest; nor in the second part, where there was no
-room for such qualities, is there any want of clearness or precision.  The
-latter half is an exquisite mosaic, of which the small pieces are with the
-utmost fineness and regularity adapted to one another.  Like the
-Protagoras, Phaedo, and others, the whole is a narrated dialogue, combining
-with the mere recital of the words spoken, the observations of the reciter
-on the effect produced by them.  Thus we are informed by him that Zeno and
-Parmenides were not altogether pleased at the request of Socrates that they
-would examine into the nature of the one and many in the sphere of Ideas,
-although they received his suggestion with approving smiles.  And we are
-glad to be told that Parmenides was 'aged but well-favoured,' and that Zeno
-was 'very good-looking'; also that Parmenides affected to decline the great
-argument, on which, as Zeno knew from experience, he was not unwilling to
-enter.  The character of Antiphon, the half-brother of Plato, who had once
-been inclined to philosophy, but has now shown the hereditary disposition
-for horses, is very naturally described.  He is the sole depositary of the
-famous dialogue; but, although he receives the strangers like a courteous
-gentleman, he is impatient of the trouble of reciting it.  As they enter,
-he has been giving orders to a bridle-maker; by this slight touch Plato
-verifies the previous description of him.  After a little persuasion he is
-induced to favour the Clazomenians, who come from a distance, with a
-rehearsal.  Respecting the visit of Zeno and Parmenides to Athens, we may
-observe--first, that such a visit is consistent with dates, and may
-possibly have occurred; secondly, that Plato is very likely to have
-invented the meeting ('You, Socrates, can easily invent Egyptian tales or
-anything else,' Phaedrus); thirdly, that no reliance can be placed on the
-circumstance as determining the date of Parmenides and Zeno; fourthly, that
-the same occasion appears to be referred to by Plato in two other places
-(Theaet., Soph.).
-
-Many interpreters have regarded the Parmenides as a 'reductio ad absurdum'
-of the Eleatic philosophy.  But would Plato have been likely to place this
-in the mouth of the great Parmenides himself, who appeared to him, in
-Homeric language, to be 'venerable and awful,' and to have a 'glorious
-depth of mind'? (Theaet.).  It may be admitted that he has ascribed to an
-Eleatic stranger in the Sophist opinions which went beyond the doctrines of
-the Eleatics.  But the Eleatic stranger expressly criticises the doctrines
-in which he had been brought up; he admits that he is going to 'lay hands
-on his father Parmenides.'  Nothing of this kind is said of Zeno and
-Parmenides.  How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to
-them the refutation of their own tenets?
-
-The conclusion at which we must arrive is that the Parmenides is not a
-refutation of the Eleatic philosophy.  Nor would such an explanation afford
-any satisfactory connexion of the first and second parts of the dialogue.
-And it is quite inconsistent with Plato's own relation to the Eleatics. 
-For of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he speaks of them with the
-greatest respect.  But he could hardly have passed upon them a more
-unmeaning slight than to ascribe to their great master tenets the reverse
-of those which he actually held.
-
-Two preliminary remarks may be made.  First, that whatever latitude we may
-allow to Plato in bringing together by a 'tour de force,' as in the
-Phaedrus, dissimilar themes, yet he always in some way seeks to find a
-connexion for them.  Many threads join together in one the love and
-dialectic of the Phaedrus.  We cannot conceive that the great artist would
-place in juxtaposition two absolutely divided and incoherent subjects.  And
-hence we are led to make a second remark:  viz. that no explanation of the
-Parmenides can be satisfactory which does not indicate the connexion of the
-first and second parts.  To suppose that Plato would first go out of his
-way to make Parmenides attack the Platonic Ideas, and then proceed to a
-similar but more fatal assault on his own doctrine of Being, appears to be
-the height of absurdity.
-
-Perhaps there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power
-than that in which he assails his own theory of Ideas.  The arguments are
-nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle; they are the objections which
-naturally occur to a modern student of philosophy.  Many persons will be
-surprised to find Plato criticizing the very conceptions which have been
-supposed in after ages to be peculiarly characteristic of him.  How can he
-have placed himself so completely without them?  How can he have ever
-persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged
-against them?  The consideration of this difficulty has led a recent critic
-(Ueberweg), who in general accepts the authorised canon of the Platonic
-writings, to condemn the Parmenides as spurious.  The accidental want of
-external evidence, at first sight, seems to favour this opinion.
-
-In answer, it might be sufficient to say, that no ancient writing of equal
-length and excellence is known to be spurious.  Nor is the silence of
-Aristotle to be hastily assumed; there is at least a doubt whether his use
-of the same arguments does not involve the inference that he knew the work.
-And, if the Parmenides is spurious, like Ueberweg, we are led on further
-than we originally intended, to pass a similar condemnation on the
-Theaetetus and Sophist, and therefore on the Politicus (compare Theaet.,
-Soph.).  But the objection is in reality fanciful, and rests on the
-assumption that the doctrine of the Ideas was held by Plato throughout his
-life in the same form.  For the truth is, that the Platonic Ideas were in
-constant process of growth and transmutation; sometimes veiled in poetry
-and mythology, then again emerging as fixed Ideas, in some passages
-regarded as absolute and eternal, and in others as relative to the human
-mind, existing in and derived from external objects as well as transcending
-them.  The anamnesis of the Ideas is chiefly insisted upon in the mythical
-portions of the dialogues, and really occupies a very small space in the
-entire works of Plato.  Their transcendental existence is not asserted, and
-is therefore implicitly denied in the Philebus; different forms are
-ascribed to them in the Republic, and they are mentioned in the Theaetetus,
-the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Laws, much as Universals would be
-spoken of in modern books.  Indeed, there are very faint traces of the
-transcendental doctrine of Ideas, that is, of their existence apart from
-the mind, in any of Plato's writings, with the exception of the Meno, the
-Phaedrus, the Phaedo, and in portions of the Republic.  The stereotyped
-form which Aristotle has given to them is not found in Plato (compare Essay
-on the Platonic Ideas in the Introduction to the Meno.)
-
-The full discussion of this subject involves a comprehensive survey of the
-philosophy of Plato, which would be out of place here.  But, without
-digressing further from the immediate subject of the Parmenides, we may
-remark that Plato is quite serious in his objections to his own doctrines: 
-nor does Socrates attempt to offer any answer to them.  The perplexities
-which surround the one and many in the sphere of the Ideas are also alluded
-to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them.  Nor have they ever
-been answered, nor can they be answered by any one else who separates the
-phenomenal from the real.  To suppose that Plato, at a later period of his
-life, reached a point of view from which he was able to answer them, is a
-groundless assumption.  The real progress of Plato's own mind has been
-partly concealed from us by the dogmatic statements of Aristotle, and also
-by the degeneracy of his own followers, with whom a doctrine of numbers
-quickly superseded Ideas.
-
-As a preparation for answering some of the difficulties which have been
-suggested, we may begin by sketching the first portion of the dialogue:--
-
-Cephalus, of Clazomenae in Ionia, the birthplace of Anaxagoras, a citizen
-of no mean city in the history of philosophy, who is the narrator of the
-dialogue, describes himself as meeting Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora
-at Athens.  'Welcome, Cephalus:  can we do anything for you in Athens?' 
-'Why, yes:  I came to ask a favour of you.  First, tell me your half-
-brother's name, which I have forgotten--he was a mere child when I was last
-here;--I know his father's, which is Pyrilampes.'  'Yes, and the name of
-our brother is Antiphon.  But why do you ask?'  'Let me introduce to you
-some countrymen of mine, who are lovers of philosophy; they have heard that
-Antiphon remembers a conversation of Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno, of
-which the report came to him from Pythodorus, Zeno's friend.'  'That is
-quite true.'  'And can they hear the dialogue?'  'Nothing easier; in the
-days of his youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present, his
-thoughts have another direction:  he takes after his grandfather, and has
-given up philosophy for horses.'
-
-'We went to look for him, and found him giving instructions to a worker in
-brass about a bridle.  When he had done with him, and had learned from his
-brothers the purpose of our visit, he saluted me as an old acquaintance,
-and we asked him to repeat the dialogue.  At first, he complained of the
-trouble, but he soon consented.  He told us that Pythodorus had described
-to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they had come to Athens at
-the great Panathenaea, the former being at the time about sixty-five years
-old, aged but well-favoured--Zeno, who was said to have been beloved of
-Parmenides in the days of his youth, about forty, and very good-looking:--
-that they lodged with Pythodorus at the Ceramicus outside the wall, whither
-Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them:  Zeno was reading one of
-his theses, which he had nearly finished, when Pythodorus entered with
-Parmenides and Aristoteles, who was afterwards one of the Thirty.  When the
-recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the
-treatise might be read again.'
-
-'You mean, Zeno,' said Socrates, 'to argue that being, if it is many, must
-be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction; and each division of
-your argument is intended to elicit a similar absurdity, which may be
-supposed to follow from the assumption that being is many.'  'Such is my
-meaning.'  'I see,' said Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is
-your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is
-one:  he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought.  To
-deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms, is
-a strain of art beyond most of us.'  'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but
-though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the
-motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides against
-ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of the existence of the many
-involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis of the one.  The book was
-a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me, and therefore I
-had no choice about the publication.'  'I quite believe you,' said
-Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question?  I should like to know,
-whether you would assume an idea of likeness in the abstract, which is the
-contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation in either or
-both of which things are like or unlike or partly both.  For the same
-things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete, though
-like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcilable.  Nor does there appear
-to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things may partake
-of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised to hear that the
-absolute one is also many.  For example, I, being many, that is to say,
-having many parts or members, am yet also one, and partake of the one,
-being one of seven who are here present (compare Philebus).  This is not an
-absurdity, but a truism.  But I should be amazed if there were a similar
-entanglement in the nature of the ideas themselves, nor can I believe that
-one and many, like and unlike, rest and motion, in the abstract, are
-capable either of admixture or of separation.'
-
-Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very well
-pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they looked at
-one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of Socrates. 
-'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'do you think that the abstract ideas of
-likeness, unity, and the rest, exist apart from individuals which partake
-of them? and is this your own distinction?'  'I think that there are such
-ideas.'  'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the
-good?'  'Yes,' he said.  'And of human beings like ourselves, of water,
-fire, and the like?'  'I am not certain.'  'And would you be undecided also
-about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear laughable:  of hair,
-mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?'  'No, Parmenides;
-visible things like these are, as I believe, only what they appear to be: 
-though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that there is nothing without an
-idea; but I repress any such notion, from a fear of falling into an abyss
-of nonsense.'  'You are young, Socrates, and therefore naturally regard the
-opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold
-of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things.  But tell me, is
-your meaning that things become like by partaking of likeness, great by
-partaking of greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and
-beauty, and so of other ideas?'  'Yes, that is my meaning.'  'And do you
-suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?'  'Why not
-of the whole?' said Socrates.  'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case
-the whole, which is one, will become many.'  'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the
-whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places:  in this way
-the ideas may be one and also many.'  'In the same sort of way,' said
-Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many--that is your
-meaning?'  'Yes.'  'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole
-sail, or by a part only?'  'By a part.'  'Then the ideas have parts, and
-the objects partake of a part of them only?'  'That seems to follow.'  'And
-would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain
-one?'  'Certainly not.'  'Would you venture to affirm that great objects
-have a portion only of greatness transferred to them; or that small or
-equal objects are small or equal because they are only portions of
-smallness or equality?'  'Impossible.'  'But how can individuals
-participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?'  'That is
-not an easy question to answer.'  'I should imagine the conception of ideas
-to arise as follows:  you see great objects pervaded by a common form or
-idea of greatness, which you abstract.'  'That is quite true.'  'And
-supposing you embrace in one view the idea of greatness thus gained and the
-individuals which it comprises, a further idea of greatness arises, which
-makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.'  Socrates replies that
-the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence
-would no longer follow.  'But must not the thought be of something which is
-the same in all and is the idea?  And if the world partakes in the ideas,
-and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think?  Or can thought be
-without thought?'  'I acknowledge the unmeaningness of this,' says
-Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse to the explanation that the ideas
-are types in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming like
-them.'  'But to become like them is to be comprehended in the same idea;
-and the likeness of the idea and the individuals implies another idea of
-likeness, and another without end.'  'Quite true.'  'The theory, then, of
-participation by likeness has to be given up.  You have hardly yet,
-Socrates, found out the real difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.' 
-'What difficulty?'  'The greatest of all perhaps is this:  an opponent will
-argue that the ideas are not within the range of human knowledge; and you
-cannot disprove the assertion without a long and laborious demonstration,
-which he may be unable or unwilling to follow.  In the first place, neither
-you nor any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm
-that they are subjective.'  'That would be a contradiction.'  'True; and
-therefore any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns
-themselves only; and the objects which are named after them, are relative
-to one another only, and have nothing to do with the ideas themselves.' 
-'How do you mean?' said Socrates.  'I may illustrate my meaning in this
-way:  one of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is
-relative to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of
-ideas, however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave
-to us.--Do you see my meaning?'  'Perfectly.'  'And absolute knowledge in
-the same way corresponds to absolute truth and being, and particular
-knowledge to particular truth and being.'  Clearly.'  'And there is a
-subjective knowledge which is of subjective truth, having many kinds,
-general and particular.  But the ideas themselves are not subjective, and
-therefore are not within our ken.'  'They are not.'  'Then the beautiful
-and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?'  'It would seem so.' 
-'There is a worse consequence yet.'  'What is that?'  'I think we must
-admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must
-therefore attribute to God.  But then see what follows:  God, having this
-exact knowledge, can have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided
-the two spheres, and forbidden any passing from one to the other:--the gods
-have knowledge and authority in their world only, as we have in ours.' 
-'Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.'--'These are some
-of the difficulties which are involved in the assumption of absolute ideas;
-the learner will find them nearly impossible to understand, and the teacher
-who has to impart them will require superhuman ability; there will always
-be a suspicion, either that they have no existence, or are beyond human
-knowledge.'  'There I agree with you,' said Socrates.  'Yet if these
-difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the
-mind? and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? philosophy is at
-an end.'  'I certainly do not see my way.'  'I think,' said Parmenides,
-'that this arises out of your attempting to define abstractions, such as
-the good and the beautiful and the just, before you have had sufficient
-previous training; I noticed your deficiency when you were talking with
-Aristoteles, the day before yesterday.  Your enthusiasm is a wonderful
-gift; but I fear that unless you discipline yourself by dialectic while you
-are young, truth will elude your grasp.'  'And what kind of discipline
-would you recommend?'  'The training which you heard Zeno practising; at
-the same time, I admire your saying to him that you did not care to
-consider the difficulty in reference to visible objects, but only in
-relation to ideas.'  'Yes; because I think that in visible objects you may
-easily show any number of inconsistent consequences.'  'Yes; and you should
-consider, not only the consequences which follow from a given hypothesis,
-but the consequences also which follow from the denial of the hypothesis. 
-For example, what follows from the assumption of the existence of the many,
-and the counter-argument of what follows from the denial of the existence
-of the many:  and similarly of likeness and unlikeness, motion, rest,
-generation, corruption, being and not being.  And the consequences must
-include consequences to the things supposed and to other things, in
-themselves and in relation to one another, to individuals whom you select,
-to the many, and to the all; these must be drawn out both on the
-affirmative and on the negative hypothesis,--that is, if you are to train
-yourself perfectly to the intelligence of the truth.'  'What you are
-suggesting seems to be a tremendous process, and one of which I do not
-quite understand the nature,' said Socrates; 'will you give me an example?' 
-'You must not impose such a task on a man of my years,' said Parmenides. 
-'Then will you, Zeno?'  'Let us rather,' said Zeno, with a smile, 'ask
-Parmenides, for the undertaking is a serious one, as he truly says; nor
-could I urge him to make the attempt, except in a select audience of
-persons who will understand him.'  The whole party joined in the request.
-
-Here we have, first of all, an unmistakable attack made by the youthful
-Socrates on the paradoxes of Zeno.  He perfectly understands their drift,
-and Zeno himself is supposed to admit this.  But they appear to him, as he
-says in the Philebus also, to be rather truisms than paradoxes.  For every
-one must acknowledge the obvious fact, that the body being one has many
-members, and that, in a thousand ways, the like partakes of the unlike, the
-many of the one.  The real difficulty begins with the relations of ideas in
-themselves, whether of the one and many, or of any other ideas, to one
-another and to the mind.  But this was a problem which the Eleatic
-philosophers had never considered; their thoughts had not gone beyond the
-contradictions of matter, motion, space, and the like.
-
-It was no wonder that Parmenides and Zeno should hear the novel
-speculations of Socrates with mixed feelings of admiration and displeasure. 
-He was going out of the received circle of disputation into a region in
-which they could hardly follow him.  From the crude idea of Being in the
-abstract, he was about to proceed to universals or general notions.  There
-is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and
-many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like
-and unlike, in themselves.  But the contradiction arises when we attempt to
-conceive ideas in their connexion, or to ascertain their relation to
-phenomena.  Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the
-position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides.
-
-To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the
-place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy.  He is the
-founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of
-metaphysics and logic (Theaet., Soph.).  Like Plato, he is struggling after
-something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans. 
-And Plato with a true instinct recognizes him as his spiritual father, whom
-he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.'  He
-may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express.
-And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticized the ideas
-of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in
-the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy.
-
-There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of
-Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier
-philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other.  The older
-philosophers were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity.
-Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost
-as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic.  He felt no incongruity in the
-veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates.  Two points in his
-criticism are especially deserving of notice.  First of all, Parmenides
-tries him by the test of consistency.  Socrates is willing to assume ideas
-or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to
-man (compare Phaedo); but he is reluctant to admit that there are general
-ideas of hair, mud, filth, etc.  There is an ethical universal or idea, but
-is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world
-as well as of the greatest?  Parmenides rebukes this want of consistency in
-Socrates, which he attributes to his youth.  As he grows older, philosophy
-will take a firmer hold of him, and then he will despise neither great
-things nor small, and he will think less of the opinions of mankind
-(compare Soph.).  Here is lightly touched one of the most familiar
-principles of modern philosophy, that in the meanest operations of nature,
-as well as in the noblest, in mud and filth, as well as in the sun and
-stars, great truths are contained.  At the same time, we may note also the
-transition in the mind of Plato, to which Aristotle alludes (Met.), when,
-as he says, he transferred the Socratic universal of ethics to the whole of
-nature.
-
-The other criticism of Parmenides on Socrates attributes to him a want of
-practice in dialectic.  He has observed this deficiency in him when talking
-to Aristoteles on a previous occasion.  Plato seems to imply that there was
-something more in the dialectic of Zeno than in the mere interrogation of
-Socrates.  Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the process which his
-own mind went through when he first became more intimately acquainted,
-whether at Megara or elsewhere, with the Eleatic and Megarian philosophers.
-Still, Parmenides does not deny to Socrates the credit of having gone
-beyond them in seeking to apply the paradoxes of Zeno to ideas; and this is
-the application which he himself makes of them in the latter part of the
-dialogue.  He then proceeds to explain to him the sort of mental gymnastic
-which he should practise.  He should consider not only what would follow
-from a given hypothesis, but what would follow from the denial of it, to
-that which is the subject of the hypothesis, and to all other things. 
-There is no trace in the Memorabilia of Xenophon of any such method being
-attributed to Socrates; nor is the dialectic here spoken of that 'favourite
-method' of proceeding by regular divisions, which is described in the
-Phaedrus and Philebus, and of which examples are given in the Politicus and
-in the Sophist.  It is expressly spoken of as the method which Socrates had
-heard Zeno practise in the days of his youth (compare Soph.).
-
-The discussion of Socrates with Parmenides is one of the most remarkable
-passages in Plato.  Few writers have ever been able to anticipate 'the
-criticism of the morrow' on their favourite notions.  But Plato may here be
-said to anticipate the judgment not only of the morrow, but of all after-
-ages on the Platonic Ideas.  For in some points he touches questions which
-have not yet received their solution in modern philosophy.
-
-The first difficulty which Parmenides raises respecting the Platonic ideas
-relates to the manner in which individuals are connected with them.  Do
-they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them?  Parmenides
-shows that objections may be urged against either of these modes of
-conceiving the connection.  Things are little by partaking of littleness,
-great by partaking of greatness, and the like.  But they cannot partake of
-a part of greatness, for that will not make them great, etc.; nor can each
-object monopolise the whole.  The only answer to this is, that 'partaking'
-is a figure of speech, really corresponding to the processes which a later
-logic designates by the terms 'abstraction' and 'generalization.'  When we
-have described accurately the methods or forms which the mind employs, we
-cannot further criticize them; at least we can only criticize them with
-reference to their fitness as instruments of thought to express facts.
-
-Socrates attempts to support his view of the ideas by the parallel of the
-day, which is one and in many places; but he is easily driven from his
-position by a counter illustration of Parmenides, who compares the idea of
-greatness to a sail.  He truly explains to Socrates that he has attained
-the conception of ideas by a process of generalization.  At the same time,
-he points out a difficulty, which appears to be involved--viz. that the
-process of generalization will go on to infinity.  Socrates meets the
-supposed difficulty by a flash of light, which is indeed the true answer
-'that the ideas are in our minds only.'  Neither realism is the truth, nor
-nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism; and conceptualism or any other
-psychological theory falls very far short of the infinite subtlety of
-language and thought.
-
-But the realism of ancient philosophy will not admit of this answer, which
-is repelled by Parmenides with another truth or half-truth of later
-philosophy, 'Every subject or subjective must have an object.'  Here is the
-great though unconscious truth (shall we say?) or error, which underlay the
-early Greek philosophy.  'Ideas must have a real existence;' they are not
-mere forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by individuals. 
-But the early Greek philosopher never clearly saw that true ideas were only
-universal facts, and that there might be error in universals as well as in
-particulars.
-
-Socrates makes one more attempt to defend the Platonic Ideas by
-representing them as paradigms; this is again answered by the 'argumentum
-ad infinitum.'  We may remark, in passing, that the process which is thus
-described has no real existence.  The mind, after having obtained a general
-idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all
-the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end. 
-The difficulty belongs in fact to the Megarian age of philosophy, and is
-due to their illogical logic, and to the general ignorance of the ancients
-respecting the part played by language in the process of thought.  No such
-perplexity could ever trouble a modern metaphysician, any more than the
-fallacy of 'calvus' or 'acervus,' or of 'Achilles and the tortoise.'  These
-'surds' of metaphysics ought to occasion no more difficulty in speculation
-than a perpetually recurring fraction in arithmetic.
-
-It is otherwise with the objection which follows:  How are we to bridge the
-chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men?  This
-is the difficulty of philosophy in all ages:  How can we get beyond the
-circle of our own ideas, or how, remaining within them, can we have any
-criterion of a truth beyond and independent of them?  Parmenides draws out
-this difficulty with great clearness.  According to him, there are not only
-one but two chasms:  the first, between individuals and the ideas which
-have a common name; the second, between the ideas in us and the ideas
-absolute.  The first of these two difficulties mankind, as we may say, a
-little parodying the language of the Philebus, have long agreed to treat as
-obsolete; the second remains a difficulty for us as well as for the Greeks
-of the fourth century before Christ, and is the stumblingblock of Kant's
-Kritik, and of the Hamiltonian adaptation of Kant, as well as of the
-Platonic ideas.  It has been said that 'you cannot criticize Revelation.' 
-'Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all,' is
-the immediate rejoinder--'You know nothing of things in themselves.'  'Then
-how do you know that there are things in themselves?'  In some respects,
-the difficulty pressed harder upon the Greek than upon ourselves.  For
-conceiving of God more under the attribute of knowledge than we do, he was
-more under the necessity of separating the divine from the human, as two
-spheres which had no communication with one another.
-
-It is remarkable that Plato, speaking by the mouth of Parmenides, does not
-treat even this second class of difficulties as hopeless or insoluble.  He
-says only that they cannot be explained without a long and laborious
-demonstration:  'The teacher will require superhuman ability, and the
-learner will be hard of understanding.'  But an attempt must be made to
-find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the
-denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind.  We can easily
-imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century
-before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to
-that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of
-cause and effect.  Men do not at first recognize that thought, like
-digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may
-be entertained respecting the nature of the process.  Parmenides attributes
-the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of
-comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every
-question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference
-to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the
-assertion of a given statement.
-
-The argument which follows is the most singular in Plato.  It appears to be
-an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in
-the Phaedrus are an imitation of the style of Lysias, or as the derivations
-in the Cratylus or the fallacies of the Euthydemus are a parody of some
-contemporary Sophist.  The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the
-other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only
-required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places.  A hint has been
-already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application.
-This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the
-dialogue.
-
-The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which
-they relate have become trivial; their true nature as abstract terms is
-perfectly understood by us, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of
-them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words.  Yet
-there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries
-afterwards.  Something that they found in them, or brought to them--some
-echo or anticipation of a great truth or error, exercised a wonderful
-influence over their minds.  To do the Parmenides justice, we should
-imagine similar aporiai raised on themes as sacred to us, as the notions of
-One or Being were to an ancient Eleatic.  'If God is, what follows?  If God
-is not, what follows?'  Or again:  If God is or is not the world; or if God
-is or is not many, or has or has not parts, or is or is not in the world,
-or in time; or is or is not finite or infinite.  Or if the world is or is
-not; or has or has not a beginning or end; or is or is not infinite, or
-infinitely divisible.  Or again:  if God is or is not identical with his
-laws; or if man is or is not identical with the laws of nature.  We can
-easily see that here are many subjects for thought, and that from these and
-similar hypotheses questions of great interest might arise.  And we also
-remark, that the conclusions derived from either of the two alternative
-propositions might be equally impossible and contradictory.
-
-When we ask what is the object of these paradoxes, some have answered that
-they are a mere logical puzzle, while others have seen in them an Hegelian
-propaedeutic of the doctrine of Ideas.  The first of these views derives
-support from the manner in which Parmenides speaks of a similar method
-being applied to all Ideas.  Yet it is hard to suppose that Plato would
-have furnished so elaborate an example, not of his own but of the Eleatic
-dialectic, had he intended only to give an illustration of method.  The
-second view has been often overstated by those who, like Hegel himself,
-have tended to confuse ancient with modern philosophy.  We need not deny
-that Plato, trained in the school of Cratylus and Heracleitus, may have
-seen that a contradiction in terms is sometimes the best expression of a
-truth higher than either (compare Soph.).  But his ideal theory is not
-based on antinomies.  The correlation of Ideas was the metaphysical
-difficulty of the age in which he lived; and the Megarian and Cynic
-philosophy was a 'reductio ad absurdum' of their isolation.  To restore
-them to their natural connexion and to detect the negative element in them
-is the aim of Plato in the Sophist.  But his view of their connexion falls
-very far short of the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being.  The Being
-and Not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that
-'determination is only negation.'
-
-After criticizing the hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to
-add another guess to the many which have been already offered.  May we say,
-in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which
-has not yet been taken?  It is quite possible that the obscurity of the
-Parmenides would not have existed to a contemporary student of philosophy,
-and, like the similar difficulty in the Philebus, is really due to our
-ignorance of the mind of the age.  There is an obscure Megarian influence
-on Plato which cannot wholly be cleared up, and is not much illustrated by
-the doubtful tradition of his retirement to Megara after the death of
-Socrates.  For Megara was within a walk of Athens (Phaedr.), and Plato
-might have learned the Megarian doctrines without settling there.
-
-We may begin by remarking that the theses of Parmenides are expressly said
-to follow the method of Zeno, and that the complex dilemma, though declared
-to be capable of universal application, is applied in this instance to
-Zeno's familiar question of the 'one and many.'  Here, then, is a double
-indication of the connexion of the Parmenides with the Eristic school.  The
-old Eleatics had asserted the existence of Being, which they at first
-regarded as finite, then as infinite, then as neither finite nor infinite,
-to which some of them had given what Aristotle calls 'a form,' others had
-ascribed a material nature only.  The tendency of their philosophy was to
-deny to Being all predicates.  The Megarians, who succeeded them, like the
-Cynics, affirmed that no predicate could be asserted of any subject; they
-also converted the idea of Being into an abstraction of Good, perhaps with
-the view of preserving a sort of neutrality or indifference between the
-mind and things.  As if they had said, in the language of modern
-philosophy:  'Being is not only neither finite nor infinite, neither at
-rest nor in motion, but neither subjective nor objective.'
-
-This is the track along which Plato is leading us.  Zeno had attempted to
-prove the existence of the one by disproving the existence of the many, and
-Parmenides seems to aim at proving the existence of the subject by showing
-the contradictions which follow from the assertion of any predicates.  Take
-the simplest of all notions, 'unity'; you cannot even assert being or time
-of this without involving a contradiction.  But is the contradiction also
-the final conclusion?  Probably no more than of Zeno's denial of the many,
-or of Parmenides' assault upon the Ideas; no more than of the earlier
-dialogues 'of search.'  To us there seems to be no residuum of this long
-piece of dialectics.  But to the mind of Parmenides and Plato, 'Gott-
-betrunkene Menschen,' there still remained the idea of 'being' or 'good,'
-which could not be conceived, defined, uttered, but could not be got rid
-of.  Neither of them would have imagined that their disputation ever
-touched the Divine Being (compare Phil.).  The same difficulties about
-Unity and Being are raised in the Sophist; but there only as preliminary to
-their final solution.
-
-If this view is correct, the real aim of the hypotheses of Parmenides is to
-criticize the earlier Eleatic philosophy from the point of view of Zeno or
-the Megarians.  It is the same kind of criticism which Plato has extended
-to his own doctrine of Ideas.  Nor is there any want of poetical
-consistency in attributing to the 'father Parmenides' the last review of
-the Eleatic doctrines.  The latest phases of all philosophies were fathered
-upon the founder of the school.
-
-Other critics have regarded the final conclusion of the Parmenides either
-as sceptical or as Heracleitean.  In the first case, they assume that Plato
-means to show the impossibility of any truth.  But this is not the spirit
-of Plato, and could not with propriety be put into the mouth of Parmenides,
-who, in this very dialogue, is urging Socrates, not to doubt everything,
-but to discipline his mind with a view to the more precise attainment of
-truth.  The same remark applies to the second of the two theories.  Plato
-everywhere ridicules (perhaps unfairly) his Heracleitean contemporaries: 
-and if he had intended to support an Heracleitean thesis, would hardly have
-chosen Parmenides, the condemner of the 'undiscerning tribe who say that
-things both are and are not,' to be the speaker.  Nor, thirdly, can we
-easily persuade ourselves with Zeller that by the 'one' he means the Idea;
-and that he is seeking to prove indirectly the unity of the Idea in the
-multiplicity of phenomena.
-
-We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides
-knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them.
-
-The argument has two divisions:  There is the hypothesis that
-
-1.  One is.
-2.  One is not.
-If one is, it is nothing.
-If one is not, it is everything.
-
-But is and is not may be taken in two senses:
-Either one is one,
-Or, one has being,
-
-from which opposite consequences are deduced,
-1.a.  If one is one, it is nothing.
-1.b.  If one has being, it is all things.
-
-To which are appended two subordinate consequences:
-1.aa.  If one has being, all other things are.
-1.bb.  If one is one, all other things are not.
-
-The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis:
-2.a.  If one is not one, it is all things.
-2.b.  If one has not being, it is nothing.
-
-Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder:
-2.aa.  If one is not one, other things are all.
-2.bb.  If one has not being, other things are not.
-
-...
-
-'I cannot refuse,' said Parmenides, 'since, as Zeno remarks, we are alone,
-though I may say with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like the
-old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and
-which I know so well.  But as I must attempt this laborious game, what
-shall be the subject?  Suppose I take my own hypothesis of the one.'  'By
-all means,' said Zeno.  'And who will answer me?  Shall I propose the
-youngest? he will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers
-will give me time to breathe.'  'I am the youngest,' said Aristoteles, 'and
-at your service; proceed with your questions.'--The result may be summed up
-as follows:--
-
-1.a.  One is not many, and therefore has no parts, and therefore is not a
-whole, which is a sum of parts, and therefore has neither beginning,
-middle, nor end, and is therefore unlimited, and therefore formless, being
-neither round nor straight, for neither round nor straight can be defined
-without assuming that they have parts; and therefore is not in place,
-whether in another which would encircle and touch the one at many points;
-or in itself, because that which is self-containing is also contained, and
-therefore not one but two.  This being premised, let us consider whether
-one is capable either of motion or rest.  For motion is either change of
-substance, or motion on an axis, or from one place to another.  But the one
-is incapable of change of substance, which implies that it ceases to be
-itself, or of motion on an axis, because there would be parts around the
-axis; and any other motion involves change of place.  But existence in
-place has been already shown to be impossible; and yet more impossible is
-coming into being in place, which implies partial existence in two places
-at once, or entire existence neither within nor without the same; and how
-can this be?  And more impossible still is the coming into being either as
-a whole or parts of that which is neither a whole nor parts.  The one,
-then, is incapable of motion.  But neither can the one be in anything, and
-therefore not in the same, whether itself or some other, and is therefore
-incapable of rest.  Neither is one the same with itself or any other, or
-other than itself or any other.  For if other than itself, then other than
-one, and therefore not one; and, if the same with other, it would be other,
-and other than one.  Neither can one while remaining one be other than
-other; for other, and not one, is the other than other.  But if not other
-by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of
-itself, not itself other, and if not itself other, not other than anything. 
-Neither will one be the same with itself.  For the nature of the same is
-not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with anything does
-not become one; for example, that which becomes the same with the many
-becomes many and not one.  And therefore if the one is the same with
-itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and not one.  And
-therefore one is neither other than other, nor the same with itself. 
-Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other; for likeness is
-sameness of affections, and the one and the same are different.  And one
-having any affection which is other than being one would be more than one. 
-The one, then, cannot have the same affection with and therefore cannot be
-like itself or other; nor can the one have any other affection than its
-own, that is, be unlike itself or any other, for this would imply that it
-was more than one.  The one, then, is neither like nor unlike itself or
-other.  This being the case, neither can the one be equal or unequal to
-itself or other.  For equality implies sameness of measure, as inequality
-implies a greater or less number of measures.  But the one, not having
-sameness, cannot have sameness of measure; nor a greater or less number of
-measures, for that would imply parts and multitude.  Once more, can one be
-older or younger than itself or other? or of the same age with itself or
-other?  That would imply likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality. 
-Therefore one cannot be in time, because that which is in time is ever
-becoming older and younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative
-terms, and he who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same
-age with itself.  None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether
-past, future, or present, can be affirmed of one.  One neither is, has
-been, nor will be, nor becomes, nor has, nor will become.  And, as these
-are the only modes of being, one is not, and is not one.  But to that which
-is not, there is no attribute or relative, neither name nor word nor idea
-nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining.  One, then, is neither
-named, nor uttered, nor known, nor perceived, nor imagined.  But can all
-this be true?  'I think not.'
-
-1.b.  Let us, however, commence the inquiry again.  We have to work out all
-the consequences which follow on the assumption that the one is.  If one
-is, one partakes of being, which is not the same with one; the words
-'being' and 'one' have different meanings.  Observe the consequence:  In
-the one of being or the being of one are two parts, being and one, which
-form one whole.  And each of the two parts is also a whole, and involves
-the other, and may be further subdivided into one and being, and is
-therefore not one but two; and thus one is never one, and in this way the
-one, if it is, becomes many and infinite.  Again, let us conceive of a one
-which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being:  will this
-abstract one be one or many?  You say one only; let us see.  In the first
-place, the being of one is other than one; and one and being, if different,
-are so because they both partake of the nature of other, which is therefore
-neither one nor being; and whether we take being and other, or being and
-one, or one and other, in any case we have two things which separately are
-called either, and together both.  And both are two and either of two is
-severally one, and if one be added to any of the pairs, the sum is three;
-and two is an even number, three an odd; and two units exist twice, and
-therefore there are twice two; and three units exist thrice, and therefore
-there are thrice three, and taken together they give twice three and thrice
-two:  we have even numbers multiplied into even, and odd into even, and
-even into odd numbers.  But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are
-implied in one, must not every number exist?  And number is infinite, and
-therefore existence must be infinite, for all and every number partakes of
-being; therefore being has the greatest number of parts, and every part,
-however great or however small, is equally one.  But can one be in many
-places and yet be a whole?  If not a whole it must be divided into parts
-and represented by a number corresponding to the number of the parts.  And
-if so, we were wrong in saying that being has the greatest number of parts;
-for being is coequal and coextensive with one, and has no more parts than
-one; and so the abstract one broken up into parts by being is many and
-infinite.  But the parts are parts of a whole, and the whole is their
-containing limit, and the one is therefore limited as well as infinite in
-number; and that which is a whole has beginning, middle, and end, and a
-middle is equidistant from the extremes; and one is therefore of a certain
-figure, round or straight, or a combination of the two, and being a whole
-includes all the parts which are the whole, and is therefore self-
-contained.  But then, again, the whole is not in the parts, whether all or
-some.  Not in all, because, if in all, also in one; for, if wanting in any
-one, how in all?--not in some, because the greater would then be contained
-in the less.  But if not in all, nor in any, nor in some, either nowhere or
-in other.  And if nowhere, nothing; therefore in other.  The one as a
-whole, then, is in another, but regarded as a sum of parts is in itself;
-and is, therefore, both in itself and in another.  This being the case, the
-one is at once both at rest and in motion:  at rest, because resting in
-itself; in motion, because it is ever in other.  And if there is truth in
-what has preceded, one is the same and not the same with itself and other. 
-For everything in relation to every other thing is either the same with it
-or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of part to
-a whole or whole to a part.  But one cannot be a part or whole in relation
-to one, nor other than one; and is therefore the same with one.  Yet this
-sameness is again contradicted by one being in another place from itself
-which is in the same place; this follows from one being in itself and in
-another; one, therefore, is other than itself.  But if anything is other
-than anything, will it not be other than other?  And the not one is other
-than the one, and the one than the not one; therefore one is other than all
-others.  But the same and the other exclude one another, and therefore the
-other can never be in the same; nor can the other be in anything for ever
-so short a time, as for that time the other will be in the same.  And the
-other, if never in the same, cannot be either in the one or in the not one. 
-And one is not other than not one, either by reason of other or of itself;
-and therefore they are not other than one another at all.  Neither can the
-not one partake or be part of one, for in that case it would be one; nor
-can the not one be number, for that also involves one.  And therefore, not
-being other than the one or related to the one as a whole to parts or parts
-to a whole, not one is the same as one.  Wherefore the one is the same and
-also not the same with the others and also with itself; and is therefore
-like and unlike itself and the others, and just as different from the
-others as they are from the one, neither more nor less.  But if neither
-more nor less, equally different; and therefore the one and the others have
-the same relations.  This may be illustrated by the case of names:  when
-you repeat the same name twice over, you mean the same thing; and when you
-say that the other is other than the one, or the one other than the other,
-this very word other (eteron), which is attributed to both, implies
-sameness.  One, then, as being other than others, and other as being other
-than one, are alike in that they have the relation of otherness; and
-likeness is similarity of relations.  And everything as being other of
-everything is also like everything.  Again, same and other, like and
-unlike, are opposites:  and since in virtue of being other than the others
-the one is like them, in virtue of being the same it must be unlike. 
-Again, one, as having the same relations, has no difference of relation,
-and is therefore not unlike, and therefore like; or, as having different
-relations, is different and unlike.  Thus, one, as being the same and not
-the same with itself and others--for both these reasons and for either of
-them--is also like and unlike itself and the others.  Again, how far can
-one touch itself and the others?  As existing in others, it touches the
-others; and as existing in itself, touches only itself.  But from another
-point of view, that which touches another must be next in order of place;
-one, therefore, must be next in order of place to itself, and would
-therefore be two, and in two places.  But one cannot be two, and therefore
-cannot be in contact with itself.  Nor again can one touch the other.  Two
-objects are required to make one contact; three objects make two contacts;
-and all the objects in the world, if placed in a series, would have as many
-contacts as there are objects, less one.  But if one only exists, and not
-two, there is no contact.  And the others, being other than one, have no
-part in one, and therefore none in number, and therefore two has no
-existence, and therefore there is no contact.  For all which reasons, one
-has and has not contact with itself and the others.
-
-Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others?  Suppose one
-and the others to be greater or less than each other or equal to one
-another, they will be greater or less or equal by reason of equality or
-greatness or smallness inhering in them in addition to their own proper
-nature.  Let us begin by assuming smallness to be inherent in one:  in this
-case the inherence is either in the whole or in a part.  If the first,
-smallness is either coextensive with the whole one, or contains the whole,
-and, if coextensive with the one, is equal to the one, or if containing the
-one will be greater than the one.  But smallness thus performs the function
-of equality or of greatness, which is impossible.  Again, if the inherence
-be in a part, the same contradiction follows:  smallness will be equal to
-the part or greater than the part; therefore smallness will not inhere in
-anything, and except the idea of smallness there will be nothing small. 
-Neither will greatness; for greatness will have a greater;--and there will
-be no small in relation to which it is great.  And there will be no great
-or small in objects, but greatness and smallness will be relative only to
-each other; therefore the others cannot be greater or less than the one;
-also the one can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the others, and they are
-therefore equal to one another.  And this will be true also of the one in
-relation to itself:  one will be equal to itself as well as to the others
-(talla).  Yet one, being in itself, must also be about itself, containing
-and contained, and is therefore greater and less than itself.  Further,
-there is nothing beside the one and the others; and as these must be in
-something, they must therefore be in one another; and as that in which a
-thing is is greater than the thing, the inference is that they are both
-greater and less than one another, because containing and contained in one
-another.  Therefore the one is equal to and greater and less than itself or
-other, having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less
-than itself or other.
-
-But does one partake of time?  This must be acknowledged, if the one
-partakes of being.  For 'to be' is the participation of being in present
-time, 'to have been' in past, 'to be about to be' in future time.  And as
-time is ever moving forward, the one becomes older than itself; and
-therefore younger than itself; and is older and also younger when in the
-process of becoming it arrives at the present; and it is always older and
-younger, for at any moment the one is, and therefore it becomes and is not
-older and younger than itself but during an equal time with itself, and is
-therefore contemporary with itself.
-
-And what are the relations of the one to the others?  Is it or does it
-become older or younger than they?  At any rate the others are more than
-one, and one, being the least of all numbers, must be prior in time to
-greater numbers.  But on the other hand, one must come into being in a
-manner accordant with its own nature.  Now one has parts or others, and has
-therefore a beginning, middle, and end, of which the beginning is first and
-the end last.  And the parts come into existence first; last of all the
-whole, contemporaneously with the end, being therefore younger, while the
-parts or others are older than the one.  But, again, the one comes into
-being in each of the parts as much as in the whole, and must be of the same
-age with them.  Therefore one is at once older and younger than the parts
-or others, and also contemporaneous with them, for no part can be a part
-which is not one.  Is this true of becoming as well as being?  Thus much
-may be affirmed, that the same things which are older or younger cannot
-become older or younger in a greater degree than they were at first by the
-addition of equal times.  But, on the other hand, the one, if older than
-others, has come into being a longer time than they have.  And when equal
-time is added to a longer and shorter, the relative difference between them
-is diminished.  In this way that which was older becomes younger, and that
-which was younger becomes older, that is to say, younger and older than at
-first; and they ever become and never have become, for then they would be. 
-Thus the one and others always are and are becoming and not becoming
-younger and also older than one another.  And one, partaking of time and
-also partaking of becoming older and younger, admits of all time, present,
-past, and future--was, is, shall be--was becoming, is becoming, will
-become.  And there is science of the one, and opinion and name and
-expression, as is already implied in the fact of our inquiry.
-
-Yet once more, if one be one and many, and neither one nor many, and also
-participant of time, must there not be a time at which one as being one
-partakes of being, and a time when one as not being one is deprived of
-being?  But these two contradictory states cannot be experienced by the one
-both together:  there must be a time of transition.  And the transition is
-a process of generation and destruction, into and from being and not-being,
-the one and the others.  For the generation of the one is the destruction
-of the others, and the generation of the others is the destruction of the
-one.  There is also separation and aggregation, assimilation and
-dissimilation, increase, diminution, equalization, a passage from motion to
-rest, and from rest to motion in the one and many.  But when do all these
-changes take place?  When does motion become rest, or rest motion?  The
-answer to this question will throw a light upon all the others.  Nothing
-can be in motion and at rest at the same time; and therefore the change
-takes place 'in a moment'--which is a strange expression, and seems to mean
-change in no time.  Which is true also of all the other changes, which
-likewise take place in no time.
-
-1.aa.  But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place
-are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way?  The others are other
-than the one because they have parts, for if they had no parts they would
-be simply one, and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise each
-part would be a part of many, and being itself one of them, of itself, and
-if a part of all, of each one of the other parts, which is absurd.  For a
-part, if not a part of one, must be a part of all but this one, and if so
-not a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, not a part of any
-one of many, and so not of one; and if of none, how of all?  Therefore a
-part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute and perfect
-whole or one.  And if the others have parts, they must partake of the
-whole, and must be the whole of which they are the parts.  And each part,
-as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute one.  And both the whole
-and the parts partake of one, for the whole of which the parts are parts is
-one, and each part is one part of the whole; and whole and parts as
-participating in one are other than one, and as being other than one are
-many and infinite; and however small a fraction you separate from them is
-many and not one.  Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes the others
-with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and
-also infinite:  finite through participation in the one, infinite in their
-own nature.  And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite,
-they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the
-highest degree unlike.  And all other opposites might without difficulty be
-shown to unite in them.
-
-1.bb.  Once more, leaving all this:  Is there not also an opposite series
-of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced
-from the existence of one?  There is.  One is distinct from the others, and
-the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and there is no
-third existence besides them.  And the whole of one cannot be in others nor
-parts of it, for it is separated from others and has no parts, and
-therefore the others have no unity, nor plurality, nor duality, nor any
-other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such as likeness and
-unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even.  For
-if they had these they would partake either of one opposite, and this would
-be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a
-participation in two.  Thus if one exists, one is all things, and likewise
-nothing, in relation to one and to the others.
-
-2.a.  But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and
-what is the consequence?  In the first place, the proposition, that one is
-not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not.  The
-subject of any negative proposition implies at once knowledge and
-difference.  Thus 'one' in the proposition--'The one is not,' must be
-something known, or the words would be unintelligible; and again this 'one
-which is not' is something different from other things.  Moreover, this and
-that, some and other, may be all attributed or related to the one which is
-not, and which though non-existent may and must have plurality, if the one
-only is non-existent and nothing else; but if all is not-being there is
-nothing which can be spoken of.  Also the one which is not differs, and is
-different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they
-being other than the one, are unlike the one, which is therefore unlike
-them.  But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness
-of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis; and one cannot be
-equal to the others; for that would suppose being in the one, and the
-others would be equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if
-one does not exist.  The one which is not, then, if not equal is unequal to
-the others, and in equality implies great and small, and equality lies
-between great and small, and therefore the one which is not partakes of
-equality.  Further, the one which is not has being; for that which is true
-is, and it is true that the one is not.  And so the one which is not, if
-remitting aught of the being of non-existence, would become existent.  For
-not being implies the being of not-being, and being the not-being of not-
-being; or more truly being partakes of the being of being and not of the
-being of not-being, and not-being of the being of not-being and not of the
-not-being of not-being.  And therefore the one which is not has being and
-also not-being.  And the union of being and not-being involves change or
-motion.  But how can not-being, which is nowhere, move or change, either
-from one place to another or in the same place?  And whether it is or is
-not, it would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance.  The
-one which is not, then, is both in motion and at rest, is altered and
-unaltered, and becomes and is destroyed, and does not become and is not
-destroyed.
-
-2.b.  Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in
-regard to one?  The expression 'is not' implies negation of being:--do we
-mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or
-do we mean absolutely to deny being of it?  The latter.  Then the one which
-is not can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of
-substance or place.  Neither can rest, or motion, or greatness, or
-smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or
-other, or attribute or relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or
-knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be asserted of
-that which is not.
-
-2.aa.  Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others?  If we speak
-of them they must be, and their very name implies difference, and
-difference implies relation, not to the one, which is not, but to one
-another.  And they are others of each other not as units but as infinities,
-the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division. 
-And they will have no unity or number, but only a semblance of unity and
-number; and the least of them will appear large and manifold in comparison
-with the infinitesimal fractions into which it may be divided.  Further,
-each particle will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions. 
-For in passing from the greater to the less it must reach an intermediate
-point, which is equality.  Moreover, each particle although having a limit
-in relation to itself and to other particles, yet it has neither beginning,
-middle, nor end; for there is always a beginning before the beginning, and
-a middle within the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the
-infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one.  Thus all being is one
-at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike
-when near; and also the particles which compose being seem to be like and
-unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and
-separation, if one is not.
-
-2.bb.  Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the
-one are, what follows?  In the first place, the others will not be the one,
-nor the many, for in that case the one would be contained in them; neither
-will they appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or
-participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not.  If
-one is not, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or
-unlike, in contact or separation.  In short, if one is not, nothing is.
-
-The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the
-others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and
-appear to be and appear not to be, in all manner of ways.
-
-I. On the first hypothesis we may remark:  first, That one is one is an
-identical proposition, from which we might expect that no further
-consequences could be deduced.  The train of consequences which follows, is
-inferred by altering the predicate into 'not many.'   Yet, perhaps, if a
-strict Eristic had been present, oios aner ei kai nun paren, he might have
-affirmed that the not many presented a different aspect of the conception
-from the one, and was therefore not identical with it.  Such a subtlety
-would be very much in character with the Zenonian dialectic.  Secondly, We
-may note, that the conclusion is really involved in the premises.  For one
-is conceived as one, in a sense which excludes all predicates.  When the
-meaning of one has been reduced to a point, there is no use in saying that
-it has neither parts nor magnitude.  Thirdly, The conception of the same
-is, first of all, identified with the one; and then by a further analysis
-distinguished from, and even opposed to it.  Fourthly, We may detect
-notions, which have reappeared in modern philosophy, e.g. the bare
-abstraction of undefined unity, answering to the Hegelian 'Seyn,' or the
-identity of contradictions 'that which is older is also younger,' etc., or
-the Kantian conception of an a priori synthetical proposition 'one is.'
-
-II.  In the first series of propositions the word 'is' is really the
-copula; in the second, the verb of existence.  As in the first series, the
-negative consequence followed from one being affirmed to be equivalent to
-the not many; so here the affirmative consequence is deduced from one being
-equivalent to the many.
-
-In the former case, nothing could be predicated of the one, but now
-everything--multitude, relation, place, time, transition.  One is regarded
-in all the aspects of one, and with a reference to all the consequences
-which flow, either from the combination or the separation of them.  The
-notion of transition involves the singular extra-temporal conception of
-'suddenness.'  This idea of 'suddenness' is based upon the contradiction
-which is involved in supposing that anything can be in two places at once. 
-It is a mere fiction; and we may observe that similar antinomies have led
-modern philosophers to deny the reality of time and space.  It is not the
-infinitesimal of time, but the negative of time.  By the help of this
-invention the conception of change, which sorely exercised the minds of
-early thinkers, seems to be, but is not really at all explained.  The
-difficulty arises out of the imperfection of language, and should therefore
-be no longer regarded as a difficulty at all.  The only way of meeting it,
-if it exists, is to acknowledge that this rather puzzling double conception
-is necessary to the expression of the phenomena of motion or change, and
-that this and similar double notions, instead of being anomalies, are among
-the higher and more potent instruments of human thought.
-
-The processes by which Parmenides obtains his remarkable results may be
-summed up as follows:  (1) Compound or correlative ideas which involve each
-other, such as, being and not-being, one and many, are conceived sometimes
-in a state of composition, and sometimes of division:  (2) The division or
-distinction is sometimes heightened into total opposition, e.g. between one
-and same, one and other:  or (3) The idea, which has been already divided,
-is regarded, like a number, as capable of further infinite subdivision: 
-(4) The argument often proceeds 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum
-simpliciter' and conversely:  (5) The analogy of opposites is misused by
-him; he argues indiscriminately sometimes from what is like, sometimes from
-what is unlike in them:  (6) The idea of being or not-being is identified
-with existence or non-existence in place or time:  (7) The same ideas are
-regarded sometimes as in process of transition, sometimes as alternatives
-or opposites:  (8) There are no degrees or kinds of sameness, likeness,
-difference, nor any adequate conception of motion or change:  (9) One,
-being, time, like space in Zeno's puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, are
-regarded sometimes as continuous and sometimes as discrete:  (10) In some
-parts of the argument the abstraction is so rarefied as to become not only
-fallacious, but almost unintelligible, e.g. in the contradiction which is
-elicited out of the relative terms older and younger:  (11) The relation
-between two terms is regarded under contradictory aspects, as for example
-when the existence of the one and the non-existence of the one are equally
-assumed to involve the existence of the many:  (12) Words are used through
-long chains of argument, sometimes loosely, sometimes with the precision of
-numbers or of geometrical figures.
-
-The argument is a very curious piece of work, unique in literature.  It
-seems to be an exposition or rather a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the
-Megarian philosophy, but we are too imperfectly acquainted with this last
-to speak with confidence about it.  It would be safer to say that it is an
-indication of the sceptical, hyperlogical fancies which prevailed among the
-contemporaries of Socrates.  It throws an indistinct light upon Aristotle,
-and makes us aware of the debt which the world owes to him or his school. 
-It also bears a resemblance to some modern speculations, in which an
-attempt is made to narrow language in such a manner that number and figure
-may be made a calculus of thought.  It exaggerates one side of logic and
-forgets the rest.  It has the appearance of a mathematical process; the
-inventor of it delights, as mathematicians do, in eliciting or discovering
-an unexpected result.  It also helps to guard us against some fallacies by
-showing the consequences which flow from them.
-
-In the Parmenides we seem to breathe the spirit of the Megarian philosophy,
-though we cannot compare the two in detail.  But Plato also goes beyond his
-Megarian contemporaries; he has split their straws over again, and admitted
-more than they would have desired.  He is indulging the analytical
-tendencies of his age, which can divide but not combine.  And he does not
-stop to inquire whether the distinctions which he makes are shadowy and
-fallacious, but 'whither the argument blows' he follows.
-
-III.  The negative series of propositions contains the first conception of
-the negation of a negation.  Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make
-a plus.  Two negatives destroy each other.  This abstruse notion is the
-foundation of the Hegelian logic.  The mind must not only admit that
-determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation.
-Whether this process is real, or in any way an assistance to thought, or,
-like some other logical forms, a mere figure of speech transferred from the
-sphere of mathematics, may be doubted.  That Plato and the most subtle
-philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same
-notion, is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought.
-
-IV.  The one and the many or others are reduced to their strictest
-arithmetical meaning.  That one is three or three one, is a proposition
-which has, perhaps, given rise to more controversy in the world than any
-other.  But no one has ever meant to say that three and one are to be taken
-in the same sense.  Whereas the one and many of the Parmenides have
-precisely the same meaning; there is no notion of one personality or
-substance having many attributes or qualities.  The truth seems to be
-rather the opposite of that which Socrates implies:  There is no
-contradiction in the concrete, but in the abstract; and the more abstract
-the idea, the more palpable will be the contradiction.  For just as nothing
-can persuade us that the number one is the number three, so neither can we
-be persuaded that any abstract idea is identical with its opposite,
-although they may both inhere together in some external object, or some
-more comprehensive conception.  Ideas, persons, things may be one in one
-sense and many in another, and may have various degrees of unity and
-plurality.  But in whatever sense and in whatever degree they are one they
-cease to be many; and in whatever degree or sense they are many they cease
-to be one.
-
-Two points remain to be considered:  1st, the connexion between the first
-and second parts of the dialogue; 2ndly, the relation of the Parmenides to
-the other dialogues.
-
-I.  In both divisions of the dialogue the principal speaker is the same,
-and the method pursued by him is also the same, being a criticism on
-received opinions:  first, on the doctrine of Ideas; secondly, of Being. 
-From the Platonic Ideas we naturally proceed to the Eleatic One or Being
-which is the foundation of them.  They are the same philosophy in two
-forms, and the simpler form is the truer and deeper.  For the Platonic
-Ideas are mere numerical differences, and the moment we attempt to
-distinguish between them, their transcendental character is lost; ideas of
-justice, temperance, and good, are really distinguishable only with
-reference to their application in the world.  If we once ask how they are
-related to individuals or to the ideas of the divine mind, they are again
-merged in the aboriginal notion of Being.  No one can answer the questions
-which Parmenides asks of Socrates.  And yet these questions are asked with
-the express acknowledgment that the denial of ideas will be the destruction
-of the human mind.  The true answer to the difficulty here thrown out is
-the establishment of a rational psychology; and this is a work which is
-commenced in the Sophist.  Plato, in urging the difficulty of his own
-doctrine of Ideas, is far from denying that some doctrine of Ideas is
-necessary, and for this he is paving the way.
-
-In a similar spirit he criticizes the Eleatic doctrine of Being, not
-intending to deny Ontology, but showing that the old Eleatic notion, and
-the very name 'Being,' is unable to maintain itself against the subtleties
-of the Megarians.  He did not mean to say that Being or Substance had no
-existence, but he is preparing for the development of his later view, that
-ideas were capable of relation.  The fact that contradictory consequences
-follow from the existence or non-existence of one or many, does not prove
-that they have or have not existence, but rather that some different mode
-of conceiving them is required.  Parmenides may still have thought that
-'Being was,' just as Kant would have asserted the existence of 'things in
-themselves,' while denying the transcendental use of the Categories.
-
-Several lesser links also connect the first and second parts of the
-dialogue:  (1) The thesis is the same as that which Zeno has been already
-discussing:  (2) Parmenides has intimated in the first part, that the
-method of Zeno should, as Socrates desired, be extended to Ideas:  (3) The
-difficulty of participating in greatness, smallness, equality is urged
-against the Ideas as well as against the One.
-
-II.  The Parmenides is not only a criticism of the Eleatic notion of Being,
-but also of the methods of reasoning then in existence, and in this point
-of view, as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction to the
-Sophist.  Long ago, in the Euthydemus, the vulgar application of the 'both
-and neither' Eristic had been subjected to a similar criticism, which there
-takes the form of banter and irony, here of illustration.
-
-The attack upon the Ideas is resumed in the Philebus, and is followed by a
-return to a more rational philosophy.  The perplexity of the One and Many
-is there confined to the region of Ideas, and replaced by a theory of
-classification; the Good arranged in classes is also contrasted with the
-barren abstraction of the Megarians.  The war is carried on against the
-Eristics in all the later dialogues, sometimes with a playful irony, at
-other times with a sort of contempt.  But there is no lengthened refutation
-of them.  The Parmenides belongs to that stage of the dialogues of Plato in
-which he is partially under their influence, using them as a sort of
-'critics or diviners' of the truth of his own, and of the Eleatic theories.
-In the Theaetetus a similar negative dialectic is employed in the attempt
-to define science, which after every effort remains undefined still.  The
-same question is revived from the objective side in the Sophist:  Being and
-Not-being are no longer exhibited in opposition, but are now reconciled;
-and the true nature of Not-being is discovered and made the basis of the
-correlation of ideas.  Some links are probably missing which might have
-been supplied if we had trustworthy accounts of Plato's oral teaching.
-
-To sum up:  the Parmenides of Plato is a critique, first, of the Platonic
-Ideas, and secondly, of the Eleatic doctrine of Being.  Neither are
-absolutely denied.  But certain difficulties and consequences are shown in
-the assumption of either, which prove that the Platonic as well as the
-Eleatic doctrine must be remodelled.  The negation and contradiction which
-are involved in the conception of the One and Many are preliminary to their
-final adjustment.  The Platonic Ideas are tested by the interrogative
-method of Socrates; the Eleatic One or Being is tried by the severer and
-perhaps impossible method of hypothetical consequences, negative and
-affirmative.  In the latter we have an example of the Zenonian or Megarian
-dialectic, which proceeded, not 'by assailing premises, but conclusions';
-this is worked out and improved by Plato.  When primary abstractions are
-used in every conceivable sense, any or every conclusion may be deduced
-from them.  The words 'one,' 'other,' 'being,' 'like,' 'same,' 'whole,' and
-their opposites, have slightly different meanings, as they are applied to
-objects of thought or objects of sense--to number, time, place, and to the
-higher ideas of the reason;--and out of their different meanings this
-'feast' of contradictions 'has been provided.'
-
-...
-
-The Parmenides of Plato belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed
-away.  At first we read it with a purely antiquarian or historical
-interest; and with difficulty throw ourselves back into a state of the
-human mind in which Unity and Being occupied the attention of philosophers.
-We admire the precision of the language, in which, as in some curious
-puzzle, each word is exactly fitted into every other, and long trains of
-argument are carried out with a sort of geometrical accuracy.  We doubt
-whether any abstract notion could stand the searching cross-examination of
-Parmenides; and may at last perhaps arrive at the conclusion that Plato has
-been using an imaginary method to work out an unmeaning conclusion.  But
-the truth is, that he is carrying on a process which is not either useless
-or unnecessary in any age of philosophy.  We fail to understand him,
-because we do not realize that the questions which he is discussing could
-have had any value or importance.  We suppose them to be like the
-speculations of some of the Schoolmen, which end in nothing.  But in truth
-he is trying to get rid of the stumblingblocks of thought which beset his
-contemporaries.  Seeing that the Megarians and Cynics were making knowledge
-impossible, he takes their 'catch-words' and analyzes them from every
-conceivable point of view.  He is criticizing the simplest and most general
-of our ideas, in which, as they are the most comprehensive, the danger of
-error is the most serious; for, if they remain unexamined, as in a
-mathematical demonstration, all that flows from them is affected, and the
-error pervades knowledge far and wide.  In the beginning of philosophy this
-correction of human ideas was even more necessary than in our own times,
-because they were more bound up with words; and words when once presented
-to the mind exercised a greater power over thought.  There is a natural
-realism which says, 'Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea
-which is an idea of nothing?'  In modern times mankind have often given too
-great importance to a word or idea.  The philosophy of the ancients was
-still more in slavery to them, because they had not the experience of
-error, which would have placed them above the illusion.
-
-The method of the Parmenides may be compared with the process of purgation,
-which Bacon sought to introduce into philosophy.  Plato is warning us
-against two sorts of 'Idols of the Den':  first, his own Ideas, which he
-himself having created is unable to connect in any way with the external
-world; secondly, against two idols in particular, 'Unity' and 'Being,'
-which had grown up in the pre-Socratic philosophy, and were still standing
-in the way of all progress and development of thought.  He does not say
-with Bacon, 'Let us make truth by experiment,' or 'From these vague and
-inexact notions let us turn to facts.'  The time has not yet arrived for a
-purely inductive philosophy.  The instruments of thought must first be
-forged, that they may be used hereafter by modern inquirers.  How, while
-mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? 
-How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to
-distinguish between a cause and an end?  How could they make any progress
-in the sciences without first arranging them?  These are the deficiencies
-which Plato is seeking to supply in an age when knowledge was a shadow of a
-name only.  In the earlier dialogues the Socratic conception of universals
-is illustrated by his genius; in the Phaedrus the nature of division is
-explained; in the Republic the law of contradiction and the unity of
-knowledge are asserted; in the later dialogues he is constantly engaged
-both with the theory and practice of classification.  These were the 'new
-weapons,' as he terms them in the Philebus, which he was preparing for the
-use of some who, in after ages, would be found ready enough to disown their
-obligations to the great master, or rather, perhaps, would be incapable of
-understanding them.
-
-Numberless fallacies, as we are often truly told, have originated in a
-confusion of the 'copula,' and the 'verb of existence.'  Would not the
-distinction which Plato by the mouth of Parmenides makes between 'One is
-one' and 'One has being' have saved us from this and many similar
-confusions?  We see again that a long period in the history of philosophy
-was a barren tract, not uncultivated, but unfruitful, because there was no
-inquiry into the relation of language and thought, and the metaphysical
-imagination was incapable of supplying the missing link between words and
-things.  The famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never
-have been heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic Ideas into a
-crude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood and
-appreciated.  Upon the term substance at least two celebrated theological
-controversies appear to hinge, which would not have existed, or at least
-not in their present form, if we had 'interrogated' the word substance, as
-Plato has the notions of Unity and Being.  These weeds of philosophy have
-struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always tending to reappear,
-sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words, such as development,
-evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in the place of facts,
-even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact.  In an
-unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense
-(i.e. more a priori assumption) than in any other, because there is more
-complete unconsciousness that we are resting on our own ideas, while we
-please ourselves with the conviction that we are resting on facts.  We do
-not consider how much metaphysics are required to place us above
-metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression
-which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and
-experiment.
-
-In the last century the educated world were astonished to find that the
-whole fabric of their ideas was falling to pieces, because Hume amused
-himself by analyzing the word 'cause' into uniform sequence.  Then arose a
-philosophy which, equally regardless of the history of the mind, sought to
-save mankind from scepticism by assigning to our notions of 'cause and
-effect,' 'substance and accident,' 'whole and part,' a necessary place in
-human thought.  Without them we could have no experience, and therefore
-they were supposed to be prior to experience--to be incrusted on the 'I';
-although in the phraseology of Kant there could be no transcendental use of
-them, or, in other words, they were only applicable within the range of our
-knowledge.  But into the origin of these ideas, which he obtains partly by
-an analysis of the proposition, partly by development of the 'ego,' he
-never inquires--they seem to him to have a necessary existence; nor does he
-attempt to analyse the various senses in which the word 'cause' or
-'substance' may be employed.
-
-The philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning, even to
-himself, if he had first analyzed from every point of view the conception
-of 'matter.'  This poor forgotten word (which was 'a very good word' to
-describe the simplest generalization of external objects) is now superseded
-in the vocabulary of physical philosophers by 'force,' which seems to be
-accepted without any rigid examination of its meaning, as if the general
-idea of 'force' in our minds furnished an explanation of the infinite
-variety of forces which exist in the universe.  A similar ambiguity occurs
-in the use of the favourite word 'law,' which is sometimes regarded as a
-mere abstraction, and then elevated into a real power or entity, almost
-taking the place of God.  Theology, again, is full of undefined terms which
-have distracted the human mind for ages.  Mankind have reasoned from them,
-but not to them; they have drawn out the conclusions without proving the
-premises; they have asserted the premises without examining the terms.  The
-passions of religious parties have been roused to the utmost about words of
-which they could have given no explanation, and which had really no
-distinct meaning.  One sort of them, faith, grace, justification, have been
-the symbols of one class of disputes; as the words substance, nature,
-person, of another, revelation, inspiration, and the like, of a third.  All
-of them have been the subject of endless reasonings and inferences; but a
-spell has hung over the minds of theologians or philosophers which has
-prevented them from examining the words themselves.  Either the effort to
-rise above and beyond their own first ideas was too great for them, or
-there might, perhaps, have seemed to be an irreverence in doing so.  About
-the Divine Being Himself, in whom all true theological ideas live and move,
-men have spoken and reasoned much, and have fancied that they instinctively
-know Him.  But they hardly suspect that under the name of God even
-Christians have included two characters or natures as much opposed as the
-good and evil principle of the Persians.
-
-To have the true use of words we must compare them with things; in using
-them we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our
-meaning.  In like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are
-not using them always in the sense which we supposed.  And Plato, while he
-criticizes the inconsistency of his own doctrine of universals and draws
-out the endless consequences which flow from the assertion either that
-'Being is' or that 'Being is not,' by no means intends to deny the
-existence of universals or the unity under which they are comprehended. 
-There is nothing further from his thoughts than scepticism.  But before
-proceeding he must examine the foundations which he and others have been
-laying; there is nothing true which is not from some point of view untrue,
-nothing absolute which is not also relative (compare Republic).
-
-And so, in modern times, because we are called upon to analyze our ideas
-and to come to a distinct understanding about the meaning of words; because
-we know that the powers of language are very unequal to the subtlety of
-nature or of mind, we do not therefore renounce the use of them; but we
-replace them in their old connexion, having first tested their meaning and
-quality, and having corrected the error which is involved in them; or
-rather always remembering to make allowance for the adulteration or alloy
-which they contain.  We cannot call a new metaphysical world into existence
-any more than we can frame a new universal language; in thought as in
-speech, we are dependent on the past.  We know that the words 'cause' and
-'effect' are very far from representing to us the continuity or the
-complexity of nature or the different modes or degrees in which phenomena
-are connected.  Yet we accept them as the best expression which we have of
-the correlation of forces or objects.  We see that the term 'law' is a mere
-abstraction, under which laws of matter and of mind, the law of nature and
-the law of the land are included, and some of these uses of the word are
-confusing, because they introduce into one sphere of thought associations
-which belong to another; for example, order or sequence is apt to be
-confounded with external compulsion and the internal workings of the mind
-with their material antecedents.  Yet none of them can be dispensed with;
-we can only be on our guard against the error or confusion which arises out
-of them.  Thus in the use of the word 'substance' we are far from supposing
-that there is any mysterious substratum apart from the objects which we
-see, and we acknowledge that the negative notion is very likely to become a
-positive one.  Still we retain the word as a convenient generalization,
-though not without a double sense, substance, and essence, derived from the
-two-fold translation of the Greek ousia.
-
-So the human mind makes the reflection that God is not a person like
-ourselves--is not a cause like the material causes in nature, nor even an
-intelligent cause like a human agent--nor an individual, for He is
-universal; and that every possible conception which we can form of Him is
-limited by the human faculties.  We cannot by any effort of thought or
-exertion of faith be in and out of our own minds at the same instant.  How
-can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time
-and space?  How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is?  How can we
-imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves?  Innumerable
-contradictions follow from either of the two alternatives, that God is or
-that He is not.  Yet we are far from saying that we know nothing of Him,
-because all that we know is subject to the conditions of human thought.  To
-the old belief in Him we return, but with corrections.  He is a person, but
-not like ourselves; a mind, but not a human mind; a cause, but not a
-material cause, nor yet a maker or artificer.  The words which we use are
-imperfect expressions of His true nature; but we do not therefore lose
-faith in what is best and highest in ourselves and in the world.
-
-'A little philosophy takes us away from God; a great deal brings us back to
-Him.'  When we begin to reflect, our first thoughts respecting Him and
-ourselves are apt to be sceptical.  For we can analyze our religious as
-well as our other ideas; we can trace their history; we can criticize their
-perversion; we see that they are relative to the human mind and to one
-another.  But when we have carried our criticism to the furthest point,
-they still remain, a necessity of our moral nature, better known and
-understood by us, and less liable to be shaken, because we are more aware
-of their necessary imperfection.  They come to us with 'better opinion,
-better confirmation,' not merely as the inspirations either of ourselves or
-of another, but deeply rooted in history and in the human mind.
-
-
-PARMENIDES
-
-by
-
-Plato
-
-Translated by Benjamin Jowett
-
-
-PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:  Cephalus, Adeimantus, Glaucon, Antiphon,
-Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, Aristoteles.
-
-Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in
-his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to
-certain Clazomenians.
-
-
-We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and
-Glaucon in the Agora.  Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the
-hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?
-
-Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you.
-
-What may that be? he said.
-
-I want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have
-forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but
-that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was
-Pyrilampes?
-
-Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?
-
-Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of
-philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain
-Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place
-between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having
-often recited it to him.
-
-Quite true.
-
-And could we hear it? I asked.
-
-Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of
-the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his
-grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses.  But, if that is what you
-want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near,
-and he has only just left us to go home.
-
-Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of
-giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted.  When he had done with the smith,
-his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an
-acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to
-repeat the dialogue.  At first he was not very willing, and complained of
-the trouble, but at length he consented.  He told us that Pythodorus had
-described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to
-Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time
-of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. 
-Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of
-his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides.  He said that
-they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither
-Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with
-him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to
-Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit.  These Zeno
-himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly
-finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles
-who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of
-the dialogue.  Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.
-
-When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis
-of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done,
-he said:  What is your meaning, Zeno?  Do you maintain that if being is
-many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for
-neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like--is that your position?
-
-Just so, said Zeno.
-
-And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to
-you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility.  In
-all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of
-the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a
-separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being
-of the many as you have composed arguments?  Is that your meaning, or have
-I misunderstood you?
-
-No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.
-
-I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one
-with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts
-what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling
-us something which is new.  For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and
-of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is
-no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence.  You affirm
-unity, he denies plurality.  And so you deceive the world into believing
-that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the
-same.  This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.
-
-Yes, Socrates, said Zeno.  But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound
-in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the
-composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine;
-for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great
-purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world.  The truth is,
-that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of
-Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many
-ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the
-affirmation of the one.  My answer is addressed to the partisans of the
-many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their
-hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more
-ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one.  Zeal for my master led
-me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy;
-and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the
-motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the
-pugnacity of a young one.  This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in
-other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.
-
-I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account.  But tell me,
-Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself,
-and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that
-in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term
-many, participate--things which participate in likeness become in that
-degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become
-in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they
-participate in both?  And may not all things partake of both opposites, and
-be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the
-wonder?  Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or
-the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a
-wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the
-things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both.  Nor,
-again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at
-the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. 
-But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute
-many one, I should be truly amazed.  And so of all the rest:  I should be
-surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite
-qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and
-also one.  When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have
-a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower
-half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other
-hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here
-assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one.  In both
-instances he proves his case.  So again, if a person shows that such things
-as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he
-shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the
-many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. 
-If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple
-notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and
-then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I
-should be very much astonished.  This part of the argument appears to be
-treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I
-should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which
-are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have
-shown to exist in visible objects.
-
-While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno
-were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but
-still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and
-smiled as if in admiration of him.  When he had finished, Parmenides
-expressed their feelings in the following words:--
-
-Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell
-me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the
-things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of
-likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many,
-and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?
-
-I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.
-
-Parmenides proceeded:  And would you also make absolute ideas of the just
-and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
-
-Yes, he said, I should.
-
-And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human
-creatures, or of fire and water?
-
-I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or
-not.
-
-And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the
-mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or
-anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of
-these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into
-contact, or not?
-
-Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they
-appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming
-any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think
-that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up
-this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a
-bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of
-which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
-
-Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the
-time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer
-grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at
-your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men.  But I
-should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which
-all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that
-similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity;
-and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that
-just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake
-of justice and beauty?
-
-Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.
-
-Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a
-part of the idea?  Can there be any other mode of participation?
-
-There cannot be, he said.
-
-Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in
-each one of the many?
-
-Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
-
-Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in
-many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation
-from itself.
-
-Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many
-places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may
-be one and the same in all at the same time.
-
-I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once.  You mean
-to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men,
-there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?
-
-I think so.
-
-And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it
-only, and different parts different men?
-
-The latter.
-
-Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which
-participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea
-existing in each of them?
-
-That seems to follow.
-
-Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible
-and yet remains one?
-
-Certainly not, he said.
-
-Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great
-things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than
-absolute greatness--is that conceivable?
-
-No.
-
-Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less
-than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that
-portion only?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of
-the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely
-small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be
-smaller and not greater than before.
-
-How absurd!
-
-Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if
-they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
-
-Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
-
-Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
-
-What question?
-
-I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind
-is as follows:--You see a number of great objects, and when you look at
-them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them
-all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
-
-Very true, said Socrates.
-
-And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view
-the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to
-compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the
-source of all these?
-
-It would seem so.
-
-Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute
-greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over
-and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each
-idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.
-
-But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper
-existence except in our minds, Parmenides?  For in that case each idea may
-still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
-
-And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
-
-Impossible, he said.
-
-The thought must be of something?
-
-Yes.
-
-Of something which is or which is not?
-
-Of something which is.
-
-Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as
-attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
-
-Yes.
-
-And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all,
-be an idea?
-
-From that, again, there is no escape.
-
-Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the
-ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and
-that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?
-
-The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one.  In
-my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other
-things are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by the
-participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
-
-But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be
-like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the
-idea?  That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of
-like.
-
-Impossible.
-
-And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
-
-They must.
-
-And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be
-the idea itself?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the
-idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be
-coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas
-will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?
-
-Quite true.
-
-The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by
-resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation
-devised?
-
-It would seem so.
-
-Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the
-ideas to be absolute?
-
-Yes, indeed.
-
-And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of
-the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea,
-parting it off from other things.
-
-What difficulty? he said.
-
-There are many, but the greatest of all is this:--If an opponent argues
-that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain
-unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies
-their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to
-follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and
-still insist that they cannot be known.
-
-What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
-
-In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains
-the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in
-us.
-
-No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
-
-True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to
-one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves,
-and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be
-termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that
-name when we partake of them.  And the things which are within our sphere
-and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one
-another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but
-belong to themselves and not to them.
-
-What do you mean? said Socrates.
-
-I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:--A master has a
-slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is
-simply a relation of one man to another.  But there is also an idea of
-mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the
-abstract.  These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they
-are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves.  Do you see my
-meaning?
-
-Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
-
-And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute
-truth?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute
-being?
-
-Yes.
-
-But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have;
-and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of
-each kind of being which we have?
-
-Certainly.
-
-But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?
-
-No, we cannot.
-
-And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea
-of knowledge?
-
-Yes.
-
-And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
-
-No.
-
-Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in
-absolute knowledge?
-
-I suppose not.
-
-Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and
-all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?
-
-It would seem so.
-
-I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
-
-What is it?
-
-Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such
-a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the
-same of beauty and of the rest?
-
-Yes.
-
-And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one
-is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?
-
-Certainly.
-
-But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human
-things?
-
-Why not?
-
-Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not
-valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them;
-the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.
-
-Yes, that has been admitted.
-
-And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority
-cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our
-authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything
-which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our
-masters, neither do they know the things of men.
-
-Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.
-
-These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the
-difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine
-each one of them to be an absolute unity.  He who hears what may be said
-against them will deny the very existence of them--and even if they do
-exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he
-will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now,
-will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very
-considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an
-absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all
-these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able
-to teach them to others.
-
-I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much
-to my mind.
-
-And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these
-and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not
-admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is
-always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest;
-and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to
-have particularly noted.
-
-Very true, he said.
-
-But, then, what is to become of philosophy?  Whither shall we turn, if the
-ideas are unknown?
-
-I certainly do not see my way at present.
-
-Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your
-attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas
-generally, without sufficient previous training.  I noticed your
-deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the
-day before yesterday.  The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is
-assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the
-vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you
-must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will
-elude your grasp.
-
-And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would
-recommend?
-
-That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit
-for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in
-reference to visible things, or to consider the question that way; but only
-in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.
-
-Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by
-this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience
-anything.
-
-Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further,
-and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis,
-but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that
-will be still better training for you.
-
-What do you mean? he said.
-
-I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's
-about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences
-to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in
-relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the
-many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in
-their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. 
-Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in
-either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other
-things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of
-unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and
-destruction, and even of being and not-being.  In a word, when you suppose
-anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at
-the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things
-which you choose,--to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all;
-and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and
-to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would
-train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.
-
-That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not
-quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the
-steps?--then I shall apprehend you better.
-
-That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.
-
-Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.
-
-Zeno answered with a smile:--Let us make our petition to Parmenides
-himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the
-extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of
-us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one,
-especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most
-people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is
-the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom.  And therefore,
-Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process
-again which I have not heard for a long time.
-
-When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of
-him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated
-Parmenides to give an example of the process.  I cannot refuse, said
-Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age,
-against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse,
-who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he
-knew so well--this was his simile of himself.  And I also experience a
-trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at
-my time of life.  But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we
-are alone.  Where shall I begin?  And what shall be our first hypothesis,
-if I am to attempt this laborious pastime?  Shall I begin with myself, and
-take my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which follow
-on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one?
-
-By all means, said Zeno.
-
-And who will answer me? he said.  Shall I propose the youngest?  He will
-not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks;
-and his answers will give me time to breathe.
-
-I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the
-youngest and at your service.  Ask, and I will answer.
-
-Parmenides proceeded: 1.a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?
-
-Why not?
-
-Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
-
-Yes.
-
-And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a
-whole, and also as having parts?
-
-To be sure.
-
-And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
-
-True.
-
-But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
-
-It ought.
-
-Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not
-have parts?
-
-No.
-
-But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end;
-for these would of course be parts of it.
-
-Right.
-
-But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
-
-Yes, unlimited.
-
-And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.
-
-But why?
-
-Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are
-equidistant from the centre?
-
-Yes.
-
-And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the
-extremes?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a
-straight or of a circular form?
-
-Assuredly.
-
-But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
-
-Right.
-
-And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be
-either in another or in itself.
-
-How so?
-
-Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it
-was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which
-is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot
-be touched all round in many places.
-
-Certainly not.
-
-But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained
-by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself;
-for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.
-
-Impossible.
-
-But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained?
-for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will
-be no longer one, but two?
-
-True.
-
-Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
-
-No.
-
-Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either
-rest or motion.
-
-Why not?
-
-Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or
-changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.
-
-Yes.
-
-And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer
-one.
-
-It cannot.
-
-It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
-nature?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then can the motion of the one be in place?
-
-Perhaps.
-
-But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in
-the same place, or from one place to another?
-
-It must.
-
-And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which
-goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the
-centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be
-carried round upon a centre?
-
-Impossible.
-
-But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
-
-Perhaps so, if it moves at all.
-
-And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?
-
-I do not see why.
-
-Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as
-yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether
-out of it, if already coming into being in it.
-
-Certainly not.
-
-And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and
-then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which
-has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within
-nor wholly without anything.
-
-True.
-
-And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts,
-and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into
-being either as a part or as a whole?
-
-Clearly.
-
-Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by going
-somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in
-itself?
-
-Very true.
-
-Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
-
-Immoveable.
-
-But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?
-
-Yes, we said so.
-
-Then it is never in the same?
-
-Why not?
-
-Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?
-
-True.
-
-Then one is never in the same place?
-
-It would seem not.
-
-But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
-
-Never.
-
-One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?
-
-It certainly appears so.
-
-Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than
-itself or other.
-
-How is that?
-
-If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.
-
-True.
-
-And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that
-upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would
-be other than one?
-
-It would.
-
-Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
-
-It will not.
-
-Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but
-only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.
-
-True.
-
-Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by
-virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not
-be other than anything?
-
-Right.
-
-Neither will one be the same with itself.
-
-How not?
-
-Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.
-
-Why not?
-
-It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.
-
-What of that?
-
-Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and
-not one.
-
-True.
-
-But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing
-became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the
-same?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself,
-and will therefore be one and also not one.
-
-Surely that is impossible.
-
-And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with
-itself.
-
-Impossible.
-
-And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to
-itself or other?
-
-No.
-
-Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.
-
-Why not?
-
-Because likeness is sameness of affections.
-
-Yes.
-
-And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
-
-That has been shown.
-
-But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be
-affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible.
-
-True.
-
-Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another
-or with itself?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?
-
-No.
-
-Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in
-such a way as to be more than one.
-
-It would.
-
-That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike
-itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.
-
-True.
-
-But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike
-itself or other?
-
-Never.
-
-Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
-
-Plainly not.
-
-Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to
-itself or to other.
-
-How is that?
-
-Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which
-it is equal.
-
-True.
-
-And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one
-will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which
-is greater?
-
-Yes.
-
-And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have
-greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is
-greater.
-
-Certainly.
-
-But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same
-measures or have anything else the same?
-
-Impossible.
-
-And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with
-itself or with another?
-
-It appears so.
-
-But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many
-parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but
-will have as many parts as measures.
-
-Right.
-
-And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it
-has been shown to be incapable of equality.
-
-It has.
-
-Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor
-of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or
-less than itself, or other?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or
-of the same age with it?
-
-Why not?
-
-Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must
-partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not
-partake either of equality or of likeness?
-
-We did say so.
-
-And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.
-
-Very true.
-
-How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than
-anything, or have the same age with it?
-
-In no way.
-
-Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself
-or with another?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not
-that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And that which is older, must always be older than something which is
-younger?
-
-True.
-
-Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time
-younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.
-
-What do you mean?
-
-I mean this:--A thing does not need to become different from another thing
-which is already different; it IS different, and if its different has
-become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be
-different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been,
-or be about to be, or yet be, a different--the only different possible is
-one which is becoming.
-
-That is inevitable.
-
-But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to
-nothing else.
-
-True.
-
-Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time,
-become younger than itself?
-
-Yes.
-
-But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter
-time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about
-to be, for the same time with itself?
-
-That again is inevitable.
-
-Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I
-suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once
-older and younger than themselves?
-
-Yes.
-
-But the one did not partake of those affections?
-
-Not at all.
-
-Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
-
-So the argument shows.
-
-Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was
-becoming,' signify a participation of past time?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,' signify a
-participation of future time?
-
-Yes.
-
-And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present time?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had
-become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is
-becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be,
-hereafter.
-
-Most true.
-
-But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
-
-There are none.
-
-Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?
-
-That is the inference.
-
-Then the one is not at all?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were and
-partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be
-trusted, the one neither is nor is one?
-
-True.
-
-But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
-
-Of course not.
-
-Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor
-knowledge of it?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does
-anything that is perceive it.
-
-So we must infer.
-
-But can all this be true about the one?
-
-I think not.
-
-1.b.  Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis;
-let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question
-appears.
-
-I shall be very happy to do so.
-
-We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever
-they may be, which follow, if the one is?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not
-partake of being?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the
-one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the
-one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have
-been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is
-not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:--am I not right?
-
-Quite right.
-
-We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
-
-Of course.
-
-And when we put them together shortly, and say 'One is,' that is equivalent
-to saying, 'partakes of being'?
-
-Quite true.
-
-Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow.  Does not this
-hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?
-
-How so?
-
-In this way:--If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of
-being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since
-the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one,
-itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And is each of these parts--one and being--to be simply called a part, or
-must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?
-
-The latter.
-
-Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Again, of the parts of the one, if it is--I mean being and one--does either
-fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the
-least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and
-every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves
-one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
-
-Clearly.
-
-Let us take another direction.
-
-What direction?
-
-We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
-
-Yes.
-
-And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
-
-True.
-
-But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and
-try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes--will
-this abstract one be one only or many?
-
-One, I think.
-
-Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is
-not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
-
-Certainly.
-
-If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is
-one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is
-other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness
-and difference.
-
-Certainly.
-
-So that the other is not the same--either with the one or with being?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or
-the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be
-rightly called both.
-
-How so.
-
-In this way--you may speak of being?
-
-Yes.
-
-And also of one?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then now we have spoken of either of them?
-
-Yes.
-
-Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any
-such case do I not speak of both?
-
-Yes.
-
-And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
-
-Undoubtedly.
-
-And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
-
-It cannot.
-
-Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be
-severally one?
-
-Clearly.
-
-And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair,
-the whole becomes three?
-
-Yes.
-
-And three are odd, and two are even?
-
-Of course.
-
-And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there
-must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?
-
-Certainly.
-
-There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there
-are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?
-
-Of course.
-
-If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are
-two and thrice, there is thrice two?
-
-Undoubtedly.
-
-Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and
-even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.
-
-True.
-
-And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?
-
-None whatever.
-
-Then if one is, number must also be?
-
-It must.
-
-But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity
-of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of
-being:  am I not right?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also
-participate?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing
-that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it?  And, indeed, the
-very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of
-being?
-
-In no way.
-
-And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being
-of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it
-have no limit.
-
-True.
-
-Then it has the greatest number of parts?
-
-Yes, the greatest number.
-
-Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
-
-Impossible.
-
-But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be
-none?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in
-any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
-
-True.
-
-But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?
-
-No; I see the impossibility of that.
-
-And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present
-with all the parts of being, unless divided.
-
-True.
-
-And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the
-greatest number of parts.  For it is not distributed into parts more than
-the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or
-being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive.
-
-Certainly that is true.
-
-The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many
-and infinite?
-
-True.
-
-Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself
-distributed by being, must also be many?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole,
-will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And that which contains, is a limit?
-
-Of course.
-
-Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having
-limits and yet unlimited in number?
-
-Clearly.
-
-And because having limits, also having extremes?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end.  For can anything be a
-whole without these three?  And if any one of them is wanting to anything,
-will that any longer be a whole?
-
-No.
-
-Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
-
-It will.
-
-But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would
-not be in the middle?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a
-union of the two?
-
-True.
-
-And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.
-
-How?
-
-Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.
-
-True.
-
-And all the parts are contained by the whole?
-
-Yes.
-
-And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
-
-No.
-
-And the one is the whole?
-
-Of course.
-
-But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the
-whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained
-by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.
-
-That is true.
-
-But then, again, the whole is not in the parts--neither in all the parts,
-nor in some one of them.  For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if
-there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts;
-for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not
-in this, how can it be in them all?
-
-It cannot.
-
-Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of
-the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
-
-Yes, impossible.
-
-But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the
-parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
-
-Certainly.
-
-If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being
-in itself, it must be in another.
-
-Very true.
-
-The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all
-its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and
-also in another.
-
-Certainly.
-
-The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in
-motion?
-
-How?
-
-The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing
-out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
-
-True.
-
-And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be
-in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest,
-in motion?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both
-at rest and in motion?
-
-Clearly.
-
-And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same
-with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous
-affections.
-
-How so?
-
-Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other;
-or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a
-whole, or of a whole to a part.
-
-Clearly.
-
-And is the one a part of itself?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself
-as whole to part?
-
-It cannot.
-
-But is the one other than one?
-
-No.
-
-And therefore not other than itself?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself,
-must it not be the same with itself?
-
-Certainly.
-
-But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if this
-'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than
-'itself,' for it will be in another place?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
-
-Yes.
-
-Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
-
-True.
-
-Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than
-that which is other?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the
-one other than the not-one?
-
-Of course.
-
-Then the one will be other than the others?
-
-True.
-
-But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other,
-opposites to one another?
-
-Of course.
-
-Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
-
-They will not.
-
-If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other
-is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small,
-the other would be in the same.  Is not that true?
-
-Yes.
-
-And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that
-is.
-
-True.
-
-Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the
-not-one other than the one.
-
-No.
-
-Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not
-partaking of the other.
-
-How can they be?
-
-But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other,
-will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
-
-They will.
-
-Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have
-been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
-
-True.
-
-Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been
-not-one at all.
-
-It would not.
-
-Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case
-partake of the one?
-
-It would.
-
-If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then
-neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or
-whole of the one?
-
-No.
-
-But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another,
-nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is
-the same with it?
-
-Let us say so.
-
-Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself
-and the others.
-
-That appears to be the inference.
-
-And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
-
-Perhaps.
-
-Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also
-be other than the one.
-
-Yes.
-
-And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are
-other than it, and neither more nor less?
-
-True.
-
-And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
-
-Yes.
-
-In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others
-in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and
-the others like the one.
-
-How do you mean?
-
-I may take as an illustration the case of names:  You give a name to a
-thing?
-
-Yes.
-
-And you may say the name once or oftener?
-
-Yes.
-
-And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and
-when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it
-always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name
-once or more than once?
-
-Of course it is the same.
-
-And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or oftener, you name
-that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
-
-True.
-
-Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other
-than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to
-which the name is applied, and of no other?
-
-Quite true.
-
-Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than
-the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in the same
-condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others,
-every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every
-thing.
-
-True.
-
-Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
-
-Yes.
-
-And the other to the same?
-
-True again.
-
-And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
-
-Yes.
-
-And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the
-others?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
-
-Yes.
-
-But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite
-affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of
-otherness.
-
-Yes.
-
-The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of
-the other.
-
-True.
-
-Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it
-is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
-
-Yes, that argument may be used.
-
-And there is another argument.
-
-What?
-
-In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise,
-and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is
-like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being
-otherwise affected is unlike.
-
-True.
-
-Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others,
-on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like
-and unlike the others?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on
-either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike
-itself?
-
-Of course.
-
-Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?--consider.
-
-I am considering.
-
-The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
-
-True.
-
-And also in other things?
-
-Yes.
-
-In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so
-far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would
-touch itself only.
-
-Clearly.
-
-Then the inference is that it would touch both?
-
-It would.
-
-But what do you say to a new point of view?  Must not that which is to
-touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place
-nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to
-itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?
-
-It ought.
-
-And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at
-once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
-
-No.
-
-Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
-
-It cannot.
-
-Neither can it touch others.
-
-Why not?
-
-The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation
-from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be
-between them.
-
-True.
-
-Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?
-
-They are.
-
-And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will
-be three, and the contacts two?
-
-Yes.
-
-And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows
-that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two
-terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms
-exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for every
-one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added
-to the contacts.
-
-True.
-
-Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one
-less.
-
-True.
-
-But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
-
-How can there be?
-
-And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and
-have no part in the one?
-
-True.
-
-Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
-
-Of course not.
-
-Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of
-any number?
-
-No.
-
-One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-And if there are not two, there is no contact?
-
-There is not.
-
-Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if
-there is no contact?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the
-others?
-
-True.
-
-Further--is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
-
-How do you mean?
-
-If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or
-less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in
-virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their
-being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another,
-or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had
-greatness and the others smallness--whichever kind had greatness would be
-greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were
-not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which
-is.
-
-How could they?
-
-If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the
-whole or in a part of the whole?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the
-whole one, or will contain the one?
-
-Clearly.
-
-If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or if
-containing the one it will be greater than the one?
-
-Of course.
-
-But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have
-the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part
-only?
-
-Yes.
-
-And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will
-recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part;
-nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.
-
-True.
-
-Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there
-will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that
-in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there,
-which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible,
-seeing that smallness is wholly absent.
-
-True.
-
-But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and
-smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.
-
-Very true.
-
-Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither
-greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of
-exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to
-one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it
-has neither greatness nor smallness.
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot
-either exceed or be exceeded by them?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and
-being on an equality, must be equal.
-
-Of course.
-
-And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having
-neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be
-exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?
-
-Clearly so.
-
-And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without
-itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as
-contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than
-itself.
-
-It will.
-
-Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and
-the others?
-
-Of course not.
-
-But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
-
-Yes.
-
-But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be
-greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.
-
-True.
-
-And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and
-they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the
-others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?
-
-That is clear.
-
-But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than
-the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others,
-because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one,
-the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the
-others less than the one.
-
-True.
-
-The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the
-others?
-
-Clearly.
-
-And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and
-less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures,
-also of parts?
-
-Of course.
-
-And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in
-number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in
-number to itself and to the others?
-
-How is that?
-
-It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as
-many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that
-than which it is less.
-
-True.
-
-And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of
-equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and
-if of measures then also of parts?
-
-It will.
-
-And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to
-itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is
-greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it
-is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size
-to other things, it will be equal to them in number.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to
-and more and less than both itself and all other things.
-
-It will.
-
-Does the one also partake of time?  And is it and does it become older and
-younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than
-itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?
-
-How do you mean?
-
-If one is, being must be predicated of it?
-
-Yes.
-
-But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to
-have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to
-be is the participation of being at a future time?
-
-Very true.
-
-Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And is not time always moving forward?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward
-in time?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes
-younger?
-
-I remember.
-
-Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the
-same time?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
-
-Yes.
-
-And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time
-between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now':  for surely in going from the
-past to the future, it cannot skip the present?
-
-No.
-
-And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no
-longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached
-by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both
-the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future,
-while in process of becoming between them.
-
-True.
-
-But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the
-present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be
-becoming.
-
-Clearly.
-
-And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to
-become, and is then older.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was
-becoming older than itself.
-
-Yes.
-
-And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the
-present?
-
-Certainly.
-
-But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for
-whenever it is it is always now.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?
-
-Truly.
-
-And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with
-itself?
-
-An equal time.
-
-But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same
-age with itself?
-
-Of course.
-
-And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?
-
-No.
-
-The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor
-becomes older or younger than itself?
-
-I should say not.
-
-And what are its relations to other things?  Is it or does it become older
-or younger than they?
-
-I cannot tell you.
-
-You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one--
-other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than
-one?
-
-They will have multitude.
-
-And a multitude implies a number larger than one?
-
-Of course.
-
-And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to
-have come into existence?
-
-The lesser.
-
-Then the least is the first?  And that is the one?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into
-being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not
-singular.
-
-They have.
-
-And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into
-being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came
-into being later, are younger than that which preceded them?  And so the
-other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other
-things?
-
-True.
-
-What would you say of another question?  Can the one have come into being
-contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?
-
-Impossible.
-
-And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a
-beginning, middle and end?
-
-Yes.
-
-And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into
-being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you
-reach the end?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the
-one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?
-
-Yes; that is what we shall say.
-
-But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into
-being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in
-accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come
-into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.
-
-Clearly.
-
-Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.
-
-That also is clear in my judgment.
-
-Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything,
-if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And will not the one come into being together with each part--together with
-the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second
-part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is
-added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole;
-it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the
-last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one
-itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor
-posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument
-the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others
-than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older
-and younger than the others and the others than the one.
-
-Certainly.
-
-After this manner then the one is and has become.  But as to its becoming
-older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither
-older nor younger, what shall we say?  Shall we say as of being so also of
-becoming, or otherwise?
-
-I cannot answer.
-
-But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than
-another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it
-was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or
-to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.
-
-Of course.
-
-Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is,
-since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become
-older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.
-
-True.
-
-And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than
-the others which are.
-
-No.
-
-But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.
-
-In what way?
-
-Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than
-the one.
-
-And what of that?
-
-If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than
-the others.
-
-Yes.
-
-But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will
-the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion
-than before?
-
-By a smaller portion.
-
-Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others
-will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added
-to both of them they will differ less and less in age?
-
-Yes.
-
-And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from
-being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was
-older?
-
-Yes, younger.
-
-And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than
-they were before, in relation to the one.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which
-previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is
-always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the
-other on the side of age.  And in like manner the older is always in
-process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going
-in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the
-younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger.  They
-cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be
-and not merely become.  But that is impossible; for they are always
-becoming both older and younger than one another:  the one becomes younger
-than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others
-become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the
-same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were
-seen to be older, and prior to the one.
-
-That is clear.
-
-Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in
-that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot
-become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but
-inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into
-being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion
---in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the
-one, and the one than the others.
-
-Certainly.
-
-For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than
-itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than
-itself or the others.
-
-Certainly.
-
-But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and
-younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?
-
-Of course it must.
-
-Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and
-will become?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and
-belongs to it?
-
-True.
-
-And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of
-the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
-
-Quite right.
-
-Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed,
-and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to
-the one.
-
-Certainly, that is true.
-
-Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider:  If the one is both
-one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and
-participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake
-of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?
-
-Certainly.
-
-But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of
-being when partaking of being?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for
-that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.
-
-True.
-
-And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes
-being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives
-and also gives it up at some time?
-
-Impossible.
-
-And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?
-
-I should.
-
-And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
-
-I should.
-
-The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and
-giving up being.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when
-it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience
-separation and aggregation?
-
-Inevitably.
-
-And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and
-dissimilated?
-
-Yes.
-
-And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be
-equalized?
-
-True.
-
-And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to
-motion, it can surely be in no time at all?
-
-How can it?
-
-But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in
-motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without
-experiencing change, is impossible.
-
-Impossible.
-
-And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither
-in motion nor at rest?
-
-There cannot.
-
-But neither can it change without changing.
-
-True.
-
-When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when
-in motion, or when in time?
-
-It cannot.
-
-And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really
-exist?
-
-What thing?
-
-The moment.  For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change
-takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state
-of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this
-curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not
-being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes
-into rest, and what is at rest into motion.
-
-So it appears.
-
-And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to
-either, for only in this way can it be in both.  And in changing it changes
-in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not
-then be either in motion or at rest.
-
-It will not.
-
-And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it
-passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming
---then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is
-nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.
-
-Very true.
-
-And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to
-one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and
-in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither
-like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation;
-and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be
-neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or
-diminution, or equalization.
-
-True.
-
-All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.
-
-Of course.
-
-1.aa.  But if one is, what will happen to the others--is not that also to
-be considered?
-
-Yes.
-
-Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than
-the one.
-
-Let us do so.
-
-Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the
-one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.
-
-Very true.
-
-Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they
-participate in the one.
-
-In what way?
-
-Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for
-if they had no parts they would be simply one.
-
-Right.
-
-And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?
-
-So we say.
-
-And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be
-parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a
-whole.
-
-How do you mean?
-
-If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely
-be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one
-of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a
-part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each
-one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of any one of the
-many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else
-of all those things of none of which it is anything.
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain
-single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of
-all--of this the part will be a part.
-
-Certainly.
-
-If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in
-the one.
-
-True.
-
-Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in
-the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it
-is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.
-
-True.
-
-But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be
-other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but
-would have been one; whereas only the itself can be one.
-
-Very true.
-
-Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will
-be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one
-part of the whole which is the whole of the part.
-
-True.
-
-And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?
-
-Of course.
-
-And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things
-which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would
-be nothing.
-
-True.
-
-But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in
-the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which
-participate in the one be infinite in number?
-
-How so?
-
-Let us look at the matter thus:--Is it not a fact that in partaking of the
-one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when
-they are partaking of it?
-
-Clearly.
-
-They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
-
-Very true.
-
-And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction,
-must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a
-multitude and not one?
-
-It must.
-
-And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded
-simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited
-in number?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit
-in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to
-the parts.
-
-Just so.
-
-The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and
-the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them
-limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they
-have no limit.
-
-That is clear.
-
-Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and
-also partake of limit.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.
-
-How is that?
-
-Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected
-in the same way.
-
-True.
-
-And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the
-same way.
-
-Of course.
-
-But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are
-affected in opposite ways.
-
-Yes.
-
-And opposites are the most unlike of things.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be
-like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them
-together, most opposed and most unlike.
-
-That appears to be true.
-
-Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
-
-True.
-
-And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion
-and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be
-proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have
-experienced the affections aforesaid?
-
-True.
-
-1.bb.  Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters
-as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether
-opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.
-
-By all means.
-
-Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of
-the others?
-
-Let us ask that question.
-
-Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?
-
-Why so?
-
-Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both
-of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.
-
-Yes, all things.
-
-Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which
-both the one and the others might exist?
-
-There is nothing.
-
-Then the one and the others are never in the same?
-
-True.
-
-Then they are separated from each other?
-
-Yes.
-
-And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be
-separated from the others, and has no parts?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do
-not partake either in whole or in part?
-
-It would seem not.
-
-Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any
-unity?
-
-There is not.
-
-Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be
-a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the
-one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.
-
-True.
-
-Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived
-of the one?
-
-True.
-
-Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and
-unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them
-likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to
-one another.
-
-That is clear.
-
-But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by
-us to be impossible?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like
-or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be
-one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which
-would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.
-
-True.
-
-Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest,
-nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less,
-nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if
-they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate
-in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been
-proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in
-every way devoid of the one.
-
-Very true.
-
-Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in
-relation to itself and to other things.
-
-Certainly.
-
-2.a.  Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence
-if the one is not?
-
-Yes; we ought.
-
-What is the meaning of the hypothesis--If the one is not; is there any
-difference between this and the hypothesis--If the not one is not?
-
-There is a difference, certainly.
-
-Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions--if the
-one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?
-
-They are entirely opposed.
-
-And suppose a person to say:--If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or
-anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an
-expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things?
-
-To be sure.
-
-And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is
-other than all others; we know what he means--do we not?
-
-Yes, we do.
-
-When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly
-something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference
-whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not
-to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from
-other things.
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then I will begin again, and ask:  If one is not, what are the
-consequences?  In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of
-it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known.
-
-True.
-
-Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as
-different from the others?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of
-the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in
-the others, but in the one.
-
-Clearly so.
-
-Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to
-'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an attribute of
-'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken
-of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or
-been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not
-partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned.
-
-True.
-
-Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one
-that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and
-nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not
-is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different
-nature, we can predicate nothing of it.  But supposing that the one that is
-not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate
-'that,' and in many others.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being
-different from the one will be of a different kind.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?
-
-Of course.
-
-And are not things other in kind unlike?
-
-They are unlike.
-
-And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be
-unlike them?
-
-Clearly so.
-
-Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike
-it?
-
-That would seem to be true.
-
-And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have
-likeness to itself.
-
-How so?
-
-If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will
-the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than
-one?
-
-Quite so.
-
-But that cannot be.
-
-No.
-
-Then the one must have likeness to itself?
-
-It must.
-
-Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would
-at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no
-being, then it can neither be nor be like?
-
-It cannot.
-
-But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to
-it?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-And things that are not equal are unequal?
-
-True.
-
-And they are unequal to an unequal?
-
-Of course.
-
-Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are
-unequal to it?
-
-Very true.
-
-And inequality implies greatness and smallness?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?
-
-That appears to be true.
-
-And greatness and smallness always stand apart?
-
-True.
-
-Then there is always something between them?
-
-There is.
-
-And can you think of anything else which is between them other than
-equality?
-
-No, it is equality which lies between them.
-
-Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies
-between them?
-
-That is clear.
-
-Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and
-smallness and equality?
-
-Clearly.
-
-Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?
-
-How so?
-
-It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying
-that the one is not.  But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what
-is.  Am I not right?
-
-Yes.
-
-And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say
-what is?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to
-be when it is not, but (Or, 'to remit something of existence in relation to
-not-being.') were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-
-being, it would at once be.
-
-Quite true.
-
-Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being
-of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond
-the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the
-truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is
-when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-
-being--that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not
-partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being--that
-is the perfection of not-being.
-
-Most true.
-
-Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must
-not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
-
-Clearly.
-
-And has not-being also, if it is not?
-
-Of course.
-
-But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without
-changing?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And change is motion--we may say that?
-
-Yes, motion.
-
-And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
-
-Yes.
-
-And therefore is and is not in the same state?
-
-Yes.
-
-Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it
-changes from being to not-being?
-
-That appears to be true.
-
-But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not,
-it cannot change from one place to another?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Then it cannot move by changing place?
-
-No.
-
-Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the
-same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?
-
-It cannot.
-
-Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?
-
-No.
-
-Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than
-itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could
-not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?
-
-True.
-
-But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same
-place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest
-must stand still?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?
-
-That seems to be true.
-
-But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything
-which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state,
-but in another?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then the one, being moved, is altered?
-
-Yes.
-
-And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?
-
-No.
-
-Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so
-far as it is not moved, it is not altered?
-
-Right.
-
-Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?
-
-That is clear.
-
-And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and
-lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can
-neither come into being nor be destroyed?
-
-Very true.
-
-And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not
-being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not
-becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?
-
-True.
-
-2.b.  And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether
-these or some other consequences will follow.
-
-Let us do as you say.
-
-If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one?  That is the
-question.
-
-Yes.
-
-Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we
-apply them?
-
-Just so.
-
-And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way
-but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no
-sort or way or kind participation of being?
-
-Quite absolutely.
-
-Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?
-
-It cannot.
-
-And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of
-being and the loss of being?
-
-Nothing else.
-
-And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose
-being?
-
-Impossible.
-
-The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in
-any way?
-
-True.
-
-Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither
-perishes nor becomes?
-
-No.
-
-Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be
-destroyed?
-
-True.
-
-But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must
-always be in one and the same spot?
-
-Of course.
-
-Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never
-moves?
-
-Neither.
-
-Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there
-had been, it would partake of being?
-
-That is clear.
-
-And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be
-attributed to it?
-
-No.
-
-Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
-
-Clearly not.
-
-Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be
-attributed to it?
-
-Certainly not.
-
-And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or
-different in relation to it?
-
-They cannot.
-
-Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the
-attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future.  Nor
-can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any
-other thing that is, have any concern with it?
-
-No.
-
-Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?
-
-Such appears to be the conclusion.
-
-2.aa.  Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others?  Let us
-determine that.
-
-Yes; let us determine that.
-
-The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could
-not be now speaking of them.
-
-True.
-
-But to speak of the others implies difference--the terms 'other' and
-'different' are synonymous?
-
-True.
-
-Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
-
-Yes.
-
-Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be
-other?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And what can that be?--for if the one is not, they will not be other than
-the one.
-
-They will not.
-
-Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative
-is that they are other than nothing.
-
-True.
-
-And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular;
-for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is
-infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the
-smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many,
-as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in
-comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?
-
-Very true.
-
-And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others
-are, and the one is not?
-
-Exactly.
-
-And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not
-being one, if one is not?
-
-True.
-
-And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them
-appears to be one, though it is really many?
-
-It can.
-
-And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no
-reality, if one is not?
-
-Yes.
-
-And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem
-large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are
-contained in it?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for
-it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without
-having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the
-appearance of equality.
-
-Yes.
-
-And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet
-appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.
-
-How so?
-
-Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the
-beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining
-after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because
-no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.
-
-Very true.
-
-And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions,
-for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?
-
-Certainly.
-
-And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one;
-but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to
-be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?
-
-Nothing more certain.
-
-Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and
-many, if others than the one exist and not the one.
-
-They must.
-
-Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
-
-In what way?
-
-Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a
-distance, and to be in the same state and alike?
-
-True.
-
-But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and
-because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and
-unlike, themselves?
-
-True.
-
-And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each
-other.
-
-Certainly.
-
-And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in
-contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort
-of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in
-neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if
-the one is not and the many are?
-
-Most true.
-
-2.bb.  Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is
-not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.
-
-Let us ask that question.
-
-In the first place, the others will not be one?
-
-Impossible.
-
-Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in
-them.  But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore
-they will not be many.
-
-True.
-
-If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.
-
-They are not.
-
-Nor do they appear either as one or many.
-
-Why not?
-
-Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort
-of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the
-others; for that which is not has no parts.
-
-True.
-
-Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connexion with
-the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.
-
-No.
-
-Then if one is not, there is no conception of any of the others either as
-one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.
-
-You cannot.
-
-Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be
-either one or many?
-
-It would seem not.
-
-Nor as like or unlike?
-
-No.
-
-Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of
-those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;--the others neither
-are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?
-
-True.
-
-Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly:  If one is
-not, then nothing is?
-
-Certainly.
-
-Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the
-truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to
-themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and
-appear to be and appear not to be.
-
-Most true.
-
-
-
-
-
-End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato
-