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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lysis, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Lysis
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Posting Date: August 24, 2008 [EBook #1579]
+Release Date: December, 1998
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LYSIS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+LYSIS
+
+By Plato
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+No answer is given in the Lysis to the question, 'What is Friendship?'
+any more than in the Charmides to the question, 'What is Temperance?'
+There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same
+youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike
+rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of
+the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the
+Laches; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys,
+Lysis and Menexenus. In the Charmides, as also in the Laches, he is
+described as middle-aged; in the Lysis he is advanced in years.
+
+The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have
+no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates
+and Lysis, who, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth of noble descent
+and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on
+in the absence of Menexenus, who is called away to take part in a
+sacrifice. Socrates asks Lysis whether his father and mother do not love
+him very much? 'To be sure they do.' 'Then of course they allow him
+to do exactly as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more
+liberty than he has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not
+old enough.' 'No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for
+are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not
+allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know
+the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will
+trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in
+such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And
+no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them
+good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he can have as
+yet no conceit of knowledge. In this manner Socrates reads a lesson
+to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of
+conversation which he should address to his beloved.
+
+After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks
+him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a
+friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is
+the secret of this great blessing.'
+
+When one man loves another, which is the friend--he who loves, or he who
+is loved? Or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they
+are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither
+the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with
+all of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings
+like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert
+that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they
+are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another.
+And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care
+about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a
+cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they
+too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their
+doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of
+bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot
+of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained;
+for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.
+
+Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like,
+nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor
+evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that
+the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend
+(not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,'
+but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?
+
+But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or
+good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be
+natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of
+getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but
+only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would
+cease to be indifferent, and would become evil)--in such a case the
+indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of
+the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or
+lover of wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he has
+ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the
+cure of the evil. (Symp.)
+
+After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh
+dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not
+friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final
+cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? But the good is
+desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no
+evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to
+be devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of
+what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then the congenial
+cannot be the same as the like; for like, as has been already shown,
+cannot be the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be the good; for
+good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is
+unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are
+still unable to find out what a friend is.
+
+Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues
+of Plato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaetetus), no
+conclusion is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know
+nothing;' but the boys have already learned the lesson which he is
+unable to teach them, and they are free from the conceit of knowledge.
+(Compare Chrm.) The dialogue is what would be called in the language
+of Thrasyllus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the
+Phaedrus and Symposium, and treated, with a manifest reference to
+the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of
+Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the Republic),
+there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the
+friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ('who
+are our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell us half the truth, and
+in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the
+philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This,
+however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear
+to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates:--First, the sense
+that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the
+higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good.
+That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth
+confirmed by experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is
+too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away
+by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against which no definition
+of friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument
+he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real
+contribution to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through
+the mist. The manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in
+the Charmides and Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge,
+so here by the introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The
+sense of the inter-dependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the
+possibility of the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable.
+
+The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic
+accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra,
+at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of
+celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares,
+as in the Symposium, that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims
+to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are likewise several
+contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom
+Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty
+lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; there
+is also a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of
+Hippothales towards Lysis, and the childlike and innocent friendship
+of the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended
+between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved
+and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony,
+which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in
+asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary
+to the intention of the question: 'Your father and mother of course
+allow you to drive the chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus
+returns, the serious dialectic begins. He is described as 'very
+pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth
+takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has not forgotten dramatic
+propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some
+older person.
+
+
+SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP.
+
+The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the
+ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love
+and marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more
+superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has
+nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received
+examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and
+Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the
+relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern
+times. Many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed
+in the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of
+similars or dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists
+between the good only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there
+may not be some peculiar attraction, which draws together 'the neither
+good nor evil' for the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4)
+whether friendship is always mutual,--may there not be a one-sided and
+unrequited friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only
+one of a laxer or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised
+the minds both of Aristotle and Plato.
+
+5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge
+with Cicero, 'Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae
+permanere'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed
+by the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight
+or upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under
+different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression
+on our minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these
+innocent perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with
+the intention of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it
+is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion,
+locality, occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons
+and unite us to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum
+non habet. But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better
+suited to the condition and nature of man? And in those especially who
+have no family ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few,
+and embrace all with whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few
+passionate and exalted natures, all men everywhere? 7) The ancients
+had their three kinds of friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the
+useful, and the good:' is the last to be resolved into the two first; or
+are the two first to be included in the last? The subject was puzzling
+to them: they could not say that friendship was only a quality, or a
+relation, or a virtue, or a kind of virtue; and they had not in the age
+of Plato reached the point of regarding it, like justice, as a form or
+attribute of virtue. They had another perplexity: 8) How could one
+of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most
+detestable corruptions of it? (Compare Symposium; Laws).
+
+Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question
+in a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual
+affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his
+friend what he cannot do for himself. He can give him counsel in time of
+difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can
+stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and
+enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can
+'double his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will discover ways
+of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will
+find out his mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among
+true friends jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another
+for making new friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives;
+(in friendship too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one
+another, and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either
+of them, though it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart
+and have little intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as
+strong as ever--according to the common saying, they find one
+another always the same. The greatest good of friendship is not daily
+intercourse, for circumstances rarely admit of this; but on the great
+occasions of life, when the advice of a friend is needed, then the word
+spoken in season about conduct, about health, about marriage, about
+business,--the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person
+who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value. When the heart
+is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear the voice or grasp
+the hand of a friend, in a shipwreck, in a defeat, in some other failure
+or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and composure to the
+paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble person into a
+hero; (compare Symposium).
+
+It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing: either we
+expect too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in
+repair;' or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults
+too clearly and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for
+us. Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The
+egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the other. The word of
+counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time,
+or in the wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until
+too late. 'Oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of
+many a troubled soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than
+spoken, because the very mention of them tends to disturb the equability
+of friendship. The alienation of friends, like many other human evils,
+is commonly due to a want of tact and insight. There is not enough
+of the Scimus et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim. The sweet
+draught of sympathy is not inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the
+person who too freely partakes of it. Thus we see that there are many
+causes which impair the happiness of friends.
+
+We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers
+have sometimes dreamed of: we find what is human. The good of it is
+necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords
+rather a solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on
+pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship.
+It is most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and
+independent, or when they are engaged together in some common work or
+have some public interest in common. It exists among the bad or inferior
+sort of men almost as much as among the good; the bad and good, and
+'the neither bad nor good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by
+personal attachment. The essence of it is loyalty, without which it
+would cease to be friendship.
+
+Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist
+between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of
+relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; whether,
+again, a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his
+or her partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather
+perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries
+(compare Sympos.). While we do not deny that great good may result
+from such attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the character
+enlarged by them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many
+dangers, and that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a
+freedom from passion, a self-control, which, in youth especially, are
+rarely to be found. The propriety of such friendships must be estimated
+a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them; they
+must be reconciled with the ordinary duties of life; and they must be
+justified by the result.
+
+Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friendships cannot be always
+permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be
+dissolved. It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has
+ceased to be. That two friends should part company whenever the relation
+between them begins to drag may be better for both of them. But then
+arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends
+of the past regard or be regarded by one another? They are parted, but
+there still remain duties mutually owing by them. They will not
+admit the world to share in their difference any more than in their
+friendship; the memory of an old attachment, like the memory of the
+dead, has a kind of sacredness for them on which they will not allow
+others to intrude. Neither, if they were ever worthy to bear the name
+of friends, will either of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the
+other who was once so much to him. Neither will he by 'shadowed hint
+reveal' the secrets great or small which an unfortunate mistake has
+placed within his reach. He who is of a noble mind will dwell upon his
+own faults rather than those of another, and will be ready to take upon
+himself the blame of their separation. He will feel pain at the loss of
+a friend; and he will remember with gratitude his ancient kindness.
+But he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been lightly
+broken...These are a few of the Problems of Friendship, some of them
+suggested by the Lysis, others by modern life, which he who wishes to
+make or keep a friend may profitably study. (Compare Bacon, Essay on
+Friendship; Cic. de Amicitia.)
+
+
+
+
+LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP
+
+
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
+
+Socrates, who is the narrator, Menexenus, Hippothales, Lysis, Ctesippus.
+
+SCENE: A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.
+
+
+I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, intending to
+take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the
+postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in
+with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and
+a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing
+me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.
+
+I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.
+
+Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.
+
+Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?
+
+He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall.
+And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly
+company we are.
+
+And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have
+you?
+
+The building, he replied, is a newly erected Palaestra; and the
+entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.
+
+Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?
+
+Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus.
+
+Indeed, I replied; he is a very eminent professor.
+
+Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them?
+
+Yes, I said; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me,
+and who is the favourite among you?
+
+Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said.
+
+And who is yours? I asked: tell me that, Hippothales.
+
+At this he blushed; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of
+Hieronymus! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love; the
+confession is too late; for I see that you are not only in love, but are
+already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have
+given me the power of understanding affections of this kind.
+
+Whereupon he blushed more and more.
+
+Ctesippus said: I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating
+to tell Socrates the name; when, if he were with you but for a very
+short time, you would have plagued him to death by talking about nothing
+else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our
+ears with the praises of Lysis; and if he is a little intoxicated, there
+is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of
+Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in
+comparison with his verse; and when he drenches us with his poems and
+other compositions, it is really too bad; and worse still is his manner
+of singing them to his love; he has a voice which is truly appalling,
+and we cannot help hearing him: and now having a question put to him by
+you, behold he is blushing.
+
+Who is Lysis? I said: I suppose that he must be young; for the name does
+not recall any one to me.
+
+Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his
+patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name; but,
+although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his
+face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.
+
+But tell me whose son he is, I said.
+
+He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexone.
+
+Ah, Hippothales, I said; what a noble and really perfect love you have
+found! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you
+have been making to the rest of the company, and then I shall be able to
+judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either
+to the youth himself, or to others.
+
+Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any importance to what
+he is saying.
+
+Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says
+that you love?
+
+No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.
+
+He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and
+is stark mad.
+
+O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in
+honour of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to
+know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of
+approaching your fair one.
+
+Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, the
+sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very
+accurate knowledge and recollection of them.
+
+Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous
+the tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he
+has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might
+not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of
+Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and
+the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their
+victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with
+four horses and single horses--these are the tales which he composes
+and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before
+yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of
+Heracles, who was a connexion of the family, setting forth how in virtue
+of this relationship he was hospitably received by an ancestor of
+Lysis; this ancestor was himself begotten of Zeus by the daughter of the
+founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he
+sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.
+
+When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be
+making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?
+
+But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates.
+
+You think not? I said.
+
+Nay, but what do you think? he replied.
+
+Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if
+you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory
+to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour
+of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from
+you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at
+having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise
+lover does not praise his beloved until he has won him, because he is
+afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any
+one praises or magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and
+vain-glory. Do you not agree with me?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture
+of them?
+
+I believe you.
+
+What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made
+the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?
+
+He would be a bad hunter, undoubtedly.
+
+Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with
+words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree.
+
+Yes.
+
+And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all
+these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will
+affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.
+
+Assuredly not, he said; such a poet would be a fool. And this is the
+reason why I take you into my counsels, Socrates, and I shall be glad of
+any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what
+words or actions I may become endeared to my love?
+
+That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love
+to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you
+how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion
+of which you are accused.
+
+There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied; if you will
+only go with Ctesippus into the Palaestra, and sit down and talk,
+I believe that he will come of his own accord; for he is fond of
+listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the
+young men and boys are all together, and there is no separation between
+them. He will be sure to come: but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom
+he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall
+call him.
+
+That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I led Ctesippus into the
+Palaestra, and the rest followed.
+
+Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing; and this
+part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in their white
+array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were
+in the outer court amusing themselves; but some were in a corner of the
+Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which
+they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of
+lookers-on; among them was Lysis. He was standing with the other boys
+and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not
+less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left
+them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where, finding
+a quiet place, we sat down; and then we began to talk. This attracted
+Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us--he was evidently
+wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage
+to come alone; but first of all, his friend Menexenus, leaving his play,
+entered the Palaestra from the court, and when he saw Ctesippus and
+myself, was going to take a seat by us; and then Lysis, seeing him,
+followed, and sat down by his side; and the other boys joined. I should
+observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where
+he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger
+him; and there he stood and listened.
+
+I turned to Menexenus, and said: Son of Demophon, which of you two
+youths is the elder?
+
+That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.
+
+And which is the nobler? Is that also a matter of dispute?
+
+Yes, certainly.
+
+And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
+
+The two boys laughed.
+
+I shall not ask which is the richer of the two, I said; for you are
+friends, are you not?
+
+Certainly, they replied.
+
+And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no
+richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends.
+
+They assented. I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and
+which was the wiser of the two; but at this moment Menexenus was called
+away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him.
+I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked
+Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father
+and mother love you very much.
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.
+
+Yes.
+
+But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a
+slave, and who cannot do what he likes?
+
+I should think not indeed, he said.
+
+And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should
+be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your
+happiness.
+
+Certainly, he replied.
+
+And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or
+hinder you from doing what you desire?
+
+Yes, indeed, Socrates; there are a great many things which they hinder
+me from doing.
+
+What do you mean? I said. Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder
+you from doing what you like? for example, if you want to mount one
+of your father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not
+allow you to do so--they will prevent you?
+
+Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do so.
+
+Whom then will they allow?
+
+There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.
+
+And do they trust a hireling more than you? and may he do what he likes
+with the horses? and do they pay him for this?
+
+They do.
+
+But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you
+like;--they will permit that?
+
+Permit me! indeed they will not.
+
+Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?
+
+Yes, he said, the muleteer.
+
+And is he a slave or a free man?
+
+A slave, he said.
+
+And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And
+do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him
+to do what he likes, when they prohibit you? Answer me now: Are you your
+own master, or do they not even allow that?
+
+Nay, he said; of course they do not allow it.
+
+Then you have a master?
+
+Yes, my tutor; there he is.
+
+And is he a slave?
+
+To be sure; he is our slave, he replied.
+
+Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be
+governed by a slave. And what does he do with you?
+
+He takes me to my teachers.
+
+You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?
+
+Of course they do.
+
+Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and
+masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother,
+she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your
+happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are
+at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from
+touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning
+implements.
+
+Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I
+should be beaten if I were to touch one of them.
+
+Well, I said, this is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your
+father or your mother?
+
+No, indeed, he replied.
+
+But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being
+happy, and doing as you like?--keeping you all day long in subjection
+to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you
+have no good, as would appear, out of their great possessions, which are
+under the control of anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your
+own fair person, which is tended and taken care of by another; while
+you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing?
+
+Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.
+
+I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine
+that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many
+things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if
+they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first
+person in the house who is summoned by them.
+
+Very true.
+
+And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which
+you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the
+fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither
+father nor mother would interfere with you.
+
+That is true, he said.
+
+Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the
+one and not the other?
+
+I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other.
+
+Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years,
+but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that
+you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his
+possessions to you.
+
+I think so.
+
+Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule
+hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of
+housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs
+himself, or will he commit them to you?
+
+I think that he will commit them to me.
+
+Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when
+they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?
+
+Yes.
+
+And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and he
+has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;--suppose that you and I go
+to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than
+his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and
+putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than
+to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?
+
+To us, clearly.
+
+And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son
+will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his
+fingers?
+
+Of course.
+
+Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will
+he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no
+knowledge of medicine?
+
+He will not allow him.
+
+Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will
+allow us to do what we like with him--even to open the eyes wide and
+sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?
+
+That is true.
+
+And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his
+son he will commit to us?
+
+That is very true, Socrates, he replied.
+
+Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which
+we know every one will trust us,--Hellenes and barbarians, men and
+women,--and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to
+interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these
+things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in
+things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as
+seems good to us--they will hinder us as far as they can; and not only
+strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who
+is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others;
+and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by
+them. Do you agree?
+
+He assented.
+
+And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as
+far as we are useless to them?
+
+Certainly not.
+
+Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody
+else, in so far as they are useless to them?
+
+No.
+
+And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends
+and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise,
+neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your
+friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you
+have any conceit of knowledge?
+
+That is impossible, he replied.
+
+And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to
+wisdom.
+
+True.
+
+And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be
+conceited.
+
+Indeed, Socrates, I think not.
+
+When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly
+making a blunder, for I was going to say to him: That is the way,
+Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and
+lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I
+saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said,
+and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not
+want to be seen by Lysis; so upon second thoughts I refrained.
+
+In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis;
+and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in
+my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear: Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus
+what you have been telling me.
+
+Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied; for I am sure that
+you were attending.
+
+Certainly, he replied.
+
+Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in
+repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again
+the next time that you see me.
+
+I will be sure to do so, Socrates; but go on telling him something new,
+and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.
+
+I certainly cannot refuse, I said, since you ask me; but then, as you
+know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the
+rescue if he attempts to upset me.
+
+Yes, indeed, he said; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why
+I want you to argue with him.
+
+That I may make a fool of myself?
+
+No, indeed, he said; but I want you to put him down.
+
+That is no easy matter, I replied; for he is a terrible fellow--a pupil
+of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus himself: do you see him?
+
+Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him.
+
+Well, I suppose that I must, I replied.
+
+Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and
+keeping the feast to ourselves.
+
+I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who
+does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask
+Menexenus, who, as he thinks, is likely to know.
+
+And why do you not ask him? he said.
+
+Very well, I said, I will; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I
+must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my
+heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies; some desire
+horses, and others dogs; and some are fond of gold, and others of
+honour. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things; but I have
+a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the
+best cock or quail in the world: I would even go further, and say the
+best horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a
+real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am
+such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your
+early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of
+you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself,
+although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a
+similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is
+acquired. But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have
+experience: tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the
+beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?
+
+Either may, I should think, be the friend of either.
+
+Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are
+mutual friends?
+
+Yes, he said; that is my meaning.
+
+But what if the lover is not loved in return? which is a very possible
+case.
+
+Yes.
+
+Or is, perhaps, even hated? which is a fancy which sometimes is
+entertained by lovers respecting their beloved. Nothing can exceed their
+love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or
+that they are hated. Is not that true?
+
+Yes, he said, quite true.
+
+In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the
+beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the
+friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they
+both love one another?
+
+There would seem to be none at all.
+
+Then this notion is not in accordance with our previous one. We were
+saying that both were friends, if one only loved; but now, unless they
+both love, neither is a friend.
+
+That appears to be true.
+
+Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?
+
+I think not.
+
+Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in
+return; nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic
+exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom
+loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although
+they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings--
+
+'Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single
+hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land'?
+
+I do not think that he was wrong.
+
+You think that he is right?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved, whether loving
+or hating, may be dear to the lover of it: for example, very young
+children, too young to love, or even hating their father or mother when
+they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time
+when they are being hated by them.
+
+I think that what you say is true.
+
+And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?
+
+Yes.
+
+And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?
+
+Clearly.
+
+Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends,
+and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends.
+Yet how absurd, my dear friend, or indeed impossible is this paradox of
+a man being an enemy to his friend or a friend to his enemy.
+
+I quite agree, Socrates, in what you say.
+
+But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is
+loved?
+
+True.
+
+And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?
+
+Certainly.
+
+Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a
+man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his
+enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates
+him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even
+his friend: for example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or
+which even loves him.
+
+That appears to be true.
+
+But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both
+together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one
+another? Do any remain?
+
+Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.
+
+But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our
+conclusions?
+
+I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed
+as he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily,
+because his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no
+mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.
+
+I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to
+give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that
+what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never
+have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for
+the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into
+which we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us
+in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends
+in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes
+them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not
+mistaken, in the following words:--
+
+'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'
+
+I dare say that you have heard those words.
+
+Yes, he said; I have.
+
+And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say
+that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write about
+nature and the universe.
+
+Very true, he replied.
+
+And are they right in saying this?
+
+They may be.
+
+Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their
+meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do
+with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him,
+the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer
+and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one
+another?
+
+That is true.
+
+But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are
+like one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as
+is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with
+themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which
+is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or
+harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree?
+
+Yes, I do.
+
+Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like
+mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the
+friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to
+any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?
+
+He nodded assent.
+
+Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the
+argument declares 'That the good are friends.'
+
+Yes, he said, that is true.
+
+Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By
+heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like,
+inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him--or
+rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do
+any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer
+anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if
+neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved by one
+another? Can they now?
+
+They cannot.
+
+And can he who is not loved be a friend?
+
+Certainly not.
+
+But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is
+like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is
+good?
+
+True.
+
+But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be
+sufficient for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient
+wants nothing--that is implied in the word sufficient.
+
+Of course not.
+
+And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
+
+He will not.
+
+Neither can he love that which he does not desire?
+
+He cannot.
+
+And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
+
+Clearly not.
+
+What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have
+no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for
+themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such
+persons ever be induced to value one another?
+
+They cannot.
+
+And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?
+
+Very true.
+
+But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this--are
+we not indeed entirely wrong?
+
+How so? he replied.
+
+Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like
+is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?--Yes, and he
+quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:
+
+'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard, Beggar with beggar;'
+
+and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity
+the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another,
+and the most unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be
+the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong,
+and the sick man of the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has
+to love and court him who knows.' And indeed he went on to say in
+grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between
+similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that
+the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not
+like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the
+moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the
+void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the
+opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from
+like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that
+he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?
+
+I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.
+
+Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?
+
+Exactly.
+
+Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will
+not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly
+enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer
+shall we make to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth?
+
+We must.
+
+They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the
+friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?
+
+Neither, he replied.
+
+Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of
+the intemperate, or the good of the bad?
+
+I do not see how that is possible.
+
+And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must
+be friends.
+
+They must.
+
+Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.
+
+I suppose not.
+
+And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of
+friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil
+still in some cases be the friend of the good?
+
+How do you mean? he said.
+
+Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head
+is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the
+conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says.
+Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a
+nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that
+the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?
+
+Yes.
+
+This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is
+the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I
+am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles--the
+good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would
+agree--would you not?
+
+I agree.
+
+And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the
+evil, nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the
+previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship
+or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must
+be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor
+evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.
+
+True.
+
+But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.
+
+True.
+
+And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which
+is neither good nor evil.
+
+Clearly not.
+
+Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor
+evil.
+
+That may be assumed to be certain.
+
+And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the
+body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid,
+but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician,
+because he is in health.
+
+He has none.
+
+But the sick loves him, because he is sick?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful
+thing?
+
+Yes.
+
+But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?
+
+True.
+
+And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends
+of the art of medicine?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by
+reason of the presence of evil?
+
+So we may infer.
+
+And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good
+nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil--if
+itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for,
+as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.
+
+Impossible.
+
+Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others
+are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated:
+take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on
+another substance.
+
+Very good.
+
+In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the
+colour or ointment?
+
+What do you mean? he said.
+
+This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with
+white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be
+white?
+
+They would only appear to be white, he replied.
+
+And yet whiteness would be present in them?
+
+True.
+
+But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the
+presence of white in them--they would not be white any more than black?
+
+No.
+
+But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become
+assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.
+
+Certainly.
+
+Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated
+by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a
+peculiar sort?
+
+The latter, he said.
+
+Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil,
+but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?
+
+Yes.
+
+And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil,
+the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the
+presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and
+friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has
+now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship
+with the evil?
+
+None.
+
+And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or
+men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom
+who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant
+person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune
+to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of
+understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do
+not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet
+neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the
+good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of
+unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?
+
+Yes, they both said.
+
+And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of
+friendship--there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which
+by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the
+good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.
+
+They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and
+was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then
+a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that
+the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and
+Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.
+
+Why do you say so? said Menexenus.
+
+I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false:
+arguments, like men, are often pretenders.
+
+How do you mean? he asked.
+
+Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of
+some one; is he not?
+
+Certainly he is.
+
+And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive
+and object?
+
+He has a motive and object.
+
+And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear
+nor hateful to him?
+
+I do not quite follow you, he said.
+
+I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in
+another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be
+clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend
+of the physician--is he not?
+
+Yes.
+
+And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the
+sake of health?
+
+Yes.
+
+And disease is an evil?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?
+
+Good, he replied.
+
+And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor
+evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend
+of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this
+friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.
+
+True.
+
+And is health a friend, or not a friend?
+
+A friend.
+
+And disease is an enemy?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good
+because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the
+friend?
+
+Clearly.
+
+Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of
+the enemy?
+
+That is to be inferred.
+
+Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard
+against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the
+friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared
+by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may
+not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will
+proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to
+us for the sake of health?
+
+Yes.
+
+And health is also dear?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
+
+Yes.
+
+And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous
+admissions?
+
+Yes.
+
+And that something dear involves something else dear?
+
+Yes.
+
+But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first
+principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being
+referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other
+things are dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?
+
+True.
+
+My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for
+the sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that
+first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put
+the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a
+son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures);
+would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other
+things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew
+that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would
+save him, he would value the wine?
+
+He would.
+
+And also the vessel which contains the wine?
+
+Certainly.
+
+But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen
+vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather
+the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means
+which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the
+sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold
+and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is
+a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and
+for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by
+us. Am I not right?
+
+Yes, certainly.
+
+And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to
+us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but
+the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships
+terminate.
+
+That, he said, appears to be true.
+
+And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the
+sake of any other or further dear.
+
+True.
+
+Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further
+object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?
+
+I think so.
+
+And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in
+this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that
+which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the
+neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or
+body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither
+good nor evil in themselves;--would the good be of any use, or other
+than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer,
+we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would
+be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the
+evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there
+had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not
+this the nature of the good--to be loved by us who are placed between
+the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in the good for its
+own sake.
+
+I suppose not.
+
+Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships
+terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake of
+something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For they
+are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true
+friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to
+be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no
+longer dear.
+
+Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good.
+
+But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we
+should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire?
+Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain,
+but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other
+desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has
+perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or
+will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our
+present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not
+that true?
+
+Yes.
+
+And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good
+and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?
+
+To be sure.
+
+But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not
+evil should perish with it?
+
+None.
+
+Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil
+will remain?
+
+Clearly they will.
+
+And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
+
+He must.
+
+Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of
+love or friendship?
+
+Yes.
+
+But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing
+will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for
+the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.
+
+True.
+
+And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a
+reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that
+the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?
+
+Very true.
+
+But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some
+other cause of friendship?
+
+I suppose so.
+
+May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is
+the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which
+is desired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have
+been only a long story about nothing?
+
+Likely enough.
+
+But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?
+
+Yes.
+
+And that of which he is in want is dear to him?
+
+True.
+
+And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?
+
+Certainly.
+
+Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural
+or congenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.
+
+They assented.
+
+Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to
+one another?
+
+Certainly, they both said.
+
+And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires another would ever
+have loved or desired or affected him, if he had not been in some way
+congenial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, or in his
+manners, or in his form.
+
+Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent.
+
+Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial nature must
+be loved.
+
+It follows, he said.
+
+Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of necessity be
+loved by his love.
+
+Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hippothales changed
+into all manner of colours with delight.
+
+Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we point out any
+difference between the congenial and the like? For if that is possible,
+then I think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some sense in our
+argument about friendship. But if the congenial is only the like, how
+will you get rid of the other argument, of the uselessness of like to
+like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is useless is
+dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish
+between the congenial and the like--in the intoxication of argument,
+that may perhaps be allowed.
+
+Very true.
+
+And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the evil
+uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is congenial to the
+evil, and the good to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil
+to that which is neither good nor evil?
+
+They agreed to the latter alternative.
+
+Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded error; for
+the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as
+well as the good of the good.
+
+That appears to be the result.
+
+But again, if we say that the congenial is the same as the good, in that
+case the good and he only will be the friend of the good.
+
+True.
+
+But that too was a position of ours which, as you will remember, has
+been already refuted by ourselves.
+
+We remember.
+
+Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to be done? I can
+only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:--If
+neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor
+the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke--for there
+were such a number of them that I cannot remember all--if none of these
+are friends, I know not what remains to be said.
+
+Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when
+suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who
+came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them
+go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove
+them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on
+shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the
+boys--they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the
+Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage--we fairly gave way and
+broke up the company.
+
+I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and
+Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would
+fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends--this is what
+the by-standers will go away and say--and as yet we have not been able
+to discover what is a friend!
+
+
+
+
+
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