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diff --git a/1616-h/1616-h.htm b/1616-h/1616-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f63d47e --- /dev/null +++ b/1616-h/1616-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7642 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Cratylus, by Plato</title> + +<style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +p.center {text-align: center; + text-indent: 0em; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +p.footnote {font-size: 90%; + text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +sup { vertical-align: top; font-size: 0.6em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> +</head> +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Cratylus, by Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Cratylus</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: B. Jowett</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: January, 1999 [eBook #1616]<br /> +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Sue Asscher</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS ***</div> + +<h1>CRATYLUS</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">By Plato</h2> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CRATYLUS</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<hr /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. +While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical +originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic +writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which +interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose +that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have +been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus +we also find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato +wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other +satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be +assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species +of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and +literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place +ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was +written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of +Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature +of language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been +“rich enough to attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,” we +should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed +to the extravagance of Socrates’ humour would have been found, like the +allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and +grammarians of the day. +</p> + +<p> +For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many questions +were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other +questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar +manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were +they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had +been striving to attain an expression of their ideas, and now they were +beginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished +from the idea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to +enquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic were +moving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they were not yet +awakened into consciousness and had not found names for themselves, or terms by +which they might be expressed. Of these beginnings of the study of language we +know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of +such a work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of +the dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. +For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is +consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new +school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations “that he knows +nothing,” “that he has learned from Euthyphro,” and the like. +Even the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes +to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories +of the ancients respecting language put together. +</p> + +<p> +The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato’s other writings, and +still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be +interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty +in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in +the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with Hermogenes, and is he serious +in those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue, +which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we +separate his jest from his earnest?—<i>Sunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, +sunt mala plura</i>. Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are +found, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any +ancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May +we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a +comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the +enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he +acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language +can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is +refuted by his silence, then in what relation does his account of language +stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the +connexion between them? (For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the +dialogue is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of +things or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many +other passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind +of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a +convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue. +</p> + +<p> +We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some +clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of +the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should +his works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry, +but they have also the freedom of conversation. “Words are more plastic +than wax” (Rep.), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from +one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any +“judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point” (Theat.), +“whither the argument blows we follow” (Rep.). To have determined +beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the +subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is +the soul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works +of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. See Phaedrus, +Introduction. +</p> + +<p> +There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more +truly viewed:—they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found +that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we arrived at no +conclusion—the different sides of the argument were personified in the +different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of +them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the Cratylus we have no +reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that +Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of +personifying, in the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the +three theories of language which are respectively maintained by them. +</p> + +<p> +The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are at +the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the +Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be not so far removed from +one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept +the third view which Socrates interposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the +poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are +conventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at +pleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or +language, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an +element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand +the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. +Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view of language is only +a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction +between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the +sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to +the speculations of Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all. +He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect +expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still +prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a +philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable +basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all +truth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of +Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but +are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as +still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean +philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Compare Theaet.) Of the +real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have +been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled +the likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the +real Critias, or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the +diviner, in the dialogue which is called after him. +</p> + +<p> +Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character, +the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two. +Language is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is +the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the +artificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the +expressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in +saying that things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either to +art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly +executed; and in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There +is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had +their original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by +convention. But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus +nature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three +views respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be +described as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The +view of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism +is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism. +</p> + +<p> +We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that “languages are +not made, but grow.” But still, when he says that “the legislator +made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,” we need +not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the +mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded +as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher +is his natural advisor. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing +any extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who +prescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a +truly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the +Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which +may be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a +meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very +definite notion. But he means to express generally that language is the product +of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals. +</p> + +<p> +A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato’s +age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought +that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. +This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to +bring Plato’s theory of language into accordance with the received +doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates +himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the +hour. +</p> + +<p> +1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future +dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in +which he attempts to realize abstractions, and that they are replaced in his +later writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See introductions to the +Meno and the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the +nature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers +of the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the +dialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and +good; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. +Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the +Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the +ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus. Here, as in the Sophist and +Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of agreement in words +and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the +less Plato’s own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that +Plato’s theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is +discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the +“dithyrambics of the Phaedrus.” They are mysteries of which he is +speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom. +When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector’s son, or when +he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has +been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and Lysias; Phaedr.) and +expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he +will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be +taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, +the pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some +of his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and +furious, <i>vires acquirit eundo</i>, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The +jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we +remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is +preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early +logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists +and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end +of our logic books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their +way into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures +of Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove +that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of +language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Compare Phaedrus.) +</p> + +<p> +When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as +he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his +“know nothing” disguise, and himself declares his first notions +about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by +resolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple +words into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who +“knows nothing,” here passes into the teacher, the dialectician, +the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is +either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of +language; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of +ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of +foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he +admits a certain element of chance. But he gives no imitation in all this that +he is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language. Or that he +has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in accordance +with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded +by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological +fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false +knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he +has heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised +than himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for +example his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of +the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the +Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of +humour. +</p> + +<p> +We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and +things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending inextricably +sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious +matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through; enjoying the flow +of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their +absurdities. Such were Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, +were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,—writers who sometimes become +unintelligible through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character +which Plato intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; +and through this medium we have to receive our theory of language. +</p> + +<p> +There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In what +relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue stand to +the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking irony of +Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does +the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer to the question of +Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the +truth, or correctness, or principle of names? +</p> + +<p> +After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, and +then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the Homeric +poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can only be +ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the +analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies which are absurd, +based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible +unions and separations of syllables and letters? +</p> + +<p> +1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates +is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and fanciful +disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. as Benfey +remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of language as well as +a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are +indicated, by the manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current +in his own age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as +would have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master +Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, +and tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under +which they are to be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, +when he is speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, +would have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, +the task “of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of +time on his hands.” The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the +errors of his contemporaries. +</p> + +<p> +The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration which +comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of +quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the +jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best +authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric; +the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as “not being in +luck,” or “being no speaker;” the dearly-bought wisdom of +Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was “Rush,” and, above all, +the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which +“to-morrow he will purge away,” are truly humorous. While +delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirizing +the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, +and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. +Etymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and +Socrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of +Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the +effect. Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his +adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano, which, as some +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a +fanciful explanation converted into heroes; “the givers of names were +like some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads +are always going round.” There is a great deal of “mischief” +lurking in the following: “I found myself in greater perplexity about +justice than I was before I began to learn;” “The rho in katoptron +must be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only +of putting the mouth into shape;” “Tales and falsehoods have +generally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of +them.” Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, +Protagoras and Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi +palaioi Omerikoi (compare Arist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by +the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of +Heracleitus;—the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= +osia the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche +and selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and +putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or +slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of +hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine that falsehood can +neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry attributed +to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with +no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language. +</p> + +<p> +In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he +does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom +here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of +this enmity we can hardly determine:—was it due to the natural dislike +which may be supposed to exist between the “patrons of the flux” +and the “friends of the ideas” (Soph.)? or is it to be attributed +to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon +“Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus” in the days of his +youth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early +Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or +imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and +that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But +Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains +unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound +philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application +not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that +“consistency is no test of truth:” or again, “If we are +over-precise about words, truth will say ‘too late’ to us as to the +belated traveller in Aegina.” +</p> + +<p> +The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty. +The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a +close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the Phaedrus and +Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the +dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is +still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the +Apology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the +Theaetetus, the philosophy of Heracleitus by “unsavoury” +similes—he cannot believe that the world is like “a leaky +vessel,” or “a man who has a running at the nose”; he +attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks’ heads. On +the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is +treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to enable us to +arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the +Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series. +</p> + +<p> +Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of Callias, +have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they are natural, +the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true +name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true. +Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; or, far rather, +he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks about the truth or +correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature +of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the +fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma +course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus +denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a +true son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an +open council and to hear both sides. +</p> + +<p> +Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be +changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered +name is as good as the original one. +</p> + +<p> +You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a man +a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest +of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false, as there are +true and false propositions. If a whole proposition be true or false, then the +parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the +greatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or +false. Would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and +as many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the +time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way in which he +can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the practice of +different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his +view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent +them differ:—Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is? +Hermogenes has always been puzzled about this, but acknowledges, when he is +pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a +great many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the +foolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say +with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that +case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But then, +the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct +natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things, +but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There +is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men +cut or burn, and any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. +And speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must +name according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with +a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. +And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a name distinguishes the +natures of things. The weaver will use the shuttle well,—that is, like a +weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,—that is, like a teacher. +The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled +person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the +teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes +them, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter +make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the +ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so +ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles +ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the +legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are +made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper +form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is +the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge +who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how +to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in short, the +dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the +dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express +the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is not the easy task, +Hermogenes, which you imagine. +</p> + +<p> +“I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural +correctness of names.” +</p> + +<p> +Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there +is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is +the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of +whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly; +and since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better learn from +him at second-hand. “Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I +should be inconsistent in going to learn of him.” Then if you reject him +you may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the +names given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river +God who fought with Hephaestus, “whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander;” or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods +call “Chalcis,” and men “Cymindis;” or the hill which +men call “Batieia,” and the Gods “Myrinna’s +Tomb.” Here is an important lesson; for the Gods must of course be right +in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may +be learnt from Homer. Does he not say that Hector’s son had two +names— +</p> + +<p> +“Hector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax”? +</p> + +<p> +Now, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other name was +conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be right—the wiser +or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently agreed with the men: +and of the name given by them he offers an explanation;—the boy was +called Astyanax (“king of the city”), because his father saved the +city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are really the same,—the +one means a king, and the other is “a holder or possessor.” For as +the lion’s whelp may be called a lion, or the horse’s foal a foal, +so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the horse had produced a +calf, then that would be called a calf. Whether the syllables of a name are the +same or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; +the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their +sounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The name Beta +has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not alter the +sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the +legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king, +who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature; the words +by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid differences of sound +the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises +the power of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. +Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same meaning; +and Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in +war), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two words present the same idea of +leader or general, like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally +denote a physician. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, +but when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no +longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be +illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the former +has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy; while the name of +the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for +his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, +which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires +(stubborn), atreotos (fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees +what is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was +unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would +entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two +etymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou talantaton einai, +signifying at once the hanging of the stone over his head in the world below, +and the misery which he brought upon his country. And the name of his father, +Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an excellent meaning, though hard to be understood, +because really a sentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, +being the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all +live: this is implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put together +and interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight, appear to be some +irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity; +but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect; Kronos, +quasi koros, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi to katharon kai akeraton +tou nou—the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, +who is so called apo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, as +philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of +Hesiod’s genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions +of the same sort. “You talk like an oracle.” I caught the infection +from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not +only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to +the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by some priest or +sophist. “Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.” Now that we have a +general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial +test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and ordinary men are often deceptive, +because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods and +demi-gods. Gods are so called, apo tou thein, from the verb “to +run;” because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they +being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, +their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and +by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, +quasi daemones, which in old Attic was used for daimones—good men are +well said to become daimones when they die, because they are knowing. Eros +(with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an eta): “the sons of +God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;” or perhaps they were a +species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo tou erotan, or eirein, +from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein is equivalent to legein. I +get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and ingenious idea comes into my +mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by +to-morrow’s dawn. My idea is, that we may put in and pull out letters at +pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, Dii philos may be turned into +Diphilos), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The +name anthrotos is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent +changed; the original meaning being o anathron a opopen—he who looks up +at what he sees. Psuche may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or +animating principle—e anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that +Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find +another: shall we identify the soul with the “ordering mind” of +Anaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e phusin echei or +ochei?—this might easily be refined into psyche. “That is a more +artistic etymology.” +</p> + +<p> +After psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either = (1) +the “grave” of the soul, or (2) may mean “that by which the +soul signifies (semainei) her wishes.” But more probably, the word is +Orphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which the soul +suffers the penalty of sin,—en o sozetai. “I should like to hear +some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of +Zeus.” The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; +but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them, +as men say in prayers, “May he graciously receive any name by which I +call him.” And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know +beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire about them, but only about the +names which they usually bear. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who +gave the name Hestia? “That is a very difficult question.” O, my +dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among +the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even +in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia, +which is an old form of ousia, and means the first principle of things: this +agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is +also another reading—osia, which implies that “pushing” +(othoun) is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a +delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian +philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may +accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been +accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of +Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of +Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, “the origin of Gods;” and in the +verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. +Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring—to diattomenon kai +ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos, the chain of the feet, because you cannot +walk on the sea—the epsilon is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps +the name may have been originally polleidon, meaning, that the God knew many +things (polla eidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou seiein,—in this +case, pi and delta have been added. Pluto is connected with ploutos, because +wealth comes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which +is usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with the +invisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing (eidenai) +all good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him, and talk with +horror of the world below from which no one may return. The reason why his +subjects never wish to come back, even if they could, is that the God enchains +them by the strongest of spells, namely by the desire of virtue, which they +hope to obtain by constant association with him. He is the perfect and +accomplished Sophist and the great benefactor of the other world; for he has +much more than he wants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He +will have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he +cannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and entangled by +fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food—e didousa meter +tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator may have been thinking +of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word aer. +Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha, which is only an euphonious +contraction of e tou pheromenou ephaptomene,—all things are in motion, +and she in her wisdom moves with them, and the wise God Hades consorts with +her—there is nothing very terrible in this, any more than in the her +other appellation Persephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe). +Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is +susceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he is the +purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, he is the true diviner, +Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (aplos = aplous, sincere); +thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), always shooting; or again, supposing +alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo becomes equivalent to ama polon, which points +to both his musical and his heavenly attributes; for there is a “moving +together” alike in music and in the harmony of the spheres. The second +lambda is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The +Muses are so called—apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named +from her willingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget +(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature, dia to +artemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton misesasa. One +of these explanations is probably true,—perhaps all of them. Dionysus is +o didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous because wine makes those think +(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) who have none. The established +derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou athrou genesin may be accepted on the +authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we, +who are Athenians, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed +dances—apo tou pallein ta opla. For Athene we must turn to the +allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to theonoe, or +possibly the word was originally ethonoe and signified moral intelligence (en +ethei noesis). Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light—o tou phaeos +istor. This is a good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, +let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one +(arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if +you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance. +“Only one more God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.” He is +ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; or o eirein momenos, +that is, eiremes or ermes—the speaker or contriver of speeches. +“Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.” Pan, as the +son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of speech, and is called Pan because +speech indicates everything—o pan menuon. He has two forms, a true and a +false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the +goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods. +</p> + +<p> +“Will you go on to the elements—sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, +air, fire, water, seasons, years?” Very good: and which shall I take +first? Let us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to +see that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men +together, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he variegates +(aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being +a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas) which is ever old and new, +and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name was +harmonized into selanaia, a form which is still in use. “That is a true +dithyrambic name.” Meis is so called apo tou meiousthai, from suffering +diminution, and astron is from astrape (lightning), which is an improvement of +anastrope, that which turns the eyes inside out. “How do you explain pur +n udor?” I suspect that pur, which, like udor n kuon, is found in +Phrygian, is a foreign word; for the Hellenes have borrowed much from the +barbarians, and I always resort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at +a loss. Aer may be explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or, +oti pneuma ex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi +aeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare the +Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the old Attic form +ora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein, because it divides the year; +eniautos and etos are the same thought—o en eauto etazon, cut into two +parts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze into Dios and Zenos. +</p> + +<p> +“You make surprising progress.” True; I am run away with, and am +not even yet at my utmost speed. “I should like very much to hear your +account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those +charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?” To explain +all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion’s +skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were +like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after +the nature of things, become dizzy; and this phenomenon, which was really in +themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no +doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of +things, is indicated in names. “No, I never did.” Phronesis is only +phoras kai rou noesis, or perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is connected +with pheresthai; gnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or +gignomenon esis; the word neos implies that creation is always going +on—the original form was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; +episteme is e epomene tois pragmasin—the faculty which keeps close, +neither anticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai, +sumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion—sullogismos tis, +akin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a foreign +look—the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be +illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian proper name Sous, or +Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,—for all things are in +motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune is clearly e tou dikaiou +sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome, and appears to mean the subtle +penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and +is the cause of all things, quasi diaion going through—the letter kappa +being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been +confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and +another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the +sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, +“What, is there no justice when the sun is down?” And when I +entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is +fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. +Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the +ordering mind. “I think that some one must have told you this.” And +not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my +originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe, the stream which flows +upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of +penetration; arren and aner have a similar derivation; gune is the same as +gone; thelu is derived apo tes theles, because the teat makes things flourish +(tethelenai), and the word thallein itself implies increase of youth, which is +swift and sudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am getting over the ground fast: +but much has still to be explained. There is techne, for instance. This, by an +aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in two places, may be identified +with echonoe, and signifies “that which has mind.” +</p> + +<p> +“A very poor etymology.” Yes; but you must remember that all +language is in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake +of euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example, what +business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter sigma in the +word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is impossible to make out the +original word; and yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name +is equally good for any object. The fact is, that great dictators of literature +like yourself should observe the rules of moderation. “I will do my +best.” But do not be too much of a precisian, or you will paralyze me. If +you will let me add mechane, apo tou mekous, which means polu, and anein, I +shall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the +two words kakia and arete. The first is easily explained in accordance with +what has preceded; for all things being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion. This +derivation is illustrated by the word deilia, which ought to have come after +andreia, and may be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches, just as aporia +signifies an impediment to motion (from alpha not, and poreuesthai to go), and +arete is euporia, which is the opposite of this—the everflowing (aei +reousa or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi airete. You will think that I am +inventing, but I say that if kakia is right, then arete is also right. But what +is kakon? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion +and declare that kakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, +aischron. The latter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon +roun. The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to +stagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata—this is mind (nous or +dianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the works of +beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of sumpheron is +explained by previous examples;—like episteme, signifying that the soul +moves in harmony with the world (sumphora, sumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi +kerannumenon—that which mingles with all things: lusiteloun is equivalent +to to tes phoras luon to telos, and is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of +gainful, but rather in that of swift, being the principle which makes motion +immortal and unceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein—that which gives +increase: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is to +blamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou—that which injures or seeks to bind +the stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too much of a +mouthful—like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The word +zemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been made in words, +and even a small change will alter their meaning very much. The word deon is +one of these disguised words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, +which is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, iota +and delta were used where we should now use eta and zeta: for example, what we +now call emera was formerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the +word to have been “the desired one coming after night,” and not, as +is often supposed, “that which makes things gentle” (emera). So +again, zugon is duogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen—(the binding of two +together for the purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil +sense, signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its ancient +form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which penetrates or goes +through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means that which binds motion +(dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin teinousa praxis—the delta is +an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes dialuseos tou somatos: ania is from alpha +and ienai, to go: algedon is a foreign word, and is so called apo tou algeinou: +odune is apo tes enduseos tes lupes: achthedon is in its very sound a burden: +chapa expresses the flow of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is +properly erpnon, because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a breath +(pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is named from +pheresthai, because the soul moves in harmony with nature: epithumia is e epi +ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos tes psuches: +imeros—oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which is in another +place, allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so called because it flows +into (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e dioxis tou eidenai, or expresses +the shooting from a bow (toxon). The latter etymology is confirmed by the words +boulesthai, boule, aboulia, which all have to do with shooting (bole): and +similarly oiesis is nothing but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards +essence. Ekousion is to eikon—the yielding—anagke is e an agke +iousa, the passage through ravines which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, +divine motion. Pseudos is the opposite of this, implying the principle of +constraint and forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to +eudon; the psi is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real existence of +that which is sought after—on ou masma estin. On and ousia are only ion +with an iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. “And what are ion, reon, +doun?” One way of explaining them has been already suggested—they +may be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true answer. But mere +antiquity may often prevent our recognizing words, after all the complications +which they have undergone; and we must remember that however far we carry back +our analysis some ultimate elements or roots will remain which can be no +further analyzed. For example; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a +compound of agastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further resolvable. +But if we take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may +fairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements, and the +truth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will you help me in the +search? +</p> + +<p> +All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of +things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the +primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And let me ask +another question,—If we had no faculty of speech, how should we +communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? +The elevation of our hands would mean lightness—heaviness would be +expressed by letting them drop. The running of any animal would be described by +a similar movement of our own frames. The body can only express anything by +imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. +But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may +imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first +place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an +imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the +invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a namer. +</p> + +<p> +And now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were asking. +The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters, or primary +elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into +classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes, vowels, and +semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in +their various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows +how to use either a single colour, or a combination of colours. And like the +painter, we may apply letters to the expression of objects, and form them into +syllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure—that +is, language—is completed. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, +but I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. +And this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary +elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that +we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we insist that ours is the +true and only method of discovery; otherwise we must have recourse, like the +tragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and say that God gave the first names, and +therefore they are right; or that the barbarians are older than we are, and +that we learnt of them; or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet +all these are not reasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no +reasons. +</p> + +<p> +I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat +crude:—the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which +the legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought to +explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was unknown to +the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of ienai: of kinesis or +eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is evident in the words +tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the imposer of names perceived +that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as +he used iota to express the subtle power which penetrates through all things. +The letters phi, psi, sigma, zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are +employed in the imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and +in general of what is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of +binding and rest in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the words +slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by +the heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy +nature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness: alpha is the +expression of size; eta of length; omicron of roundness, and therefore there is +plenty of omicron in the word goggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the +correctness of names; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. +“But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should +like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of +names?” To this appeal, Cratylus replies “that he cannot explain so +important a subject all in a moment.” “No, but you may ‘add +little to little,’ as Hesiod says.” Socrates here interposes his +own request, that Cratylus will give some account of his theory. Hermogenes and +himself are mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and +has had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words of Achilles: +“‘Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken in all things much to my +mind,’ whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was +the inspirer.” Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being +self-deceived, and therefore he must “look fore and aft,” as Homer +remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names teach us the nature of +things? “Yes.” And naming is an art, and the artists are +legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of +them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or +worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one name is better than another; they +are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about +the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms +this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that +falsehood is impossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never +been a lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument, +that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying +nothing;—you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates complains that +this argument is too subtle for an old man to understand: Suppose a person +addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would +these words be true or false? “I should say that they would be mere +unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.” But you would +acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that +pictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman:—why +may not names then equally give a representation true and right or false and +wrong? Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, +but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say +“this is year picture,” and again, he may go and say to him +“this is your name”—in the one case appealing to his sense of +sight, and in the other to his sense of hearing;—may he not? +“Yes.” Then you will admit that there is a right or a wrong +assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs +and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns +to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of +them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who +gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who +gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a +bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the +legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. “Yes, Socrates, but +the cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name +ceases to be a name.” Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is +subtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely +quantitative nature. Suppose that there are two objects—Cratylus and the +image of Cratylus; and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, +both in their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then there +will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But +an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if +images are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were, they +would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and +how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates’ +remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to acknowledge +that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and +yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. Better to admit this, that +we may not be punished like the traveller in Egina who goes about at night, and +that Truth herself may not say to us, “Too late.” And, errors +excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper +letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of +what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which was held +to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of smoothness;—and +this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eritreans +call that skleroter which we call sklerotes? We can understand one another, +although the letter rho accent is not equivalent to the letter s: why is this? +You reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of +expressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has +this in a word meaning hardness? “Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that +we put in and pull out letters at pleasure.” And the explanation of this +is custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean s and +a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there +be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? +Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is +another poor thing; although I agree with you in thinking that the most perfect +form of language is found only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound +and meaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? “The +use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows +things.” Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the +discovery of things? “Yes.” But do you not see that there is a +degree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according +to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. “But then, why, +Socrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.” Mere +consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there +may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. +And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But are +words really consistent; are there not as many terms of praise which signify +rest as which signify motion? There is episteme, which is connected with +stasis, as mneme is with meno. Bebaion, again, is the expression of station and +position; istoria is clearly descriptive of the stopping istanai of the stream; +piston indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words having a bad +sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as sumphora, amartia, +etc.: amathia, again, might be explained, as e ama theo iontos poreia, and +akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the bad names are framed on the +same principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would +favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. “Yes; but the greater +number of words express motion.” Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is +correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority? +</p> + +<p> +Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and +therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can +he have learnt things from names before there were any names? “I believe, +Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and +that these were necessarily true names.” Then how came the giver of names +to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of +motion? “I do not suppose that he did make them both.” Then which +did he make—those which are expressive of rest, or those which are +expressive of motion?...But if some names are true and others false, we can +only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things. +And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as +we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher +knowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do +not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all +things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken; +and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us +after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always +beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while +the words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they +are always passing away—for if they are always passing away, the observer +has no opportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux +or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of +sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he +will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that +everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is +a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but +is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while +you are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. +“I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to +Heracleitus.” Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. +“Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these +things yourself.” +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered the true +principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations +respecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his +genius. +</p> + +<p> +I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny +that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural +fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a +natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the +common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he +would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure +of such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in +ancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been +thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater +force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. +The philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly +endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into +common, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented +prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language +must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are +pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to +frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others +have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have +invented that which he is. But this would have been an “argument too +subtle” for Socrates, who rejects the theological account of the origin +of language “as an excuse for not giving a reason,” which he +compares to the introduction of the “Deus ex machina” by the tragic +poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern +controversies in which the primary agency of the divine Being is confused with +the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to +fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare Timaeus.) +</p> + +<p> +Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters +into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical +process. “Languages are not made but grow,” but they are made as +well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also +capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The +change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic +improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by +the poetical and literary use of words. They develope rapidly in childhood, and +when they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers, +like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language +only begins when the frame-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in +whom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the +forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised ages the +dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the +second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the +picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and +philosophy—these two, are the two great formative principles of language, +when they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of +the arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link +between them, connecting the visible and invisible, until at length the +sensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, +of the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic +and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of +language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation. +</p> + +<p> +(2) There is no trace in any of Plato’s writings that he was acquainted +with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of +Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that +many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for +accident, and also for the fancies of the conditores linguae Graecae, there is +an element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words +he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when +the Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. +Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the +“Deus ex machina,” explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for +the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is +still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and +barbarians. +</p> + +<p> +(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from +foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are +composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of +language were aware of this; they observed that alpha was adapted to express +size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu inwardness; rho accent rush or roar; +lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the detention of the liquid or slippery element; +delta and tau binding; phi, psi, sigma, xi, wind and cold, and so on. +Plato’s analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight +into the nature of language. He does not expressively distinguish between mere +imitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises +in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode +which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language +is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho accent, to express a +rushing or roaring, or of omicron to express roundness, there is a direct +imitation; while in the use of the letter alpha to express size, or of eta to +express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar +sounds, in order to express similar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him. +</p> + +<p> +In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue, Plato +makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who +said that “language is imitative sound,” which is the greatest and +deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the laws of euphony and +association by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the +first who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second +only in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in +one direction curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears +to be wholly unaware (compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and thoos) +of the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that +he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had +no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have +suggested to him the distinction. +</p> + +<p> +(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or “philosophie +une langue bien faite.” At first, Socrates has delighted himself with +discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is covertly satirising +the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in words; and he +afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his +experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest, +as he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been +otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a +great controversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but no +man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of +names...In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely +emancipated from the influence of “Idols of the tribe” as Bacon +himself. +</p> + +<p> +The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but +historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about +the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused +custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and +mind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and metaphysical +philosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, +accidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the +contemporary state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of +them the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly +transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their +etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we cannot argue that +the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, +parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to +them in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they +generalize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which +the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above +language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters. +</p> + +<p> +Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of +words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of +intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a +foreign language, he is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes, +and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the “poor creature” +imitation is supplemented by another “poor +creature,”—convention. But he does not see that “habit and +repute,” and their relation to other words, are always exercising an +influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts +of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by +civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically +applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of +human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come +with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed +by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly +changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and +particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, +Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the +makers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of +their own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage +gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and +familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other +subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that +the languages of the world are organic structures, and that every word in them +is related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work +of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of +expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language +on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed of a technical or +scientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in +the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there +is no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to +the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the +sciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical +phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that +freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential +characteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded +pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the +satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras. +</p> + +<p> +(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology, +we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. “The +Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;” “the Thessalians call +Apollo Amlos;” “The Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes +slightly changed;” “there is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning +‘he contrived’;” “our forefathers, and especially the +women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters +iota and delta; but now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into +zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.” Plato was +very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach; +but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is +induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical +sciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in +language as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always +remain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be +eliminated. +</p> + +<p> +The question, “whether falsehood is impossible,” which Socrates +characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare Euthyd.), +could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet +learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words +have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval +controversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in +various degrees of perfection, and that the analysis of them can only be +carried to a certain point. “If we could always, or almost always, use +likenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most +perfect state of language.” These words suggest a question of deeper +interest than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how +far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer +and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or +whether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from +time and authority. +</p> + +<p> +On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language than +any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is +walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato +envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to +drop out as if by accident. +</p> + +<p> +II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of +language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a +statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a +metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language +than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled, +as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can +alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly +in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and +common sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a +superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true +account of the origin of language. +</p> + +<p> +Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex. +Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a +child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words have entered +causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or +two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages. +They have been transmitted from one language to another; like the child +himself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, +who can tell? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the +circle of men’s minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts +stronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of +hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, and +after the manner of children were more given to express their feelings; in +which “they moved all together,” like a herd of wild animals, +“when they moved at all.” Among them, as in every society, a +particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the rest. +Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall +we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the +forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the +roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate +expression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of +animals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose +that some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the +meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society +who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home +in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back +the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. +Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he +repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with +a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their +newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little +danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a +narrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty +or thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any +difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech—like the +young infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well +as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of +the object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object +understood, is the first rudiment of human speech. +</p> + +<p> +After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence. +The imitation of the lion’s roar calls up the fears and hopes of the +chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound, +without any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in +the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings +previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial +image becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the +animal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for +there would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal +imitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as +the picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can +be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once an +involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, +but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they +can even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from +the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness +of themselves. +</p> + +<p> +Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually +becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and +begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places, +relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest +parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances +of children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then +came verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre +followed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some +corresponding stage in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the +family became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. +Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much +with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; +how the inner world took the place of outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or +analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and +free, was at last complete. +</p> + +<p> +So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals, +or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the +perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any +other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an +hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the +chasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be +thus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have +in this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the +harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the +conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may +have contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say: +Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the +tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man +only but of many, “as the trees of the wood are stirred by the +wind.” The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental +experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human +mind. +</p> + +<p> +In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted +elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward +and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the +root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, if such a +distinction be admitted, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and +accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the +reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the +connexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of +objects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call +them, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into +particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration +of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see +that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic—the parts +of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is +language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his +highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. +Then again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are +always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath +of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like +the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits +debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy moments, as we may +conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth—as +in the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the +eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great +writer who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their +countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development—a +migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning +to be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find +themselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more +objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the +flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, +has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of +it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still +in action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course of +infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to “the persistency of the +strongest,” to “the survival of the fittest,” in this as in +the other realms of nature. +</p> + +<p> +These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language +suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences +by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in +making these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we +are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts—of mere +possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and +definite knowledge. The words “evolution,” “birth,” +“law,” development,” “instinct,” +“implicit,” “explicit,” and the like, have a false +clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The +metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often +in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving +the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can +discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger +of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the +error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed, +or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is +the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which +separates articulate from inarticulate language—the cries of animals from +the speech of man—the instincts of animals from the reason of man. (6) +There is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of +man—of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the +definite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of +human knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have +the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds (“man, like +the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with +musical notes”), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous +nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves +learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words +without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the +after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of +the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals, +and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but +not of speaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively +devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may +note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which +appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other +mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the +child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns +to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either +case not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him—he is +taught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the +impulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to +speak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot +be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates +or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how +nature, by a law, calls into being an organised structure. But the intermediate +organism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet +unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to +herself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by +us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact. +</p> + +<p> +Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of +the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, +and also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the +individual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we +analyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of +clearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, +rapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater +distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing, +taking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their +influence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking +to ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,—they +are always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate +faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers +of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the instrument +is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame. +</p> + +<p> +The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their +actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning +of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their own individuality in the +universal cause or nature. In like manner we might think of the words which we +daily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in +the world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of +language of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception +enables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to +the scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the +reality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous +influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed +ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute +to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an +effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative +character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact +existence. +</p> + +<p> +Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all +existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not +conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything +more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena. +There is no abstract language “in rerum natura,” any more than +there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth, +maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even grammatical +exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give +unity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular. +</p> + +<p> +We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this +vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction +between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various inflexions which +accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and +the “chemical” combination of them into a new word; there is the +distinction between languages which have had a free and full development of +their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their +growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire +afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction +between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their +inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost +them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are +comparatively few classes to which they can be referred. +</p> + +<p> +Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The +organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of +uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate, +throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways; making, +first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of letters. The +elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and +simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever +slight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to +climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared +with their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of +philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now +speaking. +</p> + +<p> +Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or +physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. +The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical +notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into +the nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have +escaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in +man only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half +articulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly +enable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, +like some of the other great secrets of nature,—the origin of birth and +death, or of animal life,—remains inviolable. That problem is +indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the +one, we may expect to know more of the other.<a href="#fn1" name="fnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn1"></a> <a href="#fnref1">[1]</a> +Compare W. Humboldt, <i>Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen +Sprachbaues</i>, and M. Müller, <i>Lectures on the Science of Language</i>. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +It is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written, which +with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the interval the +progress of philology has been very great. More languages have been compared; +the inner structure of language has been laid bare; the relations of sounds +have been more accurately discriminated; the manner in which dialects affect or +are affected by the literary or principal form of a language is better +understood. Many merely verbal questions have been eliminated; the remains of +the old traditional methods have died away. The study has passed from the +metaphysical into an historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with +language, nor the anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. +Figures of speech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have +been stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The immensity of +the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of law becomes apparent. +Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of it are often lost in the +distance. For languages have a natural but not a perfect growth; like other +creations of nature into which the will of man enters, they are full of what we +term accident and irregularity. And the difficulties of the subject become not +less, but greater, as we proceed—it is one of those studies in which we +seem to know less as we know more; partly because we are no longer satisfied +with the vague and superficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; +partly also because the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted +always were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of transition; and +thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of them which can never be +filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of them has been preserved. Yet +the materials at our disposal are far greater than any individual can use. Such +are a few of the general reflections which the present state of philology calls +up. +</p> + +<p> +(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the philologer +has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back, he never arrives at +the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in Astronomy, there is no beginning. +He is too apt to suppose that by breaking up the existing forms of language +into their parts he will arrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely +analyzing what never existed, or is never known to have existed, except in a +composite form. He may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he +has no evidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi, +though analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated out of +pronouns. To say that “pronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of +verbs,” is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have +some common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language known +to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all descended. No +inference can be drawn from language, either for or against the unity of the +human race. Nor is there any proof that words were ever used without any +relation to each other. Whatever may be the meaning of a sentence or a word +when applied to primitive language, it is probable that the sentence is more +akin to the original form than the word, and that the later stage of language +is the result rather of analysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a +combination of the two. Nor, again, are we sure that the original process of +learning to speak was the same in different places or among different races of +men. It may have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may +have used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been more or +less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may have modified them +by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the lengthening and strengthening +of vowels or by the shortening and weakening of them, by the condensation or +rarefaction of consonants. But who gave to language these primeval laws; or why +one race has triliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a +group of languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages +resemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in others; +or why in one language there is a greater development of vowels, in another of +consonants, and the like—are questions of which we only “entertain +conjecture.” We must remember the length of time that has elapsed since +man first walked upon the earth, and that in this vast but unknown period every +variety of language may have been in process of formation and decay, many times +over. +</p> + +<p> +(Compare Plato, Laws):— +</p> + +<p> +“ATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of +government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which +he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good and evil? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of +time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages. +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has +elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: Hardly. +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and +incalculable? +</p> + +<p> +CLEINIAS: No doubt. +</p> + +<p> +ATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities +which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every +place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising, and at other +times falling, and again improving or waning?” +</p> + +<p> +Aristot. Metaph.:— +</p> + +<p> +“And if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only that +men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would deem the +reflection to have been inspired and would consider that, whereas probably +every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND LOST MANY TIMES OVER, such +notions were but a remnant of the past which has survived to our day.”) +</p> + +<p> +It can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still +survive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were constructed by +man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any, in which the greater +families of languages stand to each other. The influence of individuals must +always have been a disturbing element. Like great writers in later times, there +may have been many a barbaric genius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or +speak, showing them by example how to continue or divide their words, charming +their souls with rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects +the expression of their confused fancies—to whom the whole of language +might in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have introduced +a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word; he may have been +imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or accent, or quantity, or rhyme +which he introduced in a single word may have become the type on which many +other words or inflexions of words were framed, and may have quickly ran +through a whole language. For like the other gifts which nature has bestowed +upon man, that of speech has been conveyed to him through the medium, not of +the many, but of the few, who were his +“law-givers”—“the legislator with the dialectician +standing on his right hand,” in Plato’s striking image, who formed +the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and look and behaviour, +whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were instinctively imitated by +them,—the “king of men” who was their priest, almost their +God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know of the origin of +language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch the subject at all. +</p> + +<p> +(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or original +language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer divide languages +into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity of structure to be the +safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We do not confuse the parts of +speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do we conceive languages any more than +civilisations to be in a state of dissolution; they do not easily pass away, +but are far more tenacious of life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. +“Where two or three are gathered together,” they survive. As in the +human frame, as in the state, there is a principle of renovation as well as of +decay which is at work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be +invented by the wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words +newly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has imitated +nature, “words are not made but grow.” Nor do we attribute to them +a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the law which +governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the sap in trees; the +action of it is uniform, but the result, which appears in the superficial forms +of men and animals or in the leaves of trees, is an endless profusion and +variety. The laws of vegetation are invariable, but no two plants, no two +leaves of the forest are precisely the same. The laws of language are +invariable, but no two languages are alike, no two words have exactly the same +meaning. No two sounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the +same impression. +</p> + +<p> +It would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other points +which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or unconscious? In +speaking or writing have we present to our minds the meaning or the sound or +the construction of the words which we are using?—No more than the +separate drops of water with which we quench our thirst are present: the whole +draught may be conscious, but not the minute particles of which it is made up: +So the whole sentence may be conscious, but the several words, syllables, +letters are not thought of separately when we are uttering them. Like other +natural operations, the process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed +by us. We do not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has +the speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different modes of +expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in the use of +language which may be observed from without, but which cannot be explained from +within. Consciousness carries us but a little way in the investigation of the +mind; it is not the faculty of internal observation, but only the dim light +which makes such observation possible. What is supposed to be our consciousness +of language is really only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of +innumerable degrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so +misleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were either +banished or used only with the distinct meaning of “attention to our own +minds,” such as is called forth, not by familiar mental processes, but by +the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may truly say that we are not +conscious of ordinary speech, though we are commonly roused to attention by the +misuse or mispronunciation of a word. Still less, even in schools and +academies, do we ever attempt to invent new words or to alter the meaning of +old ones, except in the case, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words +which are artificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither +in our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection in man +contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of language. “Which +of us by taking thought” can make new words or constructions? Reflection +is the least of the causes by which language is affected, and is likely to have +the least power, when the linguistic instinct is greatest, as in young children +and in the infancy of nations. +</p> + +<p> +A kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental element of +language; they are really inseparable—no definite line can be drawn +between them, any more than in any other common act of mind and body. It is +true that within certain limits we possess the power of varying sounds by +opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate or the teeth with the +tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal instrument, by greater or less +stress, by a higher or lower pitch of the voice, and we can substitute one note +or accent for another. But behind the organs of speech and their action there +remains the informing mind, which sets them in motion and works together with +them. And behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties +of language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human intercourse, +there is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or nature which gives order +to it in its infinite greatness, and variety in its infinitesimal +minuteness—both equally inscrutable to us. We need no longer discuss +whether philology is to be classed with the Natural or the Mental sciences, if +we frankly recognize that, like all the sciences which are concerned with man, +it has a double aspect,—inward and outward; and that the inward can only +be known through the outward. Neither need we raise the question whether the +laws of language, like the other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The +answer in all cases is the same—that the laws of nature are uniform, +though the consistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. +The superficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but we do +not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the growth of +language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly discarded, for +nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in the other political +sciences, we must distinguish between collective and individual actions or +processes, and not attribute to the one what belongs to the other. Again, when +we speak of the hereditary or paternity of a language, we must remember that +the parents are alive as well as the children, and that all the preceding +generations survive (after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for +the purposes of comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of +words, we should not forget how casual is the manner in which their +resemblances have arisen—they were not first written down by a grammarian +in the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but were due to many +chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both combined. So many +cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first thoughts to be dismissed, +before we can proceed safely in the path of philological enquiry. It might be +well sometimes to lay aside figures of speech, such as the “root” +and the “branches,” the “stem,” the +“strata” of Geology, the “compounds” of Chemistry, +“the ripe fruit of pronouns dropping from verbs” (see above), and +the like, which are always interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such +figures of speech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute +the invention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the human +mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether climate can be +supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking of on a language: such +a view is said to be unproven: it had better therefore not be silently assumed. +</p> + +<p> +“Natural selection” and the “survival of the fittest” +have been applied in the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences +which are concerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of +philologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words in the +place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to language or to +other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory, unless very precisely +defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If by “the natural +selection” of words or meanings of words or by the “persistence and +survival of the fittest” the maintainer of the theory intends to affirm +nothing more than this—that the word “fittest to survive” +survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But if he means that +the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of the word which comes +into use or drops out of use is selected or rejected on the ground of economy +or parsimony or ease to the speaker or clearness or euphony or expressiveness, +or greater or less demand for it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a +proposition which has several senses, and in none of these senses can be +assisted to be uniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can +only act uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among neighbours +as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons why a man should +prefer his own way of speaking to that of others, unless by so doing he becomes +unintelligible. The struggle for existence among words is not of that fierce +and irresistible kind in which birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but +of a milder sort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by +force, but by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a majority. +The favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it, has tended rather +to obscure than explain the subject to which it has been applied. Nor in any +case can the struggle for existence be deemed to be the sole or principal cause +of changes in language, but only one among many, and one of which we cannot +easily measure the importance. There is a further objection which may be urged +equally against all applications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and +likewise in vegetable, so in languages, the process of change is said to be +insensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another by +imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms soon become +fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate links, and so the +better half of the evidence of the change is wanting. +</p> + +<p> +(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned many of the +rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or the corrections of +it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar, like law, delights in +definition: human speech, like human action, though very far from being a mere +chaos, is indefinite, admits of degrees, and is always in a state of change or +transition. Grammar gives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces +to a system that which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, +ellipses, anacolutha, pros to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they +do not either make conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way in +which they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an earlier use of +language into conformity with the later. Often they seem intended only to +remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles or Pindar or a great +prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking unwarrantable liberties with +grammatical rules; it appears never to have occurred to the inventors of them +that these real “conditores linguae Graecae” lived in an age before +grammar, when “Greece also was living Greece.” It is the anatomy, +not the physiology of language, which grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom +and higher life of words it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a +complete paradigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble +forms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It +distinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the nature of one +passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active, Passive, and Middle, but +takes no notice of the precarious existence and uncertain character of the last +of the three. Language is a thing of degrees and relations and associations and +exceptions: grammar ties it up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of +usage: grammar tries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into +regular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular, equally with +the regular, are subject to law, and that a language which had no exceptions +would not be a natural growth: for it could not have been subjected to the +influences by which language is ordinarily affected. It is always wanting to +describe ancient languages in the terms of a modern one. It has a favourite +fiction that one word is put in the place of another; the truth is that no word +is ever put for another. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted: +words are omitted because they are no longer needed; and the omission has +ceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some other preposition +“being understood” in a Greek sentence is another fiction of the +same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases were comprehended +originally many more relations, and that prepositions are used only to define +the meaning of them with greater precision. These instances are sufficient to +show the sort of errors which grammar introduces into language. We are not +considering the question of its utility to the beginner in the study. Even to +him the best grammar is the shortest and that in which he will have least to +unlearn. It may be said that the explanations here referred to are already out +of date, and that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from +comparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the traditional +grammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student. +</p> + +<p> +Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because +they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they can +be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight into the +history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have existed in former +ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of the different branches +of knowledge and of their relation to one another. But they are worse than +useless when they outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation +of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like +Schleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel; nearly all +of them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion of physical science. +Even Kant himself thought that the first principles of philosophy could be +elicited from the analysis of the proposition, in this respect falling short of +Plato. Westphal holds that there are three stages of language: (1) in which +things were characterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in +relation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are not such +distinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of abstract ideas which +never existed in early times. Language cannot be explained by Metaphysics; for +it is prior to them and much more nearly allied to sense. It is not likely that +the meaning of the cases is ultimately resolvable into relations of space and +time. Nor can we suppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite +and infinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time when +in their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of man...If the +science of Comparative Philology had possessed “enough of Metaphysics to +get rid of Metaphysics,” it would have made far greater progress. +</p> + +<p> +(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are fully +developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered by admixture +in various degrees,—they may only borrow a few words from one another and +retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may meet in a struggle for +existence until one of the two is overpowered and retires from the field. They +attain the full rights and dignity of language when they acquire the use of +writing and have a literature of their own; they pass into dialects and grow +out of them, in proportion as men are isolated or united by locality or +occupation. The common language sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts +to them also a literary character. The laws of language can be best discerned +in the great crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to +modern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the silent +notes of the world’s history; they mark periods of unknown length in +which war and conquest were running riot over whole continents, times of +suffering too great to be endured by the human race, in which the masters +became subjects and the subject races masters, in which driven by necessity or +impelled by some instinct, tribes or nations left their original homes and but +slowly found a resting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical +monuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself. +</p> + +<p> +(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The simplest of +all is to observe our own use of language in conversation or in writing, how we +put words together, how we construct and connect sentences, what are the rules +of accent and rhythm in verse or prose, the formation and composition of words, +the laws of euphony and sound, the affinities of letters, the mistakes to which +we are ourselves most liable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with +our own language some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it, +such as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to appreciate the +grand difference between ancient and modern European languages. In the child +learning to speak we may note the inherent strength of language, which like +“a mountain river” is always forcing its way out. We may witness +the delight in imitation and repetition, and some of the laws by which sounds +pass into one another. We may learn something also from the falterings of old +age, the searching for words, and the confusion of them with one another, the +forgetfulness of proper names (more commonly than of other words because they +are more isolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also +to be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of great +cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and crime, so +pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect articulation of the +deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from the analysis of sounds in +relation to the organs of speech. The phonograph affords a visible evidence of +the nature and divisions of sound; we may be truly said to know what we can +manufacture. Artificial languages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly +useful in showing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may +be made also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points, such +as the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech, the +influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the elements of syntax, +which may be examined as well in the history of our own language as of any +other. A few well-selected questions may lead the student at once into the +heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the pronouns and the verb of existence +generally more irregular than any other parts of speech? Why is the number of +words so small in which the sound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning +of words depart so widely from their etymology? Why do substantives often +differ in meaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from +adjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound though +retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs impersonal? Why are +there only so many parts of speech, and on what principle are they divided? +These are a few crucial questions which give us an insight from different +points of view into the true nature of language. +</p> + +<p> +(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the false +appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system generally, +have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources of our knowledge +of it and the spirit in which we should approach it, we may now proceed to +consider some of the principles or natural laws which have created or modified +it. +</p> + +<p> +i. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common also to the +animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in the solitude of the +forest: they are answered by similar cries heard from a distance. The bird, +too, mimics the voice of man and makes answer to him. Man tells to man the +secret place in which he is hiding himself; he remembers and repeats the sound +which he has heard. The love of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to +him. Primitive men learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its +mother or nurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language, +the cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call human +thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and more natural +the exercise of the power is in the use of language than in any other process +or action of the human mind. +</p> + +<p> +ii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was +“without form and void.” During how many years or hundreds or +thousands of years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no +possibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there was a +time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between what we now call +language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech before language was a rudis +indigestaque materies, not yet distributed into words and sentences, in which +the cry of fear or joy mingled with more definite sounds recognized by custom +as the expressions of things or events. It was the principle of analogy which +introduced into this “indigesta moles” order and measure. It was +Anaxagoras’ omou panta chremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light +of reason lighted up all things and at once began to arrange them. In every +sentence, in every word and every termination of a word, this power of forming +relations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound to +sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and numbers of +nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally on the same or +nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The sounds by which they were +expressed were rough-hewn at first; after a while they grew more +refined—the natural laws of euphony began to affect them. The rules of +syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time has an analogy with space, +arithmetic with geometry. Not only in musical notes, but in the quantity, +quality, accent, rhythm of human speech, trivial or serious, there is a law of +proportion. As in things of beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as +well as in the motion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by +which they are held together. +</p> + +<p> +It would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are always +uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and sometimes one and +sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are three declensions of nouns; +the forms of cases in one of them may intrude upon another. Similarly verbs in +-omega and -mu iota interchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of +the verb is often made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and +partly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of use. +Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really exceptions, but +contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many of these interruptions +or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in the verb of existence of which +the forms were too common and therefore too deeply imbedded in language +entirely to drop out. The same verbs in the same meaning may sometimes take one +case, sometimes another. The participle may also have the character of an +adjective, the adverb either of an adjective or of a preposition. These +exceptions are as regular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known +to us. +</p> + +<p> +Language, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere intersected by +the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to be derived, the +principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern the similarities and +differences of things, and their relations to one another. At first these are +such as lie on the surface only; after a time they are seen by men to reach +farther down into the nature of things. Gradually in language they arrange +themselves into a sort of imperfect system; groups of personal and case endings +are placed side by side. The fertility of language produces many more than are +wanted; and the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new +meanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially compensated by +each other. It must be remembered that in all the languages which have a +literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, we are not at the beginning +but almost at the end of the linguistic process; we have reached a time when +the verb and the noun are nearly perfected, though in no language did they +completely perfect themselves, because for some unknown reason the motive +powers of languages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of +completion: they became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from +the influence of writing and literature, or because no further differentiation +of them was required for the intelligibility of language. So not without +admixture and confusion and displacement and contamination of sounds and the +meanings of words, a lower stage of language passes into a higher. Thus far we +can see and no further. When we ask the reason why this principle of analogy +prevails in all the vast domain of language, there is no answer to the +question; or no other answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in +which, like number, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, +both visible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a) +arise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a Latin noun +in “us” should end in “um;” nor (b) from any necessity +of being understood,—much less articulation would suffice for this; nor +(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds. Such +notions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive man. We may +speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest, easiest, most +euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one of two competing +sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to our knowledge. We may try +to grasp the infinity of language either under the figure of a limitless plain +divided into countries and districts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river +eternally flowing whose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially +the laws by which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we +should never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of species, +how vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of languages came to +be distributed over the earth. +</p> + +<p> +iii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even prior to it +comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind of analogy or +similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater number of words it has +become disguised and has disappeared; but in no stage of language is it +entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early language, in which words were few; +and its influence grew less and less as time went on. To the ear which had a +sense of harmony it became a barbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium +of discourse; it was an excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which +needed to be got rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It +remained for the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and +letters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols of +ideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in another way a +new character; it affected not so much single words, as larger portions of +human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of sounds and the cadence of +sentences. It was the music, not of song, but of speech, in prose as well as +verse. The old onomatopea of primitive language was refined into an onomatopea +of a higher kind, in which it is no longer true to say that a particular sound +corresponds to a motion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but +that in all the higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense, +especially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to human +thoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables, letters, +accents, quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts of all sorts. The +poet with his “Break, break, break” or his e pasin nekuessi +kataphthimenoisin anassein or his “longius ex altoque sinum +trahit,” can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of +things or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this imitative +power may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages. The same subtle +sensibility, which adapts the word to the thing, adapts the sentence or cadence +to the general meaning or spirit of the passage. This is the higher onomatopea +which has banished the cruder sort as unworthy to have a place in great +languages and literatures. +</p> + +<p> +We can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by various +degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis or pitch, become +the natural expressions of the finer parts of human feeling or thought. And not +only so, but letters themselves have a significance; as Plato observes that the +letter rho accent is expressive of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding +and rest, the letter lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of +length, the letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so as to +form composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged), +thrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein (break), pumbein +(whirl),—in all which words we notice a parallel composition of sounds in +their English equivalents. Plato also remarks, as we remark, that the +onomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing uniformly, and further that no +explanation of language consistently corresponds with any system of philosophy, +however great may be the light which language throws upon the nature of the +mind. Both in Greek and English we find groups of words such as string, swing, +sling, spring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to +derive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which it is +impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the expressive and +onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly imitative, as for example the +omega in oon, which represents the round form of the egg by the figure of the +mouth: or bronte (thunder), in which the fulness of the sound of the word +corresponds to the thing signified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which the +first syllable, as in its English equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound. +We may observe also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech +has the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or half +expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the vocal organs +only; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human frame, including head, +chest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and it may be accompanied by a +movement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands, feet which contributes to the +effect of it. +</p> + +<p> +The principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because it has +been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of syllables and +letters, like a piece of joiner’s work,—a theory of language which +is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more going out of fashion with +philologians; and partly also because the traces of onomatopea in separate +words become almost obliterated in the course of ages. The poet of language +cannot put in and pull out letters, as a painter might insert or blot out a +shade of colour to give effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him +to alter any received form of a word in order to render it more expressive of +the sense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which is +already best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a creative, but +a formative principle, which in the later stage of the history of language +ceases to act upon individual words; but still works through the collocation of +them in the sentence or paragraph, and the adaptation of every word, syllable, +letter to one another and to the rhythm of the whole passage. +</p> + +<p> +iv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the preceding, may +be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the manner in which +differences of meaning and form have arisen in them. Into their first creation +we have ceased to enquire: it is their aftergrowth with which we are now +concerned. How did the roots or substantial portions of words become modified +or inflected? and how did they receive separate meanings? First we remark that +words are attracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form +groups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another, each +noun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three patterns, and +with exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense became first allied to +sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining how the sounds and meanings of +words were in time parted off or differentiated. (1) The chief causes which +regulate the variations of sound are (a) double or differing analogies, which +lead sometimes to one form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant +chiefly the greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs +of speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word (c) the +necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or processes of things. We +are told that changes of sound take place by innumerable gradations until a +whole tribe or community or society find themselves acquiescing in a new +pronunciation or use of language. Yet no one observes the change, or is at all +aware that in the course of a lifetime he and his contemporaries have +appreciably varied their intonation or use of words. On the other hand, the +necessities of language seem to require that the intermediate sounds or +meanings of words should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a +state of transition. The process of settling down is aided by the organs of +speech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words varies +because ideas vary or the number of things which is included under them or with +which they are associated is increased. A single word is thus made to do duty +for many more things than were formerly expressed by it; and it parts into +different senses when the classes of things or ideas which are represented by +it are themselves different and distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily +pass into a new sense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more +important than all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as +Jesuit, Puritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by +the malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different meanings and +are often used to express them; and the form or accent of a word has been not +unfrequently altered when there is a difference of meaning. The difference of +gender in nouns is utilized for the same reason. New meanings of words push +themselves into the vacant spaces of language and retire when they are no +longer needed. Language equally abhors vacancy and superfluity. But the +remedial measures by which both are eliminated are not due to any conscious +action of the human mind; nor is the force exerted by them constraining or +necessary. +</p> + +<p> +(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from being of +an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the faults of +language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in which different +strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix with one another either by +slow transitions or by violent convulsions, leaving many lacunae which can be +no longer filled up, and often becoming so complex that no true explanation of +them can be given. So in language there are the cross influences of meaning and +sound, of logic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the +inflexions of words, which often come into conflict with each other. The +grammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the same +pattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is, the more common +usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far beyond art, and it is +complicated by irregularity, so that often we can hardly say that there is a +right or wrong in the formation of words. For almost any formation which is not +at variance with the first principles of language is possible and may be +defended. +</p> + +<p> +The imperfection of language is really due to the formation and correlation of +words by accident, that is to say, by principles which are unknown to us. Hence +we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to comprehend the whole of language, +was constrained to “supplement the poor creature imitation by another +poor creature convention.” But the poor creature convention in the end +proves too much for all the rest: for we do not ask what is the origin of words +or whether they are formed according to a correct analogy, but what is the +usage of them; and we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with +Horace that usage is the ruling principle, “quem penes arbitrium est, et +jus et norma loquendi.” +</p> + +<p> +(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or fixity. +First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws, which may be +repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with a religious +accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation the whole or the +greater part of a language is literally preserved; secondly, it may be written +down and in a written form distributed more or less widely among the whole +nation. In either case the language which is familiarly spoken may have grown +up wholly or in a great measure independently of them. (1) The first of these +processes has been sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words +has been carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either perished +wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of modern philology. The +verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a ritual, but they have had no +relation to ordinary life or speech. (2) The invention of writing again is +commonly attributed to a particular epoch, and we are apt to think that such an +inestimable gift would have immediately been diffused over a whole country. But +it may have taken a long time to perfect the art of writing, and another long +period may have elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on +language has been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of +printing. +</p> + +<p> +Before the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were only +dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which writing was +not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature. In most of the +counties of England there is still a provincial style, which has been sometimes +made by a great poet the vehicle of his fancies. When a book sinks into the +mind of a nation, such as Luther’s Bible or the Authorized English +Translation of the Bible, or again great classical works like Shakspere or +Milton, not only have new powers of expression been diffused through a whole +nation, but a great step towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of +language demands regular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted +deeply on the tablets of a nation’s memory by a common use of classical +and popular writers. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly +every printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically. +</p> + +<p> +(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language we note +some other causes which have affected the higher use of it: such as (1) the +necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of tautology; (3) the +influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the language of prose and verse upon +one another; (4) the power of idiom and quotation; (5) the relativeness of +words to one another. +</p> + +<p> +It has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with ancient. +The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to which the former +cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern languages, if through the +loss of inflections and genders they lack some power or beauty or +expressiveness or precision which is possessed by the ancient, are in many +other respects superior to them: the thought is generally clearer, the +connexion closer, the sentence and paragraph are better distributed. The best +modern languages, for example English or French, possess as great a power of +self-improvement as the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be +any reason why they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that +our great writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that +whenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English language +as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or Milton. There is +no reason to suppose that English or French will ever be reduced to the low +level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The wide diffusion of great +authors would make such a decline impossible. Nor will modern languages be +easily broken up by amalgamation with each other. The distance between them is +too wide to be spanned, the differences are too great to be overcome, and the +use of printing makes it impossible that one of them should ever be lost in +another. +</p> + +<p> +The structure of the English language differs greatly from that of either Latin +or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek, sentences are joined together +by connecting particles. They are distributed on the right hand and on the left +by men, de, alla, kaitoi, kai de and the like, or deduced from one another by +ara, de, oun, toinun and the like. In English the majority of sentences are +independent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by side or +slightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the expression of the +logical relations of the clauses is closer and more exact: there is less of +apposition and participial structure. The sentences thus laid side by side are +also constructed into paragraphs; these again are less distinctly marked in +Greek and Latin than in English. Generally French, German, and English have an +advantage over the classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords +are more accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On the +other hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and feminine +gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to men and animals no +doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have a difficulty in +appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of words gives more +flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period. Of the comparative effect +of accent and quantity and of the relation between them in ancient and modern +languages we are not able to judge. +</p> + +<p> +Another quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is freedom +from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which, except for the +sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short intervals. Of course the +length of the interval must depend on the character of the word. Striking words +and expressions cannot be allowed to reappear, if at all, except at the +distance of a page or more. Pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather +must recur in successive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the +reader and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same +sounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of expression would +have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and would have added a +pleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally rejects the repetition of +the word and the use of a mere synonym for it,—e.g. felicity and +happiness. The cultivated mind desires something more, which a skilful writer +is easily able to supply out of his treasure-house. +</p> + +<p> +The fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words and the +meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the vocabulary. It is a +very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry is almost as free from +tautology as the best modern writings. The speech of young children, except in +so far as they are compelled to repeat themselves by the fewness of their +words, also escapes from it. When they grow up and have ideas which are beyond +their powers of expression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. +In like manner when language is “contaminated” by philosophy it is +apt to become awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and +freedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is himself +not free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any high degree of +literary excellence. +</p> + +<p> +To poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed; and the +most critical period in the history of language is the transition from verse to +prose. At first mankind were contented to express their thoughts in a set form +of words having a kind of rhythm; to which regularity was given by accent and +quantity. But after a time they demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to +those who had all their life been hearing poetry the first introduction of +prose had the charm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems +were converted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or +readers of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of the two +was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the human mind +became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in all succeeding +ages became the natural vehicle of expression to all mankind. Henceforward +prose and poetry formed each other. A comparatively slender link between them +was also furnished by proverbs. We may trace in poetry how the simple +succession of lines, not without monotony, has passed into a complicated +period, and how in prose, rhythm and accent and the order of words and the +balance of clauses, sometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up +a new kind of harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of +Homer, Virgil, or Dante. +</p> + +<p> +One of the most curious and characteristic features of language, affecting both +syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word “idiom” is that +which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or expression which strikes +us or comes home to us, which is more readily understood or more easily +remembered. It is a quality which really exists in infinite degrees, which we +turn into differences of kind by applying the term only to conspicuous and +striking examples of words or phrases which have this quality. It often +supersedes the laws of language or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be +regarded as another law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or +phrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and +familiar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more than +compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it. Striking +expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are the precious +stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature of idioms: they are +taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt from the proprieties of +language. Every one knows that we often put words together in a manner which +would be intolerable if it were not idiomatic. We cannot argue either about the +meaning of words or the use of constructions that because they are used in one +connexion they will be legitimate in another, unless we allow for this +principle. We can bear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a +new order or even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with +them. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did not +intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of Shakspere or of the +Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a lie, is far from unpleasing +to us. The better known words, even if their meaning be perverted, are more +agreeable to us and have a greater power over us. Most of us have experienced a +sort of delight and feeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we +first used for ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech. +</p> + +<p> +There are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is linked to +every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb or noun derives its +meaning, not only from itself, but from the words with which it is associated. +Some reflection of them near or distant is embodied in it. In any new use of a +word all the existing uses of it have to be considered. Upon these depends the +question whether it will bear the proposed extension of meaning or not. +According to the famous expression of Luther, “Words are living +creatures, having hands and feet.” When they cease to retain this living +power of adaptation, when they are only put together like the parts of a piece +of furniture, language becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead. +</p> + +<p> +Grammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and sound. +Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings. They both tend to +obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word and that all language is +relative. (1) It is relative to its own context. Its meaning is modified by +what has been said before and after in the same or in some other passage: +without comparing the context we are not sure whether it is used in the same +sense even in two successive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, +place, and occasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they +may be presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is +relative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker and +hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing ought to be +expressed which is already commonly or universally known. A word or two may be +sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long or elaborate speech or +composition is required to explain some new idea to a popular audience or to +the ordinary reader or to a young pupil. Grammars and dictionaries are not to +be despised; for in teaching we need clearness rather than subtlety. But we +must not therefore forget that there is also a higher ideal of language in +which all is relative—sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the +whole—in which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is +also the larger context of history and circumstances. +</p> + +<p> +The study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new science +which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant ages and +countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light upon all +other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The true +conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and theology, but +also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that this newly-found +science will continue to progress in the same surprising manner as heretofore; +or that even if our materials are largely increased, we shall arrive at much +more definite conclusions than at present. Like some other branches of +knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be +profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of +language from theory to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and +hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And it is not +without practical and political importance. It gives a new interest to distant +and subject countries; it brings back the dawning light from one end of the +earth to the other. Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when +we know something of their early life; and when they are better understood by +us, we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all +knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper +insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it +and enable us to make a nobler use of it.<a href="#fn2" name="fnref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn2"></a> <a href="#fnref2">[2]</a> +Compare again W. Humboldt, <i>Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen +Sprachbaues</i>; M. Müller, <i>Lectures on the Science of Language</i>; +Steinthal, <i>Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft</i>: and for +the latter part of the Essay, Delbruck, <i>Study of Language</i>; Paul’s +<i>Principles of the History of Language</i>: to the latter work the author of +this Essay is largely indebted. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CRATYLUS</h2> + +<h3>By Plato</h3> + +<p class="center"> +Translated by Benjamin Jowett +</p> + +<p class="center"> +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: If you please. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has +been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional; +not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a +truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. +Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, +and he answers “Yes.” And Socrates? “Yes.” Then every +man’s name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he +replies—“If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would +not be your name.” And when I am anxious to have a further explanation he +is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion of his own +about the matter, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he +chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather +tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or +correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that “hard is +the knowledge of the good.” And the knowledge of names is a great part of +knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course +of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and +language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at +once able to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, +I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the +truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in +the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really +Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say +that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a +fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of +difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the +question open until we have heard both sides. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and +others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness +in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my +opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new +name is as correct as the old—we frequently change the names of our +slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name +given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the +users;—such is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and +learn of Cratylus, or of any one else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;—Your +meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to +call it? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is my notion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a +horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a +horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; +and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the +world:—that is your meaning? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: He would, according to my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in +words a true and a false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition +says that which is not? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every +part? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and +false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: So we must infer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the +name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says that +there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than +this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities and countries +there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians +in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names +differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he +says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they +appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with +him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my +perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing +as a bad man? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are +very bad men, and a good many of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Not many. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Still you have found them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the +very evil very foolish? Would that be your view? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: It would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they +appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Impossible. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really +distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can +hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man +cannot in reality be wiser than another. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: He cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things +equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on his +view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always +equally to be attributed to all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to individuals, +and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they +must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not +in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but +they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed +by nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally +to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and +not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as +we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper +instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the +natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no +use at all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way +is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the +successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and +as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode +of speaking will result in error and failure. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I quite agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is +not naming also a sort of action? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a +special nature of their own? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Precisely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be given +according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our +pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with success. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced +with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with something? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: An awl. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And with which we weave? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A shuttle. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And with which we name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, “What sort of instrument is a +shuttle?” And you answer, “A weaving instrument.” +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I ask again, “What do we do when we weave?”—The +answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of +instruments in general? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will you +answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I cannot say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things +according to their natures? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing +natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Assuredly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a +weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a +teacher? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using +well? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That of the carpenter. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Only the skilled. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That of the smith. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the +legislator? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The skilled only. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a +maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the +world is the rarest. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? +Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the +carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that which is +naturally fitted to act as a shuttle? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, +looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he +made the other? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, +thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have +the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each +kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered +the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this +natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may +be, which he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the +forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their +uses? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several +kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put +the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and +give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any +true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the +same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the +same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form +must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be +equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign +country;—there is no difference. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not +therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true +and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes +no matter. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the +shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the +weaver who is to use them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who +knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work +is being well done or not? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who is he? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The player of the lyre. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The pilot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and +will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not +the user be the man? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And how to answer them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a +dialectician? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has +to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician +must be his director if the names are to be rightly given? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no +such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and +Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not +every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which +each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true forms of things in +letters and syllables. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing +my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more readily +persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness +of names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just +now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the +enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step +has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and +that not every man knows how to give a thing a name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, +if you care to know, is the next question. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then reflect. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How shall I reflect? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you +must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom +your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of +wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had +better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from +Protagoras about the fitness of names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras +and his truth (“Truth” was the title of the book of Protagoras; +compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he +say? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where he +distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. +Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness +of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right +and natural names; do you not think so? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. +But to what are you referring? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single +combat with Hephaestus? +</p> + +<p> +“Whom,” as he says, “the Gods call Xanthus, and men call +Scamander.” +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called +Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird +which, as he says, +</p> + +<p> +“The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:” +</p> + +<p> +to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name +Cymindis—do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? +(Compare Il. “The hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the tomb +of the sportive Myrina.”) And there are many other observations of the +same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the +understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which +he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, are more within the +range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by +correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: you will remember +I dare say the lines to which I refer? (Il.) +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the +names given to Hector’s son—Astyanax or Scamandrius? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not know. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the +unwise are more likely to give correct names? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should say, the men. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax +(king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of +Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That may be inferred. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their +wives? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the +boy than Scamandrius? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not +himself suggest a very good reason, when he says, +</p> + +<p> +“For he alone defended their city and long walls”? +</p> + +<p> +This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the +city which his father was saving, as Homer observes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I see. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his name? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What of that? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of +Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have +nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is +clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds +it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and indeed I +believe that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had +found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the +right track. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, +and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of +nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary +births;—if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call +that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a +natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree +with me? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play +tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a +king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes +no difference, provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or +subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing +remains in possession of the name and appears in it. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of +letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves with the +exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega; the names of the rest, +whether vowels or consonants, are made up of other letters which we add to +them; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the +name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter +beta—the addition of eta, tau, alpha, gives no offence, and does not +prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator +intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I believe you are right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the son +of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire; and similarly +the offspring of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the +parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised +until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize +them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the +same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the +physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put +out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the +addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the +change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was +just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, +which is tau, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with +the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the +meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean +“king.” Again, there are several names for a general, as, for +example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good +warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and +Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be +cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. +Would you not say so? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the +course of nature? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are +prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, +he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he +belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a +calf. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called +irreligious? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus +(mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his +should have an opposite meaning. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who +appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some +poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of +his hero’s nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And his father’s name is also according to nature. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for +remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his +resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all +the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified +by the name Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is rightly called; for his +murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and +destructive to his reputation—the name is a little altered and disguised +so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no +difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the +stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the +name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is +also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops +who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or +foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his +whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and immediate,—or +in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means +for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given +and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what are the traditions? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his +life—last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his death +he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world +below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine +that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down by +misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this +form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name +of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although +hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into +two parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others who use the +other half call him Dia; the two together signify the nature of the God, and +the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there +is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king +of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, +although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life +(di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first +sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we +might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the +fact; for this is the meaning of his father’s name: Kronos quasi Koros +(Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon +chai acheraton tou nou, the pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, +as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo +tou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the +way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could +remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more +conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,—then I +might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I +know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly +inspired, and to be uttering oracles. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the +great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which +commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting +ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and +to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of +names—that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we +will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some +priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the +enquiry about names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we +have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of +themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The +names of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are +often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have +no business; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of +good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and +others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more +chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there +ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps +there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving +them names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show +that they are rightly named Gods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the +sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many +barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that +they were always moving and running, from their running nature they were called +Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men became acquainted with the +other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think +that likely? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this word? Tell +me if my view is right. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came +first? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He says of them— +</p> + +<p> +“But now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon +the earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.” +(Hesiod, Works and Days.) +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden +men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of +this, because he further says that we are the iron race. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be +said to be of golden race? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the good wise? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them +demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic +dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a +good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a +demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that +every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both +in life and death, and is rightly called a demon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is the +meaning of the word “hero”? (Eros with an eta, in the old writing +eros with an epsilon.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is +not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What then? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, +or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you +will see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from +whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they +must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the +question (erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was +saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and +questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of +sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called +anthropoi?—that is more difficult. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think +that you are the more likely to succeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious +thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow’s dawn I +shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that +we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and +change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert +this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle +syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes +inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of +the grave. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, +appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the alpha, has +been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say that the word “man” implies that other +animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man +not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and +hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a opopen. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You +know the distinction of soul and body? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word +psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that +those who first used the name psuche meant to express that the soul when in the +body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival +(anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and +dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a +moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to +the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this +explanation. What do you say to another? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the +entire nature of the body? What else but the soul? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Just that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the +ordering and containing principle of all things? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and holds +nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into psuche. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than +the other. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this +was the true meaning of the name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean soma (the body). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little +permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the +soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index +of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (semainei) the body; +probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under +the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the +body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe +(soma, sozetai), as the name soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according +to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. +But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you +were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of +correctness is to be applied to them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, +as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know nothing, +either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are +sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are +true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as +in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics +which they like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a +very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if +you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about +them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about +the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small +blame. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do +as you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been +considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, and what of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. +Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For +example, that which we term ousia is by some called esia, and by others again +osia. Now that the essence of things should be called estia, which is akin to +the first of these (esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is reason in +the Athenians calling that estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient +times we too seem to have said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have +been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to +estia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the essence of +things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of +Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing +principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is +therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we who know +nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and +Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say +that I am talking great nonsense. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of what nature? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How plausible? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity +as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and +nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you +cannot go into the same water twice. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of +Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the +doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them +purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod +also, tells of +</p> + +<p> +“Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.—the line is not +found in the extant works of Hesiod.).” +</p> + +<p> +And again, Orpheus says, that +</p> + +<p> +“The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his +sister Tethys, who was his mother’s daughter.” +</p> + +<p> +You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of +Heracleitus. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do +not understand the meaning of the name Tethys. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, +a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (diattomenon, +ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these +two words. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether +the latter is called by that or by his other name. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original inventor +of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not +allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon; +the epsilon was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the +name may have been originally written with a double lamda and not with a sigma, +meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being +the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and +delta have been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the +giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear +to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (aeides) and so +they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this +deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of +always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to +him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the +office and name of the God really correspond. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why, how is that? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you +which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him +more to the same spot,—desire or necessity? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he +did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Assuredly they would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should +certainly infer, and not by necessity? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there are many desires? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the +greatest? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made +better by associating with another? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to +him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the +world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God +able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect +and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the +other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding +blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is +called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men +while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the +desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and +reflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the +desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not +even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own +far-famed chains. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the +unseen (aeides)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all +noble things. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and +Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here is the +lovely one (erate)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married +her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was +thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), putting +the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if +you repeat the letters of Here several times over. People dread the name of +Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,—and with as little reason; +the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature +of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are +terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise +(sophe); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), +that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is +wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), +or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (tou +pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, +consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta +now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. +There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed +to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power +of the God. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single +name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God, +embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, and +prophecy, and medicine, and archery. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the +explanation. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the +first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, +and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their +washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to +make a man pure both in body and soul. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from +all impurities? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the +physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or in +respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the +same as truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in +the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei +Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or +again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in +akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean +“together,” so the meaning of the name Apollo will be “moving +together,” whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the +harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an +harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is +the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both +among Gods and among men. And as in the words akolouthos and akoitis the alpha +is substituted for an omicron, so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; +only the second lambda is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of +destruction (apolon). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts +the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as I +was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the +single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous, aei +Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to +be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (mosthai); and Leto is +called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and so willing +(ethelemon) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often +called by strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her +smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy +(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps +because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as hating +intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave the Goddess her +name may have had any or all of these reasons. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and +also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is +not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious +one; for the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of +wine), Didoinusos, as he might be called in fun,—and oinos is properly +oionous, because wine makes those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a +mind (noun) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam +(aphros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, +will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What other appellation? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We call her Pallas. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed +dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, or by +the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Athene? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern +interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the +ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he +meant by Athene “mind” (nous) and “intelligence” +(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about +her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine +intelligence” (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is she who has +the mind of God (Theonoa);—using alpha as a dialectical variety for eta, +and taking away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in the MSS. The +meaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed form of theou +noesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps, however, the name +Theonoe may mean “she who knows divine things” (Theia noousa) +better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of +it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), +and therefore gave her the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his +successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her +Athene. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction; that is +obvious to anybody. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into +your head. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is Ares? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and +manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is +the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to +the God of war. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am +afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds +of Euthyphro can prance. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am +said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether +there is any meaning in what Cratylus says. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and +signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or +liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with +language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is expressive of the use of +speech, and there is an often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means +“he contrived”—out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai, +the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and +we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: “O my +friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he is the contriver of tales +or speeches, you may rightly call him Eirhemes.” And this has been +improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called +from the verb “to tell” (eirein), because she was a messenger. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I +was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at speeches. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son +of Hermes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you make that out? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is always +turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which +dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is +rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do +with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the +perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called aipolos +(goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, +and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is +speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no +marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the +Gods. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we +not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, +air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not +refuse. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You will oblige me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom you +mentioned first—the sun? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for +the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because when he rises +he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is always rolling in his course +(aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of which the meaning is the +same as poikillein (to variegate), because he variegates the productions of the +earth. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon +receives her light from the sun. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why do you say so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the same +meaning? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old (enon), +if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always +adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon neon +aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this when hammered +into shape becomes selanaia. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say +of the month and the stars? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because suffering +diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from astrape, which +is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the upsetting of the eyes +(anastrephein opa). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro has +deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please, +however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of +this sort. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is it? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell +me what is the meaning of the pur? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of this +and several other words?—My belief is that they are of foreign origin. +For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the +barbarians, often borrowed from them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of +these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the +language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the word is +not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians +may be observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have udor +(water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for +something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur and +udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises +(airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei rei), or because the +flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the winds “air-blasts,” +(aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in +the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this moving wind may be +expressed by either term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither +(aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be correctly said, because +this element is always running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera +reon). The meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of +gaia, for the earth may be truly called “mother” (gaia, +genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What shall we take next? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year, +eniautos and etos. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know +the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai because they +divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the +earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the same,—“that +which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and +passes them in review within itself (en eauto exetazei)”: this is broken +up into two words, eniautos from en eauto, and etos from etazei, just as the +original name of Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition +means that his power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two +words etos and eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am run away with. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would +explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming +words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring; +still, as I have put on the lion’s skin, I must not be faint of heart; +and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and +understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and +all those other charming words, as you call them? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into my head +only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly +like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature +of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and +then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving in all +directions; and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal +condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is +nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is +always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names +which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just +cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name +indicative of motion. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What was the name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis +(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing of +motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion); gnome +(judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) +of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would +rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis +(the desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world is always in +process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of +the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the +place of a double epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of +that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme +(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for +anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor +falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as epistemene, +inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as +a kind of conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), +and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company +with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be +of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You +must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid +motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous +Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians +signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by +sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name +which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things +move, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but +there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this +admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly +dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual word dikaion is +more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then +they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion +conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that +there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the +instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if +it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the +swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not +penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all +things and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter k is +only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a +general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an +enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of which I +am speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of +which anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that +justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and +I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently: +“Well, my excellent friend,” say I, “but if all this be true, +I still want to know what is justice.” Thereupon they think that I ask +tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already +sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after +another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the +sun, and that he only is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element +which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful +notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, “What, is there no justice +in the world when the sun is down?” And when I earnestly beg my +questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in the +abstract”; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, +not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” +Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that +justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with +nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my +friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice +than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, +which has led me into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons +which I have mentioned. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must have +heard this from some one else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And not the rest? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Hardly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the +originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we +have as yet discussed courage (andreia),—injustice (adikia), which is +obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle +(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems to +imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of existence, and according +to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract +the delta from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may +clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but +only to that which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have +been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar +allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I +suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female) appears to be +partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes +things flourish (tethelenai). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is surely probable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure the +growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the +legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein (running), and allesthai +(leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There +are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still +to be explained. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the possession of +mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two omichrons, one between +the chi and nu, and another between the nu and eta. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original names have +been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off +letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts +of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, +the word katoptron; why is the letter rho inserted? This must surely be the +addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of +putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no +human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another +example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, +phiggos, and there are other examples. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters +which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to +any object. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, +should observe the laws of moderation and probability. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Such is my desire. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or +“you will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).” When you have +allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the top +of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great +accomplishment—anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these +two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now +at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words +arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet understand, but kakia is +transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things +being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly); and this evil +motion when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia, or vice, +specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further +illustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come after +andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been +passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain +(desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest +and strongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same +nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is +an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos +ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, +that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort +of thing, arete will be the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease +of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has +therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is +therefore called arete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may +perhaps have had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is +more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay +that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if +the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part +in your previous discourse? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an +opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What device? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words +and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes +(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former +derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, +and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that which hindered the flux (aei +ischon roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and +has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into omicron. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not the +principle which imposes the name the cause? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their names, and is +not mind the beautiful (kalon)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and +are not other works worthy of blame? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works +of a carpenter? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Exactly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which +we recognize and speak of as the beautiful? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What more names remain to us? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and kalon, +such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their opposites. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover +for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is a sister +word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul accompanying the +world, and things which are done upon this principle are called sumphora or +sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the world. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is probable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but you +must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning; for this word +also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to +express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and universal penetration in the +good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a delta instead of a nu, and so +made kerdos. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the +gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word in the +sense of swift. You regard the profitable (lusiteloun), as that which being the +swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of +motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), +and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears +to me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun—being that which looses +(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from +ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a common +Homeric word, and has a foreign character. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Which are they? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), +alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes (hurtful). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm (blaptein) +the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold or bind); for +aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a term of censure; boulomenon +aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream) would properly be boulapteroun, and +this, as I imagine, is improved into blaberon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; and +when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are making +your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not mine. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?—let me remark, Hermogenes, how +right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by +putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will +sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may instance the word deon, which +occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, +that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised +and entirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, +which in the old language is clearly indicated. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the +sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most conservative of the +ancient language, but now they change iota into eta or epsilon, and delta into +zeta; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: How do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either imera +or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the +giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (imeirousi) and +love the light which comes after the darkness, and is therefore called imera, +from imeros, desire. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, +although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera because it makes +things gentle (emera different accents). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Such is my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: They did so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,—it ought to be duogon, which +word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the purpose of +drawing;—this has been changed into zugon, and there are many other +examples of similar changes. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word +deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other +appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, +the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of +blaberon. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be the +correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the epsilon into an +iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning +good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the +author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all these various +appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun +(profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), +euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or +all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding +principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word +zemiodes (hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the +ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will perceive, is +given to that which binds motion (dounti ion). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia +(desire), and the like, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about +them—edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends to advantage; and +the original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this has been altered +by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears to be derived from the relaxation +(luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of +motion (alpha and ienai); algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a +foreign word, which is derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called +from the putting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) “the word +too labours,” as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of +the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so called +from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a +breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into +terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves; the +former, which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is +named, as every one may see, from the soul moving (pheresthai) in harmony with +nature; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which +enters into the soul; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and +boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws +the soul dia ten esin tes roes—because flowing with desire (iemenos), and +expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, +and is termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive +of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place +(pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied to things absent, as +imeros is to things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in +(esron) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence +introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called esros (influx) in +the old time when they used omicron for omega, and is called eros, now that +omega is substituted for omicron. But why do you not give me another word? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march +of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (toxon); +the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only +oisis (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of +each thing—just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole); and +boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all +these words seem to follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as +aboulia, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or +mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I have +explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion (the +voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and +unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as +I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but +the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and +ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, +and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation +of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But +while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere +with your questions. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such as +aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to +enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has +this name of onoma. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes;—meaning the same as zetein (to enquire). +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on ou +zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more obvious in +onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that +for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia is also an agglomeration +of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; +pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given +by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep +(eudein); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of +psi; on and ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true +principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be said of not +being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion). +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one +were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon and +doun?—show me their fitness. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already +suggested. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: What way? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin; +and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be +true of them; but also the original forms of words may have been lost in the +lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should +not be surprised if the old language when compared with that now in use would +appear to us to be a barbarous tongue. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention +and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on +analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the elements out of which +the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to +answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry? +Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other +names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? +The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of +agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And probably thoos is made up of other +elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable +of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last +reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out +to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be examined according to +some new method? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this +conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say +to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating +the principle of primary names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is +applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary—when they are +regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate +the nature of things. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the +secondary names, is implied in their being names. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the +primary. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis +show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which they must do, if +they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question: Suppose that we +had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we +not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of +the body? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our hands +to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and downwardness would +be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if we were describing the +running of a horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and their +gestures as like as we could to them. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express +anything. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or +tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we +want to express. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: It must be so, I think. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator +names or imitates? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the +truth as yet. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Why not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who +imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, +what sort of an imitation is a name? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although +that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates; these, in +my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects +have sound and figure, and many have colour? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of +this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a +colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of +anything else which may be said to have an essence? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I should think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in +letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the +two other imitators. What will this imitator be called? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of +whom we are in search. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider +the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about which you +were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in +letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Very good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: There must be others. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and where +does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and +letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those +who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary, and then +of compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to +the consideration of rhythms? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the +vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which are neither vowels nor +semivowels), into classes, according to the received distinctions of the +learned; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and +distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected +the classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in +the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred +(cf. Phaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether +they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well +considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they +resemble—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there +is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who +wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and +sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh +colour or anything of that kind—he uses his colours as his figures appear +to require them; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of +objects, either single letters when required, or several letters; and so we +shall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns and +verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at +language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so +shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some +other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried +away—meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we but) the +ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in +like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject, and we +must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are +rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear +Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in +this way? for I am certain that I should not. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, +something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of +preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know +nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present +enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is +the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must +follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. +What do you think? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: I very much approve. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find +expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be +avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth +of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like +the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and +must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that “the Gods +gave the first names, and therefore they are right.” This will be the +best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of +deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we +are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same +sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious +excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort +of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary +words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the +professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first +names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you +not suppose this to be true? +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, +though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that +you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the general +instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet explained the +meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going); for the letter eta +was not in use among the ancients, who only employed epsilon; and the root is +kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. And the old word kinesis +will be correctly given as iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this +foreign root kiein, and allowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of +the nu, we have kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis +is the negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the +letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent +instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for +this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents +motion by rho; also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and +again, in words such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), +thruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts +of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I +imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in +the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express +motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the subtle elements which pass +through all things. This is why he uses the letter iota as imitative of motion, +ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, +of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these +are used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon +(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always +introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is phusodes +(windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue +in the utterance of delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a +place: he further observed the liquid movement of lambda, in the pronunciation +of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, +as in leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon +(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma +detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a +glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he observed +to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence +he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he assigned to the expression +of size, and nu of length, because they are great letters: omicron was the sign +of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron mixed up in the word +goggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and +syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation +compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; +but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; +he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this +fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell +me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what +Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? +and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of +Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, +or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such +a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all. +</p> + +<p> +HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to +add little to little” is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that +you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little +trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and +myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, +which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not +be at all surprized to find that you have found some better notion. For you +have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you +have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the +number of your disciples. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these +matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the +opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what +Achilles in the “Prayers” says to Ajax,— +</p> + +<p> +“Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to have +spoken in all things much to my mind.” +</p> + +<p> +And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my +mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long +been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I +cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I +saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver +is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore +I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to “look fore and +aft,” in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are +we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the +thing:—has this proposition been sufficiently proven? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite +true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And who are they? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain +what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, +better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort +build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and +some worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was +mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in +him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only +appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature +which corresponds to it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even +speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, +if he is not. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your +meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say +something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is +not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I +should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that +falsehood may be spoken but not said? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in +a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail, Athenian +stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”—these words, whether spoken, +said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our +friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me +whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly +false:—which is all that I want to know. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no +purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of +hammering at a brazen pot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for +you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of +the thing? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in +another way? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. +Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or +words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they +are the imitation. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: They are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the +man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the +woman, and of the woman to the man? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Only the first. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that +which belongs to them and is like them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is my view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good +understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode +of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when +applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and +assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, +false as well as wrong. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be +wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, +“This is your picture,” showing him his own likeness, or perhaps +the likeness of a woman; and when I say “show,” I mean bring before +the sense of sight. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, “This is your +name”?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not +say to him—“This is your name”? and may I not then bring to +his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, “This is a +man”; or of a female of the human species, when I say, “This is a +woman,” as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be +disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, +the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of +them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may +also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs +then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in +pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you +may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or +too much of them—may there not? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who +takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature +of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in +other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make +an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others +ill made. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; +it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; +for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or beta, or any +other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a +letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written +at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be +just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once +becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other +number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything +which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if +expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let +us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the +other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes +not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and +colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same +warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as +you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in +another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, +or that there were two Cratyluses? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of +truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer +an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images +are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the +realities which they represent? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I see. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if +they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, +and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the +realities. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be +correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall +be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a +wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun +in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and +acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general +character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you +will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance +of the names of the letters. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of +the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;—well, if +all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think +that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina +who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth +herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out some new +notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the +expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be +inconsistent with yourself. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name +rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are +incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and +similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a +part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you +would admit that? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I +cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations +of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by +assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the +notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, +and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous +knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only +principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and +opposite one, according to which you call small great and great +small—that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. +Which of these two notions do you prefer? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than +representation by any chance sign. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out +of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to +the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture +which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which +resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Impossible. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless +the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of +resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the +original elements are letters? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying +about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of +rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the +like? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: There again you were right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, is +by the Eretrians called skleroter. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the same +significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in sigma, or +is there no significance to one of us? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is +expressive not of hardness but of softness. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and +should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion +rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say +skleros (hard), you know what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I +understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is +what you are saying? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given +by me to you? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from +like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, then you have +made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be +convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those +which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even +supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you +must say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by +likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as +we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives +consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the +indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can +you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every +individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and +agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite +agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear +that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, +which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to +correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use +likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect +state of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, +what is the force of names, and what is the use of them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the +simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are +expressed by them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is +the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they +are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and +therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information about +things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of +information? or is there any other? What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information +about them; there can be no other. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers +the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method of instruction, +and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of +the same nature as instruction. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the +search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being +deceived? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: How so? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his +conception of the things which they signified—did he not? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to +his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? +Shall we not be deceived by him? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have +known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you +have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof +is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that +all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in +error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error +and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in +geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first +part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which +follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought +and attention on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or +are they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest +will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really +consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying +that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of +motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of +them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this +word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round +with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not +reject the epsilon, but make an insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not +pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the +expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria +(enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream; and +the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, +again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not +motion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, +viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and +episteme and other words which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, +epesthai, sumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and +akolasia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and +akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these +instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the +same principle as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would +take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names +indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at +rest; which is the opposite of motion. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is +correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort +there are most, those are the true ones? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to +another, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we +not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both +Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names +was the art of the legislator? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the +first names, know or not know the things which they named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, +if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he +named; are you still of that opinion? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I am. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a +knowledge of the things which he named? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the +primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our view, the +only way of learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for +ourselves or to learn them from others. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose +that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were +names at all, and therefore before they could have known them? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a +power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which +are thus given are necessarily their true names. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or +God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some +names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are +expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point +which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they +are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by what criterion +are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can +be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without +employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a +standard which shows the truth of things. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be +known without names? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of +knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when +they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other +and different from them must signify something other and different from them. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names +rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things +through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the +things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to +learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is the +expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the +truth and the image of it have been duly executed? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, +beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is +not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by +the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. +I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the +idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but, I +think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, +they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, +master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your +opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or +any other absolute existence? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair, +or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux; but let +us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, +and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and +vanish while the word is in our mouths? +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Undoubtedly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? +for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the +same; and if they are always the same and in the same state, and never depart +from their original form, they can never change or be moved. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the +observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you +cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know +that which has no state. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, +if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for +knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide +and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the +change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going +on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will +be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that +which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other +thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, +as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, +or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, +is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself +or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far +trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which +condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he +will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is +a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also +very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily +persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a +doctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the +truth, come and tell me. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have +been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble +and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a +lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and +Hermogenes shall set you on your way. +</p> + +<p> +CRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think +about these things yourself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CRATYLUS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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