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diff --git a/old/ryxis10.txt b/old/ryxis10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..770fa00 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/ryxis10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1127 @@ +*The Project Gutenberg Etext of Eryxias, by a Platonic Imitator* +#22 in our series by Plato [This is probably NOT by Plato!] + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +ERYXIAS + +by a Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II) + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +APPENDIX II. + +The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not +mentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claim to be +ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be assigned +probably to the second or third generation after Plato, when his writings +were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibit considerable +originality, and are remarkable for containing several thoughts of the sort +which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient, and which therefore have +a peculiar interest for us. The Second Alcibiades shows that the +difficulties about prayer which have perplexed Christian theologians were +not unknown among the followers of Plato. The Eryxias was doubted by the +ancients themselves: yet it may claim the distinction of being, among all +Greek or Roman writings, the one which anticipates in the most striking +manner the modern science of political economy and gives an abstract form +to some of its principal doctrines. + +For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend and +secretary, Mr. Knight. + +That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a +genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic, and +was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic is poor and +weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; and there is a +certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, which is very un- +Platonic. The best passage is probably that about the poets:--the remark +that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, is uncommonly difficult to +understand, and the ridiculous interpretation of Homer, are entirely in the +spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol.). The characters are ill- +drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and preaches too much, while +Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. There are traces of Stoic +influence in the general tone and phraseology of the Dialogue (compare opos +melesei tis...kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai): and the writer seems to +have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato (compare Laws). An incident +from the Symposium is rather clumsily introduced, and two somewhat +hackneyed quotations (Symp., Gorg.) recur. The reference to the death of +Archelaus as having occurred 'quite lately' is only a fiction, probably +suggested by the Gorgias, where the story of Archelaus is told, and a +similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echthes kai proen gegonota tauta, k.t.l. +There are several passages which are either corrupt or extremely ill- +expressed. But there is a modern interest in the subject of the dialogue; +and it is a good example of a short spurious work, which may be attributed +to the second or third century before Christ. + + +ERYXIAS + +by + +Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION. + +Much cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the Eryxias. +It is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is full of +small imitations of Plato:--Phaeax returning from an expedition to Sicily +(compare Socrates in the Charmides from the army at Potidaea), the figure +of the game at draughts, borrowed from the Republic, etc. It has also in +many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, the rather +unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quite unlike +the urbanity of Plato. + +Yet there are some points in the argument which are deserving of attention. +(1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand for it, is the first +anticipation in an abstract form of one of the great principles of modern +political economy, and the nearest approach to it to be found in an ancient +writer. (2) The resolution of wealth into its simplest implements going on +to infinity is a subtle and refined thought. (3) That wealth is relative +to circumstances is a sound conception. (4) That the arts and sciences +which receive payment are likewise to be comprehended under the notion of +wealth, also touches a question of modern political economy. (5) The +distinction of post hoc and propter hoc, often lost sight of in modern as +well as in ancient times. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions +show considerable power of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of +his merits as an imitator of Plato. + + +ERYXIAS + +by + +Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias. + +SCENE: The portico of a temple of Zeus. + + +It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me in the +Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critias and +Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew of +Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and that part +of the world. As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates! + +SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to +tell us? + +ERASISTRATUS: Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down; +for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara. + +SOCRATES: Gladly, if that is your desire. + +ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? he said. What the +Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To my +mind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a little +annoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nests if you +wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, the Syracusans, +unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with a great +expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injuries which we at +present inflict merely irritate them enough to make them utterly +intractable. And now they have sent ambassadors to Athens, and intend, I +suspect, to play us some trick.--While we were talking, the Syracusan +envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one of them, said to +me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and Sicily. For who +has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please? +And they are of a quality, too, finer than any other land in Hellas. +Moreover, he has all the things which go to make up wealth, slaves and +horses innumerable, gold and silver without end. + +I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I +asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear in +Sicily? + +ERASISTRATUS: He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of all +the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich; indeed, +if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst and the +richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named. + +I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about wealth +and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and I asked +Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier,--he who was the possessor of +a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents? + +ERASISTRATUS: The owner of the field. + +SOCRATES: And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and such +things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would be richer +than the stranger? + +ERASISTRATUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you +prefer? + +ERASISTRATUS: That which was most valuable. + +SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer? + +ERASISTRATUS: By choosing as I said. + +SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the +greatest value? + +ERASISTRATUS: He does. + +SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a +possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no one +who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all the King +of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men set health +above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference to the +other. + +ERASISTRATUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he +would be the richest who possessed it? + +ERASISTRATUS: He would. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were to ask, +Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what is of the +greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession will best +enable a man to advise how his own and his friend's affairs should be +administered?--What will be our reply? + +ERASISTRATUS: I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most precious +of human possessions. + +SOCRATES: Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most +prosperous to be the happiest? + +ERASISTRATUS: That is my opinion. + +SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in +respect either of themselves or of other men? + +ERASISTRATUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should be +done and what should be left undone;--these behave the most wisely and make +the fewest mistakes? + +Erasistratus agreed to this. + +SOCRATES: Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate and +the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is really +the most valuable of our possessions? + +Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had the +wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drink and +clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then? Or how +could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because +he had not wherewithal to live? + +I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I replied, +Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so ill-provided; +whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the house were full of gold +and silver, he would lack nothing? + +ERYXIAS: Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in +exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he could +supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything. + +SOCRATES: True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house to +the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by +wisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these, if +he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most useful +and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in the +comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living in a +shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is of no +importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highest matters? Or +is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and +marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers? Surely the +prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or the artist of any kind who is +proficient in his art, is more worth than the things which are especially +reckoned among riches; and he who can advise well and prudently for himself +and others is able also to sell the product of his art, if he so desire. + +Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and +said, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the truth, you +would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of Hipponicus. And +yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of real importance, you +would not any the more be richer than he. + +I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of ours as +a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but are like +the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move in such a way +that his opponents are unable to make any countermove. (Compare Republic.) +And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of opinion that while facts +remain the same, there are arguments, no matter whether true or false, +which enable the user of them to prove that the wisest and the richest are +one and the same, although he is in the wrong and his opponents are in the +right. There would be nothing strange in this; it would be as if two +persons were to dispute about letters, one declaring that the word Socrates +began with an S, the other that it began with an A, and the latter could +gain the victory over the former. + +Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if he +had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,--No, +indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a kind +which would never convince any one of those here present or be of advantage +to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and +the richest are the same? The truth is that we are discussing the subject +of riches, and my notion is that we should argue respecting the honest and +dishonest means of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good +thing or a bad. + +Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we will +be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the +argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point at +issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil? + +I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add +something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so, +Eryxias? + +Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not +fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion. + +And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could not +compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if they were +a good, they could not appear bad for any one? + +Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument +about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I knew +the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For I should be +ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could to prevent your +difference. And I should do the same if you were quarrelling about any +other art and were likely, unless you agreed on the point in dispute, to +part as enemies instead of as friends. But now, when we are contending +about a thing of which the usefulness continues during the whole of life, +and it makes an enormous difference whether we are to regard it as +beneficial or not,--a thing, too, which is esteemed of the highest +importance by the Hellenes:--(for parents, as soon as their children are, +as they think, come to years of discretion, urge them to consider how +wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value of a man is judged):-- +When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in other respects, +fall to disputing about a matter of such moment, that is, about wealth, and +not merely whether it is black or white, light or heavy, but whether it is +a good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest of friends and +kinsmen, the most bitter hatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your +dissension to the best of my power. If I could, I would tell you the +truth, and so put an end to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each +of you supposes that you can bring the other to an agreement, I am +prepared, as far as my capacity admits, to help you in solving the +question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines +which you yourself entertain. + +CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias +whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men? + +ERYXIAS: Most decidedly. + +CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good? + +ERYXIAS: An evil. + +CRITIAS: Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife and +commits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this although both +the state and the laws forbid? + +ERYXIAS: Unjustly. + +CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he +will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means cannot +do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a case, surely, +it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his poverty prevents +the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are evil? Or, again, +should you call sickness a good or an evil? + +ERYXIAS: An evil. + +CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate? + +ERYXIAS: Yes. + +CRITIAS: Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man +should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he cannot +owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he should be too +poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have a superabundance +of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although he desire never so +much. + +Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not +been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck him. +For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when it became +obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion about wealth. +I observed his vexation, and feared that they would proceed to abuse and +quarrelling: so I said,--I heard that very argument used in the Lyceum +yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he +was talking mere nonsense, and no one could be persuaded that he was +speaking the truth. And when at last a certain talkative young gentleman +came in, and, taking his seat, began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus, +tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the +ear of the audience far more than Prodicus. + +Can you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus. + +SOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking +Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an +evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good to +good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed, while +to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true, he went +on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they are +themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:-- + +'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.' + +Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom +whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to me. +Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he has +converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach me +grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates to +grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good to me. + +Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said. + +And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like building a +house,--the work of human agency; or do things remain what they were at +first, good or bad, for all time? + +Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument was +likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling before +all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would not have +minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good things +is a work of human agency. + +And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction? + +The latter, said Prodicus. + +Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could obtain +by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or any other art, +which he must either learn from another or find out for himself? + +Prodicus agreed to this also. + +And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you +mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and +wise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to the +evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it would +appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know. + +Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he had been +proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately granted to us +whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to the Acropolis you +earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you know not +whether they can yield your request, it is as though you went to the doors +of the grammarian and begged him, although you had never made a study of +the art, to give you a knowledge of grammar which would enable you +forthwith to do the business of a grammarian. + +While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his youthful +assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have just made +use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a vain prayer +to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and begged him to +leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which were unsuited to +them, and therefore bad for them. + +I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are +circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and said +what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and he +would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so +excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have +brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts, if +two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an honest +fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often has the +contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while the same +evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as perfectly true. +And probably the audience have something of the same feeling about yourself +and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a braggart, and regard you as a +gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they do not pay attention to the +argument so much as to the character of the speaker. + +But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking, Critias +does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight. + +SOCRATES: I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have +begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There is +still something lacking, now you have agreed that (wealth) is a good to +some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes wealth; +for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an understanding as +to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to assist you in the +enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him who affirms that +riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is wealth. + +ERASISTRATUS: Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond that +which men commonly have. I suppose that wealth is a quantity of money +(compare Arist. Pol.); and this, I imagine, would also be Critias' +definition. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later on +we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the +Carthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size of +a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one knows +but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which then passes +into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such pieces is +esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among us had a mass +of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many pebbles from +the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight which has been +rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of such iron is thought +to be the richest, although elsewhere it has no value. In Ethiopia +engraved stones are employed, of which a Lacedaemonian could make no use. +Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a man who owned the house of Polytion +would not be thought richer than one who possessed Mount Lycabettus among +ourselves. And clearly those things cannot all be regarded as possessions; +for in some cases the possessors would appear none the richer thereby: +but, as I was saying, some one of them is thought in one place to be money, +and the possessors of it are the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is +not money, and the ownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the +standard of morals varies, and what is honourable to some men is +dishonourable to others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable +to us but not to the Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather +which is worthless to us, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we +do not, can we not get an answer in some such way as this: Would an +Athenian, who had a thousand talents weight of the stones which lie about +in the Agora and which we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be +any the richer? + +ERASISTRATUS: He certainly would not appear so to me. + +SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious +stone, we should say that he was very rich? + +ERASISTRATUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful? + +ERASISTRATUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value +because they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much +store on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he +could use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage is +not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver, to +procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us. + +ERASISTRATUS: True. + +SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to us +is not wealth? + +But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting. Do we not +employ in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) and +various other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth. + +SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is wealth? +That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all,--thus much is acknowledged +by every one. But what particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let +us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps find what we +are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for what purpose has the +possession of riches been invented,--in the sense, I mean, in which drugs +have been discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we may +throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear that whatever +constitutes wealth must be useful, and that wealth is one class of useful +things; and now we have to enquire, What is the use of those useful things +which constitute wealth? For all things probably may be said to be useful +which we use in production, just as all things which have life are animals, +but there is a special kind of animal which we call 'man.' Now if any one +were to ask us, What is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want +medicine and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be +the case if disease were absent from our bodies and either never came to +them at all or went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore +conclude that medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of +disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were +free, we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have +none, suppose that we restate the question thus:--If a man could live +without food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he +want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs? + +ERYXIAS: He would not. + +SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for +the service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and heat +and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us, there +would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any +necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in order that +we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect of our various +wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is useful in ministering +to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not +need wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as wealth. + +ERYXIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what is +useful to this end? + +Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably +troubled him. + +SOCRATES: And what is your opinion about another question:--Would you say +that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless for +the production of the same result? + +ERYXIAS: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to +produce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not. + +SOCRATES: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue, +we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it +would be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases. + +ERYXIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the +existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it? + +ERYXIAS: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do not +use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and bedding +and houses,--if without these we could satisfy the wants of the body, they +would be of no use to us for that purpose? + +ERYXIAS: They would not. + +SOCRATES: They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are +useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what was +useful to us? + +ERYXIAS: O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold and +silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of +opinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the +money which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that +these things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure wealth. + +SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question? There are persons, +are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and thus +procure those things of which they stand in need? + +ERYXIAS: There are. + +SOCRATES: And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange +for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold and +silver? + +ERYXIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the +purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not say +that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs? + +ERYXIAS: We do. + +SOCRATES: Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts +are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly, the +possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it +difficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are the +wealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose +that we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our reply be, +'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?' + +ERYXIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to him +who knows how to use it? + +ERYXIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else? + +ERYXIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are +supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how to +use them? + +ERYXIAS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good +man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used? + +ERYXIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The good and gentle, therefore will alone have profit from these +things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if so, to +them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that where a +person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if +some one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what was +before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him knowledge he +has also conferred riches upon him. + +ERYXIAS: That is the case. + +SOCRATES: Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by the +argument. + +CRITIAS: No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you +not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things +which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been exceedingly +delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been holding. + +SOCRATES: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the +same kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode's +recitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been said. +But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certain things +useful to the builder when he is building a house? + +CRITIAS: They are. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that those things are useful which are +employed in house building,--stones and bricks and beams and the like, and +also the instruments with which the builder built the house, the beams and +stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which these were +obtained? + +CRITIAS: It seems to me that they are all useful for building. + +SOCRATES: And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials but +the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work could +not go on, are useful for that art? + +CRITIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And further, the instruments by which the instruments are +procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage ad infinitum,--are not +all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the work? + +CRITIAS: We may fairly suppose such to be the case. + +SOCRATES: And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other things +which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any other +means by which he could procure that which he now has? + +CRITIAS: I do not think so. + +SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for +the use of the body? + +CRITIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to +appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle that things +cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same process. + +CRITIAS: But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For you +maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become +useless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad things +are needed, and good for others. + +SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose? + +CRITIAS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of +virtue? + +CRITIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by +word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing? + +CRITIAS: Certainly not, I think. + +SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught +by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction? + +CRITIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that art +too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e.g. when +hearing is procured by the aid of medicine. + +CRITIAS: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we +not regard wealth as useful for virtue? + +CRITIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured? + +CRITIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and disgraceful +means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which enables him to +acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty for the acquisition +of virtue? + +CRITIAS: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue? + +CRITIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we obtain +what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for the same +object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good purposes? +The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this way:--If things +are useful towards the several ends for which they exist, which ends would +not come into existence without them, how would you regard them? Can +ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or +vice for virtue? + +CRITIAS: Never. + +SOCRATES: And yet we have already agreed--have we not?--that there can be +no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, nor health +where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has not been vice? + +CRITIAS: I think that we have. + +SOCRATES: But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a +thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it. Otherwise ignorance +would appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice for virtue. + +Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which went to +prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was as difficult +to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boil a stone, so I +said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since we cannot agree +whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or not. But what +shall we say to another question: Which is the happier and better man,--he +who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for body and diet, or he +who requires only the fewest and least? The answer will perhaps become +more obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the man himself at different +times, to consider whether his condition is better when he is sick or when +he is well? + +CRITIAS: That is not a question which needs much consideration. + +SOCRATES: Probably, I said, every one can understand that health is a +better condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and the most +various needs, when we are sick or when we are well? + +CRITIAS: When we are sick. + +SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and most +especial need and desire of bodily pleasures? + +CRITIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of +such things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two +persons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the other +few and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and +some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are all +desires? + +CRITIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But desires are only the lack of something: and those who have +the greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none or +very slight ones? + +CRITIAS: Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad, and +that the greater their wants the worse they are. + +SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for a +purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose? + +CRITIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the +body, we must want them for that purpose? + +CRITIAS: That is my opinion. + +SOCRATES: And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful for his +purpose, will also want the greatest number of means of accomplishing it, +supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all useful things? + +CRITIAS: It seems so. + +SOCRATES: The argument proves then that he who has great riches has +likewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body; for +wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be in the +worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Eryxias, by a Platonic Imitator + diff --git a/old/ryxis10.zip b/old/ryxis10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..aef3a0b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/ryxis10.zip |