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+********The Project Gutenberg Etext of Laches, by Plato********
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+Laches
+
+by Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+December, 1998  [Etext #1584]
+
+********The Project Gutenberg Etext of Laches, by Plato********
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+
+LACHES 
+
+by PLATO
+
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+Lysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of the
+elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous of educating
+their sons in the best manner.  Their own education, as often happens with
+the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are resolved that their
+children shall have more care taken of them, than they received themselves
+at the hands of their fathers.
+
+At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man
+named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour.  The two fathers ask the two
+generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would advise
+that their sons should acquire the accomplishment.  Nicias and Laches are
+quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that Socrates should
+be invited to take part in the consultation.  He is a stranger to
+Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his old friend
+Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the hour of his death.
+Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had introduced the excellent
+Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his son, and to Laches, who had
+witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle of Delium (compare Symp.).
+
+Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to wait
+until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a
+characteristic manner.  Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of
+the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war--useful when the
+ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken; creating a
+general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to the appearance
+of the soldier in the field.  Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that
+such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of any value, because the
+Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect it.  His own
+experience in actual service has taught him that these pretenders are
+useless and ridiculous.  This man Stesilaus has been seen by him on board
+ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself.  The possession of the art
+will make the coward rash, and subject the courageous, if he chance to make
+a slip, to invidious remarks.  And now let Socrates be taken into counsel.
+As they differ he must decide.
+
+Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes:  in
+such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he would
+consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works to show
+as evidences of his skill.  This is not himself; for he has never been able
+to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had the wit to do or
+discover anything.  But Nicias and Laches are older and richer than he is: 
+they have had teachers, and perhaps have made discoveries; and he would
+have trusted them entirely, if they had not been diametrically opposed.
+
+Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the
+younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory.  He
+earnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says,
+how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he has
+cross-examined the company about their past lives.  Nicias has often
+submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from
+Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his
+words.
+
+Socrates proceeds:  We might ask who are our teachers?  But a better and
+more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is
+Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which
+is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?'  Laches thinks
+that he knows this:  (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his post.'  But
+some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the
+heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.  (2) Socrates wants
+a more general definition, not only of military courage, but of courage of
+all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and pains.  Laches replies that this
+universal courage is endurance.  But courage is a good thing, and mere
+endurance may be hurtful and injurious.  Therefore (3) the element of
+intelligence must be added.  But then again unintelligent endurance may
+often be more courageous than the intelligent, the bad than the good.  How
+is this contradiction to be solved?  Socrates and Laches are not set 'to
+the Dorian mode' of words and actions; for their words are all confusion,
+although their actions are courageous.  Still they must 'endure' in an
+argument about endurance.  Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that
+he knows what courage is, if he could only tell.
+
+Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has
+heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is
+intelligence.'  Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort of
+intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things terrible.' 
+'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art.'  'No they do
+not.  They may predict results, but cannot tell whether they are really
+terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.'  Laches draws the
+inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a god.
+
+Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be denied
+to animals or children, because they do not know the danger.  Against this
+inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some
+degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage.  Still, he does not
+like to see an Athenian statesman and general descending to sophistries of
+this sort.  Socrates resumes the argument.  Courage has been defined to be
+intelligence or knowledge of the terrible; and courage is not all virtue,
+but only one of the virtues.  The terrible is in the future, and therefore
+the knowledge of the terrible is a knowledge of the future.  But there can
+be no knowledge of future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the
+good and evil of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil.
+Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally.  But he
+who has the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have
+courage, but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue.  Thus, a
+single virtue would be the same as all virtues (compare Protagoras).  And
+after all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in
+ignorance of the nature of courage.  They must go to school again, boys,
+old men and all.
+
+Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in the
+Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis.  There is less of
+poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power.  They
+are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play and
+development of character.  In the Lysis and Charmides the youths are the
+central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of meeting,
+which is a palaestra.  Here the place of meeting, which is also a
+palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part.  The
+seance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.
+
+First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the
+Republic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument.  Melesias, who is
+only his shadow, also subsides into silence.  Both of them, by their own
+confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the circumstance
+that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never heard of the fame of
+Socrates, his son; they belong to different circles.  In the Meno their
+want of education in all but the arts of riding and wrestling is adduced as
+a proof that virtue cannot be taught.  The recognition of Socrates by
+Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his military exploits naturally
+connect him with the two generals, of whom one has witnessed them.  The
+characters of Nicias and Laches are indicated by their opinions on the
+exhibition of the man fighting in heavy armour.  The more enlightened
+Nicias is quite ready to accept the new art, which Laches treats with
+ridicule, seeming to think that this, or any other military question, may
+be settled by asking, 'What do the Lacedaemonians say?'  The one is the
+thoughtful general, willing to avail himself of any discovery in the art of
+war (Aristoph. Aves); the other is the practical man, who relies on his own
+experience, and is the enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak,
+and is apt to lose his temper.  It is to be noted that one of them is
+supposed to be a hearer of Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his
+actions.  Laches is the admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the
+remark is put that there are some persons who, having never been taught,
+are better than those who have.  Like a novice in the art of disputation,
+he is delighted with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with
+the refinements of Nicias.
+
+In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?'
+the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out; and
+in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between them.
+Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass on from the
+more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred to him that
+there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and only by an effort
+of the mind can he frame a general notion at all.  No sooner has this
+general notion been formed than it evanesces before the dialectic of
+Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the Socratic
+doctrine, that courage is knowledge.  This is explained to mean knowledge
+of things terrible in the future.  But Socrates denies that the knowledge
+of the future is separable from that of the past and present; in other
+words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the philosopher. 
+And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--a position which
+elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which will not assist us
+in distinguishing the nature of courage.  In this part of the Dialogue the
+contrast between the mode of cross-examination which is practised by Laches
+and by Socrates, and also the manner in which the definition of Laches is
+made to approximate to that of Nicias, are worthy of attention.
+
+Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and
+knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result.  The two aspects of courage are
+never harmonized.  The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained as
+the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an unmeaning
+and transcendental conception.  Yet several true intimations of the nature
+of courage are allowed to appear:  (1) That courage is moral as well as
+physical:  (2) That true courage is inseparable from knowledge, and yet (3)
+is based on a natural instinct.  Laches exhibits one aspect of courage;
+Nicias the other.  The perfect image and harmony of both is only realized
+in Socrates himself.
+
+The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which Plato
+treats facts.  For the scene must be supposed to have occurred between B.C.
+424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B.C. 418, the year of the battle
+of Mantinea, at which Laches fell.  But if Socrates was more than seventy
+years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he could not have been a
+young man at any time after the battle of Delium.
+
+
+LACHES, OR COURAGE.
+
+by
+
+Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
+Lysimachus, son of Aristides.
+Melesias, son of Thucydides.
+Their sons.
+Nicias, Laches, Socrates.
+
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour,
+Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my
+friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him.  I think that we
+may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any
+reserve with you.  The reason was, that we were intending to ask your
+advice.  Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they
+are asked will not say what they think.  They guess at the wishes of the
+person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to
+their own, opinion.  But as we know that you are good judges, and will say
+exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels.  The matter
+about which I am making all this preface is as follows:  Melesias and I
+have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his
+grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather,
+Aristides.  Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths,
+and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with
+the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do
+the utmost that we can for them.  And knowing you to have sons of your own,
+we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and
+improvement, and, if perchance you have not attended to them, we may remind
+you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in
+the fulfilment of a common duty.  I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even
+at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this.  Melesias and I
+live together, and our sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at
+first, we are going to confess to you.  Both of us often talk to the lads
+about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace--in
+the management of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but
+neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show.  The truth is
+that we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our
+fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were
+occupied with the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads,
+pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are
+rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains
+they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear.  They, on
+their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover
+what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them.  Some one
+commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an
+excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man
+whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him.  And we
+determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were
+intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with you
+about the education of our sons.  That is the matter which we wanted to
+talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about
+this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or pursuits
+which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn.  Please to say
+whether you agree to our proposal.
+
+NICIAS:  As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your
+purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will
+be equally glad.
+
+LACHES:  Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which
+Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and which
+is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is
+occupied with public affairs.  As he says, such persons are too apt to be
+negligent and careless of their own children and their private concerns. 
+There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus.  But why, instead
+of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the
+education of the youths?  He is of the same deme with you, and is always
+passing his time in places where the youth have any noble study or pursuit,
+such as you are enquiring after.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this
+sort?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly, Lysimachus.
+
+NICIAS:  That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite
+lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,--Damon, the
+disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as
+well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at
+their age.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias
+and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are
+generally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus,
+should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you
+are able to give.  Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of
+your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the
+hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes
+back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads
+talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of
+the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of
+Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant.  Tell me, my boys, whether
+this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?
+
+SON:  Certainly, father, this is he.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name
+of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the
+prospect of our family ties being renewed.
+
+LACHES:  Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure
+you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his
+country's name.  He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can
+tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour of our country
+would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never have occurred.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates,
+by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise.  Let me
+tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that
+you will regard me as one of your warmest friends.  You ought to have
+visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now, from this
+day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say--come
+and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may
+continue your friend, as I was your father's.  I shall expect you to do so,
+and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your duty.  But what
+say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak--the art of
+fighting in armour?  Is that a practice in which the lads may be
+advantageously instructed?
+
+SOCRATES:  I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in
+this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I
+am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear
+first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have
+anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as
+to you.  Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.
+
+NICIAS:  I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the
+acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men.  It is an
+advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure
+hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure their
+bodily health.  No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise; and this,
+and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for
+they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our
+military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns.  Moreover
+in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others,
+such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest
+whenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either in
+pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in
+flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant.  Certainly
+he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm at the hands of a
+single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great
+advantage.  Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to the love of other
+noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in armour will
+desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of
+the lesson:  and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired,
+he will go on to learn the complete art of the general.  There is no
+difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts
+will be honourable and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the
+beginning of them.  Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a
+slight one,--that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant
+and self-possessed in the field.  And I will not disdain to mention, what
+by some may be thought to be a small matter;--he will make a better
+appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his
+appearance will strike terror into his enemies.  My opinion then,
+Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art,
+and for the reasons which I have given.  But Laches may take a different
+view; and I shall be very glad to hear what he has to say.
+
+LACHES:  I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge
+is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good:  and if, as
+Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a
+species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those
+who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not
+of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it?  I say this,
+because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians,
+whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which
+give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered
+this one.  And even if they had not, still these professors of the art
+would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the
+Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a
+master of the art who was honoured among them would be sure to make his
+fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honoured
+among ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a
+tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring states, but
+rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. 
+Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a
+sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of
+their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would
+rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to
+those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means firstrate
+in the arts of war.  Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of
+these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I
+can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been
+distinguished in war,--there has been a sort of fatality about them; while
+in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised
+the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception.  For example, this
+very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that
+crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at
+another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself,
+which was a far better spectacle.  He was a marine on board a ship which
+struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half
+scythe; the singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the
+man.  To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to
+this notable invention of the scythe spear.  He was fighting, and the
+scythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he
+tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free.  The two ships were passing
+one another.  He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but
+as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let
+the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the
+handle.  The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at
+his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the
+deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of
+his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they
+beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport.  Now I
+do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts,
+but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an
+art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all, but only an
+imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth having.  For my
+opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be
+likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if
+he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and
+he will be greatly traduced; for there is a jealousy of such pretenders;
+and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous,
+if he says that he has this sort of skill.  Such is my judgment,
+Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask
+Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the
+matter.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the more
+necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in a manner
+still needed who will decide between them.  Had they agreed, no arbiter
+would have been required.  But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias
+another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.
+
+SOCRATES:  What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the
+majority?
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?
+
+SOCRATES:  And would you do so too, Melesias?  If you were deliberating
+about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of
+the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and
+exercised under a skilful master?
+
+MELESIAS:  The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.
+
+SOCRATES:  His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?
+
+MELESIAS:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is
+based on knowledge and not on numbers?
+
+MELESIAS:  To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES:  Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of
+us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating?  If there is,
+let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the rest; if
+there is not, let us seek further counsel.  Is this a slight matter about
+which you and Lysimachus are deliberating?  Are you not risking the
+greatest of your possessions?  For children are your riches; and upon their
+turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house.
+
+MELESIAS:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Great care, then, is required in this matter?
+
+MELESIAS:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or
+wanting to consider, who was the best trainer.  Should we not select him
+who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?
+
+MELESIAS:  I think that we should.
+
+SOCRATES:  But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of
+the art of which we want to find the masters?
+
+MELESIAS:  I do not understand.
+
+SOCRATES:  Let me try to make my meaning plainer then.  I do not think that
+we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we
+ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a
+teacher of the art.
+
+NICIAS:  Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or
+ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may
+illustrate in this way:  When a person considers about applying a medicine
+to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or
+about the eyes?
+
+NICIAS:  About the eyes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse
+and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?
+
+NICIAS:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of
+another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?
+
+NICIAS:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too
+is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?
+
+NICIAS:  Most true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end
+is the soul of youth?
+
+NICIAS:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in
+the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?
+
+LACHES:  Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who
+have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very
+willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art,
+unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or
+more works.
+
+LACHES:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in
+their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice
+about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that
+we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men of merit and
+experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have been really our
+teachers.  Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has
+works of his own to show; then he should point out to them what Athenians
+or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. 
+But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then he should tell them to
+look out for others; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of
+friends, and thereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be
+brought against any one by those nearest to him.  As for myself, Lysimachus
+and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher of
+the art of virtue; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to
+have one.  But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the
+only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been
+able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias
+or Laches may have discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier
+than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others.  And they are older
+too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery.  And I really
+believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been
+confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus
+decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. 
+I repose confidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they
+differ from one another.  And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested
+that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn
+earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question
+them.  I would have you say to them:  Socrates avers that he has no
+knowledge of the matter--he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly;
+neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind.  But you,
+Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skilful
+educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art
+yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your
+respective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if
+you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to
+them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in
+the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our children and of
+yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and disgrace their
+ancestors.  But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field,
+give us some proof of your skill.  Who are they who, having been inferior
+persons, have become under your care good and noble?  For if this is your
+first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the
+experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a Carian slave, but on your own
+sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, 'break the
+large vessel in learning to make pots.'  Tell us then, what qualities you
+claim or do not claim.  Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let
+them off.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but
+you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and
+give an explanation about matters of this sort.  Assuredly, I and Melesias
+would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates
+asks, if you will:  for I began by saying that we took you into our
+counsels because we thought that you would have attended to the subject,
+especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to
+be educated.  Well, then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take
+Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another's
+questions:  for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most
+important of our concerns.  I hope that you will see fit to comply with our
+request.
+
+NICIAS:  I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates'
+father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself:  at least, you can
+only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his
+fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some
+other gathering.  You clearly show that you have never known him since he
+arrived at manhood.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  Why do you say that, Nicias?
+
+NICIAS:  Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an
+intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is
+liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he
+will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds
+that he has to give an account both of his present and past life; and when
+he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely
+and thoroughly sifted him.  Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he
+will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer;
+for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus.  And I think that there is
+no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been,
+doing:  he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of
+his after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so
+long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. 
+To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant;
+indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon
+pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I
+am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had
+better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.
+
+LACHES:  I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings,
+about discussions.  Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may
+seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of
+virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his
+theme, I am delighted beyond measure:  and I compare the man and his words,
+and note the harmony and correspondence of them.  And such an one I deem to
+be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or
+any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a
+harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian
+mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the
+Dorian, and no other.  Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his
+voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so
+eager am I in drinking in his words.  But a man whose actions do not agree
+with his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I
+hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse.  As to Socrates, I
+have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had
+experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments
+are natural to him.  And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with
+him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and
+shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him:  for I too agree with
+Solon, 'that I would fain grow old, learning many things.'  But I must be
+allowed to add 'of the good only.'  Socrates must be willing to allow that
+he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil:  but that
+the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is
+of no account with me.  And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you
+may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me
+anything which I know.  So high is the opinion which I have entertained of
+you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a
+proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give.  Therefore,
+say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.
+
+SOCRATES:  I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take
+counsel and advise with me.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours,
+for I reckon you as one of us.  Please then to take my place, and find out
+from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths,
+and talk and consult with them:  for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I
+do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to
+them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.  I will therefore
+beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your selves; and I will
+listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.
+
+SOCRATES:  Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus
+and Melesias.  There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which
+was first proposed to us:  'Who have been our own instructors in this sort
+of training, and whom have we made better?'  But the other mode of carrying
+on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point, and will be more
+like proceeding from first principles.  For if we knew that the addition of
+something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the
+addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising
+may be best and most easily attained.  Perhaps you do not understand what I
+mean.  Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way.  Suppose we knew
+that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift,
+and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should
+know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of
+sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what
+sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers
+about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and
+hearing to them.
+
+LACHES:  That is true, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment
+inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to
+their sons for the improvement of their minds?
+
+LACHES:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then must we not first know the nature of virtue?  For how can
+we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we
+are wholly ignorant?
+
+LACHES:  I do not think that we can, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?
+
+LACHES:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the
+whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us first
+consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the enquiry will
+thus probably be made easier to us.
+
+LACHES:  Let us do as you say, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select?  Must we not
+select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to conduce? 
+And is not that generally thought to be courage?
+
+LACHES:  Yes, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the
+nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young
+men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits.  Tell me,
+if you can, what is courage.
+
+LACHES:  Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man of
+courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against
+the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.
+
+SOCRATES:  Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself
+clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended
+to ask, but another.
+
+LACHES:  What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES:  I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous who
+remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly I should.
+
+SOCRATES:  And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who
+fights flying, instead of remaining?
+
+LACHES:  How flying?
+
+SOCRATES:  Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as
+pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they
+knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passes an
+encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and
+calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'
+
+LACHES:  Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right:  for he was speaking of
+chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way
+of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his
+rank.
+
+SOCRATES:  And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea,
+who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to
+have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks
+of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won
+the battle of Plataea.
+
+LACHES:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having
+put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering
+badly.  For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed
+soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of
+soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in
+perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are
+courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but
+mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank
+or turning upon their enemy.  There is this sort of courage--is there not,
+Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  And all these are courageous, but some have courage in
+pleasures, and some in pains:  some in desires, and some in fears, and some
+are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.
+
+LACHES:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general.  And I
+will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality,
+which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage?  Do you
+now understand what I mean?
+
+LACHES:  Not over well.
+
+SOCRATES:  I mean this:  As I might ask what is that quality which is
+called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in
+speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which
+we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs,
+mouth, voice, mind;--would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?
+
+LACHES:  Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And suppose I were to be asked by some one:  What is that common
+quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call
+quickness?  I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little
+time--whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.
+
+LACHES:  You would be quite correct.
+
+SOCRATES:  And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is
+that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the
+various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all
+the cases to which I was just now referring?
+
+LACHES:  I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I
+am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
+
+SOCRATES:  But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.
+And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be
+deemed courage.  Hear my reason:  I am sure, Laches, that you would
+consider courage to be a very noble quality.
+
+LACHES:  Most noble, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
+
+LACHES:  Very noble.
+
+SOCRATES:  But what would you say of a foolish endurance?  Is not that, on
+the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
+
+LACHES:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
+
+LACHES:  I ought not to say that, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage--
+for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
+
+LACHES:  You are right.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
+
+LACHES:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  But as to the epithet 'wise,'--wise in what?  In all things
+small as well as great?  For example, if a man shows the quality of
+endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will
+acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?
+
+LACHES:  Assuredly not.
+
+SOCRATES:  Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some
+patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be
+allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is
+that courage?
+
+LACHES:  No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.
+
+SOCRATES:  Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing
+to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and
+that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with
+him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you say of
+such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or
+some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these
+and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?
+
+LACHES:  I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.
+
+SOCRATES:  But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the
+other?
+
+LACHES:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry
+endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he
+who endures, having no such knowledge?
+
+LACHES:  So I should say.
+
+SOCRATES:  And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling,
+or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures,
+not having such a knowledge?
+
+LACHES:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in
+this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is,
+as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?
+
+LACHES:  Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
+
+SOCRATES:  Nothing, if that be what he thinks.
+
+LACHES:  But that is what I do think.
+
+SOCRATES:  And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches,
+in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.
+
+LACHES:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base
+and hurtful to us.
+
+LACHES:  Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.
+
+LACHES:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish
+endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.
+
+LACHES:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And are we right in saying so?
+
+LACHES:  Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not
+attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our
+deeds are not in accordance with our words.  Any one would say that we had
+courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking
+about courage just now.
+
+LACHES:  That is most true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And is this condition of ours satisfactory?
+
+LACHES:  Quite the reverse.
+
+SOCRATES:  Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are
+speaking to a certain extent.
+
+LACHES:  To what extent and what principle do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES:  The principle of endurance.  We too must endure and persevere in
+the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in
+searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.
+
+LACHES:  I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to
+investigations of this sort.  But the spirit of controversy has been
+aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus
+unable to express my meaning.  For I fancy that I do know the nature of
+courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot
+get hold of her and tell her nature.
+
+SOCRATES:  But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the
+track, and not be lazy?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly, he should.
+
+SOCRATES:  And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the
+sport than we are.  What do you say?
+
+LACHES:  I should like that.
+
+SOCRATES:  Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who
+are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp:  you see our
+extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will
+tell us what you think about courage.
+
+NICIAS:  I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not
+defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent
+saying which I have heard from your own lips.
+
+SOCRATES:  What is it, Nicias?
+
+NICIAS:  I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in
+which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'
+
+SOCRATES:  That is certainly true, Nicias.
+
+NICIAS:  And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.
+
+SOCRATES:  Do you hear him, Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.
+
+SOCRATES:  I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that
+courage is a sort of wisdom.
+
+LACHES:  What can he possibly mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES:  That is a question which you must ask of himself.
+
+LACHES:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you
+surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?
+
+NICIAS:  Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES:  Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?
+
+NICIAS:  No.
+
+SOCRATES:  But what is this knowledge then, and of what?
+
+LACHES:  I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and
+I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.
+
+NICIAS:  I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which
+inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.
+
+LACHES:  How strangely he is talking, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  Why do you say so, Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.
+
+SOCRATES:  That is just what Nicias denies.
+
+LACHES:  Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?
+
+NICIAS:  Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been
+proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been
+doing the same.
+
+LACHES:  Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall
+endeavour to show.  Let me ask you a question:  Do not physicians know the
+dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians
+the same as the courageous?
+
+NICIAS:  Not at all.
+
+LACHES:  No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or
+than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with
+fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a
+whit the more for that.
+
+SOCRATES:  What is Laches saying, Nicias?  He appears to be saying
+something of importance.
+
+NICIAS:  Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.
+
+SOCRATES:  How so?
+
+NICIAS:  Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only
+extends to the nature of health and disease:  he can tell the sick man no
+more than this.  Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether
+health or disease is the more terrible to a man?  Had not many a man better
+never get up from a sick bed?  I should like to know whether you think that
+life is always better than death.  May not death often be the better of the
+two?
+
+LACHES:  Yes certainly so in my opinion.
+
+NICIAS:  And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who
+had better die, and to those who had better live?
+
+LACHES:  Certainly not.
+
+NICIAS:  And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows
+this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear
+and hope?  And him I call the courageous.
+
+SOCRATES:  Do you understand his meaning, Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are
+courageous.  For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is
+better?  And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a
+soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?
+
+NICIAS:  What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the
+grounds of hope or fear?
+
+LACHES:  Indeed I do:  who but he?
+
+NICIAS:  Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer
+ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass,
+whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in
+war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering
+of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the
+soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.
+
+LACHES:  I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he
+represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor
+in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god.  My
+opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking
+nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the
+difficulty into which he has got himself.  You and I, Socrates, might have
+practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the
+appearance of inconsistency.  And if we had been arguing in a court of law
+there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself
+out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?
+
+SOCRATES:  I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not.  But perhaps
+Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking.  Let us
+ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we
+will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.
+
+LACHES:  Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him:  I think that I have asked
+enough.
+
+SOCRATES:  I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both
+of us.
+
+LACHES:  Very good.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are
+partners in the argument:  Do you mean to affirm that courage is the
+knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?
+
+NICIAS:  I do.
+
+SOCRATES:  And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the
+soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire
+it--that is what you were saying?
+
+NICIAS:  I was.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know,
+as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.
+
+NICIAS:  I think not.
+
+SOCRATES:  Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian
+sow would be called by you courageous.  And this I say not as a joke, but
+because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the
+knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast
+is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a
+boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things
+which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty.  He
+who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a
+bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.
+
+LACHES:  Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good.  And I hope,
+Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to
+be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the
+boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.
+
+NICIAS:  Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have
+no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only
+fearless and senseless.  Do you imagine that I should call little children
+courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none?  There is a
+difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage.  I am
+of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but
+that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are
+very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children,
+many animals.  And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous'
+actions which I call rash;--my courageous actions are wise actions.
+
+LACHES:  Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself
+out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom
+all the world acknowledges to be courageous.
+
+NICIAS:  Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to
+say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are
+courageous and therefore wise.
+
+LACHES:  I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth
+that I am a haughty Aexonian.
+
+SOCRATES:  Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware
+of the source from which his wisdom is derived.  He has got all this from
+my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the
+Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this
+sort.
+
+LACHES:  Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more
+suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city
+chooses to preside over her.
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a
+great intelligence.  And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias'
+definition of courage is worthy of examination.
+
+LACHES:  Then examine for yourself, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  That is what I am going to do, my dear friend.  Do not, however,
+suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to
+apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.
+
+LACHES:  I will if you think that I ought.
+
+SOCRATES:  Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again.  You
+remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.
+
+NICIAS:  Very true.
+
+SOCRATES:  And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many
+other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.
+
+NICIAS:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Do you agree with me about the parts?  For I say that justice,
+temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as
+courage.  Would you not say the same?
+
+NICIAS:  Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES:  Well then, so far we are agreed.  And now let us proceed a step,
+and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: 
+I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another.  Let me then
+tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right:  in my
+opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not
+create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of
+future and expected evil.  Do you not agree to that, Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Yes, Socrates, entirely.
+
+SOCRATES:  That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say,
+are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil
+things which are future.  Do you or do you not agree with me?
+
+NICIAS:  I agree.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the knowledge of these things you call courage?
+
+NICIAS:  Precisely.
+
+SOCRATES:  And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as
+to a third point.
+
+NICIAS:  What is that?
+
+SOCRATES:  I will tell you.  He and I have a notion that there is not one
+knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what
+is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all
+three there is one science only:  for example, there is one science of
+medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all
+times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like
+manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. 
+As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he
+has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the
+master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what
+is happening or is likely to happen in war:  and accordingly the law places
+the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. 
+Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?
+
+LACHES:  Quite correct.
+
+SOCRATES:  And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has
+understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
+
+NICIAS:  Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.
+
+SOCRATES:  And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the
+fearful and of the hopeful?
+
+NICIAS:  Yes.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future
+goods and future evils?
+
+NICIAS:  True.
+
+SOCRATES:  And the same science has to do with the same things in the
+future or at any time?
+
+NICIAS:  That is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
+fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other
+sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of
+the present and past, and of any time?
+
+NICIAS:  That, as I suppose, is true.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
+third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of
+courage:  and according to your view, that is, according to your present
+view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but
+seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. 
+What do you say to that alteration in your statement?
+
+NICIAS:  I agree, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES:  But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and
+how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect,
+and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness?  He
+would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were
+not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and
+he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or
+men.
+
+NICIAS:  I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you
+say.
+
+SOCRATES:  But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of
+yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
+
+NICIAS:  It would seem so.
+
+SOCRATES:  But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
+
+NICIAS:  Yes, that was what we were saying.
+
+SOCRATES:  And that is in contradiction with our present view?
+
+NICIAS:  That appears to be the case.
+
+SOCRATES:  Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.
+
+NICIAS:  We have not.
+
+LACHES:  And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the
+discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to
+Socrates.  I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by
+the wisdom of Damon.
+
+NICIAS:  I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed
+your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I
+have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the
+things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose,
+will be of no consequence.  You certainly appear to me very like the rest
+of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself.  I am of
+opinion that enough has been said on the subject which we have been
+discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be
+hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh down,
+although you have never seen him, and with the help of others.  And when I
+am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I
+think that you are very much in want of knowledge.
+
+LACHES:  You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware:  nevertheless I
+would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers
+about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should
+ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old enough, I would
+have asked him myself.
+
+NICIAS:  To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under
+his charge.  I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of
+Niceratus.  But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he
+recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself.  Perhaps he may be
+more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  He ought, Nicias:  for certainly I would do things for him
+which I would not do for many others.  What do you say, Socrates--will you
+comply?  And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the
+youths?
+
+SOCRATES:  Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in
+the improvement of anybody.  And if I had shown in this conversation that I
+had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you
+would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in
+the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another?  I
+certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me
+offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). 
+I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best
+teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of
+one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything.  But I
+cannot advise that we remain as we are.  And if any one laughs at us for
+going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer,
+who says, that
+
+'Modesty is not good for a needy man.'
+
+Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of
+the youths our own education.
+
+LYSIMACHUS:  I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am
+also the most eager to go to school with the boys.  Let me beg a favour of
+you:  Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these
+matters.  For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.
+
+SOCRATES:  I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God
+willing.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Laches, by Plato
+
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