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Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what +virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met +Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a +bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his +own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O +yes--nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old +man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, all +of which may be easily described.' + +Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and +not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second +attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this, +again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, +as well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly or +not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is +virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, +such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and +black and white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other +colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to +define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of +interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in +multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' +But some one may object that he does not know the meaning of the word +'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates +is willing to furnish him with a simpler and more philosophical definition, +into which no disputed word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of +form.' Meno imperiously insists that he must still have a definition of +colour. Some raillery follows; and at length Socrates is induced to reply, +'that colour is the effluence of form, sensible, and in due proportion to +the sight.' This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who +welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of +opinion that the more abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far +better. + +Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general +definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words +of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to have the +power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet +made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or +popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, +'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the +good, the point of the definition is contained in the words, 'the power of +getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The +definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with +justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the +getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition repeats the word +defined. + +Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a +torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty +to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him. +Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because +he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, +asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does +not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves +a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real +difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a +reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:-- + +He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an +immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of +existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of +ancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and under +world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by +association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of +one kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into +all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by +the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of +Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical +figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal is double the square +of the side--that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in honour of +which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a hecatomb--is +elicited from him. The first step in the process of teaching has made him +conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given +him, and is the better for the operation. But whence had the uneducated +man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it +born with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as +he always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. +(Compare Phaedo.) + +After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the +original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he +professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to +argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will +assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was +the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.) + +Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that +goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. +Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where are +the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging. +Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows +that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable. + +In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-to-do +citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, who happens to be +present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be +taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall +Meno go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman--to the great Athenian +statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (Laches, +Prot.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, had sons to whom +they would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted their own +political wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs were +remarkable for anything except riding and wrestling and similar +accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his +favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong; +he breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of another opportunity +of talking with him, and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian +people a service by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial of +Socrates. + +Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is +teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of +it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not +profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, +and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. +This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance +of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for +practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, +and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' because not +bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is +possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only +inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with knowledge, +is an ideal only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach +what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in the world below,--'he alone has +wisdom, but the rest flit like shadows.' + +This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? +No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in +the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a +general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of +courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this +ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of +the teachableness of virtue could be resolved. + +The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems rather +intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and +therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in +this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The +teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their +pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only +produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire +into what you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates +replies by his theory of reminiscence. + +To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly tending +in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found than it +vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where +are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of +systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be attained, +and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a single +science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word; that +is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their +pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready- +made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is +desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the +paradox that there are no educators. This paradox, though different in +form, is not really different from the remark which is often made in modern +times by those who would depreciate either the methods of education +commonly employed, or the standard attained--that 'there is no true +education among us.' + +There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if +there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of +education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or +divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to others. +This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the circumstance +that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. Those who +are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or philosophers, +but they are inspired and divine. + +There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the +concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean to +intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life. +To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the +most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that +'probability is the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);' and he is at the +same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a +higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of +the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds +cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent +experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach +others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or +arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not +science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato +in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that +inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He +would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or +the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas. + +Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an +unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has +knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a +sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is +no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding +the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of oracles in +the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the daemonium +of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the +higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his +philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence +of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it. + +This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of reminiscence +and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight, even +slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had abstract ideas +in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls +therefore must have always existed. For they must always have been either +men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And +Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds +immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not +altogether confident.' (Compare Phaedo.) It may be observed, however, +that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but +partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association +of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not +in the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, +not actual, and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion. + +The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in +the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of +justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything +but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained +more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the +affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern +philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the +ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed +that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was +converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the +association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of existences. +The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered from +the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a +knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of episteme); and (2) that +the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but +in what is drawn out of him. + +Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute +observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished +with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) the shrewd +reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to +ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this must +surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could +get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or (3) the remark +conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of +thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos). Characteristic also +of the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the +teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the +mathematicians; and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which +occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives +a colour to all of them--that mankind only desire evil through ignorance; +(6) the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth +which is latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for +knowing his ignorance. + +The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual +circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten +thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about +the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious-- +a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the +great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of +knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. +He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as +Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the +sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, just +as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is +made the subject of a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a +half-playful manner suited to his character; at the same time he appears +not quite to understand the process to which he is being subjected. For he +is exhibited as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the +Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue +as 'the power and desire of attaining things honourable,' like the first +definition of justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers +have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical +incapacity to grasp a general notion. + +Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant +at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true +philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions, +whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is +of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of a different variety; +the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles are not attributed to +him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the +accuser of Socrates, as is apparently indicated by his parting words. +Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing that the accusation of +Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to +a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have been regardless of the +historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno +and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol.) the real Anytus was a democrat, and +had joined Thrasybulus in the conflict with the thirty. + +The Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if +'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates +himself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher may draw +out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies of the +Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the foundations of +the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly +explained. There is a progression by antagonism of two opposite aspects of +philosophy. But at the moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles +upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of +knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed +the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide. There +is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked +simply, 'what is friendship?' 'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as +in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in +the second stage of his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge +in a prior and future state of existence. + +The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and in +all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as well as +in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but in +stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have +a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and good +speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine of +the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the +foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards +and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge to virtue is +described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The +existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher +or philosophical sense is admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again +introduced in the Theaetetus as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on +the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the +tie of the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is +given up as hopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at +different times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new +stages of thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in +order to take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him +hidden meanings or remote allusions. + +There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the +Meno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato +were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be +one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the +allusion of Anytus. + +We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has done, +of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already seen, in +the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in Plato are +very far from resembling the same characters in history. The repulsive +picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon, where he also +appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having lovers,' has +no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato. + +The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal +evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the +'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of +reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in +the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about knowing and +learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The doctrines of +immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the Phaedrus and +Phaedo; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is more fully +developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously +calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the +later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are +led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than the Protagoras, +and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias. The place which is assigned to +it in this work is due mainly to the desire to bring together in a single +volume all the Dialogues which contain allusions to the trial and death of +Socrates. + +... + +ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO. + +Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and +definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular +account of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his Dialogues +interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It is due also +to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school; and the +erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed by the +realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas may be +summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists not in +particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of God, or +in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former state of +existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or association +from sensible things. The sensible things are not realities, but shadows +only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning propositions are hardly +suspected to be a caricature of a great theory of knowledge, which Plato in +various ways and under many figures of speech is seeking to unfold. Poetry +has been converted into dogma; and it is not remarked that the Platonic +ideas are to be found only in about a third of Plato's writings and are not +confined to him. The forms which they assume are numerous, and if taken +literally, inconsistent with one another. At one time we are in the clouds +of mythology, at another among the abstractions of mathematics or +metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and fancy +are mingled in the same passage. The ideas are sometimes described as +many, coextensive with the universals of sense and also with the first +principles of ethics; or again they are absorbed into the single idea of +good, and subordinated to it. They are not more certain than facts, but +they are equally certain (Phaedo). They are both personal and impersonal. +They are abstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are +even transformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the +world. And the idea of good (Republic) may without violence be converted +into the Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things +(Tim.). + +It would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of +thought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct +meaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations, +aspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep +religious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of +curious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous +philosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great diversity +shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think. They have not +yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them, though he also +criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others are always talking +about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and that they are not +peculiar to himself (Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in his later writings +he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them. As he proceeds he makes +for himself new modes of expression more akin to the Aristotelian logic. + +Yet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common meaning +or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he treats of the +ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is the spirit of +idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many names and taken +many forms, and has in a measure influenced those who seemed to be most +averse to it. It has often been charged with inconsistency and +fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on human nature, and has +exercised a wonderful charm and interest over a few spirits who have been +lost in the thought of it. It has been banished again and again, but has +always returned. It has attempted to leave the earth and soar heavenwards, +but soon has found that only in experience could any solid foundation of +knowledge be laid. It has degenerated into pantheism, but has again +emerged. No other knowledge has given an equal stimulus to the mind. It +is the science of sciences, which are also ideas, and under either aspect +require to be defined. They can only be thought of in due proportion when +conceived in relation to one another. They are the glasses through which +the kingdoms of science are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest +minds, except when living in an age of reaction against them, have +unconsciously fallen under their power. + +The account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and clearest, +and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first and then +comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere, e.g. in the +Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the criticism of them in +the Parmenides, the personal form which is attributed to them in the +Timaeus, the logical character which they assume in the Sophist and +Philebus, and the allusion to them in the Laws. In the Cratylus they dawn +upon him with the freshness of a newly-discovered thought. + +The Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and +suffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them until +their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to earth. This +is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets bear witness. +The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent memory of ideas, +which were known to them in a former state. The recollection is awakened +into life and consciousness by the sight of the things which resemble them +on earth. The soul evidently possesses such innate ideas before she has +had time to acquire them. This is proved by an experiment tried on one of +Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits truths of arithmetic and +geometry, which he had never learned in this world. He must therefore have +brought them with him from another. + +The notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses of +Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural answer +to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of evil?' and +prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into Hellas probably +through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and mysteries. It was +easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has +really existed for the race though not for the individual, and all men come +into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of glory,' at any rate able to +enter into the inheritance of the past. In the Phaedrus, as well as in the +Meno, it is this former rather than a future life on which Plato is +disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men following in their train, go +forth to contemplate the heavens, and are borne round in the revolutions of +them. There they see the divine forms of justice, temperance, and the +like, in their unchangeable beauty, but not without an effort more than +human. The soul of man is likened to a charioteer and two steeds, one +mortal, the other immortal. The charioteer and the mortal steed are in +fierce conflict; at length the animal principle is finally overpowered, +though not extinguished, by the combined energies of the passionate and +rational elements. This is one of those passages in Plato which, partaking +both of a philosophical and poetical character, is necessarily indistinct +and inconsistent. The magnificent figure under which the nature of the +soul is described has not much to do with the popular doctrine of the +ideas. Yet there is one little trait in the description which shows that +they are present to Plato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which +had seen truths in the form of the universal, cannot again return to the +nature of an animal. + +In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a +previous state of existence. There was no time when they could have been +acquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from +another. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of +association, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person +recalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from any +part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also argued +that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous state of +existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms of them +which are given by experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine of ideas is +subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul. 'If the soul +existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future state, for a +law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas exist, then +the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both in the Meno and +the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with diffidence. He speaks in +the Phaedo of the words with which he has comforted himself and his +friends, and will not be too confident that the description which he has +given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true, but he 'ventures to +think that something of the kind is true.' And in the Meno, after dwelling +upon the immortality of the soul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have +said I am not altogether confident' (compare Apology; Gorgias). From this +class of uncertainties he exempts the difference between truth and +appearance, of which he is absolutely convinced. + +In the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not +contradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as the +genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name are +contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes, the +picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing in +nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds are only +the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or explanations +are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition of Plato's +theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and the mimetic +arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a lower kind of +knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books of the Republic we +reach the highest and most perfect conception, which Plato is able to +attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now finally seen to be +one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to have a unity which is +the idea of good and the cause of all the rest. They seem, however, to +have lost their first aspect of universals under which individuals are +contained, and to have been converted into forms of another kind, which are +inconsistently regarded from the one side as images or ideals of justice, +temperance, holiness and the like; from the other as hypotheses, or +mathematical truths or principles. + +In the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows +the Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention +occurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical ratios +furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But though the +conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or laid aside, +the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as firmly maintained as +ever. The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is superseded by the +conception of a personal God, who works according to a final cause or +principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is expressed by Plato, +either in the Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of the truths which he +conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the existence of God or +the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative or hesitating manner, +but the investigations of physiology. These he regards, not seriously, as +a part of philosophy, but as an innocent recreation (Tim.). + +Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition or +defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is put +into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to +Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is +assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the +dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that +there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals partake +of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which they become like +them, or how ideas can be either within or without the sphere of human +knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any relation to each other, +is held to be incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no universal +ideas, what becomes of philosophy? (Parmenides.) In the Sophist the +theory of ideas is spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by +another sect of philosophers, called 'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the +Megarians, who were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him +(Sophist). Nor in what may be termed Plato's abridgement of the history of +philosophy (Soph.), is any mention made such as we find in the first book +of Aristotle's Metaphysics, of the derivation of such a theory or of any +part of it from the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even +from Socrates. In the Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic +Dialogues, the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed +under the figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is +retained. The one and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working +in the mind of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' +but of 'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of +in a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former +state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a +psychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final form of +the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own writings +(see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the old string, +and returns to general notions:--these he acknowledges to be many, and yet +he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be made to recognize +the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the Protagoras, that the +virtues are four, but they are also in some sense one (Laws; compare +Protagoras). + +So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the +statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to +harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, but +the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of +Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and +general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass +from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven (jenseits) +without regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy have made +between them. They are also intended to supplement or explain each other. +They relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have said that 'he +was not confident of the precise form of his own statements, but was strong +in the belief that something of the kind was true.' It is the spirit, not +the letter, in which they agree--the spirit which places the divine above +the human, the spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the +mind before the body. + +The stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times widens +into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear after many +ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new conditions, at +first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally spreading over +the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with ancient +philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is inspired +by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born out of due +time; and before men were capable of understanding it. To the fathers of +modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new and original, but +they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past, coming back by +recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers of the seventeenth +century, who to themselves appeared to be working out independently the +enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood in a new relation to +theology and natural philosophy, and for a time maintained towards both an +attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the similarities between modern +and ancient thought are greater far than the differences. All philosophy, +even that part of it which is said to be based upon experience, is really +ideal; and ideas are not only derived from facts, but they are also prior +to them and extend far beyond them, just as the mind is prior to the +senses. + +Early Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in the +single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having arrived +at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from philosophy +to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to be the real +meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin of knowledge, will +always continue to be one of the first problems of philosophy. + +Plato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of logic-- +arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They were the +late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only part of it +which has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe. Philosophies +come and go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing of definitions, +the invention of methods still continue to be the main elements of the +reasoning process. + +Modern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions. It +is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as a +quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the semi-barbarous +Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike ancient philosophy, it +has been unaffected by impressions derived from outward nature: it arose +within the limits of the mind itself. From the time of Descartes to Hume +and Kant it has had little or nothing to do with facts of science. On the +other hand, the ancient and mediaeval logic retained a continuous influence +over it, and a form like that of mathematics was easily impressed upon it; +the principle of ancient philosophy which is most apparent in it is +scepticism; we must doubt nearly every traditional or received notion, that +we may hold fast one or two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal +form was a mental necessity to the first thinkers of modern times: from +this alone all other ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure +presentiment of 'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The +Eleatic notion that being and thought were the same was revived in a new +form by Descartes. But now it gave birth to consciousness and self- +reflection: it awakened the 'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and +abstract has no other certainty but the conviction of its own existence. +'I think, therefore I am;' and this thought is God thinking in me, who has +also communicated to the reason of man his own attributes of thought and +extension--these are truly imparted to him because God is true (compare +Republic). It has been often remarked that Descartes, having begun by +dismissing all presuppositions, introduces several: he passes almost at +once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more important for the +illustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists that God is +true and incapable of deception (Republic)--that he proceeds from general +ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in him. A certain +influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of their philosophy +is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest opposition +between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato, supposes them to be +reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by a special divine act +(compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all the parts of the human body to +meet in the pineal gland, that alone affording a principle of unity in the +material frame of man. It is characteristic of the first period of modern +philosophy, that having begun (like the Presocratics) with a few general +notions, Descartes first falls absolutely under their influence, and then +quickly discards them. At the same time he is less able to observe facts, +because they are too much magnified by the glasses through which they are +seen. The common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the +comprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say of +abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them, the +less are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete natures. + +Not very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy is +his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The system +of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that of Descartes. +In this respect the difference between them is like that between Xenophanes +and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be described generally as +the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction and taking the form of the +Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is overpowered and intoxicated +with the idea of Being or God. The greatness of both philosophies consists +in the immensity of a thought which excludes all other thoughts; their +weakness is the necessary separation of this thought from actual existence +and from practical life. In neither of them is there any clear opposition +between the inward and outward world. The substance of Spinoza has two +attributes, which alone are cognizable by man, thought and extension; these +are in extreme opposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. +They may be regarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or +substance is unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the +Eleatic philosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est +negatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's +Sophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the +spectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with another +famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie eternitatis.' +According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they are conditioned by +what is alien to them, and by one another. Human beings are included in +the number of them. Hence there is no reality in human action and no place +for right and wrong. Individuality is accident. The boasted freedom of +the will is only a consciousness of necessity. Truth, he says, is the +direction of the reason towards the infinite, in which all things repose; +and herein lies the secret of man's well-being. In the exaltation of the +reason or intellect, in the denial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; +Laws) Spinoza approaches nearer to Plato than in his conception of an +infinite substance. As Socrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza +would have maintained that knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to +knowledge useful. Both are equally far from any real experience or +observation of nature. And the same difficulty is found in both when we +seek to apply their ideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed +between the infinite substance and finite objects or individuals of +Spinoza, just as there is between the ideas of Plato and the world of +sense. + +Removed from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher Leibnitz, +who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between mind and +matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare again Phaedrus). +To him all the particles of matter are living beings which reflect on one +another, and in the least of them the whole is contained. Here we catch a +reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or similar particles of Anaxagoras, and +of the world-animal of the Timaeus. + +In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of man is +supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by observation +and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of experience, +rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is a +symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us. The +Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon of +Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons +which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some of +them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in +the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of +Plato in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much +insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the +illusions of language, and are constantly crying out against them, as +against other idols. + +Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more +than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him +experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and +construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic +of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the +transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would substitute +sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human +mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has +drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. +He has annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed +by the same laws and described under the same names. + +A like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central +principle is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would +deprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but he +seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and does +not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he remark +that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language against the +most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel with the +ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did in their +idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more important +principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and unmeaning as +this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his successors, not +unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and Berkeley upon Hume +himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in almost equal degrees. +Neither they nor their predecessors had any true conception of language or +of the history of philosophy. Hume's paradox has been forgotten by the +world, and did not any more than the scepticism of the ancients require to +be seriously refuted. Like some other philosophical paradoxes, it would +have been better left to die out. It certainly could not be refuted by a +philosophy such as Kant's, in which, no less than in the previously +mentioned systems, the history of the human mind and the nature of language +are almost wholly ignored, and the certainty of objective knowledge is +transferred to the subject; while absolute truth is reduced to a figment, +more abstract and narrow than Plato's ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to +which, if we reason strictly, no predicate can be applied. + +The question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of +ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no +longer be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know it; +there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy, in +mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may +attempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every +sphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They +are thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our +lives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them +express relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in +rerum natura corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of them +as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete +possession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce them, +and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least explained and +were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away by a word to +which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions such as +'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,' 'experience,' +'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,' and a heap of +other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source of quite as much +error and illusion and have as little relation to actual facts as the ideas +of Plato. Few students of theology or philosophy have sufficiently +reflected how quickly the bloom of a philosophy passes away; or how hard it +is for one age to understand the writings of another; or how nice a +judgment is required of those who are seeking to express the philosophy of +one age in the terms of another. The 'eternal truths' of which +metaphysicians speak have hardly ever lasted more than a generation. In +our own day schools or systems of philosophy which have once been famous +have died before the founders of them. We are still, as in Plato's age, +groping about for a new method more comprehensive than any of those which +now prevail; and also more permanent. And we seem to see at a distance the +promise of such a method, which can hardly be any other than the method of +idealized experience, having roots which strike far down into the history +of philosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the +past, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete, or +theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science from +another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have proceeded +a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the want of method +which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the branches of +knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will become the +knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp.), and all things, +like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one another. + + +MENO + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus. + + +MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or +by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it +comes to man by nature, or in what other way? + +SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among +the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am +not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at +Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is +Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among +them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell +in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering +questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is +the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes +may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at +Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have +emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any +Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your +face, and say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you +think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what +virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I +myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the +rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing +about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know +the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was +fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and +noble? Do you think that I could? + +MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do +not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to +Thessaly? + +SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have +never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. + +MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I have. + +MENO: And did you not think that he knew? + +SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell +what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and +that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he +said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that +you and he think much alike. + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By +the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I +shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you +and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying +that I have never found anybody who had. + +MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. +Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the +state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his +enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's +virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her +duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. +Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or +free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of +definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each +of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates +(Compare Arist. Pol.). + +SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you +present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your +keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, +What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of +bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and +different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some +other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer +me? + +MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees. + +SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; +tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all +alike;--would you be able to answer? + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, +they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who +would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye +fixed: Do you understand? + +MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the +question as I could wish. + +SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another +of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, +or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the +nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? + +MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. + +SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is +strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same +strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that +strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any +difference? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child +or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? + +MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from +the others. + +SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to +order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? + +MENO: I did say so. + +SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered +without temperance and without justice? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly +order them with temperance and justice? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, +must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are +intemperate and unjust? + +MENO: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in +the same virtues? + +MENO: Such is the inference. + +SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless +their virtue had been the same? + +MENO: They would not. + +SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try +and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is. + +MENO: Will you have one definition of them all? + +SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking. + +MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to +say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind. + +SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is +virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his +father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a +slave? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, +fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do +you not add 'justly and not unjustly'? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue. + +SOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'? + +MENO: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, +is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of +speaking, because there are other figures. + +MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that +there are other virtues as well as justice. + +SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you +the names of the other figures if you asked me. + +MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and +there are many others. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching +after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; +but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them +all. + +MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt +to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. + +SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know +that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you +the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? +And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of +speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a +figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.' + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you +would have told him. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered +whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is +colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other +colours as well. + +MENO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told +him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he +would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not +what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say +that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that +common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as +well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode +of speaking? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is +round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than +the straight, or the straight than the round? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. +Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or +colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know +what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not +understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might +put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile +in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and +straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I +wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to +the answer about virtue. + +MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you? + +MENO: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue? + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you +say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. +Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would +let me have a similar definition of virtue? + +MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. + +SOCRATES: Why simple? + +MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows +colour. + +(SOCRATES: Granted.) + +MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, +any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him? + +SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher +of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my +answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and +refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, +I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that +is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of +premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And +this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will +acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or +termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same sense, +although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but +still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that +is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult. + +MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning. + +SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for +example in geometry. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my +definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; +or, more concisely, the limit of solid. + +MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour? + +SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to +give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what +is Gorgias' definition of virtue. + +MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he +would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. + +MENO: Why do you think so? + +SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties +when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, +you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to +humour you I must answer. + +MENO: Please do. + +SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, +which is familiar to you? + +MENO: I should like nothing better. + +SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain +effluences of existence? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of +them are too small or too large? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an +effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. + +MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in +the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that +you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many +other similar phenomena. + +MENO: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore +was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the +other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, +if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you +said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries. + +MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers. + +SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my +very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many +as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell +me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a +plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue +to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have +given you the pattern. + +MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires +the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I +say too-- + +'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining +them.' + +SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire +the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be +good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? + +MENO: Both, I think. + +SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be +evils and desires them notwithstanding? + +MENO: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And desire is of possession? + +MENO: Yes, of possession. + +SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who +possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? + +MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and +others who know that they will do them harm. + +SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them +good know that they are evils? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do +not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although +they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be +goods they really desire goods? + +MENO: Yes, in that case. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that +evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by +them? + +MENO: They must know it. + +SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable +in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? + +MENO: How can it be otherwise? + +SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated? + +MENO: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? + +MENO: I should say not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no +one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and +possession of evil? + +MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody +desires evil. + +SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire +and power of attaining good? + +MENO: Yes, I did say so. + +SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to +all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he +must be better in the power of attaining it? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be +the power of attaining good? + +MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view +this matter. + +SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point +of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the +power of attaining goods? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and +the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the +state--those are what you would call goods? + +MENO: Yes, I should include all those. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the +great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you +add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of +no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and +dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? + +MENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. + +SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of +virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them +the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. + +MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these? + +SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner +for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally +virtue? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the +non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or +honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. + +MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment. + +SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and +the like, were each of them a part of virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me. + +MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole +and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame +your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the +power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you +acknowledge to be a part of virtue. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing +what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you +to be parts of virtue. + +MENO: What of that? + +SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of +virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare +every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though +you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too +when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I +fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? +for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue +is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with +justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any +one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue? + +MENO: No; I do not say that he can. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any +answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so. + +SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any +one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of +virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over +again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right? + +MENO: I believe that you are. + +SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your +friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? + +MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were +always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting +your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and +am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem +to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like +the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, +as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are +really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been +delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and +to many persons--and very good ones they were, as I thought--at this moment +I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in +not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as +you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician. + +SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me. + +MENO: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me. + +MENO: Why? + +SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know +that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about +them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As to my +being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity +in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex +others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. +And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, +although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have +no objection to join with you in the enquiry. + +MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? +What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what +you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not +know? + +SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome +dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either +about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he +knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not +know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post. +Anal.). + +MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound? + +SOCRATES: I think not. + +MENO: Why not? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and +women who spoke of things divine that-- + +MENO: What did they say? + +SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. + +MENO: What was it? and who were they? + +SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how +they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been +poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many +others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether their +words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time +has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but +is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in +perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of +those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again +from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become +noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly +heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been +born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in +this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no +wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever +knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the +soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as +men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is +strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but +recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical +argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and +is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and +inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the +nature of virtue. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, +and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you +teach me how this is? + +SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you +ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, +but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a +contradiction. + +MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only +asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say +is true, I wish that you would. + +SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the +utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, +that I may demonstrate on him. + +MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy. + +SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? + +MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house. + +SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether +he learns of me or only remembers. + +MENO: I will. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? + +BOY: I do. + +SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the +square are also equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: A square may be of any size? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side +be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one +direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one +foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two +feet? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. + +BOY: Four, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, +and having like this the lines equal? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the +side of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be? + +BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. + +SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, +but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a +line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does +he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he really know? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is +double. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To +the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a +double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure +equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say of eight feet; +and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from +double line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such +line here? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is +the figure of eight feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of +which is equal to the figure of four feet? + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And is not that four times four? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And four times is not double? + +BOY: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: But how much? + +BOY: Four times as much. + +SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, +but four times as much. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives +one of sixteen feet;--do you see? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, +and half the size of the other? + +BOY: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this +one, and less than that one? + +BOY: Yes; I think so. + +SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell +me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be +more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? + +BOY: It ought. + +SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. + +BOY: Three feet. + +SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line +of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are +two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, +the whole space will be three times three feet? + +BOY: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet? + +BOY: Nine. + +SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four? + +BOY: Eight. + +SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three? + +BOY: No. + +SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather +not reckon, try and show me the line. + +BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. + +SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of +recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is +the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and +answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a +difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? + +MENO: I think that he is. + +SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' +have we done him any harm? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to +the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, +but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again +that the double space should have a double side. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or +learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, +until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, +and had desired to know? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? + +MENO: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not +teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and +see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of +eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet +which I have drawn? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? + +BOY: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other? + +BOY: Four times. + +SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. + +BOY: True. + +SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect +each of these spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this +space? + +BOY: There are. + +SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is. + +BOY: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section? + +BOY: Four. + +SOCRATES: And how many in this? + +BOY: Two. + +SOCRATES: And four is how many times two? + +BOY: Twice. + +SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet? + +BOY: Of eight feet. + +SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure? + +BOY: From this. + +SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of +the figure of four feet? + +BOY: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And +if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm +that the double space is the square of the diagonal? + +BOY: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given +out of his own head? + +MENO: Yes, they were all his own. + +SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that +which he does not know? + +MENO: He has. + +SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, +as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in +different forms, he would know as well as any one at last? + +MENO: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for +himself, if he is only asked questions? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is +recollection? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have +acquired or always possessed? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have +known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in +this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the +same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any +one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he +was born and bred in your house. + +MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him. + +SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge? + +MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable. + +SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he +must have had and learned it at some other time? + +MENO: Clearly he must. + +SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the +time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into +knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed +this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man? + +MENO: Obviously. + +SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then +the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect +what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. + +MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying. + +SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of +which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and +braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we +should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing +and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;--that is a theme upon +which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power. + +MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent. + +SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that +which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together +into the nature of virtue? + +MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my +original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it +as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in +some other way? + +SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not +have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had +first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only of controlling me +who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,--such being your +notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And +therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do +not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and +allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other +way,' to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked +whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle +(Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in +a certain circle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will +offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the +figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you +apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the +given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part +produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one consequence +follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to +assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of +being inscribed in the circle':--that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we +too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether +virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of +such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first +hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be +taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, 'remembered'? For there is +no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or +rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught? + +MENO: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue +is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another +species? + +MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order. + +SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis which +is not set aside. + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from +knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, +then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things +are profitable? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable? + +MENO: That is the only inference. + +SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit +us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of +these, we call profitable? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you +not think so? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or +the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and +hurtful when they are not rightly used? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are +temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, +magnanimity, and the like? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are +sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage +wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no +sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of +apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are +profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? + +MENO: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when +under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the +guidance of folly, in the opposite? + +MENO: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be +profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the +soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made +profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore +if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? + +MENO: I quite agree. + +SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we +were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do +not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides +and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself +are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul +wrongly. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other +things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon +wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which +profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either +wholly or partly wisdom? + +MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true. + +SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of +characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their +showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should +have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon +them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might +tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the +state? + +MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way. + +SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by +instruction? + +MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the +supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is +taught. + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? + +MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand +firm not only just now, but always. + +MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is +virtue? + +SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the +assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I +have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now +and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, +must not have teachers and disciples? + +MENO: Surely. + +SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor +disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? + +MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue? + +SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and +taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have +assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the +most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately +have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; +to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy +and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or +gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as +Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well- +conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; +moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian +people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest +offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn +whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, +Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are +the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good +physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the +physicians? + +ANYTUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him +to the cobblers? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so forth? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we +should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a +physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who +profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand +payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will +come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in +sending him? + +ANYTUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the +other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse +to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be +plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed +teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge +which he wishes him to acquire--would not such conduct be the height of +folly? + +ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me +about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to +attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the +house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send +away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he +go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument +imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that +they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart +instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price? + +ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people +whom mankind call Sophists? + +ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or +kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be +so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest +pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them. + +SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how +to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not +only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to +them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? +Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who +made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such +noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of +old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse +than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and +would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, +Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him +worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not +mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were +spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a +good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, +but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others +who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted +the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or +unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of +Hellas have been out of their minds? + +ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their +money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians +who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of +their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and +did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike. + +SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so +angry with them? + +ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor +would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them. + +SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them? + +ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted. + +SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good +or bad of which you are wholly ignorant? + +ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, +whether I am acquainted with them or not. + +SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, +judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you +know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who +will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask +you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to +become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the +friend of your family, and you will oblige him. + +ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself? + +SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these +things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say +that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me +to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name? + +ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at +random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the +Sophists. + +SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having +been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that +which they had never learned themselves? + +ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of +gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there +always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the +question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;--not +whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but +whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been +discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of +other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had +themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or +imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have +been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit +that Themistocles was a good man? + +ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better. + +SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever +was a good teacher, of his own virtue? + +ANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so. + +SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have +desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have +been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him +his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a +famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl +a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which +could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard +from our elders of him? + +ANYTUS: I have. + +SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity? + +ANYTUS: Very likely not. + +SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that +Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father +was? + +ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so. + +SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father +Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and +allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better +than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled? + +ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not. + +SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best +men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: +would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? + +ANYTUS: To be sure I should. + +SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other +Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But +what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is +an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, +again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, +Paralus and Xanthippus. + +ANYTUS: I know. + +SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled +horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of +arts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had he no +wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, +as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the +incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in +number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and +Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he +trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of +them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who +had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do +you remember them? + +ANYTUS: I have heard of them. + +SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were +taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be +good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been +taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends +among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a +man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have +been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would +have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from +cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a +thing which can be taught? + +ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: +and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. +Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to +do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that +you know. + +SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a +rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these +gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them +himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and +if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; +for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too? + +MENO: Certainly there are. + +SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to +be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught? + +MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them +saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse. + +SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the +possibility of their own vocation? + +MENO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only +professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue? + +MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to +teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; +but he thinks that men should be taught to speak. + +SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers? + +MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in +doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have +doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says +the very same thing? + +MENO: Where does he say so? + +SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.): + +'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to +them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with +the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.' + +Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught? + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): + +'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who were +able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.' + +And again:-- + +'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have +heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a +bad man into a good one.' + +And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other. + +MENO: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed +not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and +bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is +there anything about which even the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are sometimes +saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the opposite? Can +you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such +confusion? + +MENO: I should say, certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, +clearly there can be no other teachers? + +MENO: No. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? + +MENO: Agreed. + +SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which +there are neither teachers nor disciples? + +MENO: We have. + +SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? + +MENO: There are not. + +SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? + +MENO: That, I think, is true. + +SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught? + +MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, +that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into +existence? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and +that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of +me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one +who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I +observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and +good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge +(episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can +be any good men at all. + +MENO: How do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were +we not right in admitting this? It must be so. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true +guides to us of action--there we were also right? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he +have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong. + +MENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'? + +SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere +else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right +and good guide? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had +never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, +he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the +truth? + +MENO: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as +knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about +the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of +right action; whereas there is also right opinion. + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? + +MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will +always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and +sometimes not. + +SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so +long as he has right opinion? + +MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I +wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they +should ever differ. + +SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you? + +MENO: Do tell me. + +SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of +Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your +country? + +MENO: What have they to do with the question? + +SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and +if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away. + +MENO: Well, what of that? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if +they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when +fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of +art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while +they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out +of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of +much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this +fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed +to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the +nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this +is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, +because fastened by a chain. + +MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth. + +SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet +that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with +me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most +certainly one of them. + +MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so. + +SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the +way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? + +MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less +useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who +has knowledge? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be +useful? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only +because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that +neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired +by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? + +MENO: Not I.) + +SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by +nature good? + +MENO: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue +is acquired by teaching? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was +taught? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there +were no teachers, not? + +MENO: True. + +SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of +virtue? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good? + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion--these +are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the +guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. + +MENO: I think so too. + +SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. + +MENO: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has +been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. + +MENO: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, +did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This +was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves--because +their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. + +MENO: That is probably true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is +that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in +politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say +many things truly, but they know not what they say. + +MENO: So I believe. + +SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who, having +no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? + +MENO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were +just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of +poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and +illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say +many grand things, not knowing what they say. + +MENO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? and +the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.' + +MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our +friend Anytus may take offence at the word. + +SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity +of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result seems to be, if we +are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, +but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct +accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen +some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an +one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias +was among the dead, 'he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting +shades'; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among +shadows. + +MENO: That is excellent, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous +by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, +before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of +virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded +yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so +exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to +the Athenian people. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Meno, by Plato + |