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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +LACHES + +by PLATO + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +Lysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of the +elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous of educating +their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often happens with +the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are resolved that their +children shall have more care taken of them, than they received themselves +at the hands of their fathers. + +At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man +named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the two +generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would advise +that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and Laches are +quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that Socrates should +be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a stranger to +Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his old friend +Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the hour of his death. +Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had introduced the excellent +Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his son, and to Laches, who had +witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle of Delium (compare Symp.). + +Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to wait +until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a +characteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of +the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war--useful when the +ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken; creating a +general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to the appearance +of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that +such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of any value, because the +Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect it. His own +experience in actual service has taught him that these pretenders are +useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen by him on board +ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The possession of the art +will make the coward rash, and subject the courageous, if he chance to make +a slip, to invidious remarks. And now let Socrates be taken into counsel. +As they differ he must decide. + +Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes: in +such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he would +consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works to show +as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never been able +to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had the wit to do or +discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older and richer than he is: +they have had teachers, and perhaps have made discoveries; and he would +have trusted them entirely, if they had not been diametrically opposed. + +Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the +younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He +earnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says, +how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he has +cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often +submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from +Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his +words. + +Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and +more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is +Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which +is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches thinks +that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his post.' But +some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the +heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea. (2) Socrates wants +a more general definition, not only of military courage, but of courage of +all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and pains. Laches replies that this +universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere +endurance may be hurtful and injurious. Therefore (3) the element of +intelligence must be added. But then again unintelligent endurance may +often be more courageous than the intelligent, the bad than the good. How +is this contradiction to be solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to +the Dorian mode' of words and actions; for their words are all confusion, +although their actions are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an +argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that +he knows what courage is, if he could only tell. + +Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has +heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is +intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort of +intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things terrible.' +'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art.' 'No they do +not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether they are really +terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.' Laches draws the +inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a god. + +Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be denied +to animals or children, because they do not know the danger. Against this +inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some +degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage. Still, he does not +like to see an Athenian statesman and general descending to sophistries of +this sort. Socrates resumes the argument. Courage has been defined to be +intelligence or knowledge of the terrible; and courage is not all virtue, +but only one of the virtues. The terrible is in the future, and therefore +the knowledge of the terrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can +be no knowledge of future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the +good and evil of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. +Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he +who has the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have +courage, but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a +single virtue would be the same as all virtues (compare Protagoras). And +after all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in +ignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys, +old men and all. + +Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in the +Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less of +poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power. They +are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play and +development of character. In the Lysis and Charmides the youths are the +central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of meeting, +which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also a +palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part. The +seance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest. + +First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the +Republic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is +only his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by their own +confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the circumstance +that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never heard of the fame of +Socrates, his son; they belong to different circles. In the Meno their +want of education in all but the arts of riding and wrestling is adduced as +a proof that virtue cannot be taught. The recognition of Socrates by +Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his military exploits naturally +connect him with the two generals, of whom one has witnessed them. The +characters of Nicias and Laches are indicated by their opinions on the +exhibition of the man fighting in heavy armour. The more enlightened +Nicias is quite ready to accept the new art, which Laches treats with +ridicule, seeming to think that this, or any other military question, may +be settled by asking, 'What do the Lacedaemonians say?' The one is the +thoughtful general, willing to avail himself of any discovery in the art of +war (Aristoph. Aves); the other is the practical man, who relies on his own +experience, and is the enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, +and is apt to lose his temper. It is to be noted that one of them is +supposed to be a hearer of Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his +actions. Laches is the admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the +remark is put that there are some persons who, having never been taught, +are better than those who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, +he is delighted with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with +the refinements of Nicias. + +In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?' +the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out; and +in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between them. +Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass on from the +more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred to him that +there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and only by an effort +of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No sooner has this +general notion been formed than it evanesces before the dialectic of +Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the Socratic +doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean knowledge +of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the knowledge +of the future is separable from that of the past and present; in other +words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the philosopher. +And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--a position which +elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which will not assist us +in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part of the Dialogue the +contrast between the mode of cross-examination which is practised by Laches +and by Socrates, and also the manner in which the definition of Laches is +made to approximate to that of Nicias, are worthy of attention. + +Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and +knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage are +never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained as +the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an unmeaning +and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations of the nature +of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is moral as well as +physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable from knowledge, and yet (3) +is based on a natural instinct. Laches exhibits one aspect of courage; +Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmony of both is only realized +in Socrates himself. + +The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which Plato +treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurred between B.C. +424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B.C. 418, the year of the battle +of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrates was more than seventy +years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he could not have been a +young man at any time after the battle of Delium. + + +LACHES, OR COURAGE. + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: +Lysimachus, son of Aristides. +Melesias, son of Thucydides. +Their sons. +Nicias, Laches, Socrates. + + +LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, +Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my +friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we +may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any +reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your +advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they +are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the +person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to +their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say +exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter +about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I +have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his +grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, +Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, +and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with +the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do +the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons of your own, +we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and +improvement, and, if perchance you have not attended to them, we may remind +you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in +the fulfilment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even +at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I +live together, and our sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at +first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads +about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace--in +the management of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but +neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is +that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our +fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were +occupied with the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, +pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are +rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains +they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on +their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover +what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one +commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an +excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man +whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we +determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were +intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with you +about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted to +talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about +this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or pursuits +which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say +whether you agree to our proposal. + +NICIAS: As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your +purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will +be equally glad. + +LACHES: Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which +Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and which +is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is +occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt to be +negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. +There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why, instead +of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the +education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always +passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit, +such as you are enquiring after. + +LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this +sort? + +LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus. + +NICIAS: That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite +lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,--Damon, the +disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as +well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at +their age. + +LYSIMACHUS: Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias +and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are +generally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus, +should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you +are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of +your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the +hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes +back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads +talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of +the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of +Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether +this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken? + +SON: Certainly, father, this is he. + +LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name +of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the +prospect of our family ties being renewed. + +LACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure +you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his +country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can +tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour of our country +would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never have occurred. + +LYSIMACHUS: That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates, +by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let me +tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that +you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought to have +visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now, from this +day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say--come +and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may +continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do so, +and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty. But what +say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak--the art of +fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the lads may be +advantageously instructed? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in +this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I +am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear +first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have +anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as +to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin. + +NICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the +acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an +advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure +hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure their +bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise; and this, +and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for +they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our +military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover +in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, +such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest +whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in +pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in +flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly +he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a +single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great +advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other +noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will +desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of +the lesson: and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, +he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no +difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts +will be honourable and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the +beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a +slight one,--that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant +and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what +by some may be thought to be a small matter;--he will make a better +appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his +appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, +Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, +and for the reasons which I have given. But Laches may take a different +view; and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say. + +LACHES: I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge +is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good: and if, as +Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a +species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those +who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not +of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? I say this, +because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, +whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which +give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered +this one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the art +would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the +Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a +master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his +fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honoured +among ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a +tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states, but +rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. +Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a +sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of +their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would +rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to +those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means firstrate +in the arts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of +these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I +can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been +distinguished in war,--there has been a sort of fatality about them; while +in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised +the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this +very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that +crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at +another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, +which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which +struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half +scythe; the singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the +man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to +this notable invention of the scythe spear. He was fighting, and the +scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he +tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing +one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but +as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let +the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the +handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at +his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the +deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of +his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they +beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I +do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, +but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an +art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all, but only an +imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth having. For my +opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be +likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if +he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and +he will be greatly traduced; for there is a jealousy of such pretenders; +and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous, +if he says that he has this sort of skill. Such is my judgment, +Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask +Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the +matter. + +LYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the more +necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in a manner +still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no arbiter +would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias +another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree. + +SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the +majority? + +LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do? + +SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating +about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of +the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and +exercised under a skilful master? + +MELESIAS: The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable. + +SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four? + +MELESIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is +based on knowledge and not on numbers? + +MELESIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of +us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there is, +let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest; if +there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about +which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the +greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches; and upon their +turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house. + +MELESIAS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter? + +MELESIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or +wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select him +who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers? + +MELESIAS: I think that we should. + +SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of +the art of which we want to find the masters? + +MELESIAS: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that +we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we +ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a +teacher of the art. + +NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or +ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may +illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a medicine +to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or +about the eyes? + +NICIAS: About the eyes. + +SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse +and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle? + +NICIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of +another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means? + +NICIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too +is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view? + +NICIAS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end +is the soul of youth? + +NICIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in +the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers? + +LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who +have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very +willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, +unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or +more works. + +LACHES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in +their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice +about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that +we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and +experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our +teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has +works of his own to show; then he should point out to them what Athenians +or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. +But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then he should tell them to +look out for others; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of +friends, and thereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be +brought against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus +and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher of +the art of virtue; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to +have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the +only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been +able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias +or Laches may have discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier +than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older +too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really +believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been +confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus +decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. +I repose confidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they +differ from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested +that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn +earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question +them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has no +knowledge of the matter--he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly; +neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, +Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skilful +educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art +yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your +respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if +you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to +them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in +the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our children and of +yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and disgrace their +ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, +give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior +persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your +first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the +experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a Carian slave, but on your own +sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, 'break the +large vessel in learning to make pots.' Tell us then, what qualities you +claim or do not claim. Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let +them off. + +LYSIMACHUS: I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but +you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and +give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias +would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates +asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took you into our +counsels because we thought that you would have attended to the subject, +especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to +be educated. Well, then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take +Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another's +questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most +important of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our +request. + +NICIAS: I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates' +father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at least, you can +only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his +fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some +other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he +arrived at manhood. + +LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias? + +NICIAS: Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an +intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is +liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he +will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds +that he has to give an account both of his present and past life; and when +he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely +and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he +will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer; +for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is +no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, +doing: he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of +his after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so +long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. +To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; +indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon +pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I +am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had +better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be. + +LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, +about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may +seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of +virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his +theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his words, +and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one I deem to +be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or +any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a +harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian +mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the +Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his +voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so +eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree +with his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I +hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I +have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had +experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments +are natural to him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with +him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and +shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him: for I too agree with +Solon, 'that I would fain grow old, learning many things.' But I must be +allowed to add 'of the good only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that +he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that +the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is +of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you +may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me +anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of +you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a +proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, +say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages. + +SOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take +counsel and advise with me. + +LYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, +for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out +from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, +and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I +do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to +them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore +beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your selves; and I will +listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions. + +SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus +and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which +was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own instructors in this sort +of training, and whom have we made better?' But the other mode of carrying +on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more +like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of +something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the +addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising +may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I +mean. Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew +that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, +and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should +know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of +sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what +sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers +about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and +hearing to them. + +LACHES: That is true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment +inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to +their sons for the improvement of their minds? + +LACHES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can +we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we +are wholly ignorant? + +LACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue? + +LACHES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell? + +LACHES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the +whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us first +consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the enquiry will +thus probably be made easier to us. + +LACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not +select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? +And is not that generally thought to be courage? + +LACHES: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the +nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young +men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, +if you can, what is courage. + +LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man of +courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against +the enemy; there can be no mistake about that. + +SOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself +clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended +to ask, but another. + +LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who +remains at his post, and fights with the enemy? + +LACHES: Certainly I should. + +SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who +fights flying, instead of remaining? + +LACHES: How flying? + +SOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as +pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they +knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passes an +encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and +calls him 'an author of fear or flight.' + +LACHES: Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking of +chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way +of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his +rank. + +SOCRATES: And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, +who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to +have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks +of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won +the battle of Plataea. + +LACHES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having +put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering +badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed +soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of +soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in +perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are +courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but +mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank +or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage--is there not, +Laches? + +LACHES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And all these are courageous, but some have courage in +pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and some +are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine. + +LACHES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I +will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, +which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you +now understand what I mean? + +LACHES: Not over well. + +SOCRATES: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is +called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in +speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which +we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, +mouth, voice, mind;--would you not apply the term quickness to all of them? + +LACHES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common +quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call +quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little +time--whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action. + +LACHES: You would be quite correct. + +SOCRATES: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is +that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the +various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all +the cases to which I was just now referring? + +LACHES: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I +am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all. + +SOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. +And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be +deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would +consider courage to be a very noble quality. + +LACHES: Most noble, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble? + +LACHES: Very noble. + +SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on +the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful? + +LACHES: True. + +SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful? + +LACHES: I ought not to say that, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-- +for it is not noble, but courage is noble? + +LACHES: You are right. + +SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage? + +LACHES: True. + +SOCRATES: But as to the epithet 'wise,'--wise in what? In all things +small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of +endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will +acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous? + +LACHES: Assuredly not. + +SOCRATES: Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some +patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be +allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is +that courage? + +LACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last. + +SOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing +to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and +that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with +him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you say of +such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or +some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these +and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver? + +LACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver. + +SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the +other? + +LACHES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry +endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he +who endures, having no such knowledge? + +LACHES: So I should say. + +SOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, +or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, +not having such a knowledge? + +LACHES: True. + +SOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in +this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, +as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge? + +LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say? + +SOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks. + +LACHES: But that is what I do think. + +SOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, +in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them. + +LACHES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base +and hurtful to us. + +LACHES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality. + +LACHES: True. + +SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish +endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage. + +LACHES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so? + +LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right. + +SOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not +attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our +deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had +courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking +about courage just now. + +LACHES: That is most true. + +SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory? + +LACHES: Quite the reverse. + +SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are +speaking to a certain extent. + +LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean? + +SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in +the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in +searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance. + +LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to +investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been +aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus +unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of +courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot +get hold of her and tell her nature. + +SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the +track, and not be lazy? + +LACHES: Certainly, he should. + +SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the +sport than we are. What do you say? + +LACHES: I should like that. + +SOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who +are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our +extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will +tell us what you think about courage. + +NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not +defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent +saying which I have heard from your own lips. + +SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias? + +NICIAS: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in +which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.' + +SOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias. + +NICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise. + +SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches? + +LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him. + +SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that +courage is a sort of wisdom. + +LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself. + +LACHES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you +surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute? + +NICIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre? + +NICIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what? + +LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and +I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom. + +NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which +inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything. + +LACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches? + +LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another. + +SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies. + +LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him? + +NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been +proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been +doing the same. + +LACHES: Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall +endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the +dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians +the same as the courageous? + +NICIAS: Not at all. + +LACHES: No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or +than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with +fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a +whit the more for that. + +SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying +something of importance. + +NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true. + +SOCRATES: How so? + +NICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only +extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no +more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether +health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better +never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that +life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the +two? + +LACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion. + +NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who +had better die, and to those who had better live? + +LACHES: Certainly not. + +NICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows +this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear +and hope? And him I call the courageous. + +SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches? + +LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are +courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is +better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a +soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous? + +NICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the +grounds of hope or fear? + +LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he? + +NICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer +ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, +whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in +war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering +of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the +soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer. + +LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he +represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor +in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My +opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking +nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the +difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have +practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the +appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law +there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself +out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this? + +SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps +Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us +ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we +will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him. + +LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked +enough. + +SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both +of us. + +LACHES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are +partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the +knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear? + +NICIAS: I do. + +SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the +soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire +it--that is what you were saying? + +NICIAS: I was. + +SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, +as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous. + +NICIAS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian +sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but +because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the +knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast +is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a +boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things +which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He +who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a +bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage. + +LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, +Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to +be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the +boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage. + +NICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have +no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only +fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little children +courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a +difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am +of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but +that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are +very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, +many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' +actions which I call rash;--my courageous actions are wise actions. + +LACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself +out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom +all the world acknowledges to be courageous. + +NICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to +say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are +courageous and therefore wise. + +LACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth +that I am a haughty Aexonian. + +SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware +of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from +my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the +Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this +sort. + +LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more +suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city +chooses to preside over her. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a +great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' +definition of courage is worthy of examination. + +LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, +suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to +apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question. + +LACHES: I will if you think that I ought. + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You +remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue. + +NICIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many +other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue. + +NICIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, +temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as +courage. Would you not say the same? + +NICIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, +and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: +I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then +tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: in my +opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not +create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of +future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches? + +LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely. + +SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, +are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil +things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me? + +NICIAS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage? + +NICIAS: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as +to a third point. + +NICIAS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one +knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what +is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all +three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of +medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all +times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like +manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. +As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he +has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the +master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what +is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places +the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. +Am I not correct in saying so, Laches? + +LACHES: Quite correct. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has +understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past? + +NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion. + +SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the +fearful and of the hopeful? + +NICIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future +goods and future evils? + +NICIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the +future or at any time? + +NICIAS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the +fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other +sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of +the present and past, and of any time? + +NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a +third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of +courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present +view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but +seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. +What do you say to that alteration in your statement? + +NICIAS: I agree, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and +how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, +and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He +would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were +not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and +he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or +men. + +NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you +say. + +SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of +yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? + +NICIAS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? + +NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying. + +SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view? + +NICIAS: That appears to be the case. + +SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is. + +NICIAS: We have not. + +LACHES: And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the +discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to +Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by +the wisdom of Damon. + +NICIAS: I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed +your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I +have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the +things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, +will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest +of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of +opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been +discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be +hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down, +although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I +am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I +think that you are very much in want of knowledge. + +LACHES: You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I +would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers +about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should +ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old enough, I would +have asked him myself. + +NICIAS: To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under +his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of +Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he +recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be +more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus. + +LYSIMACHUS: He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him +which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates--will you +comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the +youths? + +SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in +the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I +had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you +would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in +the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I +certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me +offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). +I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best +teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of +one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I +cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for +going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, +who says, that + +'Modesty is not good for a needy man.' + +Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of +the youths our own education. + +LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am +also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of +you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these +matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation. + +SOCRATES: I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God +willing. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Laches, by Plato + diff --git a/old/lachs10.zip b/old/lachs10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e752e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/lachs10.zip |