diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/prmds10.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/prmds10.txt | 5102 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 5102 deletions
diff --git a/old/prmds10.txt b/old/prmds10.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 08985d0..0000000 --- a/old/prmds10.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5102 +0,0 @@ -********Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato******** -#24 in our series by Plato. - -Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check -the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! - -Please take a look at the important information in this header. -We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an -electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. - - -**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** - -**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** - -*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* - -Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and -further information is included below. We need your donations. - - -Parmenides - -by Plato - -March, 1999 [Etext #1687] - - -********Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato******** -******This file should be named prmds10.txt or prmds10.zip***** - -Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, prmds11.txt -VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, prmds10a.txt - - -This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> - -Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions, -all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a -copyright notice is included. Therefore, we do NOT keep these books -in compliance with any particular paper edition, usually otherwise. - - -We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance -of the official release dates, for time for better editing. - -Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till -midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. -The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at -Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A -preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment -and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an -up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes -in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has -a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a -look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a -new copy has at least one byte more or less. - - -Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) - -We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The -fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take -to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright -searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This -projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value -per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2 -million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-six text -files per month, or 432 more Etexts in 1999 for a total of 2000+ -If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the -total should reach over 200 billion Etexts given away this year. - -The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext -Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] -This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, -which is only ~5% of the present number of computer users. - -At our revised rates of production, we will reach only one-third -of that goal by the end of 2001, or about 3,333 Etexts unless we -manage to get some real funding; currently our funding is mostly -from Michael Hart's salary at Carnegie-Mellon University, and an -assortment of sporadic gifts; this salary is only good for a few -more years, so we are looking for something to replace it, as we -don't want Project Gutenberg to be so dependent on one person. - -We need your donations more than ever! - - -All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are -tax deductible to the extent allowable by law. (CMU = Carnegie- -Mellon University). - -For these and other matters, please mail to: - -Project Gutenberg -P. O. Box 2782 -Champaign, IL 61825 - -When all other email fails try our Executive Director: -Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com> - -We would prefer to send you this information by email. - -****** - -To access Project Gutenberg etexts, use any Web browser -to view http://promo.net/pg. This site lists Etexts by -author and by title, and includes information about how -to get involved with Project Gutenberg. You could also -download our past Newsletters, or subscribe here. This -is one of our major sites, please email hart@pobox.com, -for a more complete list of our various sites. - -To go directly to the etext collections, use FTP or any -Web browser to visit a Project Gutenberg mirror (mirror -sites are available on 7 continents; mirrors are listed -at http://promo.net/pg). - -Mac users, do NOT point and click, typing works better. - -Example FTP session: - -ftp sunsite.unc.edu -login: anonymous -password: your@login -cd pub/docs/books/gutenberg -cd etext90 through etext99 -dir [to see files] -get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] -GET GUTINDEX.?? [to get a year's listing of books, e.g., GUTINDEX.99] -GET GUTINDEX.ALL [to get a listing of ALL books] - -*** - -**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** - -(Three Pages) - - -***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** -Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. -They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with -your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from -someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our -fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement -disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how -you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. - -*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT -By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept -this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive -a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by -sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person -you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical -medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. - -ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS -This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- -tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor -Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at -Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project"). Among other -things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright -on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and -distribute it in the United States without permission and -without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth -below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext -under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. - -To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable -efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain -works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any -medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other -things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged -disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer -codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. - -LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, -[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this -etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including -legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR -UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, -INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE -OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE -POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. - -If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of -receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) -you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that -time to the person you received it from. If you received it -on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and -such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement -copy. If you received it electronically, such person may -choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to -receive it electronically. - -THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS -TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A -PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or -the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the -above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you -may have other legal rights. - -INDEMNITY -You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, -officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost -and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or -indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: -[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, -or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. - -DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" -You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by -disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this -"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, -or: - -[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this - requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the - etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, - if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable - binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, - including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- - cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as - *EITHER*: - - [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and - does *not* contain characters other than those - intended by the author of the work, although tilde - (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may - be used to convey punctuation intended by the - author, and additional characters may be used to - indicate hypertext links; OR - - [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at - no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent - form by the program that displays the etext (as is - the case, for instance, with most word processors); - OR - - [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at - no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the - etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC - or other equivalent proprietary form). - -[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this - "Small Print!" statement. - -[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the - net profits you derive calculated using the method you - already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you - don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are - payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon - University" within the 60 days following each - date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) - your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. - -WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? -The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, -scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty -free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution -you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg -Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". - -*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* - - - - - -This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> - - - - - -PARMENIDES - -by Plato - - - - -Translated by Benjamin Jowett - - - - -INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. - -The awe with which Plato regarded the character of 'the great' Parmenides -has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name. None of the -writings of Plato have been more copiously illustrated, both in ancient and -modern times, and in none of them have the interpreters been more at -variance with one another. Nor is this surprising. For the Parmenides is -more fragmentary and isolated than any other dialogue, and the design of -the writer is not expressly stated. The date is uncertain; the relation to -the other writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connexion between the -two parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the two -we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own sentiments by -the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of his own mouth, or -whether he is propounding consequences which would have been admitted by -Zeno and Parmenides themselves. The contradictions which follow from the -hypotheses of the one and many have been regarded by some as transcendental -mysteries; by others as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new -method. They seem to have been inspired by a sort of dialectical frenzy, -such as may be supposed to have prevailed in the Megarian School (compare -Cratylus, etc.). The criticism on his own doctrine of Ideas has also been -considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance of the -metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond himself. To the -latter part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words in which he -himself describes the earlier philosophers in the Sophist: 'They went on -their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.' - -The Parmenides in point of style is one of the best of the Platonic -writings; the first portion of the dialogue is in no way defective in ease -and grace and dramatic interest; nor in the second part, where there was no -room for such qualities, is there any want of clearness or precision. The -latter half is an exquisite mosaic, of which the small pieces are with the -utmost fineness and regularity adapted to one another. Like the -Protagoras, Phaedo, and others, the whole is a narrated dialogue, combining -with the mere recital of the words spoken, the observations of the reciter -on the effect produced by them. Thus we are informed by him that Zeno and -Parmenides were not altogether pleased at the request of Socrates that they -would examine into the nature of the one and many in the sphere of Ideas, -although they received his suggestion with approving smiles. And we are -glad to be told that Parmenides was 'aged but well-favoured,' and that Zeno -was 'very good-looking'; also that Parmenides affected to decline the great -argument, on which, as Zeno knew from experience, he was not unwilling to -enter. The character of Antiphon, the half-brother of Plato, who had once -been inclined to philosophy, but has now shown the hereditary disposition -for horses, is very naturally described. He is the sole depositary of the -famous dialogue; but, although he receives the strangers like a courteous -gentleman, he is impatient of the trouble of reciting it. As they enter, -he has been giving orders to a bridle-maker; by this slight touch Plato -verifies the previous description of him. After a little persuasion he is -induced to favour the Clazomenians, who come from a distance, with a -rehearsal. Respecting the visit of Zeno and Parmenides to Athens, we may -observe--first, that such a visit is consistent with dates, and may -possibly have occurred; secondly, that Plato is very likely to have -invented the meeting ('You, Socrates, can easily invent Egyptian tales or -anything else,' Phaedrus); thirdly, that no reliance can be placed on the -circumstance as determining the date of Parmenides and Zeno; fourthly, that -the same occasion appears to be referred to by Plato in two other places -(Theaet., Soph.). - -Many interpreters have regarded the Parmenides as a 'reductio ad absurdum' -of the Eleatic philosophy. But would Plato have been likely to place this -in the mouth of the great Parmenides himself, who appeared to him, in -Homeric language, to be 'venerable and awful,' and to have a 'glorious -depth of mind'? (Theaet.). It may be admitted that he has ascribed to an -Eleatic stranger in the Sophist opinions which went beyond the doctrines of -the Eleatics. But the Eleatic stranger expressly criticises the doctrines -in which he had been brought up; he admits that he is going to 'lay hands -on his father Parmenides.' Nothing of this kind is said of Zeno and -Parmenides. How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to -them the refutation of their own tenets? - -The conclusion at which we must arrive is that the Parmenides is not a -refutation of the Eleatic philosophy. Nor would such an explanation afford -any satisfactory connexion of the first and second parts of the dialogue. -And it is quite inconsistent with Plato's own relation to the Eleatics. -For of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he speaks of them with the -greatest respect. But he could hardly have passed upon them a more -unmeaning slight than to ascribe to their great master tenets the reverse -of those which he actually held. - -Two preliminary remarks may be made. First, that whatever latitude we may -allow to Plato in bringing together by a 'tour de force,' as in the -Phaedrus, dissimilar themes, yet he always in some way seeks to find a -connexion for them. Many threads join together in one the love and -dialectic of the Phaedrus. We cannot conceive that the great artist would -place in juxtaposition two absolutely divided and incoherent subjects. And -hence we are led to make a second remark: viz. that no explanation of the -Parmenides can be satisfactory which does not indicate the connexion of the -first and second parts. To suppose that Plato would first go out of his -way to make Parmenides attack the Platonic Ideas, and then proceed to a -similar but more fatal assault on his own doctrine of Being, appears to be -the height of absurdity. - -Perhaps there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power -than that in which he assails his own theory of Ideas. The arguments are -nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle; they are the objections which -naturally occur to a modern student of philosophy. Many persons will be -surprised to find Plato criticizing the very conceptions which have been -supposed in after ages to be peculiarly characteristic of him. How can he -have placed himself so completely without them? How can he have ever -persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged -against them? The consideration of this difficulty has led a recent critic -(Ueberweg), who in general accepts the authorised canon of the Platonic -writings, to condemn the Parmenides as spurious. The accidental want of -external evidence, at first sight, seems to favour this opinion. - -In answer, it might be sufficient to say, that no ancient writing of equal -length and excellence is known to be spurious. Nor is the silence of -Aristotle to be hastily assumed; there is at least a doubt whether his use -of the same arguments does not involve the inference that he knew the work. -And, if the Parmenides is spurious, like Ueberweg, we are led on further -than we originally intended, to pass a similar condemnation on the -Theaetetus and Sophist, and therefore on the Politicus (compare Theaet., -Soph.). But the objection is in reality fanciful, and rests on the -assumption that the doctrine of the Ideas was held by Plato throughout his -life in the same form. For the truth is, that the Platonic Ideas were in -constant process of growth and transmutation; sometimes veiled in poetry -and mythology, then again emerging as fixed Ideas, in some passages -regarded as absolute and eternal, and in others as relative to the human -mind, existing in and derived from external objects as well as transcending -them. The anamnesis of the Ideas is chiefly insisted upon in the mythical -portions of the dialogues, and really occupies a very small space in the -entire works of Plato. Their transcendental existence is not asserted, and -is therefore implicitly denied in the Philebus; different forms are -ascribed to them in the Republic, and they are mentioned in the Theaetetus, -the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Laws, much as Universals would be -spoken of in modern books. Indeed, there are very faint traces of the -transcendental doctrine of Ideas, that is, of their existence apart from -the mind, in any of Plato's writings, with the exception of the Meno, the -Phaedrus, the Phaedo, and in portions of the Republic. The stereotyped -form which Aristotle has given to them is not found in Plato (compare Essay -on the Platonic Ideas in the Introduction to the Meno.) - -The full discussion of this subject involves a comprehensive survey of the -philosophy of Plato, which would be out of place here. But, without -digressing further from the immediate subject of the Parmenides, we may -remark that Plato is quite serious in his objections to his own doctrines: -nor does Socrates attempt to offer any answer to them. The perplexities -which surround the one and many in the sphere of the Ideas are also alluded -to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever -been answered, nor can they be answered by any one else who separates the -phenomenal from the real. To suppose that Plato, at a later period of his -life, reached a point of view from which he was able to answer them, is a -groundless assumption. The real progress of Plato's own mind has been -partly concealed from us by the dogmatic statements of Aristotle, and also -by the degeneracy of his own followers, with whom a doctrine of numbers -quickly superseded Ideas. - -As a preparation for answering some of the difficulties which have been -suggested, we may begin by sketching the first portion of the dialogue:-- - -Cephalus, of Clazomenae in Ionia, the birthplace of Anaxagoras, a citizen -of no mean city in the history of philosophy, who is the narrator of the -dialogue, describes himself as meeting Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora -at Athens. 'Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?' -'Why, yes: I came to ask a favour of you. First, tell me your half- -brother's name, which I have forgotten--he was a mere child when I was last -here;--I know his father's, which is Pyrilampes.' 'Yes, and the name of -our brother is Antiphon. But why do you ask?' 'Let me introduce to you -some countrymen of mine, who are lovers of philosophy; they have heard that -Antiphon remembers a conversation of Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno, of -which the report came to him from Pythodorus, Zeno's friend.' 'That is -quite true.' 'And can they hear the dialogue?' 'Nothing easier; in the -days of his youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present, his -thoughts have another direction: he takes after his grandfather, and has -given up philosophy for horses.' - -'We went to look for him, and found him giving instructions to a worker in -brass about a bridle. When he had done with him, and had learned from his -brothers the purpose of our visit, he saluted me as an old acquaintance, -and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first, he complained of the -trouble, but he soon consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described -to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they had come to Athens at -the great Panathenaea, the former being at the time about sixty-five years -old, aged but well-favoured--Zeno, who was said to have been beloved of -Parmenides in the days of his youth, about forty, and very good-looking:-- -that they lodged with Pythodorus at the Ceramicus outside the wall, whither -Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them: Zeno was reading one of -his theses, which he had nearly finished, when Pythodorus entered with -Parmenides and Aristoteles, who was afterwards one of the Thirty. When the -recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the -treatise might be read again.' - -'You mean, Zeno,' said Socrates, 'to argue that being, if it is many, must -be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction; and each division of -your argument is intended to elicit a similar absurdity, which may be -supposed to follow from the assumption that being is many.' 'Such is my -meaning.' 'I see,' said Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is -your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is -one: he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought. To -deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms, is -a strain of art beyond most of us.' 'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but -though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the -motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides against -ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of the existence of the many -involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis of the one. The book was -a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me, and therefore I -had no choice about the publication.' 'I quite believe you,' said -Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question? I should like to know, -whether you would assume an idea of likeness in the abstract, which is the -contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation in either or -both of which things are like or unlike or partly both. For the same -things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete, though -like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcilable. Nor does there appear -to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things may partake -of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised to hear that the -absolute one is also many. For example, I, being many, that is to say, -having many parts or members, am yet also one, and partake of the one, -being one of seven who are here present (compare Philebus). This is not an -absurdity, but a truism. But I should be amazed if there were a similar -entanglement in the nature of the ideas themselves, nor can I believe that -one and many, like and unlike, rest and motion, in the abstract, are -capable either of admixture or of separation.' - -Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very well -pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they looked at -one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of Socrates. -'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'do you think that the abstract ideas of -likeness, unity, and the rest, exist apart from individuals which partake -of them? and is this your own distinction?' 'I think that there are such -ideas.' 'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the -good?' 'Yes,' he said. 'And of human beings like ourselves, of water, -fire, and the like?' 'I am not certain.' 'And would you be undecided also -about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear laughable: of hair, -mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?' 'No, Parmenides; -visible things like these are, as I believe, only what they appear to be: -though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that there is nothing without an -idea; but I repress any such notion, from a fear of falling into an abyss -of nonsense.' 'You are young, Socrates, and therefore naturally regard the -opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold -of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is -your meaning that things become like by partaking of likeness, great by -partaking of greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and -beauty, and so of other ideas?' 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you -suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not -of the whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case -the whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the -whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this way -the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,' said -Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many--that is your -meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole -sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have parts, and -the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to follow.' 'And -would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain -one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that great objects -have a portion only of greatness transferred to them; or that small or -equal objects are small or equal because they are only portions of -smallness or equality?' 'Impossible.' 'But how can individuals -participate in ideas, except in the ways which I have mentioned?' 'That is -not an easy question to answer.' 'I should imagine the conception of ideas -to arise as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common form or -idea of greatness, which you abstract.' 'That is quite true.' 'And -supposing you embrace in one view the idea of greatness thus gained and the -individuals which it comprises, a further idea of greatness arises, which -makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.' Socrates replies that -the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence -would no longer follow. 'But must not the thought be of something which is -the same in all and is the idea? And if the world partakes in the ideas, -and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? Or can thought be -without thought?' 'I acknowledge the unmeaningness of this,' says -Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse to the explanation that the ideas -are types in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming like -them.' 'But to become like them is to be comprehended in the same idea; -and the likeness of the idea and the individuals implies another idea of -likeness, and another without end.' 'Quite true.' 'The theory, then, of -participation by likeness has to be given up. You have hardly yet, -Socrates, found out the real difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.' -'What difficulty?' 'The greatest of all perhaps is this: an opponent will -argue that the ideas are not within the range of human knowledge; and you -cannot disprove the assertion without a long and laborious demonstration, -which he may be unable or unwilling to follow. In the first place, neither -you nor any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm -that they are subjective.' 'That would be a contradiction.' 'True; and -therefore any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns -themselves only; and the objects which are named after them, are relative -to one another only, and have nothing to do with the ideas themselves.' -'How do you mean?' said Socrates. 'I may illustrate my meaning in this -way: one of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is -relative to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of -ideas, however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave -to us.--Do you see my meaning?' 'Perfectly.' 'And absolute knowledge in -the same way corresponds to absolute truth and being, and particular -knowledge to particular truth and being.' Clearly.' 'And there is a -subjective knowledge which is of subjective truth, having many kinds, -general and particular. But the ideas themselves are not subjective, and -therefore are not within our ken.' 'They are not.' 'Then the beautiful -and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?' 'It would seem so.' -'There is a worse consequence yet.' 'What is that?' 'I think we must -admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must -therefore attribute to God. But then see what follows: God, having this -exact knowledge, can have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided -the two spheres, and forbidden any passing from one to the other:--the gods -have knowledge and authority in their world only, as we have in ours.' -'Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.'--'These are some -of the difficulties which are involved in the assumption of absolute ideas; -the learner will find them nearly impossible to understand, and the teacher -who has to impart them will require superhuman ability; there will always -be a suspicion, either that they have no existence, or are beyond human -knowledge.' 'There I agree with you,' said Socrates. 'Yet if these -difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the -mind? and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? philosophy is at -an end.' 'I certainly do not see my way.' 'I think,' said Parmenides, -'that this arises out of your attempting to define abstractions, such as -the good and the beautiful and the just, before you have had sufficient -previous training; I noticed your deficiency when you were talking with -Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. Your enthusiasm is a wonderful -gift; but I fear that unless you discipline yourself by dialectic while you -are young, truth will elude your grasp.' 'And what kind of discipline -would you recommend?' 'The training which you heard Zeno practising; at -the same time, I admire your saying to him that you did not care to -consider the difficulty in reference to visible objects, but only in -relation to ideas.' 'Yes; because I think that in visible objects you may -easily show any number of inconsistent consequences.' 'Yes; and you should -consider, not only the consequences which follow from a given hypothesis, -but the consequences also which follow from the denial of the hypothesis. -For example, what follows from the assumption of the existence of the many, -and the counter-argument of what follows from the denial of the existence -of the many: and similarly of likeness and unlikeness, motion, rest, -generation, corruption, being and not being. And the consequences must -include consequences to the things supposed and to other things, in -themselves and in relation to one another, to individuals whom you select, -to the many, and to the all; these must be drawn out both on the -affirmative and on the negative hypothesis,--that is, if you are to train -yourself perfectly to the intelligence of the truth.' 'What you are -suggesting seems to be a tremendous process, and one of which I do not -quite understand the nature,' said Socrates; 'will you give me an example?' -'You must not impose such a task on a man of my years,' said Parmenides. -'Then will you, Zeno?' 'Let us rather,' said Zeno, with a smile, 'ask -Parmenides, for the undertaking is a serious one, as he truly says; nor -could I urge him to make the attempt, except in a select audience of -persons who will understand him.' The whole party joined in the request. - -Here we have, first of all, an unmistakable attack made by the youthful -Socrates on the paradoxes of Zeno. He perfectly understands their drift, -and Zeno himself is supposed to admit this. But they appear to him, as he -says in the Philebus also, to be rather truisms than paradoxes. For every -one must acknowledge the obvious fact, that the body being one has many -members, and that, in a thousand ways, the like partakes of the unlike, the -many of the one. The real difficulty begins with the relations of ideas in -themselves, whether of the one and many, or of any other ideas, to one -another and to the mind. But this was a problem which the Eleatic -philosophers had never considered; their thoughts had not gone beyond the -contradictions of matter, motion, space, and the like. - -It was no wonder that Parmenides and Zeno should hear the novel -speculations of Socrates with mixed feelings of admiration and displeasure. -He was going out of the received circle of disputation into a region in -which they could hardly follow him. From the crude idea of Being in the -abstract, he was about to proceed to universals or general notions. There -is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and -many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like -and unlike, in themselves. But the contradiction arises when we attempt to -conceive ideas in their connexion, or to ascertain their relation to -phenomena. Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the -position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides. - -To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the -place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the -founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of -metaphysics and logic (Theaet., Soph.). Like Plato, he is struggling after -something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans. -And Plato with a true instinct recognizes him as his spiritual father, whom -he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.' He -may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express. -And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticized the ideas -of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in -the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy. - -There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of -Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier -philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other. The older -philosophers were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity. -Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost -as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic. He felt no incongruity in the -veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates. Two points in his -criticism are especially deserving of notice. First of all, Parmenides -tries him by the test of consistency. Socrates is willing to assume ideas -or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to -man (compare Phaedo); but he is reluctant to admit that there are general -ideas of hair, mud, filth, etc. There is an ethical universal or idea, but -is there also a universal of physics?--of the meanest things in the world -as well as of the greatest? Parmenides rebukes this want of consistency in -Socrates, which he attributes to his youth. As he grows older, philosophy -will take a firmer hold of him, and then he will despise neither great -things nor small, and he will think less of the opinions of mankind -(compare Soph.). Here is lightly touched one of the most familiar -principles of modern philosophy, that in the meanest operations of nature, -as well as in the noblest, in mud and filth, as well as in the sun and -stars, great truths are contained. At the same time, we may note also the -transition in the mind of Plato, to which Aristotle alludes (Met.), when, -as he says, he transferred the Socratic universal of ethics to the whole of -nature. - -The other criticism of Parmenides on Socrates attributes to him a want of -practice in dialectic. He has observed this deficiency in him when talking -to Aristoteles on a previous occasion. Plato seems to imply that there was -something more in the dialectic of Zeno than in the mere interrogation of -Socrates. Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the process which his -own mind went through when he first became more intimately acquainted, -whether at Megara or elsewhere, with the Eleatic and Megarian philosophers. -Still, Parmenides does not deny to Socrates the credit of having gone -beyond them in seeking to apply the paradoxes of Zeno to ideas; and this is -the application which he himself makes of them in the latter part of the -dialogue. He then proceeds to explain to him the sort of mental gymnastic -which he should practise. He should consider not only what would follow -from a given hypothesis, but what would follow from the denial of it, to -that which is the subject of the hypothesis, and to all other things. -There is no trace in the Memorabilia of Xenophon of any such method being -attributed to Socrates; nor is the dialectic here spoken of that 'favourite -method' of proceeding by regular divisions, which is described in the -Phaedrus and Philebus, and of which examples are given in the Politicus and -in the Sophist. It is expressly spoken of as the method which Socrates had -heard Zeno practise in the days of his youth (compare Soph.). - -The discussion of Socrates with Parmenides is one of the most remarkable -passages in Plato. Few writers have ever been able to anticipate 'the -criticism of the morrow' on their favourite notions. But Plato may here be -said to anticipate the judgment not only of the morrow, but of all after- -ages on the Platonic Ideas. For in some points he touches questions which -have not yet received their solution in modern philosophy. - -The first difficulty which Parmenides raises respecting the Platonic ideas -relates to the manner in which individuals are connected with them. Do -they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? Parmenides -shows that objections may be urged against either of these modes of -conceiving the connection. Things are little by partaking of littleness, -great by partaking of greatness, and the like. But they cannot partake of -a part of greatness, for that will not make them great, etc.; nor can each -object monopolise the whole. The only answer to this is, that 'partaking' -is a figure of speech, really corresponding to the processes which a later -logic designates by the terms 'abstraction' and 'generalization.' When we -have described accurately the methods or forms which the mind employs, we -cannot further criticize them; at least we can only criticize them with -reference to their fitness as instruments of thought to express facts. - -Socrates attempts to support his view of the ideas by the parallel of the -day, which is one and in many places; but he is easily driven from his -position by a counter illustration of Parmenides, who compares the idea of -greatness to a sail. He truly explains to Socrates that he has attained -the conception of ideas by a process of generalization. At the same time, -he points out a difficulty, which appears to be involved--viz. that the -process of generalization will go on to infinity. Socrates meets the -supposed difficulty by a flash of light, which is indeed the true answer -'that the ideas are in our minds only.' Neither realism is the truth, nor -nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism; and conceptualism or any other -psychological theory falls very far short of the infinite subtlety of -language and thought. - -But the realism of ancient philosophy will not admit of this answer, which -is repelled by Parmenides with another truth or half-truth of later -philosophy, 'Every subject or subjective must have an object.' Here is the -great though unconscious truth (shall we say?) or error, which underlay the -early Greek philosophy. 'Ideas must have a real existence;' they are not -mere forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by individuals. -But the early Greek philosopher never clearly saw that true ideas were only -universal facts, and that there might be error in universals as well as in -particulars. - -Socrates makes one more attempt to defend the Platonic Ideas by -representing them as paradigms; this is again answered by the 'argumentum -ad infinitum.' We may remark, in passing, that the process which is thus -described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general -idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all -the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end. -The difficulty belongs in fact to the Megarian age of philosophy, and is -due to their illogical logic, and to the general ignorance of the ancients -respecting the part played by language in the process of thought. No such -perplexity could ever trouble a modern metaphysician, any more than the -fallacy of 'calvus' or 'acervus,' or of 'Achilles and the tortoise.' These -'surds' of metaphysics ought to occasion no more difficulty in speculation -than a perpetually recurring fraction in arithmetic. - -It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the -chasm between human truth and absolute truth, between gods and men? This -is the difficulty of philosophy in all ages: How can we get beyond the -circle of our own ideas, or how, remaining within them, can we have any -criterion of a truth beyond and independent of them? Parmenides draws out -this difficulty with great clearness. According to him, there are not only -one but two chasms: the first, between individuals and the ideas which -have a common name; the second, between the ideas in us and the ideas -absolute. The first of these two difficulties mankind, as we may say, a -little parodying the language of the Philebus, have long agreed to treat as -obsolete; the second remains a difficulty for us as well as for the Greeks -of the fourth century before Christ, and is the stumblingblock of Kant's -Kritik, and of the Hamiltonian adaptation of Kant, as well as of the -Platonic ideas. It has been said that 'you cannot criticize Revelation.' -'Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all,' is -the immediate rejoinder--'You know nothing of things in themselves.' 'Then -how do you know that there are things in themselves?' In some respects, -the difficulty pressed harder upon the Greek than upon ourselves. For -conceiving of God more under the attribute of knowledge than we do, he was -more under the necessity of separating the divine from the human, as two -spheres which had no communication with one another. - -It is remarkable that Plato, speaking by the mouth of Parmenides, does not -treat even this second class of difficulties as hopeless or insoluble. He -says only that they cannot be explained without a long and laborious -demonstration: 'The teacher will require superhuman ability, and the -learner will be hard of understanding.' But an attempt must be made to -find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the -denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind. We can easily -imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century -before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to -that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of -cause and effect. Men do not at first recognize that thought, like -digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may -be entertained respecting the nature of the process. Parmenides attributes -the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of -comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every -question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference -to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the -assertion of a given statement. - -The argument which follows is the most singular in Plato. It appears to be -an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in -the Phaedrus are an imitation of the style of Lysias, or as the derivations -in the Cratylus or the fallacies of the Euthydemus are a parody of some -contemporary Sophist. The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the -other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only -required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places. A hint has been -already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application. -This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the -dialogue. - -The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which -they relate have become trivial; their true nature as abstract terms is -perfectly understood by us, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of -them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words. Yet -there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries -afterwards. Something that they found in them, or brought to them--some -echo or anticipation of a great truth or error, exercised a wonderful -influence over their minds. To do the Parmenides justice, we should -imagine similar aporiai raised on themes as sacred to us, as the notions of -One or Being were to an ancient Eleatic. 'If God is, what follows? If God -is not, what follows?' Or again: If God is or is not the world; or if God -is or is not many, or has or has not parts, or is or is not in the world, -or in time; or is or is not finite or infinite. Or if the world is or is -not; or has or has not a beginning or end; or is or is not infinite, or -infinitely divisible. Or again: if God is or is not identical with his -laws; or if man is or is not identical with the laws of nature. We can -easily see that here are many subjects for thought, and that from these and -similar hypotheses questions of great interest might arise. And we also -remark, that the conclusions derived from either of the two alternative -propositions might be equally impossible and contradictory. - -When we ask what is the object of these paradoxes, some have answered that -they are a mere logical puzzle, while others have seen in them an Hegelian -propaedeutic of the doctrine of Ideas. The first of these views derives -support from the manner in which Parmenides speaks of a similar method -being applied to all Ideas. Yet it is hard to suppose that Plato would -have furnished so elaborate an example, not of his own but of the Eleatic -dialectic, had he intended only to give an illustration of method. The -second view has been often overstated by those who, like Hegel himself, -have tended to confuse ancient with modern philosophy. We need not deny -that Plato, trained in the school of Cratylus and Heracleitus, may have -seen that a contradiction in terms is sometimes the best expression of a -truth higher than either (compare Soph.). But his ideal theory is not -based on antinomies. The correlation of Ideas was the metaphysical -difficulty of the age in which he lived; and the Megarian and Cynic -philosophy was a 'reductio ad absurdum' of their isolation. To restore -them to their natural connexion and to detect the negative element in them -is the aim of Plato in the Sophist. But his view of their connexion falls -very far short of the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. The Being -and Not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that -'determination is only negation.' - -After criticizing the hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to -add another guess to the many which have been already offered. May we say, -in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which -has not yet been taken? It is quite possible that the obscurity of the -Parmenides would not have existed to a contemporary student of philosophy, -and, like the similar difficulty in the Philebus, is really due to our -ignorance of the mind of the age. There is an obscure Megarian influence -on Plato which cannot wholly be cleared up, and is not much illustrated by -the doubtful tradition of his retirement to Megara after the death of -Socrates. For Megara was within a walk of Athens (Phaedr.), and Plato -might have learned the Megarian doctrines without settling there. - -We may begin by remarking that the theses of Parmenides are expressly said -to follow the method of Zeno, and that the complex dilemma, though declared -to be capable of universal application, is applied in this instance to -Zeno's familiar question of the 'one and many.' Here, then, is a double -indication of the connexion of the Parmenides with the Eristic school. The -old Eleatics had asserted the existence of Being, which they at first -regarded as finite, then as infinite, then as neither finite nor infinite, -to which some of them had given what Aristotle calls 'a form,' others had -ascribed a material nature only. The tendency of their philosophy was to -deny to Being all predicates. The Megarians, who succeeded them, like the -Cynics, affirmed that no predicate could be asserted of any subject; they -also converted the idea of Being into an abstraction of Good, perhaps with -the view of preserving a sort of neutrality or indifference between the -mind and things. As if they had said, in the language of modern -philosophy: 'Being is not only neither finite nor infinite, neither at -rest nor in motion, but neither subjective nor objective.' - -This is the track along which Plato is leading us. Zeno had attempted to -prove the existence of the one by disproving the existence of the many, and -Parmenides seems to aim at proving the existence of the subject by showing -the contradictions which follow from the assertion of any predicates. Take -the simplest of all notions, 'unity'; you cannot even assert being or time -of this without involving a contradiction. But is the contradiction also -the final conclusion? Probably no more than of Zeno's denial of the many, -or of Parmenides' assault upon the Ideas; no more than of the earlier -dialogues 'of search.' To us there seems to be no residuum of this long -piece of dialectics. But to the mind of Parmenides and Plato, 'Gott- -betrunkene Menschen,' there still remained the idea of 'being' or 'good,' -which could not be conceived, defined, uttered, but could not be got rid -of. Neither of them would have imagined that their disputation ever -touched the Divine Being (compare Phil.). The same difficulties about -Unity and Being are raised in the Sophist; but there only as preliminary to -their final solution. - -If this view is correct, the real aim of the hypotheses of Parmenides is to -criticize the earlier Eleatic philosophy from the point of view of Zeno or -the Megarians. It is the same kind of criticism which Plato has extended -to his own doctrine of Ideas. Nor is there any want of poetical -consistency in attributing to the 'father Parmenides' the last review of -the Eleatic doctrines. The latest phases of all philosophies were fathered -upon the founder of the school. - -Other critics have regarded the final conclusion of the Parmenides either -as sceptical or as Heracleitean. In the first case, they assume that Plato -means to show the impossibility of any truth. But this is not the spirit -of Plato, and could not with propriety be put into the mouth of Parmenides, -who, in this very dialogue, is urging Socrates, not to doubt everything, -but to discipline his mind with a view to the more precise attainment of -truth. The same remark applies to the second of the two theories. Plato -everywhere ridicules (perhaps unfairly) his Heracleitean contemporaries: -and if he had intended to support an Heracleitean thesis, would hardly have -chosen Parmenides, the condemner of the 'undiscerning tribe who say that -things both are and are not,' to be the speaker. Nor, thirdly, can we -easily persuade ourselves with Zeller that by the 'one' he means the Idea; -and that he is seeking to prove indirectly the unity of the Idea in the -multiplicity of phenomena. - -We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides -knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them. - -The argument has two divisions: There is the hypothesis that - -1. One is. -2. One is not. -If one is, it is nothing. -If one is not, it is everything. - -But is and is not may be taken in two senses: -Either one is one, -Or, one has being, - -from which opposite consequences are deduced, -1.a. If one is one, it is nothing. -1.b. If one has being, it is all things. - -To which are appended two subordinate consequences: -1.aa. If one has being, all other things are. -1.bb. If one is one, all other things are not. - -The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis: -2.a. If one is not one, it is all things. -2.b. If one has not being, it is nothing. - -Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder: -2.aa. If one is not one, other things are all. -2.bb. If one has not being, other things are not. - -... - -'I cannot refuse,' said Parmenides, 'since, as Zeno remarks, we are alone, -though I may say with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like the -old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and -which I know so well. But as I must attempt this laborious game, what -shall be the subject? Suppose I take my own hypothesis of the one.' 'By -all means,' said Zeno. 'And who will answer me? Shall I propose the -youngest? he will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers -will give me time to breathe.' 'I am the youngest,' said Aristoteles, 'and -at your service; proceed with your questions.'--The result may be summed up -as follows:-- - -1.a. One is not many, and therefore has no parts, and therefore is not a -whole, which is a sum of parts, and therefore has neither beginning, -middle, nor end, and is therefore unlimited, and therefore formless, being -neither round nor straight, for neither round nor straight can be defined -without assuming that they have parts; and therefore is not in place, -whether in another which would encircle and touch the one at many points; -or in itself, because that which is self-containing is also contained, and -therefore not one but two. This being premised, let us consider whether -one is capable either of motion or rest. For motion is either change of -substance, or motion on an axis, or from one place to another. But the one -is incapable of change of substance, which implies that it ceases to be -itself, or of motion on an axis, because there would be parts around the -axis; and any other motion involves change of place. But existence in -place has been already shown to be impossible; and yet more impossible is -coming into being in place, which implies partial existence in two places -at once, or entire existence neither within nor without the same; and how -can this be? And more impossible still is the coming into being either as -a whole or parts of that which is neither a whole nor parts. The one, -then, is incapable of motion. But neither can the one be in anything, and -therefore not in the same, whether itself or some other, and is therefore -incapable of rest. Neither is one the same with itself or any other, or -other than itself or any other. For if other than itself, then other than -one, and therefore not one; and, if the same with other, it would be other, -and other than one. Neither can one while remaining one be other than -other; for other, and not one, is the other than other. But if not other -by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of -itself, not itself other, and if not itself other, not other than anything. -Neither will one be the same with itself. For the nature of the same is -not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with anything does -not become one; for example, that which becomes the same with the many -becomes many and not one. And therefore if the one is the same with -itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and not one. And -therefore one is neither other than other, nor the same with itself. -Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other; for likeness is -sameness of affections, and the one and the same are different. And one -having any affection which is other than being one would be more than one. -The one, then, cannot have the same affection with and therefore cannot be -like itself or other; nor can the one have any other affection than its -own, that is, be unlike itself or any other, for this would imply that it -was more than one. The one, then, is neither like nor unlike itself or -other. This being the case, neither can the one be equal or unequal to -itself or other. For equality implies sameness of measure, as inequality -implies a greater or less number of measures. But the one, not having -sameness, cannot have sameness of measure; nor a greater or less number of -measures, for that would imply parts and multitude. Once more, can one be -older or younger than itself or other? or of the same age with itself or -other? That would imply likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality. -Therefore one cannot be in time, because that which is in time is ever -becoming older and younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative -terms, and he who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same -age with itself. None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether -past, future, or present, can be affirmed of one. One neither is, has -been, nor will be, nor becomes, nor has, nor will become. And, as these -are the only modes of being, one is not, and is not one. But to that which -is not, there is no attribute or relative, neither name nor word nor idea -nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining. One, then, is neither -named, nor uttered, nor known, nor perceived, nor imagined. But can all -this be true? 'I think not.' - -1.b. Let us, however, commence the inquiry again. We have to work out all -the consequences which follow on the assumption that the one is. If one -is, one partakes of being, which is not the same with one; the words -'being' and 'one' have different meanings. Observe the consequence: In -the one of being or the being of one are two parts, being and one, which -form one whole. And each of the two parts is also a whole, and involves -the other, and may be further subdivided into one and being, and is -therefore not one but two; and thus one is never one, and in this way the -one, if it is, becomes many and infinite. Again, let us conceive of a one -which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this -abstract one be one or many? You say one only; let us see. In the first -place, the being of one is other than one; and one and being, if different, -are so because they both partake of the nature of other, which is therefore -neither one nor being; and whether we take being and other, or being and -one, or one and other, in any case we have two things which separately are -called either, and together both. And both are two and either of two is -severally one, and if one be added to any of the pairs, the sum is three; -and two is an even number, three an odd; and two units exist twice, and -therefore there are twice two; and three units exist thrice, and therefore -there are thrice three, and taken together they give twice three and thrice -two: we have even numbers multiplied into even, and odd into even, and -even into odd numbers. But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are -implied in one, must not every number exist? And number is infinite, and -therefore existence must be infinite, for all and every number partakes of -being; therefore being has the greatest number of parts, and every part, -however great or however small, is equally one. But can one be in many -places and yet be a whole? If not a whole it must be divided into parts -and represented by a number corresponding to the number of the parts. And -if so, we were wrong in saying that being has the greatest number of parts; -for being is coequal and coextensive with one, and has no more parts than -one; and so the abstract one broken up into parts by being is many and -infinite. But the parts are parts of a whole, and the whole is their -containing limit, and the one is therefore limited as well as infinite in -number; and that which is a whole has beginning, middle, and end, and a -middle is equidistant from the extremes; and one is therefore of a certain -figure, round or straight, or a combination of the two, and being a whole -includes all the parts which are the whole, and is therefore self- -contained. But then, again, the whole is not in the parts, whether all or -some. Not in all, because, if in all, also in one; for, if wanting in any -one, how in all?--not in some, because the greater would then be contained -in the less. But if not in all, nor in any, nor in some, either nowhere or -in other. And if nowhere, nothing; therefore in other. The one as a -whole, then, is in another, but regarded as a sum of parts is in itself; -and is, therefore, both in itself and in another. This being the case, the -one is at once both at rest and in motion: at rest, because resting in -itself; in motion, because it is ever in other. And if there is truth in -what has preceded, one is the same and not the same with itself and other. -For everything in relation to every other thing is either the same with it -or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of part to -a whole or whole to a part. But one cannot be a part or whole in relation -to one, nor other than one; and is therefore the same with one. Yet this -sameness is again contradicted by one being in another place from itself -which is in the same place; this follows from one being in itself and in -another; one, therefore, is other than itself. But if anything is other -than anything, will it not be other than other? And the not one is other -than the one, and the one than the not one; therefore one is other than all -others. But the same and the other exclude one another, and therefore the -other can never be in the same; nor can the other be in anything for ever -so short a time, as for that time the other will be in the same. And the -other, if never in the same, cannot be either in the one or in the not one. -And one is not other than not one, either by reason of other or of itself; -and therefore they are not other than one another at all. Neither can the -not one partake or be part of one, for in that case it would be one; nor -can the not one be number, for that also involves one. And therefore, not -being other than the one or related to the one as a whole to parts or parts -to a whole, not one is the same as one. Wherefore the one is the same and -also not the same with the others and also with itself; and is therefore -like and unlike itself and the others, and just as different from the -others as they are from the one, neither more nor less. But if neither -more nor less, equally different; and therefore the one and the others have -the same relations. This may be illustrated by the case of names: when -you repeat the same name twice over, you mean the same thing; and when you -say that the other is other than the one, or the one other than the other, -this very word other (eteron), which is attributed to both, implies -sameness. One, then, as being other than others, and other as being other -than one, are alike in that they have the relation of otherness; and -likeness is similarity of relations. And everything as being other of -everything is also like everything. Again, same and other, like and -unlike, are opposites: and since in virtue of being other than the others -the one is like them, in virtue of being the same it must be unlike. -Again, one, as having the same relations, has no difference of relation, -and is therefore not unlike, and therefore like; or, as having different -relations, is different and unlike. Thus, one, as being the same and not -the same with itself and others--for both these reasons and for either of -them--is also like and unlike itself and the others. Again, how far can -one touch itself and the others? As existing in others, it touches the -others; and as existing in itself, touches only itself. But from another -point of view, that which touches another must be next in order of place; -one, therefore, must be next in order of place to itself, and would -therefore be two, and in two places. But one cannot be two, and therefore -cannot be in contact with itself. Nor again can one touch the other. Two -objects are required to make one contact; three objects make two contacts; -and all the objects in the world, if placed in a series, would have as many -contacts as there are objects, less one. But if one only exists, and not -two, there is no contact. And the others, being other than one, have no -part in one, and therefore none in number, and therefore two has no -existence, and therefore there is no contact. For all which reasons, one -has and has not contact with itself and the others. - -Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? Suppose one -and the others to be greater or less than each other or equal to one -another, they will be greater or less or equal by reason of equality or -greatness or smallness inhering in them in addition to their own proper -nature. Let us begin by assuming smallness to be inherent in one: in this -case the inherence is either in the whole or in a part. If the first, -smallness is either coextensive with the whole one, or contains the whole, -and, if coextensive with the one, is equal to the one, or if containing the -one will be greater than the one. But smallness thus performs the function -of equality or of greatness, which is impossible. Again, if the inherence -be in a part, the same contradiction follows: smallness will be equal to -the part or greater than the part; therefore smallness will not inhere in -anything, and except the idea of smallness there will be nothing small. -Neither will greatness; for greatness will have a greater;--and there will -be no small in relation to which it is great. And there will be no great -or small in objects, but greatness and smallness will be relative only to -each other; therefore the others cannot be greater or less than the one; -also the one can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the others, and they are -therefore equal to one another. And this will be true also of the one in -relation to itself: one will be equal to itself as well as to the others -(talla). Yet one, being in itself, must also be about itself, containing -and contained, and is therefore greater and less than itself. Further, -there is nothing beside the one and the others; and as these must be in -something, they must therefore be in one another; and as that in which a -thing is is greater than the thing, the inference is that they are both -greater and less than one another, because containing and contained in one -another. Therefore the one is equal to and greater and less than itself or -other, having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less -than itself or other. - -But does one partake of time? This must be acknowledged, if the one -partakes of being. For 'to be' is the participation of being in present -time, 'to have been' in past, 'to be about to be' in future time. And as -time is ever moving forward, the one becomes older than itself; and -therefore younger than itself; and is older and also younger when in the -process of becoming it arrives at the present; and it is always older and -younger, for at any moment the one is, and therefore it becomes and is not -older and younger than itself but during an equal time with itself, and is -therefore contemporary with itself. - -And what are the relations of the one to the others? Is it or does it -become older or younger than they? At any rate the others are more than -one, and one, being the least of all numbers, must be prior in time to -greater numbers. But on the other hand, one must come into being in a -manner accordant with its own nature. Now one has parts or others, and has -therefore a beginning, middle, and end, of which the beginning is first and -the end last. And the parts come into existence first; last of all the -whole, contemporaneously with the end, being therefore younger, while the -parts or others are older than the one. But, again, the one comes into -being in each of the parts as much as in the whole, and must be of the same -age with them. Therefore one is at once older and younger than the parts -or others, and also contemporaneous with them, for no part can be a part -which is not one. Is this true of becoming as well as being? Thus much -may be affirmed, that the same things which are older or younger cannot -become older or younger in a greater degree than they were at first by the -addition of equal times. But, on the other hand, the one, if older than -others, has come into being a longer time than they have. And when equal -time is added to a longer and shorter, the relative difference between them -is diminished. In this way that which was older becomes younger, and that -which was younger becomes older, that is to say, younger and older than at -first; and they ever become and never have become, for then they would be. -Thus the one and others always are and are becoming and not becoming -younger and also older than one another. And one, partaking of time and -also partaking of becoming older and younger, admits of all time, present, -past, and future--was, is, shall be--was becoming, is becoming, will -become. And there is science of the one, and opinion and name and -expression, as is already implied in the fact of our inquiry. - -Yet once more, if one be one and many, and neither one nor many, and also -participant of time, must there not be a time at which one as being one -partakes of being, and a time when one as not being one is deprived of -being? But these two contradictory states cannot be experienced by the one -both together: there must be a time of transition. And the transition is -a process of generation and destruction, into and from being and not-being, -the one and the others. For the generation of the one is the destruction -of the others, and the generation of the others is the destruction of the -one. There is also separation and aggregation, assimilation and -dissimilation, increase, diminution, equalization, a passage from motion to -rest, and from rest to motion in the one and many. But when do all these -changes take place? When does motion become rest, or rest motion? The -answer to this question will throw a light upon all the others. Nothing -can be in motion and at rest at the same time; and therefore the change -takes place 'in a moment'--which is a strange expression, and seems to mean -change in no time. Which is true also of all the other changes, which -likewise take place in no time. - -1.aa. But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place -are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? The others are other -than the one because they have parts, for if they had no parts they would -be simply one, and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise each -part would be a part of many, and being itself one of them, of itself, and -if a part of all, of each one of the other parts, which is absurd. For a -part, if not a part of one, must be a part of all but this one, and if so -not a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, not a part of any -one of many, and so not of one; and if of none, how of all? Therefore a -part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute and perfect -whole or one. And if the others have parts, they must partake of the -whole, and must be the whole of which they are the parts. And each part, -as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute one. And both the whole -and the parts partake of one, for the whole of which the parts are parts is -one, and each part is one part of the whole; and whole and parts as -participating in one are other than one, and as being other than one are -many and infinite; and however small a fraction you separate from them is -many and not one. Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes the others -with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and -also infinite: finite through participation in the one, infinite in their -own nature. And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite, -they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the -highest degree unlike. And all other opposites might without difficulty be -shown to unite in them. - -1.bb. Once more, leaving all this: Is there not also an opposite series -of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced -from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others, and -the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and there is no -third existence besides them. And the whole of one cannot be in others nor -parts of it, for it is separated from others and has no parts, and -therefore the others have no unity, nor plurality, nor duality, nor any -other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such as likeness and -unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even. For -if they had these they would partake either of one opposite, and this would -be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a -participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is all things, and likewise -nothing, in relation to one and to the others. - -2.a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and -what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition, that one is -not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not. The -subject of any negative proposition implies at once knowledge and -difference. Thus 'one' in the proposition--'The one is not,' must be -something known, or the words would be unintelligible; and again this 'one -which is not' is something different from other things. Moreover, this and -that, some and other, may be all attributed or related to the one which is -not, and which though non-existent may and must have plurality, if the one -only is non-existent and nothing else; but if all is not-being there is -nothing which can be spoken of. Also the one which is not differs, and is -different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they -being other than the one, are unlike the one, which is therefore unlike -them. But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness -of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis; and one cannot be -equal to the others; for that would suppose being in the one, and the -others would be equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if -one does not exist. The one which is not, then, if not equal is unequal to -the others, and in equality implies great and small, and equality lies -between great and small, and therefore the one which is not partakes of -equality. Further, the one which is not has being; for that which is true -is, and it is true that the one is not. And so the one which is not, if -remitting aught of the being of non-existence, would become existent. For -not being implies the being of not-being, and being the not-being of not- -being; or more truly being partakes of the being of being and not of the -being of not-being, and not-being of the being of not-being and not of the -not-being of not-being. And therefore the one which is not has being and -also not-being. And the union of being and not-being involves change or -motion. But how can not-being, which is nowhere, move or change, either -from one place to another or in the same place? And whether it is or is -not, it would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance. The -one which is not, then, is both in motion and at rest, is altered and -unaltered, and becomes and is destroyed, and does not become and is not -destroyed. - -2.b. Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in -regard to one? The expression 'is not' implies negation of being:--do we -mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or -do we mean absolutely to deny being of it? The latter. Then the one which -is not can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of -substance or place. Neither can rest, or motion, or greatness, or -smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or -other, or attribute or relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or -knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be asserted of -that which is not. - -2.aa. Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? If we speak -of them they must be, and their very name implies difference, and -difference implies relation, not to the one, which is not, but to one -another. And they are others of each other not as units but as infinities, -the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division. -And they will have no unity or number, but only a semblance of unity and -number; and the least of them will appear large and manifold in comparison -with the infinitesimal fractions into which it may be divided. Further, -each particle will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions. -For in passing from the greater to the less it must reach an intermediate -point, which is equality. Moreover, each particle although having a limit -in relation to itself and to other particles, yet it has neither beginning, -middle, nor end; for there is always a beginning before the beginning, and -a middle within the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the -infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one. Thus all being is one -at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike -when near; and also the particles which compose being seem to be like and -unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and -separation, if one is not. - -2.bb. Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the -one are, what follows? In the first place, the others will not be the one, -nor the many, for in that case the one would be contained in them; neither -will they appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or -participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not. If -one is not, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or -unlike, in contact or separation. In short, if one is not, nothing is. - -The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the -others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and -appear to be and appear not to be, in all manner of ways. - -I. On the first hypothesis we may remark: first, That one is one is an -identical proposition, from which we might expect that no further -consequences could be deduced. The train of consequences which follows, is -inferred by altering the predicate into 'not many.' Yet, perhaps, if a -strict Eristic had been present, oios aner ei kai nun paren, he might have -affirmed that the not many presented a different aspect of the conception -from the one, and was therefore not identical with it. Such a subtlety -would be very much in character with the Zenonian dialectic. Secondly, We -may note, that the conclusion is really involved in the premises. For one -is conceived as one, in a sense which excludes all predicates. When the -meaning of one has been reduced to a point, there is no use in saying that -it has neither parts nor magnitude. Thirdly, The conception of the same -is, first of all, identified with the one; and then by a further analysis -distinguished from, and even opposed to it. Fourthly, We may detect -notions, which have reappeared in modern philosophy, e.g. the bare -abstraction of undefined unity, answering to the Hegelian 'Seyn,' or the -identity of contradictions 'that which is older is also younger,' etc., or -the Kantian conception of an a priori synthetical proposition 'one is.' - -II. In the first series of propositions the word 'is' is really the -copula; in the second, the verb of existence. As in the first series, the -negative consequence followed from one being affirmed to be equivalent to -the not many; so here the affirmative consequence is deduced from one being -equivalent to the many. - -In the former case, nothing could be predicated of the one, but now -everything--multitude, relation, place, time, transition. One is regarded -in all the aspects of one, and with a reference to all the consequences -which flow, either from the combination or the separation of them. The -notion of transition involves the singular extra-temporal conception of -'suddenness.' This idea of 'suddenness' is based upon the contradiction -which is involved in supposing that anything can be in two places at once. -It is a mere fiction; and we may observe that similar antinomies have led -modern philosophers to deny the reality of time and space. It is not the -infinitesimal of time, but the negative of time. By the help of this -invention the conception of change, which sorely exercised the minds of -early thinkers, seems to be, but is not really at all explained. The -difficulty arises out of the imperfection of language, and should therefore -be no longer regarded as a difficulty at all. The only way of meeting it, -if it exists, is to acknowledge that this rather puzzling double conception -is necessary to the expression of the phenomena of motion or change, and -that this and similar double notions, instead of being anomalies, are among -the higher and more potent instruments of human thought. - -The processes by which Parmenides obtains his remarkable results may be -summed up as follows: (1) Compound or correlative ideas which involve each -other, such as, being and not-being, one and many, are conceived sometimes -in a state of composition, and sometimes of division: (2) The division or -distinction is sometimes heightened into total opposition, e.g. between one -and same, one and other: or (3) The idea, which has been already divided, -is regarded, like a number, as capable of further infinite subdivision: -(4) The argument often proceeds 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum -simpliciter' and conversely: (5) The analogy of opposites is misused by -him; he argues indiscriminately sometimes from what is like, sometimes from -what is unlike in them: (6) The idea of being or not-being is identified -with existence or non-existence in place or time: (7) The same ideas are -regarded sometimes as in process of transition, sometimes as alternatives -or opposites: (8) There are no degrees or kinds of sameness, likeness, -difference, nor any adequate conception of motion or change: (9) One, -being, time, like space in Zeno's puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, are -regarded sometimes as continuous and sometimes as discrete: (10) In some -parts of the argument the abstraction is so rarefied as to become not only -fallacious, but almost unintelligible, e.g. in the contradiction which is -elicited out of the relative terms older and younger: (11) The relation -between two terms is regarded under contradictory aspects, as for example -when the existence of the one and the non-existence of the one are equally -assumed to involve the existence of the many: (12) Words are used through -long chains of argument, sometimes loosely, sometimes with the precision of -numbers or of geometrical figures. - -The argument is a very curious piece of work, unique in literature. It -seems to be an exposition or rather a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the -Megarian philosophy, but we are too imperfectly acquainted with this last -to speak with confidence about it. It would be safer to say that it is an -indication of the sceptical, hyperlogical fancies which prevailed among the -contemporaries of Socrates. It throws an indistinct light upon Aristotle, -and makes us aware of the debt which the world owes to him or his school. -It also bears a resemblance to some modern speculations, in which an -attempt is made to narrow language in such a manner that number and figure -may be made a calculus of thought. It exaggerates one side of logic and -forgets the rest. It has the appearance of a mathematical process; the -inventor of it delights, as mathematicians do, in eliciting or discovering -an unexpected result. It also helps to guard us against some fallacies by -showing the consequences which flow from them. - -In the Parmenides we seem to breathe the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, -though we cannot compare the two in detail. But Plato also goes beyond his -Megarian contemporaries; he has split their straws over again, and admitted -more than they would have desired. He is indulging the analytical -tendencies of his age, which can divide but not combine. And he does not -stop to inquire whether the distinctions which he makes are shadowy and -fallacious, but 'whither the argument blows' he follows. - -III. The negative series of propositions contains the first conception of -the negation of a negation. Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make -a plus. Two negatives destroy each other. This abstruse notion is the -foundation of the Hegelian logic. The mind must not only admit that -determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation. -Whether this process is real, or in any way an assistance to thought, or, -like some other logical forms, a mere figure of speech transferred from the -sphere of mathematics, may be doubted. That Plato and the most subtle -philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same -notion, is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought. - -IV. The one and the many or others are reduced to their strictest -arithmetical meaning. That one is three or three one, is a proposition -which has, perhaps, given rise to more controversy in the world than any -other. But no one has ever meant to say that three and one are to be taken -in the same sense. Whereas the one and many of the Parmenides have -precisely the same meaning; there is no notion of one personality or -substance having many attributes or qualities. The truth seems to be -rather the opposite of that which Socrates implies: There is no -contradiction in the concrete, but in the abstract; and the more abstract -the idea, the more palpable will be the contradiction. For just as nothing -can persuade us that the number one is the number three, so neither can we -be persuaded that any abstract idea is identical with its opposite, -although they may both inhere together in some external object, or some -more comprehensive conception. Ideas, persons, things may be one in one -sense and many in another, and may have various degrees of unity and -plurality. But in whatever sense and in whatever degree they are one they -cease to be many; and in whatever degree or sense they are many they cease -to be one. - -Two points remain to be considered: 1st, the connexion between the first -and second parts of the dialogue; 2ndly, the relation of the Parmenides to -the other dialogues. - -I. In both divisions of the dialogue the principal speaker is the same, -and the method pursued by him is also the same, being a criticism on -received opinions: first, on the doctrine of Ideas; secondly, of Being. -From the Platonic Ideas we naturally proceed to the Eleatic One or Being -which is the foundation of them. They are the same philosophy in two -forms, and the simpler form is the truer and deeper. For the Platonic -Ideas are mere numerical differences, and the moment we attempt to -distinguish between them, their transcendental character is lost; ideas of -justice, temperance, and good, are really distinguishable only with -reference to their application in the world. If we once ask how they are -related to individuals or to the ideas of the divine mind, they are again -merged in the aboriginal notion of Being. No one can answer the questions -which Parmenides asks of Socrates. And yet these questions are asked with -the express acknowledgment that the denial of ideas will be the destruction -of the human mind. The true answer to the difficulty here thrown out is -the establishment of a rational psychology; and this is a work which is -commenced in the Sophist. Plato, in urging the difficulty of his own -doctrine of Ideas, is far from denying that some doctrine of Ideas is -necessary, and for this he is paving the way. - -In a similar spirit he criticizes the Eleatic doctrine of Being, not -intending to deny Ontology, but showing that the old Eleatic notion, and -the very name 'Being,' is unable to maintain itself against the subtleties -of the Megarians. He did not mean to say that Being or Substance had no -existence, but he is preparing for the development of his later view, that -ideas were capable of relation. The fact that contradictory consequences -follow from the existence or non-existence of one or many, does not prove -that they have or have not existence, but rather that some different mode -of conceiving them is required. Parmenides may still have thought that -'Being was,' just as Kant would have asserted the existence of 'things in -themselves,' while denying the transcendental use of the Categories. - -Several lesser links also connect the first and second parts of the -dialogue: (1) The thesis is the same as that which Zeno has been already -discussing: (2) Parmenides has intimated in the first part, that the -method of Zeno should, as Socrates desired, be extended to Ideas: (3) The -difficulty of participating in greatness, smallness, equality is urged -against the Ideas as well as against the One. - -II. The Parmenides is not only a criticism of the Eleatic notion of Being, -but also of the methods of reasoning then in existence, and in this point -of view, as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction to the -Sophist. Long ago, in the Euthydemus, the vulgar application of the 'both -and neither' Eristic had been subjected to a similar criticism, which there -takes the form of banter and irony, here of illustration. - -The attack upon the Ideas is resumed in the Philebus, and is followed by a -return to a more rational philosophy. The perplexity of the One and Many -is there confined to the region of Ideas, and replaced by a theory of -classification; the Good arranged in classes is also contrasted with the -barren abstraction of the Megarians. The war is carried on against the -Eristics in all the later dialogues, sometimes with a playful irony, at -other times with a sort of contempt. But there is no lengthened refutation -of them. The Parmenides belongs to that stage of the dialogues of Plato in -which he is partially under their influence, using them as a sort of -'critics or diviners' of the truth of his own, and of the Eleatic theories. -In the Theaetetus a similar negative dialectic is employed in the attempt -to define science, which after every effort remains undefined still. The -same question is revived from the objective side in the Sophist: Being and -Not-being are no longer exhibited in opposition, but are now reconciled; -and the true nature of Not-being is discovered and made the basis of the -correlation of ideas. Some links are probably missing which might have -been supplied if we had trustworthy accounts of Plato's oral teaching. - -To sum up: the Parmenides of Plato is a critique, first, of the Platonic -Ideas, and secondly, of the Eleatic doctrine of Being. Neither are -absolutely denied. But certain difficulties and consequences are shown in -the assumption of either, which prove that the Platonic as well as the -Eleatic doctrine must be remodelled. The negation and contradiction which -are involved in the conception of the One and Many are preliminary to their -final adjustment. The Platonic Ideas are tested by the interrogative -method of Socrates; the Eleatic One or Being is tried by the severer and -perhaps impossible method of hypothetical consequences, negative and -affirmative. In the latter we have an example of the Zenonian or Megarian -dialectic, which proceeded, not 'by assailing premises, but conclusions'; -this is worked out and improved by Plato. When primary abstractions are -used in every conceivable sense, any or every conclusion may be deduced -from them. The words 'one,' 'other,' 'being,' 'like,' 'same,' 'whole,' and -their opposites, have slightly different meanings, as they are applied to -objects of thought or objects of sense--to number, time, place, and to the -higher ideas of the reason;--and out of their different meanings this -'feast' of contradictions 'has been provided.' - -... - -The Parmenides of Plato belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed -away. At first we read it with a purely antiquarian or historical -interest; and with difficulty throw ourselves back into a state of the -human mind in which Unity and Being occupied the attention of philosophers. -We admire the precision of the language, in which, as in some curious -puzzle, each word is exactly fitted into every other, and long trains of -argument are carried out with a sort of geometrical accuracy. We doubt -whether any abstract notion could stand the searching cross-examination of -Parmenides; and may at last perhaps arrive at the conclusion that Plato has -been using an imaginary method to work out an unmeaning conclusion. But -the truth is, that he is carrying on a process which is not either useless -or unnecessary in any age of philosophy. We fail to understand him, -because we do not realize that the questions which he is discussing could -have had any value or importance. We suppose them to be like the -speculations of some of the Schoolmen, which end in nothing. But in truth -he is trying to get rid of the stumblingblocks of thought which beset his -contemporaries. Seeing that the Megarians and Cynics were making knowledge -impossible, he takes their 'catch-words' and analyzes them from every -conceivable point of view. He is criticizing the simplest and most general -of our ideas, in which, as they are the most comprehensive, the danger of -error is the most serious; for, if they remain unexamined, as in a -mathematical demonstration, all that flows from them is affected, and the -error pervades knowledge far and wide. In the beginning of philosophy this -correction of human ideas was even more necessary than in our own times, -because they were more bound up with words; and words when once presented -to the mind exercised a greater power over thought. There is a natural -realism which says, 'Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea -which is an idea of nothing?' In modern times mankind have often given too -great importance to a word or idea. The philosophy of the ancients was -still more in slavery to them, because they had not the experience of -error, which would have placed them above the illusion. - -The method of the Parmenides may be compared with the process of purgation, -which Bacon sought to introduce into philosophy. Plato is warning us -against two sorts of 'Idols of the Den': first, his own Ideas, which he -himself having created is unable to connect in any way with the external -world; secondly, against two idols in particular, 'Unity' and 'Being,' -which had grown up in the pre-Socratic philosophy, and were still standing -in the way of all progress and development of thought. He does not say -with Bacon, 'Let us make truth by experiment,' or 'From these vague and -inexact notions let us turn to facts.' The time has not yet arrived for a -purely inductive philosophy. The instruments of thought must first be -forged, that they may be used hereafter by modern inquirers. How, while -mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? -How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to -distinguish between a cause and an end? How could they make any progress -in the sciences without first arranging them? These are the deficiencies -which Plato is seeking to supply in an age when knowledge was a shadow of a -name only. In the earlier dialogues the Socratic conception of universals -is illustrated by his genius; in the Phaedrus the nature of division is -explained; in the Republic the law of contradiction and the unity of -knowledge are asserted; in the later dialogues he is constantly engaged -both with the theory and practice of classification. These were the 'new -weapons,' as he terms them in the Philebus, which he was preparing for the -use of some who, in after ages, would be found ready enough to disown their -obligations to the great master, or rather, perhaps, would be incapable of -understanding them. - -Numberless fallacies, as we are often truly told, have originated in a -confusion of the 'copula,' and the 'verb of existence.' Would not the -distinction which Plato by the mouth of Parmenides makes between 'One is -one' and 'One has being' have saved us from this and many similar -confusions? We see again that a long period in the history of philosophy -was a barren tract, not uncultivated, but unfruitful, because there was no -inquiry into the relation of language and thought, and the metaphysical -imagination was incapable of supplying the missing link between words and -things. The famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never -have been heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic Ideas into a -crude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood and -appreciated. Upon the term substance at least two celebrated theological -controversies appear to hinge, which would not have existed, or at least -not in their present form, if we had 'interrogated' the word substance, as -Plato has the notions of Unity and Being. These weeds of philosophy have -struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always tending to reappear, -sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words, such as development, -evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in the place of facts, -even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact. In an -unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense -(i.e. more a priori assumption) than in any other, because there is more -complete unconsciousness that we are resting on our own ideas, while we -please ourselves with the conviction that we are resting on facts. We do -not consider how much metaphysics are required to place us above -metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression -which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and -experiment. - -In the last century the educated world were astonished to find that the -whole fabric of their ideas was falling to pieces, because Hume amused -himself by analyzing the word 'cause' into uniform sequence. Then arose a -philosophy which, equally regardless of the history of the mind, sought to -save mankind from scepticism by assigning to our notions of 'cause and -effect,' 'substance and accident,' 'whole and part,' a necessary place in -human thought. Without them we could have no experience, and therefore -they were supposed to be prior to experience--to be incrusted on the 'I'; -although in the phraseology of Kant there could be no transcendental use of -them, or, in other words, they were only applicable within the range of our -knowledge. But into the origin of these ideas, which he obtains partly by -an analysis of the proposition, partly by development of the 'ego,' he -never inquires--they seem to him to have a necessary existence; nor does he -attempt to analyse the various senses in which the word 'cause' or -'substance' may be employed. - -The philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning, even to -himself, if he had first analyzed from every point of view the conception -of 'matter.' This poor forgotten word (which was 'a very good word' to -describe the simplest generalization of external objects) is now superseded -in the vocabulary of physical philosophers by 'force,' which seems to be -accepted without any rigid examination of its meaning, as if the general -idea of 'force' in our minds furnished an explanation of the infinite -variety of forces which exist in the universe. A similar ambiguity occurs -in the use of the favourite word 'law,' which is sometimes regarded as a -mere abstraction, and then elevated into a real power or entity, almost -taking the place of God. Theology, again, is full of undefined terms which -have distracted the human mind for ages. Mankind have reasoned from them, -but not to them; they have drawn out the conclusions without proving the -premises; they have asserted the premises without examining the terms. The -passions of religious parties have been roused to the utmost about words of -which they could have given no explanation, and which had really no -distinct meaning. One sort of them, faith, grace, justification, have been -the symbols of one class of disputes; as the words substance, nature, -person, of another, revelation, inspiration, and the like, of a third. All -of them have been the subject of endless reasonings and inferences; but a -spell has hung over the minds of theologians or philosophers which has -prevented them from examining the words themselves. Either the effort to -rise above and beyond their own first ideas was too great for them, or -there might, perhaps, have seemed to be an irreverence in doing so. About -the Divine Being Himself, in whom all true theological ideas live and move, -men have spoken and reasoned much, and have fancied that they instinctively -know Him. But they hardly suspect that under the name of God even -Christians have included two characters or natures as much opposed as the -good and evil principle of the Persians. - -To have the true use of words we must compare them with things; in using -them we acknowledge that they seldom give a perfect representation of our -meaning. In like manner when we interrogate our ideas we find that we are -not using them always in the sense which we supposed. And Plato, while he -criticizes the inconsistency of his own doctrine of universals and draws -out the endless consequences which flow from the assertion either that -'Being is' or that 'Being is not,' by no means intends to deny the -existence of universals or the unity under which they are comprehended. -There is nothing further from his thoughts than scepticism. But before -proceeding he must examine the foundations which he and others have been -laying; there is nothing true which is not from some point of view untrue, -nothing absolute which is not also relative (compare Republic). - -And so, in modern times, because we are called upon to analyze our ideas -and to come to a distinct understanding about the meaning of words; because -we know that the powers of language are very unequal to the subtlety of -nature or of mind, we do not therefore renounce the use of them; but we -replace them in their old connexion, having first tested their meaning and -quality, and having corrected the error which is involved in them; or -rather always remembering to make allowance for the adulteration or alloy -which they contain. We cannot call a new metaphysical world into existence -any more than we can frame a new universal language; in thought as in -speech, we are dependent on the past. We know that the words 'cause' and -'effect' are very far from representing to us the continuity or the -complexity of nature or the different modes or degrees in which phenomena -are connected. Yet we accept them as the best expression which we have of -the correlation of forces or objects. We see that the term 'law' is a mere -abstraction, under which laws of matter and of mind, the law of nature and -the law of the land are included, and some of these uses of the word are -confusing, because they introduce into one sphere of thought associations -which belong to another; for example, order or sequence is apt to be -confounded with external compulsion and the internal workings of the mind -with their material antecedents. Yet none of them can be dispensed with; -we can only be on our guard against the error or confusion which arises out -of them. Thus in the use of the word 'substance' we are far from supposing -that there is any mysterious substratum apart from the objects which we -see, and we acknowledge that the negative notion is very likely to become a -positive one. Still we retain the word as a convenient generalization, -though not without a double sense, substance, and essence, derived from the -two-fold translation of the Greek ousia. - -So the human mind makes the reflection that God is not a person like -ourselves--is not a cause like the material causes in nature, nor even an -intelligent cause like a human agent--nor an individual, for He is -universal; and that every possible conception which we can form of Him is -limited by the human faculties. We cannot by any effort of thought or -exertion of faith be in and out of our own minds at the same instant. How -can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time -and space? How get rid of such forms and see Him as He is? How can we -imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves? Innumerable -contradictions follow from either of the two alternatives, that God is or -that He is not. Yet we are far from saying that we know nothing of Him, -because all that we know is subject to the conditions of human thought. To -the old belief in Him we return, but with corrections. He is a person, but -not like ourselves; a mind, but not a human mind; a cause, but not a -material cause, nor yet a maker or artificer. The words which we use are -imperfect expressions of His true nature; but we do not therefore lose -faith in what is best and highest in ourselves and in the world. - -'A little philosophy takes us away from God; a great deal brings us back to -Him.' When we begin to reflect, our first thoughts respecting Him and -ourselves are apt to be sceptical. For we can analyze our religious as -well as our other ideas; we can trace their history; we can criticize their -perversion; we see that they are relative to the human mind and to one -another. But when we have carried our criticism to the furthest point, -they still remain, a necessity of our moral nature, better known and -understood by us, and less liable to be shaken, because we are more aware -of their necessary imperfection. They come to us with 'better opinion, -better confirmation,' not merely as the inspirations either of ourselves or -of another, but deeply rooted in history and in the human mind. - - -PARMENIDES - -by - -Plato - -Translated by Benjamin Jowett - - -PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Cephalus, Adeimantus, Glaucon, Antiphon, -Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, Aristoteles. - -Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in -his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to -certain Clazomenians. - - -We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and -Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the -hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens? - -Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you. - -What may that be? he said. - -I want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have -forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but -that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was -Pyrilampes? - -Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask? - -Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of -philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain -Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place -between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having -often recited it to him. - -Quite true. - -And could we hear it? I asked. - -Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of -the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his -grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you -want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, -and he has only just left us to go home. - -Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of -giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, -his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an -acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to -repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of -the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had -described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to -Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time -of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. -Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of -his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that -they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither -Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with -him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to -Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno -himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly -finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles -who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of -the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before. - -When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis -of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, -he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is -many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for -neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like--is that your position? - -Just so, said Zeno. - -And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to -you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In -all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of -the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a -separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being -of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have -I misunderstood you? - -No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose. - -I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one -with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts -what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling -us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and -of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is -no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm -unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing -that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the -same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us. - -Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound -in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the -composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; -for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great -purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, -that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of -Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many -ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the -affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the -many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their -hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more -ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led -me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy; -and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the -motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the -pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in -other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one. - -I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, -Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, -and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that -in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term -many, participate--things which participate in likeness become in that -degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become -in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they -participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and -be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation?--Where is the -wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or -the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a -wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the -things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, -again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at -the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. -But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute -many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be -surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite -qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and -also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have -a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower -half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other -hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here -assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both -instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things -as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he -shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the -many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. -If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple -notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and -then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I -should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be -treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I -should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which -are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have -shown to exist in visible objects. - -While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno -were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but -still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and -smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides -expressed their feelings in the following words:-- - -Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell -me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the -things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of -likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, -and of the other things which Zeno mentioned? - -I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates. - -Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just -and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class? - -Yes, he said, I should. - -And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human -creatures, or of fire and water? - -I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or -not. - -And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the -mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or -anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of -these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into -contact, or not? - -Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they -appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming -any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think -that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up -this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a -bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of -which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them. - -Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the -time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer -grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at -your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I -should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which -all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that -similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; -and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that -just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake -of justice and beauty? - -Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning. - -Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a -part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation? - -There cannot be, he said. - -Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in -each one of the many? - -Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates. - -Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in -many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation -from itself. - -Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many -places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may -be one and the same in all at the same time. - -I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean -to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, -there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning? - -I think so. - -And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it -only, and different parts different men? - -The latter. - -Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which -participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea -existing in each of them? - -That seems to follow. - -Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible -and yet remains one? - -Certainly not, he said. - -Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great -things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than -absolute greatness--is that conceivable? - -No. - -Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less -than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that -portion only? - -Impossible. - -Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of -the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely -small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be -smaller and not greater than before. - -How absurd! - -Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if -they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes? - -Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered. - -Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question? - -What question? - -I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind -is as follows:--You see a number of great objects, and when you look at -them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them -all; hence you conceive of greatness as one. - -Very true, said Socrates. - -And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view -the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to -compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the -source of all these? - -It would seem so. - -Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute -greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over -and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each -idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied. - -But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper -existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may -still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication. - -And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing? - -Impossible, he said. - -The thought must be of something? - -Yes. - -Of something which is or which is not? - -Of something which is. - -Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as -attaching to all, being a single form or nature? - -Yes. - -And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, -be an idea? - -From that, again, there is no escape. - -Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the -ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and -that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought? - -The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In -my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other -things are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by the -participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them. - -But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be -like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the -idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of -like. - -Impossible. - -And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea? - -They must. - -And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be -the idea itself? - -Certainly. - -Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the -idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be -coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas -will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it? - -Quite true. - -The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by -resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation -devised? - -It would seem so. - -Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the -ideas to be absolute? - -Yes, indeed. - -And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of -the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, -parting it off from other things. - -What difficulty? he said. - -There are many, but the greatest of all is this:--If an opponent argues -that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain -unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies -their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to -follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and -still insist that they cannot be known. - -What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates. - -In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains -the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in -us. - -No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute. - -True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to -one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, -and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be -termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that -name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere -and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one -another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but -belong to themselves and not to them. - -What do you mean? said Socrates. - -I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:--A master has a -slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is -simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of -mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the -abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they -are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my -meaning? - -Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning. - -And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute -truth? - -Certainly. - -And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute -being? - -Yes. - -But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; -and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of -each kind of being which we have? - -Certainly. - -But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have? - -No, we cannot. - -And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea -of knowledge? - -Yes. - -And we have not got the idea of knowledge? - -No. - -Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in -absolute knowledge? - -I suppose not. - -Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and -all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us? - -It would seem so. - -I think that there is a stranger consequence still. - -What is it? - -Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such -a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the -same of beauty and of the rest? - -Yes. - -And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one -is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge? - -Certainly. - -But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human -things? - -Why not? - -Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not -valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; -the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres. - -Yes, that has been admitted. - -And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority -cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our -authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything -which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our -masters, neither do they know the things of men. - -Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous. - -These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the -difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine -each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said -against them will deny the very existence of them--and even if they do -exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he -will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, -will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very -considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an -absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all -these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able -to teach them to others. - -I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much -to my mind. - -And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these -and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not -admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is -always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; -and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to -have particularly noted. - -Very true, he said. - -But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the -ideas are unknown? - -I certainly do not see my way at present. - -Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your -attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas -generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your -deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the -day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is -assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art which is called by the -vulgar idle talking, and which is often imagined to be useless; in that you -must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will -elude your grasp. - -And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would -recommend? - -That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit -for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in -reference to visible things, or to consider the question that way; but only -in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas. - -Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by -this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience -anything. - -Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further, -and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, -but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that -will be still better training for you. - -What do you mean? he said. - -I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's -about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences -to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in -relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the -many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in -their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. -Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in -either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other -things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of -unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and -destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose -anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at -the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things -which you choose,--to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; -and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and -to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would -train yourself perfectly and see the real truth. - -That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not -quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the -steps?--then I shall apprehend you better. - -That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years. - -Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates. - -Zeno answered with a smile:--Let us make our petition to Parmenides -himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the -extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of -us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one, -especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most -people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is -the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, -Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process -again which I have not heard for a long time. - -When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of -him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated -Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said -Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, -against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, -who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he -knew so well--this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a -trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at -my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we -are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, -if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and -take my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which follow -on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one? - -By all means, said Zeno. - -And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will -not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; -and his answers will give me time to breathe. - -I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the -youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer. - -Parmenides proceeded: 1.a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many? - -Impossible. - -Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole? - -Why not? - -Because every part is part of a whole; is it not? - -Yes. - -And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole? - -Certainly. - -Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a -whole, and also as having parts? - -To be sure. - -And in either case, the one would be many, and not one? - -True. - -But, surely, it ought to be one and not many? - -It ought. - -Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not -have parts? - -No. - -But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; -for these would of course be parts of it. - -Right. - -But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything? - -Certainly. - -Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited? - -Yes, unlimited. - -And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight. - -But why? - -Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are -equidistant from the centre? - -Yes. - -And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the -extremes? - -True. - -Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a -straight or of a circular form? - -Assuredly. - -But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round? - -Right. - -And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be -either in another or in itself. - -How so? - -Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it -was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which -is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot -be touched all round in many places. - -Certainly not. - -But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained -by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; -for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it. - -Impossible. - -But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? -for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will -be no longer one, but two? - -True. - -Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another? - -No. - -Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either -rest or motion. - -Why not? - -Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or -changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion. - -Yes. - -And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer -one. - -It cannot. - -It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of -nature? - -Clearly not. - -Then can the motion of the one be in place? - -Perhaps. - -But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in -the same place, or from one place to another? - -It must. - -And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which -goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the -centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be -carried round upon a centre? - -Impossible. - -But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place? - -Perhaps so, if it moves at all. - -And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything? - -Yes. - -Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not? - -I do not see why. - -Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as -yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether -out of it, if already coming into being in it. - -Certainly not. - -And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and -then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which -has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within -nor wholly without anything. - -True. - -And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, -and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into -being either as a part or as a whole? - -Clearly. - -Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, nor by going -somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in -itself? - -Very true. - -Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable? - -Immoveable. - -But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm? - -Yes, we said so. - -Then it is never in the same? - -Why not? - -Because if it were in the same it would be in something. - -Certainly. - -And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other? - -True. - -Then one is never in the same place? - -It would seem not. - -But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest? - -Never. - -One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion? - -It certainly appears so. - -Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than -itself or other. - -How is that? - -If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one. - -True. - -And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that -upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would -be other than one? - -It would. - -Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself? - -It will not. - -Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but -only other, can be other than other, and nothing else. - -True. - -Then not by virtue of being one will it be other? - -Certainly not. - -But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by -virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not -be other than anything? - -Right. - -Neither will one be the same with itself. - -How not? - -Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same. - -Why not? - -It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one. - -What of that? - -Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and -not one. - -True. - -But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing -became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the -same? - -Certainly. - -And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, -and will therefore be one and also not one. - -Surely that is impossible. - -And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with -itself. - -Impossible. - -And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to -itself or other? - -No. - -Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other. - -Why not? - -Because likeness is sameness of affections. - -Yes. - -And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness? - -That has been shown. - -But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be -affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible. - -True. - -Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another -or with itself? - -Clearly not. - -Then it cannot be like another, or like itself? - -No. - -Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in -such a way as to be more than one. - -It would. - -That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike -itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness. - -True. - -But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike -itself or other? - -Never. - -Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other? - -Plainly not. - -Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to -itself or to other. - -How is that? - -Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which -it is equal. - -True. - -And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one -will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which -is greater? - -Yes. - -And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have -greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is -greater. - -Certainly. - -But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same -measures or have anything else the same? - -Impossible. - -And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with -itself or with another? - -It appears so. - -But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many -parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but -will have as many parts as measures. - -Right. - -And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it -has been shown to be incapable of equality. - -It has. - -Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor -of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or -less than itself, or other? - -Certainly. - -Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or -of the same age with it? - -Why not? - -Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must -partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not -partake either of equality or of likeness? - -We did say so. - -And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness. - -Very true. - -How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than -anything, or have the same age with it? - -In no way. - -Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself -or with another? - -Clearly not. - -Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not -that which is in time, be always growing older than itself? - -Certainly. - -And that which is older, must always be older than something which is -younger? - -True. - -Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time -younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than. - -What do you mean? - -I mean this:--A thing does not need to become different from another thing -which is already different; it IS different, and if its different has -become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be -different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been, -or be about to be, or yet be, a different--the only different possible is -one which is becoming. - -That is inevitable. - -But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to -nothing else. - -True. - -Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, -become younger than itself? - -Yes. - -But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter -time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about -to be, for the same time with itself? - -That again is inevitable. - -Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I -suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once -older and younger than themselves? - -Yes. - -But the one did not partake of those affections? - -Not at all. - -Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time? - -So the argument shows. - -Well, but do not the expressions 'was,' and 'has become,' and 'was -becoming,' signify a participation of past time? - -Certainly. - -And do not 'will be,' 'will become,' 'will have become,' signify a -participation of future time? - -Yes. - -And 'is,' or 'becomes,' signifies a participation of present time? - -Certainly. - -And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had -become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is -becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, -hereafter. - -Most true. - -But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these? - -There are none. - -Then the one cannot possibly partake of being? - -That is the inference. - -Then the one is not at all? - -Clearly not. - -Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were and -partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be -trusted, the one neither is nor is one? - -True. - -But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation? - -Of course not. - -Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor -knowledge of it? - -Clearly not. - -Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does -anything that is perceive it. - -So we must infer. - -But can all this be true about the one? - -I think not. - -1.b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; -let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question -appears. - -I shall be very happy to do so. - -We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever -they may be, which follow, if the one is? - -Yes. - -Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not -partake of being? - -Impossible. - -Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the -one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the -one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have -been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is -not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:--am I not right? - -Quite right. - -We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one? - -Of course. - -And when we put them together shortly, and say 'One is,' that is equivalent -to saying, 'partakes of being'? - -Quite true. - -Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this -hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts? - -How so? - -In this way:--If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of -being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since -the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, -itself be, and have for its parts, one and being? - -Certainly. - -And is each of these parts--one and being--to be simply called a part, or -must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'? - -The latter. - -Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part? - -Certainly. - -Again, of the parts of the one, if it is--I mean being and one--does either -fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one? - -Impossible. - -Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the -least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and -every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves -one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two. - -Certainly. - -And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity? - -Clearly. - -Let us take another direction. - -What direction? - -We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is? - -Yes. - -And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many? - -True. - -But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and -try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes--will -this abstract one be one only or many? - -One, I think. - -Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is -not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being? - -Certainly. - -If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is -one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is -other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness -and difference. - -Certainly. - -So that the other is not the same--either with the one or with being? - -Certainly not. - -And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or -the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be -rightly called both. - -How so. - -In this way--you may speak of being? - -Yes. - -And also of one? - -Yes. - -Then now we have spoken of either of them? - -Yes. - -Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both? - -Certainly. - -And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in any -such case do I not speak of both? - -Yes. - -And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two? - -Undoubtedly. - -And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one? - -It cannot. - -Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be -severally one? - -Clearly. - -And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, -the whole becomes three? - -Yes. - -And three are odd, and two are even? - -Of course. - -And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there -must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three? - -Certainly. - -There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there -are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three? - -Of course. - -If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are -two and thrice, there is thrice two? - -Undoubtedly. - -Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and -even taken odd times, and odd taken even times. - -True. - -And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be? - -None whatever. - -Then if one is, number must also be? - -It must. - -But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity -of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of -being: am I not right? - -Certainly. - -And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also -participate? - -Yes. - -Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing -that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the -very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of -being? - -In no way. - -And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being -of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it -have no limit. - -True. - -Then it has the greatest number of parts? - -Yes, the greatest number. - -Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part? - -Impossible. - -But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be -none? - -Certainly. - -Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in -any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it? - -True. - -But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same time? - -No; I see the impossibility of that. - -And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present -with all the parts of being, unless divided. - -True. - -And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are? - -Certainly. - -Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the -greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than -the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or -being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and co-extensive. - -Certainly that is true. - -The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many -and infinite? - -True. - -Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself -distributed by being, must also be many? - -Certainly. - -Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, -will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole? - -Certainly. - -And that which contains, is a limit? - -Of course. - -Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having -limits and yet unlimited in number? - -Clearly. - -And because having limits, also having extremes? - -Certainly. - -And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a -whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, -will that any longer be a whole? - -No. - -Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end. - -It will. - -But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would -not be in the middle? - -Yes. - -Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a -union of the two? - -True. - -And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too. - -How? - -Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole. - -True. - -And all the parts are contained by the whole? - -Yes. - -And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all? - -No. - -And the one is the whole? - -Of course. - -But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the -whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained -by the one; and thus the one will be in itself. - -That is true. - -But then, again, the whole is not in the parts--neither in all the parts, -nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if -there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; -for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not -in this, how can it be in them all? - -It cannot. - -Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of -the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible. - -Yes, impossible. - -But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the -parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all? - -Certainly. - -If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being -in itself, it must be in another. - -Very true. - -The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all -its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and -also in another. - -Certainly. - -The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in -motion? - -How? - -The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing -out of this, it is in the same, which is itself. - -True. - -And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest? - -Certainly. - -Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be -in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, -in motion? - -True. - -Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both -at rest and in motion? - -Clearly. - -And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same -with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous -affections. - -How so? - -Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; -or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a -whole, or of a whole to a part. - -Clearly. - -And is the one a part of itself? - -Certainly not. - -Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself -as whole to part? - -It cannot. - -But is the one other than one? - -No. - -And therefore not other than itself? - -Certainly not. - -If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, -must it not be the same with itself? - -Certainly. - -But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if this -'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than -'itself,' for it will be in another place? - -True. - -Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another? - -Yes. - -Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself? - -True. - -Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than -that which is other? - -Certainly. - -And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the -one other than the not-one? - -Of course. - -Then the one will be other than the others? - -True. - -But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, -opposites to one another? - -Of course. - -Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? - -They will not. - -If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other -is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, -the other would be in the same. Is not that true? - -Yes. - -And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that -is. - -True. - -Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one? - -Certainly not. - -Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the -not-one other than the one. - -No. - -Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not -partaking of the other. - -How can they be? - -But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, -will they not altogether escape being other than one another? - -They will. - -Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have -been not-one, but would have been in some way one. - -True. - -Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been -not-one at all. - -It would not. - -Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case -partake of the one? - -It would. - -If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then -neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or -whole of the one? - -No. - -But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, -nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said? - -Yes. - -Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is -the same with it? - -Let us say so. - -Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself -and the others. - -That appears to be the inference. - -And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others? - -Perhaps. - -Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also -be other than the one. - -Yes. - -And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are -other than it, and neither more nor less? - -True. - -And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree? - -Yes. - -In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others -in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and -the others like the one. - -How do you mean? - -I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a -thing? - -Yes. - -And you may say the name once or oftener? - -Yes. - -And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and -when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it -always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name -once or more than once? - -Of course it is the same. - -And is not 'other' a name given to a thing? - -Certainly. - -Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or oftener, you name -that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name? - -True. - -Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other -than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to -which the name is applied, and of no other? - -Quite true. - -Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than -the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in the same -condition; and that which is in the same condition is like? - -Yes. - -Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, -every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every -thing. - -True. - -Again, the like is opposed to the unlike? - -Yes. - -And the other to the same? - -True again. - -And the one was also shown to be the same with the others? - -Yes. - -And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the -others? - -Certainly. - -And in that it was other it was shown to be like? - -Yes. - -But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite -affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of -otherness. - -Yes. - -The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of -the other. - -True. - -Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it -is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same. - -Yes, that argument may be used. - -And there is another argument. - -What? - -In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, -and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is -like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being -otherwise affected is unlike. - -True. - -Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, -on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like -and unlike the others? - -Certainly. - -And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on -either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike -itself? - -Of course. - -Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?--consider. - -I am considering. - -The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole? - -True. - -And also in other things? - -Yes. - -In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so -far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would -touch itself only. - -Clearly. - -Then the inference is that it would touch both? - -It would. - -But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to -touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place -nearest to that in which what it touches is situated? - -True. - -Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to -itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is? - -It ought. - -And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at -once, and this, while it is one, will never happen. - -No. - -Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two? - -It cannot. - -Neither can it touch others. - -Why not? - -The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation -from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be -between them. - -True. - -Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible? - -They are. - -And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will -be three, and the contacts two? - -Yes. - -And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows -that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two -terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms -exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for every -one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added -to the contacts. - -True. - -Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one -less. - -True. - -But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact? - -How can there be? - -And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and -have no part in the one? - -True. - -Then they have no number, if they have no one in them? - -Of course not. - -Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of -any number? - -No. - -One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist? - -Clearly not. - -And if there are not two, there is no contact? - -There is not. - -Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if -there is no contact? - -Certainly not. - -For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the -others? - -True. - -Further--is the one equal and unequal to itself and others? - -How do you mean? - -If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or -less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in -virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their -being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, -or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had -greatness and the others smallness--whichever kind had greatness would be -greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller? - -Certainly. - -Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were -not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which -is. - -How could they? - -If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the -whole or in a part of the whole? - -Certainly. - -Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the -whole one, or will contain the one? - -Clearly. - -If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or if -containing the one it will be greater than the one? - -Of course. - -But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have -the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions? - -Impossible. - -Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part -only? - -Yes. - -And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will -recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is. - -Certainly. - -Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; -nor will there be anything small but actual smallness. - -True. - -Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there -will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that -in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there, -which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, -seeing that smallness is wholly absent. - -True. - -But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and -smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness. - -Very true. - -Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither -greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of -exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to -one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it -has neither greatness nor smallness. - -Clearly not. - -Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot -either exceed or be exceeded by them? - -Certainly not. - -And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and -being on an equality, must be equal. - -Of course. - -And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having -neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be -exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself. - -Certainly. - -Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others? - -Clearly so. - -And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without -itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as -contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than -itself. - -It will. - -Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and -the others? - -Of course not. - -But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere? - -Yes. - -But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be -greater; in no other way can one thing be in another. - -True. - -And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and -they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the -others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere? - -That is clear. - -But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than -the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, -because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, -the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the -others less than the one. - -True. - -The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the -others? - -Clearly. - -And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and -less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, -also of parts? - -Of course. - -And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in -number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in -number to itself and to the others? - -How is that? - -It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as -many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that -than which it is less. - -True. - -And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of -equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and -if of measures then also of parts? - -It will. - -And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to -itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself? - -Certainly. - -And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is -greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it -is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size -to other things, it will be equal to them in number. - -Certainly. - -Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to -and more and less than both itself and all other things. - -It will. - -Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and -younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than -itself and others, by virtue of participation in time? - -How do you mean? - -If one is, being must be predicated of it? - -Yes. - -But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to -have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to -be is the participation of being at a future time? - -Very true. - -Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time? - -Certainly. - -And is not time always moving forward? - -Yes. - -Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward -in time? - -Certainly. - -And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes -younger? - -I remember. - -Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the -same time? - -Certainly. - -Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself? - -Yes. - -And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time -between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now': for surely in going from the -past to the future, it cannot skip the present? - -No. - -And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no -longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached -by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both -the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, -while in process of becoming between them. - -True. - -But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the -present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be -becoming. - -Clearly. - -And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to -become, and is then older. - -Certainly. - -And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was -becoming older than itself. - -Yes. - -And that which is older is older than that which is younger? - -True. - -Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the -present? - -Certainly. - -But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for -whenever it is it is always now. - -Certainly. - -Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself? - -Truly. - -And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with -itself? - -An equal time. - -But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same -age with itself? - -Of course. - -And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger? - -No. - -The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor -becomes older or younger than itself? - -I should say not. - -And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older -or younger than they? - -I cannot tell you. - -You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one-- -other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than -one? - -They will have multitude. - -And a multitude implies a number larger than one? - -Of course. - -And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to -have come into existence? - -The lesser. - -Then the least is the first? And that is the one? - -Yes. - -Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into -being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not -singular. - -They have. - -And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into -being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came -into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the -other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other -things? - -True. - -What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being -contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible? - -Impossible. - -And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a -beginning, middle and end? - -Yes. - -And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into -being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you -reach the end? - -Certainly. - -And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the -one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one? - -Yes; that is what we shall say. - -But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into -being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in -accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come -into being after the others, simultaneously with the end. - -Clearly. - -Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one. - -That also is clear in my judgment. - -Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, -if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one? - -Certainly. - -And will not the one come into being together with each part--together with -the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second -part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is -added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; -it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the -last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on? - -True. - -Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one -itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor -posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument -the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others -than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older -and younger than the others and the others than the one. - -Certainly. - -After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming -older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither -older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of -becoming, or otherwise? - -I cannot answer. - -But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than -another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it -was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or -to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first. - -Of course. - -Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, -since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has become -older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so. - -True. - -And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than -the others which are. - -No. - -But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way. - -In what way? - -Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than -the one. - -And what of that? - -If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than -the others. - -Yes. - -But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will -the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion -than before? - -By a smaller portion. - -Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others -will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added -to both of them they will differ less and less in age? - -Yes. - -And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from -being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was -older? - -Yes, younger. - -And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than -they were before, in relation to the one. - -Certainly. - -Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which -previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is -always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the -other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in -process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going -in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the -younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They -cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be -and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always -becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger -than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others -become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the -same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were -seen to be older, and prior to the one. - -That is clear. - -Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in -that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot -become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but -inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into -being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion ---in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the -one, and the one than the others. - -Certainly. - -For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than -itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than -itself or the others. - -Certainly. - -But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and -younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future? - -Of course it must. - -Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and -will become? - -Certainly. - -And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and -belongs to it? - -True. - -And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of -the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it? - -Quite right. - -Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, -and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to -the one. - -Certainly, that is true. - -Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both -one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and -participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake -of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being? - -Certainly. - -But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of -being when partaking of being? - -Impossible. - -Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for -that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same. - -True. - -And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes -being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives -and also gives it up at some time? - -Impossible. - -And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming? - -I should. - -And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction? - -I should. - -The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and -giving up being. - -Certainly. - -And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when -it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one? - -Certainly. - -And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience -separation and aggregation? - -Inevitably. - -And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and -dissimilated? - -Yes. - -And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be -equalized? - -True. - -And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to -motion, it can surely be in no time at all? - -How can it? - -But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in -motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without -experiencing change, is impossible. - -Impossible. - -And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither -in motion nor at rest? - -There cannot. - -But neither can it change without changing. - -True. - -When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when -in motion, or when in time? - -It cannot. - -And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really -exist? - -What thing? - -The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change -takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state -of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this -curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not -being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes -into rest, and what is at rest into motion. - -So it appears. - -And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to -either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes -in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not -then be either in motion or at rest. - -It will not. - -And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes, when it -passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming ---then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is -nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed. - -Very true. - -And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to -one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and -in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither -like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; -and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be -neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or -diminution, or equalization. - -True. - -All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being. - -Of course. - -1.aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others--is not that also to -be considered? - -Yes. - -Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than -the one. - -Let us do so. - -Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the -one; for if they were they could not be other than the one. - -Very true. - -Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they -participate in the one. - -In what way? - -Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for -if they had no parts they would be simply one. - -Right. - -And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole? - -So we say. - -And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be -parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a -whole. - -How do you mean? - -If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely -be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one -of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a -part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each -one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of any one of the -many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else -of all those things of none of which it is anything. - -Clearly not. - -Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain -single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of -all--of this the part will be a part. - -Certainly. - -If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in -the one. - -True. - -Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts. - -Certainly. - -And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in -the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it -is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each. - -True. - -But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be -other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but -would have been one; whereas only the itself can be one. - -Very true. - -Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will -be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one -part of the whole which is the whole of the part. - -True. - -And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it? - -Of course. - -And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things -which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would -be nothing. - -True. - -But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in -the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which -participate in the one be infinite in number? - -How so? - -Let us look at the matter thus:--Is it not a fact that in partaking of the -one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when -they are partaking of it? - -Clearly. - -They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present? - -Very true. - -And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, -must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a -multitude and not one? - -It must. - -And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded -simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited -in number? - -Certainly. - -And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit -in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to -the parts. - -Just so. - -The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and -the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them -limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they -have no limit. - -That is clear. - -Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and -also partake of limit. - -Certainly. - -Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves. - -How is that? - -Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected -in the same way. - -True. - -And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the -same way. - -Of course. - -But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are -affected in opposite ways. - -Yes. - -And opposites are the most unlike of things. - -Certainly. - -Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be -like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them -together, most opposed and most unlike. - -That appears to be true. - -Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another? - -True. - -And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion -and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be -proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have -experienced the affections aforesaid? - -True. - -1.bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters -as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether -opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others. - -By all means. - -Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of -the others? - -Let us ask that question. - -Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one? - -Why so? - -Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both -of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things. - -Yes, all things. - -Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which -both the one and the others might exist? - -There is nothing. - -Then the one and the others are never in the same? - -True. - -Then they are separated from each other? - -Yes. - -And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts? - -Impossible. - -Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be -separated from the others, and has no parts? - -Impossible. - -Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do -not partake either in whole or in part? - -It would seem not. - -Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any -unity? - -There is not. - -Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be -a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the -one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part. - -True. - -Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived -of the one? - -True. - -Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and -unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them -likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to -one another. - -That is clear. - -But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by -us to be impossible? - -Impossible. - -Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like -or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be -one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which -would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible. - -True. - -Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, -nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, -nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if -they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate -in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been -proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in -every way devoid of the one. - -Very true. - -Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in -relation to itself and to other things. - -Certainly. - -2.a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence -if the one is not? - -Yes; we ought. - -What is the meaning of the hypothesis--If the one is not; is there any -difference between this and the hypothesis--If the not one is not? - -There is a difference, certainly. - -Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions--if the -one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed? - -They are entirely opposed. - -And suppose a person to say:--If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or -anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an -expression, that 'what is not' is other than other things? - -To be sure. - -And so when he says 'If one is not' he clearly means, that what 'is not' is -other than all others; we know what he means--do we not? - -Yes, we do. - -When he says 'one,' he says something which is known; and secondly -something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference -whether he predicate of one being or not-being, for that which is said 'not -to be' is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from -other things. - -Certainly. - -Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the -consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of -it, or the very meaning of the words, 'if one is not,' would not be known. - -True. - -Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as -different from the others? - -Certainly. - -Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of -the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in -the others, but in the one. - -Clearly so. - -Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to -'that,' and 'this,' and 'these,' and the like, and is an attribute of -'this'; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken -of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or -been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not -partake of 'some,' or of the other relations just now mentioned. - -True. - -Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one -that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and -nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not -is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different -nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is -not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate -'that,' and in many others. - -Certainly. - -And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being -different from the one will be of a different kind. - -Certainly. - -And are not things of a different kind also other in kind? - -Of course. - -And are not things other in kind unlike? - -They are unlike. - -And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be -unlike them? - -Clearly so. - -Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike -it? - -That would seem to be true. - -And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have -likeness to itself. - -How so? - -If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will -the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than -one? - -Quite so. - -But that cannot be. - -No. - -Then the one must have likeness to itself? - -It must. - -Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would -at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no -being, then it can neither be nor be like? - -It cannot. - -But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to -it? - -Certainly not. - -And things that are not equal are unequal? - -True. - -And they are unequal to an unequal? - -Of course. - -Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are -unequal to it? - -Very true. - -And inequality implies greatness and smallness? - -Yes. - -Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness? - -That appears to be true. - -And greatness and smallness always stand apart? - -True. - -Then there is always something between them? - -There is. - -And can you think of anything else which is between them other than -equality? - -No, it is equality which lies between them. - -Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies -between them? - -That is clear. - -Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and -smallness and equality? - -Clearly. - -Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being? - -How so? - -It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying -that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what -is. Am I not right? - -Yes. - -And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say -what is? - -Certainly. - -Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to -be when it is not, but (Or, 'to remit something of existence in relation to -not-being.') were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not- -being, it would at once be. - -Quite true. - -Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being -of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond -the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the -truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is -when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not- -being--that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being does not -partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being--that -is the perfection of not-being. - -Most true. - -Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must -not the one also partake of being in order not to be? - -Certainly. - -Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being? - -Clearly. - -And has not-being also, if it is not? - -Of course. - -But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without -changing? - -Impossible. - -Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change? - -Certainly. - -And change is motion--we may say that? - -Yes, motion. - -And the one has been proved both to be and not to be? - -Yes. - -And therefore is and is not in the same state? - -Yes. - -Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it -changes from being to not-being? - -That appears to be true. - -But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, -it cannot change from one place to another? - -Impossible. - -Then it cannot move by changing place? - -No. - -Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the -same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are? - -It cannot. - -Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not? - -No. - -Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than -itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could -not be still speaking of the one, but of something else? - -True. - -But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same -place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion? - -Impossible. - -Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest -must stand still? - -Certainly. - -Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion? - -That seems to be true. - -But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything -which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, -but in another? - -Yes. - -Then the one, being moved, is altered? - -Yes. - -And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way? - -No. - -Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so -far as it is not moved, it is not altered? - -Right. - -Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered? - -That is clear. - -And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and -lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can -neither come into being nor be destroyed? - -Very true. - -And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not -being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not -becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed? - -True. - -2.b. And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether -these or some other consequences will follow. - -Let us do as you say. - -If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the -question. - -Yes. - -Do not the words 'is not' signify absence of being in that to which we -apply them? - -Just so. - -And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way -but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no -sort or way or kind participation of being? - -Quite absolutely. - -Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being? - -It cannot. - -And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of -being and the loss of being? - -Nothing else. - -And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose -being? - -Impossible. - -The one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume being in -any way? - -True. - -Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither -perishes nor becomes? - -No. - -Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be -destroyed? - -True. - -But if it be not altered it cannot be moved? - -Certainly not. - -Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must -always be in one and the same spot? - -Of course. - -Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never -moves? - -Neither. - -Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there -had been, it would partake of being? - -That is clear. - -And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be -attributed to it? - -No. - -Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others? - -Clearly not. - -Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be -attributed to it? - -Certainly not. - -And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or -different in relation to it? - -They cannot. - -Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the -attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor -can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any -other thing that is, have any concern with it? - -No. - -Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind? - -Such appears to be the conclusion. - -2.aa. Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us -determine that. - -Yes; let us determine that. - -The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could -not be now speaking of them. - -True. - -But to speak of the others implies difference--the terms 'other' and -'different' are synonymous? - -True. - -Other means other than other, and different, different from the different? - -Yes. - -Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be -other? - -Certainly. - -And what can that be?--for if the one is not, they will not be other than -the one. - -They will not. - -Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative -is that they are other than nothing. - -True. - -And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular; -for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is -infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the -smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, -as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in -comparison with the fractions into which it is split up? - -Very true. - -And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others -are, and the one is not? - -Exactly. - -And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not -being one, if one is not? - -True. - -And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them -appears to be one, though it is really many? - -It can. - -And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no -reality, if one is not? - -Yes. - -And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem -large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are -contained in it? - -Certainly. - -And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for -it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without -having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the -appearance of equality. - -Yes. - -And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet -appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other. - -How so? - -Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the -beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining -after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because -no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not. - -Very true. - -And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, -for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity? - -Certainly. - -And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; -but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to -be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not? - -Nothing more certain. - -Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and -many, if others than the one exist and not the one. - -They must. - -Then will they not appear to be like and unlike? - -In what way? - -Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a -distance, and to be in the same state and alike? - -True. - -But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and -because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and -unlike, themselves? - -True. - -And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each -other. - -Certainly. - -And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in -contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort -of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in -neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if -the one is not and the many are? - -Most true. - -2.bb. Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is -not, and the others of the one are, what will follow. - -Let us ask that question. - -In the first place, the others will not be one? - -Impossible. - -Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in -them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore -they will not be many. - -True. - -If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one. - -They are not. - -Nor do they appear either as one or many. - -Why not? - -Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort -of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the -others; for that which is not has no parts. - -True. - -Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connexion with -the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others. - -No. - -Then if one is not, there is no conception of any of the others either as -one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one. - -You cannot. - -Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be -either one or many? - -It would seem not. - -Nor as like or unlike? - -No. - -Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of -those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;--the others neither -are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not? - -True. - -Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is -not, then nothing is? - -Certainly. - -Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the -truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to -themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and -appear to be and appear not to be. - -Most true. - - - - - -End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Parmenides, by Plato - |