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diff --git a/1579.txt b/1579.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a99aa47 --- /dev/null +++ b/1579.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1997 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Lysis + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: August 24, 2008 [EBook #1579] +Release Date: December, 1998 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LYSIS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +LYSIS + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?' +any more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?' +There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same +youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike +rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of +the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the +Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys, +Lysis and Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is +described as middle-aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years. + +The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have +no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates +and Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent +and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on +in the absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a +sacrifice. Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love +him very much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him +to do exactly as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more +liberty than he has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not +old enough.' 'No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for +are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not +allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know +the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will +trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in +such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And +no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them +good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he can have as +yet no conceit of knowledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson +to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of +conversation which he should address to his beloved. + +After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks +him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a +friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is +the secret of this great blessing.' + +When one man loves another, which is the friend--he who loves, or he who +is loved? Or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they +are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither +the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with +all of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings +like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert +that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they +are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. +And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care +about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a +cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they +too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their +doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of +bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot +of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; +for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil. + +Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, +nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor +evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that +the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend +(not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,' +but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful? + +But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or +good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be +natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of +getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but +only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would +cease to be indifferent, and would become evil)--in such a case the +indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of +the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or +lover of wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has +ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the +cure of the evil. (Symp.) + +After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh +dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not +friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final +cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? But the good is +desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no +evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to +be devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of +what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then the congenial +cannot be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown, +cannot be the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be the good; for +good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is +unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are +still unable to find out what a friend is. + +Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues +of Plato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaetetus), no +conclusion is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know +nothing;' but the boys have already learned the lesson which he is +unable to teach them, and they are free from the conceit of knowledge. +(Compare Chrm.) The dialogue is what would be called in the language +of Thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the +Phaedrus and Symposium, and treated, with a manifest reference to +the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of +Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the Republic), +there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the +friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ('who +are our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell us half the truth, and +in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the +philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This, +however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear +to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates:--First, the sense +that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the +higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. +That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth +confirmed by experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is +too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away +by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition +of friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument +he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real +contribution to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through +the mist. The manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in +the Charmides and Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge, +so here by the introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The +sense of the inter-dependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the +possibility of the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable. + +The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic +accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, +at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of +celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, +as in the Symposium, that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims +to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are likewise several +contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom +Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty +lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there +is also a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of +Hippothales towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship +of the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended +between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved +and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, +which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in +asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary +to the intention of the question: 'Your father and mother of course +allow you to drive the chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus +returns, the serious dialectic begins. He is described as 'very +pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth +takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has not forgotten dramatic +propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some +older person. + + +SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP. + +The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the +ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love +and marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more +superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has +nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received +examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and +Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the +relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern +times. Many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed +in the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of +similars or dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists +between the good only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there +may not be some peculiar attraction, which draws together 'the neither +good nor evil' for the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4) +whether friendship is always mutual,--may there not be a one-sided and +unrequited friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only +one of a laxer or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised +the minds both of Aristotle and Plato. + +5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge +with Cicero, 'Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae +permanere'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed +by the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight +or upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under +different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression +on our minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these +innocent perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with +the intention of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it +is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion, +locality, occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons +and unite us to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum +non habet. But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better +suited to the condition and nature of man? And in those especially who +have no family ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few, +and embrace all with whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few +passionate and exalted natures, all men everywhere? 7) The ancients +had their three kinds of friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the +useful, and the good:' is the last to be resolved into the two first; or +are the two first to be included in the last? The subject was puzzling +to them: they could not say that friendship was only a quality, or a +relation, or a virtue, or a kind of virtue; and they had not in the age +of Plato reached the point of regarding it, like justice, as a form or +attribute of virtue. They had another perplexity: 8) How could one +of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most +detestable corruptions of it? (Compare Symposium; Laws). + +Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question +in a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual +affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his +friend what he cannot do for himself. He can give him counsel in time of +difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can +stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and +enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can +'double his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will discover ways +of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will +find out his mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among +true friends jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another +for making new friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives; +(in friendship too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one +another, and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either +of them, though it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart +and have little intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as +strong as ever--according to the common saying, they find one +another always the same. The greatest good of friendship is not daily +intercourse, for circumstances rarely admit of this; but on the great +occasions of life, when the advice of a friend is needed, then the word +spoken in season about conduct, about health, about marriage, about +business,--the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person +who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value. When the heart +is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear the voice or grasp +the hand of a friend, in a shipwreck, in a defeat, in some other failure +or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and composure to the +paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble person into a +hero; (compare Symposium). + +It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing: either we +expect too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in +repair;' or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults +too clearly and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for +us. Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The +egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the other. The word of +counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time, +or in the wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until +too late. 'Oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of +many a troubled soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than +spoken, because the very mention of them tends to disturb the equability +of friendship. The alienation of friends, like many other human evils, +is commonly due to a want of tact and insight. There is not enough +of the Scimus et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim. The sweet +draught of sympathy is not inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the +person who too freely partakes of it. Thus we see that there are many +causes which impair the happiness of friends. + +We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers +have sometimes dreamed of: we find what is human. The good of it is +necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords +rather a solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on +pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship. +It is most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and +independent, or when they are engaged together in some common work or +have some public interest in common. It exists among the bad or inferior +sort of men almost as much as among the good; the bad and good, and +'the neither bad nor good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by +personal attachment. The essence of it is loyalty, without which it +would cease to be friendship. + +Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist +between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of +relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; whether, +again, a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his +or her partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather +perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries +(compare Sympos.). While we do not deny that great good may result +from such attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the character +enlarged by them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many +dangers, and that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a +freedom from passion, a self-control, which, in youth especially, are +rarely to be found. The propriety of such friendships must be estimated +a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them; they +must be reconciled with the ordinary duties of life; and they must be +justified by the result. + +Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friendships cannot be always +permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be +dissolved. It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has +ceased to be. That two friends should part company whenever the relation +between them begins to drag may be better for both of them. But then +arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends +of the past regard or be regarded by one another? They are parted, but +there still remain duties mutually owing by them. They will not +admit the world to share in their difference any more than in their +friendship; the memory of an old attachment, like the memory of the +dead, has a kind of sacredness for them on which they will not allow +others to intrude. Neither, if they were ever worthy to bear the name +of friends, will either of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the +other who was once so much to him. Neither will he by 'shadowed hint +reveal' the secrets great or small which an unfortunate mistake has +placed within his reach. He who is of a noble mind will dwell upon his +own faults rather than those of another, and will be ready to take upon +himself the blame of their separation. He will feel pain at the loss of +a friend; and he will remember with gratitude his ancient kindness. +But he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been lightly +broken...These are a few of the Problems of Friendship, some of them +suggested by the Lysis, others by modern life, which he who wishes to +make or keep a friend may profitably study. (Compare Bacon, Essay on +Friendship; Cic. de Amicitia.) + + + + +LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP + + + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: + +Socrates, who is the narrator, Menexenus, Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus. + +SCENE: A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens. + + +I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to +take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the +postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in +with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and +a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing +me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going. + +I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum. + +Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well. + +Who are you, I said; and where am I to come? + +He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. +And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly +company we are. + +And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have +you? + +The building, he replied, is a newly erected Palaestra; and the +entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome. + +Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there? + +Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus. + +Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor. + +Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them? + +Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, +and who is the favourite among you? + +Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said. + +And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothales. + +At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of +Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the +confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are +already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have +given me the power of understanding affections of this kind. + +Whereupon he blushed more and more. + +Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating +to tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very +short time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing +else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our +ears with the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there +is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of +Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in +comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and +other compositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner +of singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling, +and we cannot help hearing him: and now having a question put to him by +you, behold he is blushing. + +Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does +not recall any one to me. + +Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his +patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but, +although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his +face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him. + +But tell me whose son he is, I said. + +He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone. + +Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have +found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you +have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to +judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either +to the youth himself, or to others. + +Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any importance to what +he is saying. + +Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says +that you love? + +No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him. + +He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and +is stark mad. + +O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in +honour of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to +know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of +approaching your fair one. + +Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, the +sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very +accurate knowledge and recollection of them. + +Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous +the tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he +has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might +not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of +Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and +the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their +victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with +four horses and single horses--these are the tales which he composes +and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before +yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of +Heracles, who was a connexion of the family, setting forth how in virtue +of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of +Lysis; this ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the +founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he +sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him. + +When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be +making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won? + +But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates. + +You think not? I said. + +Nay, but what do you think? he replied. + +Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if +you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory +to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour +of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from +you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at +having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise +lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him, because he is +afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any +one praises or magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and +vain-glory. Do you not agree with me? + +Yes, he said. + +And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture +of them? + +I believe you. + +What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made +the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult? + +He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly. + +Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with +words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree. + +Yes. + +And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all +these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will +affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry. + +Assuredly not, he said; such a poet would be a fool. And this is the +reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of +any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what +words or actions I may become endeared to my love? + +That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love +to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you +how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion +of which you are accused. + +There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will +only go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit down and talk, +I believe that he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of +listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the +young men and boys are all together, and there is no separation between +them. He will be sure to come: but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom +he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall +call him. + +That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the +Palaestra, and the rest followed. + +Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this +part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in their white +array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were +in the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the +Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which +they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of +lookers-on; among them was Lysis. He was standing with the other boys +and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not +less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left +them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where, finding +a quiet place, we sat down; and then we began to talk. This attracted +Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us--he was evidently +wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage +to come alone; but first of all, his friend Menexenus, leaving his play, +entered the Palaestra from the court, and when he saw Ctesippus and +myself, was going to take a seat by us; and then Lysis, seeing him, +followed, and sat down by his side; and the other boys joined. I should +observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where +he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger +him; and there he stood and listened. + +I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two +youths is the elder? + +That is a matter of dispute between us, he said. + +And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute? + +Yes, certainly. + +And another disputed point is, which is the fairer? + +The two boys laughed. + +I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are +friends, are you not? + +Certainly, they replied. + +And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no +richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends. + +They assented. I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and +which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called +away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him. +I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked +Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father +and mother love you very much. + +Certainly, he said. + +And they would wish you to be perfectly happy. + +Yes. + +But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a +slave, and who cannot do what he likes? + +I should think not indeed, he said. + +And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should +be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your +happiness. + +Certainly, he replied. + +And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or +hinder you from doing what you desire? + +Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder +me from doing. + +What do you mean? I said. Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder +you from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one +of your father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not +allow you to do so--they will prevent you? + +Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do so. + +Whom then will they allow? + +There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving. + +And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes +with the horses? and do they pay him for this? + +They do. + +But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you +like;--they will permit that? + +Permit me! indeed they will not. + +Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules? + +Yes, he said, the muleteer. + +And is he a slave or a free man? + +A slave, he said. + +And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And +do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him +to do what he likes, when they prohibit you? Answer me now: Are you your +own master, or do they not even allow that? + +Nay, he said; of course they do not allow it. + +Then you have a master? + +Yes, my tutor; there he is. + +And is he a slave? + +To be sure; he is our slave, he replied. + +Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be +governed by a slave. And what does he do with you? + +He takes me to my teachers. + +You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you? + +Of course they do. + +Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and +masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, +she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your +happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are +at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from +touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning +implements. + +Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I +should be beaten if I were to touch one of them. + +Well, I said, this is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your +father or your mother? + +No, indeed, he replied. + +But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being +happy, and doing as you like?--keeping you all day long in subjection +to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you +have no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are +under the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your +own fair person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while +you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing? + +Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age. + +I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine +that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many +things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if +they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first +person in the house who is summoned by them. + +Very true. + +And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which +you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the +fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither +father nor mother would interfere with you. + +That is true, he said. + +Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the +one and not the other? + +I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other. + +Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, +but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that +you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his +possessions to you. + +I think so. + +Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule +hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of +housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs +himself, or will he commit them to you? + +I think that he will commit them to me. + +Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when +they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them? + +Yes. + +And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and he +has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;--suppose that you and I go +to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than +his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and +putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than +to the Prince of Asia, who is his son? + +To us, clearly. + +And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son +will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his +fingers? + +Of course. + +Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will +he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no +knowledge of medicine? + +He will not allow him. + +Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will +allow us to do what we like with him--even to open the eyes wide and +sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best? + +That is true. + +And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his +son he will commit to us? + +That is very true, Socrates, he replied. + +Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which +we know every one will trust us,--Hellenes and barbarians, men and +women,--and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to +interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these +things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in +things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as +seems good to us--they will hinder us as far as they can; and not only +strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who +is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; +and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by +them. Do you agree? + +He assented. + +And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as +far as we are useless to them? + +Certainly not. + +Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody +else, in so far as they are useless to them? + +No. + +And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends +and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, +neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your +friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you +have any conceit of knowledge? + +That is impossible, he replied. + +And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to +wisdom. + +True. + +And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be +conceited. + +Indeed, Socrates, I think not. + +When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly +making a blunder, for I was going to say to him: That is the way, +Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and +lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I +saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said, +and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not +want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained. + +In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis; +and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in +my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear: Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus +what you have been telling me. + +Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that +you were attending. + +Certainly, he replied. + +Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in +repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again +the next time that you see me. + +I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new, +and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay. + +I certainly cannot refuse, I said, since you ask me; but then, as you +know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the +rescue if he attempts to upset me. + +Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why +I want you to argue with him. + +That I may make a fool of myself? + +No, indeed, he said; but I want you to put him down. + +That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow--a pupil +of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him? + +Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him. + +Well, I suppose that I must, I replied. + +Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and +keeping the feast to ourselves. + +I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who +does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask +Menexenus, who, as he thinks, is likely to know. + +And why do you not ask him? he said. + +Very well, I said, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I +must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my +heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire +horses, and others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of +honour. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things; but I have +a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the +best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and say the +best horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a +real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am +such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your +early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of +you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, +although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a +similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is +acquired. But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have +experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the +beloved the friend; or may either be the friend? + +Either may, I should think, be the friend of either. + +Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are +mutual friends? + +Yes, he said; that is my meaning. + +But what if the lover is not loved in return? which is a very possible +case. + +Yes. + +Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is +entertained by lovers respecting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their +love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or +that they are hated. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said, quite true. + +In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved? + +Yes. + +Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the +beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the +friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they +both love one another? + +There would seem to be none at all. + +Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one. We were +saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they +both love, neither is a friend. + +That appears to be true. + +Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover? + +I think not. + +Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in +return; nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic +exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom +loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although +they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings-- + +'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single +hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land'? + +I do not think that he was wrong. + +You think that he is right? + +Yes. + +Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving +or hating, may be dear to the lover of it: for example, very young +children, too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when +they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time +when they are being hated by them. + +I think that what you say is true. + +And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one? + +Yes. + +And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy? + +Clearly. + +Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, +and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends. +Yet how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of +a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy. + +I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say. + +But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is +loved? + +True. + +And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated? + +Certainly. + +Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a +man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his +enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates +him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even +his friend: for example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or +which even loves him. + +That appears to be true. + +But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both +together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one +another? Do any remain? + +Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any. + +But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our +conclusions? + +I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed +as he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, +because his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no +mistaking his attentive look while he was listening. + +I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to +give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that +what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never +have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for +the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into +which we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us +in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends +in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes +them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not +mistaken, in the following words:-- + +'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.' + +I dare say that you have heard those words. + +Yes, he said; I have. + +And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say +that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about +nature and the universe. + +Very true, he replied. + +And are they right in saying this? + +They may be. + +Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their +meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do +with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, +the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer +and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true? + +Yes, he said. + +Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one +another? + +That is true. + +But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are +like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as +is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with +themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which +is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or +harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree? + +Yes, I do. + +Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like +mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the +friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to +any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree? + +He nodded assent. + +Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the +argument declares 'That the good are friends.' + +Yes, he said, that is true. + +Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By +heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, +inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him--or +rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do +any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer +anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if +neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one +another? Can they now? + +They cannot. + +And can he who is not loved be a friend? + +Certainly not. + +But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is +like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is +good? + +True. + +But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be +sufficient for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient +wants nothing--that is implied in the word sufficient. + +Of course not. + +And he who wants nothing will desire nothing? + +He will not. + +Neither can he love that which he does not desire? + +He cannot. + +And he who loves not is not a lover or friend? + +Clearly not. + +What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have +no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for +themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such +persons ever be induced to value one another? + +They cannot. + +And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another? + +Very true. + +But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this--are +we not indeed entirely wrong? + +How so? he replied. + +Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like +is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?--Yes, and he +quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says: + +'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard, Beggar with beggar;' + +and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity +the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, +and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be +the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, +and the sick man of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has +to love and court him who knows.' And indeed he went on to say in +grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between +similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that +the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not +like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the +moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the +void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the +opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from +like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that +he spoke well. What do the rest of you say? + +I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus. + +Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites? + +Exactly. + +Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will +not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly +enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer +shall we make to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth? + +We must. + +They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the +friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy? + +Neither, he replied. + +Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of +the intemperate, or the good of the bad? + +I do not see how that is possible. + +And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must +be friends. + +They must. + +Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends. + +I suppose not. + +And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of +friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil +still in some cases be the friend of the good? + +How do you mean? he said. + +Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head +is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the +conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. +Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a +nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that +the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that? + +Yes. + +This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is +the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I +am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles--the +good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would +agree--would you not? + +I agree. + +And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the +evil, nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the +previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship +or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must +be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor +evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad. + +True. + +But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying. + +True. + +And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which +is neither good nor evil. + +Clearly not. + +Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor +evil. + +That may be assumed to be certain. + +And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the +body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, +but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, +because he is in health. + +He has none. + +But the sick loves him, because he is sick? + +Certainly. + +And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful +thing? + +Yes. + +But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil? + +True. + +And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends +of the art of medicine? + +Yes. + +Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by +reason of the presence of evil? + +So we may infer. + +And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good +nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil--if +itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for, +as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good. + +Impossible. + +Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others +are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: +take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on +another substance. + +Very good. + +In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the +colour or ointment? + +What do you mean? he said. + +This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with +white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be +white? + +They would only appear to be white, he replied. + +And yet whiteness would be present in them? + +True. + +But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the +presence of white in them--they would not be white any more than black? + +No. + +But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become +assimilated, and are white by the presence of white. + +Certainly. + +Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated +by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a +peculiar sort? + +The latter, he said. + +Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, +but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now? + +Yes. + +And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, +the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the +presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and +friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has +now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship +with the evil? + +None. + +And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or +men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom +who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant +person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune +to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of +understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do +not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet +neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the +good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of +unlike, nor like of like. You remember that? + +Yes, they both said. + +And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of +friendship--there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which +by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the +good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere. + +They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and +was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then +a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that +the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and +Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only. + +Why do you say so? said Menexenus. + +I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: +arguments, like men, are often pretenders. + +How do you mean? he asked. + +Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of +some one; is he not? + +Certainly he is. + +And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive +and object? + +He has a motive and object. + +And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear +nor hateful to him? + +I do not quite follow you, he said. + +I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in +another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be +clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend +of the physician--is he not? + +Yes. + +And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the +sake of health? + +Yes. + +And disease is an evil? + +Certainly. + +And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither? + +Good, he replied. + +And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor +evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend +of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this +friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good. + +True. + +And is health a friend, or not a friend? + +A friend. + +And disease is an enemy? + +Yes. + +Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good +because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the +friend? + +Clearly. + +Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of +the enemy? + +That is to be inferred. + +Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard +against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the +friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared +by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may +not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will +proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to +us for the sake of health? + +Yes. + +And health is also dear? + +Certainly. + +And if dear, then dear for the sake of something? + +Yes. + +And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous +admissions? + +Yes. + +And that something dear involves something else dear? + +Yes. + +But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first +principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being +referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other +things are dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop? + +True. + +My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for +the sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that +first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put +the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a +son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures); +would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other +things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew +that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would +save him, he would value the wine? + +He would. + +And also the vessel which contains the wine? + +Certainly. + +But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen +vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather +the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means +which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the +sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold +and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is +a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and +for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by +us. Am I not right? + +Yes, certainly. + +And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to +us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but +the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships +terminate. + +That, he said, appears to be true. + +And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the +sake of any other or further dear. + +True. + +Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further +object. May we then infer that the good is the friend? + +I think so. + +And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in +this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that +which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the +neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or +body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither +good nor evil in themselves;--would the good be of any use, or other +than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, +we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would +be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the +evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there +had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not +this the nature of the good--to be loved by us who are placed between +the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its +own sake. + +I suppose not. + +Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships +terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of +something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they +are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true +friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to +be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no +longer dear. + +Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good. + +But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we +should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? +Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, +but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other +desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has +perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or +will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our +present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not +that true? + +Yes. + +And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good +and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other? + +To be sure. + +But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not +evil should perish with it? + +None. + +Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil +will remain? + +Clearly they will. + +And must not a man love that which he desires and affects? + +He must. + +Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of +love or friendship? + +Yes. + +But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing +will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for +the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed. + +True. + +And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a +reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that +the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil? + +Very true. + +But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some +other cause of friendship? + +I suppose so. + +May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is +the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which +is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have +been only a long story about nothing? + +Likely enough. + +But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want? + +Yes. + +And that of which he is in want is dear to him? + +True. + +And he is in want of that of which he is deprived? + +Certainly. + +Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural +or congenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference. + +They assented. + +Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to +one another? + +Certainly, they both said. + +And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever +have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way +congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his +manners, or in his form. + +Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent. + +Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must +be loved. + +It follows, he said. + +Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be +loved by his love. + +Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed +into all manner of colours with delight. + +Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any +difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible, +then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our +argument about friendship. But if the congenial is only the like, how +will you get rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to +like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is useless is +dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish +between the congenial and the like--in the intoxication of argument, +that may perhaps be allowed. + +Very true. + +And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil +uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the +evil, and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil +to that which is neither good nor evil? + +They agreed to the latter alternative. + +Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for +the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as +well as the good of the good. + +That appears to be the result. + +But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that +case the good and he only will be the friend of the good. + +True. + +But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has +been already refuted by ourselves. + +We remember. + +Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can +only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:--If +neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor +the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke--for there +were such a number of them that I cannot remember all--if none of these +are friends, I know not what remains to be said. + +Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when +suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who +came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them +go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove +them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on +shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the +boys--they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the +Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage--we fairly gave way and +broke up the company. + +I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and +Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would +fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends--this is what +the by-standers will go away and say--and as yet we have not been able +to discover what is a friend! + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LYSIS *** + +***** This file should be named 1579.txt or 1579.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/7/1579/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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