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The only external evidence to them which is of +much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a +century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and +some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. +Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, +general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness +of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to +have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer +ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical +orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which +have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the +slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some +affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have +originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical +author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any +ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with +length. A really great and original writer would have no object in +fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary +hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or +genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a +Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing +was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, +Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have +composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. +Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as +voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, +or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing +was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same +character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A +tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master +with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between +Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The +Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a +considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must +consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a +particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes +to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great +excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic +writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished +from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of +importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under +their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., +have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been +supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of +really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again +which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external +credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, +or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short +writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g. the +Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a +frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of +Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from +the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant +dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two +great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly +devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, +on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the +general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence +for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two +heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that +nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to +Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, +including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the +ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, +Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external +evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still +remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they +are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly +like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions +of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary +transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some +Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not +that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject +them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or +inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their +spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes +with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the +greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and +in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later +ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected +to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over +above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of +political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier +writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of +philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from +Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which +appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, +are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First +Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited +by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. +Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of +both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. +From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps +infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same +name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of +a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon +both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias +does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who +was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. +The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., +and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon +in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect +in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in +the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of +a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as +in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or +overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument +'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in +accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances +or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been +observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of +the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness +of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting +as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the +Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a +veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an +acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, +intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the +Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and +the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the +oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the +Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other +writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned +in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same +manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of +Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the +Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the +Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A +similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the +Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, +which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and +is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony +of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the +description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser +Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of +Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of +the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by +the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher +has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At +the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more +transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that +Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues +bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to +contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real +external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot +be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks +either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we +have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute +line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They +fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been +degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly +degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the +oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of +semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character +which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them +is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, +seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this +was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable +excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to +the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they +may be altogether spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly +admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the +Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection +can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight +(chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, +can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. +The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful +study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged +writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally +decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until +they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more +often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of +them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further +evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the +Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are +genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the +name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves +and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those +who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have +taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable +portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a +thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to +the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in +which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly exhibited. +Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and boastful: +he knows all things; he can make anything, including his own clothes; he is +a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of seal-rings, shoes, +strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of a finer than +Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two great +Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character with them, and +equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he +endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being +defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to +proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom +the same reluctance is ascribed). + +Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, +citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended +Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is +easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to +show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar +inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles +unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it +better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying on +the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the +two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato, who +is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of truth. The +over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is also in the +spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous than +'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in +ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural +impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of +Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and +discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, +'that he who is true is also false,' remind us of the interpretation by +Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of similar reasonings in the +first book of the Republic. The discrepancies which Socrates discovers in +the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those discovered by some of +the modern separatists of the Homeric poems... + +At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and +involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same +labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon +him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be in a +difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the +gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go +to the wise and be taught by them. + +It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1) +that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in the +other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more +palpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns of +thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other +dialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or against +the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question which will +have to be answered differently in different cases. For that a writer may +repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and Plato +elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full of +repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already remarked, +are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue is the work +of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with the other +dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias sketches the +programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to attend and bring any +friends with him who may be competent judges), are more than suspicious:-- +they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot suppose to have been due to +Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more resembles the Euthydemus than any +other dialogue; but is immeasurably inferior to it. The Lesser Hippias +seems to have more merit than the Greater, and to be more Platonic in +spirit. The character of Hippias is the same in both dialogues, but his +vanity and boasting are even more exaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His +art of memory is specially mentioned in both. He is an inferior type of +the same species as Hippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol.). Some passages in +which the Lesser Hippias may be advantageously compared with the +undoubtedly genuine dialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp.: +compare Republic (Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches +(Socrates' feeling about arguments): compare Republic (Socrates not +unthankful): compare Republic (Socrates dishonest in argument). + +The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be +reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) of +considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with Aristotle +and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of Plato's +other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning paradox +(perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the Sophists at their +own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear the better cause'; or +merely as a dialectical experiment)--are not sufficient reasons for +doubting the genuineness of the work. + + +LESSER HIPPIAS + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett. + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. + + +EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display which +Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he +seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending +him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now +alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take +part in a philosophical discussion. + +SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning of +what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, +Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey +in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; Odysseus, +he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the +other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, +what he thinks about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be +the better; he has already told us in the course of his exhibition many +things of various kinds about Homer and divers other poets. + +EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything which +you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, +will you answer him? + +HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused +to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my +house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes were +assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of the +exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which any one +had to ask. + +SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every Olympic +festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom when you +go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be so +fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as +you are in offering your mind. + +HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first +entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my superior +in anything. (Compare Gorgias.) + +SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be +to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you of +Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what +particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and +there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not +like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, and I +was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that +there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you +would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may +clearly understand; how did you distinguish them? + +HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more +clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other +heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men +who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest. + +SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a +difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? +Please to answer me kindly and gently. + +HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach +others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer +in a civil and agreeable manner. + +SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you +meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of +men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you said +that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I could not +understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I shall +perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of +mankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the +passage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to +Odysseus:-- + +'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out +plainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I +believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who +thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be +accomplished.' + +Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; he +shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false; +for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines. + +SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you +say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? + +HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is +represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey. + +SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is +not the same as the false? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? + +SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he +meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a +willingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you +declare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him? + +HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like. + +SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do +things, or that they have the power to do things? + +HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in +particular to deceive mankind. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are +they not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their +simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of +prudence? + +HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? + +HIPPIAS: So they are--very. + +SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what +they do? + +HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do mischief +to others. + +SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise? + +HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive. + +SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you not +saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in +those things about which they are false? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false are +the very opposite of each other? + +HIPPIAS: That is my view. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are +to be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? + +HIPPIAS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far +as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of +uttering their falsehoods if they like? + +HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power. + +SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the +power to speak falsely? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is +ignorant cannot be false? + +HIPPIAS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the +time when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he is +prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking +generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name when +you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am. + +SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied +by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased? + +HIPPIAS: certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in +these matters? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these +matters of calculation, are you not also the best? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best. + +SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth about +these matters, would you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must +beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and +magnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to ask +you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the best and +most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking +falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you +wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant +man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you +would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, +when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are +the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and consistently +lie? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right. + +SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about +number, or when he is making a calculation? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about +other things. + +SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are +false about calculation and number? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is +false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, +that he who is unable to be false will not be false? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said. + +SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to +speak falsely about calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said. + +SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly +about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--the +arithmetician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? +Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the +true man. + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true +about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the +false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you +were just now imagining. + +HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed. + +SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? + +HIPPIAS: I am. + +SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is not +the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about +diagrams; and he is--the geometrician? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the +highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good +man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is unable, and +for this reason is not false, as has been admitted. + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of the astronomer, +in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still greater proficient +than in the preceding--do you not? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I am. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? + +HIPPIAS: True, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he +will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, +for he has no knowledge. + +HIPPIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? + +HIPPIAS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the +sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know +that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting +in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were setting +forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said that upon +one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your +person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which was of your +own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had +another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an +oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the +shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the short tunic; but +what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was +the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly +Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had +brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose +writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also +pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true +principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember +rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you +excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard +as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other +things; but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts--and there are +plenty of them--and to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the +admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department +of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in +which the true and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you +can, of any. But you cannot. + +HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but then +if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. + +HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless +because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present +occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you +not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily? + +HIPPIAS: I was. + +SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to +be false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if +Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to +one another, but they are alike. + +HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, +selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of +grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will +demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that +Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too; +and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and +inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall make a speech on +the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man; and this +may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the +better speaker. + +SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I +have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to +him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a +desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and put +together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the speaker +appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or trouble +myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be +wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am +very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I +may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help remarking while +you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as +you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely +mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to tell a lie; +but Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he +speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, which you just now +repeated,-- + +'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and +says another:'-- + +And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by +Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,-- + +'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, having +loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and then you +shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early +in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men +eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives +me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.' + +And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,-- + +'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is +far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass wealth +and riches for you.' + +But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he spoke +after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears +never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if +he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly regardless was he of +the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I +was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be +the best, and because I thought that both of them were the best, and that +it would be difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in +respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this +matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par. + +HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks +falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against +his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But when +Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false. + +SOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself. + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? + +SOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from +design, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in +Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to Odysseus +in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus +does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to +him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood. + +HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to +Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to Ajax +he tells quite a different story? + +HIPPIAS: Where is that? + +SOCRATES: Where he says,-- + +'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, +illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, +slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about my +tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the battle, +will nevertheless stay his hand.' + +Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been the +pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have carried the +art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing liars in the +most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to Odysseus that he +would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not +rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom he regarded as an +ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his own +cunning and falsehood? + +HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that +Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in +the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or +truly, speaks always with a purpose. + +SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be +better than the involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and +voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who err +and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for +a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to +another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those +who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily. + +SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I +am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only good +point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong in some +way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet +one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes +are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I +hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what +proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have +one singular good quality, which is my salvation; I am not ashamed to +learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, +and never fail to give them my grateful thanks; and when I learn a thing I +never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own; +but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And +now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, +I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I +will not pretend to be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very +contrary of what you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or +injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are +better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am +of the opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, +a condition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be +in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me +better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due +to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general +those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong +voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and not +refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you cure my +soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. +I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me +you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you; but if you +will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, +and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have +some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to +converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must +entreat him on my behalf. + +EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any +entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer no +man.--Did you not say so, Hippias? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in +an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias; Republic.) + +SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, it +would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue), +but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as you say, he +who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. + +EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that you +may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. + +HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you +like. + +SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to +which are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if +you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching +the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a +bad runner? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs +well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and +slowness is an evil quality? + +HIPPIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly +voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a +race? + +HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action +voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred. + +SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race +than he who does them voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race. + +SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler, he +who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. + +SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to +fall, or to throw another? + +HIPPIAS: To fall. + +SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and +dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not he +who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which is +weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that when he does bad +actions with the body, he who is better made does them voluntarily, and he +who is worse made does them involuntarily. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is +better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures +voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the +bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? + +HIPPIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer +the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? + +HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune. + +SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? + +HIPPIAS: Goods. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or +involuntarily lame? + +HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame. + +SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might +voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. + +SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, +better than that which involuntarily acts ill? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of all +the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as +being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as +being good? + +HIPPIAS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the better +sort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man acts ill +voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a rudder +with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill +voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute +and all other things? + +HIPPIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may +ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. + +SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be +produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who +voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? + +HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses. + +SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind +which errs voluntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the mind +which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the +involuntary? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts +and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is +evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which +does so involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we +not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and +are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them +involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state +possible? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes +voluntarily or involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who +do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily! + +SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference. + +HIPPIAS: I do not think so. + +SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once +more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at +all events, be one of these? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has +the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater +power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. + +HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved. + +SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster +soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not the +soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is +the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also +better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? + +HIPPIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and +art--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? + +HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to +do well? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do +wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? + +HIPPIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is +he who has the bad? + +HIPPIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man +involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? + +HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. + +SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful +things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? + +HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. + +SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be +the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our +argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity +am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should +wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, +and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to +be serious both to us and to you. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Lesser Hippias, by Plato + |