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+*******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Euthyphro, by Plato*******
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+Euthyphro
+
+by Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+February, 1999  [Etext #1642]
+
+
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+
+
+EUTHYPHRO
+
+Plato
+
+
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: 
+'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to
+do men harm than to do them good;' and Socrates was anticipating another
+opportunity of talking with him.  In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting
+his trial for impiety.  But before the trial begins, Plato would like to
+put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very
+matter touching which Socrates is accused.  An incident which may perhaps
+really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner
+and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.
+
+This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of the
+King Archon.  (Compare Theaet.)  Both have legal business in hand. 
+Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought
+against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself
+to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in
+an action for murder, which he has brought against his own father.  The
+latter has originated in the following manner:--A poor dependant of the
+family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos.  The guilty person
+was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who
+sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done
+with him.  Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger
+and exposure.
+
+This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against
+his father.  Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the
+responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed
+of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for
+impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro
+(who will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an
+unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety.  What then is
+piety?
+
+Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to
+undertake all the responsibility, replies:  That piety is doing as I do,
+prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as
+the gods do--as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.
+
+Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that
+this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety.  'Are
+they really true?'  'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell
+Socrates some more of them.  But Socrates would like first of all to have a
+more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?'  'Doing as I do,
+charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can
+hardly be regarded as a general definition.
+
+Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is
+what is not dear to them.'  But may there not be differences of opinion, as
+among men, so also among the gods?  Especially, about good and evil, which
+have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which
+give rise to quarrels.  And therefore what may be dear to one god may not
+be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e.g.
+your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to
+Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not
+equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their
+sons).
+
+Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods
+or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer.  Yes, rejoins
+Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the
+point at issue.  If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are
+you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the
+gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him?  And must you not
+allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another?  Waiving this
+last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that
+'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.'  To
+this Euthyphro agrees.
+
+Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition.  He shows that
+in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being carried,
+loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and therefore
+that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first
+loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them.  But the pious
+or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is
+equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them.
+Here then appears to be a contradiction,--Euthyphro has been giving an
+attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence.  Euthyphro
+acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in
+a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates,
+who has communicated his art to his descendants.
+
+Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of
+Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner:  'Is all the pious just?' 
+'Yes.'  'Is all the just pious?'  'No.'  'Then what part of justice is
+piety?'  Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which
+'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends'
+to men.  But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods?  The word
+'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some
+way they are made better.  But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any
+better?  Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or
+ministration.  Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician,
+and the builder have an end.  To what end do we serve the gods, and what do
+we help them to accomplish?  Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult
+questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say
+simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by
+prayers and sacrifices.  In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science
+of asking and giving'--asking what we want and giving what they want; in
+short, a mode of doing business between gods and men.  But although they
+are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return?  'Nay,
+but we give them honour.'  Then we give them not what is beneficial, but
+what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been
+already disproved.
+
+Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro,
+remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety,
+or he would never have prosecuted his old father.  He is still hoping that
+he will condescend to instruct him.  But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot
+stay.  And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is
+prosecuted for impiety has disappeared.  As in the Euthydemus the irony is
+carried on to the end.
+
+The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety
+and impiety with the popular conceptions of them.  But when the popular
+conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any
+definition of his own:  as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for
+an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own
+character, refuses to answer himself.
+
+Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same
+person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds'
+Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away.  He has the conceit and self-
+confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his
+father has ever entered into his mind.  Like a Sophist too, he is incapable
+either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an
+argument.  His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness,
+are characteristic of his priestly office.  His failure to apprehend an
+argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the
+rhapsode Ion.  But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates,
+whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest.  Though unable to follow
+him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any
+suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking.  Moreover he is
+the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular
+dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same
+time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which
+would be more than a match for him.  He is quite sincere in his prosecution
+of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not
+wholly free from blame.  To purge away the crime appears to him in the
+light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.
+
+Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the
+narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion
+which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him.  'Piety is doing as I
+do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others
+who do not say what they think with equal frankness.  For men are not
+easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that
+other nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally
+serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties.  The chief difference
+between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in
+process of forgetting.  Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction
+between accidental homicide and murder:  that the pollution of blood was
+the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner.  He had
+not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer
+and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly,
+as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to
+as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the
+examples of the gods.  These are the very tales which Socrates cannot
+abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the
+reputation of impiety.  Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates
+was put to death,' suggested by the way.  Another is conveyed in the words,
+'The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins
+to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' 
+which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other
+countries, and not at Athens only.  In the course of the argument Socrates
+remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of
+the difficulty of verifying them.  There is no measure or standard to which
+they can be referred.
+
+The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is
+shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act,
+corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle
+(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb
+(philoumenon and phileitai).  The act is prior to the state (as in
+Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved
+is preceded by the act of being loved.  But piety or holiness is preceded
+by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore
+piety and the state of being loved are different.  Through such subtleties
+of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought
+and feeling.  He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an
+attribute only, and not the essence of piety.
+
+Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' 
+Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation.
+He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the
+great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated,
+and which is the universal want of all men.  To this the soothsayer adds
+the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.'  When further
+interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,'
+he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and
+asking, and the like.  Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these
+notions, (compare Symp.; Republic; Politicus.)  But when we expect him to
+go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the
+spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops
+short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to
+understand, and which every one must learn for himself.
+
+There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little
+Dialogue:  (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the
+antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent
+only; (3) the defence of Socrates.
+
+The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of
+the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other
+Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power
+and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for
+believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing.  The spirit in
+which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls
+Republic II.  The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five
+in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of
+Republic IV.  The figure of Daedalus has occurred in the Meno; that of
+Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io.  The kingly science has already appeared
+in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman.  But
+neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference,
+and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little
+work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any
+evidence of the date be obtained.
+
+
+EUTHYPHRO
+
+by
+
+Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:  Socrates, Euthyphro.
+
+SCENE:  The Porch of the King Archon.
+
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing
+in the Porch of the King Archon?  Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
+before the King, like myself?
+
+SOCRATES:  Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
+Athenians use.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  What!  I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I
+cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
+
+SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  And who is he?
+
+SOCRATES:  A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know
+him:  his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis.  Perhaps you
+may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a
+beard which is ill grown.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No, I do not remember him, Socrates.  But what is the charge
+which he brings against you?
+
+SOCRATES:  What is the charge?  Well, a very serious charge, which shows a
+good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not
+to be despised.  He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are
+their corruptors.  I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am
+the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me
+of corrupting his young friends.  And of this our mother the state is to be
+the judge.  Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to
+begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a
+good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away
+us who are the destroyers of them.  This is only the first step; he will
+afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun,
+he will be a very great public benefactor.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the
+opposite will turn out to be the truth.  My opinion is that in attacking
+you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state.  But in what
+way does he say that you corrupt the young?
+
+SOCRATES:  He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first
+hearing excites surprise:  he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and
+that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the
+ground of his indictment.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the
+familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you.  He thinks that
+you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for
+this.  He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I
+myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things,
+and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. 
+Yet every word that I say is true.  But they are jealous of us all; and we
+must be brave and go at them.
+
+SOCRATES:  Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
+consequence.  For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect,
+do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his
+wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say,
+from jealousy, they are angry.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
+
+SOCRATES:  I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and
+seldom impart your wisdom.  But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out
+myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid
+that the Athenians may think me too talkative.  Now if, as I was saying,
+they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time
+might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest,
+and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and
+that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
+
+SOCRATES:  And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the
+defendant?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I am the pursuer.
+
+SOCRATES:  Of whom?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  You will think me mad when I tell you.
+
+SOCRATES:  Why, has the fugitive wings?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
+
+SOCRATES:  Who is he?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  My father.
+
+SOCRATES:  Your father! my good man?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And of what is he accused?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Of murder, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know
+of the nature of right and truth.  A man must be an extraordinary man, and
+have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to
+bring such an action.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Indeed, Socrates, he must.
+
+SOCRATES:  I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your
+relatives--clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never
+have thought of prosecuting him.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one
+who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution
+is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer
+when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him.  The
+real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain.  If
+justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then
+even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the
+same table, proceed against him.  Now the man who is dead was a poor
+dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in
+Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with
+one of our domestic servants and slew him.  My father bound him hand and
+foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a
+diviner what he should do with him.  Meanwhile he never attended to him and
+took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that
+no great harm would be done even if he did die.  Now this was just what
+happened.  For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him,
+that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead.  And my
+father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and
+prosecuting my father.  They say that he did not kill him, and that if he
+did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice,
+for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father.  Which shows, Socrates,
+how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.
+
+SOCRATES:  Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and
+of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the
+circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may
+be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,
+Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters.  What
+should I be good for without it?
+
+SOCRATES:  Rare friend!  I think that I cannot do better than be your
+disciple.  Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge
+him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious
+questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations
+in religion, I have become your disciple.  You, Meletus, as I shall say to
+him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his
+opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not
+have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting
+him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of
+the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father
+whom he admonishes and chastises.  And if Meletus refuses to listen to me,
+but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot
+do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am
+mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal
+more to say to him than to me.
+
+SOCRATES:  And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming
+your disciple.  For I observe that no one appears to notice you--not even
+this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has
+indicted me for impiety.  And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature
+of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder,
+and of other offences against the gods.  What are they?  Is not piety in
+every action always the same? and impiety, again--is it not always the
+opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one
+notion which includes whatever is impious?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  To be sure, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  And what is piety, and what is impiety?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any
+one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime--whether he
+be your father or mother, or whoever he may be--that makes no difference;
+and not to prosecute them is impiety.  And please to consider, Socrates,
+what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof
+which I have already given to others:--of the principle, I mean, that the
+impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished.  For do not men
+regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?--and yet they admit
+that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons,
+and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason,
+in a nameless manner.  And yet when I proceed against my father, they are
+angry with me.  So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the
+gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
+
+SOCRATES:  May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with
+impiety--that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and
+therefore I suppose that people think me wrong.  But, as you who are
+well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than
+assent to your superior wisdom.  What else can I say, confessing as I
+do, that I know nothing about them?  Tell me, for the love of Zeus,
+whether you really believe that they are true.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the
+world is in ignorance.
+
+SOCRATES:  And do you really believe that the gods fought with one
+another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets
+say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists?  The
+temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is
+carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered
+with them.  Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you
+would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which
+would quite amaze you.
+
+SOCRATES:  I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I
+have leisure.  But just at present I would rather hear from you a more
+precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the
+question, What is 'piety'?  When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do,
+charging your father with murder.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  And what I said was true, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many
+other pious acts?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  There are.
+
+SOCRATES:  Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples
+of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to
+be pious.  Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the
+impious impious, and the pious pious?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I remember.
+
+SOCRATES:  Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a
+standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether
+yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such
+and such an action is pious, such another impious.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I will tell you, if you like.
+
+SOCRATES:  I should very much like.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is
+that which is not dear to them.
+
+SOCRATES:  Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer
+which I wanted.  But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet
+tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Of course.
+
+SOCRATES:  Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying.  That thing
+or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person
+which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme
+opposites of one another.  Was not that said?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  It was.
+
+SOCRATES:  And well said?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
+
+SOCRATES:  And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities
+and hatreds and differences?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, that was also said.
+
+SOCRATES:  And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?  Suppose
+for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do
+differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one
+another?  Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a
+sum?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly
+end the differences by measuring?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
+weighing machine?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES:  But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and
+which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?  I
+dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I
+will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are
+the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.  Are not
+these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable
+satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel,
+when we do quarrel?  (Compare Alcib.)
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
+quarrel is such as you describe.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,
+are of a like nature?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly they are.
+
+SOCRATES:  They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
+evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable:  there would have been
+no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences--would there
+now?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  You are quite right.
+
+SOCRATES:  Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
+good, and hate the opposite of them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and
+others as unjust,--about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and
+fightings among them.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the
+gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and
+also impious?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  So I should suppose.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
+answered the question which I asked.  For I certainly did not ask you to
+tell me what action is both pious and impious:  but now it would seem that
+what is loved by the gods is also hated by them.  And therefore, Euthyphro,
+in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is
+agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is
+acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other
+gods who have similar differences of opinion.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as
+to the propriety of punishing a murderer:  there would be no difference of
+opinion about that.
+
+SOCRATES:  Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one
+arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I should rather say that these are the questions which they are
+always arguing, especially in courts of law:  they commit all sorts of
+crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own
+defence.
+
+SOCRATES:  But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they
+ought not to be punished?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No; they do not.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and
+do:  for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished,
+but they deny their guilt, do they not?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
+punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what
+he did and when?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel
+about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that
+injustice is done among them.  For surely neither God nor man will ever
+venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  That is true, Socrates, in the main.
+
+SOCRATES:  But they join issue about the particulars--gods and men alike;
+and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in
+question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. 
+Is not that true?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
+instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all
+the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the
+master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who
+bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do
+with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to
+proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.  How would you show
+that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act?  Prove to me
+that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very
+clear indeed to you.
+
+SOCRATES:  I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
+apprehension as the judges:  for to them you will be sure to prove that the
+act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
+
+SOCRATES:  But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
+speaker.  There was a notion that came into my mind while you were
+speaking; I said to myself:  'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me
+that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know
+anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this
+action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not
+adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the
+gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.'  And therefore,
+Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like,
+that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action.  But I will amend
+the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and
+what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is
+both or neither.  Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Why not, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES:  Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there
+is no reason why not.  But whether this admission will greatly assist you
+in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to
+consider.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and
+holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
+
+SOCRATES:  Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply
+to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others?  What
+do you say?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand
+the test of enquiry.
+
+SOCRATES:  We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while.  The
+point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy
+is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of
+the gods.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  I will endeavour to explain:  we, speak of carrying and we speak
+of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen.  You
+know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in
+what the difference lies?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I think that I understand.
+
+SOCRATES:  And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of
+carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No; that is the reason.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
+visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state
+of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but
+the converse of this.  And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be
+intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion
+implies previous action or passion.  It does not become because it is
+becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does
+it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of
+suffering because it suffers.  Do you not agree?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
+suffering?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of
+being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro:  is not piety,
+according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No, that is the reason.
+
+SOCRATES:  It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a
+state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor
+is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
+different things.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  How do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES:  I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be
+loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is
+loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with
+that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which
+is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that
+which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which
+is holy would have been holy because loved by him.  But now you see that
+the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one
+another.  For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved,
+and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved.  Thus
+you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of
+holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence--the attribute of
+being loved by all the gods.  But you still refuse to explain to me the
+nature of holiness.  And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to
+hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really
+is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we
+will not quarrel); and what is impiety?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. 
+For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem
+to turn round and walk away from us.
+
+SOCRATES:  Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
+Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that
+my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed
+because I am a descendant of his.  But now, since these notions are your
+own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself
+allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who
+sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go
+round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then I must be a greater than Daedalus:  for whereas he only
+made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well.  And
+the beauty of it is, that I would rather not.  For I would give the wisdom
+of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep
+them fixed.  But enough of this.  As I perceive that you are lazy, I will
+myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of
+piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.  Tell me, then--Is
+not that which is pious necessarily just?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
+pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I do not understand you, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are
+younger.  But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your
+wisdom makes you lazy.  Please to exert yourself, for there is no real
+difficulty in understanding me.  What I mean I may explain by an
+illustration of what I do not mean.  The poet (Stasinus) sings--
+
+'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
+You will not tell:  for where there is fear there is also reverence.'
+
+Now I disagree with this poet.  Shall I tell you in what respect?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  By all means.
+
+SOCRATES:  I should not say that where there is fear there is also
+reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and
+the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of
+their fear.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling
+of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is
+afraid of an ill reputation.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No doubt.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is
+also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also
+fear.  But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a
+more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a
+part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd.  I
+suppose that you follow me now?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Quite well.
+
+SOCRATES:  That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I
+asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just;
+and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice
+is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part.  Do you dissent?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No, I think that you are quite right.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
+enquire what part?  If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;
+for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of
+number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number
+which represents a figure having two equal sides.  Do you not agree?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, I quite agree.
+
+SOCRATES:  In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is
+piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
+injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by
+you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
+justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice
+which attends to men.
+
+SOCRATES:  That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about
+which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of
+'attention'?  For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when
+applied to the gods as when applied to other things.  For instance, horses
+are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to
+them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship.  Is it not so?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
+attending to horses?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
+huntsman?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the
+art of attending to dogs?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the
+gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of
+that to which the attention is given?  As in the case of horses, you may
+observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and
+improved, are they not?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by
+the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for
+their good and not for their hurt?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly, not for their hurt.
+
+SOCRATES:  But for their good?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Of course.
+
+SOCRATES:  And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art
+of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them?  Would you say that when
+you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
+
+SOCRATES:  And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did.  I asked you the
+question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did
+not.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention
+which I mean.
+
+SOCRATES:  Good:  but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
+which is called piety?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
+
+SOCRATES:  I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Exactly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in
+view the attainment of some object--would you not say of health?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I should.
+
+SOCRATES:  Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with
+a view to the attainment of some result?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
+
+SOCRATES:  As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a
+view to the building of a house?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers
+to the gods:  what work does that help to accomplish?  For you must surely
+know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best
+instructed in religion.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  And I speak the truth, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Tell me then, oh tell me--what is that fair work which the gods
+do by the help of our ministrations?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
+
+SOCRATES:  Why, my friend, and so are those of a general.  But the chief of
+them is easily told.  Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of
+them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not
+mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Exactly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the
+chief or principal one?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these
+things accurately will be very tiresome.  Let me simply say that piety or
+holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers
+and sacrifices.  Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just
+as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and
+destruction.
+
+SOCRATES:  I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the
+chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen.  But I see
+plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me--clearly not:  else why,
+when we reached the point, did you turn aside?  Had you only answered me I
+should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety.  Now, as
+the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither
+he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what
+is piety?  Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and
+sacrificing?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, I do.
+
+SOCRATES:  And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of
+the gods?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  You understand me capitally, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
+science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will
+be thrown away upon me.  Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this
+service to the gods?  Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to
+them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Yes, I do.
+
+SOCRATES:  Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what
+they want of us.  There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any
+one that which he does not want.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Very true, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of
+doing business with one another?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
+
+SOCRATES:  But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth.  I
+wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from
+our gifts.  There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no
+good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to
+them in return is far from being equally clear.  If they give everything
+and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have
+very greatly the advantage of them.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
+gods from our gifts?
+
+SOCRATES:  But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are
+conferred by us upon the gods?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
+saying, what pleases them?
+
+SOCRATES:  Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear
+to them?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I should say that nothing could be dearer.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to
+the gods?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing
+firm, but walking away?  Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes
+them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist
+than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for
+the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point.  Were we
+not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved
+of the gods?  Have you forgotten?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  I quite remember.
+
+SOCRATES:  And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy;
+and is not this the same as what is dear to them--do you see?
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we
+were right then, we are wrong now.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  One of the two must be true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety?  That is an
+enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and
+I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and
+tell me the truth.  For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must
+detain you, like Proteus, until you tell.  If you had not certainly known
+the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on
+behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder.  You would not
+have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would
+have had too much respect for the opinions of men.  I am sure, therefore,
+that you know the nature of piety and impiety.  Speak out then, my dear
+Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.
+
+EUTHYPHRO:  Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
+
+SOCRATES:  Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair?  I was
+hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and
+then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment.  I would
+have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up
+rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through
+ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Euthyphro, by Plato
+
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