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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1643-h.zip b/1643-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5a2d66 --- /dev/null +++ b/1643-h.zip diff --git a/1643-h/1643-h.htm b/1643-h/1643-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b290df --- /dev/null +++ b/1643-h/1643-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3790 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Meno, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Meno, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Meno + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: September 21, 2008 [EBook #1643] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MENO *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + MENO + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h2> + Contents + </h2> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO. </a> + </p> + <br /> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> <b>MENO</b> </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks, 'whether + virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what + virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met + Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a + bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his + own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O + yes—nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an + old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, + all of which may be easily described.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and + not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second + attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this, + again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, + as well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly + or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is + virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, + such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and + black and white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other + colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to + define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of + interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile + in multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of + colour.' But some one may object that he does not know the meaning of the + word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant, + Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and more philosophical + definition, into which no disputed word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is + the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists that he must still have a + definition of colour. Some raillery follows; and at length Socrates is + induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of form, sensible, and in + due proportion to the sight.' This definition is exactly suited to the + taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and + Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialectical + definition of figure is far better. + </p> + <p> + Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general + definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the + words of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to + have the power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he + has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of + proverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the + objection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one + equally desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in the + words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with + justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of + getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore + virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition + repeats the word defined. + </p> + <p> + Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a + torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty + to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him. + Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, + because he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But + how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he + does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, + saves a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a + real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find + a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:— + </p> + <p> + He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an + immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of + existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of + ancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and under + world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by + association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of + one kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into + all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by + the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of + Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical + figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal is double the square + of the side—that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in + honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a + hecatomb—is elicited from him. The first step in the process of + teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the + 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the better for the operation. But + whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry + in this world; nor was it born with him; he must therefore have had it + when he was not a man. And as he always either was or was not a man, he + must have always had it. (Compare Phaedo.) + </p> + <p> + After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the + original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he + professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to + argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will + assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was + the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.) + </p> + <p> + Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that + goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. + Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where are + the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging. + Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows + that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable. + </p> + <p> + In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-to-do + citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, who happens to be + present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be + taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall Meno + go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman—to the great Athenian + statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (Laches, + Prot.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, had sons to whom + they would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted their own + political wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs were + remarkable for anything except riding and wrestling and similar + accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his + favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to + belong; he breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of another + opportunity of talking with him, and the suggestion that Meno may do the + Athenian people a service by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the + trial of Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is + teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of + it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not + profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, + and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. + This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance + of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for + practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, + and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' because + not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is + possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only + inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with knowledge, + is an ideal only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach + what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in the world below,—'he + alone has wisdom, but the rest flit like shadows.' + </p> + <p> + This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? + No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in + the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a + general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of + courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this + ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of + the teachableness of virtue could be resolved. + </p> + <p> + The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems rather + intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and + therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in + this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The + teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their + pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only + produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire + into what you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates + replies by his theory of reminiscence. + </p> + <p> + To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly + tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found + than it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and + where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of + systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be + attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of + a single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the + word; that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of + enquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or + impart to them ready-made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty + drachms.' Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and + therefore he asserts the paradox that there are no educators. This + paradox, though different in form, is not really different from the remark + which is often made in modern times by those who would depreciate either + the methods of education commonly employed, or the standard attained—that + 'there is no true education among us.' + </p> + <p> + There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if + there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of + education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or + divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to + others. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the + circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. + Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or + philosophers, but they are inspired and divine. + </p> + <p> + There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the + concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean to + intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life. + To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the + most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that + 'probability is the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);' and he is at the + same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with + a higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of + the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds + cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent + experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach + others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or + arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not + science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato + in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that + inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He + would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or + the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas. + </p> + <p> + Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an + unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has + knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a + sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is + no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is + deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of + oracles in the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of + the daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, + as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to + include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he + recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as + the expression of it. + </p> + <p> + This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of + reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight, + even slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had abstract + ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls + therefore must have always existed. For they must always have been either + men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And + Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds + immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not + altogether confident.' (Compare Phaedo.) It may be observed, however, that + the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but partial + view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association of + ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not in + the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, + not actual, and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion. + </p> + <p> + The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in + the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of + justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything + but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained + more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the + affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern + philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; + the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he + affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The + subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon + of the association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of + existences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be + gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that true + knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of + episteme); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is + brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him. + </p> + <p> + Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute + observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is + embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) + the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well + as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this + must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man + could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or (3) the + remark conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the + labour of thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos). + Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the + proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after + the manner of the mathematicians; and (5) the repetition of the favourite + doctrine which occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic + Dialogues, and gives a colour to all of them—that mankind only + desire evil through ignorance; (6) the experiment of eliciting from the + slave-boy the mathematical truth which is latent in him, and (7) the + remark that he is all the better for knowing his ignorance. + </p> + <p> + The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual + circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten + thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about + the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious—a + spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the + great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of + knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the + Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias + as Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the + sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, + just as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood + is made the subject of a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in + a half-playful manner suited to his character; at the same time he appears + not quite to understand the process to which he is being subjected. For he + is exhibited as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the + Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue + as 'the power and desire of attaining things honourable,' like the first + definition of justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers + have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical + incapacity to grasp a general notion. + </p> + <p> + Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant + at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true + philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions, + whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is + of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of a different variety; + the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles are not attributed to + him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the + accuser of Socrates, as is apparently indicated by his parting words. + Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing that the accusation of + Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to + a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have been regardless of the + historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno + and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol.) the real Anytus was a democrat, and + had joined Thrasybulus in the conflict with the thirty. + </p> + <p> + The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if + 'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates + himself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher may + draw out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies + of the Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the + foundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is + more distinctly explained. There is a progression by antagonism of two + opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach + nearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem to + find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In + human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right opinion + is our actual guide. There is another sort of progress from the general + notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is friendship?' 'what is + temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, to the + transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second stage of his philosophy, + sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and future state of + existence. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and + in all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as well + as in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but in + stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have + a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and + good speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine + of the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the + foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards + and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is + described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The + existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher + or philosophical sense is admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again + introduced in the Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected + on the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by + the tie of the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is + given up as hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at + different times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new + stages of thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in + order to take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him + hidden meanings or remote allusions. + </p> + <p> + There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the + Meno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato + were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be + one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the + allusion of Anytus. + </p> + <p> + We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has + done, of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already + seen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in + Plato are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The + repulsive picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon, where + he also appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having + lovers,' has no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato. + </p> + <p> + The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal + evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the + 'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of + reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in + the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about knowing and + learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The doctrines of + immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the Phaedrus and + Phaedo; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully + developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously + calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the + later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are + led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than the Protagoras, + and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias. The place which is assigned to + it in this work is due mainly to the desire to bring together in a single + volume all the Dialogues which contain allusions to the trial and death of + Socrates. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO. + </h2> + <p> + Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and + definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular + account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his + Dialogues interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It is + due also to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; and + the erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed by the + realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas may be + summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists not in + particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of God, or + in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former state of + existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or association + from sensible things. The sensible things are not realities, but shadows + only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning propositions are hardly + suspected to be a caricature of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato + in various ways and under many figures of speech is seeking to unfold. + Poetry has been converted into dogma; and it is not remarked that the + Platonic ideas are to be found only in about a third of Plato's writings + and are not confined to him. The forms which they assume are numerous, and + if taken literally, inconsistent with one another. At one time we are in + the clouds of mythology, at another among the abstractions of mathematics + or metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and + fancy are mingled in the same passage. The ideas are sometimes described + as many, coextensive with the universals of sense and also with the first + principles of ethics; or again they are absorbed into the single idea of + good, and subordinated to it. They are not more certain than facts, but + they are equally certain (Phaedo). They are both personal and impersonal. + They are abstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are + even transformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the + world. And the idea of good (Republic) may without violence be converted + into the Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things + (Tim.). + </p> + <p> + It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of + thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct + meaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, + aspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep + religious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of + curious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous + philosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great diversity + shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think. They have not + yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them, though he also + criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others are always + talking about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and that they are + not peculiar to himself (Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in his later + writings he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them. As he proceeds + he makes for himself new modes of expression more akin to the Aristotelian + logic. + </p> + <p> + Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common meaning + or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he treats of + the ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is the spirit + of idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many names and + taken many forms, and has in a measure influenced those who seemed to be + most averse to it. It has often been charged with inconsistency and + fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on human nature, and has + exercised a wonderful charm and interest over a few spirits who have been + lost in the thought of it. It has been banished again and again, but has + always returned. It has attempted to leave the earth and soar heavenwards, + but soon has found that only in experience could any solid foundation of + knowledge be laid. It has degenerated into pantheism, but has again + emerged. No other knowledge has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It is + the science of sciences, which are also ideas, and under either aspect + require to be defined. They can only be thought of in due proportion when + conceived in relation to one another. They are the glasses through which + the kingdoms of science are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest + minds, except when living in an age of reaction against them, have + unconsciously fallen under their power. + </p> + <p> + The account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and + clearest, and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first + and then comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, e.g. + in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the criticism of + them in the Parmenides, the personal form which is attributed to them in + the Timaeus, the logical character which they assume in the Sophist and + Philebus, and the allusion to them in the Laws. In the Cratylus they dawn + upon him with the freshness of a newly-discovered thought. + </p> + <p> + The Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and + suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them + until their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to earth. + This is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets bear + witness. The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent memory of + ideas, which were known to them in a former state. The recollection is + awakened into life and consciousness by the sight of the things which + resemble them on earth. The soul evidently possesses such innate ideas + before she has had time to acquire them. This is proved by an experiment + tried on one of Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits truths of + arithmetic and geometry, which he had never learned in this world. He must + therefore have brought them with him from another. + </p> + <p> + The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses of + Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural answer + to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of evil?' and + prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into Hellas probably + through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and mysteries. It was + easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has + really existed for the race though not for the individual, and all men + come into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of glory,' at any rate able + to enter into the inheritance of the past. In the Phaedrus, as well as in + the Meno, it is this former rather than a future life on which Plato is + disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men following in their train, go + forth to contemplate the heavens, and are borne round in the revolutions + of them. There they see the divine forms of justice, temperance, and the + like, in their unchangeable beauty, but not without an effort more than + human. The soul of man is likened to a charioteer and two steeds, one + mortal, the other immortal. The charioteer and the mortal steed are in + fierce conflict; at length the animal principle is finally overpowered, + though not extinguished, by the combined energies of the passionate and + rational elements. This is one of those passages in Plato which, partaking + both of a philosophical and poetical character, is necessarily indistinct + and inconsistent. The magnificent figure under which the nature of the + soul is described has not much to do with the popular doctrine of the + ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the description which shows that + they are present to Plato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which + had seen truths in the form of the universal, cannot again return to the + nature of an animal. + </p> + <p> + In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a + previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been + acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from + another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of + association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person + recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any + part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued + that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of + existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them + which are given by experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine of ideas is + subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. 'If the soul + existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future state, for a + law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas exist, then + the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both in the Meno and + the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with diffidence. He speaks in + the Phaedo of the words with which he has comforted himself and his + friends, and will not be too confident that the description which he has + given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true, but he 'ventures to + think that something of the kind is true.' And in the Meno, after dwelling + upon the immortality of the soul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have + said I am not altogether confident' (compare Apology; Gorgias). From this + class of uncertainties he exempts the difference between truth and + appearance, of which he is absolutely convinced. + </p> + <p> + In the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not + contradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as the + genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name are + contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, the + picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing in + nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds are only + the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or explanations + are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition of Plato's + theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and the mimetic + arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a lower kind of + knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books of the Republic we + reach the highest and most perfect conception, which Plato is able to + attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now finally seen to be + one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to have a unity which is + the idea of good and the cause of all the rest. They seem, however, to + have lost their first aspect of universals under which individuals are + contained, and to have been converted into forms of another kind, which + are inconsistently regarded from the one side as images or ideals of + justice, temperance, holiness and the like; from the other as hypotheses, + or mathematical truths or principles. + </p> + <p> + In the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows + the Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention + occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical ratios + furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But though the + conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or laid aside, + the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as firmly maintained as + ever. The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is superseded by the + conception of a personal God, who works according to a final cause or + principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is expressed by Plato, + either in the Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of the truths which he + conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the existence of God or + the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative or hesitating manner, + but the investigations of physiology. These he regards, not seriously, as + a part of philosophy, but as an innocent recreation (Tim.). + </p> + <p> + Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition + or defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is + put into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to + Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is + assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the + dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that + there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals partake + of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which they become + like them, or how ideas can be either within or without the sphere of + human knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any relation to each + other, is held to be incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no + universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy? (Parmenides.) In the Sophist + the theory of ideas is spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by + another sect of philosophers, called 'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the + Megarians, who were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him + (Sophist). Nor in what may be termed Plato's abridgement of the history of + philosophy (Soph.), is any mention made such as we find in the first book + of Aristotle's Metaphysics, of the derivation of such a theory or of any + part of it from the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even + from Socrates. In the Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic + Dialogues, the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed + under the figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is + retained. The one and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working + in the mind of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' + but of 'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of + in a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former + state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a + psychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final form + of the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own + writings (see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the old + string, and returns to general notions:—these he acknowledges to be + many, and yet he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be made + to recognize the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the + Protagoras, that the virtues are four, but they are also in some sense one + (Laws; compare Protagoras). + </p> + <p> + So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the + statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to + harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, + but the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of + Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and + general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass + from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven + (jenseits) without regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy + have made between them. They are also intended to supplement or explain + each other. They relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have + said that 'he was not confident of the precise form of his own statements, + but was strong in the belief that something of the kind was true.' It is + the spirit, not the letter, in which they agree—the spirit which + places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the material, the + one above the many, the mind before the body. + </p> + <p> + The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times widens + into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear after many + ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new conditions, at + first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally spreading over + the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with ancient + philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is inspired + by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born out of due + time; and before men were capable of understanding it. To the fathers of + modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new and original, but + they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, coming back by + recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers of the seventeenth + century, who to themselves appeared to be working out independently the + enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood in a new relation to + theology and natural philosophy, and for a time maintained towards both an + attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the similarities between modern + and ancient thought are greater far than the differences. All philosophy, + even that part of it which is said to be based upon experience, is really + ideal; and ideas are not only derived from facts, but they are also prior + to them and extend far beyond them, just as the mind is prior to the + senses. + </p> + <p> + Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in the + single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having arrived + at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from + philosophy to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to + be the real meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin of + knowledge, will always continue to be one of the first problems of + philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of logic—arms + ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They were the late + birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only part of it which + has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. Philosophies come and + go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing of definitions, the + invention of methods still continue to be the main elements of the + reasoning process. + </p> + <p> + Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. It + is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as a + quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the semi-barbarous + Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike ancient philosophy, it + has been unaffected by impressions derived from outward nature: it arose + within the limits of the mind itself. From the time of Descartes to Hume + and Kant it has had little or nothing to do with facts of science. On the + other hand, the ancient and mediaeval logic retained a continuous + influence over it, and a form like that of mathematics was easily + impressed upon it; the principle of ancient philosophy which is most + apparent in it is scepticism; we must doubt nearly every traditional or + received notion, that we may hold fast one or two. The being of God in a + personal or impersonal form was a mental necessity to the first thinkers + of modern times: from this alone all other ideas could be deduced. There + had been an obscure presentiment of 'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 + years previously. The Eleatic notion that being and thought were the same + was revived in a new form by Descartes. But now it gave birth to + consciousness and self-reflection: it awakened the 'ego' in human nature. + The mind naked and abstract has no other certainty but the conviction of + its own existence. 'I think, therefore I am;' and this thought is God + thinking in me, who has also communicated to the reason of man his own + attributes of thought and extension—these are truly imparted to him + because God is true (compare Republic). It has been often remarked that + Descartes, having begun by dismissing all presuppositions, introduces + several: he passes almost at once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more + important for the illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, + insists that God is true and incapable of deception (Republic)—that + he proceeds from general ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be + found in him. A certain influence of mathematics both on the form and + substance of their philosophy is discernible in both of them. After making + the greatest opposition between thought and extension, Descartes, like + Plato, supposes them to be reunited for a time, not in their own nature + but by a special divine act (compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all + the parts of the human body to meet in the pineal gland, that alone + affording a principle of unity in the material frame of man. It is + characteristic of the first period of modern philosophy, that having begun + (like the Presocratics) with a few general notions, Descartes first falls + absolutely under their influence, and then quickly discards them. At the + same time he is less able to observe facts, because they are too much + magnified by the glasses through which they are seen. The common logic + says 'the greater the extension, the less the comprehension,' and we may + put the same thought in another way and say of abstract or general ideas, + that the greater the abstraction of them, the less are they capable of + being applied to particular and concrete natures. + </p> + <p> + Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy is + his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The system + of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that of + Descartes. In this respect the difference between them is like that + between Xenophanes and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be + described generally as the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction and + taking the form of the Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is + overpowered and intoxicated with the idea of Being or God. The greatness + of both philosophies consists in the immensity of a thought which excludes + all other thoughts; their weakness is the necessary separation of this + thought from actual existence and from practical life. In neither of them + is there any clear opposition between the inward and outward world. The + substance of Spinoza has two attributes, which alone are cognizable by + man, thought and extension; these are in extreme opposition to one + another, and also in inseparable identity. They may be regarded as the two + aspects or expressions under which God or substance is unfolded to man. + Here a step is made beyond the limits of the Eleatic philosophy. The + famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' is already + contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's Sophist. The grand + description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the spectator of all + time and all existence, may be paralleled with another famous expression + of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie eternitatis.' According to + Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they are conditioned by what is + alien to them, and by one another. Human beings are included in the number + of them. Hence there is no reality in human action and no place for right + and wrong. Individuality is accident. The boasted freedom of the will is + only a consciousness of necessity. Truth, he says, is the direction of the + reason towards the infinite, in which all things repose; and herein lies + the secret of man's well-being. In the exaltation of the reason or + intellect, in the denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; Laws) + Spinoza approaches nearer to Plato than in his conception of an infinite + substance. As Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would + have maintained that knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to + knowledge useful. Both are equally far from any real experience or + observation of nature. And the same difficulty is found in both when we + seek to apply their ideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed + between the infinite substance and finite objects or individuals of + Spinoza, just as there is between the ideas of Plato and the world of + sense. + </p> + <p> + Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher + Leibnitz, who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between mind + and matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare again + Phaedrus). To him all the particles of matter are living beings which + reflect on one another, and in the least of them the whole is contained. + Here we catch a reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or similar particles + of Anaxagoras, and of the world-animal of the Timaeus. + </p> + <p> + In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of man is + supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by observation + and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of experience, + rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is a + symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us. The + Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon of + Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons + which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some + of them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in + the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of + Plato in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much + insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the + illusions of language, and are constantly crying out against them, as + against other idols. + </p> + <p> + Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more + than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him + experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and + construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic + of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the + transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would substitute + sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human + mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has + drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. + He has annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed + by the same laws and described under the same names. + </p> + <p> + A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central + principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would + deprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but he + seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and does + not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he remark + that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language against + the most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel with the + ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did in their + idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more important + principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and unmeaning as + this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his successors, not + unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and Berkeley upon Hume + himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in almost equal degrees. + Neither they nor their predecessors had any true conception of language or + of the history of philosophy. Hume's paradox has been forgotten by the + world, and did not any more than the scepticism of the ancients require to + be seriously refuted. Like some other philosophical paradoxes, it would + have been better left to die out. It certainly could not be refuted by a + philosophy such as Kant's, in which, no less than in the previously + mentioned systems, the history of the human mind and the nature of + language are almost wholly ignored, and the certainty of objective + knowledge is transferred to the subject; while absolute truth is reduced + to a figment, more abstract and narrow than Plato's ideas, of 'thing in + itself,' to which, if we reason strictly, no predicate can be applied. + </p> + <p> + The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of + ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no + longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know it; + there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, in + mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may + attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every + sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They + are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our + lives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them + express relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in + rerum natura corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of them + as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete + possession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce + them, and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least explained + and were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away by a word + to which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions such as + 'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,' 'experience,' + 'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' and a heap of + other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source of quite as much + error and illusion and have as little relation to actual facts as the + ideas of Plato. Few students of theology or philosophy have sufficiently + reflected how quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes away; or how hard + it is for one age to understand the writings of another; or how nice a + judgment is required of those who are seeking to express the philosophy of + one age in the terms of another. The 'eternal truths' of which + metaphysicians speak have hardly ever lasted more than a generation. In + our own day schools or systems of philosophy which have once been famous + have died before the founders of them. We are still, as in Plato's age, + groping about for a new method more comprehensive than any of those which + now prevail; and also more permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the + promise of such a method, which can hardly be any other than the method of + idealized experience, having roots which strike far down into the history + of philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the + past, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, or + theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science from + another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have proceeded + a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the want of method + which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the branches of + knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will become the + knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp.), and all things, + like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one another. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + MENO + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or + by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it + comes to man by nature, or in what other way? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among + the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I + am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at + Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is + Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among + them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, + fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering + questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is + the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who + likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here + at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have + emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any + Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your + face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you + think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what + virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I + myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the + rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing + about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know + the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was + fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and + noble? Do you think that I could? + </p> + <p> + MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do + not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to + Thessaly? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have + never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, I have. + </p> + <p> + MENO: And did you not think that he knew? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell + what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and + that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he + said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that + you and he think much alike. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By + the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for + I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you + and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just + saying that I have never found anybody who had. + </p> + <p> + MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. + Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to + administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his + friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer + harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also + be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is + indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young + or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are + virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is + relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the + same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare Arist. Pol.). + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you + present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your + keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, + What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of + bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and + different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by + some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you + answer me? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; + tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all + alike;—would you be able to answer? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, + they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who + would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye + fixed: Do you understand? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the + question as I could wish. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another + of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, + or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the + nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, + she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength + subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, + as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any + difference? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child + or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from + the others. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to + order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I did say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered + without temperance and without justice? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly + order them with temperance and justice? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, + must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are + intemperate and unjust? + </p> + <p> + MENO: They cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in + the same virtues? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Such is the inference. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless + their virtue had been the same? + </p> + <p> + MENO: They would not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try + and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Will you have one definition of them all? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking. + </p> + <p> + MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to + say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue + the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, + or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, + fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do + you not add 'justly and not unjustly'? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'? + </p> + <p> + MENO: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, + is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of + speaking, because there are other figures. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that + there are other virtues as well as justice. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you + the names of the other figures if you asked me. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and + there are many others. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after + one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but + we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt + to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know + that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you + the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And + if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, + by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a figure;' + and you would answer 'a figure.' + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And for this reason—that there are other figures? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you + would have told him. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered + whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is + colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other + colours as well. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?—you would have + told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he + would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not + what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say + that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that + common nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight + as well as round, and is no more one than the other—that would be + your mode of speaking? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is + round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than + round? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than + the straight, or the straight than the round? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. + Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or + colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know + what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not + understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might + put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile + in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and + straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I + wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to + the answer about virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you? + </p> + <p> + MENO: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you + say to this answer?—Figure is the only thing which always follows + colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if + you would let me have a similar definition of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why simple? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows + colour. + </p> + <p> + (SOCRATES: Granted.) + </p> + <p> + MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, + any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have + given him? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher + of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my + answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and + refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, + I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; + that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use + of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And + this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will + acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or + termination, or extremity?—all which words I use in the same sense, + although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but + still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that + is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for + example in geometry. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my + definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; + or, more concisely, the limit of solid. + </p> + <p> + MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to + give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what + is Gorgias' definition of virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he + would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why do you think so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties + when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, + you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to + humour you I must answer. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Please do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, + which is familiar to you? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should like nothing better. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain + effluences of existence? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of + them are too small or too large? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'—colour is an + effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. + </p> + <p> + MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in + the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that + you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many + other similar phenomena. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore + was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the + other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, + if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you + said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. + </p> + <p> + MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my + very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many + as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell + me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a + plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver + virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I + have given you the pattern. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires + the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I + say too— + </p> + <p> + 'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining + them.' + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire + the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be + good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Both, I think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be + evils and desires them notwithstanding? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And desire is of possession? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, of possession. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who + possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? + </p> + <p> + MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and + others who know that they will do them harm. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them + good know that they are evils? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do + not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although + they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to + be goods they really desire goods? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, in that case. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that + evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by + them? + </p> + <p> + MENO: They must know it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable + in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? + </p> + <p> + MENO: How can it be otherwise? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should say not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no + one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and + possession of evil? + </p> + <p> + MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody + desires evil. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire + and power of attaining good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, I did say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to + all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he + must be better in the power of attaining it? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be + the power of attaining good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view + this matter. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point + of view; for very likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be + the power of attaining goods? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and + the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the + state—those are what you would call goods? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, I should include all those. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the + great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you + add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of + no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and + dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of + virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them + the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner + for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally + virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the + non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice + or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. + </p> + <p> + MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and + the like, were each of them a part of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole + and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to + frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue + is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you + acknowledge to be a part of virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing + what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by + you to be parts of virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: What of that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of + virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare + every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though + you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too + when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I + fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? + for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of + virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action + done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; + for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: No; I do not say that he can. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any + answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any + one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of + virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask + over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I believe that you are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your + friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were + always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting + your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and + am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem + to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very + like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and + touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my + tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though + I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue + before now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as I + thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think + that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if + you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison + as a magician. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me. + </p> + <p> + MENO: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know + that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about + them—as well they may—but I shall not return the compliment. + As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of + torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I + perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed + myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same + case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I + have no objection to join with you in the enquiry. + </p> + <p> + MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? + What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what + you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not + know? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome + dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either + about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he + knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not + know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post. + Anal.). + </p> + <p> + MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think not. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Why not? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and + women who spoke of things divine that— + </p> + <p> + MENO: What did they say? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. + </p> + <p> + MENO: What was it? and who were they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how + they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been + poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and + many others who were inspired. And they say—mark, now, and see + whether their words are true—they say that the soul of man is + immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at + another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that + a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year + Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty + of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, + and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in + wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as + being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all + things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has + knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call + to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; + for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is + no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single + recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for + all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought + not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of + enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but + the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I + will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, + and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you + teach me how this is? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you + ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, + but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a + contradiction. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only + asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you + say is true, I wish that you would. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the + utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, + that I may demonstrate on him. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether + he learns of me or only remembers. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? + </p> + <p> + BOY: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the + square are also equal? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side + be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one + direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one + foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two + feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: There are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. + </p> + <p> + BOY: Four, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, + and having like this the lines equal? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Of eight feet. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the + side of that double square: this is two feet—what will that be? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, + but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a + line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does + he not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does he really know? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is + double. + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the + Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double + line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal + every way, and twice the size of this—that is to say of eight feet; + and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from + double line? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such + line here? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is + the figure of eight feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of + which is equal to the figure of four feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And four times is not double? + </p> + <p> + BOY: No, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how much? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Four times as much. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, + but four times as much. + </p> + <p> + BOY: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen—are they not? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives + one of sixteen feet;—do you see? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, + and half the size of the other? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this + one, and less than that one? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes; I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell + me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be + more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: It ought. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. + </p> + <p> + BOY: Three feet. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line + of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are + two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, + the whole space will be three times three feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Nine. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Eight. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? + </p> + <p> + BOY: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But from what line?—tell me exactly; and if you would + rather not reckon, try and show me the line. + </p> + <p> + BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of + recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is + the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and + answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a + difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows. + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think that he is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' + have we done him any harm? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to + the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, + but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again + that the double space should have a double side. + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or + learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, + until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, + and had desired to know? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not + teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and + see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of + eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet + which I have drawn? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Four times. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. + </p> + <p> + BOY: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect + each of these spaces? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this + space? + </p> + <p> + BOY: There are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is. + </p> + <p> + BOY: I do not understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Four. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how many in this? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Two. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Twice. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Of eight feet. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? + </p> + <p> + BOY: From this. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of + the figure of four feet? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if + this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm + that the double space is the square of the diagonal? + </p> + <p> + BOY: Certainly, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given + out of his own head? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, they were all his own. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his—had he not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that + which he does not know? + </p> + <p> + MENO: He has. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, + as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in + different forms, he would know as well as any one at last? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for + himself, if he is only asked questions? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is + recollection? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have + acquired or always possessed? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have + known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it + in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do + the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has + any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, + he was born and bred in your house. + </p> + <p> + MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge? + </p> + <p> + MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he + must have had and learned it at some other time? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Clearly he must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the + time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into + knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed + this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Obviously. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then + the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect + what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of + which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and + braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we + should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no + knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;—that is a + theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of + my power. + </p> + <p> + MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that + which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together + into the nature of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my + original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard + it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in + some other way? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not + have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had + first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me + who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,—such being + your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And + therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I + do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, + and allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any + other way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is + asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain + circle (Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a + triangle in a certain circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but + I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If + the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, + when you apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle + (autou).), the given area of the triangle falls short by an area + corresponding to the part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), + then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; + and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this + triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle':—that is a + geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and + qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a + hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it + be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not + knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were + just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about the + name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that + knowledge alone is taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is + of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another + species? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis + which is not set aside. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from + knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, + then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things + are profitable? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? + </p> + <p> + MENO: That is the only inference. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit + us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like + of these, we call profitable? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you + not think so? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or + the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and + hurtful when they are not rightly used? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are + temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, + magnanimity, and the like? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are + sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage + wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no + sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of + apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are + profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when + under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the + guidance of folly, in the opposite? + </p> + <p> + MENO: That appears to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be + profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the + soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made + profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore + if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I quite agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we + were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do + not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides + and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself + are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul + wrongly. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other + things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon + wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which + profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either + wholly or partly wisdom? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of + characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on + their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we + should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a + stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one + might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful + to the state? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by + instruction? + </p> + <p> + MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the + supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is + taught. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand + firm not only just now, but always. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is + virtue? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the + assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I + have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now + and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, + must not have teachers and disciples? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor + disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and + taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have + assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the + most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately + have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; + to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy + and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or + gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as + Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a + well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; + moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian + people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest + offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn + whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, + Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are + the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good + physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the + physicians? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him + to the cobblers? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so forth? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we + should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a + physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who + profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand + payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will + come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in + sending him? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the + other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse + to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be + plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed + teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge + which he wishes him to acquire—would not such conduct be the height + of folly? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about + my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain + that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the house, + and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away + citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he go in + order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply + clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they + are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction + to any one who likes, at a fixed price? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people + whom mankind call Sophists? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or + kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be + so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a + manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how + to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not + only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to + them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? + Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who + made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such + noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of + old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse + than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and + would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, + Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him + worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not + mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were + spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a + good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, + but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others + who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted + the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or + unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of + Hellas have been out of their minds? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their + money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians + who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of + their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and + did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so + angry with them? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor + would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good + or bad of which you are wholly ignorant? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, + whether I am acquainted with them or not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, + judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you + know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who + will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask + you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to + become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the + friend of your family, and you will oblige him. + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these + things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say + that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me + to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at + random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the + Sophists. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having + been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that + which they had never learned themselves? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of + gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there + always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the + question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;—not + whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but + whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been + discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of + other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had + themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or + imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have + been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that + Themistocles was a good man? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever + was a good teacher, of his own virtue? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Yes certainly,—if he wanted to be so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have + desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have + been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him + his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a + famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl + a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which + could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard + from our elders of him? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: I have. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Very likely not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that + Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father + was? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father + Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and + allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better + than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best + men of the past. Let us take another,—Aristides, the son of + Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: To be sure I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other + Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But + what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is + an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, + again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, + Paralus and Xanthippus. + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: I know. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled + horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of + arts—in these respects they were on a level with the best—and + had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But + virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose + the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few + in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and + Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he + trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of + them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who + had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do + you remember them? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: I have heard of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were + taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to + be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been + taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends + among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a + man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have + been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would + have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time + from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is + not a thing which can be taught? + </p> + <p> + ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: + and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. + Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to + do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that + you know. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a + rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these + gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of + them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, + and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, + Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly there are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to + be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them + saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the + possibility of their own vocation? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only + professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to + teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; + but he thinks that men should be taught to speak. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in + doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have + doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet + says the very same thing? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Where does he say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.): + </p> + <p> + 'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to + them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with + the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.' + </p> + <p> + Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): + </p> + <p> + 'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who + were able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.' + </p> + <p> + And again:— + </p> + <p> + 'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have + heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a + bad man into a good one.' + </p> + <p> + And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed + not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and + bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is + there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are sometimes + saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the opposite? Can + you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such + confusion? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I should say, certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, + clearly there can be no other teachers? + </p> + <p> + MENO: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Agreed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which + there are neither teachers nor disciples? + </p> + <p> + MENO: We have. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? + </p> + <p> + MENO: There are not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? + </p> + <p> + MENO: That, I think, is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, + that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into + existence? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and + that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of + me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one + who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I + observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and + good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge + (episteme);—and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how + there can be any good men at all. + </p> + <p> + MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were + we not right in admitting this? It must be so. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true + guides to us of action—there we were also right? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he + have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong. + </p> + <p> + MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere + else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a + right and good guide? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had + never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, + he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows + the truth? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as + knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation + about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide + of right action; whereas there is also right opinion. + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? + </p> + <p> + MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will + always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and + sometimes not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long + as he has right opinion? + </p> + <p> + MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I + wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why + they should ever differ. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Do tell me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of + Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your + country? + </p> + <p> + MENO: What have they to do with the question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and + if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Well, what of that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if + they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when + fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of + art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while + they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out + of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of + much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this + fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed + to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the + nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this + is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, + because fastened by a chain. + </p> + <p> + MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that + knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. + There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most + certainly one of them. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the + way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? + </p> + <p> + MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less + useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who + has knowledge? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be + useful? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only + because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that + neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired + by him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Not I.) + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by + nature good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue + is acquired by teaching? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was + taught? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there + were no teachers, not? + </p> + <p> + MENO: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of + virtue? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these + are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the + guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think so too. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has + been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. + </p> + <p> + MENO: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, + did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This + was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves—because + their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. + </p> + <p> + MENO: That is probably true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is + that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in + politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets + say many things truly, but they know not what they say. + </p> + <p> + MENO: So I believe. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having + no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? + </p> + <p> + MENO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were + just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe + of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and + illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they + say many grand things, not knowing what they say. + </p> + <p> + MENO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine—do they not? + and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine + man.' + </p> + <p> + MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our + friend Anytus may take offence at the word. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity + of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the result seems to be, + if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor + acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the + instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among + statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be + such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that + Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are + flitting shades'; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality + among shadows. + </p> + <p> + MENO: That is excellent, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous + by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, + before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of + virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded + yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so + exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to + the Athenian people. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Meno, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MENO *** + +***** This file should be named 1643-h.htm or 1643-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/4/1643/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Meno + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: September 21, 2008 [EBook #1643] +Release Date: February, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MENO *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +MENO + +by Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks, +'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet +know what virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot +have met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but +he has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell +him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of +Gorgias? 'O yes--nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a +woman, of an old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and +state of life, all of which may be easily described.' + +Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues +and not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a +second attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to +this, again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those +who obey, as well as of those who command; and the power of command must +be justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that +justice is virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are +other virtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round +is a figure, and black and white are colours, and yet there are other +figures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and +colour, and try to define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after +a process of interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the +nature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the +accompaniment of colour.' But some one may object that he does not know +the meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not +a mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and +more philosophical definition, into which no disputed word is allowed to +intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists that +he must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows; and +at length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of +form, sensible, and in due proportion to the sight.' This definition is +exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language +of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract +or dialectical definition of figure is far better. + +Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general +definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the +words of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to +have the power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than +he has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece +of proverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the +objection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one +equally desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in +the words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or +with justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power +of getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and +therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The +definition repeats the word defined. + +Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a +torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty +to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert +him. Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, +because he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. +But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into +what he does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates +remarks, saves a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the +puzzle has a real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will +endeavour to find a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:-- + +He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of +an immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of +existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of +ancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and +under world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by +association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is +of one kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed +into all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further +proved by the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful +hands of Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations +of geometrical figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal +is double the square of the side--that famous discovery of primitive +mathematics, in honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to +have sacrificed a hecatomb--is elicited from him. The first step in the +process of teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He +has had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the better for the +operation. But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? He had +never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born with him; he must +therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he always either was +or was not a man, he must have always had it. (Compare Phaedo.) + +After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, +the original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again +he professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing +to argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He +will assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. +(This was the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.) + +Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and +that goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of +knowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But +where are the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely +discouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the +discovery follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is +not teachable. + +In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and +well-to-do citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, +who happens to be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the +Sophists and be taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To +whom, then, shall Meno go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman--to +the great Athenian statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as +elsewhere (Laches, Prot.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great +men, had sons to whom they would surely, if they could have done so, +have imparted their own political wisdom; but no one ever heard that +these sons of theirs were remarkable for anything except riding and +wrestling and similar accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation +which is cast on his favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he +supposes himself to belong; he breaks off with a significant hint. The +mention of another opportunity of talking with him, and the suggestion +that Meno may do the Athenian people a service by pacifying him, are +evident allusions to the trial of Socrates. + +Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is +teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of +it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do +not profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to +observe, and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus +Socrates. This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under +the guidance of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion +is for practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of +being taught, and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk +off,' because not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of +instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing +persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is +identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the statesman had this +knowledge, and could teach what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in +the world below,--'he alone has wisdom, but the rest flit like shadows.' + +This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be +taught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern +times. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind +could rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular +virtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception +of this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the +question of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved. + +The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems +rather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is +knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, +and therefore in this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no +knowledge. The teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and +Meno, who is their pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general +terms. He can only produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you +can neither enquire into what you know nor into what you do not know;' +to which Socrates replies by his theory of reminiscence. + +To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly +tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found +than it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; +and where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense +of systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be +attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision +of a single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of +the word; that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit +of enquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or +impart to them ready-made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty +drachms.' Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and +therefore he asserts the paradox that there are no educators. This +paradox, though different in form, is not really different from the +remark which is often made in modern times by those who would depreciate +either the methods of education commonly employed, or the standard +attained--that 'there is no true education among us.' + +There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even +if there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of +education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing +or divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to +others. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the +circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their +sons. Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science +or philosophers, but they are inspired and divine. + +There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms +the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not +mean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of +human life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of +all things the most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing +to admit that 'probability is the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);' +and he is at the same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which +governs the world with a higher wisdom. There are many instincts, +judgments, and anticipations of the human mind which cannot be reduced +to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always be given in words. A +person may have some skill or latent experience which he is able to use +himself and is yet unable to teach others, because he has no principles, +and is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas. He has practice, +but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of psychology, +which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from +saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be +regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet +or man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the +virtue based upon ideas. + +Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an +unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only +has knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There +may be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But +there is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he +is deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or +of oracles in the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking +of the daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right +opinion, as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who +desires to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just +as he recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the +Sophists as the expression of it. + +This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of +reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very +slight, even slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had +abstract ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and +their souls therefore must have always existed. For they must always +have been either men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is +transparent. And Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their +weakness; for he adds immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things +of which I am not altogether confident.' (Compare Phaedo.) It may be +observed, however, that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined +with a true but partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, +and of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular +knowledge, and exists not in the previous state of the individual, but +of the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be appropriated +by strenuous exertion. + +The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in +the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas +of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of +anything but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is +explained more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of +the affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern +philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; +the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when +he affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The +subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon +of the association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of +existences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also +be gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that +true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of +episteme); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is +brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him. + +Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the +acute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is +embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) +the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern +as well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large +fortunes; this must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, +for that no man could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good +shoemaker; or (3) the remark conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal +sceptic is saved the labour of thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto +zeteseos). Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic enquiry +is, (4) the proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under +an hypothesis, after the manner of the mathematicians; and (5) the +repetition of the favourite doctrine which occurs so frequently in +the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a colour to all +of them--that mankind only desire evil through ignorance; (6) the +experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which +is latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for +knowing his ignorance. + +The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the +actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery +to the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also +silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, +rich and luxurious--a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the +hereditary friend of the great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired +with an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of +Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same +relation to Gorgias as Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other +great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his +cross-examining powers, just as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and +the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of a similar +experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner suited to +his character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand the +process to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant +of the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed +to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue as 'the power and +desire of attaining things honourable,' like the first definition +of justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers have a +sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical incapacity +to grasp a general notion. + +Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is +indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and +the true philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new +opinions, whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian +greatness. He is of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of +a different variety; the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles +are not attributed to him. The moderation with which he is described is +remarkable, if he be the accuser of Socrates, as is apparently indicated +by his parting words. Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing +that the accusation of Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or +malevolence, but rather to a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have +been regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his +dialogue, as in the case of Meno and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol.) +the real Anytus was a democrat, and had joined Thrasybulus in the +conflict with the thirty. + +The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if +'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates +himself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher +may draw out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling +follies of the Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the +foundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge +is more distinctly explained. There is a progression by antagonism of +two opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach +nearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem +to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. +In human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right +opinion is our actual guide. There is another sort of progress from the +general notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is friendship?' +'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the Lysis, Charmides, +Laches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second stage of +his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and +future state of existence. + +The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and +in all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as +well as in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but +in stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to +have a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men +and good speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The +doctrine of the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being +made the foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine +of rewards and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge +to virtue is described in a manner more consistent with modern +distinctions. The existence of the virtues without the possession +of knowledge in the higher or philosophical sense is admitted to be +possible. Right opinion is again introduced in the Theaetetus as +an account of knowledge, but is rejected on the ground that it is +irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the tie of the cause), +and also because the conception of false opinion is given up as +hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at different +times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new stages of +thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in order to +take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him hidden +meanings or remote allusions. + +There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the +Meno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato +were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be +one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by +the allusion of Anytus. + +We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has +done, of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already +seen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in +Plato are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The +repulsive picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon, +where he also appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth +having lovers,' has no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato. + +The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal +evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the +'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of +reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed +in the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about +knowing and learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The +doctrines of immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the +Phaedrus and Phaedo; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is +more fully developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he +facetiously calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. +Unlike the later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion. +Hence we are led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than +the Protagoras, and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias. The place +which is assigned to it in this work is due mainly to the desire to +bring together in a single volume all the Dialogues which contain +allusions to the trial and death of Socrates. + + +***** + + + + +ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO. + +Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and +definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular +account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his +Dialogues interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It +is due also to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; +and the erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed +by the realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas +may be summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists +not in particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of +God, or in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former +state of existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or +association from sensible things. The sensible things are not +realities, but shadows only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning +propositions are hardly suspected to be a caricature of a great theory +of knowledge, which Plato in various ways and under many figures of +speech is seeking to unfold. Poetry has been converted into dogma; and +it is not remarked that the Platonic ideas are to be found only in about +a third of Plato's writings and are not confined to him. The forms which +they assume are numerous, and if taken literally, inconsistent with one +another. At one time we are in the clouds of mythology, at another among +the abstractions of mathematics or metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly +from one to the other. Reason and fancy are mingled in the same +passage. The ideas are sometimes described as many, coextensive with +the universals of sense and also with the first principles of ethics; or +again they are absorbed into the single idea of good, and subordinated +to it. They are not more certain than facts, but they are equally +certain (Phaedo). They are both personal and impersonal. They are +abstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are even +transformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the world. +And the idea of good (Republic) may without violence be converted into +the Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things (Tim.). + +It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of +thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct +meaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, +aspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep +religious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of +curious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous +philosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great +diversity shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think. +They have not yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them, +though he also criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others +are always talking about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and +that they are not peculiar to himself (Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in +his later writings he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them. +As he proceeds he makes for himself new modes of expression more akin to +the Aristotelian logic. + +Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common +meaning or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he +treats of the ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is +the spirit of idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many +names and taken many forms, and has in a measure influenced those +who seemed to be most averse to it. It has often been charged with +inconsistency and fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on +human nature, and has exercised a wonderful charm and interest over +a few spirits who have been lost in the thought of it. It has been +banished again and again, but has always returned. It has attempted to +leave the earth and soar heavenwards, but soon has found that only +in experience could any solid foundation of knowledge be laid. It has +degenerated into pantheism, but has again emerged. No other knowledge +has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It is the science of sciences, +which are also ideas, and under either aspect require to be defined. +They can only be thought of in due proportion when conceived in relation +to one another. They are the glasses through which the kingdoms of +science are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest minds, except when +living in an age of reaction against them, have unconsciously fallen +under their power. + +The account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and +clearest, and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first +and then comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, +e.g. in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the +criticism of them in the Parmenides, the personal form which is +attributed to them in the Timaeus, the logical character which they +assume in the Sophist and Philebus, and the allusion to them in the +Laws. In the Cratylus they dawn upon him with the freshness of a +newly-discovered thought. + +The Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and +suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them +until their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to +earth. This is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets +bear witness. The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent +memory of ideas, which were known to them in a former state. The +recollection is awakened into life and consciousness by the sight of the +things which resemble them on earth. The soul evidently possesses such +innate ideas before she has had time to acquire them. This is proved by +an experiment tried on one of Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits +truths of arithmetic and geometry, which he had never learned in this +world. He must therefore have brought them with him from another. + +The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses +of Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural +answer to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of +evil?' and prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into +Hellas probably through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and +mysteries. It was easier to think of a former than of a future life, +because such a life has really existed for the race though not for the +individual, and all men come into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of +glory,' at any rate able to enter into the inheritance of the past. In +the Phaedrus, as well as in the Meno, it is this former rather than a +future life on which Plato is disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men +following in their train, go forth to contemplate the heavens, and are +borne round in the revolutions of them. There they see the divine forms +of justice, temperance, and the like, in their unchangeable beauty, but +not without an effort more than human. The soul of man is likened to +a charioteer and two steeds, one mortal, the other immortal. The +charioteer and the mortal steed are in fierce conflict; at length the +animal principle is finally overpowered, though not extinguished, by the +combined energies of the passionate and rational elements. This is one +of those passages in Plato which, partaking both of a philosophical +and poetical character, is necessarily indistinct and inconsistent. The +magnificent figure under which the nature of the soul is described has +not much to do with the popular doctrine of the ideas. Yet there is one +little trait in the description which shows that they are present to +Plato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which had seen truths +in the form of the universal, cannot again return to the nature of an +animal. + +In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a +previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been +acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from +another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of +association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person +recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from +any part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also +argued that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous +state of existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms +of them which are given by experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine +of ideas is subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. +'If the soul existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future +state, for a law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas +exist, then the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both +in the Meno and the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with +diffidence. He speaks in the Phaedo of the words with which he has +comforted himself and his friends, and will not be too confident that +the description which he has given of the soul and her mansions is +exactly true, but he 'ventures to think that something of the kind is +true.' And in the Meno, after dwelling upon the immortality of the +soul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have said I am not altogether +confident' (compare Apology; Gorgias). From this class of uncertainties +he exempts the difference between truth and appearance, of which he is +absolutely convinced. + +In the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not +contradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as +the genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name +are contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, +the picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing +in nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds +are only the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or +explanations are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition +of Plato's theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and +the mimetic arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a +lower kind of knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books +of the Republic we reach the highest and most perfect conception, which +Plato is able to attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now +finally seen to be one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to +have a unity which is the idea of good and the cause of all the rest. +They seem, however, to have lost their first aspect of universals under +which individuals are contained, and to have been converted into forms +of another kind, which are inconsistently regarded from the one side as +images or ideals of justice, temperance, holiness and the like; from the +other as hypotheses, or mathematical truths or principles. + +In the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows +the Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention +occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical +ratios furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But +though the conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or +laid aside, the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as +firmly maintained as ever. The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is +superseded by the conception of a personal God, who works according to +a final cause or principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is +expressed by Plato, either in the Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of +the truths which he conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the +existence of God or the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative +or hesitating manner, but the investigations of physiology. These he +regards, not seriously, as a part of philosophy, but as an innocent +recreation (Tim.). + +Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition +or defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is +put into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to +Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is +assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape +the dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted +that there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals +partake of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which +they become like them, or how ideas can be either within or without +the sphere of human knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any +relation to each other, is held to be incapable of explanation. And +yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy? +(Parmenides.) In the Sophist the theory of ideas is spoken of as a +doctrine held not by Plato, but by another sect of philosophers, called +'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the Megarians, who were very distinct +from him, if not opposed to him (Sophist). Nor in what may be termed +Plato's abridgement of the history of philosophy (Soph.), is any mention +made such as we find in the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, +of the derivation of such a theory or of any part of it from the +Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even from Socrates. In +the Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic Dialogues, +the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed under the +figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is retained. The +one and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working in the mind +of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' but of +'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of in +a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former +state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a +psychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final +form of the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own +writings (see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the +old string, and returns to general notions:--these he acknowledges to +be many, and yet he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be +made to recognize the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the +Protagoras, that the virtues are four, but they are also in some sense +one (Laws; compare Protagoras). + +So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the +statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to +harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, +but the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression +of Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and +general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They +pass from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to +heaven (jenseits) without regard to the gulf which later theology and +philosophy have made between them. They are also intended to supplement +or explain each other. They relate to a subject of which Plato himself +would have said that 'he was not confident of the precise form of his +own statements, but was strong in the belief that something of the kind +was true.' It is the spirit, not the letter, in which they agree--the +spirit which places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the +material, the one above the many, the mind before the body. + +The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times +widens into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear +after many ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new +conditions, at first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally +spreading over the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with +ancient philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is +inspired by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born +out of due time; and before men were capable of understanding it. To the +fathers of modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new +and original, but they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, +coming back by recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers +of the seventeenth century, who to themselves appeared to be working out +independently the enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood +in a new relation to theology and natural philosophy, and for a time +maintained towards both an attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the +similarities between modern and ancient thought are greater far than the +differences. All philosophy, even that part of it which is said to be +based upon experience, is really ideal; and ideas are not only derived +from facts, but they are also prior to them and extend far beyond them, +just as the mind is prior to the senses. + +Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in +the single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having +arrived at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from +philosophy to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to +be the real meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin +of knowledge, will always continue to be one of the first problems of +philosophy. + +Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of +logic--arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They +were the late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only +part of it which has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. +Philosophies come and go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing +of definitions, the invention of methods still continue to be the main +elements of the reasoning process. + +Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. +It is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as +a quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the +semi-barbarous Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike +ancient philosophy, it has been unaffected by impressions derived from +outward nature: it arose within the limits of the mind itself. From the +time of Descartes to Hume and Kant it has had little or nothing to do +with facts of science. On the other hand, the ancient and mediaeval +logic retained a continuous influence over it, and a form like that +of mathematics was easily impressed upon it; the principle of ancient +philosophy which is most apparent in it is scepticism; we must doubt +nearly every traditional or received notion, that we may hold fast one +or two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal form was a mental +necessity to the first thinkers of modern times: from this alone all +other ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure presentiment of +'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The Eleatic notion +that being and thought were the same was revived in a new form by +Descartes. But now it gave birth to consciousness and self-reflection: +it awakened the 'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and abstract has +no other certainty but the conviction of its own existence. 'I think, +therefore I am;' and this thought is God thinking in me, who has also +communicated to the reason of man his own attributes of thought and +extension--these are truly imparted to him because God is true (compare +Republic). It has been often remarked that Descartes, having begun by +dismissing all presuppositions, introduces several: he passes almost +at once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more important for the +illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists that God +is true and incapable of deception (Republic)--that he proceeds from +general ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in him. A +certain influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of their +philosophy is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest +opposition between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato, +supposes them to be reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by +a special divine act (compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all +the parts of the human body to meet in the pineal gland, that alone +affording a principle of unity in the material frame of man. It is +characteristic of the first period of modern philosophy, that having +begun (like the Presocratics) with a few general notions, Descartes +first falls absolutely under their influence, and then quickly discards +them. At the same time he is less able to observe facts, because they +are too much magnified by the glasses through which they are seen. +The common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the +comprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say +of abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them, +the less are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete +natures. + +Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy +is his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The +system of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that +of Descartes. In this respect the difference between them is like that +between Xenophanes and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be +described generally as the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction +and taking the form of the Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is +overpowered and intoxicated with the idea of Being or God. The greatness +of both philosophies consists in the immensity of a thought which +excludes all other thoughts; their weakness is the necessary separation +of this thought from actual existence and from practical life. In +neither of them is there any clear opposition between the inward and +outward world. The substance of Spinoza has two attributes, which alone +are cognizable by man, thought and extension; these are in extreme +opposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. They may be +regarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or substance +is unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the Eleatic +philosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est +negatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's +Sophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the +spectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with +another famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie +eternitatis.' According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they +are conditioned by what is alien to them, and by one another. Human +beings are included in the number of them. Hence there is no reality +in human action and no place for right and wrong. Individuality is +accident. The boasted freedom of the will is only a consciousness of +necessity. Truth, he says, is the direction of the reason towards the +infinite, in which all things repose; and herein lies the secret of +man's well-being. In the exaltation of the reason or intellect, in the +denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; Laws) Spinoza approaches +nearer to Plato than in his conception of an infinite substance. As +Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained +that knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to knowledge useful. +Both are equally far from any real experience or observation of nature. +And the same difficulty is found in both when we seek to apply their +ideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed between the infinite +substance and finite objects or individuals of Spinoza, just as there is +between the ideas of Plato and the world of sense. + +Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher +Leibnitz, who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between +mind and matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare +again Phaedrus). To him all the particles of matter are living beings +which reflect on one another, and in the least of them the whole is +contained. Here we catch a reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or +similar particles of Anaxagoras, and of the world-animal of the Timaeus. + +In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of +man is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by +observation and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea +of experience, rather than experience itself, with which the mind is +filled. It is a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is +vouchsafed to us. The Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual +facts than the Organon of Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many +of the old rags and ribbons which defaced the garment of philosophy have +been stripped off, but some of them still adhere. A crude conception of +the ideas of Plato survives in the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other +hand, there are many passages of Plato in which the importance of the +investigation of facts is as much insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are +almost equally superior to the illusions of language, and are constantly +crying out against them, as against other idols. + +Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more +than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him +experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and +construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the +dialectic of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley +is but the transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would +substitute sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation +of the human mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as +before, though he has drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided +at a different point. He has annihilated the outward world, but it +instantly reappears governed by the same laws and described under the +same names. + +A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central +principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would +deprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but +he seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and +does not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he +remark that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language +against the most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel +with the ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did +in their idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more +important principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and +unmeaning as this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his +successors, not unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and +Berkeley upon Hume himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in +almost equal degrees. Neither they nor their predecessors had any true +conception of language or of the history of philosophy. Hume's +paradox has been forgotten by the world, and did not any more than the +scepticism of the ancients require to be seriously refuted. Like some +other philosophical paradoxes, it would have been better left to die +out. It certainly could not be refuted by a philosophy such as Kant's, +in which, no less than in the previously mentioned systems, the history +of the human mind and the nature of language are almost wholly ignored, +and the certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject; +while absolute truth is reduced to a figment, more abstract and narrow +than Plato's ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to which, if we reason +strictly, no predicate can be applied. + +The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of +ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no +longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know +it; there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, +in mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may +attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every +sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They +are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our +lives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them +express relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in +rerum natura corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of +them as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete +possession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce +them, and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least +explained and were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away +by a word to which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions +such as 'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,' +'experience,' 'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' +and a heap of other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source +of quite as much error and illusion and have as little relation +to actual facts as the ideas of Plato. Few students of theology or +philosophy have sufficiently reflected how quickly the bloom of a +philosophy passes away; or how hard it is for one age to understand the +writings of another; or how nice a judgment is required of those who are +seeking to express the philosophy of one age in the terms of another. +The 'eternal truths' of which metaphysicians speak have hardly ever +lasted more than a generation. In our own day schools or systems of +philosophy which have once been famous have died before the founders of +them. We are still, as in Plato's age, groping about for a new method +more comprehensive than any of those which now prevail; and also more +permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the promise of such a +method, which can hardly be any other than the method of idealized +experience, having roots which strike far down into the history of +philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the +past, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, +or theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science +from another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have +proceeded a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the +want of method which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the +branches of knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will +become the knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp.), +and all things, like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one +another. + + + + +MENO + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus. + + +MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching +or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether +it comes to man by nature, or in what other way? + +SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous +among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but +now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, +especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend +Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the +flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the +other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he +has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold +style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he +himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him +anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there +is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated +from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian +whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, +and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think +that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue +is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I +myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as +the rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally +nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how +can I know the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could +I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the +reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could? + +MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you +do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to +Thessaly? + +SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I +have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. + +MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I have. + +MENO: And did you not think that he knew? + +SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now +tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, +and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what +he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect +that you and he think much alike. + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: +By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; +for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and +that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been +just saying that I have never found anybody who had. + +MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. +Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer +the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends +and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm +himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also +be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is +indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young +or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are +virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is +relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And +the same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare Arist. Pol.). + +SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you +present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your +keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of +you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many +kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there +are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be +distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or +shape? How would you answer me? + +MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. + +SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; +tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all +alike;--would you be able to answer? + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, +they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he +who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have +his eye fixed: Do you understand? + +MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the +question as I could wish. + +SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another +of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to +virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or +is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? + +MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. + +SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is +strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same +strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that +strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there +any difference? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a +child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? + +MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from +the others. + +SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to +order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? + +MENO: I did say so. + +SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered +without temperance and without justice? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly +order them with temperance and justice? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, +must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they +are intemperate and unjust? + +MENO: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in +the same virtues? + +MENO: Such is the inference. + +SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, +unless their virtue had been the same? + +MENO: They would not. + +SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try +and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. + +MENO: Will you have one definition of them all? + +SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking. + +MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to +say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. + +SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is +virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern +his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any +longer a slave? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once +more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' +but do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. + +SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'? + +MENO: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for +example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this +mode of speaking, because there are other figures. + +MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that +there are other virtues as well as justice. + +SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you +the names of the other figures if you asked me. + +MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and +there are many others. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching +after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as +before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs +through them all. + +MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt +to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. + +SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know +that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked +you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is +figure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in +my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is +'figure' or 'a figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.' + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you +would have told him. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered +whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is +colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other +colours as well. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have +told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he +would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not +what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and +say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what +is that common nature which you designate as figure--which contains +straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would +be your mode of speaking? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round +is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than +round? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure +than the straight, or the straight than the round? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. +Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure +or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, +or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: +Do you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And +then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what +is that 'simile in multis' which you call figure, and which includes +not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that +question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good +practice with a view to the answer about virtue. + +MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you? + +MENO: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue? + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do +you say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows +colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if +you would let me have a similar definition of virtue? + +MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. + +SOCRATES: Why simple? + +MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows +colour. + +(SOCRATES: Granted.) + +MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, +any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given +him? + +SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher +of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my +answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and +refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are +now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's +vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should +make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to +admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. +You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an +end, or termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same +sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about +them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or +terminated--that is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult. + +MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning. + +SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for +example in geometry. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my +definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid +ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid. + +MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour? + +SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to +give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering +what is Gorgias' definition of virtue. + +MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he +would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. + +MENO: Why do you think so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all +beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, +as I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and +therefore to humour you I must answer. + +MENO: Please do. + +SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, +which is familiar to you? + +MENO: I should like nothing better. + +SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain +effluences of existence? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of +them are too small or too large? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an +effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. + +MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in +the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that +you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of +many other similar phenomena. + +MENO: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and +therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that +the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the +same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not +compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. + +MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. + +SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do +my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very +many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and +tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into +a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver +virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I +have given you the pattern. + +MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires +the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and +I say too-- + +'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining +them.' + +SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire +the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be +good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? + +MENO: Both, I think. + +SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be +evils and desires them notwithstanding? + +MENO: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And desire is of possession? + +MENO: Yes, of possession. + +SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who +possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? + +MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and +others who know that they will do them harm. + +SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do +them good know that they are evils? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature +do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods +although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the +evils to be goods they really desire goods? + +MENO: Yes, in that case. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think +that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be +hurt by them? + +MENO: They must know it. + +SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are +miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? + +MENO: How can it be otherwise? + +SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated? + +MENO: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? + +MENO: I should say not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is +no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and +possession of evil? + +MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody +desires evil. + +SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the +desire and power of attaining good? + +MENO: Yes, I did say so. + +SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to +all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he +must be better in the power of attaining it? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be +the power of attaining good? + +MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view +this matter. + +SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another +point of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to +be the power of attaining goods? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and +the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the +state--those are what you would call goods? + +MENO: Yes, I should include all those. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the +great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would +you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to +be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and +dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? + +MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. + +SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part +of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without +them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. + +MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these? + +SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest +manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may +be equally virtue? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the +non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice +or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. + +MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment. + +SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and +the like, were each of them a part of virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me. + +MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole +and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to +frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that +virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and +justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing +what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by +you to be parts of virtue. + +MENO: What of that? + +SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature +of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but +declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; +as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, +and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my +dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: +What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done +with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying +that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the +question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a +part of virtue? + +MENO: No; I do not say that he can. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any +answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so. + +SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any +one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of +virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask +over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right? + +MENO: I believe that you are. + +SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and +your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? + +MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were +always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are +casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and +enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest +upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over +others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who +come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For +my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer +you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches +about virtue before now, and to many persons--and very good ones they +were, as I thought--at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And +I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, +for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast +into prison as a magician. + +SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me. + +MENO: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me. + +MENO: Why? + +SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I +know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made +about them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As +to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of +torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; +for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly +perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be +in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched +me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry. + +MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not +know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find +what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you +did not know? + +SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome +dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either +about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if +he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does +not know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. +Post. Anal.). + +MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? + +SOCRATES: I think not. + +MENO: Why not? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and +women who spoke of things divine that-- + +MENO: What did they say? + +SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. + +MENO: What was it? and who were they? + +SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how +they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been +poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and +many others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether +their words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at +one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born +again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to +live always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends +the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient +crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these +are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom +and are called saintly heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being +immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all +things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has +knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able +to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about +everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all +things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, +out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and +does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. +And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about +the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet +only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and +inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the +nature of virtue. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not +learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? +Can you teach me how this is? + +SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you +ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, +but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in +a contradiction. + +MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only +asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you +say is true, I wish that you would. + +SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to +the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous +attendants, that I may demonstrate on him. + +MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy. + +SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? + +MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house. + +SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe +whether he learns of me or only remembers. + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? + +BOY: I do. + +SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the +square are also equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other +side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in +one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of +one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two +feet? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. + +BOY: Four, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, +and having like this the lines equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the +side of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be? + +BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, +but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long +a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; +does he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he really know? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is +double. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To +the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from +a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a +figure equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say +of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double +square comes from double line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such +line here? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is +the figure of eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of +which is equal to the figure of four feet? + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four times is not double? + +BOY: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: But how much? + +BOY: Four times as much. + +SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, +but four times as much. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives +one of sixteen feet;--do you see? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, +and half the size of the other? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than +this one, and less than that one? + +BOY: Yes; I think so. + +SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell +me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be +more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? + +BOY: It ought. + +SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. + +BOY: Three feet. + +SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the +line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, +here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which +you speak? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, +the whole space will be three times three feet? + +BOY: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? + +BOY: Nine. + +SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? + +BOY: Eight. + +SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? + +BOY: No. + +SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather +not reckon, try and show me the line. + +BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. + +SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of +recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what +is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, +and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he +has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? + +MENO: I think that he is. + +SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's +shock,' have we done him any harm? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree +to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his +ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again +and again that the double space should have a double side. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or +learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of +it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not +know, and had desired to know? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? + +MENO: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and +not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch +and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of +eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet +which I have drawn? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? + +BOY: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? + +BOY: Four times. + +SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect +each of these spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this +space? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is. + +BOY: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? + +BOY: Four. + +SOCRATES: And how many in this? + +BOY: Two. + +SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? + +BOY: Twice. + +SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? + +BOY: From this. + +SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of +the figure of four feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. +And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to +affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal? + +BOY: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given +out of his own head? + +MENO: Yes, they were all his own. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that +which he does not know? + +MENO: He has. + +SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, +as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in +different forms, he would know as well as any one at last? + +MENO: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for +himself, if he is only asked questions? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is +recollection? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have +acquired or always possessed? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have +known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it +in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to +do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, +has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as +you say, he was born and bred in your house. + +MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him. + +SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge? + +MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he +must have had and learned it at some other time? + +MENO: Clearly he must. + +SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at +the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened +into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always +possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man? + +MENO: Obviously. + +SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, +then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to +recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. + +MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said +of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and +braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than +we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no +knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;--that is a +theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of +my power. + +MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent. + +SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that +which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire +together into the nature of virtue? + +MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my +original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard +it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men +in some other way? + +SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would +not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, +until we had first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only +of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling +yourself,--such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, +for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the +qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any +rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question 'Whether +virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon +hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain +triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or, whether a +certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain +circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a +hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be +such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply +it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the +given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to +the part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one +consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and +therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether +this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle':--that is +a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and +qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under +a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, +will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or +is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were +just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about +the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see +that knowledge alone is taught? + +MENO: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue +is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of +another species? + +MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. + +SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis +which is not set aside. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from +knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, +then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good +things are profitable? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? + +MENO: That is the only inference. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit +us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of +these, we call profitable? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you +not think so? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable +or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and +hurtful when they are not rightly used? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are +temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, +magnanimity, and the like? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, +are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage +wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no +sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of +apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are +profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when +under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under +the guidance of folly, in the opposite? + +MENO: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be +profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of +the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are +all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; +and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom +or prudence? + +MENO: I quite agree. + +SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we +were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, +do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul +guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul +herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by +folly? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul +wrongly. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other +things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon +wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that +which profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either +wholly or partly wisdom? + +MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. + +SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners +of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on +their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we +should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a +stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no +one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been +useful to the state? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. + +SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by +instruction? + +MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the +supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue +is taught. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? + +MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should +stand firm not only just now, but always. + +MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge +is virtue? + +SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the +assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that +I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider +now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is +taught, must not have teachers and disciples? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor +disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? + +MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue? + +SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and +taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have +assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the +most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately +have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make +enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son +of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not +by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made +himself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and +who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or +annoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as +the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to +fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you +are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who +they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering +our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we +wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should +we not send him to the physicians? + +ANYTUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send +him to the cobblers? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so forth? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we +should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be +a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those +who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who +demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one +who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be +right in sending him? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the +other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse +to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be +plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed +teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge +which he wishes him to acquire--would not such conduct be the height of +folly? + +ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me +about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires +to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or +the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when +to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to +whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the +previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who +profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and +are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price? + +ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people +whom mankind call Sophists? + +ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or +kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever +be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are +a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with +them. + +SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how +to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not +only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to +them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? +Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, +who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who +created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that +be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes +or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty +days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more +than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his +disciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found +out. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his +death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; +and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he +retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; +some who lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when +you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be +supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those +who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of +their minds? + +ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their +money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians +who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out +of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, +and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike. + +SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so +angry with them? + +ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor +would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them. + +SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them? + +ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted. + +SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good +or bad of which you are wholly ignorant? + +ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, +whether I am acquainted with them or not. + +SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, +judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, +you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers +who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only +ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him +how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He +is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him. + +ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself? + +SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these +things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say +that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me +to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name? + +ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at +random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the +Sophists. + +SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having +been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that +which they had never learned themselves? + +ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of +gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there +always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But +the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own +virtue;--not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of +the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we +have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our +own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue +which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being +communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question +which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: +Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man? + +ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better. + +SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever +was a good teacher, of his own virtue? + +ANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so. + +SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have +desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not +have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from +imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son +Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on +horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; +and in anything which could be learned from a master he was well +trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him? + +ANYTUS: I have. + +SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of +capacity? + +ANYTUS: Very likely not. + +SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that +Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father +was? + +ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so. + +SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father +Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, +and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be +no better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself +excelled? + +ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not. + +SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among +the best men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of +Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? + +ANYTUS: To be sure I should. + +SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other +Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But +what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? +He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is +Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, +had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus. + +ANYTUS: I know. + +SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled +horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of +arts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had +he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But +virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose +the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and +few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and +Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, +he trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one +of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, +who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that +day. Do you remember them? + +ANYTUS: I have heard of them. + +SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were +taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them +to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have +been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many +friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great +family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if +virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian +or foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not +himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend +Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught? + +ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: +and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. +Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than +to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe +that you know. + +SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be +in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these +gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one +of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of +defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will +return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your +region too? + +MENO: Certainly there are. + +SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess +to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught? + +MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear +them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the +reverse. + +SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the +possibility of their own vocation? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only +professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue? + +MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to +teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; +but he thinks that men should be taught to speak. + +SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers? + +MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in +doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have +doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet +says the very same thing? + +MENO: Where does he say so? + +SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.): + +'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to +them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with +the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.' + +Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught? + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): + +'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who +were able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.' + +And again:-- + +'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have +heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a +bad man into a good one.' + +And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other. + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are +affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant +themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing +to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged +'gentlemen' are sometimes saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and +sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true +sense whose ideas are in such confusion? + +MENO: I should say, certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, +clearly there can be no other teachers? + +MENO: No. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? + +MENO: Agreed. + +SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which +there are neither teachers nor disciples? + +MENO: We have. + +SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? + +MENO: There are not. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? + +MENO: That, I think, is true. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught? + +MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, +that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into +existence? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and +that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of +me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find +some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, +because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked +that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than +that of knowledge (episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no +seeing how there can be any good men at all. + +MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. +Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are +true guides to us of action--there we were also right? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he +have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong. + +MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'? + +SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere +else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a +right and good guide? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had +never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other +knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who +knows the truth? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as +knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation +about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the +guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? + +MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will +always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, +and sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so +long as he has right opinion? + +MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I +wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they +should ever differ. + +SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you? + +MENO: Do tell me. + +SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of +Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your +country? + +MENO: What have they to do with the question? + +SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and +if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. + +MENO: Well, what of that? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if +they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but +when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful +works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true +opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, +but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and +therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie +of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, +as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the +first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second +place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable +and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain. + +MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth. + +SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet +that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with +me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most +certainly one of them. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. + +SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading +the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? + +MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or +less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to +him who has knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be +useful? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not +only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, +and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature +or acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by +nature? + +MENO: Not I.) + +SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by +nature good? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether +virtue is acquired by teaching? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it +was taught? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there +were no teachers, not? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of +virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not +wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true +opinion--these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance +are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true +opinion and knowledge. + +MENO: I think so too. + +SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. + +MENO: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, +has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political +life. + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were +wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern +states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like +themselves--because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. + +MENO: That is probably true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains +is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in +politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets +say many things truly, but they know not what they say. + +MENO: So I believe. + +SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, +having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we +were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole +tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine +and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition +they say many grand things, not knowing what they say. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? +and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine +man.' + +MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely +our friend Anytus may take offence at the word. + +SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another +opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result +seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither +natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor +is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to +be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And +if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living +what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has +understanding; but the rest are flitting shades'; and he and his virtue +in like manner will be a reality among shadows. + +MENO: That is excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the +virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth +until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual +nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you +are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him +be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good +service to the Athenian people. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Meno, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MENO *** + +***** This file should be named 1643.txt or 1643.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/4/1643/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what +virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met +Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a +bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his +own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O +yes--nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old +man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, all +of which may be easily described.' + +Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and +not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second +attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this, +again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, +as well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly or +not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is +virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, +such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and +black and white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other +colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to +define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of +interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in +multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' +But some one may object that he does not know the meaning of the word +'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates +is willing to furnish him with a simpler and more philosophical definition, +into which no disputed word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of +form.' Meno imperiously insists that he must still have a definition of +colour. Some raillery follows; and at length Socrates is induced to reply, +'that colour is the effluence of form, sensible, and in due proportion to +the sight.' This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who +welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of +opinion that the more abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far +better. + +Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general +definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words +of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to have the +power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet +made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or +popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, +'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the +good, the point of the definition is contained in the words, 'the power of +getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The +definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with +justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the +getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition repeats the word +defined. + +Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a +torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty +to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him. +Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because +he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, +asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does +not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves +a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real +difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a +reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:-- + +He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an +immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of +existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of +ancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and under +world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by +association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of +one kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into +all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by +the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of +Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical +figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal is double the square +of the side--that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in honour of +which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a hecatomb--is +elicited from him. The first step in the process of teaching has made him +conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given +him, and is the better for the operation. But whence had the uneducated +man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it +born with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as +he always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. +(Compare Phaedo.) + +After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the +original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he +professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to +argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will +assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was +the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.) + +Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that +goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. +Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where are +the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging. +Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows +that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable. + +In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-to-do +citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, who happens to be +present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be +taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall +Meno go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman--to the great Athenian +statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (Laches, +Prot.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, had sons to whom +they would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted their own +political wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs were +remarkable for anything except riding and wrestling and similar +accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his +favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong; +he breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of another opportunity +of talking with him, and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian +people a service by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial of +Socrates. + +Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is +teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of +it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not +profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, +and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. +This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance +of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for +practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, +and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' because not +bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is +possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only +inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with knowledge, +is an ideal only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach +what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in the world below,--'he alone has +wisdom, but the rest flit like shadows.' + +This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? +No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in +the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a +general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of +courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this +ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of +the teachableness of virtue could be resolved. + +The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems rather +intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and +therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in +this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The +teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their +pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only +produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire +into what you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates +replies by his theory of reminiscence. + +To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly tending +in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found than it +vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where +are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of +systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be attained, +and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a single +science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word; that +is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their +pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready- +made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is +desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the +paradox that there are no educators. This paradox, though different in +form, is not really different from the remark which is often made in modern +times by those who would depreciate either the methods of education +commonly employed, or the standard attained--that 'there is no true +education among us.' + +There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if +there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of +education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or +divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to others. +This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the circumstance +that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. Those who +are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or philosophers, +but they are inspired and divine. + +There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the +concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean to +intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life. +To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the +most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that +'probability is the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);' and he is at the +same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a +higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of +the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds +cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent +experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach +others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or +arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not +science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato +in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that +inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He +would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or +the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas. + +Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an +unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has +knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a +sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is +no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding +the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of oracles in +the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the daemonium +of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the +higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his +philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence +of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it. + +This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of reminiscence +and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight, even +slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had abstract ideas +in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls +therefore must have always existed. For they must always have been either +men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And +Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds +immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not +altogether confident.' (Compare Phaedo.) It may be observed, however, +that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but +partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association +of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not +in the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, +not actual, and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion. + +The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in +the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of +justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything +but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained +more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the +affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern +philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the +ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed +that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was +converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the +association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of existences. +The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered from +the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a +knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of episteme); and (2) that +the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but +in what is drawn out of him. + +Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute +observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished +with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) the shrewd +reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to +ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this must +surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could +get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or (3) the remark +conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of +thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos). Characteristic also +of the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the +teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the +mathematicians; and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which +occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives +a colour to all of them--that mankind only desire evil through ignorance; +(6) the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth +which is latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for +knowing his ignorance. + +The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual +circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten +thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about +the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious-- +a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the +great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of +knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. +He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as +Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the +sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, just +as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is +made the subject of a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a +half-playful manner suited to his character; at the same time he appears +not quite to understand the process to which he is being subjected. For he +is exhibited as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the +Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue +as 'the power and desire of attaining things honourable,' like the first +definition of justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers +have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical +incapacity to grasp a general notion. + +Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant +at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true +philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions, +whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is +of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of a different variety; +the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles are not attributed to +him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the +accuser of Socrates, as is apparently indicated by his parting words. +Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing that the accusation of +Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to +a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have been regardless of the +historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno +and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol.) the real Anytus was a democrat, and +had joined Thrasybulus in the conflict with the thirty. + +The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if +'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates +himself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher may draw +out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies of the +Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the foundations of +the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly +explained. There is a progression by antagonism of two opposite aspects of +philosophy. But at the moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles +upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of +knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed +the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide. There +is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked +simply, 'what is friendship?' 'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as +in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in +the second stage of his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge +in a prior and future state of existence. + +The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and in +all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as well as +in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but in +stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have +a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and good +speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine of +the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the +foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards +and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is +described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The +existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher +or philosophical sense is admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again +introduced in the Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on +the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the +tie of the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is +given up as hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at +different times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new +stages of thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in +order to take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him +hidden meanings or remote allusions. + +There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the +Meno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato +were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be +one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the +allusion of Anytus. + +We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has done, +of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already seen, in +the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in Plato are +very far from resembling the same characters in history. The repulsive +picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon, where he also +appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having lovers,' has +no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato. + +The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal +evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the +'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of +reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in +the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about knowing and +learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The doctrines of +immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the Phaedrus and +Phaedo; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully +developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously +calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the +later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are +led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than the Protagoras, +and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias. The place which is assigned to +it in this work is due mainly to the desire to bring together in a single +volume all the Dialogues which contain allusions to the trial and death of +Socrates. + +... + +ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO. + +Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and +definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular +account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his Dialogues +interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It is due also +to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; and the +erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed by the +realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas may be +summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists not in +particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of God, or +in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former state of +existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or association +from sensible things. The sensible things are not realities, but shadows +only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning propositions are hardly +suspected to be a caricature of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato in +various ways and under many figures of speech is seeking to unfold. Poetry +has been converted into dogma; and it is not remarked that the Platonic +ideas are to be found only in about a third of Plato's writings and are not +confined to him. The forms which they assume are numerous, and if taken +literally, inconsistent with one another. At one time we are in the clouds +of mythology, at another among the abstractions of mathematics or +metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and fancy +are mingled in the same passage. The ideas are sometimes described as +many, coextensive with the universals of sense and also with the first +principles of ethics; or again they are absorbed into the single idea of +good, and subordinated to it. They are not more certain than facts, but +they are equally certain (Phaedo). They are both personal and impersonal. +They are abstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are +even transformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the +world. And the idea of good (Republic) may without violence be converted +into the Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things +(Tim.). + +It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of +thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct +meaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, +aspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep +religious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of +curious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous +philosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great diversity +shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think. They have not +yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them, though he also +criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others are always talking +about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and that they are not +peculiar to himself (Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in his later writings +he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them. As he proceeds he makes +for himself new modes of expression more akin to the Aristotelian logic. + +Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common meaning +or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he treats of the +ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is the spirit of +idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many names and taken +many forms, and has in a measure influenced those who seemed to be most +averse to it. It has often been charged with inconsistency and +fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on human nature, and has +exercised a wonderful charm and interest over a few spirits who have been +lost in the thought of it. It has been banished again and again, but has +always returned. It has attempted to leave the earth and soar heavenwards, +but soon has found that only in experience could any solid foundation of +knowledge be laid. It has degenerated into pantheism, but has again +emerged. No other knowledge has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It +is the science of sciences, which are also ideas, and under either aspect +require to be defined. They can only be thought of in due proportion when +conceived in relation to one another. They are the glasses through which +the kingdoms of science are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest +minds, except when living in an age of reaction against them, have +unconsciously fallen under their power. + +The account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and clearest, +and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first and then +comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, e.g. in the +Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the criticism of them in +the Parmenides, the personal form which is attributed to them in the +Timaeus, the logical character which they assume in the Sophist and +Philebus, and the allusion to them in the Laws. In the Cratylus they dawn +upon him with the freshness of a newly-discovered thought. + +The Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and +suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them until +their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to earth. This +is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets bear witness. +The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent memory of ideas, +which were known to them in a former state. The recollection is awakened +into life and consciousness by the sight of the things which resemble them +on earth. The soul evidently possesses such innate ideas before she has +had time to acquire them. This is proved by an experiment tried on one of +Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits truths of arithmetic and +geometry, which he had never learned in this world. He must therefore have +brought them with him from another. + +The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses of +Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural answer +to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of evil?' and +prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into Hellas probably +through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and mysteries. It was +easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has +really existed for the race though not for the individual, and all men come +into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of glory,' at any rate able to +enter into the inheritance of the past. In the Phaedrus, as well as in the +Meno, it is this former rather than a future life on which Plato is +disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men following in their train, go +forth to contemplate the heavens, and are borne round in the revolutions of +them. There they see the divine forms of justice, temperance, and the +like, in their unchangeable beauty, but not without an effort more than +human. The soul of man is likened to a charioteer and two steeds, one +mortal, the other immortal. The charioteer and the mortal steed are in +fierce conflict; at length the animal principle is finally overpowered, +though not extinguished, by the combined energies of the passionate and +rational elements. This is one of those passages in Plato which, partaking +both of a philosophical and poetical character, is necessarily indistinct +and inconsistent. The magnificent figure under which the nature of the +soul is described has not much to do with the popular doctrine of the +ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the description which shows that +they are present to Plato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which +had seen truths in the form of the universal, cannot again return to the +nature of an animal. + +In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a +previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been +acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from +another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of +association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person +recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any +part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued +that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of +existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them +which are given by experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine of ideas is +subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. 'If the soul +existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future state, for a +law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas exist, then +the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both in the Meno and +the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with diffidence. He speaks in +the Phaedo of the words with which he has comforted himself and his +friends, and will not be too confident that the description which he has +given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true, but he 'ventures to +think that something of the kind is true.' And in the Meno, after dwelling +upon the immortality of the soul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have +said I am not altogether confident' (compare Apology; Gorgias). From this +class of uncertainties he exempts the difference between truth and +appearance, of which he is absolutely convinced. + +In the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not +contradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as the +genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name are +contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, the +picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing in +nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds are only +the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or explanations +are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition of Plato's +theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and the mimetic +arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a lower kind of +knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books of the Republic we +reach the highest and most perfect conception, which Plato is able to +attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now finally seen to be +one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to have a unity which is +the idea of good and the cause of all the rest. They seem, however, to +have lost their first aspect of universals under which individuals are +contained, and to have been converted into forms of another kind, which are +inconsistently regarded from the one side as images or ideals of justice, +temperance, holiness and the like; from the other as hypotheses, or +mathematical truths or principles. + +In the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows +the Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention +occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical ratios +furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But though the +conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or laid aside, +the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as firmly maintained as +ever. The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is superseded by the +conception of a personal God, who works according to a final cause or +principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is expressed by Plato, +either in the Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of the truths which he +conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the existence of God or +the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative or hesitating manner, +but the investigations of physiology. These he regards, not seriously, as +a part of philosophy, but as an innocent recreation (Tim.). + +Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition or +defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is put +into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to +Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is +assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the +dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that +there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals partake +of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which they become like +them, or how ideas can be either within or without the sphere of human +knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any relation to each other, +is held to be incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no universal +ideas, what becomes of philosophy? (Parmenides.) In the Sophist the +theory of ideas is spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by +another sect of philosophers, called 'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the +Megarians, who were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him +(Sophist). Nor in what may be termed Plato's abridgement of the history of +philosophy (Soph.), is any mention made such as we find in the first book +of Aristotle's Metaphysics, of the derivation of such a theory or of any +part of it from the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even +from Socrates. In the Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic +Dialogues, the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed +under the figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is +retained. The one and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working +in the mind of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' +but of 'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of +in a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former +state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a +psychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final form of +the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own writings +(see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the old string, +and returns to general notions:--these he acknowledges to be many, and yet +he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be made to recognize +the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the Protagoras, that the +virtues are four, but they are also in some sense one (Laws; compare +Protagoras). + +So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the +statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to +harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, but +the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of +Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and +general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass +from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven (jenseits) +without regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy have made +between them. They are also intended to supplement or explain each other. +They relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have said that 'he +was not confident of the precise form of his own statements, but was strong +in the belief that something of the kind was true.' It is the spirit, not +the letter, in which they agree--the spirit which places the divine above +the human, the spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the +mind before the body. + +The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times widens +into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear after many +ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new conditions, at +first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally spreading over +the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with ancient +philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is inspired +by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born out of due +time; and before men were capable of understanding it. To the fathers of +modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new and original, but +they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, coming back by +recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers of the seventeenth +century, who to themselves appeared to be working out independently the +enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood in a new relation to +theology and natural philosophy, and for a time maintained towards both an +attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the similarities between modern +and ancient thought are greater far than the differences. All philosophy, +even that part of it which is said to be based upon experience, is really +ideal; and ideas are not only derived from facts, but they are also prior +to them and extend far beyond them, just as the mind is prior to the +senses. + +Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in the +single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having arrived +at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from philosophy +to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to be the real +meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin of knowledge, will +always continue to be one of the first problems of philosophy. + +Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of logic-- +arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They were the +late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only part of it +which has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. Philosophies +come and go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing of definitions, +the invention of methods still continue to be the main elements of the +reasoning process. + +Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. It +is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as a +quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the semi-barbarous +Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike ancient philosophy, it +has been unaffected by impressions derived from outward nature: it arose +within the limits of the mind itself. From the time of Descartes to Hume +and Kant it has had little or nothing to do with facts of science. On the +other hand, the ancient and mediaeval logic retained a continuous influence +over it, and a form like that of mathematics was easily impressed upon it; +the principle of ancient philosophy which is most apparent in it is +scepticism; we must doubt nearly every traditional or received notion, that +we may hold fast one or two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal +form was a mental necessity to the first thinkers of modern times: from +this alone all other ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure +presentiment of 'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The +Eleatic notion that being and thought were the same was revived in a new +form by Descartes. But now it gave birth to consciousness and self- +reflection: it awakened the 'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and +abstract has no other certainty but the conviction of its own existence. +'I think, therefore I am;' and this thought is God thinking in me, who has +also communicated to the reason of man his own attributes of thought and +extension--these are truly imparted to him because God is true (compare +Republic). It has been often remarked that Descartes, having begun by +dismissing all presuppositions, introduces several: he passes almost at +once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more important for the +illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists that God is +true and incapable of deception (Republic)--that he proceeds from general +ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in him. A certain +influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of their philosophy +is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest opposition +between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato, supposes them to be +reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by a special divine act +(compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all the parts of the human body to +meet in the pineal gland, that alone affording a principle of unity in the +material frame of man. It is characteristic of the first period of modern +philosophy, that having begun (like the Presocratics) with a few general +notions, Descartes first falls absolutely under their influence, and then +quickly discards them. At the same time he is less able to observe facts, +because they are too much magnified by the glasses through which they are +seen. The common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the +comprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say of +abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them, the +less are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete natures. + +Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy is +his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The system +of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that of Descartes. +In this respect the difference between them is like that between Xenophanes +and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be described generally as +the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction and taking the form of the +Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is overpowered and intoxicated +with the idea of Being or God. The greatness of both philosophies consists +in the immensity of a thought which excludes all other thoughts; their +weakness is the necessary separation of this thought from actual existence +and from practical life. In neither of them is there any clear opposition +between the inward and outward world. The substance of Spinoza has two +attributes, which alone are cognizable by man, thought and extension; these +are in extreme opposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. +They may be regarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or +substance is unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the +Eleatic philosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est +negatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's +Sophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the +spectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with another +famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie eternitatis.' +According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they are conditioned by +what is alien to them, and by one another. Human beings are included in +the number of them. Hence there is no reality in human action and no place +for right and wrong. Individuality is accident. The boasted freedom of +the will is only a consciousness of necessity. Truth, he says, is the +direction of the reason towards the infinite, in which all things repose; +and herein lies the secret of man's well-being. In the exaltation of the +reason or intellect, in the denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; +Laws) Spinoza approaches nearer to Plato than in his conception of an +infinite substance. As Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza +would have maintained that knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to +knowledge useful. Both are equally far from any real experience or +observation of nature. And the same difficulty is found in both when we +seek to apply their ideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed +between the infinite substance and finite objects or individuals of +Spinoza, just as there is between the ideas of Plato and the world of +sense. + +Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher Leibnitz, +who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between mind and +matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare again Phaedrus). +To him all the particles of matter are living beings which reflect on one +another, and in the least of them the whole is contained. Here we catch a +reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or similar particles of Anaxagoras, and +of the world-animal of the Timaeus. + +In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of man is +supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by observation +and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of experience, +rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is a +symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us. The +Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon of +Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons +which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some of +them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in +the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of +Plato in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much +insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the +illusions of language, and are constantly crying out against them, as +against other idols. + +Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more +than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him +experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and +construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic +of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the +transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would substitute +sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human +mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has +drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. +He has annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed +by the same laws and described under the same names. + +A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central +principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would +deprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but he +seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and does +not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he remark +that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language against the +most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel with the +ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did in their +idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more important +principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and unmeaning as +this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his successors, not +unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and Berkeley upon Hume +himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in almost equal degrees. +Neither they nor their predecessors had any true conception of language or +of the history of philosophy. Hume's paradox has been forgotten by the +world, and did not any more than the scepticism of the ancients require to +be seriously refuted. Like some other philosophical paradoxes, it would +have been better left to die out. It certainly could not be refuted by a +philosophy such as Kant's, in which, no less than in the previously +mentioned systems, the history of the human mind and the nature of language +are almost wholly ignored, and the certainty of objective knowledge is +transferred to the subject; while absolute truth is reduced to a figment, +more abstract and narrow than Plato's ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to +which, if we reason strictly, no predicate can be applied. + +The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of +ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no +longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know it; +there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, in +mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may +attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every +sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They +are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our +lives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them +express relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in +rerum natura corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of them +as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete +possession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce them, +and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least explained and +were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away by a word to +which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions such as +'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,' 'experience,' +'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' and a heap of +other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source of quite as much +error and illusion and have as little relation to actual facts as the ideas +of Plato. Few students of theology or philosophy have sufficiently +reflected how quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes away; or how hard it +is for one age to understand the writings of another; or how nice a +judgment is required of those who are seeking to express the philosophy of +one age in the terms of another. The 'eternal truths' of which +metaphysicians speak have hardly ever lasted more than a generation. In +our own day schools or systems of philosophy which have once been famous +have died before the founders of them. We are still, as in Plato's age, +groping about for a new method more comprehensive than any of those which +now prevail; and also more permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the +promise of such a method, which can hardly be any other than the method of +idealized experience, having roots which strike far down into the history +of philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the +past, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, or +theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science from +another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have proceeded +a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the want of method +which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the branches of +knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will become the +knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp.), and all things, +like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one another. + + +MENO + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus. + + +MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or +by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it +comes to man by nature, or in what other way? + +SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among +the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am +not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at +Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is +Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among +them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell +in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering +questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is +the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes +may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at +Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have +emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any +Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your +face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you +think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what +virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I +myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the +rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing +about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know +the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was +fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and +noble? Do you think that I could? + +MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do +not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to +Thessaly? + +SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have +never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. + +MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I have. + +MENO: And did you not think that he knew? + +SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell +what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and +that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he +said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that +you and he think much alike. + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By +the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I +shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you +and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying +that I have never found anybody who had. + +MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. +Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the +state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his +enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's +virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her +duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. +Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or +free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of +definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each +of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates +(Compare Arist. Pol.). + +SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you +present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your +keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, +What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of +bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and +different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some +other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer +me? + +MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. + +SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; +tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all +alike;--would you be able to answer? + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, +they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who +would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye +fixed: Do you understand? + +MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the +question as I could wish. + +SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another +of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, +or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the +nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? + +MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. + +SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is +strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same +strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that +strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any +difference? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child +or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? + +MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from +the others. + +SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to +order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? + +MENO: I did say so. + +SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered +without temperance and without justice? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly +order them with temperance and justice? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, +must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are +intemperate and unjust? + +MENO: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in +the same virtues? + +MENO: Such is the inference. + +SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless +their virtue had been the same? + +MENO: They would not. + +SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try +and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. + +MENO: Will you have one definition of them all? + +SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking. + +MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to +say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. + +SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is +virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his +father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a +slave? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, +fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do +you not add 'justly and not unjustly'? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. + +SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'? + +MENO: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, +is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of +speaking, because there are other figures. + +MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that +there are other virtues as well as justice. + +SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you +the names of the other figures if you asked me. + +MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and +there are many others. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching +after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; +but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them +all. + +MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt +to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. + +SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know +that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you +the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? +And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of +speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a +figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.' + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you +would have told him. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered +whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is +colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other +colours as well. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told +him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he +would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not +what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say +that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that +common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as +well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode +of speaking? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is +round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than +the straight, or the straight than the round? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. +Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or +colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know +what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not +understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might +put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile +in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and +straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I +wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to +the answer about virtue. + +MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you? + +MENO: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue? + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you +say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. +Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would +let me have a similar definition of virtue? + +MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. + +SOCRATES: Why simple? + +MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows +colour. + +(SOCRATES: Granted.) + +MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, +any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him? + +SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher +of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my +answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and +refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, +I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that +is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of +premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And +this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will +acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or +termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same sense, +although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but +still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that +is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult. + +MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning. + +SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for +example in geometry. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my +definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; +or, more concisely, the limit of solid. + +MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour? + +SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to +give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what +is Gorgias' definition of virtue. + +MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he +would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. + +MENO: Why do you think so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties +when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, +you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to +humour you I must answer. + +MENO: Please do. + +SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, +which is familiar to you? + +MENO: I should like nothing better. + +SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain +effluences of existence? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of +them are too small or too large? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an +effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. + +MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in +the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that +you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many +other similar phenomena. + +MENO: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore +was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the +other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, +if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you +said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. + +MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. + +SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my +very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many +as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell +me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a +plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue +to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have +given you the pattern. + +MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires +the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I +say too-- + +'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining +them.' + +SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire +the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be +good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? + +MENO: Both, I think. + +SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be +evils and desires them notwithstanding? + +MENO: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And desire is of possession? + +MENO: Yes, of possession. + +SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who +possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? + +MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and +others who know that they will do them harm. + +SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them +good know that they are evils? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do +not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although +they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be +goods they really desire goods? + +MENO: Yes, in that case. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that +evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by +them? + +MENO: They must know it. + +SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable +in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? + +MENO: How can it be otherwise? + +SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated? + +MENO: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? + +MENO: I should say not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no +one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and +possession of evil? + +MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody +desires evil. + +SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire +and power of attaining good? + +MENO: Yes, I did say so. + +SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to +all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he +must be better in the power of attaining it? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be +the power of attaining good? + +MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view +this matter. + +SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point +of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the +power of attaining goods? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and +the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the +state--those are what you would call goods? + +MENO: Yes, I should include all those. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the +great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you +add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of +no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and +dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? + +MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. + +SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of +virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them +the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. + +MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these? + +SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner +for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally +virtue? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the +non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or +honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. + +MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment. + +SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and +the like, were each of them a part of virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me. + +MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole +and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame +your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the +power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you +acknowledge to be a part of virtue. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing +what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you +to be parts of virtue. + +MENO: What of that? + +SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of +virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare +every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though +you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too +when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I +fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? +for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue +is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with +justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any +one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue? + +MENO: No; I do not say that he can. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any +answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so. + +SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any +one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of +virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over +again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right? + +MENO: I believe that you are. + +SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your +friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? + +MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were +always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting +your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and +am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem +to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like +the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, +as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are +really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been +delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and +to many persons--and very good ones they were, as I thought--at this moment +I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in +not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as +you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician. + +SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me. + +MENO: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me. + +MENO: Why? + +SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know +that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about +them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As to my +being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity +in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex +others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. +And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, +although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have +no objection to join with you in the enquiry. + +MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? +What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what +you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not +know? + +SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome +dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either +about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he +knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not +know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post. +Anal.). + +MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? + +SOCRATES: I think not. + +MENO: Why not? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and +women who spoke of things divine that-- + +MENO: What did they say? + +SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. + +MENO: What was it? and who were they? + +SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how +they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been +poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many +others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether their +words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time +has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but +is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in +perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of +those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again +from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become +noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly +heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been +born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in +this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no +wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever +knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the +soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as +men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is +strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but +recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical +argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and +is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and +inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the +nature of virtue. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, +and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you +teach me how this is? + +SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you +ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, +but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a +contradiction. + +MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only +asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say +is true, I wish that you would. + +SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the +utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, +that I may demonstrate on him. + +MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy. + +SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? + +MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house. + +SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether +he learns of me or only remembers. + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? + +BOY: I do. + +SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the +square are also equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side +be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one +direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one +foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two +feet? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. + +BOY: Four, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, +and having like this the lines equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the +side of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be? + +BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, +but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a +line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does +he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he really know? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is +double. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To +the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a +double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure +equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say of eight feet; +and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from +double line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such +line here? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is +the figure of eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of +which is equal to the figure of four feet? + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four times is not double? + +BOY: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: But how much? + +BOY: Four times as much. + +SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, +but four times as much. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives +one of sixteen feet;--do you see? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, +and half the size of the other? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this +one, and less than that one? + +BOY: Yes; I think so. + +SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell +me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be +more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? + +BOY: It ought. + +SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. + +BOY: Three feet. + +SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line +of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are +two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, +the whole space will be three times three feet? + +BOY: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? + +BOY: Nine. + +SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? + +BOY: Eight. + +SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? + +BOY: No. + +SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather +not reckon, try and show me the line. + +BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. + +SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of +recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is +the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and +answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a +difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? + +MENO: I think that he is. + +SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' +have we done him any harm? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to +the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, +but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again +that the double space should have a double side. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or +learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, +until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, +and had desired to know? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? + +MENO: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not +teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and +see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of +eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet +which I have drawn? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? + +BOY: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? + +BOY: Four times. + +SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect +each of these spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this +space? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is. + +BOY: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? + +BOY: Four. + +SOCRATES: And how many in this? + +BOY: Two. + +SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? + +BOY: Twice. + +SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? + +BOY: From this. + +SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of +the figure of four feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And +if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm +that the double space is the square of the diagonal? + +BOY: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given +out of his own head? + +MENO: Yes, they were all his own. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that +which he does not know? + +MENO: He has. + +SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, +as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in +different forms, he would know as well as any one at last? + +MENO: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for +himself, if he is only asked questions? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is +recollection? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have +acquired or always possessed? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have +known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in +this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the +same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any +one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he +was born and bred in your house. + +MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him. + +SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge? + +MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he +must have had and learned it at some other time? + +MENO: Clearly he must. + +SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the +time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into +knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed +this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man? + +MENO: Obviously. + +SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then +the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect +what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. + +MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of +which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and +braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we +should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing +and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;--that is a theme upon +which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power. + +MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent. + +SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that +which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together +into the nature of virtue? + +MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my +original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it +as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in +some other way? + +SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not +have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had +first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me +who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,--such being your +notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And +therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do +not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and +allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other +way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked +whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle +(Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in +a certain circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will +offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the +figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you +apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the +given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part +produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one consequence +follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to +assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of +being inscribed in the circle':--that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we +too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether +virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of +such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first +hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be +taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is +no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or +rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught? + +MENO: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue +is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another +species? + +MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. + +SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis which +is not set aside. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from +knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, +then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things +are profitable? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? + +MENO: That is the only inference. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit +us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of +these, we call profitable? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you +not think so? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or +the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and +hurtful when they are not rightly used? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are +temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, +magnanimity, and the like? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are +sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage +wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no +sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of +apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are +profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when +under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the +guidance of folly, in the opposite? + +MENO: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be +profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the +soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made +profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore +if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? + +MENO: I quite agree. + +SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we +were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do +not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides +and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself +are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul +wrongly. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other +things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon +wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which +profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either +wholly or partly wisdom? + +MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. + +SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of +characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their +showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should +have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon +them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might +tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the +state? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. + +SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by +instruction? + +MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the +supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is +taught. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? + +MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand +firm not only just now, but always. + +MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is +virtue? + +SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the +assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I +have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now +and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, +must not have teachers and disciples? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor +disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? + +MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue? + +SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and +taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have +assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the +most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately +have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; +to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy +and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or +gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as +Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well- +conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; +moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian +people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest +offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn +whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, +Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are +the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good +physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the +physicians? + +ANYTUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him +to the cobblers? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so forth? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we +should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a +physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who +profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand +payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will +come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in +sending him? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the +other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse +to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be +plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed +teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge +which he wishes him to acquire--would not such conduct be the height of +folly? + +ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me +about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to +attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the +house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send +away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he +go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument +imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that +they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart +instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price? + +ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people +whom mankind call Sophists? + +ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or +kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be +so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest +pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them. + +SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how +to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not +only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to +them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? +Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who +made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such +noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of +old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse +than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and +would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, +Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him +worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not +mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were +spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a +good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, +but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others +who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted +the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or +unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of +Hellas have been out of their minds? + +ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their +money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians +who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of +their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and +did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike. + +SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so +angry with them? + +ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor +would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them. + +SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them? + +ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted. + +SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good +or bad of which you are wholly ignorant? + +ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, +whether I am acquainted with them or not. + +SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, +judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you +know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who +will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask +you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to +become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the +friend of your family, and you will oblige him. + +ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself? + +SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these +things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say +that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me +to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name? + +ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at +random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the +Sophists. + +SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having +been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that +which they had never learned themselves? + +ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of +gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there +always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the +question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;--not +whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but +whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been +discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of +other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had +themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or +imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have +been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit +that Themistocles was a good man? + +ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better. + +SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever +was a good teacher, of his own virtue? + +ANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so. + +SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have +desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have +been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him +his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a +famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl +a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which +could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard +from our elders of him? + +ANYTUS: I have. + +SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity? + +ANYTUS: Very likely not. + +SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that +Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father +was? + +ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so. + +SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father +Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and +allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better +than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled? + +ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not. + +SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best +men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: +would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? + +ANYTUS: To be sure I should. + +SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other +Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But +what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is +an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, +again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, +Paralus and Xanthippus. + +ANYTUS: I know. + +SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled +horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of +arts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had he no +wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, +as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the +incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in +number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and +Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he +trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of +them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who +had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do +you remember them? + +ANYTUS: I have heard of them. + +SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were +taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be +good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been +taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends +among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a +man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have +been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would +have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from +cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a +thing which can be taught? + +ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: +and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. +Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to +do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that +you know. + +SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a +rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these +gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them +himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and +if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; +for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too? + +MENO: Certainly there are. + +SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to +be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught? + +MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them +saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse. + +SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the +possibility of their own vocation? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only +professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue? + +MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to +teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; +but he thinks that men should be taught to speak. + +SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers? + +MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in +doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have +doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says +the very same thing? + +MENO: Where does he say so? + +SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.): + +'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to +them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with +the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.' + +Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught? + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): + +'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who were +able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.' + +And again:-- + +'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have +heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a +bad man into a good one.' + +And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other. + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed +not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and +bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is +there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are sometimes +saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the opposite? Can +you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such +confusion? + +MENO: I should say, certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, +clearly there can be no other teachers? + +MENO: No. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? + +MENO: Agreed. + +SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which +there are neither teachers nor disciples? + +MENO: We have. + +SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? + +MENO: There are not. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? + +MENO: That, I think, is true. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught? + +MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, +that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into +existence? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and +that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of +me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one +who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I +observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and +good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge +(episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can +be any good men at all. + +MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were +we not right in admitting this? It must be so. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true +guides to us of action--there we were also right? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he +have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong. + +MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'? + +SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere +else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right +and good guide? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had +never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, +he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the +truth? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as +knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about +the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of +right action; whereas there is also right opinion. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? + +MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will +always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and +sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so +long as he has right opinion? + +MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I +wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they +should ever differ. + +SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you? + +MENO: Do tell me. + +SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of +Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your +country? + +MENO: What have they to do with the question? + +SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and +if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. + +MENO: Well, what of that? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if +they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when +fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of +art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while +they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out +of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of +much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this +fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed +to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the +nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this +is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, +because fastened by a chain. + +MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth. + +SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet +that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with +me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most +certainly one of them. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. + +SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the +way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? + +MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less +useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who +has knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be +useful? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only +because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that +neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired +by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? + +MENO: Not I.) + +SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by +nature good? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue +is acquired by teaching? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was +taught? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there +were no teachers, not? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of +virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion--these +are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the +guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. + +MENO: I think so too. + +SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. + +MENO: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has +been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, +did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This +was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves--because +their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. + +MENO: That is probably true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is +that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in +politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say +many things truly, but they know not what they say. + +MENO: So I believe. + +SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having +no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were +just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of +poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and +illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say +many grand things, not knowing what they say. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? and +the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.' + +MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our +friend Anytus may take offence at the word. + +SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity +of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result seems to be, if we +are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, +but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct +accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen +some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an +one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias +was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting +shades'; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among +shadows. + +MENO: That is excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous +by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, +before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of +virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded +yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so +exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to +the Athenian people. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Meno, by Plato + diff --git a/old/1meno10.zip b/old/1meno10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf14c6f --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1meno10.zip |