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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1673-h.zip b/1673-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..accc12d --- /dev/null +++ b/1673-h.zip diff --git a/1673-h/1673-h.htm b/1673-h/1673-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..769ec17 --- /dev/null +++ b/1673-h/1673-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,1918 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Lesser Hippias, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lesser Hippias, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lesser Hippias + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: October 15, 2008 [EBook #1673] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSER HIPPIAS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + LESSER HIPPIAS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Plato + </h2> + <p> + (see Appendix I) <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_APPE"> APPENDIX I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> LESSER HIPPIAS </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_APPE" id="link2H_APPE"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + APPENDIX I. + </h2> + <p> + It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of + Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of + much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a + century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the + Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty + concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to + him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and + some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. + Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, + general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the + genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more + likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, + than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or + panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, + again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later + age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a + motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which + seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some + classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance + of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence + with length. A really great and original writer would have no object in + fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary + hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or + genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a + Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic + writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, + Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to + have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have + occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost + as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular + publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An + unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works + bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained + authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions + of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the + difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to + ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but + a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we + must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a + particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + </p> + <p> + These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of + genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes + to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great + excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the + Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be + distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various + degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning + Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the + Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They + may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in + the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; + those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in + their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle + was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case + of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, + e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, + and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty + years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous + citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found + in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark + that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, + which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly + attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) + accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater + part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be + summed up under two heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of + tradition—a kind of evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, + is of inferior value. + </p> + <p> + Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion + that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed + to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, + including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the + ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, + Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and + external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there + still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that + they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or + possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the + compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some + contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, + or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his + master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should + lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of + execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive + of their spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or + who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits + the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, + and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his + later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be + expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship + extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual + activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not + Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide + an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later + writings from Aristotle. + </p> + <p> + The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which + appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, + are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First + Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited + by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. + Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of + both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. + From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps + infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same + name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of + a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon + both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias + does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who + was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. + The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. + Mem., and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from + Xenophon in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the + upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a + true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in + subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they + will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning + upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is + ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point + we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is + asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the + argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is + also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The + resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, + which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced + on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour + of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. + </p> + <p> + The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting + as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the + Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting + a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an + acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, + intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the + Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and + the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; + the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the + Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other + writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned + in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same + manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention + of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the + Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the + Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A + similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the + Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + </p> + <p> + To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, + which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and + is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony + of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the + description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser + Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of + Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of + the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by + the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher + has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At + the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more + transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that + Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues + bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to + contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real + external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot + be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks + either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that + we have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings + bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment + on the genuineness of the extant dialogue. + </p> + <p> + Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute + line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They + fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been + degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly + degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the + oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of + semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character + which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them + is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, + seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this + was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable + excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to + the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; + they may be altogether spurious;—that is an alternative which must + be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as + the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable + objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the + weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other + hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are + usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be + genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require + more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with + forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can + finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine + until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still + more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some + of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until + further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that + the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws + are genuine. + </p> + <p> + On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the + name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves + and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by + those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may + have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable + portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a + thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to + the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + LESSER HIPPIAS + </h1> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in + which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly + exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and + boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his own + clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of + seal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of + a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two + great Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character with them, and + equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he + endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being + defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to + proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom + the same reluctance is ascribed). + </p> + <p> + Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, + citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended + Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is + easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to + show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar + inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles + unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it + better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying on + the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the + two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato, who + is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of truth. The + over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is also in the + spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous than + 'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in + ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural + impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of + Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and + discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final + paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us of the + interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of similar + reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancies which + Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those + discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric poems... + </p> + <p> + At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and + involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same + labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon + him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be in a + difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the + gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go + to the wise and be taught by them. + </p> + <p> + It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1) + that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in the + other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more + palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns of + thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other + dialogues:—whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or + against the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question + which will have to be answered differently in different cases. For that a + writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and + Plato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full of + repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already remarked, + are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue is the work + of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with the other + dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias sketches the + programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to attend and bring + any friends with him who may be competent judges), are more than + suspicious:—they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot suppose + to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more resembles the + Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurably inferior to it. + The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than the Greater, and to be + more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias is the same in both + dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even more exaggerated in the + Greater Hippias. His art of memory is specially mentioned in both. He is + an inferior type of the same species as Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. + Pol.). Some passages in which the Lesser Hippias may be advantageously + compared with the undoubtedly genuine dialogues of Plato are the + following:—Less. Hipp.: compare Republic (Socrates' cunning in + argument): compare Laches (Socrates' feeling about arguments): compare + Republic (Socrates not unthankful): compare Republic (Socrates dishonest + in argument). + </p> + <p> + The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be + reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) of + considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with Aristotle + and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of Plato's + other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning paradox + (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the Sophists at their + own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear the better cause'; or + merely as a dialectical experiment)—are not sufficient reasons for + doubting the genuineness of the work. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h3> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <div class="poetry"> + <p> + EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display + which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, + if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in + commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because + we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly + claim to take part in a philosophical discussion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning of + what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, + Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the + Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; + Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and + Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no + objection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which + of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the + course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and + divers other poets. + </p> + <p> + EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything + which you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a + question, will you answer him? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I + refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up + from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes + were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of + the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which + any one had to ask. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every + Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom + when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be + so fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, + as you are in offering your mind. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first + entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my + superior in anything. (Compare Gorgias.) + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom + be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you + of Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what + particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting + and there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did + not like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, + and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But + now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, + I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so + that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more + clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other + heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men + who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find + a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times + over? Please to answer me kindly and gently. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who + teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, + answer in a civil and agreeable manner. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you + meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of + men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you + said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I + could not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I + shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of + mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the + passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to + Odysseus:— + </p> + <p> + 'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out + plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I + believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who + thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be + accomplished.' + </p> + <p> + Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; + he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and + false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these + lines. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you + say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is + represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is + not the same as the false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he + meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a + willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you + declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do + things, or that they have the power to do things? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in + particular to deceive mankind. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are + they not? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their + simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort + of prudence? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: So they are—very. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what + they do? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do + mischief to others. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they + wise? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you + not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise + in those things about which they are false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false—the true and the + false are the very opposite of each other? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That is my view. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are + to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so + far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power + of uttering their falsehoods if they like? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the + power to speak falsely? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is + ignorant cannot be false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: You are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the + time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he + is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking + generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name + when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and + arithmetician? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 + multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if + you pleased? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: certainly I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in + these matters? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these + matters of calculation, are you not also the best? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth + about these matters, would you not? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must + beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and + magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to + ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the + best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power + of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same + matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? + Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of + calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes + stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not + know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie + would always and consistently lie? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about + number, or when he is making a calculation? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about + other things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who + are false about calculation and number? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is + false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, + that he who is unable to be false will not be false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to + speak falsely about calculation? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about + calculation? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly + about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation—the + arithmetician? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? + Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the + true man. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true + about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the + false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as + you were just now imagining. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is not + the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about + diagrams; and he is—the geometrician? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the + highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the + good man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is + unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Once more—let us examine a third case; that of the + astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still + greater proficient than in the preceding—do you not? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: True, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he + will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak + falsely, for he has no knowledge. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: It would seem so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the + sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I + know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you + boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were + setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said + that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you + had on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which + was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; + and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a + strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also + that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak + and the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and + a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, + was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; + moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, + and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; + and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I + was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and + harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a + great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten + to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, + and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was + saying, only look to your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and + to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which + you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any + description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the + true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, of + any. But you cannot. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but + then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless + because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the + present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: + were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and + wily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I was. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to + be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if + Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to + one another, but they are alike. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, + selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead + of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will + demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, + that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful + man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many + untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall + make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the + better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will + know which of us is the better speaker. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I + have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention + to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having + a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and + put together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the + speaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or + trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I + deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise + man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in + order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help + remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in + which Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you + must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never + found to tell a lie; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own + showing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, + which you just now repeated,— + </p> + <p> + 'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and + says another:'— + </p> + <p> + And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by + Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,— + </p> + <p> + 'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, + having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and + then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to + you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, + and my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the + earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile + Phthia.' + </p> + <p> + And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,— + </p> + <p> + 'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships + is far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass + wealth and riches for you.' + </p> + <p> + But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he + spoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, + he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down + the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly + regardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the + question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was + intended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of + them were the best, and that it would be difficult to decide which was + the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of + virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are + much upon a par. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks + falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled + against his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But + when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from + design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in + Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to + Odysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, + and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to + say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to + Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to + Ajax he tells quite a different story? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Where is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Where he says,— + </p> + <p> + 'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, + illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, + slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about my + tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the + battle, will nevertheless stay his hand.' + </p> + <p> + Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been + the pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have + carried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing + liars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to + Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and + that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom + he regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of + him by his own cunning and falsehood? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that + Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in + the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely + or truly, speaks always with a purpose. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than + Achilles? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be + better than the involuntary? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and + voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who + err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be + made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of + harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe + on those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil + involuntarily. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious + I am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only + good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong + in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that + when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom + all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For + speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything + which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to + differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my + salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very + grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful + thanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend + that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and + proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what + you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my + own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to be + more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what + you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, + and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far than + those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the + opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a + condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be + in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to + me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is + due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in + general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do + wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and + not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you + cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of + disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long + oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow + you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a + great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse + yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for + you incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not + answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf. + </p> + <p> + EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any + entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer + no man.—Did you not say so, Hippias? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome + in an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias; + Republic.) + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, it + would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would + argue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as + you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. + </p> + <p> + EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that + you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you + like. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to + which are the better—those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? + And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of + approaching the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are + good runners? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is + a bad runner? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs + well? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and + slowness is an evil quality? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly + voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in + a race? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action + voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a + race than he who does them voluntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match—which is the better + wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to + fall, or to throw another? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: To fall. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and + dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them + involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise—is + not he who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that + which is weak—that which is fair and that which is foul?—so + that when he does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does + them voluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is + better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures + voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the + bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer + the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Goods. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or + involuntarily lame? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might + voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily + blink? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts + ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of + all the senses—those which involuntarily act ill are not to be + desired, as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to + be desired as being good? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;—which are the + better sort of instruments to have to do with?—those with which a + man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better + have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or + involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill + voluntarily. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute + and all other things? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you + may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be + produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who + voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind + which errs voluntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;—has not + the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing + art? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the + involuntary? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all + arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does + what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse + that which does so involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we + not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and + are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them + involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best + state possible? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make + mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those + who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong + involuntarily! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: I do not think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once + more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, + at all events, be one of these? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has + the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater + power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster + soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge—then will + not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and + that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom + also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and + art—and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is + to do well? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do + wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man + is he who has the bad? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man + involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful + things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? + </p> + <p> + HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be + the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from + our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in + perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary + man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men + also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the + matter begins to be serious both to us and to you. + </p> + <br /> + </div> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lesser Hippias, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSER HIPPIAS *** + +***** This file should be named 1673-h.htm or 1673-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/7/1673/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lesser Hippias + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: October 15, 2008 [EBook #1673] +Release Date: March, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSER HIPPIAS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + +by Plato + +(see Appendix I) + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +APPENDIX I. + +It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings +of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is +of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of +a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, +and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are +taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular +author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the +genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are +more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous +designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as +epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than +others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the +ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, +or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be +detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really +occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while +there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, +which combines excellence with length. A really great and original +writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the +forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the +Gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to +balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not +forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of +his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the +next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and +mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in +the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and +without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, +or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed +to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once +appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to +blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. +To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was +not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the +Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature +which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the +question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost +literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle +attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) +great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of +the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always +be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various +degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning +Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the +Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They +may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in +the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; +those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective +in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that +Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars +in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more +important work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was +living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during +the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all +his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes +any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And +lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the +Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian +(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) +length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit +of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the +genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads +only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion +that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been +ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of +them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by +the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, +Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and +external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there +still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either +that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, +or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly +the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some +contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of +Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to +imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy +we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority +of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered +decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to +himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not +Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the +formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings +are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with +the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during +a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age +of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary +transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated +from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation +as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and +which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic +writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the +First Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration +are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the +Rhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his +citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the +extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by +Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second +dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a +Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does +to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very +clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain +anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student +of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading +thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is +no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an +undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will +detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning +upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is +ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last +point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the +author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely +following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion +is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier +dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, +and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with +certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more +may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is +interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators +praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and +dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. +It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and +was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the +proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The +satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to +the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, +like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by +a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of +Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have +suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to +be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to +Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages +in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be +founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody +appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the +Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First +Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the +greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not +verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance +with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates +and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be +compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, +perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades +describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the +disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue +there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson +imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted +dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite +thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed +current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates +and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for +the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as +trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of +poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have +express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an +absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of +Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may +have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there +are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The +traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have +formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the +same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, +although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, +unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with +the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite +form, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which +we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may +be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether +spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor +can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and +the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged +against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) +of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can +we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be +genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require +more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and +with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we +can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as +genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained +and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but +should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor +disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are +as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the +Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under +the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients +themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly +doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change +and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That +twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment +of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some +interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance +to the general reader. + + + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, +in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly +exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain +and boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his +own clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of +seal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is +of a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than +the two great Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character +with them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of +Socrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he +gets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with +difficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, +Callicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed). + +Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, +citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended +Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is +easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends +to show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar +inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles +unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it +better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying +on the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter +of the two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of +Plato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side +of truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is +also in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous +than 'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were +reasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive +the natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they +read. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent +inconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, +and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us +of the interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of +similar reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancies +which Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great +as those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric +poems... + +At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary +and involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the +same labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would +make upon him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be +in a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible +of the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no +longer go to the wise and be taught by them. + +It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1) +that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in +the other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more +palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns +of thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other +dialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or +against the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question +which will have to be answered differently in different cases. For that +a writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and +Plato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full +of repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already +remarked, are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue +is the work of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with +the other dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias +sketches the programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to +attend and bring any friends with him who may be competent judges), are +more than suspicious:--they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot +suppose to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more +resembles the Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurably +inferior to it. The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than the +Greater, and to be more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias is +the same in both dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even more +exaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His art of memory is specially +mentioned in both. He is an inferior type of the same species as +Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol.). Some passages in which the Lesser +Hippias may be advantageously compared with the undoubtedly genuine +dialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp.: compare Republic +(Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches (Socrates' feeling about +arguments): compare Republic (Socrates not unthankful): compare Republic +(Socrates dishonest in argument). + +The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be +reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) +of considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with +Aristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of +Plato's other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning +paradox (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the +Sophists at their own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear +the better cause'; or merely as a dialectical experiment)--are not +sufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work. + + + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. + + +EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display +which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, +if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in +commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because +we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly +claim to take part in a philosophical discussion. + +SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning +of what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, +Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the +Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; +Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and +Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no +objection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which +of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the +course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and +divers other poets. + +EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything +which you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a +question, will you answer him? + +HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I +refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up +from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes +were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of +the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which +any one had to ask. + +SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every +Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom +when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be +so fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, +as you are in offering your mind. + +HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first +entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my +superior in anything. (Compare Gorgias.) + +SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom +be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you +of Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what +particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting +and there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did +not like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, +and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But +now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, +I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so +that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them? + +HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more +clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other +heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men +who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest. + +SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find +a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times +over? Please to answer me kindly and gently. + +HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who +teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, +answer in a civil and agreeable manner. + +SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you +meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest +of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you +said that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I +could not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I +shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of +mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the +passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to +Odysseus:-- + +'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out +plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, +I believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who +thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be +accomplished.' + +Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; +he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and +false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these +lines. + +SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you +say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? + +HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is +represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey. + +SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is +not the same as the false? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? + +SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what +he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a +willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you +declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him? + +HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like. + +SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do +things, or that they have the power to do things? + +HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in +particular to deceive mankind. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are +they not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their +simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort +of prudence? + +HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? + +HIPPIAS: So they are--very. + +SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what +they do? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do +mischief to others. + +SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they +wise? + +HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive. + +SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you +not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise +in those things about which they are false? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false are +the very opposite of each other? + +HIPPIAS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are +to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? + +HIPPIAS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so +far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power +of uttering their falsehoods if they like? + +HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power. + +SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the +power to speak falsely? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is +ignorant cannot be false? + +HIPPIAS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the +time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he +is prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking +generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name +when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am. + +SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 +multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if +you pleased? + +HIPPIAS: certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in +these matters? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these +matters of calculation, are you not also the best? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best. + +SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth +about these matters, would you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I +must beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and +magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to +ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the +best and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power +of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same +matters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? +Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters +of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes +stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did +not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie +would always and consistently lie? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right. + +SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about +number, or when he is making a calculation? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about +other things. + +SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who +are false about calculation and number? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is +false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, +that he who is unable to be false will not be false? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said. + +SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to +speak falsely about calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said. + +SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about +calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly +about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--the +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? +Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the +true man. + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true +about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the +false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as +you were just now imagining. + +HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed. + +SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? + +HIPPIAS: I am. + +SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is +not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about +diagrams; and he is--the geometrician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the +highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the +good man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is +unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted. + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of the +astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still +greater proficient than in the preceding--do you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I am. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? + +HIPPIAS: True, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely +he will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak +falsely, for he has no knowledge. + +HIPPIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? + +HIPPIAS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all +the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. +I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you +boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were +setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said +that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you +had on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which +was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; +and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and +a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also +that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak +and the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and +a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, +was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; +moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, +and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; +and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which +I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and +harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a +great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten +to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, +and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was +saying, only look to your own arts--and there are plenty of them--and to +those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which +you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any +description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the +true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, of +any. But you cannot. + +HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but +then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. + +HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless +because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the +present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: +were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and +wily? + +HIPPIAS: I was. + +SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to +be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if +Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to +one another, but they are alike. + +HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, +selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead +of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will +demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, +that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful +man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many +untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall +make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the +better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will +know which of us is the better speaker. + +SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I +have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention +to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having +a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and +put together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the +speaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or +trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I +deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise +man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, +in order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help +remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in +which Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you +must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is +never found to tell a lie; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own +showing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, +which you just now repeated,-- + +'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and +says another:'-- + +And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by +Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,-- + +'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, +having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and +then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care +to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, +and my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the +earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile +Phthia.' + +And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,-- + +'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships +is far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass +wealth and riches for you.' + +But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he +spoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, +he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down +the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly +regardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you +the question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was +intended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of +them were the best, and that it would be difficult to decide which was +the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of +virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are +much upon a par. + +HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks +falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled +against his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But +when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false. + +SOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself. + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? + +SOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from +design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, +in Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to +Odysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, +and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to +say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood. + +HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to +Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to +Ajax he tells quite a different story? + +HIPPIAS: Where is that? + +SOCRATES: Where he says,-- + +'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, +illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, +slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about +my tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the +battle, will nevertheless stay his hand.' + +Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been +the pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have +carried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing +liars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to +Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and +that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom +he regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of +him by his own cunning and falsehood? + +HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that +Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in +the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely +or truly, speaks always with a purpose. + +SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than +Achilles? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be +better than the involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and +voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who +err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be +made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of +harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe +on those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil +involuntarily. + +SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious +I am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only +good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong +in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that +when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom +all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For +speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything +which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to +differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my +salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very +grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful +thanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend +that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and +proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what +you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my +own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to +be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what +you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, +and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far +than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the +opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a +condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be +in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to +me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind +is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in +general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do +wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and +not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you +cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of +disease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long +oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow +you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a +great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse +yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for +you incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not +answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf. + +EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any +entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer +no man.--Did you not say so, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome +in an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias; +Republic.) + +SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, +it would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would +argue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as +you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. + +EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that +you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. + +HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you +like. + +SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to +which are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if +you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching +the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good +runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is +a bad runner? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs +well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and +slowness is an evil quality? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly +voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in +a race? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action +voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred. + +SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a +race than he who does them voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race. + +SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler, +he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. + +SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to +fall, or to throw another? + +HIPPIAS: To fall. + +SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base +and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not he +who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which +is weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that when +he does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does them +voluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is +better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures +voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the +bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer +the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? + +HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune. + +SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? + +HIPPIAS: Goods. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or +involuntarily lame? + +HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame. + +SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might +voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily +blink? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. + +SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts +ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of +all the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, +as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be +desired as being good? + +HIPPIAS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the better +sort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man acts +ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a +rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill +voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute +and all other things? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you +may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be +produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who +voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? + +HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses. + +SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind +which errs voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the +mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the +involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all +arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does +what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse +that which does so involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we +not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, +and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best +state possible? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make +mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that +those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong +involuntarily! + +SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference. + +HIPPIAS: I do not think so. + +SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once +more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, +at all events, be one of these? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has +the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater +power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved. + +SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster +soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not +the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that +which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom +also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and +art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? + +HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is +to do well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do +wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man +is he who has the bad? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man +involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? + +HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful +things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? + +HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be +the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from +our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in +perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary +man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men +also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the +matter begins to be serious both to us and to you. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lesser Hippias, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LESSER HIPPIAS *** + +***** This file should be named 1673.txt or 1673.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/7/1673/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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The only external evidence to them which is of +much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a +century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and +some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. +Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, +general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness +of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to +have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer +ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical +orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which +have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the +slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some +affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have +originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical +author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any +ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with +length. A really great and original writer would have no object in +fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary +hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or +genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a +Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing +was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, +Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have +composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. +Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as +voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, +or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing +was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same +character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A +tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master +with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between +Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The +Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a +considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must +consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a +particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes +to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great +excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic +writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished +from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of +importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under +their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., +have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been +supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of +really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again +which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external +credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, +or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short +writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g. the +Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a +frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of +Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from +the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant +dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two +great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly +devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, +on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the +general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence +for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two +heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that +nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to +Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, +including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the +ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, +Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external +evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still +remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they +are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly +like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions +of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary +transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some +Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not +that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject +them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or +inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their +spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes +with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the +greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and +in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later +ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected +to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over +above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of +political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier +writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of +philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from +Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which +appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, +are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First +Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited +by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. +Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of +both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. +From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps +infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same +name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of +a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon +both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias +does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who +was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. +The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., +and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon +in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect +in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in +the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of +a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as +in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or +overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument +'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in +accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances +or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been +observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of +the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness +of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting +as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the +Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a +veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an +acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, +intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the +Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and +the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the +oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the +Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other +writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned +in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same +manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of +Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the +Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the +Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A +similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the +Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, +which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and +is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony +of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the +description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser +Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of +Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of +the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by +the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher +has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At +the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more +transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that +Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues +bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to +contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real +external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot +be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks +either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we +have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute +line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They +fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been +degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly +degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the +oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of +semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character +which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them +is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, +seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this +was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable +excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to +the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they +may be altogether spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly +admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the +Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection +can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight +(chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, +can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. +The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful +study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged +writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally +decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until +they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more +often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of +them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further +evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the +Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are +genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the +name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves +and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those +who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have +taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable +portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a +thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to +the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in +which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly exhibited. +Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and boastful: +he knows all things; he can make anything, including his own clothes; he is +a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of seal-rings, shoes, +strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of a finer than +Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two great +Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character with them, and +equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he +endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being +defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to +proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom +the same reluctance is ascribed). + +Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, +citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended +Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is +easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to +show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar +inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles +unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it +better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying on +the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the +two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato, who +is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of truth. The +over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is also in the +spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous than +'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in +ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural +impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of +Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and +discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, +'that he who is true is also false,' remind us of the interpretation by +Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of similar reasonings in the +first book of the Republic. The discrepancies which Socrates discovers in +the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those discovered by some of +the modern separatists of the Homeric poems... + +At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and +involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same +labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon +him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be in a +difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the +gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go +to the wise and be taught by them. + +It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1) +that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in the +other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more +palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns of +thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other +dialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or against +the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question which will +have to be answered differently in different cases. For that a writer may +repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and Plato +elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full of +repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already remarked, +are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue is the work +of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with the other +dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias sketches the +programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to attend and bring any +friends with him who may be competent judges), are more than suspicious:-- +they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot suppose to have been due to +Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more resembles the Euthydemus than any +other dialogue; but is immeasurably inferior to it. The Lesser Hippias +seems to have more merit than the Greater, and to be more Platonic in +spirit. The character of Hippias is the same in both dialogues, but his +vanity and boasting are even more exaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His +art of memory is specially mentioned in both. He is an inferior type of +the same species as Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol.). Some passages in +which the Lesser Hippias may be advantageously compared with the +undoubtedly genuine dialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp.: +compare Republic (Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches +(Socrates' feeling about arguments): compare Republic (Socrates not +unthankful): compare Republic (Socrates dishonest in argument). + +The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be +reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) of +considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with Aristotle +and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of Plato's +other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning paradox +(perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the Sophists at their +own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear the better cause'; or +merely as a dialectical experiment)--are not sufficient reasons for +doubting the genuineness of the work. + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett. + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. + + +EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which +Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he +seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending +him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now +alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take +part in a philosophical discussion. + +SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning of +what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, +Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey +in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; Odysseus, +he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the +other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, +what he thinks about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be +the better; he has already told us in the course of his exhibition many +things of various kinds about Homer and divers other poets. + +EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything which +you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, +will you answer him? + +HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused +to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my +house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes were +assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of the +exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which any one +had to ask. + +SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every Olympic +festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom when you +go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be so +fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as +you are in offering your mind. + +HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first +entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my superior +in anything. (Compare Gorgias.) + +SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be +to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you of +Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what +particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and +there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not +like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, and I +was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that +there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you +would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may +clearly understand; how did you distinguish them? + +HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more +clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other +heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men +who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest. + +SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a +difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? +Please to answer me kindly and gently. + +HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach +others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer +in a civil and agreeable manner. + +SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you +meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of +men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you said +that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I could not +understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I shall +perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of +mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the +passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to +Odysseus:-- + +'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out +plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I +believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who +thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be +accomplished.' + +Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; he +shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false; +for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines. + +SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you +say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? + +HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is +represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey. + +SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is +not the same as the false? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? + +SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he +meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a +willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you +declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him? + +HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like. + +SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do +things, or that they have the power to do things? + +HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in +particular to deceive mankind. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are +they not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their +simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of +prudence? + +HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? + +HIPPIAS: So they are--very. + +SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what +they do? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do mischief +to others. + +SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise? + +HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive. + +SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you not +saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in +those things about which they are false? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false are +the very opposite of each other? + +HIPPIAS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are +to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? + +HIPPIAS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far +as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of +uttering their falsehoods if they like? + +HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power. + +SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the +power to speak falsely? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is +ignorant cannot be false? + +HIPPIAS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the +time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he is +prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking +generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name when +you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am. + +SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied +by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased? + +HIPPIAS: certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in +these matters? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these +matters of calculation, are you not also the best? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best. + +SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about +these matters, would you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must +beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and +magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to ask +you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the best and +most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking +falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you +wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant +man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you +would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, +when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are +the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and consistently +lie? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right. + +SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about +number, or when he is making a calculation? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about +other things. + +SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are +false about calculation and number? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is +false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, +that he who is unable to be false will not be false? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said. + +SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to +speak falsely about calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said. + +SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly +about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--the +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? +Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the +true man. + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true +about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the +false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you +were just now imagining. + +HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed. + +SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? + +HIPPIAS: I am. + +SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is not +the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about +diagrams; and he is--the geometrician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the +highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good +man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is unable, and +for this reason is not false, as has been admitted. + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of the astronomer, +in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still greater proficient +than in the preceding--do you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I am. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? + +HIPPIAS: True, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he +will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, +for he has no knowledge. + +HIPPIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? + +HIPPIAS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the +sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know +that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting +in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were setting +forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said that upon +one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your +person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which was of your +own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had +another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an +oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the +shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the short tunic; but +what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was +the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly +Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had +brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose +writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also +pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true +principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember +rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you +excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard +as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other +things; but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts--and there are +plenty of them--and to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the +admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department +of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in +which the true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you +can, of any. But you cannot. + +HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but then +if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. + +HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless +because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present +occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you +not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily? + +HIPPIAS: I was. + +SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to +be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if +Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to +one another, but they are alike. + +HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, +selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of +grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will +demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that +Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too; +and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and +inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall make a speech on +the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man; and this +may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the +better speaker. + +SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I +have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to +him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a +desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and put +together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the speaker +appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or trouble +myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be +wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am +very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I +may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help remarking while +you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as +you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely +mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to tell a lie; +but Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he +speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, which you just now +repeated,-- + +'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and +says another:'-- + +And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by +Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,-- + +'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, having +loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and then you +shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early +in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men +eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives +me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.' + +And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,-- + +'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is +far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass wealth +and riches for you.' + +But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he spoke +after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears +never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if +he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly regardless was he of +the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I +was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be +the best, and because I thought that both of them were the best, and that +it would be difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in +respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this +matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par. + +HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks +falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against +his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But when +Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false. + +SOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself. + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? + +SOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from +design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in +Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to Odysseus +in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus +does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to +him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood. + +HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to +Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to Ajax +he tells quite a different story? + +HIPPIAS: Where is that? + +SOCRATES: Where he says,-- + +'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, +illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, +slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about my +tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the battle, +will nevertheless stay his hand.' + +Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been the +pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have carried the +art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing liars in the +most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to Odysseus that he +would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not +rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom he regarded as an +ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his own +cunning and falsehood? + +HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that +Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in +the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or +truly, speaks always with a purpose. + +SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be +better than the involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and +voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who err +and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for +a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to +another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those +who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily. + +SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I +am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only good +point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong in some +way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet +one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes +are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I +hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what +proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have +one singular good quality, which is my salvation; I am not ashamed to +learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, +and never fail to give them my grateful thanks; and when I learn a thing I +never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own; +but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And +now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, +I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I +will not pretend to be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very +contrary of what you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or +injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are +better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am +of the opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, +a condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be +in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me +better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due +to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general +those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong +voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and not +refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you cure my +soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. +I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me +you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you; but if you +will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, +and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have +some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to +converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must +entreat him on my behalf. + +EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any +entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer no +man.--Did you not say so, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in +an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias; Republic.) + +SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, it +would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue), +but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as you say, he +who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. + +EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that you +may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. + +HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you +like. + +SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to +which are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if +you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching +the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a +bad runner? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs +well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and +slowness is an evil quality? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly +voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a +race? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action +voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred. + +SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race +than he who does them voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race. + +SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler, he +who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. + +SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to +fall, or to throw another? + +HIPPIAS: To fall. + +SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and +dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not he +who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which is +weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that when he does bad +actions with the body, he who is better made does them voluntarily, and he +who is worse made does them involuntarily. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is +better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures +voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the +bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer +the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? + +HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune. + +SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? + +HIPPIAS: Goods. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or +involuntarily lame? + +HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame. + +SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might +voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. + +SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, +better than that which involuntarily acts ill? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of all +the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as +being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as +being good? + +HIPPIAS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the better +sort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man acts ill +voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a rudder +with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill +voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute +and all other things? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may +ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be +produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who +voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? + +HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses. + +SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind +which errs voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind +which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the +involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts +and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is +evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which +does so involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we +not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and +are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state +possible? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes +voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who +do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily! + +SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference. + +HIPPIAS: I do not think so. + +SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once +more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at +all events, be one of these? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has +the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater +power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved. + +SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster +soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not the +soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is +the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also +better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and +art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? + +HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to +do well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do +wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is +he who has the bad? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man +involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? + +HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful +things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? + +HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be +the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our +argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity +am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should +wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, +and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to +be serious both to us and to you. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Lesser Hippias, by Plato + diff --git a/old/lhpps10.zip b/old/lhpps10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..edd6d08 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/lhpps10.zip |