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diff --git a/old/13789.txt b/old/13789.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de193d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/13789.txt @@ -0,0 +1,26378 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil War +by Ephraim Douglass Adams + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Great Britain and the American Civil War + +Author: Ephraim Douglass Adams + +Release Date: October 18, 2004 [EBook #13789] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN CIVIL WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Charlie Kirschner and the PG Online +Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + + + +[Illustration: LORD JOHN RUSSELL +(_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy_")] + +_EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS_ + +GREAT BRITAIN +AND +THE AMERICAN +CIVIL WAR + +TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE + + + + +PREFACE + +This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the British Museum +many newspapers and journals for the years 1860-1865, and then planned a +survey of English public opinion on the American Civil War. In the +succeeding years as a teacher at Stanford University, California, the +published diplomatic correspondence of Great Britain and of the United +States were studied in connection with instruction given in the field of +British-American relations. Several of my students prepared excellent +theses on special topics and these have been acknowledged where used in +this work. Many distractions and other writing prevented the completion +of my original plan; and fortunately, for when in 1913 I had at last +begun this work and had prepared three chapters, a letter was received +from the late Charles Francis Adams inviting me to collaborate with him +in preparing a "Life" of his father, the Charles Francis Adams who was +American Minister to Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams had +recently returned from England where he had given at Oxford University a +series of lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as to +obtain copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. Worthington +C. Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office files +in the Public Record Office and from the private papers in the +possession of various families. + +The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at Washington +and at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life." Two volumes were +completed, the first by Mr. Adams carrying the story to 1848, the +second by myself for the period 1848 to 1860. For the third volume I +analysed and organized the new materials obtained in England and we were +about to begin actual collaboration on the most vital period of the +"Life" when Mr. Adams died, and the work was indefinitely suspended, +probably wisely, since any completion of the "Life" by me would have +lacked that individual charm in historical writing so markedly +characteristic of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr. +Adams was an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory. + +The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I returned +to the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the American Civil +War" in the hope that the English materials obtained by Mr. Adams might +be made available to me. When copies were secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 a +restriction had been imposed by the Foreign Office to the effect that +while studied for information, citations and quotations were not +permissible since the general diplomatic archives were not yet open to +students beyond the year 1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, the +whole matter was again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exact +statement that the new request was in no way related to the proposed +"Life" of Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of the +materials. Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved the +request but with the usual condition that my manuscript be submitted +before publication to the Foreign Office. This has now been done, and no +single citation censored. Before this work will have appeared the +limitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic correspondence will have been +removed, and the date for open research have been advanced beyond 1865, +the end of the Civil War. + +Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made through +my friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the owners of various private papers, +and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came to England for further study +of some of these private papers. The Russell Papers, transmitted to the +Public Record Office in 1914 and there preserved, were used through the +courtesy of the Executors of the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with the +hearty goodwill of Lady Agatha Russell, daughter of the late Earl +Russell, the only living representative of her father, Mr. Rollo +Russell, his son, having died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved in +the Muniment Room at Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesy +of the Duchess of Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor. +The Gladstone Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used through +the courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from the +Palmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved by +Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M.P. + +The opportunity to study these private papers has been invaluable for my +work. Shortly after returning from England in 1913 Mr. Worthington Ford +well said: "The inside history of diplomatic relations between the +United States and Great Britain may be surmised from the official +archives; the tinting and shading needed to complete the picture must be +sought elsewhere." (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 478.) Mr. +C.F. Adams declared (_ibid._, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers +"... the character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865) cannot +be understood.... It would appear that the commonly entertained +impressions as to certain phases of international relations, and the +proceedings and utterances of English public men during the progress of +the War of Secession, must be to some extent revised." + +In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate in the +generosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor Frank A. +Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St. Petersburg in +1914, of all Russian diplomatic correspondence on the Civil War. Many +friends have aided, by suggestion or by permitting the use of notes and +manuscripts, in the preparation of this work. I have sought to make due +acknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to those +already named, I should here particularly note the courtesy of the late +Mr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State Department at +Washington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, for the +transcript of the Correspondence of Mason and Slidell, Confederate +Commissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles Moore, Chief of Manuscripts +Division, Library of Congress, for the use of the Schurz Papers +containing copies of the despatches of Schleiden, Minister of the +Republic of Bremen at Washington during the Civil War. Especially thanks +are due to my friend, Mr. Herbert Hoover, for his early interest in this +work and for his generous aid in the making of transcripts which would +otherwise have been beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to the +skill and care of my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press, +and whose criticisms were invaluable. + +It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my hope +that with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence," now for the +first time available to the historian, a fairly true estimate may be +made of what the American Civil War meant to Great Britain; how she +regarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief, my work is primarily a +study in British history in the belief that the American drama had a +world significance, and peculiarly a British one. + +EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS. + +_November 25, 1924_ + + + +CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE + +CHAPTER PAGE + + I. BACKGROUNDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + II. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61 . . . 35 + III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861 . . . . . . 76 + IV. BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD . . . . . . . . . . 113 + V. THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION . . . . . . . 137 + VI. BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND MERCIER . . . . 172 + VII. THE "TRENT" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 +VIII. THE BLOCKADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 + IX. ENTER MR. LINDSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + +PART ONE + +LORD JOHN RUSSELL . . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece_ +_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of +Italy_" + +LORD LYONS (1860) . . . . . . . . . _facing p_. 42 +_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons" (Edward +Arnold & Co_.) + +SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G. . . . . . " 90 +_From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, +K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography"_ (_John Murray_) + +WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD . . . . . . . . " 114 +_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons"_ (_Edward +Arnold & Co._) + +C.F. ADAMS . . . . . . . . . . . " 138 +_From a photograph in the United States Embassy, +London_ + +JAMES M. MASON . . . . . . . . . . " 206 +_From a photograph by L.C. Handy, Washington_ + +"KING COTTON BOUND" . . . . . . . . " 262 +_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of +"Punch"_ + +GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR + + + +CHAPTER I + +BACKGROUNDS + +In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in London, the +American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of depression and +bitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That Great Britain did, +in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a +monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and +at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only +foreign nation steadily contributing in every indirect way possible to +verify its judgment, will probably be the verdict made against her by +posterity, on calm comparison of the evidence[1]." Very different were +the views of Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "The +perfect neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to +me almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has +been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. It is +the single case in which the English Government and public--generally so +meddlesome--have displayed most prudent and commendable forbearance in +spite of great temptations to the contrary[2]." And Sir William +Harcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord Russell's many +titles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner in which he has +steered the vessel of State through the Scylla and Charybdis of the +American War will, I think, always stand conspicuous[3]." + +Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason somewhat +to modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of Great Britain was +long prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was also among the historians +and writers of Continental Europe--notably those of France and Russia. +To what extent was this dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite of +her long years of championship of personal freedom and of leadership in +the cause of anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in the +disruption of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms, +react only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national +power? In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted by +historians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in both +foreign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of her +statesmen, or the inspirations of her people? + +It was to answer this question that the present work was originally +undertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became progressively more +clear that the great crisis in America was almost equally a crisis in +the domestic history of Great Britain itself and that unless this were +fully appreciated no just estimate was possible of British policy toward +America. Still more it became evident that the American Civil War, as +seen through British spectacles, could not be understood if regarded as +an isolated and unique situation, but that the conditions preceding that +situation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the two +nations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when the +crisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions is +here possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this first +chapter is devoted. + + * * * * * + +On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it is +unnecessary to dilate, though it should always be remembered that both +during the war and afterwards there existed a minority in Great Britain +strongly sympathetic with the political ideals proclaimed in +America--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something to be striven for +in Britain itself and the conflict with America as, in a measure, a +conflict in home politics. But independence once acknowledged by the +Treaty of Peace of 1783, the relations between the Mother Country and +the newly-created United States of America rapidly tended to adjust +themselves to lines of contact customary between Great Britain and any +other Sovereign State. Such contacts, fixing national attitude and +policy, ordinarily occur on three main lines: governmental, determined +by officials in authority in either State whose duty it is to secure the +greatest advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial, +resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the business +opportunities of either nation in the other's territory, or from their +rivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of comparative +development especially in those ideals of political structure which +determine the nature of the State and the form of its government. The +more obvious of these contacts is the governmental, since the attitude +of a people is judged by the formal action of its Government, and, +indeed, in all three lines of contact the government of a State is +directly concerned and frequently active. But it may be of service to a +clearer appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if the +intermingling of elements required by a strict chronological account of +relations is here replaced by a separate review of each of the three +main lines of contact. + +Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, the +interest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs American. +True, there still remained the valued establishments in the West Indies, +and the less considered British possessions on the continent to the +north of the United States. Meanwhile, there were occasional frictions +with America arising from uncertain claims drawn from the former +colonial privileges of the new state, or from boundary contentions not +settled in the treaty of peace. Thus the use of the Newfoundland +fisheries furnished ground for an acrimonious controversy lasting even +into the twentieth century, and occasionally rising to the danger point. +Boundary disputes dragged along through official argument, survey +commissions, arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of the +northern limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty of +Washington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any time in +the forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an agreement +creditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both countries, was +reached establishing small and equal naval armaments on the Great Lakes. +The British fear of an American attack on Canada proved groundless as +time went on and was definitely set at rest by the strict curb placed by +the American Government upon the restless activities of such of its +citizens as sympathized with the followers of McKenzie and Papineau in +the Canadian rebellion of 1837[4]. + +None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British policy +toward America. But the "War of 1812," as it is termed in the United +States, "Mr. Madison's War," as it was derisively named by Tory +contemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious policies in which +the respective governments were in definite opposition. Briefly, this +was a clash between belligerent and neutral interests. Britain, fighting +at first for the preservation of Europe against the spread of French +revolutionary influence, later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire, +held the seas in her grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomed +rights of a naval belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view, +and as always in the case of the dominant naval belligerent, she +stretched principles of international law to their utmost interpretation +to secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral of +importance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested point by +point the issue of exceeded belligerent right as established in +international law. America did more; she advanced new rules and theories +of belligerent and neutral right respectively, and demanded that the +belligerents accede to them. Dispute arose over blockades, contraband, +the British "rule of 1756" which would have forbidden American trade +with French colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited by +France herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching the +personal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the British +exercise of a right of search and seizure to recover British sailors. + +Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely opposed +theories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a man once born a +British subject could never cease to be a subject--could never "alienate +his duty." It was her practice to fill up her navy, in part at least, by +the "impressment" of her sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, and +wherever found--in her own coast towns, or from the decks of her own +mercantile marine. But many British sailors sought security from such +impressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to desert to +American merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in the +rapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became by +naturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty of +America to defend them as such in their lives and business. America +ultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was accomplished +from Great Britain when American citizenship was conferred. On shore +they were safe, for Britain did not attempt to reclaim her subjects +from the soil of another nation. But she denied that the American flag +on merchant vessels at sea gave like security and she asserted a naval +right to search such vessels in time of peace, professing her complete +acquiescence in a like right to the American navy over British merchant +vessels--a concession refused by America, and of no practical value +since no American citizen sought service in the British merchant marine. + +This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic points of +opposition between the two governments. First America contested the +British theory of "once a citizen always a citizen[5]"; second, America +denied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel in _time of peace_ +to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying the American flag. The +_right of search in time of war_, that is, a belligerent right of +search, America never denied, but there was both then and later much +public confusion in both countries as to the question at issue since, +once at war, Great Britain frequently exercised a legal belligerent +right of search and followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged to +be British subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially careful +to make sure that no American-born sailors were included in their +impressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after victim, +the American irritation steadily increased. True, France was also an +offender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was lost sight of in +view of the, literally, thousands of _bona fide_ Americans seized by +Great Britain. Here, then, was a third cause of irritation connected +with impressment, though not a point of governmental dispute as to +right, for Great Britain professed her earnest desire to restore +promptly any American-born sailors whom her naval officers had seized +through error. In fact many such sailors were soon liberated, but a +large number either continued to serve on British ships or to languish +in British prisons until the end of the Napoleonic Wars[6]. + +There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812, most of +them arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief maritime +neutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific presidential +administration of Jefferson sought by trade restrictions, using embargo +and non-intercourse acts, to bring pressure on both England and France, +hoping to force a better treatment of neutrals. The United States, +divided in sympathy between the belligerents, came near to disorder and +disruption at home, over the question of foreign policy. But through all +American factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to Great +Britain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by America in +1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one section, New +England, that war later came to be regarded as of great national value +as one of the factors which welded the discordant states into a national +unity. Naturally also, the war once ended, its commercial causes were +quickly forgotten, whereas the individual, personal offence involved in +impressment and right of search, with its insult to national pride, +became a patriotic theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, in +fact, a British "right of search" became a national point of honour, +upon which no American statesman would have dared to yield to British +overtures. + +In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war of +Independence" and also as of international importance in contesting an +unjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to be +remembered that no other war of importance was fought by America until +the Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus centred on the +two wars fought against Great Britain. The contemporary British view +was that of a nation involved in a life and death struggle with a great +European enemy, irritated by what seemed captious claims, developed to +war, by a minor power[7]. To be sure there were a few obstinate Tories +in Britain who saw in the war the opportunity of smashing at one blow +Napoleon's dream of empire, and the American "democratic system." The +London _Times_ urged the government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and +then deal with Mr. Madison and democracy," arguing that it should be +England's object to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian +school." But this was not the purpose of the British Government, nor +would such a purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whig +minority in Parliament. + +The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of the war, +quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict. Impressment was +not mentioned, but it was never again resorted to by Great Britain upon +American ships. But the principle of right of search in time of peace, +though for another object than impressment, was soon again asserted by +Great Britain and for forty years was a cause of constant irritation and +a source of danger in the relations of the two countries. Stirred by +philanthropic emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for the +suppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principle +repudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various maritime +powers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels of each upon +the others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade was in fact +outlawed for the flags of all nations. But America, smarting under the +memory of impressment injuries, and maintaining in any case the doctrine +that in time of peace the national flag protected a vessel from +interference or search by the naval vessels of any other power, refused +to sign mutual right of search treaties and denied, absolutely, such a +right for any cause whatever to Great Britain or to any other nation. +Being refused a treaty, Britain merely renewed her assertion of the +right and continued to exercise it. + +Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not ended with +the war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national relations, for +Britain alone used her navy with energy to suppress the slave trade, and +the slave traders of all nations sought refuge, when approached by a +British naval vessel, under the protection of the American flag. If +Britain respected the flag, and sheered off from search, how could she +stop the trade? If she ignored the flag and on boarding found an +innocent American vessel engaged in legal trade, there resulted claims +for damages by detention of voyage, and demands by the American +Government for apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seized +under the American flag, never protested to the United States, nor +claimed American citizenship, for his punishment in American law for +engaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any other +nation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his vessel. + +Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British contention was +that here was a great international humanitarian object frustrated by an +absurd American sensitiveness on a point of honour about the flag. After +fifteen years of dispute Great Britain offered to abandon any claim to a +right of _search_, contenting herself with a right of _visit_, merely to +verify a vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted this +to be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whose +legality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine boundary +controversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape. Joint +cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of Africa, the British +to search all suspected vessels except those flying the American flag, +and these to be searched by the American squadron. At once President +Tyler notified Congress that Great Britain had renounced the right of +search. Immediately in Parliament a clamour was raised against the +Government for the "sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and Lord +Aberdeen promptly made official disclaimer of such surrender. + +Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of peace was a +steady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty of Great Britain, +appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, but suspicious of an +ulterior "will to rule the seas." After 1830 no American political +leader would have dared to yield the right of search. Great Britain for +her part, viewing the expansion of domestic slavery in the United +States, came gradually to attribute the American contention, not to +patriotic pride, but to the selfish business interests of the +slave-holding states. In the end, in 1858, with a waning British +enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade suppression, and with +recognition that America had become a great world power, Britain yielded +her claim to right of search or visit, save when established by Treaty. +Four years later, in 1862, it may well have seemed to British statesmen +that American slavery had indeed been the basic cause of America's +attitude, for in that year a treaty was signed by the two nations giving +mutual right of search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade. +In fact, however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State +for the North, to influence British and European opinion against the +seceding slave states of the South. + +The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when American power +reached a point where the British Government must take it seriously into +account as a factor in general world policy. That power had been +steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From almost the first moment +of established independence American statesmen visualized the +separation of the interests of the western continent from those of +Europe, and planned for American leadership in this new world. +Washington, the first President, emphasized in his farewell address the +danger of entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations of +Europe, immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this +new world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward, +but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France, +commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened in +Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about to +intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted colonies, +there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly about to draw +America and England into closer co-operation. Canning, for Britain, +proposed to America a joint declaration against French intervention in +the Americas. His argument was against the principle of intervention; +his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial expansion; but his +ultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influence +and position in the new world. + +Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The +ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, but +the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, favouring +rather a separate declaration by the United States, and of this opinion +was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe Doctrine announcing +American opposition to the principle of "intervention," and declaring +that the American continents were no longer to be regarded as open to +further colonization by European nations. The British emergency +situation with France, though already quieted, caused Monroe's Message +to be greeted in England with high approval. But Canning did not so +approve it for he saw clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge +not merely to continental Europe, but to England as well and he set +himself to thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policy +been followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted a +serious clash with the United States[8]. + +In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying policy of +non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the United States +the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own expansion in territory +and in influence. But for a time there was no need of additional +territory for that already hers stretched from the Atlantic to the Rocky +Mountains, two-thirds of the way from ocean to ocean. Her population was +growing fast. But four millions at the time of the Revolution, there +were thirteen millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were already +across the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards new +lands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first definite +notice given to Europe of America's preconceived "destiny," but the +earlier realization of that destiny took place on lines of expansion +within her own boundaries. To this there could be no governmental +objection, whether by Great Britain or any other nation. + +But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the view of +British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering upon a policy +of further territorial expansion, forsaking her peaceful progress and +turning toward war, there was a quick determination on a line of British +policy as regards the American advance. The first intimation of the new +American policy came in relation to the State of Texas which had +revolted from Mexico in 1836, and whose independence had been generally +recognized by 1842. To this new state Britain sent diplomatic and +consular agents and these reported two factions among the people--one +seeking admission to the American Union, one desiring the maintenance +of independence. + +In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with instructions to +secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in dispute. Here was a +genuine British effort to escape from national irritations. But before +the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the earlier stages +of negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm, quite new +questions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious relation +with the United States the desire for which had led to the Ashburton +mission. This new development was the appearance of an American fever +for territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced +as a "manifest destiny" which should carry American power and +institutions to the Pacific and even into Central America. Among these +institutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of Great +Britain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration since the +great cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of +raw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself a +cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon slave-grown +cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once acquired, what was there +to prevent further American exploitation, followed by slave expansion, +into Mexico, where for long British influence had been dominant? + +On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole British +policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, urged a +British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering Texas, and +strong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining her +independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer Anglo-Saxon +state, prohibiting American advance to the south-west, releasing Britain +from dependence on American cotton, and ultimately, he hoped, leading +Texas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be ineradicable. This +policy was approved by the British Government, Pakenham was sent to +Washington to watch events, a _charge_, Elliot, was despatched to Texas, +and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to +force the acquiescence of Mexico. + +In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it is +unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, for such +it became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both sides. The basic +fact was that America was bent upon territorial expansion, and that +Great Britain set herself to thwart this ambition. But not to the point +of war. Aberdeen was so incautious at one moment as to propose to France +and Mexico a triple guarantee of the independence of Texas, if that +state would acquiesce, but when Pakenham notified him that in this case, +Britain must clearly understand that war with America was not merely +possible, but probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan of +guarantee, fortunately not yet approved by Mexico[9]. + +The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. Did she +wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer independence? +Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas would choose +independence and British favour. But the people of the new state were +largely emigrants from the United States, and a majority of them wished +to re-enter the Union, a step finally accomplished in 1846, after ten +years of separate existence as a Republic. The part played by the +British Government in this whole episode was not a fortunate one. It is +the duty of Governments to watch over the interests of their subjects, +and to guard the prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a +perfect _right_ to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to +Texas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a +policy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. The +Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a policy +of preventing the development of the power of the United States. Then, +fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic British public +feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, of never again being +drawn into war with America, not because of fear, but because of +important trade relations and also because of essential liking and +admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, was not appreciated in +America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in governmental circles, +pleaded that the support of Texan independence was in reality perfectly +in harmony with the best interests of the United States, since it would +have tended toward the limitation of American slavery. And in the matter +of national power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that the +American Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two, +perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South, free +nations in North and West. + +The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all +opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted +northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness. Mexico, +relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy between the +United States and Great Britain over the Oregon territory, expected +British aid in her war of 1846 against America. But she was sharply +warned that such aid would not be given, and the Oregon dispute was +settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of vigorous legal argument, followed +by a fair compromise. The Mexican war resulted in the acquisition of +California by the United States. British agents in this province of +Mexico, and British admirals on the Pacific were cautioned to take no +active steps in opposition. + +Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier to +American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the extension +of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was not realized. +The United States was soon plunged, as British statesmen had prophesied, +into internal conflict over the question whether the newly-acquired +territories should be slave or free. + +The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick transit +between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned across Central +America. Here Britain and America acted together, at first in amity, +though the convention signed in 1850 later developed discord as to the +British claim of a protectorate over the Atlantic end of the proposed +canal at San Juan del Nicaragua. But Britain was again at war in Europe +in the middle 'fifties, and America was deep in quarrel over slavery at +home. On both sides in spite of much diplomatic intrigue and of +manifestations of national pride there was governmental desire to avoid +difficulties. At the end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to +Nicaragua her protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of +friction, so reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, were +happily removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition to +the growth of American power. + +In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were seemingly all +at an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The differing theories +of the two Governments on British expatriation still remained, but +Britain attempted no practical application of her view. The right of +search in time of peace controversy, first eased by the plan of joint +cruising, had been definitely settled by the British renunciation of +1858. Opposition to American territorial advance but briefly manifested +by Britain, had ended with the annexation of Texas, and the fever of +expansion had waned in America. Minor disputes in Central America, +related to the proposed canal, were amicably adjusted. + +But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples, +frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions in +governmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to react +to such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the commercial +relations of the two nations--later to examine their political ideals. + +In 1783 America won her independence in government from a colonial +status. But commercially she remained a British colony--yet with a +difference. She had formed a part of the British colonial system. All +her normal trade was with the mother country or with other British +colonies. Now her privileges in such trade were at an end, and she must +seek as a favour that which had formerly been hers as a member of the +British Empire. The direct trade between England and America was easily +and quickly resumed, for the commercial classes of both nations desired +it and profited by it. But the British colonial system prohibited trade +between a foreign state and British colonies and there was one channel +of trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable to +both sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by American +independence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and farm products +desired by the West Indian planters, and these in turn offered needed +sugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired to restore the trade, and +in spite of the legal restrictions of the colonial system, the trade was +in fact resumed in part and either permitted or winked at by the British +Government, but never to the advantageous exchange of former times. + +The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not reached +until some thirty years after American Independence, but the uncertainty +of such trade during a long period in which a portion of it consisted +in unauthorized and unregulated exchange was a constant irritant to all +parties concerned. Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with its +preliminary check upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and its +final total prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800 +the bulk of American importation of manufactures still came from Great +Britain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jefferson +attempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially on +England, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation Act, +1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were so +unpopular in the commercial states of New England that they were +withdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked the +United States into believing that France had yielded to American +contentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse was +proclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America finally +declared war and trade stopped save in a few New England ports where +rebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a blockading British +naval squadron. + +For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had steadily +decreased, finally almost to extinction during the war. But America +required certain articles customarily imported and necessity now forced +her to develop her own manufactures. New England had been the centre of +American foreign commerce, but now there began a trend toward +manufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814, however, at the end of the war, +it was still thought in the United States that under normal conditions +manufactured goods would again be imported and the general cry of +"protection for home industries" was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, a +group of infant industries had in fact been started and clamoured for +defence now that peace was restored. This situation was not unnoticed in +Great Britain where merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peace +on the continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discovered +that the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking with +apprehension toward the new industries of America, British merchants, +following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary speech, dumped +great quantities of their surplus goods on the American market, selling +them far below cost, or even on extravagant credit terms. One object was +to smash the budding American manufactures. + +This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry patriotic +emotions in the circles where American business suffered and a demand +began to be heard for protection. But the Government of the United +States was still representative of agriculture, in the main, and while a +Tariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was regarded as a temporary +measure required by the necessity of paying the costs of the recent war. +Just at this juncture, however, British policy, now looking again toward +a great colonial empire, sought advantages for the hitherto neglected +maritime provinces of British North America, and thought that it had +found them by encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies. +The legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now enforced +and for a time intercourse was practically suspended. + +This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection in +America. It not only worked against a return by New England from +manufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks of +protectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had been +accustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters seeking +cheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist element was +as yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home markets" for +agriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning to be felt, and +by 1820 the question of West Indian trade became one of constant +agitation and demanded political action. That action was taken on lines +of retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law excluding from American +ports any British vessel coming from a port access to which was denied +to an American vessel, and placing under bond in American ports British +vessels with prohibition of their proceeding to a British port to which +American vessels could not go. This act affected not merely direct trade +with the West Indies, but stopped the general custom of British ships of +taking part cargoes to Jamaica while _en route_ to and from the United +States. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson's +administration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment by +Britain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial system. + +The "retaliatory system" which J.Q. Adams regarded as "a new declaration +of independence," was, in fact, quickly taken up by other non-colonial +nations, and these, with America, compelled Great Britain to take stock +of her interests. Huskisson, rightly foreseeing British prosperity as +dependent upon her manufactures and upon the carrying trade, stated in +Parliament that American "retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom of +trade in British ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nations +that would open their ports within one year on terms of equality to +British ships. J.Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayed +acceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and was +rebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade did +not take place until 1830, after the close of Adams' administration. +That trade never recovered its former prosperity. + +Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, had +resulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not a +sufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice of, the +theory of protection to attribute this alone to British checks placed +upon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless the progress of America +toward an established system, reaching its highest mark for years in the +Tariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly related to the events just narrated. +After American independence, the partially illegal status of West Indian +trade hampered commercial progress and slightly encouraged American +manufactures by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutral +troubles of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increased +the transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection to +infant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirred +patriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial system +restrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave time +for the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the United +States. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for the world +the common advantage and the justice of a great theory of free trade. +America was apparently now committed to an opposing economic theory, the +first great nation definitely to establish it, and thus there resulted a +clear-cut opposition of principle and a clash of interests. From 1846, +when free trade ideas triumphed in England, the devoted British free +trader regarded America as the chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptance +of his theory. + +The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free trader, +was in the Southern States, where cotton interests, desiring no +advantage from protection, since their market was in Europe, attacked +American protection and sought to escape from it. Also slave supplies, +without protection, could have been purchased more cheaply from England +than from the manufacturing North. In 1833 indeed the South had forced a +reaction against protection, but it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it was +Southern opinion that carried through Congress the reciprocity treaty +with the British American Provinces, partly brought about, no doubt, by +a Southern fear that Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantages +in British markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join the +United States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union. +Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial tie +with the United States, and the one great hope, to the British minds, of +a break in the false American system of protection. Thus both in +economic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of slavery, the +export trading interests of Great Britain became more and more directed +toward the Southern States of America. Adding powerfully to this was the +dependence of British cotton manufactures upon the American supply. The +British trade attitude, arising largely outside of direct governmental +contacts, was bound to have, nevertheless, a constant and important +influence on governmental action. + +Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade and +industrial interests, are the favourite themes of those historians who +regard nations as determined in their relations solely by economic +causes--by what is called "enlightened self-interest." But governments, +no matter how arbitrary, and still more if in a measure resting on +representation, react both consciously and unconsciously to a public +opinion not obviously based upon either national or commercial rivalry. +Sometimes, indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter to +popular attitude in international affairs. In such a case, the +historical estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmental +action, is a false one and may do great injustice to the essential +friendliness of a people. + +How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America before +1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British Government? +Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and its reaction to, +American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such public opinion can +be found in quantity sufficient to base an estimate only in travellers' +books, in reviews, and in newspapers of the period. When all these are +brought together it is found that while there was an almost universal +British criticism of American social customs and habits of life, due to +that insularity of mental attitude characteristic of every nation, +making it prefer its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours, +summed up in the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found that +British opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as a +place for emigration and, second, American political ideals and +institutions[10]. + +British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured colonization +process before the American revolution, lost that favour after 1783, +though not at first definitely opposed. But emigration still continued +and at no time, save during the war of 1812, was it absolutely stopped. +Its exact amount is unascertainable, for neither Government kept +adequate statistics before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic wars +there came great distress in England from which the man of energy sought +escape. He turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay at +least, with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, and +influenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would find +people of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier emigration +to America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825, one energetic +Member of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the Government to appoint a +committee to investigate the whole subject, the result was a mass of +testimony, secured from returned emigrants or from their letters home, +in which there constantly appeared one main argument influencing the +labourer type of emigrant; he got good wages, and he was supplied, as a +farm hand, with good food. Repeatedly he testifies that he had "three +meat meals a day," whereas in England he had ordinarily received but one +such meal a week. + +Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type of +emigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this type +remaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity surrounding +America. But there was a second testimony brought out by Horton's +Committee, less general, yet to be picked up here and there as evidence +of another argument for emigration to America. The labourer did not +dilate upon political equality, nor boast of a share in government, +indeed generally had no such share, but he did boast to his fellows at +home of the social equality, though not thus expressing it, which was +all about him. He was a common farm hand, yet he "sat down to meals" +with his employer and family, and worked in the fields side by side with +his "master." This, too, was an astounding difference to the mind of the +British labourer. Probably for him it created a clearer, if not +altogether universal and true picture of the meaning of American +democracy than would have volumes of writing upon political +institutions. Gradually there was established in the lower orders of +British society a visualization of America as a haven of physical +well-being and personal social happiness. + +This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium of +expression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public opinion +of America, of much latent influence, but for the moment largely +negligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A more +important emigrating class in its influence on opinion at home, though +not a large class, was composed about equally of small farmers and small +merchants facing ruin in the agricultural and trading crises that +followed the end of the European war. The British travellers' books +from 1810 to 1820 are generally written by men of this class, or by +agents sent out from co-operative groups planning emigration. Generally +they were discontented with political conditions at home, commonly +opposed to a petrified social order, and attracted to the United States +by its lure of prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, a +superior type of emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant, +examining and emphasizing industrial opportunity. + +Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior political +institutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican finds here A +Republic, and the only Republic on the face of the earth that ever +deserved the name: where all are under the protection of equal laws; of +laws made by Themselves[11]." Another, who established an English colony +in the Western States of Illinois, wrote of England that he objected to +"being ruled and taxed by people who had no more right to rule and tax +us than consisted in the power to do it." And of his adopted country he +concludes: "I love the Government; and thus a novel sensation is +excited; it is like the development of a new faculty. I am become a +patriot in my old age[12]." Still another detailed the points of his +content, "I am here, lord and master of myself and of 100 acres of +land--an improvable farm, little trouble to me, good society and a good +market, and, I think, a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry in +summer; the parson gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and +poor rates amount to Sec.25.00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I +leave my door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an +ounce or a little more[13]." + +From the first days of the American colonial movement toward +independence there had been, indeed, a British interest in American +political principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these principles for +reasons of home political controversy. Their sympathy continued after +American independence and by its insistent expression brought out +equally insistent opposition from Tory circles. The British home +movement toward a more representative Government had been temporarily +checked by the extremes into which French Liberalism plunged in 1791, +causing reaction in England. By 1820 pressure was again being exerted by +British Liberals of intelligence, and they found arguments in such +reports as those just quoted. From that date onward, and especially just +before the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, the +example of a prosperous American democracy was an element in British +home politics, lauded or derided as the man in England desired or not an +expansion of the British franchise. In the earlier period, however, it +is to be remembered that applause of American institutions did not mean +acceptance of democracy to the extent of manhood franchise, for no such +franchise at first existed in America itself. The debate in England was +simply whether the step forward in American democracy, was an argument +for a similar step in Great Britain. + +Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political quarrel +there grew in force, depicted America favourably or otherwise according +to political sympathies at home. Both before and after the Reform Bill +of 1832 this type of effort to mould opinion, by citation of America, +was widespread. Hence there is in such writing, not so much the +expression of public opinion, as of propaganda to affect that opinion. +Book upon book, review upon review, might be quoted to illustrate this, +but a few notable examples will suffice. + +The most widely read and reviewed book on the United States before +1840, except the humorous and flippant characterization of America by +Mrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil Hall's three-volume work, published in +1829[14]. Claiming an open mind, he expected for his adverse findings a +readier credence. For adverse to American political institutions these +findings are in all their larger applications. In every line Hall +betrays himself as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief, +and convinced of the perfection and unalterableness of the British +Constitution. Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank in +avowal of a purpose[15]. He states in his preface: + + "... When I found the institutions and experiences of the + United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament, + as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and + learned that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense, + instead of encountering merited derision, were listened to + with patience and approbation by men as ignorant as + themselves, I certainly did feel that another work on America + was yet wanted, and at once determined to undertake a task + which inferior considerations would probably have induced me + to decline." + +Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home, found in +the United States proofs for her faith in democracy[16]. Captain Marryat +belittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes proved himself less a +critic of America than an enemy of democracy. Answering a review of his +earlier volumes, published separately, he wrote in his concluding +volume: "I candidly acknowledge that the reviewer is right in his +supposition; my great object has been to do serious injury to the cause +of democracy[17]." + +The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes were +suffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step toward +democracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was still +limited to a small minority of the population. Britain was still ruled +by her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile, however, just at +the moment when dominant Whig influence in England carried through that +step forward toward democratic institutions which Whigs had long lauded +in America, the latter country had progressed to manhood suffrage, or as +nearly all leading Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, had +plunged into the rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening in +Whig ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before long +to the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in Great +Britain that the Reform of 1832 was "final," the last step toward +democracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange that the +books and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily stress the +dangers and crudity of American democracy. They were written for what +was now a nearly unanimous British reading public, fearful lest Radical +pressure for still further electoral reform should preach the example of +the United States. + +Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section of the +British governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by a critical, +if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid development of the +power and wealth of the United States, governing-class England, of all +factions save the Radical, came to view America just as it would have +viewed any other rising nation, that is, as a problem to be studied for +its influence on British prosperity and power. Again, expressions in +print reflect the changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than in +travellers' books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted, +not to American political institutions, but to studies, many of them +very careful ones, of American industry and governmental policy. + +Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of such +description. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this day to the +American historical student[18]. George Combe, philosopher and +phrenologist, studied especially social institutions[19]. Joseph Sturge, +philanthropist and abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of the +poet Whittier, through the Northern and Eastern States[20]. +Featherstonaugh, a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southern +slave states, in terms completely at variance with those of Sturge[21]. +Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston, and +Warburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of Canada, +an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter professedly +alarmed, at the evidences of power in America[22]. Amazed at the energy, +growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the anti-British +feeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote that "they +[Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the incendiary torch of +Republicanism to the nations of Europe[23]." Soon after this was written +there began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish emigration to America +which heavily reinforced the anti-British attitude of the City of New +York, and largely changed its character. + +Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect British +public opinion, or did they create it? It is difficult to estimate such +matters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these books coincided in +point of time with a British governmental attitude of opposition, though +on peaceful lines, to the development of American power, and to the +adoption to the point of faith, by British commercial classes, of free +trade as opposed to the American protective system. But governing +classes were not the British public, and to the great unenfranchised +mass, finding voice through the writings of a few leaders, the +prosperity of America made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy was +again beginning to make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was published +a study of the United States, more careful and exact than any previous +to Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions. This +was Mackay's "Western World," and that there was a public eager for such +estimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went through four +British editions in 1850[24]. At the end of the decade, then, there +appeared once more a vigorous champion of the cause of British +democracy, comparing the results of "government by the wise" with +alleged mob rule. Mackay wrote: + + "Society in America started from the point to which society + in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to + this moment, its corner-stone ... that which develops itself + as the sympathy of class, becomes in America the general + sentiment of society.... We present an imposing front to the + world; but let us tear the picture and look at the canvas. + One out of every seven of us is a pauper. Every six + Englishmen have, in addition to their other enormous burdens, + to support a seventh between them, whose life is spent in + consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of their + common subsistence." + +British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition to the +advance of American power, found themselves involved again, as before +1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a prosperous American +democracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion at home. Also, for all +Englishmen, of whatever class, in spite of rivalry in power, of opposing +theories of trade, of divergent political institutions, there existed a +vague, though influential, pride in the advance of a people of similar +race, sprung from British loins[25]. And there remained for all +Englishmen also one puzzling and discreditable American institution, +slavery--held up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficult +of excuse among her friends. + +Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce, had early +committed British Government and people to a crusade against the African +slave trade. This British policy was clearly announced to the world in +the negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15. But Britain herself still +supported the institution of slavery in her West Indian colonies and it +was not until British humanitarian sentiment had forced emancipation +upon the unwilling sugar planters, in 1833, that the nation was morally +free to criticize American domestic slavery. Meanwhile great +emancipation societies, with many branches, all virile and active, had +grown up in England and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack on +slavery the world over, and especially on American slavery. The great +American abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than in +his own country; his weekly paper, _The Liberator_, is full of messages +of cheer from British friends and societies, and of quotations from a +sympathetic, though generally provincial, British press. + +From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its height. It +watched with anxiety the evidence of a developing struggle over slavery +in the United States, hopeful, as each crisis arose, that the free +Northern States would impose their will upon the Southern Slave States. +But as each crisis turned to compromise, seemingly enhancing the power +of the South, and committing America to a retention of slavery, the +hopes of British abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to British +opinion, become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery, +but after the "great compromise of 1850," where the elder American +statesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of that +measure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover, +after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general humanitarian +sentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to seem hopeless and +the earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The British Government still +maintained its naval squadron for the suppression of the African slave +trade, but the British official mind no longer keenly interested itself +either in this effort or in the general question of slavery. + +Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still, after +1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally critical, by +English writers. Each renewal of the conflict in America, even though +local, not national in character, drew out a flood of comment. In the +public press this blot upon American civilization was a steady subject +for attack, and that attack was naturally directed against the South. +The London _Times_, in particular, lost no opportunity of presenting the +matter to its readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansas +during the height of the border struggles there, and reported his +observations in letters to the _Times_. The writer was wholly on the +side of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that the +Kansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantly +depicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence of +the North as compared with the South[26]. + +Mrs. Stowe's _Uncle Tom's Cabin_ excited greater interest in England +than in America itself. The first London edition appeared in May, 1852, +and by the end of the year over one million copies had been sold, as +opposed to one hundred and fifty thousand in the United States. But if +one distinguished writer is to be believed, this great British interest +in the book was due more to English antipathy to America than to +antipathy to slavery[27]. This writer was Nassau W. Senior, who, in +1857, published a reprint of his article on "American Slavery" in the +206th number of the _Edinburgh Review_, reintroducing in his book +extreme language denunciatory of slavery that had been cut out by the +editor of the _Review_[28]. Senior had been stirred to write by the +brutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after his +speech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident of the +slavery quarrel in America excited British attention. + +Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all anti-slavery, +the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of British +understanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the citations of +the British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison in his +_Liberator_[29]. Yet for intellectual Britain, at least--that Britain +which was vocal and whose opinion can be ascertained in spite of this +constant interest in American slavery, there was generally a fixed +belief that slavery in the United States was so firmly established that +it could not be overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditure +of British sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at the +conclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed the +pessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not venture to hope +that we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see American slavery +extirpated, or even materially mitigated[30]." + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: State Department, Eng., Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27, +1862.] + +[Footnote 2: Walpole, _Russell_, Vol. II, p. 367.] + +[Footnote 3: _Life of Lady John Russell_, p. 197.] + +[Footnote 4: There was a revival of this fear at the end of the American +Civil War. This will be commented on later.] + +[Footnote 5: This was the position of President and Congress: yet the +United States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen to +expatriate himself.] + +[Footnote 6: Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from American +ships, 102 were retained, 1,042 were discharged, and 805 were held for +further proof. (Updyke, _The Diplomacy of the War of 1812_, p. 21.)] + +[Footnote 7: The people of the British North American Provinces regarded +the war as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the European +wars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United Empire +Loyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the same two +wars which fostered militant patriotism in America against England had +the same result in Canadian sentiment against America.] + +[Footnote 8: Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in +_Am. Hist. Rev._, XI, 783. Also _Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy_, Vol. II, ch. 2.] + +[Footnote 9: Much has recently been published on British policy in +Texas. See my book, _British Interests and Activities in Texas, +1838-1846_, Johns Hopkins Press, Balt., 1910. Also Adams, Editor, +_British Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas_, +The Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, 1918.] + +[Footnote 10: In my studies on British-American relations, I have read +the leading British reviews and newspapers, and some four hundred +volumes by British travellers. For a summary of the British travellers +before 1860 see my article "The Point of View of the British Traveller +in America," in the _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, +June, 1914.] + +[Footnote 11: John Melish, _Travels_, Vol. I, p. 148.] + +[Footnote 12: Morris Birkbeck, _Letters from Illinois_, London, 1818, p. +29.] + +[Footnote 13: Letter in Edinburgh _Scotsman_, March, 1823. Cited by +_Niles Register_, Vol. XXV, p. 39.] + +[Footnote 14: _Travels in North America_, 1827-28, London, 1829.] + +[Footnote 15: Captain Thomas Hamilton, _Men and Manners in America_, +Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols.] + +[Footnote 16: _Society in America_, London, 1837. 3 vols. _Retrospect of +Western Travel_, London, 1838. 2 vols.] + +[Footnote 17: Captain Frederick Marryat, _A Diary in America, with +Remarks on Its Institutions_, Vol. VI, p. 293.] + +[Footnote 18: James Silk Buckingham, _America, Historical, Statistic and +Descriptive_, London, 1841-43. 9 vols.] + +[Footnote 19: _Notes on the United States of North America during a +phrenological visit_, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh, 1841. 3 vols.] + +[Footnote 20: _A Visit to the United States in 1841_, London, 1842.] + +[Footnote 21: George William Featherstonaugh, _Excursion through the +Slave States_, London, 1844. 2 vols.] + +[Footnote 22: William Kennedy, _Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects +of the Republic of Texas_, London, 1841. 2 vols. George Warburton, +_Hochelaga: or, England in the New World_, London, 1845. 2 vols.] + +[Footnote 23: Warburton, _Hochelaga_, 5th Edition, Vol. II, pp. 363-4.] + +[Footnote 24: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World: or, Travels through +the United States in 1846-47_, London, 1849.] + +[Footnote 25: This is clearly indicated in Parliament itself, in the +debate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856 of Crampton, the +British Minister at Washington, for enlistment activities during the +Crimean War.--_Hansard_, 3rd. Ser., CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203.] + +[Footnote 26: Gladstone's letters were later published in book form, +under the title _The Englishman in Kansas_, London, 1857.] + +[Footnote 27: "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom' gratified in England +were not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but national jealousy and +national vanity. We have long been smarting under the conceit of +America--we are tired of hearing her boast that she is the freest and +the most enlightened country that the world has ever seen. Our clergy +hate her voluntary system--our Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hate +her parvenus--our Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, and +her ambition. All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from the +enemy." Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 38.] + +[Footnote 28: The reprint is without date, but the context shows the +year to be 1857.] + +[Footnote 29: For example the many British expressions quoted in +reference to John Brown's raid, in _The Liberator_ for February 10, +1860, and in succeeding issues.] + +[Footnote 30: Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 68.] + + + +CHAPTER II + +FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61. + +It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, that +immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomatic +controversies between England and America had largely been settled, and +that England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly" yielded under +American demands. This generalization, as applied to what were, after +all, minor controversies, is in great measure true. In larger questions +of policy, as regards spheres of influence or developing power, or +principles of trade, there was difference, but no longer any essential +opposition or declared rivalry[31]. In theories of government there was +sharp divergence, clearly appreciated, however, only in governing-class +Britain. This sense of divergence, even of a certain threat from America +to British political institutions, united with an established opinion +that slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforce +governmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America. The +British public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in the +institution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest was +waning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to a degree +not true of any other two world-powers, were of the same race, had +similar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in close touch at +many points by the steady flow of British emigration to the +United States. + +When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in November, +1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered, the situation +took both British Government and people by surprise. There was not any +clear understanding either of American political conditions, or of the +intensity of feeling now aroused over the question of the extension of +slave territory. The most recent descriptions of America had agreed in +assertion that at some future time there would take place, in all +probability, a dissolution of the Union, on lines of diverging economic +interests, but also stated that there was nothing in the American +situation to indicate immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, a +long-time resident in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote: + + "The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will break + the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But + no man may foretell the period of dissolution.... The many + restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation. + The Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are + invisible; and it seems wondrous that each limb does not act + for itself independently of its fellows. A closer examination + shows the nature of the network which keeps the members of + this association so tightly bound. Any attempt to untangle + the ties, more firmly fastens them. When any one State talks + of separation, the others become spontaneously knotted + together. When a section blusters about its particular + rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to all. If + a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes + in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which + there can be danger, there is also found the element of + safety." Yet, he added, "All attempts to strengthen this + federal government at the expense of the States' governments + must be futile.... The federal government exists on + sufferance only. Any State may at any time constitutionally + withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually dissolve it[32]." + +Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one Charles +Mackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished British poet," +who made the usual rapid tour of the principal cities of America in +1857-58, and as rapidly penned his impressions: + + "Many persons in the United States talk of a dissolution of + the Union, but few believe in it.... All this is mere bravado + and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to all + Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary.... There is + no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions + to which over-ardent politicians of the North and South + sometimes give vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West,' + as it is fondly called, is in the position even now to + arbitrate between North and South, should the quarrel stretch + beyond words, or should anti-slavery or any other question + succeed in throwing any difference between them which it + would take revolvers and rifles rather than speeches and + votes to put an end to[33]." + +The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be regarded in +England as a constant quarrel between North and South, but of no +immediate danger to the Union. Each outbreak of violent American +controversy produced a British comment sympathetic with the North. The +turmoil preceding and following the election of Lincoln in 1860, on the +platform of "no extension of slavery," was very generally noted by the +British press and public, as a sign favourable to the cause of +anti-slavery, but with no understanding that Southern threat would at +last be realized in definite action. Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May +15, 1862, to his American friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had the +means of judging, the feeling here was at first _very decidedly_ on the +side of the North[34] ..." The British metropolitan press, in nearly +every issue of which for at least two years after December, 1860, there +appeared news items and editorial comment on the American crisis, was at +first nearly unanimous in condemning the South[35]. The _Times_, with +accustomed vigour, led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated: + + "When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject of + Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments + it expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation, + for the feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we + see how entirely he narrows his opposition to the single + point of the admission of Slavery into the Territories, we + cannot help being forcibly struck by the absurdity of + breaking up a vast and glorious confederacy like that of the + United States from the dread and anger inspired by the + election of such a man to the office of Chief Magistrate.... + We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it [the + election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad + to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone + which its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom, + has been at length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a + vast community of our own race has at length given an + authoritative expression to sentiments which are entertained + by everyone in this country. We trust to see the American + Government employed in tasks more worthy of a State founded + on the doctrines of liberty and equality than the invention + of shifts and devices to perpetuate servitude; and we hear in + this great protest of American freedom the tardy echo of + those humane doctrines to which England has so long become a + convert." + +Other leading journals, though with less of patronizing +self-complacency, struck the same note as the _Times_. The _Economist_ +attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the sympathies of the "lower +orders" in the electorate who had now deserted their former leaders, the +slave-owning aristocracy of the South, and allied themselves with the +refined and wise leaders of the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not an +extremist in any sense. His plan of action lay within the limits of +statesmanlike moderation[36]. The _Saturday Review_ was less sure that +England should rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had suffered +some hard blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but at +least England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no more +discourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The Republican +party, however, had no policy, except that of its leader, Seward, and +from him might be expected extreme insolence[37]. This was a very early +judgment of Seward, and one upon which the _Saturday Review_ preened +itself later, as wholly justified. The _Spectator_, the only one of the +four journals thus far considered which ultimately remained constant in +advocacy of the Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment, +regarding the 1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as in +reality a mere contest between parties for political power[38]. + +Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press issue +for several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding varying +notes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said the _Times_, +it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred thousand slave-owners, +trembling nightly with visions of murder and pillage, backed by a +dissolute population of 'poor whites,' are no match for the hardy and +resolute populations of the Free States[39]," and if the South hoped for +foreign aid it should be undeceived promptly: "Can any sane man believe +that England and France will consent, as is now suggested, to stultify +the policy of half a century for the sake of an extended cotton trade, +and to purchase the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville by +recognizing what has been called 'the isothermal law, which impels +African labour toward the tropics' on the other side of the +Atlantic[40]?" Moreover all Americans ought to understand clearly that +British respect for the United States "was not due to the attitude of +the South with its ruffian demonstrations in Congress.... All that is +noble and venerable in the United States is associated with its Federal +Constitution[41]." + +Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no direct +evidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography or letters +upon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent on the struggle +in America for the first few months and presumably public opinion, less +informed even than the press, received its impressions from the journals +customarily read. Both at this period and all through the war, also, it +should be remembered, clearly, that most newspapers, all the reviews, in +fact nearly all vehicles of British expression, were in the early +'sixties "in the hands of the educated classes, and these educated +classes corresponded closely with the privileged classes." The more +democratic element of British Society lacked any adequate press +representation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by such +comparatively crude methods as public meetings and demonstrations, but +it was hampered in literary and political expression[42]." The opinion +of the press was then, presumably, the opinion of the majority of the +educated British public. + +Thus British comment on America took the form, at first of +moralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet very +generally asserting the essential justice of the Northern position. But +it was early evident that the newspapers, one and all, were quite +unprepared for the determined front soon put up by South Carolina and +other Southern States. Surprised by the violence of Southern +declarations, the only explanation found by the British press was that +political control had been seized by the uneducated and lawless element. +The _Times_ characterized this element of the South as in a state of +deplorable ignorance comparable with that of the Irish peasantry, a +"poor, proud, lazy, excitable and violent class, ever ready with knife +and revolver[43]." The fate of the Union, according to the _Saturday +Review_, was in the hands of the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, and +most lawless [class] in the world--the poor or mean whites of the Slave +States[44]." Like judgments were expressed by the _Economist_ and, more +mildly, by the _Spectator_[45]. Subsequently some of these journals +found difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle to +expressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of the +South; but all, especially the _Times_, were skilled by long practice +in the journalistic art of facing about while claiming perfect +consistency. In denial of a Southern right of secession, also, they were +nearly a unit[46], though the _Saturday Review_ argued the case for the +South, making a pointed parallel between the present situation and that +of the American Colonies in seceding from England[47]. + +The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an initial +confusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the theory of an +"enlightened press." The Reviews, by the conditions of publication, came +into action more slowly and during 1860 there appeared but one article, +in the _Edinburgh Review_, giving any adequate idea of what was really +taking place in America[48]. The lesser British papers generally +followed the tone of the leading journals, but without either great +interest or much acumen. In truth the depth of British newspaper +ignorance, considering their positiveness of utterance, appears utterly +astonishing if regarded from the view-point of modern historical +knowledge. But is this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there not +equal confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself, +certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They also +had come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were slow to +understand that the great conflict of ideals and interests was at +last begun. + +The British press both influenced and reflected educated class opinion, +and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John Russell at the +Foreign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, were +exchanging anxious letters, and the latter was sending home reports +remarkable for their clear analysis of the American controversy. Yet +even he was slow to appreciate the inevitability of secession. + +[Illustration: LORD LYONS (_From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S.A., +in 1860) (From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind permission_)] + +Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the United +States, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to that of the +press. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a far-fetched view of +causes, is supplied in a letter of February 2, 1860, from Consul Bunch, +at Charleston, S.C., to Lord Lyons, the British Minister at +Washington[49]. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had been given the +evening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston. Being called upon for +a speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the Turf at home, and had +referred especially to the Plates run for the various British colonies. +Continuing, he said: + + "'... I cannot help calling your attention to the great loss + you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial + Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had + continued to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure + in sending you some Plates too.' + + "Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke, + calculated to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my + amazement, the company chose to take me literally, and + applauded for about ten minutes--in fact I could not go on + for some time." + +Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration. He could +with difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be re-annexed as a +colony of Great Britain, and comments upon the episode in a somewhat +humorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his letter, he solemnly +assures Lord Lyons that + + "... The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people' of + South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents, + therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of + universal suffrage." + +It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in England +there was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a resumption of +colonial relations, though W.H. Russell, correspondent of the _Times_, +reported in the spring, 1861, that he frequently heard the same +sentiment in the South[50]. For general official England, as for the +press, the truth is that up to the time of the secession of South +Carolina no one really believed that a final rupture was about to take +place between North and South. When, on December 20, 1860, that State in +solemn convention declared the dissolution "of the Union now existing +between South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the +'United States of America,'" and when it was understood that other +Southern States would soon follow this example, British opinion believed +and hoped that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until it +became clear that war would ensue, the South was still damned by the +press as seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery was +even more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In the +number for April, 1861, the _Edinburgh Review_ attributed the whole +difficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would be with the +anti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the very dissolution of +the Union would hasten the ultimate extinction of slavery since economic +competition with a neighbouring free state, the North, would compel the +South itself to abandon its beloved "domestic institution[51]." + +Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the _Times_, in a long and +carefully worded editorial, took up one by one the alleged causes of +secession, dismissed them as inadequate, and concluded, "... we cannot +disguise from ourselves that, apart from all political complications, +there is a right and a wrong in this question, and that the right +belongs, with all its advantages, to the States of the North[52]." Three +days later it asserted, "The North is for freedom of discussion, the +South represses freedom of discussion with the tar-brush and the +pine-fagot." And again, on January 10, "The Southern States expected +sympathy for their undertaking from the public opinion of this country. +The tone of the press has already done much to undeceive them...." + +In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press expressed +similar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The _Dublin News_ +published with approval a long communication addressed to Irishmen at +home and abroad: "... there is no power on earth or in heaven which can +keep in peace this unholy co-partnership.... I hope ... that the North +will quietly permit the South to retire from the confederacy and bear +alone the odium of all mankind[53]...." The _Saturday Review_ thought +that deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social structure of +the South which now visioned a re-opening of the African Slave Trade, +and the occupation by slavery of the whole southern portion of North +America. "A more ignoble basis for a great Confederacy it is impossible +to conceive, nor one in the long run more precarious.... Assuredly it +will be the Northern Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with a +policy untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, that +will be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the New +World[54]." The _London Chronicle_ was vigorous in denunciation. "No +country on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or a +treachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the new +Southern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in itself[55]. +The _London Review_ more moderately stigmatized slavery as the cause, +but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding the whole +matter as one of diverging economic systems and in any case as +inevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some time. The +inevitable might as well come now as later and would result in benefit +to both sections as well as to the world fearing the monstrous empire of +power that had grown up in America[56]. + +The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in truth, +definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was particularly true of +the provincial press. Garrison's _Liberator_, advocating extreme +abolition action, had long made a practice of presenting excerpts from +British newspapers, speeches and sermons in support of its cause. In +1860 there were thirty-nine such citations; in the first months of 1861 +many more, all condemning slavery and the South. For the most part these +citations represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section, +both in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnold +was among the first of men of letters to record his faith that secession +was final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the North, looking to +the purity of race and the opportunity for unhampered advance[57]. If +English writers were in any way influenced by their correspondents in +the United States they may, indeed, have well been in doubt as to the +origin and prospects of the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently at +home again after seven years' consulship in England, was writing that +abolition was not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittier +wrote to _his_ English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was the +basic issue[58]. But literary Britain was slow to express itself save in +the Reviews. These, representing varying shades of British upper-class +opinion and presenting articles presumably more profound than the +newspaper editorials, frequently offered more recondite origins of the +American crisis. The _Quarterly Review_, organ of extreme Conservatism, +in its first article, dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions, +a topic not here treated at length since it will be dealt with in a +separate chapter as deserving special study. The _Quarterly_ is also the +first to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated by +the North, was a real cause for Southern secession[59]; an idea made +much of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, but not +hitherto advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, there +was frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory. + + "At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern planters + did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country + gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with + him on the part of those in England who represented the old + traditions of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman' + theory, containing as it did an undeniable element of truth, + is much harped upon by certain of the reviewers, and one can + easily conceive of its popularity in the London Clubs.... The + 'American,' so familiar to British readers, during the first + half of the century, through the eyes of such travellers as + Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee,' and is located north + of Mason and Dixon's line[60]." + +Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of the Tory +organs alone, and the Radical _Westminster_ took pains to deny the truth +of the picture, asserting again and again that the vital and sole cause +of the conflict was slavery. Previous articles are summed up in that of +October, 1863, as a profession of the _Westminster's_ opinion +throughout: "... the South are fighting for liberty to found a Slave +Power. Should it prove successful, truer devil's work, if we may use the +metaphor, will rarely have been done[61]." + +Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British opinion +generally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had not soon +found cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from the trend of +events in America. Lincoln had been elected on a platform opposing the +further territorial expansion of slavery. On that point the North was +fairly well united. But the great majority of those who voted for +Lincoln would have indignantly repudiated any purpose to take active +steps toward the extinction of slavery where it already existed. Lincoln +understood this perfectly, and whatever his opinion about the ultimate +fate of slavery if prohibited expansion, he from the first took the +ground that the terms of his election constituted a mandate limiting his +action. As secession developed he rightly centred his thought and effort +on the preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to the +Presidency. + +Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at still +another great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing President, +Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until March 4, 1861, +there were still some Southern leaders, like Jefferson Davis, seeking +either a complete surrender to Southern will, or advantages for Southern +security in case secession was accomplished. Buchanan appealed +hysterically to the old-time love of the Union and to the spirit of +compromise. Great congressional committees of both Senate and House of +Representatives were formed seeking a solution. Crittenden for the +border states between North and South, where, more than anywhere else, +there was division of opinion, proposed pledges to be given to the +South. Seward, long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was active +in the Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended to +conciliate by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler, +in the House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republican +colleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of slavery as +then established[62]. A constitutional amendment was drafted to this +effect and received Lincoln's preliminary approval. Finally Lincoln, in +his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared: + + "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with + the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I + believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no + inclination to do so." + +It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these efforts +were observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began to replace +the earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of slavery was at stake +in America. This offered an easy excuse for a switch-about of sympathy +as British commercial and other interests began to be developed, and +even dismayed the ardent friends of the anti-slavery North. Meanwhile +the Government of Great Britain, from the very first appearance of the +cloud of civil war, had focused its attention on the point of what the +events in America portended to British interests and policy. This is the +business of governments, and their agents would be condemned as +inefficient did they neglect it. But did British governmental policy go +beyond this entirely justifiable first thought for immediate British +interests to the point of positive hope that England would find an +advantage in the breaking up of the great American Republic? American +opinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of this +offence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the Civil +War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an unfriendly one +because of his official position, made emphatic declaration to like +effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, Russian Ambassador at +London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the English Government, at the +bottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into two +republics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one +the other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both, +would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them, +restraining them by their rival ambitions[63]." + +If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as to the +springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of official +and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no proof for such +accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, nor +Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, reveal any animus against +the United States. Considering his many personal ties with leaders of +both factions Lyons, from the first, reported events with wonderful +impartiality, and great clarity. On November 12, 1860, he sent to +Russell a full description of the clamour raised in the South over the +election of Lincoln, enumerated the resignation of Federal officials +(calling these "ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that +Lincoln was no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without +damage to the Union[64]. Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct +Lyons and the British consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather +than the other," and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless +asked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should be +against all violent action as tending toward civil war[65]. + +This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an eager +readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the dissolution of the +Union, but such an interpretation is not borne out by a reading of his +instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and anxious that British agents +should not gain the ill-will of either American faction, an ill-will +that would be alike detrimental in the future, whether the Union +remained unbroken or was destroyed. + +Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore repeated +frequently[66]. Meanwhile the first concrete problem requiring British +action came from the seizure by South Carolina of the Federal customs +house at the port of Charleston, and the attempt of the State +authorities to collect port dues customarily paid to Federal officials. +British shipowners appealed to Consul Bunch for instructions, he to +Lyons, and the latter to the American Secretary of State, Judge Black. +This was on December 31, 1860, while Buchanan was still President, and +Black's answer was evasive, though asserting that the United States must +technically regard the events in South Carolina as acts of violent +rebellion[67]. Black refused to state what action would be taken if +Bunch advised British shipowners to pay, but a way out of the +embarrassment was found by advising such payment to State authorities +"under protest" as done "under compulsion." To one of his letters to +Bunch on this topic, Lyons appended an expression indicative of his own +early attitude. "The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pill +which it will be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the +Slave Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish British +stomach will reject it[68]." + +Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon followed by +other Southern States, made a deep impression on Russell, especially +when compared with the uncertainty and irresolution manifested in the +attempted compromise measures of Northern statesmen. In a private letter +to Lyons, January 10, 1861, he wrote "I do not see how the United States +can be cobbled together again by any compromise.... I cannot see any +mode of reconciling such parties as these. The best thing _now_ would +be that the right to secede should be acknowledged.... I hope sensible +men will take this view.... But above all I hope no force will be +used[69]." And again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of the +Union is now inevitable[70]." To Russell, as to most foreign observers, +it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous extent +of territory, and its five and one-half millions of population, were +determined to leave the Union, no force whatever could compel a return. +History failed to record any revolution on so large a scale which had +not succeeded. His desire, therefore, was that the North would yield to +the inevitable, and would not plunge into a useless civil war disastrous +alike to the prosperity of America and of foreign nations. Russell's +first hope was that the South would forgo secession; his second, this +accomplished, that there would be no war, and in this sense he +instructed Lyons. The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and +more aware of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his +entire service at Washington that there was at least a _chance_ that the +North could subdue the South by might of arms[71], but he also, looking +to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, in cautious +suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from January to +March, 1861, British effort and indirect advice were based on the hope +that British trade interests might escape the tribulations inevitable +from a civil conflict in America. Beyond that point there was no grasp +of the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clear +formulation of British policy[72]. + +In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and official +British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determined +Northern effort to recover the South. Early British attitude was, +therefore, based on a misconception. As this became clear, public +opinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentiment +and to show, in some quarters, quite another face. Even as early as +January the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States had +not availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such an +incubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]." and a month +later professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit the +North to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexing +Canada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was +argued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down military +expenditures[74]. The _London Press_ indulged in similar speculation, +though from the angle of a Canadian annexation of the Northern States, +whose more sober citizens must by now be weary of the sham of American +democracy, and disgusted with the rowdyism of political elections, which +"combine the morals of a horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the +passions of a tap-room, and the emotions of a gambling house[75]." +Probably such suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the +moment, but it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in +Canada should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the +same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles Sumner +held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the face of the +growing Northern determination to preserve the Union. It lay at the +bottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old friend Charles +Francis Adams, now busy in schemes intended, apparently, to restore the +Union by compromise, and it led Sumner to hope for appointment as +Minister to England[76]. + +The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the _Times_, was one of +the first to begin the process of "face about," as civil war in America +seemed imminent[77]. Viewed from the later attitude of the _Times_, the +earlier expressions of that paper, and in truth of many British +journals, seem merely the customary platitudinous British holding up of +horrified hands at American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strong +editorial still proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting +"without law, without justice," but displayed a real dismay at the +possible consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January +22, the _Times_ reprinted an article from the _Economist_, on a probable +cessation of cotton supply and editorially professed great alarm, even +advocating an early recognition of the Southern confederacy if needed to +maintain that supply. From this time on there is no further note in the +_Times_ of the righteousness of the Northern cause; but while it is +still asserted that war would be folly, the strength of the South, its +superiority as a military nation, are depicted. + +A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial comment. +Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written by Bancroft +Davis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause, was discontinued. +W.H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the Crimea, was summoned +to London and, according to his own story, upon being given papers, +clippings, and correspondence (largely articles from the _New York +Herald_) supporting the right of the South to secede, hastily took his +departure for America to report upon the situation[78]. He sailed from +Queenstown on March 3, and arrived in New York on March 16. At last on +March 12, the _Times_ took positive ground in favour of the justice of +the Southern cause. + + "No treachery has been at work to produce the disruption, and + the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies + of every free and enlightened people. Such are the widely + different auspices under which the two rival Republics start + into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these + things by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly + swayed by their own interest, and the two Republics must be + weighed, not by their professions or their previous history, + but by the conduct they pursue and the position they maintain + among the Powers of the earth. Their internal institutions + are their own affair; their financial and political + arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil is a slave-holding + Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct it has + contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy of + nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free + from this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy + of America evinces a determination to act in a narrow, + exclusive, and unsocial spirit, while its Southern + competitor extends the hand of good fellowship to all + mankind, with the exception of its own bondsmen, we must not + be surprised to see the North, in spite of the goodness of + its cause and the great negative merit of the absence of + Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the + sympathy and regard of mankind." + +This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral tone +earlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that England +would not "stultify the policy of half a century for the sake of an +extended cotton trade[79]." + +The _Economist_, with more consistency, still reported the violence and +recklessness of the South, yet in logical argument proved to its own +satisfaction the impossibility of Northern reconquest, and urged a +peaceful separation[80]. The _Spectator_, even though pro-Northern, had +at first small hope of reunion by force, and offered consolation in the +thought that there would still remain a United States of America +"strong, powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the Black +South[81]." In short from all quarters the public press, whatever its +sympathy, united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failure +if undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion, +however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was indeed +more slow to make up its mind and more considerate in expressing itself. +When it became clear that in all probability the North would fight, +there was still no conception, any more than in the United States +itself, of the duration and intensity of the conflict. Indeed, Russell +yet hoped, as late as the end of January, that no protracted war would +occur. Nevertheless he was compelled to face the situation in its +relation to British commerce. + +On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of possible war +which would at once call for a determination of British policy. "Above +all things," he wrote, "endeavour to prevent a blockade of the Southern +coast. It would produce misery, discord, and enmity incalculable[82]." +Within a week Forster, a thorough friend of the North throughout the +whole war, was interrogating the Ministry in the House of Commons in +regard to the situation at Charleston, and expressing the hope that +England would not in any way attempt to interfere[83]. This was the +first reference in Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the +long vacation, to the American conflict, but British commercial +interests were being forced to a keener attention, and already men in +many circles were asking themselves what should be the proper +governmental attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could +justly claim European recognition; how far and how fast European +governments ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be +the proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a +declaration of neutrality ought to be issued. + +With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became important +for British statesmen to know something about the leaders in this new +Southern movement, the attitude of the people in general, and the +purposes of the new Government. Here, unfortunately, Lord Lyons could +be no guide. The consuls in the South, however, were in a position to +give their impressions. On February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell, +describing the election of Davis and Stephens[84], to the Presidency and +Vice-Presidency of the Confederacy, and giving a personal +characterization of many members of the Government. He was rather +caustic. Davis, he said, was the only _able_ man, and he, unfortunately, +was a confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunch +prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had acquiesced +in a Southern State and the fear of the North had passed. Bunch had no +faith in any future greatness of the South, asserting that it would be a +State despised among nations for its maintenance of slavery, and that it +could not hope for any encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations +of Europe; in fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to +the South. Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned +that the South had already actually established its independence. This +he seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter, +there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to the +Civil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity long +preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and her +certainty that a new State was being born. + +For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to report, +but up to the end of January he had not written in any great detail with +regard to the new administration and its make-up, though on January 7, +he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State and +had expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be "a +dangerous Foreign Minister[85]." Lincoln was still in Illinois and the +constituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward's voice was +sure to be a powerful one. Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to +talk with him. On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell, +Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter +had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was but +superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon +prevail[86]. In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons +asserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary +of State. He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to +protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in order +to resist such interference[87]. Again, on February 12, while himself +expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties in +America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solve +these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governments +refused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formal +blockade closing the Southern ports[88]. Writing privately, Lyons +exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested +that the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for +if these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade, +Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89]. + +Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction in +which it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld and +a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by an +assertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy toward +England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of +strength but that "blustering demonstrations" must not be carried too +far[90]. Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the +possibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in +America. Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons +that this might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct +Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same +time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism. +Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for a +time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see what +Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope of +compromise, and that in his own view this was still possible. In this +letter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyons +is concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a +resumption of normal relations between the North and South. He at least +had no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91]. + +Before this communication could reach England Russell had thoroughly +awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in relation to +British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to Lyons, he +stated, "I hope you are getting on well with the new President. If he +blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a difficulty. But according +to all American doctrine it must be an actual blockade kept up by an +efficient force[92]." Thus, before any act had really occurred in +America, the matter of a blockade was occupying the attention of British +statesmen. One difficulty at the time was that there was no one in +England qualified to speak for the new administration at Washington. +Dallas, the American Minister appointed under the Buchanan +administration, while, unlike some other diplomatic representatives +abroad, faithful to the cause of the United States, was nevertheless not +wholly trusted by Lincoln or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in +representing to Russell American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had +very little communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England was +known to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell, +"Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister in +London. I think it a very good appointment[93]." This news was received +in London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to elapse before Adams +reached his post. The appointment of Adams, however, seemed to Lyons a +matter of congratulation in his hope that no vicious anti-British policy +would be indulged in by Seward. Ten days after his telegram, he wrote at +length to Russell, making an excellent statement and analysis in regard +to the character of Adams. + + "Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. of the + U.S., and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The + grandfather was the first Am. minister in England. The father + was one of the Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the + Convention of the 3rd July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of + the H. of R. for one of the districts of Mass., acted with + the less violent section of the 'Republican' Party. During + the last session of Congress he made a very remarkable + speech on the state of the Union, denying the reasonableness + of the complaints of the Southern States, but stating his + desire that every concession not inconsistent with honour and + principle should be made to them. He is considered to be a + man of great independence of character, and has the + reputation of being very tenacious of his own opinions. In + manner he is quiet and unassuming. He is a man of good + fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a considerable family in Mass., + of the name of Brooks. The late wife of Mr. Edward Everett, + who, as your L. is aware, has held the offices of Minister in + London and Secretary of State, was her sister[94]." + +Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the same time +by Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now being despatched +to London, but they were not so favourable. Mann, wrote Bunch, was the +son of a "bankrupt grocer." His personal character was "not good," yet +he alone of the three Commissioners appointed had had diplomatic +experience. Yancey, it was stated, was an able lawyer, a stirring +orator, and a recognized leader of the secession movement, but he was +also extremely pro-slavery in his views, had expressed himself in favour +of a renewal of the slave trade, and throughout his career had been a +"manifest destiny" man. Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusion +Bunch described the extreme confidence expressed in the South in "King +Cotton," and in rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern +Commissioners thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be +compelled to bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get +cotton[95]. + +The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an astonishingly +pro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald, consul at New York, +wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, an exceedingly strong +statement of his faith in the power of the North and its fixed and +unalterable determination to force the South back into the Union, his +confidence in Northern success, and his belief in the justice of the +Northern cause. He ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to +pursue, viz., to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly +and clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did not +feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such a +consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for the +North as would help in shortening the war[96]. The British Consul at +Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far, indeed, did these +men go in expressing their sympathy with the North, that Lyons, on April +27, commented to Russell that these consuls had "taken the Northern War +Fever," and that he had mildly reproved Archibald[97]. + +With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the installation of +Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for Lyons to become more +active in his efforts to prevent a disruption of British Trade. On March +20 he told Seward in a confidential conversation: + + "... If the United States determined to stop by force so + important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the + cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what + might happen. + + "... It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to + England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were + to take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were + to be at the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an + immense pressure would be put upon Her Majesty's Government + to use all the means in their power to open those ports. If + Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to do so, + they would naturally endeavour to effect their object in a + manner as consistent as possible, first with their friendly + feelings towards both Sections of this Country, and secondly + with the recognized principles of International Law. As + regards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared + that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to + recognize the Southern Confederacy[98]." + +This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the South did +not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five days later, on +March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreign +Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all +ships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade, +made Lyons very anxious. As a host he diverted the conversation lest it +become too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward + + "... that it was really a matter so very serious that I was + unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount + in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast + comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an + enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase + the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in + the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of + submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99]." + +Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the Southern +Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treated +well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his folly. Still +Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as his +language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that "prudent +counsels" were in the ascendant, that there would be no interference +with trade "_at present_," and that a quieter tone was everywhere +perceptible in Washington[100]. + +From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, the +danger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain lay +in this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports. Naturally, +and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade. At first, +indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war really +ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. Certainly he bore hard +and constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not only +officials at Washington but the public press. Thus, in a letter to Bunch +dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W.H. Russell, the +_Times_ correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed +Bunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impress +him with the idea that any interruption of trade might and probably +would result in a British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, "... +the _only_ chance, if chance there still be of preventing an +interruption of the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained +here, that it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.[101]" In these +words is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the +fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade rather +than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result in a +British recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen, when the +blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause for recognition +and was most tolerant of its early ineffectiveness. + +While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the relations +between England and America at London were exceedingly meagre. All that +the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's intentions is summed up +in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and April 9, 1861[102]. On the +former date, he gave an account of an interview with Russell in which +the latter simply refused to pledge himself against a recognition of +the Confederacy; in the latter, presenting a long memorial written by +Seward to all of the larger European Governments arguing in friendly +spirit the cause of the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell +merely a general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the +United States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful +solution. Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English +policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be better +for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any definite +action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though the latter +later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There is no doubt, +however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say to Dallas, the +separation in America was an accomplished fact and the hope of Great +Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful separation. + +Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting that no +definite stand was yet being taken by the American Government. At the +same time Russell was continuing his instructions to Lyons to recommend +conciliation "but never to obtrude advice unasked[103]." Yet Russell was +not wholly undisturbed by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude, +for in a private letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to +Lyons, "I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us +through the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr. +Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the +Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a +proper distance[104]." It is an interesting query, whether this fear +thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct benefit to the +United States at the moment when the Southern Commissioners arrived in +England. The inference would seem to be clear, that in spite of Lyons' +advice to treat them well, the effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude +was to treat them coolly. Russell was indeed distinctly worried by +Seward's unfriendly attitude. + +In the meantime the British press and public, while still uncertain and +divided as to the merits of the conflict were now substantially a unit +in accepting separation as final. The _Times_, with judicial ponderosity +declared: "The new nationality has been brought forth after a very short +period of gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted +themselves a nation[105] ..." At the other end of the scale in newspaper +"tone," the _London Press_ jeered at the Northern American eagle as +having "had his tail pulled out and his wings clipped--yet the meek bird +now holds out his claws to be pared, with a resignation that would be +degrading in the most henpecked of domestic fowls[106]." Having now +veered about to expressions of confidence in the permanency of the +Southern Confederacy the _Times_ was also compelled to alter its opinion +of Southern Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate +Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far superior +to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to resist making +the customary reference to manners traditionally American; + + "With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain from + quoting the _naive_ testimony of a visitor in its favour. + 'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in + Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such + industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant + Congressional action. _Not one member has appeared in his + seat under the influence of liquors or wines_, not a harsh + word has been uttered in debate, and all exhibit the most + unflagging energy and determination[107].'" + +The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the _Times_, +forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the control of +"ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike directness and +sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the stupidity of the +North, displayed in its tariff policy[108]. A few journals thought that +the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle but that such a +victory would be disastrous to the principles of federalism[109], and, +in any case, that this civil war was one without "a noble cause to +sustain either side[110]." By May nearly all the older journals were +aligned on the right of the South to secede, and on the fact of a +successful secession, though still differing as to the basic causes and +essential justice involved. In this same month, however, there emerged a +few vigorous champions of the Northern cause and prospects. In April the +_Spectator_ agreed that the Great Republic was at an end[111]; in May it +urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of +ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of all +European nations[112]. A small newspaper of limited circulation, the +_Morning Star_, organ of John Bright, had from the first championed the +Northern cause. Now, as the armed conflict broke in America, it was +joined by a more important paper, the _Daily News_, which set itself the +task of controverting the _Times_. Moreover the _Daily News_ was all the +more influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet +consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause and +principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling for a +low price, twopence-halfpenny, the _Daily News_, like the _Westminster_ +among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and more popular constituency +than the older publications, especially to a constituency not yet vocal, +since still unrepresented, in Parliament[113]. + +The _Daily News_ was fortunate in having, after 1862, the best-informed +New York correspondent writing to the London press. This was an +Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in America, was the +intimate friend of literary men, and himself, later, a great moulder of +public opinion[114]. Harriet Martineau further aided the _Daily News_ by +contributing pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical +circles[115]. But literary England in general, was slow to express +itself with conviction, though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was +firmly determined in his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was +writing in letters of the "good cause[116]." But Browning was a rare +exception and it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many +months that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make +comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was +negligible[117]. + +In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike indicative of +a widespread conviction that Southern independence was assured, there +still remained both in those circles where anti-slavery sentiment was +strong, and in others more neutral in sympathy, a distaste for the +newly-born State as the embodiment of a degrading institution. Lincoln's +inaugural address denying an intention to interfere with slavery was a +weapon for the friends of the South, but it could not wholly still that +issue. Even in the _Times_, through the medium of W.H. Russell's +descriptive letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his +"Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and perfect +the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the more hateful +and odious does slavery become[118]," and in his letter of May 8, from +Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale of slaves he stated: + + "I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor negro + worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill + through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar + with the fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as + absolutely the owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew, + flesh and brains as of the horse which stood by my side. + There was no sophistry which could persuade me the man was + not a man--he was, indeed, by no means my brother, but + assuredly he was a fellow creature[119]." + +This was hard printing for the _Times_, in its new advocacy of the +South, and Russell's description was made much of by the _Westminster +Review_ and other publications that soon began to sound again the +"issue" of slavery[120]. Yet the _Westminster_ itself in the same +article decried the folly of the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also +thought even John Bright at the moment, when expressing himself +privately to friends in America[121]. + +Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British public, but of +what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world State were in fact +born? And if a State in power, why not give it prompt recognition? The +extreme British anti-slavery opponents feared that this was just what +the Government was inclined to do, and with promptness. Here and there +meetings were hurriedly called to protest against recognition[122]. This +fear was unfounded. Neither in London nor at Washington was there any +official inclination to hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward +the logic of such action, if British trade were illegally interfered +with. By April 9 Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the +Cabinet would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer +be attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to +follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in +Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere to +protect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassing +to that trade. He himself was still insisting, but with dwindling +confidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under any +circumstances. And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated to +Russell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners with +deference. Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase the +Northern confidence that they may do anything without provoking the +resistance of England[123]. + +Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all it +was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if that +injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) he +did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action by +Great Britain. When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter in +Charleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyons +expressed himself with regard to other elements in the struggle +previously neglected in his correspondence. On April 15 describing to +Russell the fall of Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun. +The North he believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the +South more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of +slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized +world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the cotton States +is of vital importance to manufacturing nations[124]...." but Lyons was +now facing an actual situation rather than a possible one, and as will +be seen later, he soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this +"commercial intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of +the South. + +With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a civil +war was actually under way in America, a large number of new and vexing +problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them furnishes the +subject matter of later chapters. For the period previous to April, +1861, British official attitude may be summed up in the statement that +the British Minister at Washington hoped against hope that some solution +might be found for the preservation of the Union, but that at the same +time, looking to future British interests and possibly believing also +that his attitude would tend to preserve the Union, he asserted +vehemently the impossibility of any Northern interference with British +trade to Southern ports. Across the water, Russell also hoped faintly +that there might be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that +separation inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed +his hope on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this, +however, he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else +in England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a +long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering the +arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new, +independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the future is +no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of British +governmental pleasure in American disruption was justified[125]. +Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge himself to Dallas, was using +exactly such caution as a Foreign Secretary was bound to exercise. He +would have been a rash man who, in view of the uncertainty and +irresolution of Northern statesmen, would have committed Great Britain +in March, 1861, to a definite line of policy. + +On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend +reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an instruction +from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of "traditional friendship" +against a British recognition of the Confederacy. Russell again refused +to pledge his Government, but on April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British +Ministers were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and +final[126]." In the early morning of that same day the armed conflict in +America had begun, and on the day following, April 13, the first +Southern victory had been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The +important question which the man at the head of the British Foreign +Office had now immediately to decide was, what was to be England's +attitude, under international law, toward the two combatants in +America. In deciding this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of +morality, nor humanitarianism need play any part; England's _first_ need +and duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens +the correct position, under International law, which must be assumed in +the presence of certain definite facts. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the 'fifties Great +Britain made a sharp change of policy. (_Cambridge History of British +Foreign Policy_, Vol. II, p. 283.)] + +[Footnote 32: Thomas Colley Grattan, _Civilized America_, 2 vols. 2nd +ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The first edition was printed in +1859 and a third in 1861. In some respects the work is historically +untrustworthy since internal evidence makes clear that the greater part +of it was written before 1846, in which year Grattan retired from his +post in Boston. In general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his +son succeeded to the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it +wiser to postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which +treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This fact +and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work importance as +influencing British knowledge and opinions.] + +[Footnote 33: Charles Mackay, _Life and Liberty in America: or, Sketches +of a Tour in the United States and Canada in 1857-8_, one vol., New +York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at least of sufficient repute as a +poet to be thought worthy of a dinner in Boston at which there were +present, Longfellow, Holmes, Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks, +and others. He preached "hands across the seas" in his public lectures, +occasionally reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance +copy of Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding +verse, "John" speaking, was: + + "And I have strength for nobler work + Than e'er my hand has done, + And realms to rule and truths to plant + Beyond the rising sun. + Take you the West and I the East; + We'll spread ourselves abroad, + With trade and spade and wholesome laws, + And faith in man and God." +] + +[Footnote 34: Duncan, _Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer_, Vol. I, p. +140.] + +[Footnote 35: R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes on "The +English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work on this +subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford University before +completing his thesis. His notes have been of considerable value, both +for suggested citations from the English Press, and for points of +interpretation.] + +[Footnote 36: _Economist_, November 24, 1860. Six months later, however, +the _Economist_ pictured Lincoln as merely an unknown "sectionalist," +with no evidence of statesmanship--_Economist_, June 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 37: _Saturday Review_, November 24, 1860.] + +[Footnote 38: _Spectator_, November 24, 1860.] + +[Footnote 39: The _Times_, November 26, 1860.] + +[Footnote 40: _Ibid._, November 29, 1860.] + +[Footnote 41: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 42: R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the +American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in fulfilment of the +requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Stanford University, +1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a valuable study of the +Reviews and of the writings of men of letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus +"English Opinion."] + +[Footnote 43: The _Times_, January 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 44: _Saturday Review_, January 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 45: _Economist_, December 8, 1860. _Spectator_, January 19, +1861.] + +[Footnote 46: _Spectator_, December 1, 1860. _Times_, January 29, 1861. +_Economist_, May 25, 1861.] + +[Footnote 47: _Saturday Review_, January 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 48: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 112, p. 545.] + +[Footnote 49: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 50: Russell, _My Diary North and South_, Boston, 1863, p. 134. +"Then cropped out again the expression of regret for the rebellion of +1776, and the desire that if it came to the worst, England would receive +back her erring children, or give them a prince under whom they could +secure a monarchical form of government. There is no doubt about the +earnestness with which these things are said." Russell's _Diary_ is +largely a condensation of his letters to the _Times_. In the letter of +April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a column +on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of colonial +relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported a Charleston +sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club in February. He +wrote to Lyons: + + "The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration of a + newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the + _nefastus ille dies_ in which the bloody Britishers left + Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for + about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos _de_ + nothing at all." + +In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic demonstration. +Returning to his home one evening, he met a military company, which from +curiosity he followed, and which + + "drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of my + friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium + of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto + Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very + brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life + an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded, + to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr. + Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the + amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (_dia + stomatos_) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back + into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a + blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy + that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over + the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to + the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit + on the floor." + +Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the +British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than the +clamour of the orator, that offended him? (_Lyons Papers_.)] + +[Footnote 51: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 113, p. 555.] + +[Footnote 52: The _Times_, January 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 53: Letter to _Dublin News_, dated January 26, 1861. Cited in +_The Liberator_, March 1, 1861. Garrison, editor of _The Liberator_, was +then earnest in advocating "letting the South go in peace" as a good +riddance.] + +[Footnote 54: _Saturday Review_, March 2, 1861, p. 216.] + +[Footnote 55: _London Chronicle_, March 14, 1861. Cited in _The +Liberator_, April 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 56: _London Review_, April 20, 1861. Cited in Littel's _Living +Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the _Review_ was a Dr. Mackay, +but I have been unable to identify him, as might seem natural from his +opinions, as the Mackay previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York +correspondent of the _Times_.] + +[Footnote 57: Matthew Arnold, _Letters_, Vol. I., p. 150. Letter to Mrs. +Forster, January 28, 1861.] + +[Footnote 58: Julian Hawthorne, _Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife_, Vol. +II, pp. 271-78. _Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier_, Vol. II, +pp. 439 seq.] + +[Footnote 59: _Quarterly Review_, Vol. 110, p. 282. July, 1861.] + +[Footnote 60: Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 7.] + +[Footnote 61: _Westminster_, Vol. LXXX, p. 587.] + +[Footnote 62: Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his former +intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of Adams was, +foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so strongly the +arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create greater unity of +Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could not be declared and +both at home and abroad his action, and that of other former +anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith that the North was +in earnest on the general issue of slavery.] + +[Footnote 63: _Services rendered by Russia to the American People during +the War of the Rebellion_, Petersburg, 1904, p. 5.] + +[Footnote 64: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 1.] + +[Footnote 65: _Ibid._, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, December 26, 1860.] + +[Footnote 66: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, January 5, 1861, and No. +17, February 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 67: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Lords_, Vol. XVIII. +Correspondence with U.S. Government respecting suspension of Federal +Customs House at the Port of Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.] + +[Footnote 68: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, 1860.] + +[Footnote 69: _Ibid._, The same day official instructions were sent +permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, but directing him, if asked to +recognize South Carolina, to refer the matter to England. F.O., Am., +Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, January 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 70: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, 1861.] + +[Footnote 71: This view was not shared by Lyons' colleagues at +Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early declared the Union +permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, yet hoped the North +would soon accept the inevitable and seek close co-operation with the +South in commerce and in foreign relations. This view was repeated by +him many times and most emphatically as late as the first month of 1863. +(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No. +342.) It was not until September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope +for a Northern reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A. +Golder, of Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts +covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the United +States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this material the +English translation is mine.] + +[Footnote 72: Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with Lyons, at which he, +Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had asserted that if Civil +War came all foreign commerce with the South would be interrupted. To +this Lyons protested that England could not get along without cotton and +that she would secure it in one way or another. Seward made no reply. +(_Ibid._, March 25-April 9, 1861, No. 810.)] + +[Footnote 73: _Economist_, January 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 74: _Ibid._, February 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 75: _London Press_, March 23, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living +Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.] + +[Footnote 76: Before Adams' selection as Minister to England was decided +upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were urging him for the place. +Longfellow was active in this interest. _H.W. Longfellow_, by Samuel +Longfellow, Vol. II, pp. 412-13.] + +[Footnote 77: John Bright later declared "his conviction that the +leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or friendly +article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to office." Dasent, +_Life of Delane_, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is approximately correct, but +the shift in policy began earlier, when it came to be feared that the +North would not submit to peaceable secession.] + +[Footnote 78: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. I, pp. 344-45.] + +[Footnote 79: See _ante_, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 80: _Economist_, March 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 81: _Spectator_, March 16, 1861.] + +[Footnote 82: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 83: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February 22, 1861. +William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early taken part in +public meetings called to express humanitarian sentiment. From 1850 on +he was an acceptable public speaker in all matters liberal, as free +trade, social reform, and anti-slavery. Elected to Parliament in 1859 +and again in 1861 from Bradford, where he was engaged in business as a +woollen manufacturer, he sought, after the fashion of new Members, a +cause to represent and found it in championship of the North. Having +great native ability, as shown by his later distinguished career, it was +the good fortune of the United States thus to enlist so eager a +champion. Forster and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the +North" in Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but +was more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a +reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved prestige +for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and private +secretary of the American Minister to England, once told the writer that +he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, the most valuable +rendered by any Englishman to the North.] + +[Footnote 84: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.] + +[Footnote 85: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I, p. 30.] + +[Footnote 86: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.] + +[Footnote 87: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 88: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.] + +[Footnote 89: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 90: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 17. Russell to +Lyons, February 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 91: F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March 11. It is +curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no extended +characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with the new +President were insufficient to justify it. The first record of personal +impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later printed in his +"Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the _Times_. Russell was +taken to the White House. "Soon afterwards there entered, with a +shambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean +man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long +pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, +however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression +produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and +wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness, +sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes dark, full, and +deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almost +amounts to tenderness.... A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street +would not take him to be what--according to usages of European +society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at the same time, it would not +be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street +without notice."--_My Diary_, I, pp. 37-8.] + +[Footnote 92: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 93: F.O., Am., Vol. 761.] + +[Footnote 94: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, 1861. Received +April 16.] + +[Footnote 95: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. Received +April 9.] + +[Footnote 96: F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, 1861.] + +[Footnote 97: Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 98: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, 1861. Printed +in Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I., p. 31.] + +[Footnote 99: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 100: Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 101: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 102: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, pp, 80-81.] + +[Footnote 103: F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to Lyons, April 6, +1861.] + +[Footnote 104: Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861.] + +[Footnote 105: The _Times_, February 26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 106: _London Press_, March 30, 1861, Cited in Littell's +_Living Age_, Vol. 69, p. 379.] + +[Footnote 107: The _Times_, March 26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 108: _Saturday Review_, May 11, 1861, pp. 465-6.] + +[Footnote 109: _Economist_, May 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 110: _Examiner_, January 5 and (as quoted) April 27, 1861. +Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 68, p. 758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.] + +[Footnote 111: _Spectator_, April 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 112: _Ibid._, May 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 113: These four publications, the _Spectator_, the +_Westminster_, the _Daily News_, and the _Morning Star_, were the +principal British pro-Northern organs. In addition _The Liberator_ names +among the lesser and provincial press the following: _Nonconformist, +British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, Newcastle +Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury_ and _Belfast Whig_. Duffus, "English +Opinion," p. 40.] + +[Footnote 114: Godkin had joined the staff of the _Daily News_ in 1853. +During the Crimea War he was special war correspondent. He had travelled +extensively in America in the late 'fifties and was thoroughly well +informed. From 1862 to 1865 his letters to the _Daily News_ were of +great value in encouraging the British friends of the North. In 1865 +Godkin became editor of the New York _Nation_.] + +[Footnote 115: W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet Martineau alone +who was keeping English opinion about America on the right side through +the Press." The _Daily News_ Jubilee Edition, p. 46.] + +[Footnote 116: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, Vol. II, +p. 92.] + +[Footnote 117: Moncure D. Conway's _Autobiography_ asserts that +two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union cause, some of +them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, Sir Charles Lyell, +Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic +Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406. +This is probably true of ultimate, though not of initial, interest and +attitude. But for many writers their published works give no clue to +their opinions on the Civil War--as for example the works of Dickens, +Thackeray, William Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion," +p. 103.] + +[Footnote 118: Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 398.] + +[Footnote 119: The _Times_, May 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 120: _Westminster Review_, Vol. 76, pp. 487-509, October, +1861.] + +[Footnote 121: Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited in Rhodes, +_United States_, Vol. III, p. 509.] + +[Footnote 122: A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, declared that +anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the South. Reported in +_Liberator_, May 31, 1861.] + +[Footnote 123: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and 142.] + +[Footnote 124: _Ibid._, No. 146.] + +[Footnote 125: See _ante_, pp. 50-51.] + +[Footnote 126: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.] + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861 + +In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under the +leadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" Liberal +Government, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so constituted +that almost equal influence was attributed to the Foreign Secretary, +Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held the Premiership, and, as +they represented different wings of the Whig-Liberal party, it was +prophesied by political wiseacres that personal friction would soon lead +to a new disruption. Nor were the possible elements of discord confined +to these two. Gladstone, formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a time +uncertain whether to return to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals, +had yielded to Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters, +and had joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed to +him in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadership +among the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home Secretary +until July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April, 1863, Secretary +for War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and conciliator between +these divergent interests stood Lord Granville, President of Council, +then a "Conservative-Liberal," especially valuable to the Cabinet for +the confidence reposed in him by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. + +In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this he had +built his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism," assertive of +England's honour and jealous for British advantage. Now, however, as +head of a Government requiring the most delicate handling to maintain +itself, he devoted his energies to details of political management in +which he had great skill. His ambition was, primarily, to retain office, +and in this purpose he was fortunate because, unknown to his ministerial +colleagues, he had received an indirect pledge from Lord Derby, the +Opposition leader, that there would be, for a time at least, no +determined effort to unseat him so long as his Ministry brought forward +no Bill for a further expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingness +to make any further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerston +was wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so, +was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John," gained by his +assertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step toward +democracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchise +question. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the +"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political faith, and +none were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The outspoken Radicals in +Parliament, like John Bright, and his friend Cobden, who had refused to +take office under Palmerston, gave a lukewarm support to the Ministry, +but would not pledge themselves to steadfast adherence. They had hopes +of Gladstone, believed that he would ultimately come into their group, +but meanwhile watched with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeed +Palmerston desired it, in the details of financial management to the +exclusion of other questions. + +The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward democracy +as affecting British policy during the American Civil War will be +considered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had not become a +clear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as historical evidence can +determine, affect early governmental policy toward America. The +outstanding feature of the British Government in 1861 is that it was +made up of various so-called "Liberal" elements, the representatives of +each of which carried on the business of his own department much as he +pleased. Palmerston's was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever he +cared to express it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern was +to keep his all-star associates running smoothly together and thus to +give no occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followed +that Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreign +affairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed the +Government was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell Ministry." +These two were the leaders of the team; next came Gladstone and +Cornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation, and each eager to +lead when their elders should retire from harness. Gladstone's great +ability was already recognized, but his personal political faith was not +yet clear. Lewis, lacking his rival's magnetic and emotional qualities, +cold, scholarly, and accurate in performance, was regarded as a +statesman of high promise[127]. Other Cabinet members, as is the custom +of coalitions, were more free in opinion and action than in a strict +party ministry where one dominating personality imposes his will upon +his colleagues. + +Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the main voice +of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme crisis, governmental +foreign policy was Russell's policy. This was even more true as regards +American than European affairs, for the former were little understood, +and dependence was necessarily placed upon the man whose business it was +to be familiar with them. Indeed there was little actual parliamentary +or governmental interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American +question, attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian +expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian +islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in Schleswig-Holstein. +Neither did the opposition party venture to express a policy as regards +America. Lord Derby, able but indolent, occasionally indulged in caustic +criticism, but made no attempt to push his attack home. Malmesbury, his +former Foreign Secretary, was active and alert in French affairs, but +gave no thought to relations across the Atlantic[128]. Disraeli, Tory +leader in the Commons, skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the +Government's policy, but never on the American question, though +frequently urged to do so by the friends of the South. In short for the +first year of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward +America was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend +or foe. + +This being the case, what did Russell know about the American crisis? +Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived from the +reports of British officials in the United States, and from the pages of +the public press. The salient facts known to Russell were few. Lincoln's +Cabinet had been named. Lincoln himself was absolutely an unknown +quantity, but it was unbelievable that a man of his origins and history +could be more than a mere figurehead--an opinion then held as widely in +America as in England. But someone must determine American policy, and +by universal consent, this would be Seward. + +The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in England +than any other American statesman, with the possible exception of +Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had established a +circle of British friendships. Both men were accepted as champions of +anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations and his so-called +"martyrdom" under the physical violence of the South Carolinan, Brooks; +and Seward for his clever political anti-Southern leadership in the +United States Senate. But Seward's reputation in this respect was offset +by the belief that he was anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at +least that he was very ready to arouse for political ends the customary +anti-British sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New +York. In 1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the +Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of +Newcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then +"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat, +whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious speculation +in British governmental circles[129]. Moreover Seward's reputation was +that of a wily, clever politician, rather unscrupulous in methods which +British politicians professed to disdain--a reputation serving to dim +somewhat, as indeed it did in America also, the sincere idealisms and +patriotism of the statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in Great +Britain as a rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding power +in the new Republican administration. + +This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but not by +all. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis Adams, himself +a most stiffly upright politician, both regarded Seward as the only +possible leader of Republican party policy and rejoiced that this was +so, having great confidence in his chief's integrity and wisdom. Adams +himself was well suited to his new post. He was known as having early in +1849 fought the battle of anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig," and later +as a leading Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts. +Principally, however, he was suited to his post by education, family, +and character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father's +ministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England. His +father and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, both +Presidents of the United States, had both, also, been American Ministers +at London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide acquaintance through +training and study with European affairs, especially those of Britain, +and equipped with high intellectual gifts, Adams was still further +fitted to his new post by his power of cool judgment and careful +expression in critical times. His very coolness, sometimes appearing as +coldness and stiff dignity, rendered him an especially fit agent to deal +with Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. The two men quickly +learned to respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose in +national policies. + +But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in London. The +Southern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama, but soon +transferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson Davis as +President and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President. Neither man was well +known in England, though both had long been prominent in American +politics. The little British information on Davis, that he had served in +the United States Senate and as a Cabinet member, seemed to indicate +that he was better fitted to executive duties than his rival, Lincoln. +But Davis' foreign policy was wholly a matter for speculation, and his +Cabinet consisted of men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. In +truth it was not a Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune of +the South that everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southern +gentlemen sought reputation and glory in the army rather than in +political position. Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the +importance to the South of a well-considered and energetic foreign +policy. At first, indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention +to the exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southern +patriotism, Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary +in denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to +appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on both +slavery and secession[130]. "The single exception to this general +policy[131]" was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and +Mann, all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Of +these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic experience. +Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he at least was +known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern orator, demanding for +ten years past, that Southern action in defence of states rights and +Southern "interests," which now, at last, the South was attempting[132]. + +Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached London +on April 29[133]. Meanwhile in this same month of April, conditions in +America, so long confused and uncertain, were being rapidly clarified. +The South, earlier than the North, had come to a determined policy, for +while during January and February, at the Montgomery convention, there +had been uncertainty as to actively applying the doctrinaire right of +secession, by March the party of action had triumphed, and though there +was still talk of conferences with the North, and commissioners actually +appointed, no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In the +North, the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincoln +was not inaugurated until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was +earlier possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed. +European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing to let +the South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was discussing the +advisability of a separate secession by that financial centre from +Nation and State alike--and of setting up as a "free town." Seward, just +appointed Secretary of State, was repudiating in both official and +private talk any intention to coerce the South by force of arms[134]. It +is no wonder that British statesmen were largely at sea over the +American situation. + +But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort Sumter +in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal fortress +under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That event drove +away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and removed the last +vestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of militant patriotism swept +over both sections[135]. Hurriedly both North and South prepared for +war, issuing calls for volunteers and organizing in all accustomed +warlike preparations. The news of Sumter reached London on April 27, and +that civil war seemed certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis, +since the South lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue +letters of marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a +Northern intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such +letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to be +instituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British officials and +public after the long delay and uncertainty of months, events in America +had precipitated a state of war, though in fact there were still to +elapse other months in which both North and South laboured to transform +a peaceful society into one capable of waging effective battle. + +The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to alter, +almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British policy, +though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting the turn of +events, had given careful consideration to the steps required of it in +just such a situation as had now arisen. Certainly both Lyons and +Russell had been deeply anxious for some time, and had visualized a +proper British policy. The movement in Great Britain now became rapid. +On April 29, Malmesbury, in the Lords, spoke of the news of civil war +which had arrived "this morning," and asked if the Government had tried +to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with other powers to +check it. Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United +States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions from +Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be extremely +careful about offering advice unless "asked for by the contending +parties themselves." Both speakers commented on the "ties of blood" +rendering Britain especially anxious in this American quarrel, and +regretted the conflict[136]. Malmesbury's query as to the approach to +another government, meaning France, was evaded. That some such approach, +in accordance with the earlier advice of Lyons[137], had already been +made, is evident from the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas +learned from Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though +what that action would be was not made clear[138]. As Dallas' report was +soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be considered, the +paragraph referring to this matter is important: + + "The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of + certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the + President induced him to request me to call at his private + residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three + representatives of the Southern confederacy were here[139]; + that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, + _unofficially_; that there existed an understanding between + this government and that of France which would lead both to + take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course + might be; and he then referred to the rumour of a meditated + blockade of Southern ports and their discontinuance as ports + of entry--topics on which I had heard nothing. But as I + informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention + to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara,' which + left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive + in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his + lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere + rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my + successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be + further postponed, at his lordship's suggestion." + +May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two Southern +commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As reported by +them[140], Russell listened with attention to their representation, but +made no informing comment. They argued the constitutional right of +secession, depicted the firm determination of the South, were confident +of early acquiescence by the North, and especially laid stress on the +Southern desire for free trade. Russell's own report to Lyons on this +interview and on one held six days later, May 9, is in substantial +agreement, but much more is made by him than by the Commissioners of a +question put by Russell as to a Southern plan of reviving the African +slave-trade[141]. Yancey and Rost denied this and asserted "that they +had prohibited the slave-trade, and did not mean to revive it." Their +report to Richmond does not depict this matter as of special +significance in the interview; Russell's report to Lyons lays stress +upon it. The general result of the interview was that Russell listened, +but refused, as to Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But the +Southern Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were +content to wait on British action[142]. + +On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the Attorney-General a +memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing the belligerency of the +South and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and +reprisal. The memorandum notes that Southern privateering would be +dangerous to British commerce with the North, but sees no help for it. +"The best solution," wrote the Attorney-General, "would be for the +European nations to determine that the war between the two Confederacies +shall be carried on on the principles of 'Justum Bellum,' and shall be +conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize the +Southern States as a Belligerent on this condition only[143]." The next +day, referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law +officers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in America +as regular war[144]," but he does _not_ comment on the legal advice to +press the South to abandon privateering before recognizing her +belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning that can be attached to +the last sentence quoted from the Attorney-General's memorandum. This +advice, however, in view of the opinion that there was "no help for it," +was presumably but a suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre +with little confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" was +not the probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily +yield its only naval weapon. + +In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and announced. The +letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to be a "regular war" +was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction giving Lyons advance +notice of the determination reached by the Cabinet to recognize the +belligerent rights of the South. Russell indulged in many expressions of +regret and sympathy, but Lyons was not to conceal that this British +action represented the Government's view of the actualities of the +American situation. Yet while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he +was not instructed to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of +Southern belligerency[145]. Here was a correct understanding of the +difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a permitted +avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground[146]. Russell was not then aware +of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a theory, not yet +clearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was a +rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he does +appear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to the +constituted government at Washington[147]. Moreover his instructions +were in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, a +recognition of Southern sovereignty. + +On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent to +Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France to +join, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights. Cowley was +also instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautions +by European governments, and it was suggested that France and England +unite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and third +articles of the Declaration of Paris[148]. These articles refer to the +exemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a +neutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag[149]. This day, +also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognize +the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as a +necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified Russell that +Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with +England's policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication, +Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's suggestion that both powers issue a +declaration that they "intended to abstain from all interference," and +that M. de Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been given +instructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151]. + +The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May +1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat by +surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell's +parliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date. But on May +9 the _Times_ set the fashion of general approval in an editorial +stating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflict +in a new light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals +involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were now +more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to be +regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business to keep strictly +out of it and to maintain neutrality[152]. This generalization was no +doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the Government and in +Parliament men who were thinking seriously of specific difficulties +realized that the two main problems immediately confronting a British +neutral policy were privateering and blockade. The South had declared +its _intention_ to use privateers. The North had declared its +_intention_, first to hang those who engaged in privateering, and second +to establish a blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been put +into effect. + +The first action of the British Government was directed toward +privateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords Commissioners +of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern plan to issue letters +of marque and reprisal and directing that reinforcements be sent to the +British fleet in American waters. This was prompt action on unofficial +information, for Davis' proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons' +despatch containing copies of it, sent on April 22, was not received by +Russell until May 10[153]. Ordinary news from the United States required +ten days to get into print in London[154], but official messages might +be sent more rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer +to Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram to +Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was +occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best the +exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln +proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been received +only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce the +British fleet. + +[Illustration: _Photo: F. Hollyer_. SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G. (_From +Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography," by +kind permission_)] + +The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers sailing +under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with as Pirates," +thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at the Davis and +Lincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a British fleet had +been sent to protect British interests and took occasion to indicate +British policy by adding, "we have not been involved in any way in that +contest by any act or giving any advice in the matter, and, for God's +sake, let us if possible keep out of it[155]." May 6, Gregory, a friend +of the South, who had already given notice of a motion for the +recognition of the Confederacy as an independent State, asked whether +the United States had been informed that a blockade of Southern ports +would not be recognized unless effective, and whether there would be +acquiescence in the belligerent right of the South to issue letters of +marque and reprisal[156]. Russell replied that Lincoln had _not_ been +informed that a blockade must be effective to be respected since the +Washington Government did not need to be told of an international rule +which it had itself long proclaimed. As to the second point, he now +announced what heretofore had not been clearly stated, that Southern +privateers could not be regarded by Great Britain as pirates, for if so +regarded Britain would herself have to treat them as pirates and would +thus be unneutral. This was in fact, in spite of Northern bitter +accusations that Britain was exhibiting governmental sympathy with the +South by her tolerance of the plan of Southern privateering, an +inescapable conclusion. Russell added, however, that the matter of +privateering involved some new questions under the Declaration of Paris +upon which the Government had not yet decided what stand to take[157]. +It was on this same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley to +take up with France the question of the Declaration of Paris[158], +Privateering and blockade, declared in America months before there was +any possibility of putting them into effect, and months before there +were any military operations in the field, forced this rapid European +action, especially the action of Great Britain, which, more than any +other European nation, feared belligerent interference with her carrying +and export trade. How was the British Government to know that Davis +would not bend every energy in sending out privateers, and Lincoln to +establish a blockade? The respective declarations of Davis and Lincoln +were the _first_ evidences offered of belligerent status. It was +reasonable to assume that here would come the first energetic efforts of +the belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence sufficiently +informed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled few ships that +could be fitted out as privateers, or that two-thirds of the Northern +navy was at the moment widely scattered in foreign seas, making +impossible a prompt blockade. + +To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial interests lay +in this announced maritime war, and it felt the necessity of defining +its neutral position with speed. The underlying fact of the fixity of +Southern determination to maintain secession had in the last few weeks +become clearly recognized. + +Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in America, +some of it received just before the issue of the Proclamation of +Neutrality, some just after, was all confirmative of the rapid approach +of a great war. A letter from Bunch, at Charleston, was received on May +10, depicting the united Southern will to resist Northern attack, and +asserting that the South had no purpose save to conduct a strictly +defensive war. Bunch was no longer caustic; he now felt that a new +nation was in process of birth[159]. May 4, Monson, writing from +Washington, and just returned from a trip through the South, in the +course of which he had visited Montgomery, stated "_no reconstruction_ +of the Union is possible," and added that there was no danger of a +servile insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb the +British Government and public[160]. A few days later on, May 12, Lyons +expressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons of +anti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from expressions +of sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern Cabinet in its +plan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would be frightful in its +consequences both to America and to England[161]. + +Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation of +Neutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action was +necessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that action had +been wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series of questions as +to the application of the British Foreign Enlistment Act in the American +crisis. What would be the status of British citizens serving on +Confederate privateers? How would the Government treat citizens who +aided in equipping such privateers? Did not the Government intend to +take measures to prevent the infringement of law in British ports? Here +was pressure by a friend of the North to hasten an official announcement +of the policy already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis replied +stating that the Government was about to issue a general proclamation +warning British subjects not to take any part in the war[162]. Similar +questions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received a +similar answer[163]. The few days' delay following Russell's statement +of May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law Officers to the exact +form required. The Proclamation as issued was dated May 13, and was +officially printed in the _London Gazette_ on May 14. + +In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not differ +from customary usage[164]. It spoke of the Confederacy as "states +styling themselves the Confederate States of America," prohibited to +Englishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist others, or +equipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to such ships. War +vessels being equipped in British ports would be seized and forfeited to +the British Government. If a belligerent war-ship came into a British +port, no change or increase of equipment was to be permitted. If a +subject violated the Proclamation he was both punishable in British +courts and forfeited any claim to British protection. The Parliamentary +discussion on May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimity +of opinion the policy of the Government in application of the +Proclamation; the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, but +recognition of independence was for the future to determine; the right +of the South to send out privateers was regretfully recognized; such +privateers could not be regarded as pirates and the North would have no +right to treat them as such, but if the North in defiance of +international opinion did so treat them, Great Britain had at least +warned its subjects that they, if engaged in service on a Southern +privateer, had no claim to British protection; a blockade of the South +to be respected must be effective at least to the point where a vessel +attempting to pass through was likely to be captured; the plan of +blockading the entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of +coast line, was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members of +Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of the +Southern seaboard[165]. + +The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for one side +in the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly on legal +questions and their probable application. On May 15 Russell sent to +Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but did not instruct him to +communicate it officially to Seward, leaving this rather to Lyons' +discretion. This was discretionary in diplomatic usage since in strict +fact the Proclamation was addressed to British subjects and need not be +communicated officially to the belligerents. In the result the +discretion permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition +of Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the +Northern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then, or +later, make official communication to Seward of the Proclamation[166]. +The fact soon appeared that the United States seriously objected to the +Proclamation of Neutrality, protesting first, its having been issued at +all, and, in the second place, resenting what was considered its +"premature" announcement by a friendly nation. This matter developed so +serious a criticism by both American Government and public, both during +and after the Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did the +British Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a +"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality? + +On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on the +morning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in London[167], +but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was +prevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford[168]. +All that was immediately possible was to make official notification of +arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen. This was +promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, Palmerston +attending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams' first report to +Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that public opinion was "not +exactly what we would wish." In this he referred to the utterances of +the press, particularly those of the _Times_, which from day to day and +with increasing vigour sounded the note of strict neutrality in a +"non-idealistic" war. On May 30 the _Times_, asserting that both parties +in America were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion +as follows: + + "We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, that it + does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern leaders + that they are half inclined to become British once more. Both + sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans + over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily. + + "For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of + events has induced us to regard the dispute as a more + commonplace kind of quarrel than it at first appeared to be. + The real motives of the belligerents, as the truth + transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as have caused + wars in all times and countries. They are essentially selfish + motives--that is to say, they are based upon speculations of + national power, territorial aggrandizement, political + advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim any + superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of + patriotism.... + + "We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to + remove the case from the common category of national or + monarchical quarrels. The representations of the North might + be made word for word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous + of 'rectifying' his frontier, consolidating his empire, or + retaining a disaffected province in subjection. The + manifestos of the South might be put forth by any State + desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion or exchanging + union for independence.... + + "It is just such a question as has been left times out of + mind in this Old World to the decision of the sword. The + sword will be the arbitrator in the New World too; but the + event teaches us plainly enough that Republics and + Democracies enjoy no exemption from the passions and follies + of humanity." + +Under these impressions Adams presented himself on May 18 for his first +interview with Russell[169]. He stated that he had come with the idea +that there was + + ".... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the + relations actually existing between the two nations from the + risk of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate + domestic disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was + not without pain that I was compelled to admit that from the + day of my arrival I had felt in the proceedings of both + houses of Parliament, in the language of Her Majesty's + ministers, and in the tone of opinion prevailing in private + circles, more of uncertainty about this than I had before + thought possible," + +Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to Dallas +refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South implied a +British purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the effect to widen, +if not to make irreparable, a breach [between North and South] which we +believed yet to be entirely manageable by ourselves." + +Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had simply +meant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not disposed in +any way to interfere." To this Adams answered that: + + ".... it was deserving of grave consideration whether great + caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might, + even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage + the hopes of the disaffected in America.... It was in this + view that I must be permitted to express the great regret I + had felt on learning the decision to issue the Queen's + proclamation, which at once raised the insurgents to the + level of a belligerent State, and still more the language + used in regard to it by Her Majesty's ministers in both + houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever might be the + design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the effect of + these events had been to encourage the friends of the + disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private + opinion indicated it strongly." + +Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on recent events +than they deserved. The Government had taken the advice of the Law +Officers and as a result had concluded that "as a question merely of +_fact_, a war existed.... Under such circumstances + + it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this in the + technical sense as _justum bellum_, that is, a war of two + sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice, + as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to + bring the management of it within the rules of modern + civilized warfare. This was all that was contemplated by the + Queen's proclamation. It was designed to show the purport of + existing laws, and to explain to British subjects their + liabilities in case they should engage in the war." + +To this Adams answered "... that under other circumstances + + I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to this + view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to + remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a + little more rapid than was absolutely called for by the + occasion.... And furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to + be a belligerent State before they had ever shown their + capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever, except + within one of their own harbours, and under every possible + advantage. It considered them a marine power before they had + ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean.... The rule + was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any + organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its + power to defend and protect itself against the assaults of + enemies, and at the same time to manifest a capacity to + maintain binding relations with foreign nations, then a + measure of recognition could not be justly objected to on any + side. The case was very different when such an interference + should take place, prior to the establishment of the proof + required, as to bring about a result which would not probably + have happened but for that external agency." + +This representation by the American Minister, thus early made, contains +the whole argument advanced against the British Proclamation of +Neutrality, though there were many similar representations made at +greater length both by Adams later, and by Seward at Washington. They +are all well summarized by Bernard as "a rejection ... of the +proposition that the existence of war is a simple matter of fact, to be +ascertained as other facts are--and an assertion ... of the dogma that +there can be no war, so far as foreign nations are concerned, and, +therefore, no neutrality, so long as there is a sovereignty _de +jure_[170]." But in this first representation Adams, in the main, laid +stress upon the _haste_ with which the Proclamation of Neutrality had +been issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that British +sympathies were with the South. + +One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing exactly +those opinions advanced by Adams. The _Spectator_ declared that while +the Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared to be one of strict +neutrality, it in reality tended "directly to the benefit of the +South[171]." A fortnight later this paper asserted, "The quarrel, cover +it with cotton as we may, is between freedom and slavery, right and +wrong, the dominion of God and the dominion of the Devil, and the duty +of England, we submit, is clear." She should, even though forced to +declare her neutrality, refuse for all time to recognize the +slave-holding Confederacy[172]. But the _Spectator_ stood nearly alone +in this view. The _Saturday Review_ defended in every respect the issue +of the Proclamation and added, "In a short time, it will be necessary +further to recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but the +United States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall be +postponed until the failure of the effort which they assert or believe +that they are about to make has resulted in an experimental proof that +subjugation is impossible[173]." A few provincial papers supported the +view of the _Spectator_, but they were of minor importance, and +generally the press heartily approved the Proclamation. + +At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has just +received an instruction from Seward written under the impression aroused +by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April 8 to make any pledge as +to British policy on the recognition of Southern independence. Seward +was very much disturbed by what Russell had said to Dallas. In this +instruction, dated April 27[174], he wrote: + + "When you shall have read the instructions at large which + have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that + these last remarks of his lordship are by no means + satisfactory to this government. Her Britannic Majesty's + government is at liberty to choose whether it will retain the + friendship of this government by refusing all aid and comfort + to its enemies, now in flagrant rebellion against it, as we + think the treaties existing between the two countries + require, or whether the government of Her Majesty will take + the precarious benefits of a different course. + + "You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic + Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of + his lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this + government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights + and derogating from its dignity." + +Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood them, +Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and especially +in the Government, stating that this improvement was due, in part, to +the vigour now being shown by the Northern Government, in part "to a +sense that the preceding action of Her Majesty's ministers has been +construed to mean more than they intended by it[175]." But at +Washington the American irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was +reporting Seward and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the +Proclamation of Neutrality[176]. On June 14, Lyons had a long +conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that the +South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the conference +feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and England on this +point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious because France was so long +delaying her own Proclamation[177]. To meet the situation, he and +Mercier, the French Minister, went the next day, June 15, on an official +visit to Seward with the intention of formally presenting the British +Proclamation and Thouvenel's instructions to Mercier to support it[178]. +But Seward "said at once that he could not receive from us a +communication founded on the assumption that + + the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as Belligerents; that + this was a determination to which the Cabinet had come + deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events had + in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers + and the Southern States; that he would not discuss the + question with us, but that he should give instructions to the + United States Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be + enabled to state the reasons for the course taken by their + Government to Your Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you + should be desirous to hear them.... He should not take + Official cognizance of the recognition of the Belligerent + Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and France, unless + he should be forced to do so by an Official communication + addressed to the Government of the United States itself." + +In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward "for +his own use only." They did not regard the moment well chosen "to be +punctilious." Lyons reported that Seward's language and demeanour +throughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good humoured," but +the fact remained that the United States had not been officially +notified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and that the American +Government, sensitive to popular excitement in the matter and committed +to the theory of a rebellion of peoples, was thus left free to continue +argument in London without any necessity of making formal protest and of +taking active steps to support such protest[179]. The official relation +was eased by the conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger of +America, expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and, +temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs. The +_Times_ told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that the utmost care +and circumspection must be used by every man or party in England to +avoid giving offence to either of the two incensed belligerents[180]." +In answer to the Northern outcry at the lack of British sympathy, it +declared "Neutrality--strict neutrality--is all that the United States +Government can claim[181]." + +While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward the +British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two other +matters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of the +British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing given by +Russell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward, on May 21, +wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent +service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We +treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by +our own citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great +Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents and give +them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the law of nations affords +an adequate and proper remedy[182]." This was threatening language, but +was for Adams' own eye, and in the next sentence of his letter Seward +stated that avoidance of friction on this point was easy, since in 1856 +Great Britain had invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration +of Paris everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United +States was now ready to accede. + +What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made clear for +the question of privateering did not constitute the main point of his +belligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed treatment of +privateers as pirates might have resulted in very serious complications, +for though the Proclamation of Neutrality had warned British subjects +that they would forfeit any claim to protection if they engaged in the +conflict, it is obvious that the hanging as a pirate of a British seaman +would have aroused a national outcry almost certain to have forced the +Government into protest and action against America. Fortunately the +cooler judgment of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of +the plan of treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of +giving "shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from +Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such +shelter would be available in British ports[183]. + +In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that the +Southern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially," +instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that: "You +will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as +well as official, with the British Government, so long as it shall +continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this +country." Here was a positive instruction as to the American Minister's +conduct in a given situation, and a very serious instruction, nearly +equivalent to "taking leave" after a rupture of diplomatic relations, +but the method to be used in avoiding if possible the necessity of the +serious step was left to Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment, +when reporting the outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion of +my task[184]." Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as to +British intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, but +added that he had not been able to convince himself of the existence of +an unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised that the fact of +the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in this city, and still +more the knowledge that they had been admitted to more or less +interviews with his lordship, was calculated to excite uneasiness. +Indeed, it had already given great dissatisfaction to my Government. I +added, as moderately as I could, that in all frankness any further +protraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as +hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action +accordingly." Russell replied that both France and England had long been +accustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the case of +"Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc.," to hear what they had to say. "But +this did not imply recognition in their case any more than in ours. He +added that he had seen the gentlemen once some time ago, and once more +some time since; he had no expectation of seeing them any more[185]." + +For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions might +have brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of Adams and +the acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been given; Russell +merely stated that he had "no expectation" of further interviews with +the Southern commissioners; he was still ready to hear from them in +writing. This caused a division of opinion between the commissioners; +Yancey argued that Russell's concession to Adams was itself a violation +of the neutrality the British Government had announced, and that it +should be met by a formal protest. But the other members insisted on a +reference to Richmond for instructions[186]. On the same day that Adams +reported the result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston: + + "My position here thus far has not been difficult or painful. + If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in the + diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high + road to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to + me to be expedient so to play into the hands of our + opponents. Although there has been and is more or less of + sympathy with the slave-holders in certain circles, they are + not so powerful as to overbear the general sentiment of the + people. The ministry has been placed in rather delicate + circumstances, when a small loss of power on either extreme + would have thrown them out[187]." + +In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly, at +least, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he therefore +considered it best not to press too harshly upon the Government. + +But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant: "I wait +with patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to engage a house +for more than a month at a time...." He might himself be inclined to +view more leniently the Proclamation of Neutrality and be able to find +excuses for the alleged haste with which it had been issued, but his +instructions required strong representations, especially on the latter +point. Adams' report to Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interview +with Russell of June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southern +commissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of delay +given by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that pledge in a +hasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on the line already +taken on May 18[188]. From this time on, throughout and after the war, +this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing bitterness. +British friends of the North joined in the American outcry. By mere +reiteration it became in the popular mind on both sides of the Atlantic +an accepted and well-founded evidence of British governmental +unfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion of the Civil War, John +Bright in Parliament, commenting on the causes of American ill-will, +declared that the Government of 1861, knowing that Adams was on his way, +should in mere courtesy, have waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, the +Proclamation, entirely justifiable in itself, might have been issued +without offence and without embittering the United States[189]. + +Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was the +Proclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had given any +such pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the interview of May 1 +would seem to support that denial[190]. On that day Russell for the +second time told Dallas that England would not commit herself, as yet, +as regards Southern recognition, clearly meaning a recognition of +_sovereignty_, not of belligerency, and immediately asked Dallas what +the rumours of a blockade meant. Dallas replied that he had no +information on this point, and Russell "acquiesced in the expediency of +disregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought +by my successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further +postponed, at his lordship's suggestion." + +The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that Russell +refrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of which Dallas +knew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by Adams, and +especially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's motion, which +was one for _recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the South_, +would be postponed. If there was a pledge here it was a pledge not to +recognize Southern sovereignty until after Adams' arrival. + +But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no question," +writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his father, "that the +proclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly haste.... The purpose +was manifest. It was to have the status of the Confederacy as a +belligerent an accomplished fact before the arrival of the newly +accredited minister. This precipitate action was chiefly significant as +indicating an animus; that animus being really based on ... the belief, +already matured into a conviction, that the full recognition of the +Confederacy as an independent power was merely a question of time, and +probably of a very short time[191]." The author does not, however, +support the contemporary American contention that _any_ Proclamation was +contrary to international custom and that no recognition of belligerent +status was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced the +mother country itself to recognize the division as fully accomplished, +even while war still continued. Indeed American practice was flatly +contradictory of the argument, as in the very pertinent example of the +petty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when President Van Buren had promptly +issued a proclamation of neutrality. It is curious that in his several +replies to Seward's complaints Russell did not quote a letter from +Stevenson, the American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May +22, 1838. Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the +"Caroline" affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible +principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, as to +belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same ground, +and are governed by the same principles; that whenever a portion of a +State seek by force of arms to overthrow the Government, and maintain +independence, the contest becomes one _de facto_ of war[192]." This was +as exact, and correct, a statement of the British view as could have +been desired[193]. + +The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did not +then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July 2, 1861, +his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our side; of that I +have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of this.] But they +thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and as we seemed to have +made up our minds to it, that their Proclamation was just the thing to +keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned out otherwise +they did their best to correct their mistake[194]." The modern +historical judgment of the best American writers likewise exonerates the +British Government of "unfriendly animus[195]," but is still apt to +refer to the "premature" issue of the Proclamation. + +This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the Government be +criticized even as exercising an unwise (not unfriendly) haste? Henry +Adams wrote that the British thought the "dissolution seemed inevitable" +and "we seemed to have made up our minds to it." Certainly this was a +justifiable conclusion from the events in America from Lincoln's +election in November, 1860, to his inauguration in March, 1861--and even +to a later date, almost in fact to the first week in April. During this +period the British Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy. +Then, suddenly, actual conflict begins and at once each side in America +issues declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and +piracy, indicative that _maritime_ war, the form of war at once most +dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in British +citizens, was the method first to be tried by the contestants. Unless +these declarations were mere bluff and bluster England could not dare +wait their application. She must at once warn her citizens and make +clear her position as a neutral. The Proclamation was no effort "to keep +straight with both sides"; it was simply the natural, direct, and prompt +notification to British subjects required in the presence of a _de +facto_ war. + +Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was fortunate +that the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The theory of the +Northern administration under which the Civil War was begun and +concluded was that a portion of the people of the United States were +striving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance, and that there +could be no recognition of any Southern _Government_ in the conflict. In +actual practice in war, the exchange of prisoners and like matters, this +theory had soon to be discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theory +nevertheless in looking forward to the purely domestic and +constitutional problem of the return to the Union, when conquered, of +the sections in rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreign +nations, and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet under +that theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation of +Neutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded otherwise +than to protest, officially, against any British declaration of +neutrality, declaring that his Government did not acknowledge a state of +war as existing, and threatening to take his leave. It would have been +his duty to _prevent_, if possible, the issue of the Proclamation. +Dallas, fortunately, had been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams, +fortunately, arrived too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely to +complain. The "premature" issue of the Proclamation averted an +inevitable rupture of relations on a clash between the American theory +of "no state of war" and the international fact that war existed. Had +that rupture occurred, how long would the British Government and people +have remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of the +United States[196]? + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 127: Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better informed in the +early stages of the American conflict than any of his ministerial +colleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the reviews and his +unsigned article in the _Edinburgh_, April, 1861, on "The Election of +President Lincoln and its Consequences," was the first analysis of real +merit in any of the reviews.] + +[Footnote 128: In his _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, Malmesbury makes but +three important references to the Civil War in America.] + +[Footnote 129: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 165.] + +[Footnote 130: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, pp. 227-8.] + +[Footnote 131: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 132: It was generally whispered in Southern political circles +that Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him, fearing his +interference at home. If true, this is further evidence of Davis' +neglect of foreign policy.] + +[Footnote 133: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.] + +[Footnote 134: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, pp. 149-51.] + +[Footnote 135: Possibly the best concise statement of the effect on the +North is given in Carl Schurz, _Reminiscences_, Vol. II, p. 223. Or see +my citation of this in _The Power of Ideals in American History_, ch. I, +"Nationality."] + +[Footnote 136: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1207-9.] + +[Footnote 137: See _ante_, p. 60.] + +[Footnote 138: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, pp. 83-4. Dallas +to Seward, May 2, 1862.] + +[Footnote 139: An error. Mann did not arrive in London until May 15. Du +Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.] + +[Footnote 140: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, +Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann was not present at the +first interview with Russell.] + +[Footnote 141: F.O., America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell to Lyons, May +11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the +Queen." The greater and essential part has been printed in +_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil +War in United States." No. 33.] + +[Footnote 142: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.] + +[Footnote 143: Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum sent to Lyons is +undated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May 4, in which it was +enclosed, it is presumable that the date of May 3 for the Memorandum +is correct.] + +[Footnote 144: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 145: F.O., Am., Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to Lyons, May 6, +1861.] + +[Footnote 146: It is to be remembered that the United States had given +no notice of the existence of a state of war.] + +[Footnote 147: In diplomatic usage official notification of neutrality +to a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters show him to have +appreciated a peculiar delicacy here.] + +[Footnote 148: F.O., France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft. Printed in +_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on +International Maritime Law." No. 1.] + +[Footnote 149: It is interesting that on this same day Lyons was writing +from Washington advocating, regretfully, because of his sympathy with +the North, a strict British neutrality: + + "The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally inclined + towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that + anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here + would place us in a position which would soon become + untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they + would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of + our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt + sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to + reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce + the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all + events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might + lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all + chance of this to be gone for ever." + +Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861.] + +[Footnote 150: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 677.] + +[Footnote 151: _Ibid._, No. 684. Printed in part in _Parliamentary +Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on International +Maritime Law." No. 3.] + +[Footnote 152: _Times_, May 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 153: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 31.] + +[Footnote 154: So stated by the _Times_, May 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 155: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1378-9. This blunt +expression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary offers an interesting +comparison with the words of the American President Wilson, in a +parallel statement at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Wilson on +August 3, 1914, gave a special audience to newspaper correspondents, +begging them to maintain an attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4 +he issued the first of several neutrality proclamations in which, +following the customary language of such documents, the people were +notified that neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expression +of sympathies in public and in private." But on August 18 in an address +to the people of the United States, this legal phraseology, required by +traditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that "we must be +impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our +sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as +a preference of one party to the struggle before another." And three +weeks later, on September 8, came the proclamation setting aside October +4 "as a day of prayer to Almighty God," informing Him that war existed +and asking His intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithy +expression was better suited to the forthrightness of the +British public.] + +[Footnote 156: Hansard, _ibid_., pp. 1564-7. Gregory, a +"Liberal-Conservative," though never a "good party man" was then +supporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in Parliament, +representing by his prominence in sport and society alike, the +"gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and was a valuable +influence for the South.] + +[Footnote 157: This subject is developed at length in Chapter V on "The +Declaration of Paris Negotiation."] + +[Footnote 158: See _ante, p_. 88. The chronology of these rapidly +succeeding events is interesting: + + April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was received + this day." + May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American waters. + May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas. + May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake keep out of + it." + May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and Rost. + May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum. + May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular war." + May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize Southern + belligerency. + May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize Southern belligerency. + May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can not be + treated as pirates. + [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin in the late + afternoons, the instructions to diplomats were drawn before + the statement in Parliament.] + May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and Rost. + May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation of Neutrality + will be issued soon. + May 13--The Proclamation authorized. + May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool. + May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the _London Gazette_. + May 14--Adams in London "ready for business." + +It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2 +indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified to +Lyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the governmental +position had become definitely fixed, even though official instructions +were not sent Lyons until the 6th.] + +[Footnote 159: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to Russell, April 19, +1861.] + +[Footnote 160: F.O., Am., 789, Monson to Alston, received May 21.] + +[Footnote 161: F.O., Am., 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell, received May +26. The full statement is: + + "To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare of + this country, the present state of things is peculiarly + painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more + complete community of race and language, enlist his + sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he + cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant + war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both + sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead + only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life + and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would + be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of + the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of + Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to + England than to the Northern States themselves." + +[Footnote 162: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, p. 1763.] + +[Footnote 163: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34. In the general discussion in the +Lords there appeared disagreement as to the status of privateering. +Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it as piracy. Earl Hardwicke +thought privateering justifiable. The general tone of the debate, though +only on this matter of international practice, was favourable to +the North.] + +[Footnote 164: For example see Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, Vol. +I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813 during the +Spanish-American colonial revolutions.] + +[Footnote 165: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, pp. 2077-2088.] + +[Footnote 166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 35. Russell to +Lyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for Lyons' precaution was that while +his French colleague, Mercier, had been instructed to support the +British Proclamation, no official French Proclamation was issued until +June 10, and Lyons, while he trusted Mercier, felt that this French +delay needed some explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of his +instructions and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request made +no official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure. +This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one, though +it irritated both the British and French Ministers.] + +[Footnote 167: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 85. Adams to +Seward, May 17, 1861.] + +[Footnote 168: Bedford died that day.] + +[Footnote 169: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, pp. 90-96. Adams +to Seward, May 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 170: Bernard, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the +American Civil War_, p. 161. The author cites at length despatches and +documents of the period.] + +[Footnote 171: _Spectator_, May 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 172: _Spectator_, June 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 173: _Saturday Review_, June 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 174: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 82.] + +[Footnote 175: _Ibid._, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June 7, 1861. See also +p. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31, 1861.] + +[Footnote 176: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 177: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 178: F.O., Am., Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to Russell, June 17, +1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with that of Lyons, is in +_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 106. Seward to Adams, June +19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 179: Bancroft in his _Seward_ (II, p. 183) prints a portion of +an unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in Paris, July 1, 1861, as +"his clearest and most characteristic explanation of what the attitude +of the government must be in regard to the action of the foreign nations +that have recognized the belligerency of the 'insurgents.'" + + "Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor both + together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the + sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor + confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to + last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the + whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for + disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and + shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign + nations to respect and observe the treaties. + + "We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the + fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain + and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent + party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes, + but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their + public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless, + reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that + concludes the fact." + +[Footnote 180: The _Times_, June 3, 1861.] + +[Footnote 181: _Ibid._, June 11, 1861.] + +[Footnote 182: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 87.] + +[Footnote 183: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 56. Lyons to +Russell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with Seward on June 15.] + +[Footnote 184: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, p. 104. Adams to +Seward, June 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 185: Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes the view that +the protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in regard to privateering +and against interviews with the Southern commissioners were all +unjustifiable. The first, he says, was based on "unsound reasoning" (II, +177). On the second he quotes with approval a letter from Russell to +Edward Everett, July 12, 1861, showing the British dilemma: "Unless we +meant to treat them as pirates and to hang them we could not deny them +belligerent rights" (II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners he +asserts that Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps he +remembered that he himself had recently communicated, through three +different intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners to +Washington, and would have met them if the President had not forbidden +it." Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 179.] + +[Footnote 186: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 606.] + +[Footnote 187: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters, 1861-1865_, Vol. I, p. 11. +Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr., June 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 188: See _ante_, p. 98. Russell's report to Lyons of this +interview of June 12, lays special emphasis on Adams' complaint of +haste. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence +on Civil War in the United States," No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June +21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 189: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21, March 13, +1865.] + +[Footnote 190: See _ante_, p. 85.] + +[Footnote 191: C.F. Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 172. In preparing +a larger life of his father, never printed, the son later came to a +different opinion, crediting Russell with foresight in hastening the +Proclamation to avoid possible embarrassment with Adams on his arrival. +The quotation from the printed "Life" well summarizes, however, current +American opinion.] + +[Footnote 192: _U.S. Documents_, Ser. No. 347, Doc. 183, p. 6.] + +[Footnote 193: The United States Supreme Court in 1862, decided that +Lincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was "itself official +and conclusive evidence ... that a state of war existed." (Moore, Int. +Law Digest, I, p. 190.)] + +[Footnote 194: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 16. Henry Adams to +C.F. Adams, Jnr.] + +[Footnote 195: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, III, p. 420 +(_note_) summarizes arguments on this point, but thinks that the +Proclamation might have been delayed without harm to British interests. +This is perhaps true as a matter of historical fact, but such fact in no +way alters the compulsion to quick action felt by the Ministry in the +presence of probable _immediate_ fact.] + +[Footnote 196: This was the later view of C.F. Adams, Jnr. He came to +regard the delay in his father's journey to England as the most +fortunate single incident in American foreign relations during the +Civil War.] + + + +CHAPTER IV + +BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD + +The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been considered +solely from the point of view of a formal American contention as to +correct international practice and the British answer to that +contention. In fact, however, there were intimately connected wth these +formal arguments and instructions of the American Secretary of State a +plan of possible militant action against Great Britain and a suspicion, +in British Governmental circles, that this plan was being rapidly +matured. American historians have come to stigmatize this plan as +"Seward's Foreign War Panacea," and it has been examined by them in +great detail, so that there is no need here to do more than state its +main features. That which is new in the present treatment is the British +information in regard to the plan and the resultant British suspicion of +Seward's intentions. + +The British public, as distinguished from the Government, deriving its +knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and past +utterances, might well consider him as traditionally unfriendly to Great +Britain. He had, in the 'fifties, vigorously attacked the British +interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized Great +Britain as "the most grasping and the most rapacious Power in the +world"; he had long prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to the +United States; he had not disdained, in political struggles in the State +of New York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism to +Great Britain; and more especially and more recently he had been +reported to have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civil +conflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by fomenting a +quarrel with England and engaging in a war against her[197]. Earlier +expressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a politician +never over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of foreign nations +and peoples, for he had been even more outspoken against the France of +Louis Napoleon, but the Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mind +as indicative of a probable animus when the politician had become the +statesman responsible for foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did, +that he had ever uttered the words alleged[198], and his friend Thurlow +Weed might describe the words as "badinage," in a letter to the London +_Times_[199], but the "Newcastle story" continued to be matter for +frequent comment both in the Press and in private circles. + +British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to Seward's +speeches intended for home political consumption, or to a careless bit +of social talk, had there not been suspicion of other and more serious +evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an unusually able and +well-informed Minister, and from the first he had pictured the +leadership of Seward in the new administration at Washington, and had +himself been worried by his inability to understand what policy Seward +was formulating. But, in fact, he did not see clearly what was going on +in the camp of the Republican party now dominant in the North. The +essential feature of the situation was that Seward, generally regarded +as the man whose wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himself +thinking this to be his destined function, early found his authority +challenged by other leaders, and his policies not certain of +acceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly, the +situation at Washington. + +[Illustration: WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD (_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord +Lyons," by kind permission_)] + +Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been elected as +a Republican by a political party never before in power. Many of the +leading members of this party were drawn from the older parties and had +been in administrative positions in either State or National +Governments, but there were no party traditions, save the lately created +one of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the Territories. All +was new, then, to the men now in power in the National Government, and a +new and vital issue, that of secession already declared by seven +Southern States, had to be met by a definite policy. The important +immediate question was as to whether Lincoln had a policy, or, if not, +upon whom he would depend to guide him. + +In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular estimate, +were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the Secretary of the +Treasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of State. Both were +experienced in political matters and both stood high in the esteem of +the anti-slavery element in the North, but Seward, all things +considered, was regarded as the logical leading member of the Cabinet. +He had been the favoured candidate for Republican Presidential +nomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln only on the theory that the +latter as less Radical on anti-slavery, could be more easily elected. +Also, he now held that position which by American tradition was regarded +as the highest in the Cabinet. + +In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that Seward would +determine the policy of the new administration. Seward's own attitude is +well summed up in a despatch to his Government, February 18, 1861, by +Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from the Republic of Bremen. He described a +conversation with Seward in regard to his relations with Lincoln: + + "Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever remark, + that there is no great difference between an elected + president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The + latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth, + the former through the chances which make his election + possible. The actual direction of public affairs belongs to + the leader of the ruling party, here as well as in any + hereditary principality. + + "The future President is a self-made man and there is + therefore as little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial + honesty ('honest old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he + does not lack common sense. But his other qualities for the + highest office are practically unknown. His election may + therefore be readily compared with a lottery. It is possible + that the United States has drawn the first prize, on the + other hand the gain may only have been a small one. But + unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may + have been merely a blank." + +The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; the +second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later Schleiden +sent home a further analysis of Lincoln: + + "He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and + healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He + seems to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which + rests upon him. But at the same time it appears as if he had + lost some of his famous firmness and resoluteness through the + novelty of the conditions which surround him and the hourly + renewed attempts from various sides to gain influence over + him. He is therefore at present inclined to concede double + weight to the superior political experience of his Secretary + of State[200]." + +This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly described. +Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not unchallenged and +soon a decision was called for that in its final solution was to +completely overthrow his already matured policy towards the seceding +States. Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possession +of federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federal +troops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he +had refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and +re-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On +March 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded +unless reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and +indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of his +Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an issue the +whole question of Seward's policy and leadership. + +For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatory +delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting to +time and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and people +to a less violent attitude. He sincerely believed in the existence of an +as yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in those +States which were wavering on secession. He was holding communications, +through intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in +Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence that +State against secession. To all these Southern representatives he now +conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that Sumter +would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own "policy" +would be approved by the President. His argument in reply to Lincoln's +call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing Fort Sumter, and it +seemed to meet, for the moment, with the approval of the majority of his +Cabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself made no pertinent comment, yet did +not commit himself. + +There the matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners, +regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the maturing +of Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw[201]," did not care to +press for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal pledge that +in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce Sumter, notification +of that determination would at once be given to South Carolina. The days +went by, and it was not until the last week of March that Lincoln, +disillusioned as to the feasibility of Seward's policy of conciliation, +reached the conclusion that in his conception of his duty as President +of the United States he must defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt +to retain them, for the preservation of the Union, and decided to +reinforce Fort Sumter. On March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and +learned Lincoln's determination. + +This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it also +threatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet understand fully +that either supreme leadership, or control of policy, had been assumed +by Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that astonishing document entitled, +"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," which at once reveals +his alarm and his supreme personal self-confidence. This document +begins, "We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without +a policy either domestic or foreign." It then advocates as a domestic +policy, "_Change The Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery, +Or About Slavery_, for a question upon _Union or Disunion_." Then in a +second section, headed "For Foreign Nations," there followed: + + "I would demand explanations from Spain and France, + categorically, at once. + + "I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and + send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse + a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this + continent against European intervention. + + "And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from + Spain and France. + + "Would convene Congress and declare war against them. + + "But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic + prosecution of it. + + "For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue + and direct it incessantly. + + "Either the President must do it himself, and be all the + while active in it, or + + "Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, + debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. + + "It is not in my especial province; + + "But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility[202]." + +Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically gentle, +yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed with his own +superior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's "domestic policy" +was exactly his own, except that he did not intend to abandon Fort +Sumter. As to the warlike foreign policy Lincoln pointed out that this +would be a sharp reversal of that already being prepared in circulars +and instructions to Ministers abroad. This was, indeed, the case, for +the first instructions, soon despatched, were drawn on lines of +recalling to foreign powers their established and long-continued +friendly relations with the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated as +to the required "guiding hand," "I remark that if this must be done, I +must do it.... I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of +all the Cabinet[203]." + +This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to direct +affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had he not, +momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific policy toward +the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of Lincoln's quiet +persistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate issue, the relief of +Sumter (though attempting to divert reinforcements to another quarter) +but did not as yet wholly yield either his policy of conciliation and +delay, nor give up immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by +plunging it into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurances +to the Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he +could and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this +confidence that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up +to the second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the ships +despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day Governor +Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the Northern +purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon the +South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemed +inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel. + +The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a day and +a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13--for +as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of Sumter changed, as +in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people. There was now a +nearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union _by force_. Yet +Seward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the "sober +second thought" of the South would offer a way out toward reunion +without war. In official utterances and acts he was apparently in +complete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South. Davis' +proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered by +the Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet +officially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at +least one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation +Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April +24 and offered his services as a mediator[204]. + +Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the South +until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathing +spell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides. He had +consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Seward +favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the +Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend, +Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal. Seward at once took +Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three men, with Chase (and the Prussian +Minister) were the only ones in the secret. Lincoln's first comment was +that he was "willing to make an attempt of contributing to the +prevention of bloodshed and regretted that Schleiden had not gone to +Richmond without consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that +"he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but +merely the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility +to govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have enlightened +Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union. Lincoln +said he could neither authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, but +that he would gladly consider any such proposals voluntarily made. +Schleiden asked for a definite statement as to whether Lincoln would +recall the blockade proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis would +recall the letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused to +commit himself. + +This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward still +thought something might result from the venture, and on that evening, +April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided by Seward with +a pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the afternoon of the +twenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city was convinced that his +mission would be a failure. All along his journey, at each little +station, he saw excited crowds assembled enthusiastic for secession, +bands of militia training, and every indication of preparation for war. +Already, on that same day, the Virginia secession ordinance had been +published, and the State convention had ratified the provisional +constitution of the Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notified +Stephens of his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, and +was at once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frank +and positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settle +peacefully the differences between the two sections were futile." Formal +letters were exchanged after this conference, but in these the extent to +which Stephens would go was to promise to use his influence in favour of +giving consideration to any indication made by the North of a desire +"for an amicable adjustment of the questions at issue," and he was +positive that there could be no return of the South to the Union. + +On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington. He found +that three days had made a great change in the sentiment of the Capitol. +"During my short absence," he wrote, "many thousands of volunteers had +arrived from the North. There was not only a feeling of security +noticeable, but even of combativeness." He found Seward not at all +disposed to pursue the matter, and was not given an opportunity to talk +to Lincoln; therefore, he merely submitted copies of the letters that +had passed between him and Stephens, adding for himself that the South +was arming _because_ of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers. +Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that he had +no fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding that Stephens' +letters gave no ground for action since the "Union of these States is +the supreme as it is the organic law of this country," and must be +maintained. + +This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be regarded as +Seward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued policy of +conciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden to Richmond, +but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had encouraged and aided +Schleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27, hope had vanished, and +Seward's "domestic policy," as set forth in his "Thoughts for the +President's Consideration" on April 1, was discredited, and inevitably, +in some measure, their author also. The dates are important in +appreciating Seward's purposes. On April 27, the day of Schleiden's +return to Washington, there was sent to Adams that "sharp" despatch, +taking issue with British action as foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9, +and concluding by instructing Adams to lose no time in warning Russell +that such action would be regarded by the United States as "injurious to +its rights and derogating from its dignity[205]." It appears, therefore, +that Seward, defeated on one line of "policy," eager to regain prestige, +and still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found to +avert domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick at those +threads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the Union through +a foreign war. He was now seeking to force the acceptance of the second, +and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts for the President." + +Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no secret +at Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to Schleiden this +fantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse +for a war with England, France, or Spain," he said "that would be the +best means of re-establishing internal peace[206]." Again, on February +10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same topic, and complained that +there was no foreign complication offering an excuse for a break. Lyons +knew of this attitude, and by February 4 had sent Russell a warning, to +which the latter had replied on February 20 that England could afford to +be patient for a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" must +not be indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarked +in his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line, +addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for established +friendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction to +Adams, April 10[207], in the concluding paragraph of which Seward wrote, +"The United States are not indifferent to the circumstances of common +descent, language, customs, sentiments, and religion, which recommend a +closer sympathy between themselves and Great Britain than either might +expect in its intercourse with any other nation." True, on this basis, +Seward claimed a special sympathy from Great Britain for the United +States, that is to say, the North, but most certainly the tone of this +first instruction was one of established friendship. + +Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell "refuses +to pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to threats. What +other explanation is possible except that, seeking to save his domestic +policy of conciliation and to regain his leadership, he now was +adventuring toward the application of his "foreign war panacea" idea. +Lyons quickly learned of the changed tone, and that England, especially, +was to hear American complaint. On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in +cypher characterizing Seward as "arrogant and reckless toward Foreign +Powers[208]." Evidently Seward was making little concealment of his +belligerent attitude, and when the news was received of the speeches in +Parliament of the first week in May by which it became clear that Great +Britain would declare neutrality and was planning joint action with +France, he became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter home +exhibiting, still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own +foreign policy. + + "A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save it + had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence, + needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate + position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do + too much for my country, lest some advantage may revert + indirectly to my own fame. + + "... They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe, + Great Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the + South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to + make war against her, as the ally of the traitors.... I am + trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet before + it is too late[209]." + +The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10," of May 21, +already commented upon in the preceding chapter. But as sent to Adams +it varied in very important details from the draft submitted by Seward +to Lincoln[210]. + +Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a challenge. Its +language implied that the United States desired war, and Seward's plan +was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, give him a copy of it, +and then discontinue diplomatic relations so long as Russell held either +official or unofficial intercourse with the Southern Commissioners. This +last instruction was, indeed, retained in the final form of the +despatch, but here, as elsewhere, Lincoln modified the stiff expressions +of the original. Most important of all, he directed Adams to consider +the whole despatch as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion. +The despatch, as amended, began with the statement that the United +States "neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the +sensibilities of that or any other European nation.... The paper itself +is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any of +its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly made +known. But its spirit will be your guide[211]." Thus were the teeth +skilfully drawn from the threat of war. Even the positive instructions, +later in the despatch, as to the Southern Commissioners, need not have +been acted upon by Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But even +with alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm +Adams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The Government +seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe, and +almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the Ministers +here in a certain contingency.... I scarcely know how to understand Mr. +Seward. The rest of the Government may be demented for all I know; but +he surely is calm and wise. My duty here is in so far as I can do it +honestly to prevent the irritation from coming to a downright quarrel. +It seems to me like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy[212]." + +Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the source of +American belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment of what was +wise at the moment coincided with that of Lincoln's--though of this he +had no knowledge. In the event Adams' skilful handling of the situation +resulted favourably--even to the cessation of intercourse between +Russell and the Southern Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no more +than earlier, was to be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's +"foreign war panacea" was stillborn. + +The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Seward +at last realized that the President intended to control policy, and +though it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln's +customary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now established +between himself and his chief. Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though +free in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter, +avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the +altered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them +simple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with +Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a "leak" +of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to Despatch +No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence by +Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This was particularly +true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England that +Seward most directed his enmity. There resulted for British diplomats +both at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long +after he had made a complete face-about in policy. This suspicion +influenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War. + +On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a long +twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward's +warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly ignorant of +foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward, having lost +strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recover +influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet is +strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought, should maintain a +stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and make close contacts with +France. He was evidently anxious to impress upon Russell that Seward +really might mean war, but he declared the chief danger to lie in the +fact of American belief that England and France could not be driven into +war with the United States, and that they would submit to any insult. +Lyons urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to +correct this false impression[213]. Again, on the next day, May 21, the +information in his official despatch was repeated in a private letter to +Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as mere bluster. Yet +he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any case insists that the best +preventative of war with the United States is to show that England is +ready for it[214]. + +It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. May 22, +he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him to make +defensive preparation[215]. The following day he dilated to Russell, +privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the bounds of +decency even in ordinary social intercourse[216] ..." and in an official +communication of this same day he records Washington rumours of a +belligerent despatch read by Seward before the Cabinet, of objections by +other members, and that Seward's insistence has carried the day[217]. +That Seward was, in fact, still smarting over his reverse is shown by a +letter, written on this same May 23, to his intimate friend and +political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had evidently cautioned him against +precipitate action. Seward wrote, "The European phase is bad. But your +apprehension that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will you +consent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have audiences +and compliments in the Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs' +[Confederate Secretary of State] emissaries have access to his +bedroom[218]?" + +Two interpretations are possible from this: either that Seward knowing +himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had not yet +yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the changes made in his +Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation seems the more likely, for +though Seward continued to write for a time "vigorous" despatches to +Adams, they none of them approached the vigour of even the amended +despatch. Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and the +complete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24 +to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to +Bremen of that date[219]. And on the same day Seward himself told +Schleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a break +with England[220]." On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspicious +that an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was able +to report a better tone from Seward[221]. + +British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they +were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the +American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in +comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are very +unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and +uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political +calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]." He believed +that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary +measure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, be +local"--a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British +Ministers. Russell was less perturbed. He had previously expressed +appreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a +very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223]," +and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage +him in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so +reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man[224]." But at +Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As a +result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not +Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6, +stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the +United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means +impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]." +This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the +probability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should be +conducted. England should strike at once with the largest possible naval +force and bring the war to an end before the United States could +prepare. Otherwise, "the spirit, the energy, and the resources of this +people" would make them difficult to overcome. England, on her part, +must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and she +would be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping +Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter and +advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to write +it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he would exert +every effort and use every method to conciliate America[226]. + +In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had so +renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press reception of +the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. The Northern people, +counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy on +anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at the +moment loudly voicing their vexation. Had Seward not already been turned +from his foreign war policy he now would have received strong public +support in it. But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to his +own advantage in the Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on +June 14 that Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with +the Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington could +learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from the +Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. On June +15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in which +Seward had positively refused to receive the Queen's Proclamation, but +had throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so +reported the conversation[228]. June 15 may, in fact, be taken as the +date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war. Possibly he +found it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy to +fair weather. June 21, he wrote that the "lull" was still +continuing[229]. June 24, he at last learned and described at length the +details of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10[230]. He did not +know the exact date but he expressed the opinion that "a month or three +weeks ago" war was very near--a misjudgment, since it should be +remembered that war seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that +on this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed +leadership into the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants. + +Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of +American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinking +that an American attack on England was either imminent or intended. +Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward's prestige and +Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. It was long, indeed, +before he could escape from suspicion of Seward's purposes, though +dropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war. A month +later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for a +confidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that there +never had been any intention of stirring agitation against England. +Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take +official cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerent +rights of the South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that +previous strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers +understand the intensity of Northern feeling[231]. + +Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change, +mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all to +the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmost +bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London, +Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen's +Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams' +representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" consisted. + +Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons was the receipt of a +despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had reported +that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that the knowledge +in Washington of the result of their previous interviews had brought +satisfaction, and Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had "learned, +through another member of the diplomatic corps, that no further +expression of opinion on the subject in question would be +necessary[232]." This referred, presumably, to the question of British +intention, for the future, in relation to the Proclamation of +Neutrality. Adams wrote: "This led to the most frank and pleasant +conversation which I have yet had with his lordship.... I added that I +believed the popular feeling in the United States would subside the +moment that all the later action on this side was known.... My own +reception has been all that I could desire. I attach value to this, +however, only as it indicates the establishment of a policy that will +keep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In +reply to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his +interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view that the +British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was not +defensible in international law. There was not now, nor later, any +yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was intended for +Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer, much +as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great Britain: + + "I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I may at + any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and + profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has + prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned + remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or + measure of recognition of the insurgents by the government of + Great Britain. I write in the same spirit now; and I invoke + on the part of the British government, as I propose to + exercise on my own, the calmness which all counsellors ought + to practise in debates which involve the peace and happiness + of mankind[233]." + +Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform oratory leads +to the suspicion that the writer is thinking, primarily, of the ultimate +publication of his despatches. Thus Seward seems to have been laying the +ground for a denial that he had ever developed a foolish foreign war +policy. History pins him to that folly. But in another respect the +interview with Lyons on July 20 and the letter to Adams of the day +following overthrow for both Seward and for the United States the +accusations sometimes made that it was the Northern disaster at Bull +Run, July 21, in the first pitched battle with the South, which made +more temperate the Northern tone toward foreign powers[234]. It is true +that the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, but +internal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before there +was any news from the battle-field, and the interview with Lyons on the +20th proves that the military set-back had no influence on Seward's +friendly expressions. Moreover, these expressions officially made were +but a delayed voicing of a determination of policy arrived at many weeks +earlier. The chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapter +will have shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward's +leadership, and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone," +preceded any news whatever from England, lightening the first +impressions. The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, even +know that England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knew +merely of Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and the +friendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received in +Washington until the month following. + +In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not deserve the +place in history usually accorded it as a moment of extreme crisis in +British-American relations. There was never any danger of war from it, +for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud. The public excitement in +America over the Queen's Proclamation was, indeed, intense; but this did +not alter the Governmental attitude. In England all that the public knew +was this American irritation and clamour. The London press expressed +itself a bit more cautiously, for the moment, merely defending the +necessity of British neutrality[235]. But if regarded from the effect +upon British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly even +vital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had been +gravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely alarmed, +was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in London the +suspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years of the war, and +to British Ministers it seemed that at any moment he might recover +leadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British attitude toward +America was affected in two opposite ways; Britain was determined not to +be bullied, and Russell himself sometimes went to the point of arrogance +in answer to American complaints; this was an unfortunate result. But +more fortunate, and _also a result_, was the British Government's +determination to step warily in the American conflict and to give no +just cause, unless on due consideration of policy, for a rupture of +relations with the United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, from +every angle but a short-lived "brain-storm," served America well in the +first years of her great crisis. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 197: See _ante_, p. 80.] + +[Footnote 198: Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, II, p. 378. Seward to +Weed, December 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 199: _Ibid._, p. 355. Weed's letter was on the _Trent_ affair, +but he went out of his way to depict Seward as attempting a bit of +humour with Newcastle.] + +[Footnote 200: Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was educated at the +University of Berlin, and entered the Danish customs service. In the +German revolution of 1848 he was a delegate from Schleswig-Holstein to +the Frankfort Parliament. After the failure of that revolution he +withdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was sent by that Republic to the United +States as Minister. By 1860 he had become one of the best known and +socially popular of the Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimate +relations with leading Americans both North and South. His reports on +events preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archives +of Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor's +thesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten +Staaten waehrend des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My facts with +regard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis, in part from an +article by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond, April 25, +1861," printed in the _Annual Report of the American Historical +Association_ for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies of some of Schleiden's +despatches are on deposit in the Library of Congress among the papers of +Carl Schurz. Through the courtesy of Mr. Frederic Bancroft, who +organized the Schurz papers, I have been permitted to take copies of a +few Schleiden dispatches relating to the visit to Richmond, an incident +apparently unknown to history until Dr. Lutz called attention to it.] + +[Footnote 201: This is Bancroft's expression. _Seward_, II, p. 118.] + +[Footnote 202: Lincoln, _Works_, II, 29.] + +[Footnote 203: _Ibid._, p. 30.] + +[Footnote 204: For references to this whole matter of Schleiden's visit +to Richmond see _ante_, p. 116, note 1.] + +[Footnote 205: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 82. This, and +other despatches have been examined at length in the previous chapter in +relation to the American protest on the Queen's Proclamation of +Neutrality. In the present chapter they are merely noted again in their +bearing on Seward's "foreign war policy."] + +[Footnote 206: Quoted by Lutz, _Am. Hist. Assn. Rep_. 1915, p. 210.] + +[Footnote 207: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 80. This +despatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W. H. Russell, correspondent +of the _Times_, who commented that it contained some elements of danger +to good relations, but it is difficult to see to what he could have had +objection.--Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 103. ] + +[Footnote 208: Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 209: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 169.] + +[Footnote 210: Yet at this very time Seward was suggesting, May 14, to +Prussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland a joint naval +demonstration with America against Japan because of anti-foreign +demonstrations in that country. This has been interpreted as an attempt +to tie European powers to the United States in such a way as to hamper +any friendly inclination they may have entertained toward the +Confederacy (Treat, _Japan and the United States_, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50. +Also Dennet, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," in _Am. Hist. Rev_., Vol. +XXVIII, No. 1. Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as in +harmony with his determined policy in the Far East.) Like Seward's +overture, made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention to +guarantee the independence of San Domingo (F.O., Am., Vol. 763, No. 196, +Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to me to +have been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude while in the +process of developing a really serious policy--the plunging of America +into a foreign war.] + +[Footnote 211: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 88. The exact +facts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10, though soon known in +diplomatic circles, were not published until the appearance in 1890 of +Nicolay and Hay's _Lincoln_, where the text of a portion of the +original draft, with Lincoln's changes were printed (IV, p. 270). Gideon +Welles, Secretary of the Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a short +book in 1874, _Lincoln and Seward_, in which the story was told, but +without dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it. +Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and the +contents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and the +Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sumner.] + +[Footnote 212: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 21. +Reprint from _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.] + +[Footnote 213: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 206. Confidential.] + +[Footnote 214: Russell Papers. This letter has been printed, in part, in +Newton, _Lyons_, I, 41.] + +[Footnote 215: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 216: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 217: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209, Confidential, Lyons to +Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" from this despatch was printed +in the British _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 48. The +"extract" in question consists of two short paragraphs only, printed, +without any indication of important elisions, in each of the +paragraphs. ] + +[Footnote 218: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 174. ] + +[Footnote 219: Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's information is +not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many persons closely in +touch with events, especially with Sumner, Chairman of the Senate +Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Blair, a member of +the Cabinet.] + +[Footnote 220: _Ibid._, Schleiden to Republic of Bremen, May 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 221: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 179, sets the date as June 8 +when Seward's instructions for England and France show that he had +"recovered his balance." This is correct for the change in tone of +despatches, but the acceptance of Lincoln's policy must have been +immediate. C.F. Adams places the date for Seward's complete change of +policy much later, describing his "war mania" as lasting until the +Northern defeat of Bull Run, July 21. I think this an error, and +evidence that it is such appears later in the present chapter. See +Charles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," _Mass. +Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.] + +[Footnote 222: Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 223: Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 224: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 25, 1861.] + +[Footnote 225: F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.] + +[Footnote 226: _Ibid._, No. 263, Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861.] + +[Footnote 227: See _ante_, p. 106.] + +[Footnote 228: See _ante_, p. 102. Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181, using +Seward's description to Adams _(U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. +106) of this interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus +preventing a joint notification by England and France of their intention +to act together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as +"diplomatic skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the +emphasis is placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt +that the knowledge of British-French joint action had been made +sufficiently clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common +though unofficial representation to Seward.] + +[Footnote 229: Russell Papers. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 230: _Ibid_, To Russell. Lyons' source of information was not +revealed.] + +[Footnote 231: _Ibid._, To Russell.] + +[Footnote 232: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 110.] + +[Footnote 233: _Ibid._, p. 118. To Adams.] + +[Footnote 234: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris." p. 29, +and so argued by the author throughout this monograph. I think this +an error.] + +[Footnote 235: The _Spectator_, friend of the North, argued, June 15, +1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next best thing for the +North to a definite British alliance. Southern privateers could not now +be obtained from England. And the United States was surely too proud to +accept direct British aid.] + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION + +If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology there +accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with Great +Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the American +Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite support of +the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation undertaken by +Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic service he attached +to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, to the extent of +permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate failure of the negotiation +to distort his usually cool and fair judgment. The matter in question +was the offer of the United States to accede by a convention to the +Declaration of Paris of 1856, establishing certain international rules +for the conduct of maritime warfare. + +This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It failed to +result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be negligible. Yet it +was at the time of very great importance in affecting the attitude +toward each other of Great Britain and the United States, and of the men +who spoke for their respective countries. The bald facts of the +negotiation appear with exactness in Moore's _Digest of International +Law_[236], but without comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in +Bernard's _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil +War_[237], at the conclusion of which the author writes, with sarcasm, +"I refrain from any comment on this negotiation[238]." Nicolay and Hay's +_Lincoln_, and Rhodes' _United States_, give the matter but passing and +inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in some detail in the American +argument before the Geneva court of arbitration in the case of the +_Alabama_, but was there presented merely as a part of the general +American complaint of British neutrality. In fact, but three historical +students, so far as the present writer has been able to discover, have +examined this negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as +to purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British +intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly +spreading in America. + +These three, each with an established historical reputation, exhibit +decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic incidents and +documents. The first careful analysis was presented by Henry Adams, son +of the American Minister in London during the Civil War, and then acting +as his private secretary, in his _Historical Essays_, published in 1891; +the second study is by Bancroft, in his _Life of Seward_, 1900; while +the third is by Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American +Minister), who, in his _Life_ of his father, published 1900, gave a +chapter to the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid +down by his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion, +through further study, that he had earlier been in error and developed a +very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward and the Declaration +of Paris." + +[Illustration: C.F. ADAMS (_From a photograph in the United States +Embassy, London, by kind permission_)] + +If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking as they +do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise general in +treatment, the author's answer is that the personality of two of the +writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the effect of the +negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in London are +themselves important historical data; a further answer is the fact +that the materials now available from the British Foreign Office +archives throw much new light both on the course of the negotiation and +on British purposes. It is here planned, therefore, first to review the +main facts as previously known; second, to summarize the arguments and +conclusions of the three historians; third, to re-examine the +negotiation in the light of the new material; and, finally, to express +an opinion on its conduct and conclusions as an evidence of +British policy. + +In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the chief +maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily agreed to +respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or the enemy's flag. +This was a distinct step forward in the practice of maritime warfare, +the accepted international rules of which had not been formally altered +since the Napoleonic period. The action of Great Britain was due in +part, according to a later statement in Parliament by Palmerston, March +18, 1862, to a fear that unless a greater respect were paid than +formerly to neutral rights, the Allies would quickly win the ill-will of +the United States, then the most powerful maritime neutral, and would +run the danger of forcing that country into belligerent alliance with +Russia[239]. No doubt there were other reasons, also, for the barbarous +rules and practices of maritime warfare in earlier times were by now +regarded as semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the +action of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the +result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris in +1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and some +leading neutrals were gathered. + +The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four points: + + "1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. + + "2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception + of contraband of war. + + "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, + are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. + + "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; + that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to + prevent access to the coast of the enemy[240]." + +This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, +Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed that a general +invitation to accede should be extended to all nations, but with the +proviso "that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shall +accede thereto, shall not in future enter into any arrangement, +concerning the application of the law of neutrals in time of war, which +does not rest altogether upon the four principles embodied in the said +declaration[241]." In other words it must be accepted in whole, and not +in part, and the powers acceding pledging themselves not to enter into +any subsequent treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not +stipulate observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all +the maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the +Declaration of Paris. + +But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in the +advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. Little by +little her avowed principles of international law as regards neutrals, +first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in treaty stipulations. +Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in July, 1856, that the United +States would accede to the Declaration if a fifth article were added to +it protecting all private property at sea, when not contraband. This +covered not only cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would +have been to exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's +goods under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned. +Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to battles +between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule were adopted +also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States could not forgo +the right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her most +effective maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had no +large navy, were essential to her fighting power." + +"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been abolished on +land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" The American +proposal met with general support among the smaller maritime nations. It +was believed that the one great obstacle to the adoption of Marcy's +amendment lay in the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and that obstacle +proved insurmountable. Thus the United States refused to accede to the +Declaration, and there the matter rested until 1861. But on April 17 +Jefferson Davis proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of +privateers against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed +representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and expressing the +hope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, but +authorizing them to enter into conventions for American adherence to the +Declaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sent +to the Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, +Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands. + +Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his first +meeting with Russell on May 18, after having developed at length the +American position relative to the issue of the British Proclamation of +Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to offer adherence by +means of a convention, to the Declaration of Paris. Russell replied that +Great Britain was willing to negotiate, but "seemed to desire to leave +the subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had +already transmitted authority[242]...." Adams therefore did not press +the matter, waiting further information and instruction from Washington. +Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, approached the Government +of France with a suggestion that the two leading maritime powers should +propose to the American belligerents adherence to the second and third +articles of the Declaration of Paris. France had agreed and the date of +Russell's instruction to Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with +Adams. Confusion now arose in both London and Washington as to the place +where the arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion +will be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note +that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London. + +On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready to enter +into a convention with the United States, provided a similar convention +was signed with France at the same time. This convention, as submitted +by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by the two powers to abide by the +four points of the Declaration of Paris, using the exact wording of that +document[243]. Adams' draft had been communicated to Russell on July 13. +There then followed a delay required by the necessity of securing +similar action by Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29 +Adams reported to Russell that this had been done and that he was ready +to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, was +ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on the part +of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not +invalidate anything already done[244]." It was not until August 8, +however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to France, reported that +Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign Minister, that he was +ready to sign the similar convention with France[245]. With no +understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, and +professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's phrase, just +quoted[246], Adams waited the expected invitation to an official +interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was a condition of +the negotiation that this should be done simultaneously in London and +Paris, the further delay that now occurred caused him no misgivings. + +On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day "in the +course of this week," and prefaced this request with the statement that +he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he proposed to make in +writing, upon signing the convention. "You will observe," he wrote, +"that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of +the engagement to be taken by Her Majesty." The proposed +Declaration read: + + "In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day + between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland + and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, + by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend + thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any + bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now + prevailing in the United States[247]." + +Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and simple +adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now go on to +official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. Sincerely believing, +as he stated to Russell in a communication of August 23, that the United +States was "acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a +permanent doctrine for all time," and with the object of "ameliorating +the horrors of warfare all over the globe," he objected "to accompany +the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the +face of it seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that +the United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the +Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable policy, but +with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy +struggle which is going on at home[248]." He also pointed out that +Russell's proposed declaration either was or was not a part of the +convention. If it was a part then the Senate of the United States must +ratify it as well as the convention itself, and he would have gone +beyond his instructions in submitting it. If not a part of the +convention there could be no advantage in making the Declaration since, +unratified by the Senate, it would have no force. Adams therefore +declined to proceed further with the matter until he had received new +instructions from Washington. + +To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit exposition of +his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her neutrality in the +American conflict, thereby recognizing the belligerent rights of the +South. It followed that the South "might by the law of nations arm +privateers," and that these "must be regarded as the armed vessels of a +belligerent." But the United States had refused to recognize the status +of belligerency, and could therefore maintain that privateers issued by +the Southern States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a +European Power signing a convention with the United States, embodying +the principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat the +privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates." Hence +Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from contradictory +premises as to the status of the conflict in America, might become +involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of the convention. He +had therefore merely intended by his suggested declaration to prevent +any misconception by the United States. + + "It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government decline + to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their + part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an + adoption of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be + construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy + dissensions now prevailing in the United States; an + interference which would be contrary to Her Majesty's public + declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which Her + Majesty has deliberately sanctioned[249]." + +Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the proposed +declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to Adams, in +London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar declaration had +been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue the question save in +generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed possible "intervention" +which Great Britain and France seemed to fear they would be called upon +to make was exactly the action which the United States desired to +forestall, and he notified Adams that he could not consent since the +proposed Declaration "would be virtually a new and distinct article +incorporated into the projected convention[250]." The first formal +negotiation of the United States during the Civil War, and of the new +American Minister in London, had come to an inglorious conclusion. +Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, and +were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, not at the +moment informed save on the American offer and the result, paid little +attention to these "inner circle" controversies[251]. + +What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the negotiating +powers. The first answer in historical writing was that offered by Henry +Adams[252], in an essay entitled "The Declaration of Paris, 1861," in +the preparation of which the author studied with care all the diplomatic +correspondence available in print[253]. His treatment presents Russell +as engaged in a policy of deception with the view of obtaining an +ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of commercial rivalry +and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' argument Russell, on May +9, brought to the attention of France a proposal for a joint request on +the American belligerents to respect the second and third articles of +the Declaration of Paris, and received an acquiescent reply. After some +further exchanges of proposed terms of instructions to the British and +French Ministers at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to +Lyons with instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his +first interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could +have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to +negotiate on the Declaration of Paris as a _whole_--that is to say, on +all four articles--intimated that instructions had already gone to +Lyons, with directions to assent to any modification of the article on +privateering that the United States might desire. Adams understood +Russell to prefer that the negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to +be) should take place in Washington, and did not press the matter. + +This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since the +interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's country +house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable supposition the +despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until the Foreign Secretary's +return to his office; second because Lyons was not instructed to +_negotiate_ on the Declaration. The interpretation is justified +therefore that Russell "evaded the offer of the United States +Government." The result of this evasion was delay, but when Seward +learned from Lyons that he had no authority to negotiate a convention +and Adams received renewed instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his +temper, but the affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook +his faith in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In +renewing his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the +previous "misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further +"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview. + +Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit and +evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that Lyons, at +Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward the South, +Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a line of policy +distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each point in the +negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as follows: + + "The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues ... + induced the French Government to violate the pledge in the + protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to + both belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the + United States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of + Paris, while it placed both belligerents on the same apparent + footing. These steps were taken in haste before Adams could + obtain an interview. When Adams by an effort unexpected to + Russell obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of + Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May + 21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to + the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded the offer, saying + that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons, + although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they + been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his + notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made + such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as + coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams. + When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell + declared that he had never heard of it before, although he + had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to + him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration, + Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure + and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams + overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written + proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent + ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but + insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a + declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be + disregarded[254]." + +In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points are +insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question of +who first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams' +conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed by +Russell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying one +device after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from the +written declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference than +that Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, in +order to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]." The +_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been a +deep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, the +earlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject +to belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was the +American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled Great +Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now, +to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's hands, but if there +were no such complete adherence and only temporary observation of the +second article, after the war had resulted in the disruption of the +United States, thus removing the chief supporter of that article, Great +Britain would feel free to resume her old-time practice when she engaged +in war. If Great Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she +would feel bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood +constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord Malmesbury +declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect it[256]." Thus +the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first on +privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the negotiation +of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner in which Russell +received the advances of President Lincoln, no American Minister in +London could safely act on any other assumption than that the British +Government meant, at the first convenient opportunity, to revive the +belligerent pretensions dormant since the War of 1812[257]." + +This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly summarized it +depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude on the part of Russell +and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, selfish British policy, and +throughout a blind following on by France, yielding to Russell's +leadership. The American proposal is regarded merely as a simple and +sincere offer to join in supporting an improved international practice +in war-times. But when Frederic Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, +examined the negotiation he was compelled to ask himself whether this +was all, indeed, that the American Secretary of State had in view. +Bancroft's analysis may be stated more briefly[258]. + +Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April 24, +nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern +belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to remove all +excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward asserted a +twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with other progressive +nations in the melioration of the rigours of maritime war," and "to +remove every cause that any foreign Power could have for the recognition +of the insurgents as a belligerent Power[259]." This last result was not +so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the mechanism of operation ever +openly stated by Seward. But he did write, later, that the proposal of +accession to the Declaration of Paris was tendered "as the act of this +Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal +citizens." "It did not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy +to tell what would result in case the offer of accession on the part of +the United States should be accepted[260]." + +Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position where +they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard Southern +privateers as pirates, and treat them as such. This was a conceivable +result of the negotiation before European recognition of Southern +belligerency, but even after that recognition and after Dayton had +pointed out the impossibility of such a result, Seward pressed for the +treaty and instructed Dayton not to raise the question with France. He +still had in mind this main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not +intended to use the adherence of the United States to the declaration as +a lever to force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates, +or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and +unofficially have removed all such suspicions[261]." In an interview +with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of the treaty, +arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could be determined +afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave warning to Russell. +"Probably it was this advice that caused Russell to insist on the +explanatory declaration[262]." + +It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the acuteness of +Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into a trap." Nor +could his claim "that there was no difference between a nation entirely +at peace and one in circumstances like those of the United States at +this time" be taken seriously. "He was furnishing his opponent with +evidences of his lack of candour." This clouded the effect that would +have followed "a wise and generous policy toward neutrals, which had +doubtless been in Seward's mind from the beginning[263]." In the end he +concluded the negotiation gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of +American respect for the second and third articles of the Declaration of +Paris--exactly that which Lyons had originally been instructed by +Russell to secure. + + "We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, + according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods + not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not + contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found + under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be + committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our + citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or + property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective, + must be respected[264]." + +Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part the +result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a concealed purpose +of Northern advantage. This last he calls a "trap." And it is to be +noted that in Seward's final pledge to Adams the phrase "those of any of +our citizens" reserves, for the North, since the negotiation had failed, +the right to issue privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says +Bancroft, was not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a +British commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States +respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, and +"if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships and +goods of citizens of the North, all the better for other commercial +nations; for it would soon cause the commerce of the United States to be +carried on under foreign flags, especially the British and French[265]." +Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed to both parties in the +negotiation, and that of Seward is treated as conceived at the moment +when a policy of seeking European friendship was dominant at Washington, +but with the hope of securing at least negative European support. +Seward's persistence after European recognition of Southern belligerency +is regarded as a characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of +possible resulting dangerous complications. + +This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of State and +it does not completely satisfy the third historian to examine the +incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of British policy. +Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, writing in 1899, +followed in the main the view of his brother, Henry Adams. But in 1912 +he reviewed the negotiation at great length with different +conclusions[266]. His thesis is that the Declaration of Paris +negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war policy," in +that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and France and then +those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of Southern privateering, +or at least permitted them access to British and French ports, a good +ground of complaint leading to war would be established. _This_ was the +ultimate ulterior purpose in Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a +method of fixing a quarrel on some foreign Power in case the United +States should seek, as Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home +by a foreign war. + +In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with Bancroft, but +with this new interpretation. The opening misunderstanding he ascribed, +as did Lyons, to the simple fact that Seward "had refused to see the +despatch" in which Russell's proposals were made[267]. Seward's +instructions of July 6, after the misunderstanding was made clear to +him, pushing the negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a +very high horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st +of the previous May[268]," and this warlike charger he continued to ride +until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, put an end to +his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory he would have gone +on with his project. Now, with the end of a period of brain-storm and +the emergence of sanity in foreign policy, "Secretary Seward in due time +(September 7) pronounced the proposed reservation [by Russell] quite +'inadmissible.' And here the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and +not altogether creditable diplomatic farce[269]." + +Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and intention. +Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly said that his +course throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism[270]." And +Lyons is quoted as having understood, in the end, the real purpose of +Seward's policy in seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell +on December 6 upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying +the President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading +the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to the +effect it would have on the privateering operations of the Southern +States; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, after +having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as +pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground of +quarrel[271]...." As to Russell, combating Henry Adams' view, it is +asserted that it was the great good fortune of the United States that +the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a policy of neutrality, +was not to be driven from its honest application by irritations, nor +seduced into a position where the continuation of that policy would be +difficult. + +Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly available +British materials on the negotiation--materials which will in themselves +offer sufficient comment on the theories of Henry Adams, and in less +degree of Bancroft--it is best to note here the fallacy in C.F. Adams' +main thesis. If the analysis given in the preceding chapter of the +initiation and duration of Seward's "foreign war policy" is correct, +then the Declaration of Paris negotiation had no essential relation +whatever to that policy. The instructions to Adams were sent to eight +other Ministers. Is it conceivable that Seward desired a war with the +whole maritime world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate +proposal of a foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in +fact stamps the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe +which Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did +not come to a head until the news had been received of England's +determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the second +week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked the decline, +not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the President's +orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh certainly, Seward had +yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to expressions of +friendship[272]. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's first +instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June that the +"misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were despatched by Seward +to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations at London and Paris. The +battle of Bull Run had nothing to do with a new policy. Thus chronology +forbids the inclusion of this negotiation, either in its inception, +progress, or conclusion, as an agency intended to make possible, on just +grounds, a foreign war. + +A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and in +archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the Declaration of +Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation known in London it +will be remembered that on May 1 the British Government and Parliament +became aware that a civil war was inevitable and that the South planned +to issue privateers. On that day Russell asked the Admiralty to +reinforce the British fleet in West Indian waters that British commerce +might be adequately protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in +the Commons that Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a +policy of close harmony with France was being matured; and on this day +he proposed through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each +ask _both_ the contending parties in America to abide by the second and +third articles of the Declaration of Paris[273]. If there was ulterior +motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then or later, +passing between any of the British diplomats concerned--Russell, Cowley, +and Lyons. The plain fact was that the United States was not an adherent +to the Declaration, that the South had announced privateering, and the +North a blockade, and that the only portions of the Declaration in +regard to which the belligerents had as yet made no statement were the +second and third articles. + +It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On May 9 +Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's attitude +toward a British subject serving on a Southern privateer[274]. The next +day in the Lords there occurred a debate the general burden of which was +that privateering was in fact piracy, but that under the conditions of +the American previous stand, it could not be treated as such[275]. Both +in the Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming +Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both +debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to +Cowley, on May 11[276]. By that despatch France was asked to send an +instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft instruction +intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to Cowley, the object +being to secure from the American belligerents adherence to _all_ the +articles, privateering included, of the Declaration of Paris[277]. + +Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original suggestion, it +met with a prompt check from France. On May 9 Thouvenel had agreed +heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the practical advice that the +best method of approach to the Confederacy would be through the consuls +in the South[278]. Now, on May 13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel +feared that England and France would get into serious trouble if the +North agreed to accede on privateering and the South did not. Cowley +reported that he had argued with Thouvenel that privateers were pirates +and ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more +than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles[279]. For the +moment Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On +May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in which he +mentioned a communication about to be made to the South[280]; and on May +15 the London _Times_, presumably reflecting governmental decision, in +commenting on the Proclamation of Neutrality, developed at some length +the idea that British citizens, if they served on Southern privateers, +could claim no protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat +them as pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written +Mercier in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but +omitting the part about privateering[281], and on this same day Russell +sent to Cowley a copy of a _new_ draft of instructions to Lyons, +seemingly in exact accord with the French idea[282]. On the seventeenth, +Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to Thouvenel[283]. Finally +on May 18 the completed instruction was despatched. + +It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview with +Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had been +based on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had no +knowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams, +toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority to +negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So far +as he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of an +agreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in fact +completed, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on the +sixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a +completed agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instruction +already given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams' +conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought. +The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status +of belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been +wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This required +consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again open +up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and +permanent renunciation of privateering? + +For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May +18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to +privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to +Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had already +transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of the +only point in issue which the Government of the United States might +prefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty +whatever[284]." This clearly referred to privateering. Russell's +instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in +reverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by all +nations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized as +law, both in Great Britain and in the United States." The second +article, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the +history of their independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great +Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to +adhere to the principle she then adopted." Thus briefly stating his +confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles, +Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the +American crisis. + + "There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that + relating to privateering, from which the Government of the + United States withheld their assent. Under these + circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on + this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be + borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or + other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and + abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the + most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no + question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship + bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry + on their hostilities according to the established laws of + war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any + Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, + and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her + Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of + vessels sailing under such letters of marque. + + "In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a + certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new + principle. + + "You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]." + +What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to him +were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that +Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be +piracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce +privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln's +proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an +object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russell +could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in +treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as +close to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would use +vigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might be +interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the +_facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern +activities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in the +proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's +criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and +a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal +letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was also +dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British +Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction +"to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled +Confederate States," and he further explained his purpose and the +British position: + + "... You will not err in encouraging the Government to which + you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which + they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in + regard to privateering.... + + "You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government + cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of + the Government of the United States if coupled with the + condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the + Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue + letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent + operations of vessels holding from them such letters of + marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the + recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of + the law of nations[287]." + +Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy +of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared by +Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a +half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a +renunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced of +the wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenel +might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this +same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote: + + "I have further to state to you, with reference to my + despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first + instance inclined to propose to both of the contending + parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of + Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after + communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit + our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch. + + "I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M. + Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the + abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action + is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to + exercise it[288]." + +Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward's +mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his +own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only +as the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatever +method seemed most "conciliatory." His first private comment on +receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when he +finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the +Southern privateering[289]," and in an official confidential despatch of +the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward +expected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did the +matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a +time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the +transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in London +Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June +6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he +understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an +American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... it may open the way +to the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But ... we ought +not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining +this desirable object[292]." Evidently, in his opinion, the South would +not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days +later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in +Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States +that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote +that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294]. +Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection +to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could +not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared +neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American +Secretary of State. + +Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had +specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed +would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern +privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to +impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to +Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which +was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the +two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that +joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as +acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he +read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent +by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not +pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons +told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some +intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British +interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its +eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were +doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons +thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal +knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the +negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this +postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date, +indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution +of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the +Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to +be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor +of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate +Government[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated, +feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous," but believing they had +prevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of +an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions +and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify +Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, that +such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to +issue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions +to make this clear--let alone any "latitude" to deal with +privateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward +his personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was +not an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the +"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were being +sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His only +subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he +learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no +further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in +case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the +Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no +circumstances should a convention be signed without a distinct +declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern +privateers[301]. + +The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' report +of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to +Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that +Adams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, and +that he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offer +to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth. +On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step +indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior +motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no +resulting irritations or complications with the United States. He +recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the +Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons +should act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall was +now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation +without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already +started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the +end[303]." + +Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the +United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American +adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the +convention at once. The warnings received from many sources did not +dismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue, +believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering. +Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have +been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he +telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing +a Convention with the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to +the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer +immediately by telegraph[304]." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that +Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley in +a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very +cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it would be +better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again +his fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The same +objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a +reply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that +while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the +same time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late +afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your +despatches to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308], +and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by +Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to +act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of +Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be +informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter +the Proclamation of Neutrality[309]. + +The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310]. +Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar French +convention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued +French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for the +affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous +promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit +understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be +attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton +refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident +sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion +that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed" +from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the +Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint +Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had +been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long +since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this +negotiation. + +But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that +in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of +any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of +British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting +to secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this +was by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True he +probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing +privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not +to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of +belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six +months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to +maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he +returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their +proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as +final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed +it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would +be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid +in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument, +but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the +recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply +could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have +constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the +existence of a state of war. + +In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simple +and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a +conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules +advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both +personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed +toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the +negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far +as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was +concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the +straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry +was gone[316]." + +And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not, +it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a +high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British +neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually +effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of +Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly +attitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the +moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with +the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of +offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration +of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a +portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the +larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United +States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against +warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the +instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by +Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France, +and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting +declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence +of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if +obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly +admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good +understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated, +suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality +could long be maintained[318]. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.] + +[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.] + +[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.] + +[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275.] + +[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562.] + +[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, p. 563.] + +[Footnote 242: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams to +Seward, May 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol +XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 18.] + +[Footnote 244: _Ibid._, No. 25.] + +[Footnote 245: _Ibid._, No. 26.] + +[Footnote 246: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams to +Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV, +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 28.] + +[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, No. 31.] + +[Footnote 249: _Ibid._, No. 32.] + +[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581.] + +[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early in +the London press. Thus the _Saturday Review_. June 8, 1861, commenting +on the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration of +Paris, stated that this could have no effect on the present war but +would be welcomed for its application after this war was over.] + +[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the Geneva +Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British +diplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gain +the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and +third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected +and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be +deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in +Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280.] + +[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279.] + +[Footnote 254: _Ibid._, p. 271.] + +[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 273.] + +[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, p. 277.] + +[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without stating +details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of Henry +Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.] + +[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31.] + +[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189.] + +[Footnote 260: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 261: _Ibid._, p. 193.] + +[Footnote 262: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 263: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 264: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward to +Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.] + +[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is not +supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. While +it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out +by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.] + +[Footnote 266: C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Mass. +Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.] + +[Footnote 267: _Ibid._, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons +of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward +had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and +considered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts of +Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The +incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I +regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily +a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality. +Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to +be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation, +thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181.) +I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the +negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some +reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused +a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and +Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)] + +[Footnote 268: _Ibid._, p. 51.] + +[Footnote 269: _Ibid._, p. 64.] + +[Footnote 270: _Ibid._, p. 60.] + +[Footnote 271: _Ibid._, p. 58.] + +[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130.] + +[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 1. It was +with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "If +any step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feeling +our way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the men +who have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who +is about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political +friend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but +still he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any +step." (Palmerston MS.)] + +[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. 1763.] + +[Footnote 275: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34.] + +[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentary +papers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion, +for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against French +advice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in +seeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration +of Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at which +Russell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.] + +[Footnote 277: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft.] + +[Footnote 278: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May +9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 279: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May +13, 1861.] + +[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II, +p. 40.] + +[Footnote 281: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 733.] + +[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 5.] + +[Footnote 283: _Ibid._, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding document +are all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendment +of Russell's plan did not appear.] + +[Footnote 284: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward, +May 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 7.] + +[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons, +had been officially received in London on May 10.] + +[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 8.] + +[Footnote 288: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. and the +Queen."] + +[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printed +in Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42.)] + +[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 12. Marked +"Received," June 17.] + +[Footnote 291: F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8, +1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to act +extended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, which +they also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to order +the French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis. +Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on this +planned proposal to the Confederacy.] + +[Footnote 292: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld. +Palmerston and the Queen."] + +[Footnote 293: In Washington, so different was the point of view, Lyons +and Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of the +proposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them their +passports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward his +instructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North was +concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit and +representation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June +15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learned +the effect of this "joint proposal." F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons +to Russell, June 8, 1861.] + +[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 10. Russell +to Grey, June 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state to +which the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to a +serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until results +were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi mon +avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)] + +[Footnote 296: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.] + +[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 14. Lyons to +Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in this interview that +Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of the +proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had no +instructions to sign a convention.] + +[Footnote 298: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.] + +[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing +privately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution" +in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal, +rather than official communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's +idea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had +agreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with +France. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.] + +[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 303: F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell was +writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of the +British position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding, +"It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates, +and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we +mean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them +belligerent rights." C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," +pp. 49-50.] + +[Footnote 304: F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. Russell to +Cowley, July 15, 1861.] + +[Footnote 305: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.] + +[Footnote 306: Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July 16 Cowley +repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not yet approached +France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.)] + +[Footnote 307: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. Palmerston's +Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact language is used in +the last paragraph of the communication to Adams, November 18, as +printed in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 19.] + +[Footnote 308: F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell to Cowley, July +17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th at 4.30 p.m.] + +[Footnote 309: _Ibid._, No. 729.] + +[Footnote 310: See _ante_ pp. 142-45.] + +[Footnote 311: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley to Russell, July +26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 312: It should be noted that during this period Russell +learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall of +instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at Charleston the +overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved this action +(_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence +respecting International Maritime Law." No. 23.)] + +[Footnote 313: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley to Russell, +August 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 314: Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston, August 26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 315: See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," +pp. 58 and 74.] + +[Footnote 316: Adams, _Life of C.F. Adams_, p. 209.] + +[Footnote 317: The Confederate Commissions on August 14, 1861, just +before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris negotiation, had +made vigorous protest against this British order, characterizing it as +giving a "favour" to the Government at Washington, and thus as lacking +in neutrality. Quoted by C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of +Paris," p. 31.] + +[Footnote 318: A few facts about Southern privateering not directly +pertinent to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was no +case during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer +(i.e., a private vessel operating under government letters of marque) +from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. +38.) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard, +_Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general +instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia in +August, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to the +United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen at +the time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the Russian +Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U.S. would +equip privateers in case war should break out with England and France. +Seward replied 'that is a matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon +remarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted to +cruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the +only state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates +in accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then +exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about +it.'" (Schleiden MS.)] + + + +CHAPTER VI + +BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER + +The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the preceding +chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and Ministers as important +in themselves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon all +parties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. But +the public knew nothing of the details of the inconclusive negotiation +and the Press merely gave a hint now and then of its reported progress +and ultimate failure. Newspapers continued to report the news from +America in unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort +Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both sides +in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in arms for +which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for +75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 additional. The +regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy by 18,000 men. Naval +vessels widely scattered over the globe, were instructed to hasten their +home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an available land force, however +badly trained and organized, of over 300,000, though these were widely +scattered from the Potomac in the east to the Missouri in the west. + +In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for 100,000 +volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the newly-born +Confederacy. The seven states already in secession were soon joined, +between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas, Virginia, North +Carolina and Tennessee in order, but the border states of Maryland, +Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly sympathetic with the rest of the +South, were held to the Union by the "border state policy" of Lincoln, +the first pronouncement of which asserted that the North had no purpose +of attacking slavery where it existed, but merely was determined to +preserve the Union. The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session on +July 4, heartily approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized an +army of 500,000, provided for a loan of $200,000,000, sanctioned the +issue of $50,000,000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both direct +and by tariffs to meet these expenditures. + +In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed determination of +the South to secede and the uncertainty of the North had led the British +press to believe that the decision rested wholly with the South. Now the +North by its preparations was exhibiting an equally fixed determination +to preserve the Union, and while the British press was sceptical of the +permanence of this determination, it became, for a short time, until +editorial policy was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The +_Economist_ on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal +step" rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate +desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so proud, +but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of population and +wealth, be the victor, though this could not conceivably result in any +real reunion, rather in a conquest requiring permanent military +occupation. Southern leaders were mad: "to rouse by gratuitous insult +the mettle of a nation three times as numerous and far more than three +times as powerful, to force them by aggressive steps into a struggle in +which the sympathy of every free and civilized nation will be with the +North, seems like the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and hearts +hardened by the evil cause they defend." + +Two weeks later, the _Economist_, while still maintaining the justice of +the Northern cause, though with lessened vigour, appealed to the common +sense of the North to refrain from a civil war whose professed object +was unattainable. "Everyone knows and admits that the secession is an +accomplished, irrevocable, fact.... Even if the North were sure of an +easy and complete victory--short, of course, of actual subjugation of +the South (which no one dreams of)--the war which was to end in such a +victory would still be, in the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an +objectless and unprofitable folly[319]." But by the middle of June the +American irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly +and angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press +resentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of British +attitude. "We _do_ believe the secession of the Slave States to be a +_fait accompli_--a completed and irreversible transaction. We believe it +to be impossible now for the North to lure back the South into the Union +by any compromise, or to compel them back by any force." "If this is an +offence it cannot be helped[320]." + +The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed through the +same shifts of opinion and expression as the _Economist_; first +upbraiding the South, next appealing to the North not to wage a useless +war, finally committing themselves to the theory of an accomplished +break-up of the Union and berating the North for continuing, through +pride alone, a bloody conflict doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer +attention was diverted from the ethical causes at issue by the +publication in the _Times_ of Motley's letter analysing the nature of +the American constitution and defending the legal position of the North +in its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against the +general British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness in +England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our +downfall, but to accept the fact[321]...." + +He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South into +subjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is written on +the record of our race. British and American history is made up of +rebellion and revolution.... There can be nothing plainer, then, than +the American right of revolution. But, then, it should be called +revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should find difficulty in +understanding that the United States Government is a nation among the +nations of the earth; a constituted authority, which may be overthrown +by violence, as may be the fate of any state, whether kingdom or +republic, but which is false to the people if it does not its best to +preserve them from the horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood." + +Motley denied any _right_ of _peaceful_ secession, and his +constitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view. But he +was compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the sense of +Lincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no purpose of +emancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that slavery within +a state was sacred from all interference by the general government, or +by the free states, or by individuals in those states; and the Chicago +Convention [which nominated Lincoln] strenuously asserted that +doctrine." Coming at the moment when the British press and public were +seeking ground for a shift from earlier pro-Northern expressions of +sympathy to some justification for the South, it may be doubted whether +Motley's letter did not do more harm than good to the Northern cause. +His denial of a Northern anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a, +professedly, more calm and judicial examination of the claimed +_Southern right_ of secession, and his legal argument could be met, and +was met, with equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as to +the nature of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity of +Lincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even to +warnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring into +consideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial that +there were any great moral principles at stake in the American conflict. + +In the meantime the two sections in America were busily preparing for a +test of strength, and for that test the British press, reporting +preparations, waited with interest. It came on July 21 in the first +battle of Bull Run, when approximately equal forces of raw levies, +30,000 each, met in the first pitched battle of the war, and where the +Northern army, after an initial success, ultimately fled in disgraceful +rout. Before Bull Run the few British papers early taking strong ground +for the North had pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as +inevitably destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The +_Daily News_ lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a +great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all free +people a question of upholding the eternal principles of liberty, +morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be civil war, may +perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most perfect instrument in +working out a pure intent[322].'" The disaster to the Northern army, its +apparent testimony that the North lacked real fighting men, bolstered +that British opinion which regarded military measures against the South +as folly--an impression reinforced in the next few months by the long +pause by the North before undertaking any further great effort in the +field. The North was not really ready for determined war, indeed, until +later in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the British +press upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military weakness. + +Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment were +the letters of W.H. Russell to the _Times_. This famous +war-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 by +Delane, editor of the _Times_, his first letter, written on March 29, +appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through the South, was +met everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man of his reputation and +one representing the most important organ of British public opinion, +returned to the North in late June, and at Washington was given intimate +interviews by Seward and other leaders. For a time his utterances were +watched for, in both England and America, with the greatest interest and +expectancy, as the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest, +dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of slavery, +terming apologists of that institution "the miserable sophists who +expose themselves to the contempt of the world by their paltry theiscles +on the divine origin and uses of Slavery[323]...." and writing "day +after day ... the impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States +Rights' meant protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and +free-trade in slave produce with the other world[324]." But at the same +time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the South in +high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in the North. +The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he rode out from +Washington to meet the defeated army, and his description of the routed +rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy toward the Capitol, so ridiculed +Northern fighting spirit as to leave a permanent sting behind it. At +the same time it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the +Northern effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himself +guarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and France +think of it?' is the question which is asked over and over again," wrote +Russell on July 24[325], expatiating on American anxiety and chagrin in +the face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he recorded in his +diary the beginnings of the American newspaper storm of personal attack +because of his description of the battle in the _Times_--an attack which +before long became the alleged cause of his recall by Delane[326]. In +fact Russell's letters added nothing in humiliating description to the +outpourings of the Northern press, itself greedily quoted by +pro-Southern foreign papers. The impression of Northern military +incapacity was not confined to Great Britain--it was general throughout +Europe, and for the remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured to +assert a Northern success in the war[327]. + +Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the policy of +strict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The truth is, the +North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by professional +politicians, while the South are fighting for what they consider rightly +or wrongly vital interests," thus explaining to his own satisfaction why +a Northern army of brave men had _chosen_ to _run_ away[328], but the +Government was careful to refrain from any official utterances likely to +irritate the North. The battle served, in some degree, to bring into the +open the metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing +neutrality and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each +took a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of +Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of +British interference[329], and to Gladstone (evidently controverting the +latter's opinion) that slavery was and would continue to be an object in +the war[330], but the press, certainly, was not united either as to +future British policy or on basic causes and objects of the war. The +_Economist_ believed that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, if +coming soon, would "so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Union +that the contest will be abandoned on the instant.... Some day, with +scarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has been +agreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been signed[331]." John +Bright's paper, the _Morning Star_, argued long and feverishly that +Englishmen must not lose sight of the fact that slavery was an issue, +and made appeal for expressions, badly needed at the moment, of +pro-Northern sympathy[332]. To this _John Bull_ retorted: + + "Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery has + nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America.... The + people of America have erected a political idol. The + Northerners have talked and written and boasted so much about + their Republic that they have now become perfectly furious to + find that their idol can be overthrown, and that the false + principles upon which the American Republic is built should + be exhibited to the world, that their vaunted democracy + should be exposed as a mere bubble or a piece of rotten + timber, an abominable and worthless tyranny of the sovereign + mob[333]." + +Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at issue[334]. +_John Bull_, the "country squire's paper," might venture to voice the +thought, but more important papers were still cautious in expressing it. +W.H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is quite obvious, I think, +that the North will succeed in reducing the South[335]." But Delane +permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the _Times_. Darwin is +good testimony of the all-prevalent British feeling: "I hope to God we +English are utterly wrong in doubting whether the North can conquer the +South." "How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquer +the South; and I never meet a soul, even those who would most wish it, +who think it possible--that is, to conquer and retain it[336]." + +In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned, there +appeared several books and articles on the American question which gave +opportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and controversy. A Dr. +Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of St. John's College, +Oxford," published a work, _The American Crisis Considered_, chiefly +declamatory, upholding the right of Southern secession, stating that no +one "who has the slightest acquaintance with the political action of +history would term the present movement rebellion." With this the +_Spectator_ begged leave to differ[337]. The _Saturday Review_ +acknowledged that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipation +to the front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this view +as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, +who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of her +pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. Under the +caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the _Saturday Review_ +avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy War" in America. "The North +does not proclaim abolition and never pretended to fight for +anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the Sacred +Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its _cri de guerre_ is not unconditional +emancipation." "The Governmental course of the British nation ... is not +yet directed by small novelists and their small talk[338]." Thomas +Hughes also came in for sarcastic reference in this article, having +promptly taken up the cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attack +through the columns of the _Spectator_, reasserting slavery as an issue +and calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of Americans +and realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations of mean +motives," and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A nation engaged in +a life and death struggle should not be treated in a tone of flippant +and contemptuous serenity. The British press had chosen "to impute the +lowest motives, to cull out and exult over all the meanness, and +bragging, and disorder which the contest has brought out, and while we +sit on the bank, to make no allowances for those who are struggling in +the waves[339]." + +Besides the _Spectator_, on the Northern side, stood the _Daily News_, +declaring that the South could not hold out, and adding, +"The Confederate States may be ten millions, but they _are_ +wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong[340]." The _Daily News_, according +to its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone in steadfast advocacy of +the Northern cause[341]. This claim of unique service to the North is +not borne out by an examination of newspaper files, but is true if only +metropolitan dailies of large circulation are considered. The +_Spectator_ was a determined and consistent friend of the North. In its +issue of September 28 a speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and +attacked. The speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would +be beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size +and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that the +final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate nations, and +stated his belief that the friendly emulation of these nations would +result for Americans in a rapid advance in art and commerce such as had +been produced in the old commonwealths of Greece. The _Spectator_ +answered that such a breaking up of America was much more likely to +result in a situation comparable to that in South America, inquired +caustically whether Bulwer Lytton had heard that slavery was in +question, and asserted that his speech presumably represented the +official view of the Tories, and embodied that of the English governing +class[342]. + +In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861 there is +little on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality is approved +by all papers and public speakers. But as the months passed without +further important military engagements attention began to be directed +toward the economic effects on England of the war in America and to the +blockade, now beginning to be made effective by the North. The _Saturday +Review_, though pro-Southern, declared for neutrality, but distinguished +between strict observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognition +of the _de facto_ government of the Confederacy "as soon as the Southern +States had achieved for their independence that amount of security with +which Great Britain had been satisfied in former cases[343]." But +another article in the same issue contained a warning against forcibly +raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the North, and +that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. Two weeks later +appeared a long review of Spence's _American Union_, a work very +influential in confirming British pro-Southern belief in the +constitutional right of the South to secede and in the certainty of +Southern victory. Spence was "likely to succeed with English readers, +because all his views are taken from a thoroughly English +standpoint[344]." The week following compliments are showered upon the +"young professor" Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the Present +American War," in which he distinguished between recognition of +belligerency and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the former +was inevitable and logical. The _Saturday Review_, without direct +quotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early recognition +of Southern independence on the ground that it was _a fait accompli_, +and expressed approval[345]. + +These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and reputable +journals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side or the other +throughout the months from June to December, 1861. All publications had +much to say of the American struggle and varied in tone from dignified +criticism to extreme vituperation, this last usually being the resort of +lesser journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writing +in a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was a +characteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined with a +supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior nation, gave +great offence to Americans, whether North or South. But the British +press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the governmental policy +of neutrality, and in any event Motley was right in stating "the Press +is not the Government," adding his opinion that "the present English +Government has thus far given us no just cause of offence[346]." +Meanwhile the Government, just at the moment when the Declaration of +Paris negotiation had reached an inglorious conclusion, especially +irritating to Earl Russell, was suddenly plunged into a sharp +controversy with the United States by an incident growing out of +Russell's first instructions to Lyons in regard to that negotiation and +which, though of minor importance in itself, aroused an intensity of +feeling beyond its merits. This was the recall by Seward of the +exequatur of the British consul Bunch, at Charleston, South Carolina. + +It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on the +Declaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at Charleston, be +commissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance of the binding force +of the second and third articles, but that Lyons and Mercier, fearing +Seward's irritation, had hesitated to proceed in the matter. Later +Russell had recalled his instructions, but before this recall could +reach Lyons the latter had decided to act[347]. On July 5 Lyons gave +explicit directions to Bunch not to approach the Confederate Government +directly, but to go to Governor Pickens of South Carolina and explain +the matter to him verbally, adding "you should act with great caution, +in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new +Confederation by Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am +authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this +matter to you," thus after all implying that a real _negotiation_ with +the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent similar +instructions to St. Andre, the French Acting-Consul at Charleston[348]. +Bunch received Lyons' official letter on July 19[349], together with a +private one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was to put nothing in +writing, and that he and his French colleagues were to keep the names of +Lyons and Mercier out of any talk, even, about the matter. Bunch was to +talk as if his instructions came directly from Russell. Lyons hoped the +South would be wise enough not to indulge in undue publicity, since if +"trumpeted" it might elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal from +France and England." Both the official and the private letter must, +however, have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all a +negotiation and that he had been entrusted with it[350]. + +Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with the +Southern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his environment, +become more friendly to it[351]. He now acted with promptness and with +some evident exultation at the importance given him personally. In +place of Governor Pickens an experienced diplomat, William Henry +Trescott, was approached by Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. Andre, was +then the French agent at Charleston[352]. Trescott went directly to +President Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not been +made through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhat +unwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the Confederate +Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris except for the +article on privateering[353]. Bunch took great pride in the secrecy +observed. "I do not see how any clue is given to the way in which the +Resolutions have been procured.... We made a positive stipulation that +France and England were not to be alluded to in the event of the +compliance of the Confederate Govt.[354]," he wrote Lyons on August 16. +But he failed to take account either of the penetrating power of +mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On +this same day, August 16, Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on the +fourteenth, of one Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage for +Liverpool carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to the +British Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. The +letters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch's +recent activities and stated that "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy, +communicated to me also that the first step of recognition was +taken[355]." The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams to +Russell with an enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on the +alleged "negotiation" with the South. + +Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as a +passport, as did the United States. This also was made matter of +complaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented to +Russell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the three +principal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a negotiation +with the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a passport, not +countersigned by the Secretary of State as required by the United States +rules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he had permitted the person +to whom this passport was issued to carry letters from the enemies of +the United States to their agents abroad. On these grounds the British +Government was requested to remove Bunch from his office. On first +learning of Mure's arrest Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch's +conduct had been perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be found +to contain nothing supporting the suspicion of the American +Government[356]. The language used by Lyons was such as to provide an +excellent defence in published despatches, and it was later so used. But +privately neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the +correctness of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on +August 18, and at once protested that no passport had been given, but +merely a "Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British +Merchant residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was +carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office[357]. In fact Mure +had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the +distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion. +Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in +taking charge of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. Bunch's +confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me not to +forward himself any letters alluding to military or political events, +excepting letters to or from British officials[358]." This made good +reading when put in the published Parliamentary Papers. But in reality +the sending of private letters by messenger also carrying an official +pouch was no novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that this +was his practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for the +merchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I must +leave it to your Lordship and H.M.'s Government to support me. My own +despatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so I take the +responsibility of aiding British interests by sending the mercantile +letters as well[359]." And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons on Mure's +arrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could not consider +him [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer of a bag to Earl +Russell, by his doing what everyone who left Charleston was doing +daily[360]...." + +Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation with +Belligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington, writing, +"I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult +and delicate, was managed with great tact and good judgment by the two +Consuls[361]." But this referred merely to the use of Trescott and its +results, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British Government was, indeed, +prepared to defend the action of its agents in securing, _indirectly_, +from the South, an acknowledgment of certain principles of +international law. Russell did not believe that Lincoln was "foolhardy +enough to quarrel with England and France," though Hammond (Under +Secretary of Foreign Affairs) "is persuaded that Seward wishes to pick a +quarrel[362]." Enquiry was promptly made of France, through Cowley, as +to her stand in the matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell +intimating by an enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as +to the initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was +Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through the +Consuls[363]. This was an error of memory[364], and Cowley was perturbed +by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. The latter +stated that if a like American demand were made on France "undoubtedly +he could not give up an Agent who had done no more than execute the +orders entrusted to him[365]." This looked like harmony, but the +situation for the two countries was not the same as no demand had been +made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley was, in reality, anxious and +suspicious, for Thouvenel, in conversation, attributed Seward's anger to +Bunch's alleged indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that France +would not "stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against the +fact of a communication (not a _negotiation_) having been held with the +Confederacy[366]. Before the French reply was secured Russell had +prepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him that the bag +from Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain "correspondence of +the enemies of the Government of the United States" as had been +suspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's explanation of the reason +for forwarding private letters[367]. In another letter to Adams of the +same date Russell avowed the Government's responsibility for Bunch's +action on the Declaration of Paris, and declined to recall him, adding: + + "But when it is stated in a letter from some person not + named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern + States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs + to decline all responsibility for such a statement. + + "Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the + belligerent character of the Southern States, and they will + continue to recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's + Government have not recognized and are not prepared to + recognize the so-called Confederate States as a separate and + independent State[368]." + +Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13[369], and merely +stated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That Russell +was anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to Lyons instructing +him if sent away from Washington "to express in the most dignified and +guarded terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be +the result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire +to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon cease, +and the former friendly relations be restored[370]." Meantime Russell +was far from satisfied with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform him +that the "statements made in regard to his proceedings require +explanation[371]." The failure of Seward to demand Belligny's recall +worried Russell. He wrote to Palmerston on September 19, "I cannot +believe that the Americans, having made no demand on the French to +disavow Belligny, or Baligny, will send away Lyons," and he thought that +Seward ought to be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part +of Bunch's supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending +reinforcements to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about +Bunch, we may rest on our oars for the winter[372]." There was nothing +further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of the British +refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at Washington was writing +in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract assertions of principles," but +accustoming the North to the _practice_ of British recognition of +Southern belligerent rights[373]. Lyons believed that Seward would not +go further than to withdraw Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for +the return of Mercier (long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our +position is unluckily not exactly the same with that of France[374]." On +October 12 Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, as +usual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter just +received from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not "unfriendly +to the United States," and "appeared anxious not to pick a quarrel, yet +hardly knowing how to retract from his original position." Lyons told +Seward that it would be "impossible to carry on the Diplomatic +business ... on the false hypothesis that the United States Government" +did not _know_ England and France had recognized the belligerent rights +of the South, and he urged Russell to get from France an open +acknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated" with +the Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid this, thus +seeking to bring pressure on the British Government to adopt his plan +of an early recognition of Southern independence. Like Cowley, Lyons +was disturbed at the French evasion of direct support in the Bunch +affair[375]. + +Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him by the +United States was confined to three points; he asserted his disbelief +that Mure carried any despatches from the _de facto_ government at +Richmond; he protested that "there was not one single paper in my bag +which was not entirely and altogether on Her Majesty's service"; and he +explained the alleged "passport" was not intended as such, but was +merely "a certificate stating that Mr. Mure was charged by me with +despatches," but he acknowledged that in the certificate's description +of Mure as a "British merchant" a possible error had been committed, +adding, however, that he had supposed anyone would understand, since the +words "British subject" had not been used, that Mure was in reality a +naturalized citizen of America[376]. This explanation was received by +Russell on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, made +without knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, was +that if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters +carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I mean +the distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the distinction +between a document requesting that the bearer '_may be permitted to pass +freely and receive all proper protection and assistance_' and a +passport[377]." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's explanation was also +dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated Lyons' instructions +against entrusting despatches to persons carrying private +correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives no distinct denial" to +the newspaper stories that he had gossiped about his activities and had +stated them to be "a first step toward recognition[378]." These +criticisms were directed entirely to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the +overture to the South; on the propriety of that act Russell supported +Bunch with vigour[379]. October 26, Seward read to Lyons the instruction +to Adams on the revocation of Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken for +this, reported Lyons, was an evasion of that charge of communicating +with the South for which Russell had avowed responsibility, and a +turning to the charge that Bunch was personally unacceptable longer to +the United States because of his partisanship to the South, as evidenced +by various acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion that +Great Britain had taken "a first step to recognition." "Never," wrote +Lyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation." "No +one who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to me can +consider him as in the least degree a partisan of the Southern cause." +"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. +After a short pause I took leave of him courteously, and +withdrew[380]." + +As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American decision +against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been relieved that this +would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. His despatch just +cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the proper British refutation +of charges, but with acceptance of the American decision. Nevertheless +he wrote gloomily on the same day of future relations with the United +States[381]. At the same time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action, +was not disturbed. He thought it still "not off the cards that the +Southern Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be +strictly neutral, and it will be[382]." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch +and letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach +much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of Seward to +feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the most +grateful food he can offer[383]." For Russell saw clearly that Great +Britain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personal +grounds alleged by Seward. There followed in due course the formal +notification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned of +the _Trent_ affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarming +incident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, for +while both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative +papers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the +only point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain +that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British +interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the +Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its citizens, +but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British agent who +should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell closed the matter +by stating that he did "not perceive that any advantage would be +obtained by the continuance of this correspondence[384]." Bunch was +expected to leave Charleston as soon as a safe conveyance could be +provided for him, but this was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he +remained at Charleston until February, 1863, actively engaged, but +official papers were signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over +the _Trent_, he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as +he did from the public horizon[385]. + +The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so far as the +alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had its real +significance in the effort of Great Britain to make contact with the +Southern Government--an effort incautiously entered upon, and from which +an attempt to withdraw had come too late. The result was British +assertion of a right in case of necessity to make such contact, having +recognized the South as a belligerent, but a discontinuance of the +practice, under the American protest[386]. While this controversy was in +progress the attention of the British Government was directed to a +proposal urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared to +have the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so +Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel expressing +great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, due +to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informed +Lyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, complete +harmony of action between England and France; second, recognition of +Southern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade; +fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment," +when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a good +one[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be +deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument over +this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but +thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the +idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop +other sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusive +dependence on the United States. Mercier answered that France was in +dire need and could not wait and he urged that mere recognition of the +South would not secure cotton--it was necessary also to break the +blockade. In comment to Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but +thought the fact in itself an argument against accepting Mercier's +ideas: "The time is far distant when the intervention of England and +France in the quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion, +tolerated by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far +enough in establishing its independence to render a recognition of it +either proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with +emphasis that recognition would _not_ end the war unless there was also +an _alliance_ with the South[388]. + +In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was being +directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any push from the +British manufacturing interest, but because of queries addressed to it +by the French Minister in London. Russell wrote to Palmerston, referring +to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree with you that the cotton question +may become serious at the end of the year," but he added that Lindsay +had informed him that in any case cotton could not be brought in the +winter-time from the interior to the Southern ports[389]. In truth any +serious thought given at this time to the question of cotton appears to +be the result of the French arguments at London and Washington +advocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier +renewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this +time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons +insisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any power +that recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more +suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage +of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in +dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of +attitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified +when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, +after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward +said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign +power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France +could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He +acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed +Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On his +part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible +outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel that +the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and +"bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to Russell is that +Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification of +Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learn +whether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercier +replied "no," and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to +Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--a +caution with which Lyons was very content[391]. + +Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at a +rather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint about +Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would +magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before +Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote to +Palmerston: + + "There is much good sense in Mercier's observations. + But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything, + it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England + and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting + cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, + Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms + of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you + accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts + them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, + and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would + be quite ready to hold this language with us. + + "If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it + would be the end of the year, or immediately before the + meeting of Parliament[392]." + +Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat +carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly held +thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor +was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not +inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell: + + "As to North America, our best and true policy seems to + be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the + conflict between North and South.... The only + excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening + parties if the conflict went on; but in the American + case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe. + + "I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would + not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress + created by that want was far more serious than it is likely + to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way + to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply + than usual from other quarters. + + "The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars + and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel + with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights + and those of our fellow countrymen[395]." + +In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward, +outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared +despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was +one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we +consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed +to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what +the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]." +Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none +the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since +Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which +Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no +expanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyons +by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister +could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and +Russell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied. +Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not +become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share +in the discussion[397]. + +Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still +another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with +Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of +national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views +became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed with +more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons +into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he +"had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the +time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the +South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied +that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it +would be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive +exception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written on +November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred +an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than +any other during the Civil War. + +The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression of +Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and +determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a +favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed, +as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatory +statement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell felt +that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell +learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's +recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days +later, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8. +It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increasing +uncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also an +increasing irritation at having to guard their steps with such care in a +situation where they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was +the dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the +news of the _Trent_ affair was received they had pursued a policy, so +they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and were fixed in the +determination not to permit minor controversies or economic advantage to +divert them from it. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 319: _Economist_, May 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 320: _Ibid._, June 29, 1861.] + +[Footnote 321: J.L. Motley, _The Causes of the American Civil War_. +Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.] + +[Footnote 322: _Daily News_, July 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 323: Russell, _My Diary, North and South_, p. 159, Boston, +1863. This work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the +_Times_, but contains many intimate descriptions not given in the +newspaper.] + +[Footnote 324: _Ibid._, p. 315.] + +[Footnote 325: The _Times_, August 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 326: Russell, _My Diary_, London, 1863, II, p. 296. This +edition varies somewhat from that published at Boston and previously +cited. The _New York Times_ became Russell's most vicious critic, +labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a name which stuck, and beginning its +first article on his sins "The terrible epistle has been read with quite +as much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcely +exaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on the +minds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at _Bull's +Run_ was, what will Russell say?" _Ibid._, p. 297. As to his recall +Russell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance of +opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in sympathy +and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be examined later when +Russell's position as an independent editor in London becomes +important.] + +[Footnote 327: For similar German impressions see G.H. Putnam, _Memories +of My Youth_, N.Y., 1914, p. 187.] + +[Footnote 328: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, p. 48. In the same view Russell +wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of Manassas or Bull's Run seems +to me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the descendants +of the men of 1776 and indeed of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage." +(Lyons Papers.)] + +[Footnote 329: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 31. August 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 330: Gladstone Papers, August 29, 1861.] + +[Footnote 331: _Economist_, Aug. 17, 1861.] + +[Footnote 332: _Morning Star_, Sept. 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 333: _John Bull_, Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 334: To be discussed fully in Chapter XVIII.] + +[Footnote 335: Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, _Delane_, II, p. 34.] + +[Footnote 336: Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861. Cited in +_Rhodes_, III, p. 510.] + +[Footnote 337: _Spectator_, Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 338: _Saturday Review_, Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 339: _Spectator_, Sept. 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 340: _Daily News_, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1861. The statement +is in reply to an article in the _Times_ of October 9, arguing that even +if the South were regarded as in the wrong, they had ten millions, a +fact that was conclusive.] + +[Footnote 341: _The Daily News Jubilee_. By Justin McCarthy and John E. +Robinson, pp. 69-77.] + +[Footnote 342: _Spectator_, Sept. 28, 1861.] + +[Footnote 343: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 344: _Ibid._, Nov. 16. Spence's book rapidly went through many +editions, was widely read, and furnished the argument for many a +pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon became the intimate friend +and adviser of Mason, the Confederate envoy to England.] + +[Footnote 345: _Ibid._, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference from Bernard's la +guage is perhaps permissible, but not inevitable.] + +[Footnote 346: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 37. To his mother, Oct. +18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 347: See _ante_, Ch. V.] + +[Footnote 348: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 21 and +Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at Charleston who acted +with Bunch.] + +[Footnote 349: F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 2, +1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days were here required to +transmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached its +destination in two days. Lyons states that he does not intend to inform +Mercier of Russell's attempted recall of instructions.] + +[Footnote 350: F.O., Am., Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure No. 2. Private. +Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to Lyons, also used the +word "negotiation."] + +[Footnote 351: When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch had thought this +indicated a "low morality" and that Southern privateers would be in +reality pirates. F.O., Am., Vol. 763. Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch to +Russell, April 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 352: Bancroft's account, _Seward_, II, pp. 197-203, states +that Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's account privately was +that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally unfit to be intrusted with +anything in which judgment and discretion are at all necessary." (Lyons +Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 16, 1861.)] + +[Footnote 353: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 198.] + +[Footnote 354: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons.] + +[Footnote 355: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 4. Adams to +Russell, Sept. 3, 1861.] + +[Footnote 356: _Ibid._, No. 2. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 357: Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18, 1861. Copy in +Lyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861.] + +[Footnote 358: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 7. Lyons to +Russell, Aug. 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 359: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 360: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15. +Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 361: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting International +Maritime Law." No. 39. Lyons to Russell.] + +[Footnote 362: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 6, 1861.] + +[Footnote 363: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 6. Russell +to Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861.] + +[Footnote 364: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. 17, +1861.] + +[Footnote 365: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 10. Cowley to +Russell, Sept. 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 366: F.O., France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley to Russell, +Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. +10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 367: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 9. Russell +to Adams, Sept. 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 368: _Ibid._, No. 8. Two days later, September 11, Russell +wrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant of Seward's intentions, and +that the Queen wished a modification of the "phrase about not being +prepared to recognize," but that he was against any change. +Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 369: _Ibid._, No. 12. Adams to Russell.] + +[Footnote 370: Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited in Newton, +_Lyons_, I, p. 52.)] + +[Footnote 371: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 11. Russell +to Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 372: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 373: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. _Private_. Sept. 24, +1861.] + +[Footnote 374: _Ibid._, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts about Belligny were, +as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before Bunch's activities became +known, the French Consul had been recalled and replaced by another man, +St. Andre. It will have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent +their instructions to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was +addressed to St. Andre. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus +there was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft +(_Seward_, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward "thought +it important not to give them (England and France) a common grievance."] + +[Footnote 375: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 376: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15. +Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 377: Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and Confidential, Lyons to +Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in this letter that Mure had +been set free.] + +[Footnote 378: F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to Lyons. Draft. +Oct. 26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 379: The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were not printed in +the _Parliamentary Papers_. Bunch did later deny specifically that he +had told anyone of his activities. _(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, +Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. +22. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861.)] + +[Footnote 380: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 17. Lyons +to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting unindicated +elisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating them in brackets +the sentences run: first:-- + +"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges brought +against Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed proceeding being +deemed advisable with a view to gratify the American Public, Mr. Bunch +has merely been selected as a safer object of attack than the British or +French Government.] I can not help saying that never were more serious +charges, etc.," and second:-- + +"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. [I +allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me to be apparent +in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward's +character, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say would +make so much impression upon him as my maintaining an absolute silence.] +After a short pause, etc." (F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to +Russell, Oct. 28, 1861).] + +[Footnote 381: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861.] + +[Footnote 382: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 383: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861. He +added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of the +bully and coward."] + +[Footnote 384: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 26. Russell +to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 385: Bonham, _British Consuls in the Confederacy_, p. 45. +Columbia University, _Studies in History, Economics and Public Law_, +XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons +thought. Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privately +at Charleston. (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. Lyons +to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the +United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious +circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister +resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United +States and Colombia." (Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, V, p. 22.)] + +[Footnote 386: Bancroft, _Seward, II_, p. 203, says that if Great +Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that British representatives +were careful to preserve perfect secrecy." I have found no evidence of +any similar communication with the South.] + +[Footnote 387: As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier as +urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governments +authority to recognize the South whenever they thought "the right time" +had come. Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that +the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him +in his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea, +and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England and France +had acted. Russia could then also recognize the South without offending +the North. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861. +No. 863.)] + +[Footnote 388: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 389: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1861. On +Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the winter and +spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we shall attain a +great object." (Lyons Papers.)] + +[Footnote 390: F.O., America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 21, +1861.] + +[Footnote 391: _Ibid._, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to Russell. +Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861.] + +[Footnote 392: Walpole, _Russell_, II, 344.] + +[Footnote 393: See _ante_, p. 194.] + +[Footnote 394: "The Americans certainly seem inclined to pick a quarrel +with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to oblige us to +recognize the Southern States. A step further would enable us to open +the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity." +(Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 245. Granville to Clarendon. No exact date is +given but the context shows it to have been in October, 1861.)] + +[Footnote 395: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 218-19. On October 30, Russell +wrote to Gladstone expressing himself as worried about cotton but +stating that the North was about to try to take New Orleans and thus +release cotton. (Gladstone Papers).] + +[Footnote 396: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 219. Bancroft cites also a +letter from Seward to his wife showing that he appreciated thoroughly +the probability of a foreign war if France should press on in the +line taken.] + +[Footnote 397: F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 623. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, Nov. 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 398: _Ibid._, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 8, +1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that suspicion of France +indicated by Cowley, and for both men these suspicions date from the +moment when France seemed lukewarm in support of England in the matter +of Bunch.] + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE "TRENT" + +The _Trent_ affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax of American +arrogance[399]. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at the outbreak of +the Civil War had accomplished little, and after seven months of waiting +for a more favourable turn in foreign relations, President Davis +determined to replace them by two "Special Commissioners of the +Confederate States of America." These were James M. Mason of Virginia, +for Great Britain, and John Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their +appointment indicated that the South had at last awakened to the need of +a serious foreign policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the +Southern press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North, +almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to secure +recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual accomplishment of +their object. + +Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at Charleston on the +night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate steamer _Theodora_[400], +and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, on the fourteenth, thence +proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, Cuba, and from that point +journeyed overland to Havana, arriving October 22. In the party there +were, besides the two envoys, their secretaries, McFarland and Eustis, +and the family of Slidell. On November 7 they sailed for the Danish +island of St. Thomas, expecting thence to take a British steamer for +Southampton. The vessel on which they left Havana was the British +contract mail-packet _Trent_, whose captain had full knowledge of the +diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 the +_Trent_ was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United States sloop of +war, _San Jacinto_, Captain Wilkes commanding, by a shot across the +bows, and a boarding party took from the _Trent_ Mason and Slidell with +their secretaries, transferred them to the _San Jacinto_, and proceeded +to an American port. Protest was made both by the captain of the _Trent_ +and by Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on +board the ship[401]. The two envoys also declared that they would yield +only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid upon shoulders +and coat collars, and, accepting this as the application of _force_, +they were transferred to the _San Jacinto's_ boats. The scene on the +_Trent_, as described by all parties, both then and later, partakes of +the nature of comic opera, yet was serious enough to the participants. +In fact, the envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction +that the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early +realization of the object of their journey--recognition of the South, +at least by Great Britain[402]. Once on board the _San Jacinto_ they +were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having "seats at the +captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an American war-ship. + +Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even without any +recent official information from Washington. He was returning from a +cruise off the African coast, and had reached St. Thomas on October 10. +A few days later, when off the south coat of Cuba, he had learned of the +Confederate appointment of Mason and Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth, +in Havana harbour, he heard that the Commissioners were to sail on the +_Trent_. At once he conceived the idea of intercepting the _Trent_, +exercising the right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the +alleged objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The +result was that quite without authority from the United States Navy +Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was +addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be accepted +by that nation as an insult to national prestige and national pride not +quietly to be suffered. + +The _San Jacinto_ reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of November 15. +The next day the news was known, but since it was Saturday, few papers +contained more than brief and inaccurate accounts and, there being then +few Sunday papers, it was not until Monday, the eighteenth, that there +broke out a widespread rejoicing and glorification in the Northern +press[403]. America, for a few days, passed through a spasm of +exultation hard to understand, even by those who felt it, once the first +emotion had subsided. This had various causes, but among them is evident +a quite childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and +Slidell. Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of +the previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed +antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a +leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was a +United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by birth, +but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in business there, +and had for nearly twenty years been the political "boss" of one faction +of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in the State. With much +previous experience in diplomacy, especially that requiring intrigue and +indirect methods (as in the preliminaries of the Mexican War), and +having held his seat in the United States Senate until the withdrawal of +Louisiana from the Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more +detested, but both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the +personal side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing[404]. + +Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until the news +of the capture was received no portion of the public had given serious +thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise also played its part +when the affair became known in England, though in official circles +there had been some warning. It had already been reported in the British +press that Mason and Slidell had run the blockade at Charleston, were in +Cuba, and were about to set sail for England on the Confederate steamer +_Nashville_, but the British Government, considering that the envoys +might perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for +Southampton, became much concerned over a possible American interference +with that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the +Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the +presence at Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking whether +this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be entitled to +interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with beyond the territorial +limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond three miles from the +British Coast." + +[Illustration: _Photo: Handy, Washington_ JAMES M. MASON] + + "Whether for instance she might cause the West India Mail + Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers, + open the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine + the luggage of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason + and Slidell in person, or seize their Credentials and + Instructions and Despatches, or even put a Prize Crew on + board the West India Steamer and carry her off to a Port of + the United States; in other words what would be the right of + the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers and crew + and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet on + the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and + confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches; + would the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and + everything in her back to America or would she be obliged to + land in this Country or in some near port all the people and + all the unseizable goods[405]?" + +Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an immediate +reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in Southampton on +November 12. The opinion of the law officer consulted is best given in +Palmerston's own words in a letter to Delane, Editor of the _Times_: + + "_94 Piccadilly, + November 11, 1861_. + + "MY DEAR DELANE, + + "It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr. + Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of + Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider + what we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no + doubt, to search the West Indian packet supposed to be + bringing hither the two Southern envoys; and, much to my + regret, it appeared that, according to the principles of + international law laid down in our courts by Lord Stowell, + and practised and enforced by us, a belligerent has a right + to stop and search any neutral not being a ship of war, and + being found on the high seas and being suspected of carrying + enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American + cruiser might, by our own principles of international law, + stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern + men and their despatches and credentials were found on board, + either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back + to New York for trial. Such being the opinion of our men + learned in the law, we have determined to do no more than to + order the _Phaeton_ frigate to drop down to Yarmouth Roads + and watch the proceedings of the American within our + three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, and to prevent + her from exercising within that limit those rights which we + cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit. + + "In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk + this morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and + finding it blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the + night within Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the + Southampton river. + + "I mention these things for your private information. + + Yours sincerely, + + PALMERSTON[406]." + +Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to Delane, and +sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a difficult +situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to Adams on the +next day, November 12, and asking for an interview. His note took Adams +by surprise, but he promptly waited upon Palmerston, and was told of the +latter's disturbance at the presence of the American ship _James Adger_, +Captain Marchand commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged +purpose of stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting the +journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not pretend +to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right to stop a +foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and he urged on +Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither did the object +to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it was surely of no +consequence whether one or two more men were added to the two or three +who had already been so long here. They would scarcely make a difference +in the action of the Government after once having made up its +mind[407]." + +The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the same day, +November 12, was reassuring: + + "MY DEAR DELANE, + + "I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the + American paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the _Nashville_ + if found in these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under + a foreign flag. He said he had seen the commander, and had + advised him to go straight home; and he believed the steamer + to be now on her way back to the United States. This is a + very satisfactory explanation. + + Yours sincerely, + + PALMERSTON[408]." + +In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded quite +the same statement as that here attributed to him by Palmerston, and +this became later, but fortunately after the question of the _Trent_ had +passed off the stage, a matter of minor dispute. Adams' own statement +was that he had told Palmerston the _James Adger_ was seeking to +intercept the _Nashville_ and "had no instruction" to interfere with a +British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already had +instructions "not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag[409]." +But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had been +warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually happened in the +case of the _Trent_ should occur, English practice, if followed, would +compel acquiescence in it[410]. This is not to say that a first legal +advice thus given on a problematical case necessarily bound the +Government to a fixed line of action, but that the opinion of the +Government was one of "no help for it" if the case should actually arise +is shown by the instructions to Lyons and by his reaction. On November +16, Hammond wrote to Lyons stating the opinion of the Law Officers that +"we could do nothing to save the Packet being interfered with outside +our three miles; so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that +the American [the _James Adger_] had no instructions to meddle with any +ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to endeavour to +take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under foreign colours[411]." On +receipt of this letter subsequent to the actual seizure of the envoys, +Lyons hardly knew what to expect. He reported Hammond's account to +Admiral Milne, writing that the legal opinion was that "Nothing could be +done to save the Packet's being interfered with outside of the Marine +league from the British Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that +the Law Officers decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of +the Packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being +interfered with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion +which was to come _after_ the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so uncertain as +to what his instructions would be that he thought he "ought to maintain +the greatest reserve here on the matter of the _Trent_[412]." + +This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complication +occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before that +fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell, "says it was all a +false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggerated +notions[413]." But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that the +North, especially Seward, was so eager for continued British +neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes' action +was received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it a +continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a direct +affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, was +stirred at first to keen resentment, writing "of this wretched piece of +American folly.... I am all against submitting to any clean breach of +International Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414]." The +Law Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon +the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sending +the _Trent_ as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415]." This +was still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could not +be considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the _Trent_ +as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was +to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would have +prohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port for +trial by a prize court. + +But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon +the United States. The case was one for a quick demand of prompt +reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was +couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an +unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a +breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without +orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an +apology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to +propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British +position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy +of it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russell +authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward, +if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether +"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied +with[418]." And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons +instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from +anything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Government +hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began +preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated +munitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but faint +hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be +avoided[420]. + +It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost +immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was +softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point +being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was +unauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to the +receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he +stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict +silence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the +realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could +divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands +over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in +America this was a far-fetched notion. The efforts promptly made by the +Confederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showed +how little Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very +quiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain +intended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and +30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but received +in reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them +"in the present state of affairs[425]." + +The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportation +before even the first American reaction to the British demand could be +received in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a more +careful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really felt +and desired. Gladstone wrote: "It is a very sad and heart-sickening +business, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426]." +Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone +of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on +technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a +calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not only +ourselves, but all our North American colonies[427]." But war seemed to +both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by Cornewall +Lewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in a +position midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429]. Yet Russell, +with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's policy, as also +believing that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was less +pessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediate +hostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense. +On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the +opinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive +answer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to ask +compliance.... I do not think the country would approve an immediate +declaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand of a +restoration of the prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada. +Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430]." And on December 20 +he wrote, "Adams' language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding +to us, if our tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are +refused, we must, of course, call Parliament together. The sixth +of February will do. In any other case we must decide according to +circumstances[431]." + +Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America without +the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for delay. He was +reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought which was +experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager British +"Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first explosion of +the Press, on receipt of the news of the _Trent_, had been a terrific +one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen field of supremacy, the +sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at first preserving a certain +slow dignity of motion. Customary "strong leader-writing" became +vigorous, indeed, in editorial treatment of America and in demand for +the prompt release of the envoys with suitable apology. The close touch +of leading papers with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the +_Times_, by the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28 +there was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much +questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be doubtful. +But even if old British practice seemed to support Captain Wilkes, the +present was not to be controlled by a discarded past, and "essential +differences" were pointed out. This tone of vexed uncertainty changed to +a note of positive assurance and militant patriotism on November 30 when +the Government made its demand. The _Times_ up to December 2, thought it +absolutely certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted +much space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy +toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But on +December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American news of +the arrival of the _San Jacinto_ at Fortress Monroe, and this contained +a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had no orders. The _Times_ +was sceptical, but printed the news as having an important bearing, if +true, and, at the same time, printed communications by "Justicia" and +others advising a "go slowly" policy[432]. Yet all British papers +indulged in sharp reflections on American insults, displayed keen +resentment, and demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand. + +An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward on +November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of feeling as +has been created by the news of the boarding of [the Trent]. The people +are frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men out +of a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot +resist the impulse if he would." And another American, in Edinburgh, +wrote to his uncle in New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling +of indignation exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may +make itself heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet +officers[433]." If such were the British temper, it would require +skilful handling by even a pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even +without belligerent newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in +_Punch's_ cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of +the water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least +implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a general +hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement from the +American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that he had said the +action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at Washington before he +sailed for Europe, and asserting that no orders were given to seize the +envoys on board any British or foreign vessel[434]. Nevertheless, Adams, +for the moment intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of +British policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The +expression of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great +Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May she +drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a few +spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong enough to hold +her from driving it home. Little do you understand of this fast-anchored +isle[435]." + +There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and sharper tone +in the British press was the reception of the counter-exultation of the +American press on learning of the detention and the exercise of "right +of search" on a British ship. The American public equally went "off its +head" in its expressions. Writing in 1911, the son of the American +Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young +law-student in Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of +the half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American +people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment losing +possession of their senses, as during the weeks which immediately +followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell[436]." There were evident two +principal causes for this elation. The North with much emotion and high +courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of restoring the Union +and hoping for quick success, had now passed through a wearisome six +months with no evident progress towards its object. Northern failure had +developed a deep mortification when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold +naval captain, on his own initiative, appeared to have struck a real +blow at the South. His action seemed to indicate that the fighting +forces of the North, if free from the trammels of Washington red tape, +could, and would, carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight +incident to create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden +lifting from despondency to elation. + +But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on American +minds the notion that the United States had at last given to Great +Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had exercised upon +a British ship that "right of search" which had been so keenly resented +by America as to have become almost a _permanent_ cause of a sense of +injury once received and never to be forgotten. There was no clear +thinking about this; the obnoxious right of search in times of peace for +vagrant seamen, the belligerent right exercised by Britain while America +was a neutral, the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as +necessary in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused +by the American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to +this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a general +American jubilation that the United States had now revenged herself for +British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain could not +consistently complain. These two main reasons for exultation were shared +by all classes, not merely by the uninformed mob of newspaper readers. +At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in Boston on November 26, Governor +Andrews of Massachusetts called Wilkes' action "one of the most +illustrious services that had made the war memorable," and added "that +there might be nothing left [in the episode] to crown the exultation of +the American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of +the ship that bore the British lion at its head[437]." + +All America first applauded the act, then plunged into discussion of its +legality as doubts began to arise of its defensibility--and wisdom. It +became a sort of temporarily popular "parlour game" to argue the +international law of the case and decide that Great Britain could have +no cause of complaint[438]. Meanwhile at Washington itself there was +evidenced almost equal excitement and approval--but not, fortunately, by +the Department responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. +Secretary of the Navy Welles congratulated Wilkes on his "great public +service," though criticizing him for not having brought the _Trent_ into +port for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2, +thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to give +him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence of +approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of national +responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, therefore, and +on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the Cabinet, like Sumner, +Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful solution. Thoroughly alarmed +and despondent, anxious as to the possible fate of Canada[439], he +advised against any public preparations in Canada for defence, on the +ground that if the _Trent_ affair did blow over it should not appear +that we ever thought it an insult which would endanger peace[440]. This +was very different from the action and attitude of the Government at +home, as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising +like caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at +the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States. + +The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became known to +the British press some six days after its own spasm of anger, and three +days after the Government had despatched its demand for release of the +prisoners and begun its hurried military preparations. On December 3 the +_Times_ contained the first summary of American press outpourings. The +first effect in England was astonishment, followed by renewed and more +intense evidences of a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there +began to appear a note of caution and more sane judgment of the +situation, though with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had +suffered an injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of +delight seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave +pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright made a +great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British precedent for +Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American leadership in democracy, +and stating his positive conviction that the United States Government +was as much astonished as was that of Great Britain by the attack on the +_Trent._[441] To this the _Times_ gave a full column of report on +December 5 and the day following printed five close-type columns of the +speech itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the +speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where the +orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why Manchester or +Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the _Times_ was +attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" Bright as an apostle of +democracy rather than to fan the flames of irritation over the _Trent_, +and the prominence given to Bright's speech indicates a greater +readiness to consider as hopeful an escape from the existing crisis. + +After December 3 and up to the ninth, the _Times_ was more caustic about +America than previously. The impression of its editorials read to-day is +that more hopeful of a peaceful solution it was more free to snarl. But +with the issue of December 10 there began a series of leaders and +communications, though occasionally with a relapse to the former tone, +distinctly less irritating to Americans, and indicating a real desire +for peace[442]. Other newspapers either followed the _Times_, or were +slightly in advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful +expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw no +change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction of the +"insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized in the next +few days that a slow shift was taking place in the British temper and +regretted the violence of American utterances. December 12, he wrote to +his son in America: "It has given us here an indescribably sad feeling +to witness the exultation in America over an event which bids fair to be +the final calamity in this contest...." Great Britain "is right in +principle and only wrong in point of consistency. Our mistake is that we +are donning ourselves in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth +wearing[443]." His secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful +as I am of Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the +same time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody +set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable could +you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an insult. _We_ +should have jumped out of our boots at such a one[444]." + +The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope or +pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for an +honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they trusted +the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves aiding a slave as +against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had written a long account +of the changes taking place in Northern feeling as regards slavery. He +thought it very probable that the issue of emancipation would soon be +forced upon Lincoln, and that the American conflict would then take on a +new and more ideal character[445]. This letter, arriving in the midst of +uncertainty about the _Trent_ solution, was in line with news published +in the British papers calling out editorials from them largely in +disapproval[446]. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If the prisoners +were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then to do? Would it be +wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at once? + +"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise the +blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent the egress +of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will be sent against +our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at present not defensible. He +had been reading Alison on the War of 1812, and found that then the +American army of invasion had numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect +40 or 50,000[447]." Two days later he wrote to Gladstone that if America +would only "let the Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he +would be satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad +to make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and +securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels or to +persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. This would be +a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the particular case would be +decided in our favour[448]." + +On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was well-known +that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of Palmerston's foreign +policy and, to the initiated, his last effort in this direction--the +modification of the instruction to Lyons on the _Trent_--was no secret. +There is no evidence that his death made any change in the British +position, but it was true, as the American Minister wrote, that "Now +they [the British public] are beginning to open their eyes to a sense of +his value. They discover that much of their political quietude has been +due to the judicious exercise of his influence over the Queen and the +Court, and they do not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without +him[449]." The nation was plunged into deep mourning, but not to +distraction from the American crisis, for on the day when all papers +were black with mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of +the approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a summary +of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their astonishment, made +no mention of the _Trent_ affair. The Congressional approval caused +"almost a feeling of consternation among ourselves," but Lincoln's +silence, it was argued, might possibly be taken as a good omen, since it +might indicate that he had as yet reached no decision[450]. Evidently +there was more real alarm caused by the applause given Wilkes by one +branch of the government than by the outpourings of the American press. +The next day several papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the +_Times_ gave a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had +ignored the issue with Great Britain[451]. On the eighteenth this +journal also called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the +report of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not +unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the increase +of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The _Times_ +continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance on the _Trent_, but +devoted most of its energy to combating the suggestions, now being made +very generally, advocating a recourse to arbitration. This would be +"weak concession," and less likely to secure redress and peace for the +future, than an insistence on the original demands. + +Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson wrote +that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute may after +all be settled without war[452]." Cornewall Lewis thought the "last mail +from America is decidedly threatening, not encouraging[453]." But on +December 19, Adams was at last able to give Russell official assurance +that Wilkes had acted without authorization. Russell at once informed +Lyons of this communication and that he had now told Adams the exact +terms of his two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed +Lyons to accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes' +action was unauthorized--a very important further British modification, +but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the +affair at Washington[454]. Meanwhile a notable change had taken place in +American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes affair +unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at all[455]," a +reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of the +British demand and the unanimous support given it by the British +public[456]. On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone +produced less effect than might have been expected, and this because of +the persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt, +would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that he +had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was the +time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow Weed, +Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London and +attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of the +_Times_. His communication was printed, but his assertion that Seward's +unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle story," were +misunderstood, did not convince the _Times_, which answered him at +length[457], and asserted its belief "... that upon his ability to +involve the United States in a war with England, Mr. Seward has staked +his official, and, most probably, also his political existence." The +Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's remarks, wrote George Peabody +later, "has strongly influenced the Government in war preparations for +several months past[458]." Adams himself, though convinced that Seward's +supposed animosity "was a mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the +Duke of Newcastle," acknowledged that: "The Duke has, however, +succeeded in making everybody in authority here believe it[459]." Surely +no "joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but +British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious reasons, +as previously related[460]. + +As time passed without an answer from America, British speculation +turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a war. These were not +reassuring since even though postulating a British victory, it appeared +inevitable that England would not escape without considerable damage +from the American navy and from privateers. Americans were "a powerful +and adventurous people, strong in maritime resources, and participating +in our own national familiarity with the risks and dangers of the +deep[461]." Englishmen must not think that a war would be fought only on +the shores of America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed +and intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in +the _Daily News_ on December 25, 26 and 27, by W. W. Story, an artist +resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice Story, +whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain[462]. By the last +week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager to +find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to an +extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave they +have themselves created[463]." He greatly regretted the death of the +Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the United +States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams wrote Seward: +"I think the signs are clear of a considerable degree of reaction." He +also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European support of +England in this contention: "Unquestionably the view of all other +countries is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new +and large modifications of international law which will hereafter +materially restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the +ocean[464]." + +Adams' estimate was correct. Even the _Morning Post_, generally accepted +as Palmerston's organ[465], and in the _Trent_ crisis the most +'vigorous' of all metropolitan journals, commented upon the general +public hope of a peaceful solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a +Government [the American] elected but a few months since by the popular +choice, depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford +to disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question must, +we fear, be in the negative...." The _Post_ (thereby Palmerston?) did +indeed, as later charged, "prolong the excitement," but not with its +earlier animosity to America. The very fact that the _Post_ was accepted +as Palmerston's organ justified this attitude for it would have been +folly for the Government to announce prematurely a result of which there +was as yet no definite assurance. Yet _within_ the Cabinet there was a +more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell of +December 19 was practically conclusive[466], and Adams himself now +thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an American plan to +inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at least in this case +nothing of the kind had been intended[467]." Everyone wondered at and +was vexed with the delay of an answer from America, yet hopefully +believed that this indicated ultimate yielding. There could be no +surety until the event. Russell wrote to Palmerston on January 7, "I +still incline to think Lincoln will submit, but not until the clock is +59 minutes past 11. If it is war, I fear we must summon Parliament +forthwith[468]." + +The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage of at +Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for consideration +by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to Lyons. These were +received on December 18, and on the next day Lyons unofficially +acquainted Seward with their nature[469]. The latter expressed +gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" of Lyons and +asked for two days' time for consideration. On Saturday, December 21, +therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a formal presentation of demands +but was met with a statement that the press of other business had +prevented sufficient consideration and was asked for a further two days' +postponement until Monday. Hence December 23 became the day from which +the seven days permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the +meantime, Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support +given by France to the British position. + +The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first learning +of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic fever and for a +saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written to his brother that if +the prisoners were not given up, "this nation means to make war." To +this the brother in America replied "this nation doesn't[470]," an +answer that sums up public determination no matter how loud the talk or +deep the feeling. Seward understood the change and had now received +strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in +Paris[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America must +yield. Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in +an impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released _if the +demand were made_. The comment of those who were "wise after the event" +was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the +prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any +complaint could be received from Great Britain. This leaves out of +consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration +already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the +war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself +a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all +probability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in +the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems +to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they +might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to +notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472]. + +On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great +Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden, +earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of +British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against +the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be +made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede +what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give +another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your +country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on +Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that +his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's +discussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next +day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his +associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply in +the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on +the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did not +contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be +released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great +Britain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantially +complied with" that he should remain at his post until he received +further orders[474]. + +Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyons +reported that it was very well received and that the public was calm and +apparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus the +preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's argument reviewed +at great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on many +points of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated the +past relations of the two nations on "right of search," and finally took +the ground that Mason and Slidell were contraband of war and justly +subject to capture, but that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the +_Trent_, with her passengers, into port for trial by an American prize +court. Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed +over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, says +Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in argument, +and contained many contradictions[476], but, he adds, that it was +intended primarily for the American public and to meet the situation at +home. Another critic sums up Seward's difficulties: he had to persuade a +President and a reluctant Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day, +to reconcile a Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending +Wilkes, and to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch[477]. +Still more important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of +contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the _neutral port_ +destination of the _Trent_, was the likening of Mason and Slidell to +"ambassadors of independent states." For eight months Seward had +protested to Europe "that the Confederates were not belligerents, but +insurgents," and now "his whole argument rested on the fact that they +were belligerents[478].... But this did not later alter a return to his +old position nor prevent renewed arguments to induce a recall by +European states of their proclamations of neutrality. + +On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was received in +London, stating that the envoys would be released and the next day came +his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. The envoys themselves +did not reach England until January 30, and the delay in their voyage +gave time for an almost complete disappearance of public interest in +them[479]. January 10, Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was +well satisfied with the fact and manner of the American answer, and +regarded the incident as closed, but that it could not agree with +portions of Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was +done on January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of +interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the legal +advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes +contraband[480]. Possibly the British Government was embarrassed by the +fact that while France had strongly supported England at Washington, +Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes, +whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or +as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of +all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had +ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to +Seward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially +as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens +and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main +reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was +the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent +maritime power. + +In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated +that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they +were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as +distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious, +seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own +house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after +listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had +hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart +from a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested that +Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does not +necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is +exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners +before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have +been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell +and a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence of +Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also, +in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarily +at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "I +do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosity +to this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it was +beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone" +which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as +especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based +upon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit +of this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations that +the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign +interference. The final decision in the _Trent_ affair, such was the +situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and that +decision was, from the first, for peace. + +Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America in +general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed, +was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred and +the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up the +traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect the +discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and then fight Great +Britain[486]." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his "Bigelow +Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862: + + "It don't seem hardly right, John, + When both my hands was full, + To stump me to a fight, John-- + Your cousin, tu, John Bull! + Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess + We know it now,' sez he, + 'The lion's paw is all the law, + Accordin' to J.B., + Thet's fit for you an' me[487]!'" + +It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and Slidell that +in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of the British press +and the preparations of the Government. Even after their surrender +America was further incensed by British boasting that America had +yielded to a threat of war, as in the _Punch_ cartoon of a penitent +small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says he is very sorry and that he didn't mean +to do it," and so escapes the birching Britannia was about to +administer. America had, in all truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked +being told so, and regarded the threat itself as evidence of British +ill-will[488]. This was long the attitude of the American public. + +In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great national +sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulder +to the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earlier +careers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than any +other men," were responsible for the traditional American "insane +prejudice against England," an assertion for which no facts were offered +in proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell +on American politics before secession. They were "about the most +worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of the +American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not +give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." Continuing, the +_Times_ argued: + + "What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our + conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not + suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great + war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our + eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their + own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the + swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right + to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason + and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of + these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town, + and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen + to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have + to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation." + +This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading British +newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections save +the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "The +first effect of the surrender ... has been extraordinary. The current +which ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seems +to be going with equal fury in our favour[489]." Officially on the same +day he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in the +crisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet and +religious citizens of the middle classes," that if Great Britain did +engage in war with the United States she would be forced to become the +ally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]." + +Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during the +period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer was +received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "we +necessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of the +South[491]." Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Story +the British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was with +the North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery] +in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one let +or stop," but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object had +largely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable +though a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr. +Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]." He +assured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I +have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay at +the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with +America[493]." And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purpose +of the North is also understood at last; ... there is no longer the +notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494].'" + +A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passed +resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation of +Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with a +slave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not +_publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, is +certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touring +America, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignation +against Captain Wilkes, wrote: + + "These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our + books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image, + are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their + vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them. + They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our + greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff + of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States + would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the + world's surface[496]." + +The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, be +regarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions. +Much more exactly and with more authority as representing that +thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of John +Stuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862, +making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling about +the _Trent_: + + "We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity, + and something more than an indignity, which, not to have + resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of + insults and injuries from the same and from every other + quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done; + yet it is impossible to think, without something like a + shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of + the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in + Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until + we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us + to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... _we_ should have + lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding + positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only + to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...." + +No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliance +with the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debate +upon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lords +the Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank and +open apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with having +yielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" for +recognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship +for America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better +informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speaking +for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of the +Washington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted a +personal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy, +"although circumstances may arise which may call for a different +course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like general +tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby) +in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult position +in which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit for +the energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position of +strict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an important +declaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In +substance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's +stand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497]. + +A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February +17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the military +contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generously +trusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, and +it is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him +_in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolition +of slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of +slavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as a +necessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American +consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showing +that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show of +force to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would long +be the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedly +correct in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And +looked at from a distance of time it would seem that a British +Government, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness, +which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand for +reparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was +right in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so +also were the military preparations. + +Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make more +clear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November, +1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to be +weakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the point +of any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at the +slow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to +_think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to +Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if +Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reported +on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the +peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will +be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of +the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the +_Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It +brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as +regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the +conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British +public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was +closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of +that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the +Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of +which England could not possibly take a stand. + +This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of +the public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it did +indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a +determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward, +"I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the +_Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather +opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the +Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us +incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our +nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared +to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss +we have had about these two men[501]." + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of more +contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of more +historical writing later, than any other incident of diplomatic +relations between the United States and Great Britain during the Civil +War--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account given +in this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement of +the facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out by +hitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of British +public attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _after +effect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service to +list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in all +histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to +international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, though +from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., _The Trent +Affair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its many +citations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review is +that of C.F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts Historical +Society for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and +a rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912.] + +[Footnote 400: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. +Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)] + +[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 1. Inclosure. Williams to +Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes the +exact _force_ used.] + +[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. +Soc., XLV, pp. 509-22.)] + +[Footnote 404: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. +Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 39-40.)] + +[Footnote 405: F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond to +Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 406: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. +Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)] + +[Footnote 407: _Ibid._, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, p. 55.] + +[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the American +volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter with +Adams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862: + +"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question that +Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with any +vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard to +vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean to +dispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War to +search them; but that the exercise of that right and the right of +detention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt with +according to the circumstances of the case, and that it was not +necessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not in +point; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War to +harass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence of +preventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contraband +of War. + +"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account which +Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, and +Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy. + +"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as to +Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state the +real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_.) + +This resume by Russell contained still other variations from the +original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did not +think it worth while to call attention to them.] + +[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error in +stating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an American +war vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port for +adjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason +and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue +her voyage." Certainly Palmerston did not so understand the +advice given.] + +[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O., Private. Nov. 16, +1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not to +endeavour, etc.," is in line with Palmerston's understanding of the +conversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reporting +Adams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions to +meddle," which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructions +not to meddle." Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood. +He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ at +Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell that +Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "I +had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him to +intercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to do +so, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British ships +as might be going to the United States with contraband of war. Lord +Palmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this last +particular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly +that which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in +the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., Vol. +78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter mentions +also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had +"sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet...."] + +[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 413: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861.] + +[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861.] + +[Footnote 415: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. +Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)] + +[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much argued +international law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _in +extenso_ by Moore.] + +[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 2.] + +[Footnote 418: _Ibid._, No. 4.] + +[Footnote 419: _Ibid._, No. 29. Inclosure.] + +[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted, +after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance which +permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to Great +Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St. +Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. When +permission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly ordered +that all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting to +Canada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind +without exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press +made much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by +Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application from +a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggage +at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons +was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to the +Governor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia +and New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward's +permission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops were +marched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, +Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26.] + +[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November +30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint and +argument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the +_Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Acts +of violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched" +in the "ordinary way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken +by force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violating +neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes. +(5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship" +except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court. +(6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, and +intended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It +is essential for British Interests, that consistently with the +obligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_ +blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of Her +Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." These seven +points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to the +British position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of the +Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on more +mature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758. +No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861).] + +[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 78. Russell to +Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861.] + +[Footnote 425: _Ibid._, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec. +7, 1861.] + +[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec. +7, 1861.] + +[Footnote 427: _Ibid._, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.] + +[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon, +Dec. 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec. +17, 1861.] + +[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _The +Trent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous, +anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examination +of the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequently +to communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but one +side of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fair +treatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the +_Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers. +Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-British +feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. The +British press made exactly similar quotations from the American +newspapers.] + +[Footnote 433: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. +Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the London +Press, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that there +were but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue and +cry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one +in Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384.) +This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than the +picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm, +sorrowful, astonished determination."] + +[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from Percy +Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements were +made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure.)] + +[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. +(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 95.)] + +[Footnote 436: _Ibid._, p. 37.] + +[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19, +stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more +genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the +capture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea +that England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud +the gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and +such an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended +and invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let +the handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him. +Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and +costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such +a victory." Note the "_Fourth_ of July."] + +[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861. +"Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm and +proving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H.M.'s mail boat."] + +[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightened +me by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at this +moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)] + +[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_.] + +[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on international +law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling American legal +argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributed +very acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the American +civil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North. +Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitators +are still doing their worst." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392.) Cobden was +himself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess I +have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or +Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr. +Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign +Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a +very peaceable and safe man." _(ibid._, p. 386, to Lieut.-Col. +Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that Canadian opinion +regarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will toward +Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce" +(J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the +_Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that +if _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was a +British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life of +Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348.) Yet the author states that +in the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the +_Trent_ as did Great Britain.] + +[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2.] + +[Footnote 444: _Ibid._, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, +Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.] + +[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29, +1861.] + +[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first time +the _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied to +emancipation.] + +[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861.] + +[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. On +the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubt +that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes.... but I wish +we had not done them.... It is all terrible and awful, and I hope and +pray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first natural +burst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready to +execrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not taken +to prevent so fearful a calamity." (Dana, _The Trent Affair. +(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))] + +[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles Francis +Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ] + +[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861.] + +[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message, +on December 16 and 17.] + +[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18, +1861.] + +[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon, +Dec. 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec. +19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no +authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, since +this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The point +was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it as +indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to an +English Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston, +1862.) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston had +intentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes. +"Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated to +Russell_ on the 19th]... virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the +wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, was +like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley, +_Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., 1862.)] + +[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The +Trent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 107.)] + +[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing of +lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared, +in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whose +commanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders" +not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presence +was, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the +_Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and +to give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great +Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer +recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly a +myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863, +not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainly +responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of Thurlow +Weed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable historians like Rhodes +make no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russian +fleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "The +Russian Fleet and the Civil War," _Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915.] + +[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61.] + +[Footnote 458: _Ibid._, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles Francis +Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV.] + +[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861.] + +[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp. +108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured their +publication through Dicey.] + +[Footnote 463: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26, +1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 109).] + +[Footnote 464: _Ibid._, p. 110.] + +[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the +_Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of any +party or faction.] + +[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 467: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan. +2, 1862.] + +[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reported +that he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, +_Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 19. +Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) shows +that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the +nineteenth.] + +[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C.F. Adams, Jr., +to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December +3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th.] + +[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wise +view, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason and +Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., Welles, _Lincoln and +Seward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and +Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general +contemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in +Washington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of +Bremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst +had been seen by Lincoln. + +"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned them +with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent on +war.' At the same time the President has assured my informant that he +would examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, in +order that no expression should remain which could create bad blood +anew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some of +his former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England" +(Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first +glance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he was +putting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden +apparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when +this was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting +Seward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing +your answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they +ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the +reasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the points +on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer to +Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234).] + +[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright to +Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are all +printed in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the +_Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University.] + +[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec. +27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 475: F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, +1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in the +Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitter +feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world ... we ask help of Thee for +our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and with +one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and +reproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained by +the remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment, +succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers. +Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).] + +[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53.] + +[Footnote 477: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. +Soc., XLV. p. 75).] + +[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250.] + +[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered to +the British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax the +ship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her to +St. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.] + +[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3, +Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was +in possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November +12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law +Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact +(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).] + +[Footnote 481: F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell, +Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.] + +[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73.] + +[Footnote 483: F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons, +Feb. 11, 1861.] + +[Footnote 484: F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell to +Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.] + +[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec. +27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John." After the +release of the envoys there was much correspondence between friends +across the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attempted +to explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture on +receiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this is +in a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field +and Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between Great +Britain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote, +"The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes where +we thought we had friends," p. 7.] + +[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., +XLV, pp. 508-22).] + +[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10, +1862.] + +[Footnote 490: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan. +10, 1862.] + +[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Also +expressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid._, Jan. 1, 1862.] + +[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105. +Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861.] + +[Footnote 493: _Ibid._, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861.] + +[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting +at Bromley-by-Bow.] + +[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862), +I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the +spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer, +and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the +North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and +prophesied its victory.] + +[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 _seq_., though not +consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the +Address to the Throne.] + +[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.] + +[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward, +Feb. 13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.] + +[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.] + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE BLOCKADE + +The six months following the affair of the _Trent_ constituted a period +of comparative calm in the relations of Great Britain and America, but +throughout that period there was steadily coming to the front a Northern +belligerent effort increasingly effective, increasingly a cause for +disturbance to British trade, and therefore more and more a matter for +anxious governmental consideration. This was the blockade of Southern +ports and coast line, which Lincoln had declared _in intention_ in his +proclamation of April 19, 1861. + +As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the +relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of +Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an evasive +reply[502]. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the possibility of a +blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent would at least +require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made great efforts to +convince Seward that _any_ interference with British trade would be +disastrous to the Northern cause in England. He even went so far as to +hint at British intervention to preserve trade[503]. But on April 15, +Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade was possible, thought +that the attempt to institute one was less objectionable than +legislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports of Entry," in reality a +mere paper blockade and one which would "justify Great Britain and +France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy...." Thus he began to +weaken in opposition to _any_ interference[504]. His earlier expressions +to Seward were but arguments, without committing his Government to a +line of policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously. + +Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a blockade +campaign. But when the Civil War actually began and Lincoln, on April +19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade," and +that when a "competent force" had been posted "so as to prevent entrance +and exit of vessels," warning would be given to any vessel attempting to +enter or to leave a blockaded port, with endorsement on her register of +such warning, followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass the +blockade, Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonable +consideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the Law +of Nations, I suppose it must be recognized[505]." The Proclamation +named the original seven seceding states, and on April 27 Virginia was +added. The blockade was actually begun at certain Virginia ports on +April 30, and by the end of May there were a few war-ships off all the +more important Southern harbours[506]. This method of putting a blockade +into effect by warning at the port rather than by a general notification +communicated to European governments and setting a date, involved a +hardship on British merchants since they were thereby made uncertain +whether goods started for a Southern port would be permitted to enter. +In practice vessels on their first departure from a blockaded harbour +were warned and permitted to go out, but those seeking to enter were +warned and turned back. In _effect_, while the blockade was being +established, Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for the +timid British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paper +blockade. This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutrals +must acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition," +but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet" British +trade could be carried on[507]. + +Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long conversation on +April 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3,000 mile coast line, but +Seward assured him it would be done and effectively[508]. The British +press was equally sceptical, and in any case believed that the war would +be of short duration, so that there need be no anxiety over next year's +supply of cotton[509]. In Parliament Russell took the stand that the +blockade, if carried on in accordance with international law and made +effective, required British recognition and respect. He also defended +Lincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might seem +a hardship, but was perfectly legal[510]. Thus there was early and easy +acquiescence in the American effort, but when, in June, there was +revived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by legislative action, +Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous opposition. Lyons learned that +a Bill would be introduced in Congress giving the President authority, +among other powers, to "proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifying +foreign nations not to attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpected +application of the Northern theory that the South was not a belligerent +and had no rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paper +blockade[511]. + +The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not direct +the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern ports--it merely +gave him the power to do so. Almost from the first Lyons thought that +Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue such a proclamation[512]. +Nevertheless it was his duty to be on guard and to oppose the plan. For +six weeks there was much communication in regard to the "Southern Ports +Bill," as all parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with +Cowley in France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter, +almost rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the +small importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the +reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest. +Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in official +remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British +recognition of Southern belligerency. + +Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell +addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged a +stiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was seemingly +indifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest, then drew back +and on three separate occasions promised support only to withdraw such +promise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to join in a "friendly hint" +to America because of the touchy sensibilities lately shown by Seward, +and feared a direct protest might result in an American declaration of +war. In any case why not wait until the President _did_ act, and even +then the proper method would be a protest rather than "reprisals." "I +wish," wrote Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to be +more _bumptious_, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all times +rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them on[513]...." +Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would not +observe a "legislative closing" of Southern ports[514]. On July 12 Lyons +telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, and on the +sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much disturbed over +its possible consequences since "even Sumner was for it[515]," as this +indicated a real intention to carry it into effect[516]. On August 8, +Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to be +handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise +discretion as to communicating the despatch[517]. + +The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised in +July, concluded with language that might well draw out Thouvenel's +objection to a threat of "reprisals." It read that "H.M.G. ... +reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other Nations in +opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of Commercial Countries +and so manifest a violation of International Law[518]." This high tone +had been modified possibly by French opposition, possibly by Lyons' +early opinion that the Bill would not be made operative. Indeed on July +24 Russell told Lyons that no final instruction of protest would be sent +him until the President actually issued a proclamation[519]. Yet in +spite of being fairly well assured that there was no danger in the +"Southern Ports Bill," Russell did send the instruction of August 8, +still distinctly "vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of +"reprisals." His reason for doing so is difficult to understand. +Certainly he was hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiff +instruction would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of the +American Cabinet[520], or else he strangely misjudged American +temperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to print +a Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was exercising in +guarding British interests. + +Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had voluntarily +reassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons reported this, +privately, on July 20[521], but on the same day also reported, +officially, that two days earlier, that is on the eighteenth, he and +Mercier had discussed the "Southern Ports" Bill and that as a result +Mercier had then gone, that same day, to Seward to state that France +must regard such a measure as merely a paper blockade[522]. "We were not +very sanguine of success," wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him +[Mercier] with calmness," and personally seemed disinclined to issue the +required Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England and +France were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having a +difficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the Parliamentary +Papers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and in spite of the +reassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally not for printing) +presumably received in the same mail with the official despatch, it +furnished the basis of his "strong" instruction of August 8. + +At Washington also there were indications of an effort to prepare a good +case for the British public and Parliament. July 23, so Lyons wrote +privately, Seward had prevented the issue of the "Southern Ports" +Proclamation[523], and on the next day he was shown by Seward, +confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers abroad in +which was maintained the right to close the ports by proclamation, but +stating the Government's decision not to exercise the right. Lyons +believed this was the end of the matter[524]. Yet on August 12, he +presented himself formally at the Department of State and stated that he +had instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's Government would +consider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possession +of the insurgent or Confederate States as null and void, and that they +would not submit to measures taken on the high seas in pursuance of such +decree."... "Mr. Seward thanked me for the consideration I had shown; +and begged me to confine myself for the present to the verbal +announcement I had just made. He said it would be difficult for me to +draw up a written communication which would not have the air of a +threat." To this Lyons agreed[525]. + +This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the +"forthright yet friendly" tone of British diplomats when dealing with +Seward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, not yet received +by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet there is a +possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward had +asked him to play it. On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged the +receipt of Russell's communication of July 24, in which it was stated +that while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the "Southern Ports" +Bill _no final instructions_ would be sent until Lincoln issued a +Proclamation. Lyons now explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this +moment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be +guided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating your +decision about the matter[526]." Is it possible that Seward really +wished to have a "strong," yet not "too strong" statement from Lyons in +order to combat the advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are many +ramifications of diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government. +At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no +question now of issuing the Proclamation[527]." And on the nineteenth +could write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed +been issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528]. + +The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more space in the +British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from the +British Government than it would seem to have merited from the +Washington attitude toward it. The Bill had been drawn by the Secretary +of the Treasury, and its other sections related to methods of meeting a +situation where former customs houses and places for the collection of +import duties were now in the hands of the Confederacy. The fourth +section alone implied a purpose to declare a paper blockade. The idea +of proclaiming closed the Southern ports may have at first received the +sanction of Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a +war; or it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy[529], +but the more reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of +many ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by +the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any public +means to attack the South. But the interest attached to the measure in +this work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt that Russell, +in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear two +points: first, the close harmony with France--which in fact was not so +close as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the Foreign +Secretary in guarding British interests. Now in fact British trade was +destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been +greatly hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade +feasible. Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the +"Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_ +blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South: + + "If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern + Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by + agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles, + creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run + for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be + transhipped. But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such + plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]." + +A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to +Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the +remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of +cotton in any considerable amount. His bays and creeks did indeed long +provide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for the +transport of a bulky export like cotton[531]. To Russell, however, the +blockade appearing negligible in probable effect and also not open to +objection by neutrals if regularly established, it seemed that any +immediate danger to British trade was averted by the final American +action on the "Southern Ports" Bill. It was not until the blockade did +begin to be thoroughly effective that either the British public or +Government gave it serious consideration. + +Not again until late November did Russell return with any interest to +the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an American effort +which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of blockading squadrons and +a plan to remedy this by unusual, even "uncivilized," if not illegal, +methods. This was the "Stone Boat Fleet" plan of blocking Charleston +harbour by sinking vessels across the entrance bar[532]. The plan was +reported by Lyons and the news received in England at the most uncertain +moment as to the outcome of the _Trent_ controversy[533]. British press +and Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of +the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor matter. +In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an opinion on +the blockade, answered: + + "I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer your + question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is + certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense + extent of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose + the ships which run it successfully both in and out are more + numerous than those which are intercepted. On the other hand + it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many + vessels are captured; it is a most serious interruption to + Trade; and if it were as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis + says in his Message, he would not be so very anxious to get + rid of it[534]." + +This was a very fair description of the blockade situation. Lyons, +unaffected by irritations resulting from the _Trent_, showed the frame +of mind of a "determined neutral," as he was fond of describing himself. +His answer was the first given to Russell indicating a possibility that +the blockade might, after all, become strictly effective and thus +exceedingly harmful to British trade. There is no direct _proof_ that +this influenced Russell to denounce the plan of blocking Southern +harbours with stone-laden boats sunk in the channel, but the existence +of such a motive seems probable. Moreover his protest was not made until +December 20, the _day after_ he had learned officially from Adams that +Wilkes was unauthorized in searching the _Trent_--a day on which strain +and uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly lessened. +Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be stated, +"apparently on good authority," that the declared purpose of the stone +boat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for ever." He +characterized this as implying "utter despair of the restoration of the +Union," and as being only "a measure of revenge and irremediable injury +against an enemy." + +"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary war, +such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the commerce of +nations and the free intercourse of the Southern States of America with +the civilized world. It is a project worthy only of times of barbarism." + +Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it was +hoped, would disavow the project[535]. + +There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American newspaper +extracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation and +expostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in America the +project had been characterized as "odious and barbarous," adding, "The +question seems to depend on the extent to which the harbours will be +permanently injured[536]." It will be noted that Russell did not refer +to information received from Lyons (though it was already in hand), but +to "apparently good authority" in justification of his vigorous +denunciation. But like vigour, and like characterization of American +"barbarism" did not appear in the British press until after the news +arrived of the release of Mason and Slidell. Then the storm broke, well +summed up in the Punch cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very Sad +Picture.) War Dance of the I.O.U. Indian," and showing Uncle Sam in +war-feathers and with war-club, in his hand a flag made of the _New York +Herald_, dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour across +which stretched a row of sunken ships[537]. + +On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the attention +of the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour had been +closed by stone boats and urged governmental remonstrance[538]. Hammond +at once replied quoting the language of Russell's letter of December 20 +and stating that further representations would be made[539]. On the +sixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but now was +much less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury in the future +to the United States itself in case the harbours were permanently +destroyed since "... the object of war is peace, and the purposes of +peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous commercial intercourse[540]." +To-day it seems absurd that any save the most ignorant observer should +have thought the North contemplated a permanent and revengeful +destruction of Southern port facilities. Nor was there any just ground +for such an extreme British view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert +Browning was affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do," he +wrote Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again[541]?" a query +expressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the intense +bitterness, indicating a long war, of the American belligerents. How +absurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British concern at an American +"lapse toward barbarism" was soon made evident. On January II Lyons, +acting on the instructions of December 20, brought up the matter with +Seward and was promptly assured that there was no plan whatever "to +injure the harbours permanently." Seward stated that there had never +been any plan, even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, but +merely the lesser channels, because the Secretary of the Navy had +reported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the 'large +holes,'" but "could not stop up the 'small ones.'" Seward assured Lyons +that just as soon as the Union was restored all obstructions would be +removed, and he added that the best proof that the entrance to +Charleston harbour had not been destroyed was the fact that in spite of +blockading vessels and stone boats "a British steamer laden with +contraband of war had just succeeded in getting in[542]." Again, on +February 10, this time following Russell's instruction of January 16, +Lyons approached Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that +"all the vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared for +obstructing the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is not +likely that any others will be used for that purpose[543]." This was no +yielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's accusation of +barbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction of harbours, +extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been undertaken by the +Navy with little expectation of success, and, on the first appearance of +new channels made by the wash of waters, was soon abandoned[544]. + +The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America was +conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem at first +glance to have been merely manifestations of a British tendency to +meddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other states and to +give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose civilization was +presumably less advanced than that which stamped the Englishman was, +according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a characteristic of +British public and Government alike[545]. But this is scarcely a +satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the first place it +is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions in an enemy's +harbours in order to render more effective a blockade was no novelty in +maritime warfare, as Russell must have well known, and that there was no +modern record of such obstructions having permanently destroyed a +harbour. A far more reasonable explanation is that which connects the +energy of the British Government in opposing a proposed American closing +of Southern harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energy +against the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightly +regarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but both +methods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because they were +very evidently the result of efforts to find a way in which an as yet +ineffective blockade could be made more rigorous. On the impossibility +of an effective blockade, if conducted on customary lines, the British +people and Foreign Secretary had pinned their faith that there would be +no serious interruption of trade. This was still the view in January, +1862, though doubts were arising, and the "stone boat" protest must be +regarded as another evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce with +the South. The very thought that the blockade might become effective, in +which case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly caused +Russell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the North for +a planned "barbarity." + +Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be made +the subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on the Civil +War in America. In another three months the Government began to feel a +pressure from its associate in "joint attitude," France, to examine +again with much care its asserted policy of strict neutrality, and this +because of the increased effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhile +another "American question" was serving to cool somewhat British +eagerness to go hand in hand with France. For nearly forty years since +independence from Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thorny +problem to European nations since it was difficult, in the face of the +American Monroe Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for the +satisfaction of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measures +were being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly in +the matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures, President +Buchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1860, had +sounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that American principles +would compel the use of force in aid of Mexico if debt-collecting +efforts were made the excuse for a plan "to deprive our neighbouring +Republic of portions of her territory." But this was at the moment of +the break-up of the Union and attracted little attention in the United +States. For the same reason, no longer fearing an American block to +these plans, the three European Governments, after their invitation to +the United States to join them had been refused, signed a convention, +October 31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledged +themselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not to +interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico. + +In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon III was +not--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood even by his +Ministers[546]. A joint expedition under the leadership of the Spanish +General Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took possession of +customs houses and began to collect duties. It soon became evident to +the British and Spanish agents on the spot that France had far other +objects than the mere satisfaction of debts. The result was a clash of +interests, followed by separate agreements with Mexico and the +withdrawal of forces by Great Britain and Spain. This difference of view +on Mexican policy had become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador at +Paris, by January, 1862, and from that month until the end of March his +private letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general are +almost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley learned +that earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the Archduke +Maximilian of Austria upon the _Throne_ of Mexico, far from being +unfounded, were but faint indications of a great French "colonial +Empire" scheme, and he thought that there was "some ill-will to the +United States at the bottom of all this[547]...." He feared that the +Mexican question would "give us a deal of trouble yet[548]," and by +March was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt." made by +France[549]. + +These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he hastened, +in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also did Spain. Great +Britain believed that she had been tricked into a false position in +Mexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view of the close relation of +joint policy with France toward the Civil War in America, undertook no +direct opposition though prophesying an evil result. This situation +required France to refrain, for a time, from criticism of British policy +and action toward the North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy, +rather than one based on its own initiative. On the British side the +French Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposes +and objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow to +accept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to that war +Great Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a very +advantageous situation for the North, as the event was to prove. On the +purely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity to assure Seward +that Great Britain was "entirely averse to any interference in the +internal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing could be further from their +wishes than to impose upon the Mexican Nation any Government not of its +own choice[550]." + +British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to swell the breeze +of amity toward America that had sprung up once the _Trent_ was beyond +the horizon, and made, temporarily, for smooth sailing in the relations +of Great Britain and the North. Lyons wrote on February 7 that the +"present notion appears to be to overwhelm us with demonstrations of +friendship and confidence[551]." Adams' son in London thought "our work +here is past its crisis," and that, "Our victory is won on this side the +water[552]," while the American Minister himself believed that "the +prospect of interference with us is growing more and more remote[553]." +Russell also was optimistic, writing to Lyons, "Our relations have now +got into a very smooth groove.... There is no longer any excitement here +upon the question of America. I fear Europe is going to supplant the +affairs of America as an exciting topic[554]," meaning, presumably, +disturbances arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic +duties as "almost in a state of profound calm[555]." + +This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter what +anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the blockade +there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its legality. That +there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an urgent letter from +Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, asserting that if cotton +brought but four pence at Charleston and thirteen pence at Liverpool +there must be some truth in its alleged effectiveness: + + "I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do not let + us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that they + failed thro' our interference.... Patience for a few more + weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient + policy[556]." + +[Illustration: KING COTTON BOUND: Or, The Modern Prometheus. _Reproduced +by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_] + +This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the blockade +and on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more weeks" had no +place in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he wrote to Lyons in +regard to assertions being made that the blockade was ineffective +because certain vessels had eluded it: + + "Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, + assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a + number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a + port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create + an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these + ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact + that various ships may have successfully escaped through it + (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of + itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by + international law[557]." + +From this view Russell never departed in official instructions[558]. +England's position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable that +she should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautious +in criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history and +probable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far +more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to +British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with the +South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they would +do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition of +the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be made by it, send +supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails." + +But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on the +Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive at +his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearly +took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's position. They +had now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adams +he "had no intention of seeing them again." Very angry they planned a +formal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rost +counselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559]. On his arrival Mason ignored +this situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in +pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private +reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed, +somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity for +evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confident +of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his arrival he wrote +unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State "... although the +Ministry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition through +the Queen's speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popular +voice through the House of Commons will demand both."... "I shall be +disappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by the +Ministry[560]...." + +Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of many +English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take was +to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urge +European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived in Paris, wrote +Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should "make only a +passing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating that on that +point I am not disposed at present to press consideration. But I shall +insist upon the inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of the +stone fleet,' etc[561]." Mason was urged to take a like course with +Russell. Both men were much excited by a document a copy of which had +been secured by Mann purporting to be a "confidential memorandum" +addressed by England to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time +had not come to raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, but +Slidell and Mason believed it genuine[562]. They had great hopes of the +opening of Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and +the only references in debate were to the _Trent_ and its fortunate +outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It is thought that +silence as to the blockade was intended to leave that question +open[563]." This, no doubt, was the consolatory explanation of his +friends, but the unofficial interview with Russell, at his home, on +February 10, chilled Mason's hopes. + +As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by Mason on +the blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to Richmond shows +that he proceeded with great caution, omitting portions of his +instructions on cotton for fear of arousing antagonism, and venturing +only a slight departure by expressing the hope that if Great Britain +wished to renew communication with the Confederacy it might be made +through him, rather than through the British consuls at the South. +Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I might find my residence in London +agreeable." He refused to see Mason's credentials, stating this to be +"unnecessary, our relations being unofficial." He listened with +courtesy, asked a few questions, but "seemed utterly disinclined to +enter into conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and +only said, in substance, they must await events." Certainly it was a +cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that Russell's +"personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy inaction[564]." +But Mason still counted on parliamentary pressure on the Government, and +he was further encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at +Liverpool, stating that he had just received a request to come to London +"from a government quarter, of all the _most important_[565]." + +The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself feared +somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to Mason that +interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with Russell, that he had +unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, while not citing these men +directly, declared the general "London idea" to be that of +"postponement"; since it was inevitable that "the North will break down +in a few months on the score of money," and that "We have only to wait +three months." Evidently Spence believed he was being used as an +intermediary and influential adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade +them to a period of quiet. This, he thought, was unwise since delay +would be injurious[566]. Of like opinion were the two Members of +Parliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be his +closest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former possessing +somewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class, the latter the +largest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice also was to press on +the blockade question[567], as a matter of primary British commercial +interest, and they believed that France was eager to follow a British +lead. This was contrary to Slidell's notion at the moment, but of this +Mason was unaware[568]. + +The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before Parliament the +papers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of one hundred and +twenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3, 1861, to February +17, 1862. In it were the details of the institution of the blockade, +reports from British consuls on its effectiveness, lists of vessels +captured and of vessels evading it, all together furnishing a very +complete view of this, the principal maritime belligerent effort of the +North[569]. The Blockade Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired, +and especially so as almost at the end of this document appeared that +instruction of February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly stated +British acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview with +Russell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had been +urged vainly to use his influence for "postponement," Russell, so it +must appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting the +effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost immediately made known +to Parliament by the presentation of papers. + +Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without further +protest, in governmental policy they must now make some decided effort. +This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons, on March 7, of a +motion by Gregory urging the Government to declare the blockade +ineffective[570], and of a similar debate on March 10 in the Lords. As +is inevitable where many speakers participate in a debate the arguments +advanced were repeated and reiterated. In the Commons important speeches +for the motion were made by Gregory, Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, Lord +Robert Cecil and Lindsay, while against it appeared Forster and Monckton +Milnes. The Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Government +view. Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that while +himself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion had no +essential bearing on that question and was directed wholly to a +_fact_--that the blockade was not in reality effective and should not be +recognized as such. He presented and analysed statistics to prove the +frequency with which vessels passed through the blockade, using the +summaries given by Mason to Russell in their interview of February 10, +which were now before Parliament in the document on the blockade just +presented, and he cited the reports of Bunch at Charleston as further +evidence. This was the burden of Gregory's argument[571], but he glanced +in passing at many other points favourable to the South, commenting on +its free trade principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity, +asserting the right of the South to secede, declaring that France +regarded British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking to +future wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of American +inconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for all +those principles of international law, which we have ever upheld, they +are as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of the +moment[572]." Gregory concluded with the statement that the United +States should be treated "with justice and nothing more." + +When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree on a +line of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the blockade was +that it was wise to minimize the question of recognition, and Gregory +had laboured to prove that this was not related to a refusal longer to +recognize the blockade. But Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion, +promptly undid him for he unhappily admitted that recognition and +blockade questions were so closely interwoven that they could not be +considered separately. This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who led +in opposition. Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearing +to pieces of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the alleged +blockade runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which, +by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then +make a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade of +main ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was proved, he +declared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where it was 100 per +cent. greater than in the South, and of salt in Charleston, where the +importer could make a profit of 1,000 per cent. To raise the blockade, +he argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality. The +real reason for this motion was not the _ineffectiveness_ of the +blockade, but the effectiveness, and the real object an English object, +not a Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion to +recognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew the +former would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended to +secure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of the +Government in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any other +conduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would have had to +fight for slavery against her kinsmen." + +Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a judicial tone +of argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one who knows his +cause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and was characterized by +Henry Adams, an interested auditor, as "listened to as you would listen +to a funeral eulogy."... "The blockade is now universally acknowledged +to be unobjectionable[573]." This estimate is borne out by the speech +for the Government by the Solicitor-General, who maintained the +effectiveness of the blockade and who answered Gregory's argument that +recognition was not in question by stating that to refuse longer to +recognize the blockade would result in a situation of "armed +neutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war." He pictured the disgust of +Europe if England should enter upon such a war in alliance "with a +country ... which is still one of the last strongholds of slavery"--an +admission made in the fervour of debate that was dangerous as tending to +tie the Government's hands in the future, but which was, no doubt, +merely a personal and carelessly ventured view, not a governmentally +authorized one. In general the most interesting feature of this debate +is the hearty approval given by friends of the North to the Government's +entire line of policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play at +the moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy, +was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make no +criticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of British +neutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, in +specific cases, in neutral duty. + +The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for the +motion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there was no +indication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a similar +debate in the Lords was of importance only as offering Russell, since he +was now a member of the upper chamber, an opportunity to speak for +himself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any intention to attack the +blockade since Russell, on February 15, had officially approved it, but +criticized the sending to Lyons of the despatch itself. Russell upheld +the strict legality and effectiveness of the blockade, stated that if +England sided with the South in any way the North would appeal to a +slave insurrection--the first reference to an idea which was to play a +very important role with Russell and others later--and concluded by +expressing the opinion that three months would see the end of the +struggle on lines of separation, but with some form of union between the +two sovereignties[574]. Russell's speech was an unneeded but emphatic +negative of the pro-Southern effort. + +Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics by +pressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason were +dashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to force the +Government to a decided stand when they preferred, as the summons of +Spence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance for a time any +further declaration on the blockade. The refusal of Mason and his +Southern friends to wait compelled a governmental decision and the +result was Russell's instruction to Lyons of February 15. The effect of +the debate on Mason was not to cause distrust of his English advisers, +but to convince him that the existing Government was more determined in +unfriendliness than he had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: "... no +step will be taken by this Government to interfere with it[575]." He +thought the military news from America in part responsible as: "The late +reverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate effect +upon the minds of our friends here[576]...." Spence was opposed to any +further move in Parliament until some more definite push on the +Government from France should occur[577]. Slidell, anxiously watching +from Paris the effort in England, had now altered his view of policy and +was convinced there was no hope in France until England gave the signal. +Referring to his previous idea that the Continent could be put in +opposition to Great Britain on the blockade he wrote: + + "I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was such + that any view of the question which he might urge on the + British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to + change entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all + that concerns us the initiative must be taken by England; + that the Emperor sets such value on her good will that he + will make any sacrifice of his own opinions and policy to + retain it[578]." + +On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason[579]. It was a correct +judgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that his was to +be the first place in importance in any and all operations intended to +secure European support for the Confederacy, but he could not conceal +from himself that the first steps undertaken in that direction had been +premature. From this first failure dated his fixed belief, no matter +what hopes were sometimes expressed later, that only a change of +Government in England would help the Southern cause. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 502: See _ante_, p. 52.] + +[Footnote 503: See _ante_, pp. 61 and 65-66.] + +[Footnote 504: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 15, 1861.] + +[Footnote 505: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell. Private. April 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 506: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain_, pp. 80-1.] + +[Footnote 507: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 508: Bernard, p. 229.] + +[Footnote 509: _Saturday Review_, May 18, 1861.] + +[Footnote 510: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIII, pp. 188-195.] + +[Footnote 511: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24, 1861.] + +[Footnote 512: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, July 2, 1861.] + +[Footnote 513: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The important +correspondence on this subject is found in: F.O., France, Vol. 1393. No. +796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. _Ibid._, No. 804. Cowley to +Russell, July 4, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1377. No. 704. Russell to Cowley, +July 10, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1394. No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17, +1861. _Ibid._, No. 922. Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. _Ibid._, No. +923. Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers. +Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, July 28, +1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to support England in +remonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill" appears, through Cowley's +communications, in the printed Parliamentary Papers. A study of these +alone would lead to the judgment that France _had been the first_ to +raise the question with England and had heartily supported England. The +facts were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions from +Thouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (_Parliamentary Papers_, +1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United +States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861).] + +[Footnote 514: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 61.] + +[Footnote 515: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16, 1861.] + +[Footnote 516: Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to the Bill and +Sumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact spoken publicly in +favour of the measure. Probably he told Schleiden that privately he was +against it. Schleiden reported Sumner as active in urging the Cabinet +not to issue a Proclamation closing the ports (Schleiden Papers. +Schleiden to Senate of Bremen, July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier later +informed Thouvenel that Sumner declared the Bill intended for the +Northern public only, to show administration "energy," and that there +was never any intention of putting it into effect. F.O., France, 1394. +No. 931. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 517: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 70 and 71. +Thouvenel did finally consent to support Russell's protest.] + +[Footnote 518: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168.] + +[Footnote 519: F.O., Am., Vol. 756.] + +[Footnote 520: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley to Russell, Aug. +8, 1861.] + +[Footnote 521: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell.] + +[Footnote 522: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 68. Lyons to +Russell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a copy of the six lines of +Thouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier, dated July 4, the very brevity of +which shows that this was in fact no instruction at all, but merely a +comment by Thouvenel to Mercier.] + +[Footnote 523: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 524: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, August 1, 1861.] + +[Footnote 525: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 81. Lyons to +Russell, Aug. 12, 1861.] + +[Footnote 526: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Aug. 13, +1861.] + +[Footnote 527: _Ibid._, Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 528: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 83.] + +[Footnote 529: Lyons thought this possible. Russell Papers. Lyons to +Russell. Private. July 20, 1861.] + +[Footnote 530: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. Aug. 16, 1861. +And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent smuggling over 3,000 miles +of coast and 1,500 miles of land frontier seems to me impossible" +(_Ibid._, Aug. 17, 1861). Russell had received some two weeks earlier, a +letter from Bunch at Charleston, urging that England make no objection +to the blockade in order that the South might be taught the lesson that +"King Cotton," was not, after all, powerful enough to compel British +recognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at the +failure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they both +could and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F.O., Am., Vol. 781. +No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on July 23 that the +South planned to hold back its cotton until Great Britain and France +raised the blockade (_Ibid._, No. 87). Bunch was now impressed with +Southern determination.] + +[Footnote 531: The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia), Wilmington +(North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah (Georgia), +Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston (Texas).] + +[Footnote 532: The first important reference to the blockade after +mid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed through Lyons, not +to give advice to British merchants in Charleston as to blockade runners +that had gotten into port having any "right" to go out again (F.O., Am., +Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861).] + +[Footnote 533: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 125. Lyons to +Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec. 9.] + +[Footnote 534: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861.] + +[Footnote 535: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 127.] + +[Footnote 536: _Ibid._, No. 126. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861. +Received Dec. 12.] + +[Footnote 537: _Punch_, Feb. 1, 1862.] + +[Footnote 538: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 141.] + +[Footnote 539: _Ibid._, No. 142. Jan. 15, 1861.] + +[Footnote 540: _Ibid._, No. 143.] + +[Footnote 541: James, _W. W. Story_, II, p. 111, Jan. 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 542: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. +"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 153. Lyons to +Russell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan. 27.] + +[Footnote 543: _Ibid., Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Despatch from Lord Lyons +respecting the Obstruction of the Southern Harbours." Lyons to Russell, +Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb. 24.] + +[Footnote 544: Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of +G.V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy_, 1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pont +to Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited as _Fox, Confid. Corresp_. This +letter shows clearly also that the Navy had no thought of a _permanent_ +obstruction.] + +[Footnote 545: _Vide_ Arnold, _Friendship's Garland_.] + +[Footnote 546: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 249. Thouvenel +could mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13, 1862. "Nous ne voulons +pas cependant imposer une forme de gouvernement aux Mexicains..."] + +[Footnote 547: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Jan. 17, +1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to Flahault in London, hoped +England would feel that she had a common interest with France in +preventing Mexico from falling under the yoke of Americans either "unis +ou secedes." (Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 226).] + +[Footnote 548: _Ibid._, Jan. 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 549: _Ibid._, March 6, 1862.] + +[Footnote 550: F.O., Am., Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 28, +1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France just as Napoleon's plans +for Mexico took clearer form has been made the ground for assumptions +that he immediately gave assurance of Southern acquiescence and +encouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have found no good evidence of +this--rather the contrary. The whole plan was clear to Cowley by +mid-January before Slidell reached Paris, and Slidell's own +correspondence shows no early push on Mexico. The Confederate agents' +correspondence, both official and private, will be much used later in +this work and here requires explanation. But four historical works of +importance deal with it extensively, (1) Richardson, _Messages and +Papers of the Confederacy_, 2 vols., 1905, purports to include the +despatches of Mason and Slidell to Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory. +Important despatches are missing, and elisions sometimes occur without +indication. (2) Virginia Mason, _The Public Life and Diplomatic +Correspondence of James M. Mason_, 1906, contains most of Mason's +despatches, including some not given by Richardson. The author also used +the _Mason Papers_ (see below). (3) Callahan, _The Diplomatic History of +the Southern Confederacy_, 1901, is the most complete and authoritative +work on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used the collection known +as the "Pickett Papers," for official despatches, supplementing these +when gaps occurred by a study of the _Mason Papers_, but his work, +narrative in form, permits no extended printing of documents. (4) L.M. +Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. (Am. Hist. +Rev. Jan., 1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the +_Mason Papers_. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or packages in +the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and in addition +there is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to Richmond. These +contain the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell while in Europe. +Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's letters are copies in Slidell's +hand-writing, made apparently at Mason's request and sent to him in May, +1865. A complete typed copy of this correspondence was taken by me in +1913, but this has not hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master's +degree thesis by Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat," +Stanford University, 1915, and for a few citations by C. F. Adams, _A +Crisis in Downing Street_ (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914). +The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's English friends, +Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others.] + +[Footnote 551: Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought France also +included in these demonstrations.] + +[Footnote 552: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 113. Henry Adams to +Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Feb. 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 553: _Ibid._, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 554: Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862.] + +[Footnote 555: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son.] + +[Footnote 556: Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862.] + +[Footnote 557: Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with Russell but adds +that Great Britain, in the early stages of the blockade, was indulgent +to the North, and rightly so considering the difficulties of +instituting it.] + +[Footnote 558: He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863, that he saw "no +reason to qualify the language employed in my despatch to Lord Lyons of +the 15th of February last." (Bernard, p. 293).] + +[Footnote 559: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II, +p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27, 1862.] + +[Footnote 560: Mason, _Mason_, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, 1862.] + +[Footnote 561: Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.] + +[Footnote 562: Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" to Jefferson +Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no indication of how +he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To his astonishment +Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France knew nothing of such a +memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by some enterprising "Southern +friend" in need of money.] + +[Footnote 563: Mason, _Mason_, p. 258. Mason to Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 564: _Ibid._, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch No. 4. Feb. 22, +1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.) Slidell was more +warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same line of argument and +apparently made a favourable impression. Cowley reported Thouvenel, +after the interview, as expressing himself as "hoping that in two or +three months matters would have reached such a crisis in America that +both parties would be willing to accept a Mediation...." + +(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to Russell, +Feb. 10, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 565: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, 1862. This was +that James Spence, author of _The American Union_, a work strongly +espousing the Southern cause. This book was not only widely read in +England but portions of it were translated into other languages for use +on the Continent. Spence was a manufacturer and trader and also operated +in the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason, +was early active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in +England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was much +less favourably regarded and the impression created by his frequent +letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre elated by the +prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he took to be the birth +of a new State.] + +[Footnote 566: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862.] + +[Footnote 567: Mason, _Mason p_. 258.] + +[Footnote 568: Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging that +Continental interests and British interests in the blockade were +"directly antagonistic," basing his argument on England's forward look +as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862. Richardson, II, +p. 186).] + +[Footnote 569: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Papers +relating to the Blockade."] + +[Footnote 570: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp. +1233-43.] + +[Footnote 571: Mason's authenticated statistics, unfortunately for his +cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply that +after that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and which +certainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective to +prevent regular and frequent communications between the government at +Richmond and its agents abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he +promptly incorporated Mason's figures in the papers presented to +Parliament? These figures showed that according to reports from four +Southern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29 +and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date +December 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from +Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockade +running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those reaching Cuba +were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3 +American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the names +of the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper though +apparently included in the list submitted by Mason. These figures did in +fact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861. The American +blockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available material +and were slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy could +not enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing +their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render a +large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive effort +and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet of +blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See _Fox, Confid. Corresp._, I, +pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tribute +to the energy with which the South for "thirteen long months" had +defended its important port shore lines.) If Gregory had been able to +quote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have +had a strong argument. "The blockade runners are doing a great +business.... Everything is brought in in abundance. Not a day passes +without an arrival or a departure. The Richmond Government sent about a +month ago an order to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from +Nassau to New York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence +here, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the +order. Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are +all changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and no +one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed, +there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862).] + +[Footnote 572: I have nowhere found any such statement by Seward. +Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of May 27, 1861, +printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds that temporary absence +of blockading ships does not impair the blockade nor render "necessary a +new notice of its existence."] + +[Footnote 573: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 119-20. Henry Adams +to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15, 1862.] + +[Footnote 574: This "three months" statement returned to plague Russell +later, British merchants complaining that upon it they had based plans +in the belief that the Government had something definite in view. +Spence's reference to this "three months" idea, after his conferences in +London, would indicate that Russell was merely indulging in a +generalization due to the expected financial collapse of the North. The +Russian Ambassador in London gave a different interpretation. He wrote +that the Northern victories in the West had caused Great Britain to +think the time near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by +these victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation +from the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that +Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken." (Brunow to +F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so state, but his +despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk with Russell. If +so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret Lincoln's "border state +policy" in a sense that would appear reasonable in the British view that +there could be no real hope at Washington of restoring the Union.] + +[Footnote 575: Mason, _Mason_, p. 264. Despatch No. 6. March 11, 1862.] + +[Footnote 576: _Ibid._, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken by Grant on +February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture of these two +places gave an opening for the advance of the Western army southwards +into Tennessee and Mississippi.] + +[Footnote 577: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 578: Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, March 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 579: Mason Papers.] + + + +CHAPTER IX + +ENTER MR. LINDSAY + +The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the threatening +_Trent_ episode, appears to have made Secretary Seward believe that the +moment was opportune for a renewal of pressure on Great Britain and +France for the recall of their Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon +the victories of Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on +February 28 explaining that as a result the United States, now having +access to the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, +"had determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways +and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment +succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the +sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the +blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations would +"go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw their +"belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as we +conceive, to the insurgents[580]." This was large talk for a relatively +unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the door +in the West and was still far from having "access to the interior +districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of this +despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said the +position and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved and +notable successes probable, it could not be maintained that hostilities +were "so near their conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale +as to disqualify either party for the title of Belligerents[581]." Lyons +and Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of +belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received that the +purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the news quite +took Thouvenel's breath away[582]. As yet, however, Seward did no more +than hint and Adams was quick to advise that the moment had not yet come +"when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use[583]." + +Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no doubt +intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the North, yet also +truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the South and its "domestic +institution." This was the negotiation of a Slave-Trade treaty with +Great Britain, by which America joined, at last, the nations agreeing to +unite their efforts in suppression of the African Slave Trade. The +treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons at Washington on April 7. On the +next day Seward wrote to Adams that had such a treaty been ratified "in +1808, there would now have been no sedition here, and no disagreement +between the United States and foreign nations[584]," a melancholy +reflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsible +for the long delay of American participation in a world humanitarian +movement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to +save the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he +should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing the +Union[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of the +intensity of both Northern and Southern feeling if regarded from our +present knowledge, but a view natural enough to the foreign observer at +the moment. Lyons, in this letter, correctly stated the rising +determination of the North to restore the Union, but underestimated the +rapid growth of an equal determination against a restoration with +slavery. The real motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade +treaty was the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic, +affairs. Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken +"the risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had +indicated[586]. + +In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over recent +military successes. The campaign in the West had been followed in the +East by a great effort under McClellan to advance on Richmond up the +peninsula of the James river and using Chesapeake Bay as a means of +water transportation and supply. This campaign had been threatened by +the appearance of the iron-clad ram _Merrimac_ and her attack on the +wooden naval vessels operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9 +the _Monitor_, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove the +_Merrimac_ from her helpless prey, and removed the Southern threat to +McClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the Civil +War the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck the +imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its +significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been +the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in +Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval +people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in +warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]." +The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in British +eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, and especially +the ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden ships on the +day previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future. +Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle. +"Only think," he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankees +turning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphs +they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight of +metal[588]." + +This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while American +ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded the +death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in the character of +navies was immediately possible. Moreover British shipbuilders could +surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any other +nation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the British +Government as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in the +North promising further and more important successes on land. The +Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief +that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission, +for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the +conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The +idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability +and realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle, +was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusion +that the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation. +Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the +"morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]." He +believed that the end of the war would be hastened by Northern +victories, and he therefore rejoiced in them. + +Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in April, +began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and to write +warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the West +at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, called +out such a flood of Northern expressions of determination to drive the +war to the bitter end as to startle Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably +clear letter of survey, to recast his opinions. He wrote: + + "The general opinion is that the Campaign of this Spring will + clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the War. If + the Military successes of the North continue, the + determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last + really put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military + reverses, the loss of the Border States, and the occupation + of the most important points on the Coast, the Southern men + hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their + cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be + removed and then retire into the interior with their families + and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but + barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal + Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to + continue the enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation + to protracting the War indefinitely. I confess, however, that + I fear that a protraction of the War during another year or + longer, is a not less probable result of the present posture + of affairs, than either the immediate subjugation of the + South or the immediate recognition of its independence[590]." + +This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line with +Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. There was +indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a hypothetical defensible +interior which impressed Englishmen, but had no foundation in +geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention was eagerly fixed on the +Northern advance, and it was at least generally hoped that the +projected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsula +toward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict in +America. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of any +conclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance +of Grant's western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news +of the capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to +make up their minds to believe it[591]," but even the capture of this +the most important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of +great importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond. + +News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching England +as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during this advance +and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two remarkable +adventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly on +individual initiative, by a Frenchman in America and an Englishman in +France. Mercier at Washington and Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite +independently, that the time had come for projects of foreign mediation. + +French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have been +that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result in such a +rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions of now +recognizing the _facts_ of the situation and acknowledging the +independence of the South would not be unfavourably received. In this +sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, privately, on March 13, but was +careful to state that the word "mediation" ought not to be uttered. His +letter dilated, also, on French manufacturing difficulties at home due +to the lack of cotton[592]. This was in no way an instruction to +Mercier, but the ideas expressed were broached by him in a conversation +with Seward, only to be met with such positive assertions of intention +and ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French +Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that he +wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself that there +also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which the +latter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier asserted to +Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eager +acquiescence in a suggestion made _without previous thought_, but that +on consideration he returned to Seward and accepted the proposal, +outlining the substance of what he intended to say at Richmond. He +should there make clear that the anxiety of France was above all +directed toward peace as essential to French commercial interests; that +France had always regarded the separation of North and South with +regret; that the North was evidently determined in its will to restore +the Union; and, in repetition, that France wished to aid in any way +possible the early cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to +add that he, personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of +any persons whom the South wished to elect[593]. + +Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient +sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the balance +and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite unnecessarily, +Seward helped him to make the trip[594]." A circumstance apparently not +known to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, before +departure, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and a +proposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materially +different from the report made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit +expanded treatment as new light on a curious episode and especially as +revealing the British policy of the moment, represented in the person of +the British Minister in Washington[595]. + +On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to set out +for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time thinking of +making this journey." He told of _making the suggestion to Seward_, and +that this "rather to his surprise" had been "eagerly" taken up. + + "Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital + importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed, + was to put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and + generally to a state of things which caused so grievous an + interruption of the trade between Europe and this country. It + was, he said, possible that he might hasten the attainment of + this object by conferring personally with the Secession + leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances + their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in + all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought + to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a + state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to + Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the + European Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed + principles. They would recognize any people which + established its independence, but they could not encourage + the prolongation of a fruitless struggle. + + "Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very + much discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from + the Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down + blow ('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them. + It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all + events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might + be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr. + Seward his notion of using this language, and had added that + of course as a Minister accredited to the United States, and + visiting Richmond with the consent of the United States + Government, he could not speak to the Southern men of any + other terms for ending the War than a return to the Union. + + "Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely + approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had + authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course + from the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward, + personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to + apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to + their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of + political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so + much to any other person, but that he would tell Monsieur + Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political station + and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards the + South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand + or fall by it." + +This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased the +American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond to have +constituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be regarded as +at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor as expressive of +Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain from much comment on the +matter of Mercier's proposed representations at Richmond. He was more +concerned that the trip was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed +to it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity of +French-British attitude which was so desirable. Nor was he without +suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate +advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the +South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to +accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any +interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the +Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea." Lyons +frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of +declining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed since +this certainly looked like a break in "joint policy," and he objected +positively on the same ground to Stoeckl's going[596]. Mercier yielded +the latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of his +consultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objection +would be obviated. Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons +thought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts to +driving home the idea that no opening should be given for a "separate +agreement" with the South. + + "I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans, + and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I + said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to + remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would + be possible to inveigle France or any other great European + Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to + believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected + by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to + the exclusion of others. I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson + Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish + a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any + mind in which it had found place[597]." + +Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and fourteenth +and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, "without saying +anything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it." This +was intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France, +and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the result of my communications with +M. Mercier entitles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmond +with my acquiescence[598]." Nevertheless he both believed, and declared +to Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening of +determination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor South +was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace. +He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy proved +well founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of the +results of the journey. Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, +reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day +called on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate +Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled +determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under +extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected +European assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders +professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and that +confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously adverting +to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in view French +commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received any +proposals of benefit in return for recognition. Mercier answered with a +simple negative. He then further developed the interview with +Benjamin[599]. + + "He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of + the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the + particular language which he had intended to hold was + entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found + the Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that + they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for + making terms with the North. What he had said to them about + the recognition of their Independence was that the principal + inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her + doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening + peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any + such effect; that it would embroil France with the United + States, and that would be all[600]." + +Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercier +to convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, in +fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he had +approached Benjamin with the simple declaration "that the purpose of my +journey was merely to assure myself, for myself, of the true condition +of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it." +Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to +Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the +trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make +them. They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some +degree also to Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The +report to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated +to Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principal +inducement" thereto[601]. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views on +recognition: + + "He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration + of the old Union was impossible. He believed that, if the + Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last + for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South + must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the + Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable + opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War. + The present opportunity would however, he thought, be + particularly unfavourable." + +Lyons writes: + + "I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be + eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur + Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that + there was nothing to do at the present moment but to watch + events." + +On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of Mercier's +trip and was given a very different view of the situation at Richmond. +Seward said: + + "He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur Mercier's + account of what had passed, that the Confederates were about + to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought + into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they + were now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be + offered them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was + idle. If the United States were undisputed masters of the + Border States and the Sea Coast, there would be no occasion + for any more fighting. Those who chose to retire into the + interior were welcome to do so, and to stay there till they + were tired." + +"The truth," wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the South +probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those of Monsieur +Mercier." Lyons concluded his report of the whole matter: + + "The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to bring + him back precisely to the point at which he was three months + ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had + somewhat shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the + South, and consequently his opinions as to the policy to be + adopted by France. The sentiments he now expresses are + exactly those which he expressed at the beginning of the + year[602]." + +In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early recognition of +the South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons the effect of the +adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of this; and on Russell also +its influence was to cause some doubt of Southern success. Appended to +Lyons' report stands Russell's initialled comment: + + "It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which the + Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms + they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will + cause but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can + the country be held permanently by the U.S. Armies if the + Confederates have small bodies in Arms resisting the + authority of the U.S. Congress? + + Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union + feeling in the South will be of great value in forming a + judgment on the final issue." + +Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid public +misconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on Mercier's +trip. This appeared May 6, in the New York _Times_, the paper more +closely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout the war, representing +Mercier as having gone to Richmond by order of Napoleon and with +Lincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to surrender and to +encourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons commented on this +article that the language attributed to Mercier was "not very unlike +that which he intended to hold," but that in fact he had not used +it[603]. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. Indeed everyone in London +and Paris was much astonished, and many were the speculations as to the +meaning of Mercier's unusual procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing +"Que diable allait il faire dans cette galere[604]?" and Cowley, at +Paris, could give no light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours +of Mercier's trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could +be true[605]." May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable +unless the Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not +the case[606]." The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, was +assured by the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier's +conduct, and that he greatly regretted it," being especially disturbed +by a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with the British +Representative" at Washington[607]. This was reassuring to Russell, yet +there is no question that Mercier's conduct long left a certain +suspicion in British official circles. On May 2, also, Thouvenel wrote +to Flahault in London of the Emperor's displeasure, evidently with the +intention that this should be conveyed to Russell[608]. + +Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate agents in +Europe. At first they believed Mercier must have had secret orders from +Napoleon, and were delighted; then on denials made to Slidell by +Thouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an unfavourable sense as +Seward's agent. Later they returned to the theory of Napoleon's private +manipulation, and being confident of his friendship were content to wait +events[609]. Slidell had just received assurance from M. Billault, +through whom most of his information came, "that the Emperor and all +the Ministers are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last +year, and are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M. +Thouvenel is of course excepted, but then he has no hostility[610]." But +a greater source of Southern hope at this juncture was another +"diplomatic adventure," though by no accredited diplomat, which +antedated Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not only +the Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well. + +This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament, Lindsay, in +the role of self-constituted Southern emissary to Napoleon. Lindsay, as +one of the principal ship-owners in England, had long been an earnest +advocate of more free commercial intercourse between nations, supporting +in general the principles of Cobden and Bright, and being a warm +personal friend of the latter, though disagreeing with him on the +American Civil War. He had been in some sense a minor expert consulted +by both French and British Governments in the preparation of the +commercial treaty of 1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself +to Cowley asking that an audience with the Emperor be procured for him +to talk over some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the request +seemed reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On the +twelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon's +conversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs[611]. + +The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction that re-union +between North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he was +ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him the +example." More than once he had expressed these ideas to England, but +"they had not been attended to" and he should not try again. He +continued: + + "... that France ought not to interfere in the internal + affairs of the United States, but that the United States + ought equally to abstain from all interference in the + internal concerns of France; and that His Majesty considered + that the hindrance placed by the Northern States upon the + exportation of cotton from the South was not justifiable, and + was tantamount to interference with the legal commerce of + France." + +He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established. He had +made observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, but they +had not been replied to." Then "His Majesty asked what were the opinions +of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her Majesty's Govt. agreed with +him as to the inefficiency of the blockade, he was ready to send ships +of war to co-operate with others of Her Majesty to keep the Southern +ports open." Finally Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and find +out what he thought of these ideas. + +Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever having been +made by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion was "that it +might be true that the North and the South would never re-unite, but +that it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of the blockade was a +legal and international question, and that upon the whole it had been +considered by Her Majesty's Govt. as efficient, though doubtless many +ships had been enabled to run it"; and "that at all events there could +not be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question both of the +recognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. The +time was gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for +every mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting with +success upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of the +blockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her Majesty's Govt. +would consent to send a squadron to act as the Emperor had indicated, +but that I could only give a personal opinion, which might be corrected +if I was in error by Mr. Lindsay himself seeing Lord Russell." + +On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay and +Napoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to Napoleon +Cowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a contrary view +of the situation, Napoleon: + + "... repeated the statement that two long despatches with his + opinion had been written to M. de Flahault, which had not + been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he + expressed a desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London, + lay His Majesty's views before Lord Palmerston and Lord + Russell, and bring their answers direct to him as quickly as + possible, His Majesty observing that these matters were + better arranged by private than official hands.... Mr. + Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be back in + Paris on Thursday morning." + +In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty intrigue." +Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and Thouvenel had denied +all knowledge and declared that certainly no such proposals as Lindsay +reported the Emperor to have mentioned had ever been sent to England. +Cowley wrote: + + "My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations with me, + which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood + hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor + his own views, and that those views are supported by the + majority of the people of England, and by the present + Opposition in Parliament, who would denounce the blockade if + in power; that he has found a willing listener in the + Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any means; and I + am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make + political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the + Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose + no time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over + to-night, and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord + Palmerston as soon as possible[612]." + +The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown by his +conveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was jubilant, writing +to Mason: + + "Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor who is + prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has + always been ready to do so and has twice made representations + to England, but has received evasive responses. He has now + for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. + Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely + confidential but you can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory, + etc., that I now have positive and _authoritative_ evidence + that France now waits the assent of England for recognition + and other more cogent measures[613]." + +Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in substance +very similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though more highly +coloured as favourable to the South, but he added an important feature +which, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, but which had not been +stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to see Derby and Disraeli, the +leaders of the parliamentary opposition, and inform them of his views--a +suggestion which if known to the British Ministry as coming from +Napoleon could not fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believed +that, failing British participation, the Emperor might act separately in +recognition of the South[614]. + +April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval of the +language used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was about to write +to Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to bring them also on +my part officially to your [Russell's] notice[615]." This official +report does not differ materially from that in Cowley's private letter +of the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally, aspersions on Lindsay and +suspicions of the use to which he might put his information[616]. Cowley +had held a long conversation with Thouvenel, in which it was developed +that the source of the Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce, +who was very anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that +Lindsay in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "_I_ [Cowley] +_coincided in his views_." This exasperated Cowley, and he resented +Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that he "was placed +in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. M. Thouvenel +exclaimed that his own position was still more false, and that he should +make a point of seeing the Emperor, on the following morning, and of +ascertaining the extent of His Majesty's participation in the +proceeding." This was done, with the result that Napoleon acknowledged +that on Lindsay's request he had authorized him to recount to Russell +and Palmerston the views expressed, but asserted that "he had not +charged him to convey those opinions." Cowley concluded his despatch: + + "Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not understand + the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had + confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate + proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more + preoccupied with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's + Government seemed to be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in + his communications with M. de Flahault, but that he knew too + well the general opinions prevailing in England to have made + proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what proposals could have + been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the Emperor and M. + Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the South would + not bring Cotton into the markets, while any interference + with the blockade would probably have produced a collision. + At the same time he could not conceal from me the just + anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not + the Northern States be induced to declare some one port + Neutral, at which the trade could be carried on? + + I said that the events which were now passing in America + demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two + Governments. The recognition of the South would not have + prevented the North from continuing its armaments and + undertaking the expedition now in progress, and a refusal to + acknowledge the blockade as efficient must have been followed + by the employment of force, on a question of extreme + delicacy[617]." + +Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this Russell +stated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation was alarming, +but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so the remedy." He +assured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish to take no step in +respect to the Civil War in America except in concert with France and +upon full deliberation[618]." Meanwhile Lindsay's diplomatic career had +received a severe jolt in London. Confidently addressing to Russell a +request for an interview, he received the reply "that I thought the best +way for two Govts. to communicate with each other was through their +respective Embassies.... He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you +[Cowley] had not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the +proposal through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to +see me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and the +French Ambassr. could make the most Confidential as well as Official +Communications[619]." This rebuff was not regarded as final, though +exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all being +agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in their favour. +Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and on April 18 had +still another conversation with Napoleon. He reported Russell's refusal +of an interview, and that he had seen Disraeli, but not Derby, who was +ill. Disraeli had declared that he believed Russell and Seward to have a +"secret understanding" on the blockade, but that if France should make a +definite proposal it would probably be supported by a majority in +Parliament, and that Russell would be compelled to assent in order to +avoid a change of Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsay +expressions of vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon +(according to Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting to +learn the result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an event +which "he did not anticipate," but which, if it occurred, "might render +it inexpedient to act[620]." + +Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to London, +found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English repetition. He wrote +that Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had attempted to get at +Palmerston, but with no success. Thereupon Lindsay turning to the +Opposition had visited Disraeli a second time and submitted to him +Palmerston's rebuff. The strongest expression that fell from Disraeli +was--"if it is found that the Emperor and Russell are at issue on the +question the session of Parliament would not be as quiet as had been +anticipated." This was scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all +important. Yet "on the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in +conclusion[621]. Within a fortnight following arrived the news of the +capture of New Orleans, an event upon which Seward had postulated the +relief of a European scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a +serious blow. May 13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him, +personally, that "he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the +moment but to watch events[622]." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the +effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, "that +it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control of +the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would not in any way +modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to an +extermination[623]." Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all from his +section, never fully realizing the importance of the Confederate +South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about Richmond, was telling +the "nervous amongst our friends" that New Orleans would "form a barren +acquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as a +stimulant[624]." + +If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeated +doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In England, +Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, but +thought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in that +direction. May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of British +public opinion, "there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as +ever that we must ultimately fail[625]," but on May 16, that "the effect +of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ... +the _Times_ came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it +had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it +has an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first time +that it sees little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a +preparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and +acknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all the +national territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will +bring us up to this, I am confident[626]." + +This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep pace +with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry was +simply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and to +restrain its French partner in a "wait for events" policy. The "one more +victory" so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and the +attention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited +in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of +Northern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond. +McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington +that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This was treated at +some length in the semi-official _National Intelligencer_ of May 16 in +an article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating that +mediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, but +would otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly +represented the situation[627]. + +There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was largely the +result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of ultimate Southern +success and his somewhat free private communications. He may, indeed, +have been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxiety at +Northern success, for McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily, +if slowly, progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent +instruction from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yet +he thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan on +Lyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of the +situation were as follows: + + "M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility + that the South may be victorious both in the battle in + Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite + confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not + give in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his + Government to endeavour to put an end to the war by + intervening on the first opportunity. He is, however, very + much puzzled to devise any mode of intervention, which would + have the effect of reviving French trade and obtaining + cotton. I should suppose he would think it desirable to go to + great lengths to stop the war; because he believes that the + South will not give in until the whole country is made + desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim + immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of + cotton for an indefinite time. + + I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It + appears to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. + There is a good deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations + of evil, but I do not see my way to doing any good. + + If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a + month or six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will + be at Richmond, having very probably got there without much + real fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if + so far.... + + The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the + summer. It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as + Trade and Cotton are concerned, we may be next Autumn, just + in the situation we are now. If the South really defeated + either or both the Armies opposed to them I think it would + disgust the North with the war, rather than excite them to + fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much from disease, + recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the + Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it + would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is + possible, under such circumstances that a Peace Party might + arise; and perhaps just _possible_ that England and France + might give weight to such a Party[628]." + +In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation unless +a strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and even then +regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just _possible_." Nor was +Russell inclined to depart from established policy. He wrote to Lyons at +nearly the same time: + + "The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth seems to + portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see + therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population + entertain those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which + were so freely expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate + Statesmen at Richmond. I know not how to answer this + question. But there are other questions not less important to + be solved in the North. Will the Abolitionists succeed in + proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all those who have + resisted? I guess not. + + But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and + its old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair + solution except separation--but that the North will not hear + of--nor in the moment of success would it be of any use to + give them unpalatable advice[629]." + +Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully informed of +Mercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France had no intention +to depart from her attitude of strict neutrality and that it was more +than ever necessary to wait events[630]. + +Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation were then +wholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as yet taken up +this plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern successes were +continued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction from his former high +hopes, summed up the situation in a few words: "This Government passive +and ignorant, France alert and mysterious. The Emperor alone knows what +is to come out of it, and he keeps his own secret[631]." The Southern +play, following the ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quiet +and extended even to discouraging public demonstrations against +governmental inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration by +cotton operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matter +of judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory as I +think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success and +power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would have +resulted[632]." The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell was +conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediately +following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions to +Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of the +declaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel replied +with some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strong +representation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton and +tobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had little +expectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute the +orders," advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customary +arguments on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual +refusal to alter British policy[634]. If Seward was sincere in asking +for a retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook +European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories to +return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable in +causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well chosen. +Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward's +renewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there was no immediate +reason to require his presence in America, ill and fearing the heat of +summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to take leave of absence +for a trip home. On June 6 he received this permission, evidence that +Russell also saw no cause for anxiety, and on June 13 he took leave +of Lincoln. + + "I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this + morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more + or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on + political matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in + England think a great deal more of me than I deserve, pray + tell 'em I mean 'em no harm[635].'" + +Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of news on any +striking military event in America. New Orleans was an old story, and +while in general it was believed that Richmond must fall before +McClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid declarations that +they would never submit gave renewed courage to their British friends. +Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might be wise, after all, to make +some effort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumours +were becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motion +demanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, an +offer of mediation be made to the contending parties in America. +Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had +failed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a +terrible war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure. +Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined +to make the effort[636]. Probably he was still smarting under his +reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personal +clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influence +on governmental attitude--perhaps might even indicate a governmental +purpose to alter its policy. + +This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston to +Adams on the publication in the _Times_ of General Butler's famous order +in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as "women of the +town" those women who publicly insulted Northern troops. The British +press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similar +to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the Stone Fleet episode. +Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies received need no further +notice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than to +explain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and with +great violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, but +in very dignified if irritating terms[637]. In British opinion Butler's +order was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans +understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. In +fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers, +whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick to +accept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if not +impossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited in +the mind of every honourable man by the general order of General +Butler...." "If the Federal government chooses to be served by men +capable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by the +deserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]." This +extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry and +perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an intention to +change British policy and that Palmerston was but laying the ground for +some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, after his wont when striking +out on a new line. He was further confirmed in this view by an editorial +in the _Times_ on June 12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news +from France that Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a +step. But however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a +diplomat. His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston +enquiring whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him +"officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment between +gentlemen[639]." + +There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were contemplating a +change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does appear that Palmerston +wished to be able to state in Parliament that he had taken Adams to task +for Butler's order, so that he might meet an enquiry already placed on +the question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This +question was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell +wrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that +Palmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not +see why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of war +do not sanction such conduct[640]." This was very different from the +tone used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way." +Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston: + + "Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you + have written him about Butler. + + I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do + nothing more till I had seen or written to you. + + What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your + interpretation of the order. + + But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, + and I think if you could add something to the effect that you + respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish + to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him. + + If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the + best. But this you may not like to do[641]." + +It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move against +Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last, +he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order, +was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicion +proving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended, +returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was not +until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far different +language seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet making +no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded +with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being +official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous +assertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell, +who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but +had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding +was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June +19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect +still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the +"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organ +for communications...." In conclusion he expressed gratification that +reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans had +been curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpreting +Palmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that he +would not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]." + +Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew there was +to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move may +even have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in that +policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends of +the South thought the _Times_ editorial indicated "that some movement is +to be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor for +it[644]." But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state +in Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal from +France to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it +on our part[645]." This was the exact language used by Palmerston in +reply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but was +assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "still +hold his motion under consideration[647]." Lindsay, according to his own +account, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knew +privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for +his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone +it[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead of +mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to +Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to +the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the +moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in +despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what +prospect of success, to _demand_ recognition from France[649]. This +alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging +against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there +would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's +motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, including +Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it "has been so far reduced +and diluted ... as to make it only expressive of the opinion of the +House that the present posture of affairs in America made the question +of the recognition of the Confederate States worth the serious +consideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent the +Ministry making an issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it +would be sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined to +postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from this +quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' to +turn the screw still further[651]." On June, 20 Lindsay gave this notice +of postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was a +moment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe. +Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demanding +recognition and wrote: + + "The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and + almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be + consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way + advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that + we would have done better to withdraw after our first + interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]." + +[Illustration: PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH (_From a photograph by Elliott & +Fry, Ltd._)] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 580: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 41.] + +[Footnote 581: F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862.] + +[Footnote 582: F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell, +March 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 583: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 54. +Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862.] + +[Footnote 584: _Ibid._, p. 65.] + +[Footnote 585: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. April 8, +1862.] + +[Footnote 586: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 587: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son, April 4, +1862.] + +[Footnote 588: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 31, 1862.] + +[Footnote 589: Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.] + +[Footnote 590: F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. Lyons to Russell, +April 11, 1802.] + +[Footnote 591: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 143. Adams to his son, +May 16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 592: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 247.] + +[Footnote 593: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, pp. 120-122. Mercicr to +Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of this despatch was printed, +with some minor inaccuracies, in the New York _Tribune_, Feb. 5, 1863, +and of Mercier's report, April 28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb. +9, under the caption "The Yellow Book." It is interesting that the +concluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the +_Tribune_, are not given in the printed volume of _Documents +Diplomatiques_, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to +certain pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences +with French vessels. How the _Tribune_ secured these paragraphs, if +authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the publication was an +attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in an effort to cause his +removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 371-2.] + +[Footnote 594: Bancroft, _Seward_. II, 298-99. Bancroft's account is +based on the _Tribune_ translation and on Seward's own comments to Weed +and Bigelow. _Ibid._, 371-72.] + +[Footnote 595: Newton. _Lord Lyons_, I, pp. 82-85, gives an account of +the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints Lyons' private letter to +Russell of April 25, describing the results, but does not bring out +sufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks that +Mercier "whether instructed from home or not ... after the manner of +French diplomatists of the period ... was probably unable to resist the +temptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_...."] + +[Footnote 596: Stoeckl's report does not agree with Mercier's statement. +He wrote that he had been asked to accompany Mercier but had refused and +reported a conversation with Seward in which the latter declared the +time had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would not +be accepted in that role, and that if ever mediation should become +acceptable, Russia would be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to +F.O., April 23-May 5, 1862. No. 927).] + +[Footnote 597: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, April 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 598: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 599: This suspicion was a natural one but that it was +unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of Mercier's +visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the same terms +that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached by +Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by the fact that he did +not write to Slidell about it until July. Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin +to Slidell, July 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 600: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, April 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 601: _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, pp. 122-124.] + +[Footnote 602: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, April 28, 1862.] + +[Footnote 603: F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, May 9, 1862.] + +[Footnote 604: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, 1862.] + +[Footnote 605: F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley to Russell, +April 28, 1862.] + +[Footnote 606: _Ibid._, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To Russell. Mercier's +conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy confidence" +to Lyons. _Ibid._, No. 566. May 1, 1862. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 607: _Ibid._, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, May 2, 1862.] + +[Footnote 608: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 299.] + +[Footnote 609: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862. +Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 610: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, May 16, 1862. Billault was a +member of the French Ministry, but without portfolio.] + +[Footnote 611: Several accounts have been given of this episode. The two +known to me treating it at greatest length are (1) Callahan, _Diplomatic +History of the Southern Confederacy_ and (2) Sears, _A Confederate +Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both +writers drew their information wholly from Confederate documents, using, +especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither +treats the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my +account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other +materials only where they offer a side light. The principal new sources +are Cowley's private and official letters to Russell.] + +[Footnote 612: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. April 13, +1862.] + +[Footnote 613: Mason Papers. April 12, 1862.] + +[Footnote 614: Richardson, II, 239. April 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 615: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private.] + +[Footnote 616: F.O., France, Vol. 1437. No. 497. _Confidential_. Cowley +to Russell April 15, 1862.] + +[Footnote 617: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 618: F.O., France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell to Cowley, +April 16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 619: _Ibid._, No. 415. Russell to Cowley, April 16, 1862. +Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with a mission must +remain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have prevaricated--or at +least so officially reported. He had + + "Le 20 Avril, 1862. + + Mon cher Lord Cowley: + + Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'espere comme vous que + bientot nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de tout + ete choque de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas recu Mr. Lindsay. + Celui-ci m'avait demande l'autorisation de rapporter au + principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais + consenti et voila tout. + + Croyez a mes sentiments d'amitie. + + Napoleon." +] + +[Footnote 620: Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin, April 18, 1862. +New Orleans was captured on April 25.] + +[Footnote 621: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30, 1862.] + +[Footnote 622: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.] + +[Footnote 623: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 624: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, May 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 625: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 139.] + +[Footnote 626: _Ibid._, p. 146.] + +[Footnote 627: F.O., Am., Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to Russell, May 16, +1862.] + +[Footnote 628: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. May 16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 629: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. May 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 630: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, p. 124. May 15.] + +[Footnote 631: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 632: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3, 1862.] + +[Footnote 633: F.O., France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley to Russell, May +23, 1862, and _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 127. Thouvenel to +Mercier, May 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 634: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862_, pp. 97-99. Adams to +Seward, May 22, 1862.] + +[Footnote 635: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, 88.] + +[Footnote 636: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11, 1862.] + +[Footnote 637: All the letters are given in Adams, _C.F. Adams_, Ch. +XIII.] + +[Footnote 638: _Ibid._, pp. 248-9.] + +[Footnote 639: _Ibid._, p. 251.] + +[Footnote 640: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 641: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 642: Adams, _C.F. Adams_, pp. 253-55.] + +[Footnote 643: _Ibid._, pp. 256-60.] + +[Footnote 644: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 645: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 646: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 543. June 13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 647: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14, 1862.] + +[Footnote 648: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. Lindsay wrote: + + "Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of my + motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced + the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have + told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to + him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the + House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even + if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a + majority of votes might have been obtained in its + favour--that a majority of votes _would_ be obtained within + the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope + that the Government would move (as the country, and France, + are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the + necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which + belonged to the Executive. + + "I further told his Lordship that recognition was a _right_ + which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the + fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the + majority of the leading men in the Northern States would + thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself + might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse + for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged + his people. I further said, that if the question is settled + _without_ our recognition of the South, he might _rest + certain_ that the Northern Armies _would_ be marched into + Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and + thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for _sub + rosa_, I saw that the House was not _yet_ prepared to vote, + and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in + idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm." +] + +[Footnote 649: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 650: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 651: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 652: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 810.] + +[Footnote 653: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, 1862.] + + + +CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO + + +CHAPTER PAGE + X. KING COTTON . . . . . . . . . . 1 + XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN . . . . . . 33 + XII. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION . . . . 75 + XIII. THE LAIRD RAMS . . . . . . . . . 116 + XIV. ROEBUCK'S MOTION . . . . . . . . 152 + XV. THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION . 186 + XVI. BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH . . . 219 + XVII. THE END OF THE WAR . . . . . . . . 247 +XVIII. THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE . . . 274 + INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + +PART TWO + +PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece_ +_From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd_. + +JOHN SLIDELL . . . . . . . . . . . _facing p. 24_ +_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham +Lincoln," by permission of the Century Co., New +York._ + +"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD" . . . . . . . " 102 +_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of +"Punch_" + +WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851) . . . . . . " 134 +_From Reid's "Life of Forster" (Chapman & Hall, +Ltd._) + +"THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS--HABET!" . . . . " 248 +_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of +"Punch_" + +"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH COLUMBIA" . . . " 262 +_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of +"Punch_" + +JOHN BRIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . " 294 +_From Trevelyan's "Life of John Bright" +(Constable & Co., Ltd_.) + + + +GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR + + + +CHAPTER X + +KING COTTON + +For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England. +But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance on +Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the much +heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrous +failure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns in +the West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored or +their significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in +America approached a stalemate. The time had come with the near +adjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must +be made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was +hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily +increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to the +Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and private +efforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review the +cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern to +both friend and foe of the North and in less degree to the +Ministry itself. + +"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no great +revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such convenient and +soothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the time +of the organization of the Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities +could not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what the +Confederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced to +aid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terrible +distress that was sure to follow a blockade[654]." This confidence was +no new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats of +secession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of that +section had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing +industry of America and as the one product which would compel European +acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, or +of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression that +swept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leading +financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of the South is +permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Events +now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbug +explodes[655]." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina, +asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished for +three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but +this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole +civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on +cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_ +King[656]." Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 in +which the main question was that of the territorial expansion of +slavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing +that "the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the +world.... Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and +we have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry +it out successfully[657]." + +These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be +amplified and repeated from a hundred sources. + +Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand in +hand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter of +the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In the three million +bags of cotton," said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, "the slave-labour +annually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing more +to advance civilization ... than all the canting philanthropists of New +England and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of +the Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturing +system[658]...." Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the +Civil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon: + + "Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton + crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care + about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and + slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that + subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested + in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern + States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and + all Lancashire would deplore a successful insurrection of the + slaves, if such a thing were possible[659]." + +On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession. +Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported a +conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now a +consistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan of +close commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation, +postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South for +cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I would remark," wrote Bunch, "all +their calculations are based[660]." Such was, indeed, Southern +calculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an article +declaring that "the first demonstration of blockade of the Southern +ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering +on the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the +free flow of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of +the raw material ... would produce the most disastrous political +results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of English +statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cotton +associations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661]." + +The historical student will find but few such British utterances at the +moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics or +in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesied +results accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmental +foreign policy neglected all other considerations and the first +Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demand +recognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt British +acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidence +but did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. In +June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that "Great +Britain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, to +prevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of +an article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: "The +cards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _the +bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the +acknowledgment of our independence_[663]." As late as March, 1862, Bunch +was still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described the +newly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly due +to the fact that he was the leader of the "King Cotton" theory of +diplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that British +persistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the +lack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading +Richmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of +Jefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms of +Confederate foreign policy: + + "'Cotton,' said the Charleston _Mercury_, 'would bring + England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that + England and France would instinctively or readily fling + themselves into a convulsion, which their great politicians + saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. But the + puerile argument, which even President Davis did not hesitate + to adopt, about the power of 'King Cotton,' amounted to this + absurdity: that the great and illustrious power of England + would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging + its dependency on the infant Confederacy of the South, and + the subserviency of its empire, its political interests and + its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in + America[665]!" + +But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in cotton +extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth serious +enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to Southern +sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" have +frequently been treated by historians at much length[666] and need here +but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the +erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an examination +of the extent to which the question of cotton supply affected or +determined British governmental policy toward America. + +English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of importance +equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on varying statistics +diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree in emphasizing the +pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining the general prosperity of +the nation. Surveying the English, not the whole British, situation it +is estimated that there were 2,650 factories of which 2,195 were in +Lancashire and two adjacent counties. These employed 500,000 operatives +and consumed a thousand million pounds of cotton each year[667]. An +editorial in the _Times_, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of +the entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly +or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts[668], and +therefore also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South, +since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton supplied +from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. of the total +English importation[669]. + +The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly 4,000,000 +bales, and the foreign shipments, without question hurried because of +the storm-cloud rising at home, had been practically completed by April, +1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received +the larger portion[670]. There was, then, no immediate shortage of +supply when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of raw +stocks, even permitting some reshipment to the Northern manufacturing +centres of America where the scarcity then brought high prices. In +addition, from December, 1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been +somewhat of a slump in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers +due to an over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had +been a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial +crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous demand +from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running again on full +time, while many new mills were brought into operation. But by May, +1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy demands and the rest of the +year saw uncertainty of operations and brought expressions of fear that +the "plunge" to produce had been overdone. Manufactured stocks began to +accumulate, and money was not easy since 1860 brought also a combination +of events--deficient grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from +England to France for investment in French public works, demand of +America for gold in place of goods, due to political uncertainties +there--which rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per +cent. in January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861, +the Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a +dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased +exports of goods[671]. The news of war actually begun in America came as +a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and in the prospect of +decreased supply prices rose, saving many manufacturers from impending +difficulties. A few mills had already begun to work on part-time because +of trade depression. The _immediate_ effect of Lincoln's blockade +proclamation was to check this movement, but by October it had again +begun and this time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw +cotton as compared with the slower advance of the price of goods[672]. + +In substance the principal effect of the War on the English cotton trade +for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in the manufacturing +districts but in the Liverpool speculative and importing markets of raw +cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a shilling a pound in October, +1861. On November 23 there was a near panic caused by rumours of British +intervention. These were denounced as false and in five days the price +was back above its previous figure. Then on November 27 came the news +of the _Trent_ and the market was thrown into confusion, not because of +hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war with +America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators breathed +freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative British +interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and could not +affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, presumably, a more +serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or even impossible to obtain, +a serious situation would demand consideration. + +In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at first no +great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with December, 1861, +there was almost complete stoppage of supply from America. In the six +months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500 bales were received, less +than one per cent. of the amount for the same six months of the previous +year[673]. The blockade was making itself felt and not merely in +shipments from the South but in prospects of Southern production, for +the news came that the negroes were being withdrawn by their masters +from the rich sea islands along the coast in fear of their capture by +the Northern blockading squadrons[674]. Such a situation seemed bound in +the end to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental +action to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained +by Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as follows: + + "The immediate result of the American war was, at this time, + to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in + the raw material and the producers and dealers in + manufactures, from a serious and impending difficulty. They + had in hand a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption + of two-thirds of a year, therefore a rise in the price of the + raw material and the partial closing of their establishments, + with a curtailment of their working expenses, was obviously + to their advantage. But to make their success complete, this + rise in the price of cotton was upon the largest stock ever + collected in the country at this season. To the cotton trade + there came in these days an unlooked for accession of wealth, + such as even it had never known before. In place of the hard + times which had been anticipated, and perhaps deserved, there + came a shower of riches[675]." + +This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar analysis, +no doubt on the explanations offered by his English friends, of "the +question of cotton supply, which we had supposed would speedily have +disturbed the level of their neutral policy" was made by Mason in March, +1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that even in Lancashire and other +manufacturing districts no open demonstration has been made against the +blockade[676]." Manufactures other than cotton were greatly prospering, +in particular those of woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the +cotton lords were not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited +by it--was bruited even during the war. _Blackwood's Magazine_, October, +1864, held this view, while the _Morning Post_ of May 16, 1864, went to +the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, relieved just in +the nick of time by the War, preventing a financial crash, "which must +sooner or later have caused great suffering in Lancashire." + +Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the _immediate_ +effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton industry from great +disaster and that there _immediately_ resulted large profits to the +manufacturers from the increased price of stocks on hand. In fact his +description of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages +show, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are +concerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For +though prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any +large quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no +transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677]. +Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just +been abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen +to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English +producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking an +effective market. The importance of this in British foreign policy is +that at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was there +likely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America. +Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern ports +and a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged great +losses incurred and patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in +Parliament the members from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with +the Government policy of neutrality for in the various debates on +blockade, mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire, +Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or +referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to any +other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the war[679]. + +But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. Whatever the +causes of short-time operation in the mills or of total cessation of +work the situation was such that from October, 1861, more and more +operatives were thrown out of employment. As their little savings +disappeared they were put upon public poor relief or upon private +charity for subsistence. The governmental statistics do not cover, +accurately, the relief offered by private charity, but those of public +aid well indicate the loss of wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called +"Distressed Districts" of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it +appears that poor relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times, +out of a total population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November, +1861, it was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593; +thereafter mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of +113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there was a +slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief resumed an +upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, when it reached +its highest point of 284,418. In this same first week of December +private relief, now thoroughly organized in a great national effort, was +extended to 236,000 people, making a grand total at high tide of +distress of over 550,000 persons, if private relief was not extended to +those receiving public funds. But of this differentiation there is no +surety--indeed there are evidences of much duplication of effort in +certain districts. In general, however, these statistics do exhibit the +great lack of employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying +unusual prosperity[680]. + +The manufacturing operative population of the district was estimated at +between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest distress some +412,000 of these were receiving either public or private aid, though +many were working part-time in the mills or were engaged on public +enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. But there was no starvation +and it is absurd to compare the crisis to the Irish famine of the +'forties. This was a _cotton_ famine in the shortage of that commodity, +but it was not a _human_ famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was +passing through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by +the contributions of the country[681]." Nevertheless a rapid change from +a condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on charity--a +change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either directly or +indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might have been expected +to arouse popular demonstrations to force governmental action directed +to securing cotton that trade might revive. That no such popular effect +was made demands careful analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but +here the _fact_ is alone important, and the fact was that the operatives +sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the Cabinet. Thus at +no time during the war was there any attempt from Lancashire, whether of +manufacturers or operatives, to force a change of governmental +policy[682]. + +As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public discussion and +consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was little talk of +governmental interference and such as did appear was promptly met with +opposition by the leading trade journals. July 13, 1861, the _Economist_ +viewed the cotton shortage as "a _temporary_ and an _immediate_ one.... +We have--on our hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our +supply for _one_ year, and that the very _next_ year." Would it _pay_, +asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think myself it would be +cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United States[683]." This was +also the notion of the London _Shipping Gazette_ which, while +acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and France were about to +be greatly embarrassed, continued: "_But we are not going to add to the +difficulty by involving ourselves in a naval war with the Northern +States_[684]...." The _Times_ commented in substance in several issues +in September, 1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time as a +precaution against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the +glutted state of distant markets for manufactured goods[685]." October +12, the _Economist_ acknowledged that the impatience of some mill-owners +was quite understandable as was talk of a European compulsion on America +to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, but then entered upon an +elaborate discussion of the principles involved and demonstrated why +England ought not to intervene. In November Bright could write: "The +notion of getting cotton by interfering with the blockade is abandoned +apparently by the simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted +now as a fixed policy that we are to take no part in your +difficulties[686]." Throughout the fall of 1861 the _Economist_ was +doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging that due to the "glut" of +manufactured goods short-time must have ensued anyway, pointing out that +now an advanced price was possible, and arguing that here was a +situation likely to result in the development of other sources of supply +with an escape from the former dependence on America. In view of the +actual conditions of the trade, already recounted, these were appealing +arguments to the larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on +short order supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less +easily convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence +and hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the +new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and +manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for any +_immediate_ change[687]." + +Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the +_Trent_ reached England: that of January, 1862, just after that +controversy had been amicably settled. The _Trent_ had both diverted +attention from cotton and in its immediate result created a general +determination to preserve neutrality. It is evident that even without +this threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon the +Government. With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes were +aroused that the war would soon end or that at least some cotton +districts would be captured to the relief of England. Seward held out +big promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a time +calmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that +the inability to secure the country back of the city, together with the +Southern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into +the hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the +Mississippi valley[688]. This was still not a matter of _immediate_ +concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinion +that it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for the +distress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload their +stocks[689]. But in considering and judging the attitude of the British +public on this question of cotton it should always be remembered that +the great mass of the people sincerely believed that America was +responsible for the distress in Lancashire. The error in understanding +was more important than the truth. + +In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causes +of distress in England is the more important element. The "Cotton Lords" +did not choose to reveal it. One must believe that they intentionally +dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause. In the first important +parliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of any +other element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word +advocating a change in British neutral policy[690]. It is to be noted +also that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers on +poor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and the +general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious it +was not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it. There was +not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressed +governmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I +believe, get thro' the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland works +and railroads in India[692]." Moreover the Southern orders to destroy +cotton rather than permit its capture and export by the North +disagreeably affected British officials[693]. Up to the end of August, +1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for +cotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern +policy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special official +consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time came +wholly from France[694]. + +It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July of +the Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695]. June had +seen the collapse of Lindsay's initial move, and Palmerston's answer to +Hopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offer +mediation, appeared final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat, +that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood +had withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked +whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the country, +the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and the +hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend to +take any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise, +to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?" This was +differently worded, yet contained little variation from his former +question of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that the +Government certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of success +but that at present "both parties would probably reject it. If a +different situation should arise the Government would be glad to +act[696]." This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July +11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of +offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and +insisted upon a debate. + +Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours of +British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams was +keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presented +to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote "under the +President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours were highly +injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South has +been encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession. Having +developed this complaint at some length Seward went on to a brief +threat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreign +nations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, the +North would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used, +namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters. This was +clearly a threat of a "servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a +war which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view +of her anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams' +discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from +presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the +American Minister anxious[697]. No answer was given by Russell for over +a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. Soon +the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope of +British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny in +conversation had assured him "that this Government is now more anxious +than ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour." Slidell +asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged that +everything depended on Palmerston: "that august body seems to be as +afraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their +pedagogue[698]." + +Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private instructions +now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a visit to London. +The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croit +pas le moment venu de reconnaitre le Sud[699]." Palmerston had already +answered this question in Parliament and Thouvenel was personally very +much opposed to the Emperor's suggestion. There were press rumours that +he was in London to bring the matter to a head, but his report to +Mercier was that interference in America was a very dangerous matter and +that he would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he +had suggested any change in neutral policy[700]. + +In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of Foreign +Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern hopes was the +knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay chose his time well +for on July 16 the first thorough report on Lancashire was laid before +Parliament[701], revealing an extremity of distress not previously +officially authenticated, and during this week the papers were full of +an impending disaster to McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his +vacation trip, was concerned for the future mainly because of cotton, +but did not believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with +America[702]. But the great Southern argument of the moment was the +Northern military failure, the ability of the South to resist +indefinitely and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18 +all London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news +from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of his +entire army. + +Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams thought +the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to carry the +House of Commons off their feet in its debate to-night[703]." The +debate itself may be regarded as a serious attempt to push the Ministry +into a position more favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced +surveyed the entire ground of the causes of secession and the +inevitability of the final separation of North and South. They need but +brief summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement +because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no +element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that +England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring to a +conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune since +mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, and he +quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, stating, "We +think it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they so +richly deserve." + +Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. Gregory +said: "We should remember what is impending over Lancashire--what want, +what woe, what humiliation--and that not caused by the decree of God, +but by the perversity of man. I leave the statistics of the pauperism +that is, and that is to be, to my honourable friends, the +representatives of manufacturing England." No statistics were +forthcoming from this quarter for not a representative from Lancashire +participated in the debate save Hopwood who at the very end upbraided +his fellow members from the district for their silence and was +interrupted by cries of "Divide, Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was +met by opponents of mediation with the assertion that the operatives +were well known to be united against any action and that they could be +sustained "in luxury" from the public purse for far less a cost than +that of a war with America. + +But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. Forster +in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a consideration of the +effect of mediation on _England_, advanced the idea that such a step +would not end the war but would merely intensify it and so prolong +English commercial distress. He did state, however, that intervention +(as distinct from mediation) would bring on a "servile war" in America, +thus giving evidence of his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of +Seward's despatch of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were +content to be silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay. +This was good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by +evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive +result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real _attack_ on +the Government by his bitter criticisms of Russell's "three months" +speech[704]. + +At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, their +immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to adjourn the +debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed that everyone +earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he declared that such +debates were a great mistake unless something definite was to follow +since they only served to create irritation in America, both North and +South. He concluded with a vigorous assertion that if the Ministry were +to administer the affairs of the nation it ought to be trusted in +foreign affairs and not have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions +of opinion at inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet +securely established its independence and hence could not be recognized. +This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and thus +be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention in the +future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government Palmerston +did not insist upon a division and the motion was withdrawn[705]. + +On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in ignominious +failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think we know here +sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] to be able to +come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers should do." But +the impression left by the debate that there was a strong parliamentary +opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: "I suppose Mercier will +open full cry on the scent, and be all for mediation. I am still afraid +of any attempt of the kind[706]." Very much the same opinion was held by +Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has again passed by for the moment and +we breathe more freely. But I think I wrote to you some time ago that if +July found us still in Virginia, we could no longer escape interference. +I think now that it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North +on slavery would bring "the greatest strength in this running +battle[707]." + +In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" the +"pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and Mason +and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the Cabinet, reacting +to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the Northern defeats, and the +distress in Lancashire, was seriously considering the possibility of +taking some step toward mediation. On July 16, two days before the +debate in the Commons, Slidell at last had his first personal contact +with Napoleon, and came away from the interview with the conviction that +"if England long persists in her inaction he [Napoleon] would be +disposed to act without her." This was communicated to Mason on July +20[708], but Slidell did _not_ as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in +the interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate +action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special commercial +treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for Mexican affairs," +this last without any authority from Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary +of State. On July 23 Slidell made a similar offer to Thouvenel and left +with him a full memorandum of the Southern proposal[709]. He was +cautioned that it was undesirable his special offer to France should +reach the ears of the British Government--a caution which he transmitted +to Mason on July 30, when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but +still without revealing the full extent of his own overtures +to Napoleon. + +[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL (_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham +Lincoln": The Century Co. New York_)] + +In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to pull off a +special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, and in line, +also, with a persistent theory that the policy most likely to secure +results was that of inducing France to act alone. But he was repeatedly +running against advice that France must follow Great Britain, and the +burden of his July 20 letter to Mason was an urging that a demand for +recognition be now made simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel, +not at all enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was +at least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the demand +should be made at once[710]. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay, +Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for +recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the debate of +July 18[711]. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell referring to their +interview of February, 1862, in which he had urged the claims of the +Confederacy to recognition and again presented them, asserting that the +subsequent failure of Northern campaigns had demonstrated the power of +the South to maintain its independence. The South, he wrote, asked +neither aid nor intervention; it merely desired recognition and +continuation of British neutrality[712]. On the same day Mason also +asked for an interview[713], but received no reply until July 31, when +Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until "after a +Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem necessary[714]. + +This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in uncertainty. It +is significant that Russell took this moment to reply at last to +Seward's protestations of May 28[715], which had been presented to him +by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at Washington that his delay +had been due to a "waiting for military events," but that these had +been indecisive. He gave a resume of all the sins of the North as a +belligerent and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins +had not "induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an +impartial neutrality[716]." Here was no promise of a continuance of +neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one member of +the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote privately: + + "It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and + purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been + plain enough that the whole question was whether the South + was earnest and united. That has now for some months been + demonstrated; and the fact thus established at once places + the question beyond the region even of the most brilliant + military successes[717]...." + +Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial situation. +Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a change of +policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to Stuart: + + "...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under which I + should think the intervention of England in the quarrel + between the North and South advisable.... + + "But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is + apparent from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other + ports. And the distress in the manufacturing districts + threatens to be so great that a pressure may be put upon the + Government which they will find it difficult to resist[718]." + +In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the expense of +the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to the fury of +Cobden[719]. Of this period Arnold later sarcastically remarked that, +"The representatives of Lancashire in the Houses of Parliament did not +permit the gaieties of the Exhibition season wholly to divert their +attention from the distress which prevailed in the home county[720]." + +Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on August 1 a +long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, using exactly those +arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate[721]. The answer, evidently +given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had been waiting, +was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to Seward on July 28, +called attention to the wholly contradictory statements of North and +South on the status of the war, which, in British opinion, had not yet +reached a stage positively indicative of the permanence of Southern +independence. Great Britain, therefore, still "waited," but the time +might come when Southern firmness in resistance would bring +recognition[722]. The tone was more friendly than any expressions +hitherto used by Russell to Southern representatives. The reply does not +reveal the decision actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote +to Argyll on August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the +question "to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil +War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident the +prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both parties +are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish; he would have +England approach France and Russia, but if they were not ready, wait +until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done before the hot +weather is over to stop these frightful horrors[723]." + +All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the +Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at present" +and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. Apparently one +Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the need to splutter. On +the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the Lords moved for the +production of Russell's correspondence with Mason, making a very +confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were convinced the war ought +to end in separation. At one time Campbell argued that reconquest of the +South was impossible; at another that England should interfere to +prevent such reconquest. Again he urged that the North was in a +situation where she could not stop the war without aid from Europe in +extricating her. Probably the motion was made merely to draw from +Russell an official statement. Production of the papers was refused. +Russell stated that the Government still maintained its policy of strict +neutrality, that if any action was to be taken it should be by all the +maritime powers and that if, in the parliamentary recess, any new policy +seemed advisable he would first communicate with those powers. He also +declared very positively that as yet no proposal had been received from +any foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect +accord" between Great Britain and France[724]. + +Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying and +naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that France +would promptly make this clear[725]. But France gave no sign of lack of +"perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel even discouraged Slidell +from following Mason's example of demanding recognition and the formal +communication was withheld, Mason acquiescing[726]. Slidell thought new +disturbances in Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French +interest in the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration +of high hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin: + + "You will find by my official correspondence that we are + still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off + but a strong and continued current of important successes in + the field. + + I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she + desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the + North shall be entirely exhausted and broken down. + + Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen + except their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting + about their disinterested magnaminity and objection of all + other considerations than those dictated by a high-toned + morality, while their entire policy is marked by egotism and + duplicity. I am getting to be heartily tired of Paris[727]." + +On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day of the +session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire by +authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. Like +Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that in August +there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for a change in +British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell had merely +declared that the time for action was "not yet" come, but this was +regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in informed Southern nor +Northern circles outside the Cabinet was there any suspicion, _except by +Adams_, that in the six months elapsed since Lindsay had begun his +movement the Ministry had been slowly progressing in thoughts of +mediation. + +In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had been +_favourable_ to mediation when "both parties were ready for it" and that +such readiness would come soon most Members were convinced. This was a +convenient and reasonable ground for postponing action but did not +imply that if the conviction were unrealized no mediation would be +attempted. McClellan, driven out of the Peninsula, had been removed, and +August saw the Northern army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now +Washington and not Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the +North must soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports +early in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a +strong peace party. + +But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of enormous new +Northern levies of men and of renewed courage[728]. By mid-August, +writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any quantity of +it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the peace +party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of the +Administration[729]. As to recognition, Stuart believed: "There is +nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous fresh levies, but +to wait and see what the next two months will bring forth[730]." The +hopes of the British Ministry based on a supposed Northern weariness of +the war were being shattered. Argyll, having received from Sumner a +letter describing the enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote +to Gladstone: + + "It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the prospects + of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any + approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of + mediation[731]...." + +To this Gladstone replied: + + "I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to + mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty + to determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I + cannot subscribe to the opinion of those who think that + Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness + these horrors and absurdities, which will soon have consumed + more men, and done ten times more mischief than the Crimean + War; but with the difference that there the end was + uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole + world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled to point + out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled by + the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any + interference or warning from third powers, and as far as + principle goes there never was a case in which warning was so + proper and becoming, because of the frightful misery which + this civil conflict has brought upon other countries, and + because of the unanimity with which it is condemned by the + civilized world[732]." + +The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were known to +Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British Ministry. +Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. Lindsay's +initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect diplomacy and not +supported by France officially, had received prompt rejection +accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart from strict +neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the Northern victorious +progress in arms and in the face of increasing distress in Lancashire, +the second answer to Lindsay was less dogmatic. As given by Palmerston +the Government desired to offer mediation, but saw no present hope of +doing so successfully. Finally the Government asked for a free hand, +making no pledges. Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when +August dawned plans were already on foot for a decided change. The +secret was well kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on +events, two days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence +with Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was +writing to Palmerston: + + "Mercier's notion that we should make some move in October + agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England + before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of + course the war may flag before that. + + "I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice + should be the first step; but we must be prepared to answer + the question on what basis are we to negotiate[733]?" + +The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to come, not +from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the South, but from +the British Ministry itself. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 654: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 204.] + +[Footnote 655: _De Bow's Review_, Dec., 1857, p. 592.] + +[Footnote 656: Cited in Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, +p. 66.] + +[Footnote 657: _Ibid._, p. 64.] + +[Footnote 658: Cited in Smith, _Parties and Slavery_, 68. A remarkable +exposition of the "power of cotton" and the righteousness of slavery was +published in Augusta, Georgia, in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine +hundred pages, entitled _Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments_. +This reproduced seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers +analysing Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and +political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology, +international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united publication +was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of slavery, the +prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the power of the United +States as dependent on its control of the cotton supply. The editor was +E.N. Elliot, President of Planters' College, Mississippi.] + +[Footnote 659: Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. +237.] + +[Footnote 660: _Am. Hist. Rev._, XVIII, p. 785. Bunch to Russell. No. +51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here printed this letter shows two +dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the original in the Public Record Office +is dated Dec. 5.] + +[Footnote 661: pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of Florida.] + +[Footnote 662: Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, learned from +Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to Yancey. Had he been +instructed to negotiate commercial treaties with European powers? Mr. +Yancey had received no intimation from any source that authority to +negotiate commercial treaties would devolve upon the Commission. 'What +then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be your instructions?' The President, Mr. +Yancey said, seemed to be impressed with the importance of the cotton +crop. A considerable part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a +full crop will soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton, +so far as he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy +expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, _Life and Times of Yancey_, 599).] + +[Footnote 663: F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to Russell, June 5, +1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the South in industries +other than its staple products is well illustrated by a request from +Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the Confederacy, to Mason, urging him +to secure _three_ ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote, +"The reduction of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason +Papers. Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).] + +[Footnote 664: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. Bunch to +Russell, March 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 665: p. 130] + +[Footnote 666: The two principal British works are: Arnold, _The History +of the Cotton Famine_, London, 1864; and Watts, _The Facts of the Cotton +Famine_, Manchester, 1866. A remarkable statistical analysis of the +world cotton trade was printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner +seeking to use his study as an argument for British mediation. George +McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_.] + +[Footnote 667: Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, pp. 263-4.] + +[Footnote 668: Lack of authentic statistics on indirect interests make +this a guess by the _Times_. Other estimates run from one-seventh to +one-fourth.] + +[Footnote 669: Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the Civil War," p. 408 +(in _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_, Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent. +(Hereafter cited as Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton_.) Scherer, _Cotton as a +World Power_, p. 264, states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, _Cotton +Famine_, pp. 36-39, estimates 83 per cent.] + +[Footnote 670: Great Britain ordinarily ran more than twice as many +spindles as all the other European nations combined. Schmidt, _Wheat and +Cotton_, p. 407, _note_.] + +[Footnote 671: This Return for April is noteworthy as the first +differentiating commerce with the North and the South.] + +[Footnote 672: These facts are drawn from Board of Trade Reports, and +from the files of the _Economist_, London, and _Hunt's Merchants +Magazine_, New York. I am also indebted to a manuscript thesis by T.P. +Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War Blockade on the Cotton Trade of +the United Kingdom," Stanford University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented +at Harvard University a thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The +Influence of Trade (in Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations, +1829-1846," but has not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil +War period.] + +[Footnote 673: Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 89.] + +[Footnote 674: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to Russell, Jan. 8, +1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were being transformed to +corn production and that even the cotton on hand was deteriorating +because of the lack of bagging, shut off by the blockade.] + +[Footnote 675: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 81.] + +[Footnote 676: Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, March 11, 1862.] + +[Footnote 677: Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. _Monthly Accounts +of Trade and Navigation_ (in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_. +Vol. LV, and 1863, _Commons_, Vol. LXV).] + +[Footnote 678: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, pp. 174 and 215.] + +[Footnote 679: In 1861 there were 26 Members from Lancashire in the +Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. The suffrage was such +that only 1 in every 27 of the population had the vote. For all England +the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, 359). _Parliamentary Papers_, +1867-8, _Lords_, Vol. XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and +Counties of England."] + +[Footnote 680: The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's "Reports on +Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862. _Parliamentary Papers, +Commons_, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. _Ibid._, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from +"Summary of the Number of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from +November, 1861, to December, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. LII. Farnall's +reports are less exact than the _Summary_ since at times Liverpool is +included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do not +appear in his reports until 1864. The _Summary_ consistently includes +Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that city whenever weather +conditions interfered with the ordinary business of the port. It is a +striking illustration of the narrow margin of living wages among the +dockers of Liverpool that an annotation at the foot of a column of +statistics should explain an increase in one week of 21,000 persons +thrown on poor relief to the "prevalence of a strong east wind" which +prevented vessels from getting up to the docks.] + +[Footnote 681: Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 309. To Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.] + +[Footnote 682: The historians who see only economic causes have +misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton famine." Recently, +also, there has been advanced an argument that "wheat defeated +cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England itself during the war by +pro-Northern friends who pointed to the great flow of wheat from the +North as essential in a short-crop situation in Great Britain. Mr. +Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American +Relations during the Civil War," a paper read before the American +Historical Association, Dec. 1917, and since published in the _Iowa +Journal of History and Politics_, July, 1918, presents with much care +all the important statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions +seem to me wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence +on Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping +the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious +statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did not +escape the attention of the English government," since leading journals +referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: "But it was +Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the decisive factor, +counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in keeping the British +government from recognizing the Confederacy" (p. 437). "That the wheat +situation must have exerted a profound influence on the government ..." +(p. 438). And finally: "In this contest wheat won, demonstrating its +importance as a world power of greater significance than cotton" (p. +439). This interesting thesis has been accepted by William Trimble in +"Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the United States, +1862-1902" (_Am. Hist. Assoc. Reports_, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think +Mr. Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition +of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in +midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of that +year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a parity, +since the former could not be obtained in quantity from _any_ source +before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the United States, could +have been obtained from interior Russia, as well as from the maritime +provinces, in increased supply if Britain had been willing to pay the +added price of inland transport. There was a real "famine" of cotton; +there would have been none of wheat, merely a higher cost. (This fact, a +vital one in determining influence, was brought out by George McHenry in +the columns of _The Index_, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of +all Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a +subject of governmental concern in _memoranda_ and in private notes +between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one single case of +the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in negation of Mr. +Schmidt's thesis.] + +[Footnote 683: Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited in _Hunt's +Merchants Magazine_, Vol. 45, pp. 326-7.] + +[Footnote 684: _Ibid._, p. 442.] + +[Footnote 685: e.g., The _Times_, Sept. 19, 1861.] + +[Footnote 686: To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, +XLVI, p. 97.] + +[Footnote 687: _Ibid._, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. 157.] + +[Footnote 688: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to Russell, June 25, +1862. He reported a general burning of cotton estimating the amount so +destroyed as nearly one million bales.] + +[Footnote 689: Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression that England +was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton disaster to the War. +Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was the general public belief +but not that of the well informed. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it +was not until January, 1863, that it was "begun to be understood" that +famine was not wholly caused by the War, but partly by glut.] + +[Footnote 690: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. Debate on "The +Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The principal speakers were +Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. Another debate on "The Cotton +Supply" took place June 19, 1862, with no criticism of America. _Ibid._, +CLXVII, pp. 754-93.] + +[Footnote 691: See _ante_, p. 12.] + +[Footnote 692: Gladstone Papers.] + +[Footnote 693: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to Russell, May 12, +1862. A description of these orders as inclusive of "foreign owned" +cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had been purchased and +stored, waiting export, by British citizens. Molyneaux at Savannah made +a similar report. _Ibid._, Vol. 849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.] + +[Footnote 694: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 214-18.] + +[Footnote 695: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 228, quotes a song in the +"improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where operatives were being given a +leisure-time education. One verse was: + + "Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are + the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by + English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war + is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for + more." +] + +[Footnote 696: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 1213.] + +[Footnote 697: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further +Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 1. +Reed. June 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 698: Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 699: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 352. The exact +length of Thouvenel's stay in London is uncertain, but he had arrived by +July 10 and was back in Paris by July 21. The text of the telegram is in +a letter to Flahault of July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very +averse to any move which may lead to war with America, "an adventure +more serious than that of Mexico" (_Ibid._, p. 353).] + +[Footnote 700: _Ibid._, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See also resume in +Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, II, 55.] + +[Footnote 701: Farnall's First Report. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, +_Commons_, Vol. XLIX.] + +[Footnote 702: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, 1862. + + "Public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for + the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not + be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from + the U.S. ..." + + "However, the real question of the day is cotton...." + + "The problem is of how to get over _this next_ winter. The + prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy." + + "...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton + for England before the winter, you will have done a greater + service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century; + but nobody expects it." +] + +[Footnote 703: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 166. To his son, July 18, +1862. He noted that the news had come by the _Glasgow_ which had sailed +for England on July 5, whereas the papers contained also a telegram from +McClellan's head-quarters, dated July 7, but "the people here are fully +ready to credit anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings +were "Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a +steamer." _Ibid._, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July 19.] + +[Footnote 704: Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract from the _Dubuque +Sun_, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a repudiation of all debts to +England, and solemnly held this up as evidence of the lack of financial +morality in America. If he knew of this the editor of the small-town +American paper must have been tickled at the reverberations of +his humour.] + +[Footnote 705: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, for the entire +debate.] + +[Footnote 706: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 707: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 168-9. To Charles +Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 708: Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's letter to +Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of +Napoleon III," _Am. Hist. Rev._, Jan., 1921, p. 263. C.F. Adams, "A +Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, p. +379, is in error in dating this letter April 21, an error for which the +present writer is responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult +hand-writing.] + +[Footnote 709: Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to Benjamin, July +25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned the details of +Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of July 20, wrote: +"There is an important part of our conversation that I will give you +through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London to +enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go to +London, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he could +guess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sent +to him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything on +Mexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to +France. In C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is +stated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of +Mercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result +of Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's +instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, while +it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it will +no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informed +Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as in +Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons at +their face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothing +in French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour, +while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it.] + +[Footnote 710: Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 711: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19.] + +[Footnote 712: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. +"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition." +No. 7.] + +[Footnote 713: _Ibid._, No. 8.] + +[Footnote 714: _Ibid._, No. 9.] + +[Footnote 715: See _ante_, p. 18.] + +[Footnote 716: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further +Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 2. +Russell to Stuart, July 28, 1862.] + +[Footnote 717: Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 718: Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.] + +[Footnote 719: Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, II, p. 276. July +31, 1862.] + +[Footnote 720: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 721: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. +"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition." +No. 10.] + +[Footnote 722: _Ibid._, No. 11.] + +[Footnote 723: Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, p. +191.] + +[Footnote 724: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177 _seq_.] + +[Footnote 725: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, 1862.] + +[Footnote 726: F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley to Russell, Aug. +8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, 1862. Mason to +Slidell, Aug. 21.] + +[Footnote 727: Richardson, II, p. 315.] + +[Footnote 728: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 729: _Ibid._, To Russell, Aug. 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 730: _Ibid._, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing to be done" refers, +not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July that the time was ripe +for recognition. He was wholly at variance with Lyons on +British policy.] + +[Footnote 731: Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 732: _Ibid._, Aug. 29, 1862.] + +[Footnote 733: Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.] + + + +CHAPTER XI + +RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN + +The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental +inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the +British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that +direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, +was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private +correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have +made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning +McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign +he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his +[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last +long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _The +Index_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and +necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared +rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of +England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close +sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to, +in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end +the chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognition +seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation +because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public +manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738]. + +The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are, +however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were +based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan +now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering +it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is +here proposed to review them in the light of all available important +materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more +citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell +the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of +British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great +Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the +American conflict[739]. + +Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18, +and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the +North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he +wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough +could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will +only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts. +The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this +very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure +governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the +South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but +ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British +neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's +fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward. +On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining +the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy +should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to +Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat +discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the +possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of +such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does +not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given +serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a +very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very +specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if +approached by the British Government with propositions implying +a purpose: + + "To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit + or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to + debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or + transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked + an opinion what reception the President would give to such a + proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not + instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it + would be entertained." + +This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction +with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams +was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote +Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with +the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you +will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]." + +This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any +intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully +committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the +need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now +knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he +held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He +did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the +Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that +the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the +presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not +have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made +owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation +and that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was as +yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell. + +Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their +determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from +Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier, +that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even +though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong +personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially +any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as +well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with +Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of +straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, +thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an +attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full +month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an +emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of +Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at +best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to +influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with +Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we +must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before +we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But +this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October +would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in +attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great +plan[751]. + +Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date +he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel, +_privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston +commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall +Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In +October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions +were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same +reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14: + + "The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even + Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the + Confederates." + + "If this should happen, would it not be time for us to + consider whether in such a state of things England and France + might not address the contending parties and recommend an + arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?" + +Russell replied: + + "... I agree with you that the time is come for offering + mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the + recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree + further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to + recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For + the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must + have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit + me for the meeting[755]." + +The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the +unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This, +considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by +Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a +long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation +as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to +wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier +apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the +Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party +gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far +committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set +aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France +might expect if they recognized the South. + + "I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation, + and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and + let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the + recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such + recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it." + + Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia. + + "...the French Government had some time back sounded that of + Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of + mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...." + + "It appears also that there is less public pressure here for + the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]." + +Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell +had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than +formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for +Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American +policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded +conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will, +if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still +more important. It was already known through the French press that a +sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all +signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude +Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to +discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to +go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently +in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26. + + "I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough + for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which + Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the + interval between this time and the middle of next month. + These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the + first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to + recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of + separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of + neutrality[757]." + +The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to +Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be +sent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone. +Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. +"She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said +that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed +was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just +returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of +the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe +would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759]. +Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the +plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to +include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might +probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait +for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go +slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America: + + "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the + north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great + effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a + great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and + the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other + hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and + see what may follow[760]...." + +Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in +Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not +been sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26 +indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on +September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for +his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for +an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out +in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and +now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being +"particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word +_separation_," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With +full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to +Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement +that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers, +but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the +Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact +nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly +worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by +Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is +outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade, +and negotiation on the basis of separation[765]. + +Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed +overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be +opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen +at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell +opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in +this wise: + + "...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition + of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid + drifting into it." + + "...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to + depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you + and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong + antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, + and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such + general approval from Parliament, the press, and the + public[766]." + +But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later +he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley: + + "I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it + decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to + do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it; + and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It + appears to me a great mistake[767]." + +Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived +confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a +check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the +battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland +campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old +defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for +McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for +an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and +was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European +overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell: + + "MY DEAR RUSSELL, + + "I return you Granville's letter which contains much + deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that + the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be + accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It + would give the South in principle the points for which they + are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come + from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the + principle for which they have been fighting so long as they + had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they + could carry their point. The condition of things therefore + which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be + great success of the South against the North. That state of + things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has + been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course + of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about + to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer + light upon future prospects. + + "As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns + following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the + South, it is quite true that we should have less to care + about that resentment in the spring when communication with + Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily + operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are + cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe. + + "But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time + by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would + probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like + one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would + render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the + acknowledgment of which would have caused it. + + "The first communication to be made by England and France to + the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of + mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not + come when it might be well for the two parties to consider + whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any + other result than separation; and whether it might not + therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must + necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at + once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of + separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of + the contest, however long it may last. + + "The best thing would be that the two parties should settle + details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps + with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this + might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would + do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An + armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades, + would be all in favour of the North, especially if New + Orleans remained in the hands of the North. + + "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be + cleared up by some more decided events between the contending + armies...." + + PALMERSTON[768]." + +Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour +of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's +arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much +more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall +Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted +to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also, +momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote: + + "This American question must be well sifted. I send you a + letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..." + + "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia + holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the + rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the + 16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day, + but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish + to stop it, write to Hammond[769]." + +From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that +Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed +private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was +waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so +his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French +Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any +other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal +retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several +Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into +retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The +Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the +last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as +soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a +serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was +more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of +previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773]. + +Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while +wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that +England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or +private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for +granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by +the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of +Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for +Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to +return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston: + + "I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the + very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest, + proposing to North and South to come to terms. + + "Two things however must be made clear: + + (i) That we propose separation, + + (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked + ourselves[775]." + +How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made +clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a +memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines +of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became +evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart, +written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a +suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell +now thought: + + "If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be + adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the + North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible + course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition + if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over + on the 25th[777]." + +British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign +Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and +vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side, +if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be +considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content +with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already +troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was +Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was +devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis +had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still +greater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at +first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the +intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line +earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. +His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was +certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental +action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early +recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure +is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth +is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in +complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from +Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any +hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention +in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make +the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did +not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not +yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the +traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without +authorization and "off his own bat." + +The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy, +immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general +belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw +cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them +to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be +no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other +hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone was +merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and +Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your +old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first +accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and +generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was +still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made +clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be +supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his +unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much +disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was +reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the +plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six +days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a +memorandum on America[782]. + +This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its +power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion +of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be +wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing +of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was +no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the +loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile +war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the +Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty +to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly +the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and +recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an +armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about +and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly +negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is +to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and +now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in +a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet +decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on +October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that +it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying +Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office +memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously +maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan +of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his +speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition. + +Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he +treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the +Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground +of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his +arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet +acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was +his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must +acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be +undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when +it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of +international law that the independence of the Southern States had been +established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet +decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet +traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but +excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had +forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose +and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile +Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in +uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult, +indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was +done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby +was averse to action. + + "He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_ + recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the + ground that recognition would merely irritate the North + without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a + single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present + temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the + mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair + basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having + that which the other declared was vitally essential to its + existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out + the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of + the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant + to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of + hostility towards the North[789]." + +More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess, +fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was +Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his +male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet +crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after +Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis +circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He +agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in +America, but added with sarcasm: + + "A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the + historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war + should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between + the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any + proposal of the English Government will be made, not by + dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent + partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal + indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it + would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it + is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be + addressed." + +Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was +intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument +against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of +bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the +belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the +only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for +the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary +and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict +neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as +yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable +consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we +may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the +chances of good, and whether it is not-- + + 'Better to endure the ills we have + Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'" + +At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on +the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received +at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British +special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States. +Anderson's reports emphasized three points: + +(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of +ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed; + +(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing +cotton for a long time to come; + +(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of +vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met +with enthusiasm[792]. + +This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for +Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on +Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still +argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm +and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition +"would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now +heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged +to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the +ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was +the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with +an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons +gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the +extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without +Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for +the immediate present, writing to Russell: + + "Your description of the state of things between the two + parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much + inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no + step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition + with any advantage." + + * * * * * + + "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position + would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree + to an armistice but whether they might not turn their + thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the + answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The + Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement + would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say + their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North + of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and + should only have pledged each party more strongly to the + object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined + to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the + Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am + very much come back to our original view of the matter, that + we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall + have taken a more decided turn[796]." + +By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet +to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a +few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell +still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the +majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was +possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that +Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding +and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon +of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the +speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and +was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change +its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared +to Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain and +has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams' +confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently +unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead +to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require +any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side +Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an +outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe +and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as +insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the +preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his +approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of +"no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted +it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the +belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the +winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]." + +This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently +had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of +Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the +twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put +it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the +present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...." + + "G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never + thought of making. He says I propose that England and France + and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to + suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal. + + "I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and + England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would + not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any + specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G. + Lewis' invention. + + "I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is + much pleased[802]." + +Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by +England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five +powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired +a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the +informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in +answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly +interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in +contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The +advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted, +was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved this +advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer to +Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite +plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by +letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave +notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also +circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England, +France and Russia[804]. + +Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his +Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely +putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member +of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on +October 24 wrote to Lewis: + + "Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American + question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny + [Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is + prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in + his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for + yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to + your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position + we should occupy, either in having presented our face + gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in + being asked what practical solution we had to propose after + an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no + discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the + Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to + draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]." + +On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's +newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again: + + "The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable + soreness, for which you are specially bound to make + allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He + had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out + of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was + not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is + therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a + deal more training before he can appear in public again." + + * * * * * + + "I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as + effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by + Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the + Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did + so without in the smallest degree committing either the + Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]." + +In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's +complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but +there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which, +if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question. +This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect +overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an +opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon +as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was +written the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's +silence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the +succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion +of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition" +was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should +not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show +pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to +the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and +his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question. + +On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which +American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and +Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had +no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a +proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the +present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported +that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an +end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not +be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to +America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and +France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was +exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if +officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed +consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been +going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push. +October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the +Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an +armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had +now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's +orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in +England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three +powers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspension +of the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to European +commerce[812]. + +Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not +regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell: + + "As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States, + we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets, + which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as + would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is + it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to + be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would + give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they + may want?" + + * * * * * + + "Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of + runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal + which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England + would approve of. The French Government are more free from + the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these + matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would + be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over + before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to + put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning + by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from + that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]." + +But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of +proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston: + + "My notion is that as there is little chance of our good + offices being accepted in America we should make them such as + would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to + answer the French proposal therefore by saying, + + "That in offering our good offices we ought to require both + parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any + terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the + Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there + are any terms upon which both would consent to separate. + + "We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it + would be essential in our view, that after what has taken + place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation + being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain + emancipated her slaves in 1833. + + "If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of + slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil. + + "This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the + Cabinet. + + "It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and + probably the South will refuse it[814]." + +Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and +South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them +certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to +present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the +previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom +of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of +the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of +Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, +again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another +memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. +This was in the main an historical resume of past British policy in +relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such +cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a +revolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on. +Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by +legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own +interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn +the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had +previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a +concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the +five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to +set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to +satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first +to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on +the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might +find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]? + +Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its +appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international +law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there +appeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus," on "The +International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form +exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and +advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality. +"Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter +who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all +trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature +action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the +"Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]." + +Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis +was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer +was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days +the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis +described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that +Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the +effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French +proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not +cause irritation[819]." + + "Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain + his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the + recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable + opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen + their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, + Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with + France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of + separating France and England. He therefore advised that the + proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed + Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal. + His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy + with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of + mitigating it [_sic_]. + + "The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who + proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a + stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who + supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who + expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the + proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a + suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly + unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was + no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, + Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was + against being a party to the representation, and he + capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it + certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the + Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had + been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular + sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation, + and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came + rather late ... I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_ + at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of + the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He + admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from + Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of + displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive + was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article + in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I + take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of + the Cabinet[820]." + +Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief +account: + + "Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again + to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the + business of America. But I will send you definite + intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right._ + Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well. + Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without + resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we + decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in + terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov. + 13. I think the French will make our answer about America + public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not + take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may + themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur + with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to + Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]." + +The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France +and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views +and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be +taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but +remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia +wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to +hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any +overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its +being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of +Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though +earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to +the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. +Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer +to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason +for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision +within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded +England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion, +adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result +reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view +than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at +the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to +the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it +smoother[824]." + +Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet +decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country +against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important +journals are taken into account but not true of all. The _Times_ of +November 13 declared: + + "We are convinced that the present is not the moment for + these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that + by means of their own internal action the Americans may + themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe + could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it + would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our + self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with + Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on + turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with + the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our + back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in + defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are + as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty + or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as + this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia + belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor + of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits + in this American mediation league." + +This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English +statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in +such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On +the other hand the _Herald_, always intense in its pro-Southern +utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself +unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively +informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to +them," the _Herald_ declared, "we must hope against hope that they are +innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire +(depicted in lurid colours): + + "A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon + them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and + delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the + task before them and the power to perform it in their + hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven + cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country, + dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might + do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the + infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?" + +In the non-political _Army and Navy Gazette_ the returned editor, W.H. +Russell, but lately the _Times_ correspondent in America, jeered at the +American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of +England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York +Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and +threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must +expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be +ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. _Blackwood's_ for +November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. +The _Edinburgh_ for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry +and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of +the war. _The Index_ naturally frothed in angry disappointment, +continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial +decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or +the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might +contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his +country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the _Richmond_ (Virginia) +_Whig_ was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as +"two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in +America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and +expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North +and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation, +said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous +fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the +bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year +following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a +statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was +primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of +Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never +shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of +these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than +useless[832]." + +_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet +Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed, +wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the +only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the +Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been +led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so +much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's +attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at +last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer +to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on +American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was +of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a +plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment, +save to his correspondent. + +In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the +public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new +policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when +the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America. +Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives" +were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it +would only do harm until there was a change of Government in +Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation +useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and +that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the +blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837]. +Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of +conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in +comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern +arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a +single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838]. +In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and +England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British +feeling[839]. + +The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of +European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It +expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to +animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally +responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no +cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific +instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to +present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward +believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He +wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession +intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget +them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by +Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to +the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that +answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that +Great Britain intended no change of policy[841]. + +So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed +to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for +immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, +that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his +return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening +the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on +by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and +directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the +tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his +resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused +both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control +which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy +"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much +more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man +more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years +ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell +wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a +remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward +had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in +the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone" +being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief +in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities. + +Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a +polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of +armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The +projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed +destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the +British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South +was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some +time come when European recognition would have to be given the +Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of +the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the +attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their +sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in +evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the +expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations +_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result +in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised +good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though +personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in +the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which +determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw +his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover +both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as +the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were +brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true +policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844]. + +For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous +crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been +adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that +Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued +between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other +respects the independence of the South would have been established. +Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of +life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed +that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to +servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that +proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against +any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there +serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil +War[845]. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March +16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a +purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the +Confederacy.] + +[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.] + +[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report +of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his +speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to +England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not +come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends. +(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they +are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't +say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I +am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."] + +[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much +length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F. +Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his +_Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp. +400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis +in Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp. +372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion +of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.] + +[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.] + +[Footnote 741: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp. +165-168.] + +[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. First +printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.] + +[Footnote 743: _Ibid._, p. 390.] + +[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32.] + +[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.] + +[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. +Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the +newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on +consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only +make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next +spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21, +1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer +of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open +the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before +leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on +mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager +for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the +other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to +yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right +(_Ibid._, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).] + +[Footnote 748: _Ibid._, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.] + +[Footnote 749: _Ibid._, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, +Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely +political."] + +[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a +letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an +accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the +war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).] + +[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes +the date of Russell's letter.] + +[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360.] + +[Footnote 755: _Ibid._, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This +is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to +mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.] + +[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.] + +[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.] + +[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.] + +[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.] + +[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.] + +[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.] + +[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.] + +[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the +exact text paraphrased by Morley.] + +[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire +letter. Sept. 27, 1862.] + +[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes +much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the +Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that +she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to +Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have +counted for little.] + +[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is +printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.] + +[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, +(1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering +good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much +importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of +success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in +which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed +likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just +ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the +action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay +it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political +necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian +Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.) +Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter +from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow +expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to +introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the +differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This +seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to +Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of +extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. +3, 1862 (O.S.).)] + +[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, pp. 438-9.] + +[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.] + +[Footnote 773: _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.] + +[Footnote 774: Even the _Edinburgh Review_ for October, 1862, discussed +recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against +such action.] + +[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for +the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to +postpone. This study reverses the roles.] + +[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see _ante_ p. 41. Stuart to Lyons. +The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.] + +[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862. +Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.] + +[Footnote 778: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 79. Morley calls this +utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who +himself later so characterized it.] + +[Footnote 779: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 402.] + +[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc. +_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a +Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation +proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a +wise measure.] + +[Footnote 781: The _Times_, October 9 and 10, while surprised that +Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as +equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the _Times_ makes no +further comment of moment until November 13. The _Morning Post_ +(regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October +9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much +laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but _with no mention whatever_ of +his utterances on America.] + +[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that +he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom +he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words +(Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must +allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all +speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a +nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the +Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very +topic" _(Ibid.)_] + +[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts +of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September +22, and an extract from the _National Intelligencer_ of September 26, +giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.] + +[Footnote 784: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 80, narrates the "tradition." +Walpole, _Twenty-five Years_, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also +_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an +anonymous writer in the _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact +details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in +Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams, +_Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, Ch. III, repeats the tradition, +but in _A Crisis in Downing Street_ he completely refutes his earlier +opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter, +especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted +solely on his own initiative.] + +[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the _Edinburgh_, for April, 1861, Lewis +had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never +to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer +the South.] + +[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 407.] + +[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized +Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice. +Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to +Lewis' speech. Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, +Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think +this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of +the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. _Ibid._, p. 267.] + +[Footnote 788: _The Index_, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of +Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy, +asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly +interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter +enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord +Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to _The Index_, was the evil +genius of the Government.] + +[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 790: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 279.] + +[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 792: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. I XII. +"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North +America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. +Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British +subjects into the Northern Army.] + +[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.] + +[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's +organ, the _Morning Post_, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with +a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also +reflected upon, but less severely.] + +[Footnote 797: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.] + +[Footnote 798: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. +Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in _A Crisis in Downing +Street_, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was +"to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive +assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.] + +[Footnote 799: _The Index_, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are +starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry +have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, +talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and +wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."] + +[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 801: _Ibid._, To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."] + +[Footnote 804: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84. Morley was the first to make +clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto +accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a +resume of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October +23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally +agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also +"complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends +in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important +interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this +was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's _France and the Confederate Navy_, +p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation +proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes' +supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to +Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is +evidently erroneous.] + +[Footnote 805: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.] + +[Footnote 806: _Ibid._, p. 266.] + +[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862. +Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.] + +[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.] + +[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 810: F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28, +1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de +Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France +approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed +that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America, +she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and +was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary +effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation +Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral +support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No. +320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and +was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to +limit his efforts to approval of any _agreement_ by the North and South +to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as +Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North +and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some +friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending +parties themselves to begin direct negotiations (_Ibid._, F.O. to +Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)] + +[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's +full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.] + +[Footnote 812: F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither +party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell +Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley, _Gladstone_, II, +84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation." +There was no renewal for this was the _first_ proposal, and it was not +one of mediation though that was an implied result.] + +[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was +the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.] + +[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.] + +[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the +additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.] + +[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case +of the _Trent_, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they +were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: _Letters by +Historicus on some questions of International Law_, London, 1863.] + +[Footnote 817: The _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.] + +[Footnote 818: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch +respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. +13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see _ante_, +p. 59, _note_ 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that +the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to +join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article +on his overtures that had appeared in the _Journal de Petersbourg_, and +thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian +Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)] + +[Footnote 820: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is +dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to +be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11 +and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined +on the latter date. The article in the _Times_, referred to by Lewis, +appeared on Nov. 13.] + +[Footnote 821: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85.] + +[Footnote 822: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. +"Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, +Nov. 13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 823: F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The +same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the +French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia +would take no chances of offending the North. _Ibid._, No. 408.] + +[Footnote 824: Morley, _Gladstone_, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862. +Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry +due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it +was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because +of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of +a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that +_ten_ Southerners had been executed because of _one_ Northerner seized +by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a +series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W." +(Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if +Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, +"I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This +is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be +pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French +proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of +the South.] + +[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.] + +[Footnote 826: The _Times_, Nov. 15, 1862.] + +[Footnote 827: The _Herald_, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by +Hotze of _The Index_, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying +to earn his salary.] + +[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's +editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that +the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he +was _constantly_ pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in _A +Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 14l.] + +[Footnote 829: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.] + +[Footnote 830: _Ibid._, Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.] + +[Footnote 831: _Ibid._, Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.] + +[Footnote 832: _Ibid._, May 28, 1863, p. 72.] + +[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.] + +[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This +despatch is not in Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, +and illustrates the gaps in that publication.] + +[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.] + +[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a +banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it. +_The Ottawa Sun_, Nov. 16, 1904.] + +[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington, +Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and +France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the +South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office: +"What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports +were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought +England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge +that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be +merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This +would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her +special relationship with the United States. He was against any _joint_ +European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862, +No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve +son opinion tres sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the +latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell +had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's +refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised +(_Ibid._, to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).] + +[Footnote 838: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1832, _Commons_, Vol. LXXII, +"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North +America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had +been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt +that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38. +Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.] + +[Footnote 839: F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons, +Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to +Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and +jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the +North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to +Southern dislike."] + +[Footnote 840: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow +was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern +confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts +with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the +Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and +judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so +that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. _Ibid._, +p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He +wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the +American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec. +12, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.] + +[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.] + +[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell +expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement +that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United +States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed +her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and +understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason +for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, +1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow +knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.] + +[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as +the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will +be shown.] + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION + +The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relative +to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the moment +though time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full of +suggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from France +since that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with the +United States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the same +view, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon +III, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon +dictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in +courteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended +recognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached +Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _New +York Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt this +would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained in +French-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons was +disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise his +Government to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made no +comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that the +Settlement of the Contest should be made without the intervention +of England." + +A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiring +to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone, +or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to the +North[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary of +war, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did not +think that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions; +but he was somewhat suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite +forget that Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to +Richmond together last Spring[850]." The day after this despatch was +written Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on +February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet polite +language, but positively declining the proposal[851]. Evidently Lyons +was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, Napoleon's overture +to America was officially stated to be unobjectionable, as indeed was +required by the implications of the reply of November 13, to France. +Russell, on February 14, answered Lyons' communications in a letter +marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the Queen": + + "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at + present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer + good offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would + feel no jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part + of France alone[852]." + +The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France had +already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate any +governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations with France +on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the case and became +increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's despatch to Lyons of +February 14 appears rather to be evidence of the effect of the debates +in Parliament when its sessions were resumed on February 5, for in both +Lords and Commons there was given a hearty and nearly unanimous support +of the Government's decision to make no overture for a cessation of the +conflict in America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions +of mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had +practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action by +neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be fully +prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and strict +neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved strict neutrality +but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle speech and sharply +attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable policy--merely a party +speech. Russell upheld the Government's decision but went out of his way +to assert that the entire subjugation of the South would be a calamity +to the United States itself, since it would require an unending use of +force to hold the South in submission[853]. Later, when news of the +French offer at Washington had been received, the Government was +attacked in the Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord +Campbell, on the ground of a British divergence from close relations +with France. Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that +the time had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show +the possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis +that recognition of the South could justly be regarded by the North as +an "unfriendly act[854]." + +Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in America, +basing this attitude on neutral duty and national interests, and with +barely a reference to the new policy of the North toward slavery, +declared in the emancipation proclamations of September 22, 1862, and +January 1, 1863, Had these great documents then no favourable influence +on British opinion and action? Was the Northern determination to root +out the institution of slavery, now clearly announced, of no effect in +winning the favour of a people and Government long committed to a world +policy against that institution? It is here necessary to review early +British opinion, the facts preceding the first emancipation +proclamation, and to examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln. + +Before the opening of actual military operations, while there was still +hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been with the North +on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as against a slave-owning +society. But war once begun the disturbance to British trade interests +and Lincoln's repeated declarations that the North had no intention of +destroying slavery combined to offer an excuse and a reason for an +almost complete shift of British opinion. The abolitionists of the North +and the extreme anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in +number in both countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause +of the war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by +thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct bearing on +the position of Great Britain when the war was concluded. In May, 1861, +Palmerston declared that it would be a happy day when "we could succeed +in putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of our +North American cousins," but added that the difficulty for England was +that "_We_ could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment of +slavery[855]...." + +Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, indeed, a +perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to the final +outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken for granted. +Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon largely +disappeared from British discussion and in its place there cropped out, +here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as to whether the war +could long continue without a "servile insurrection," with all its +attendant horrors. + +On July 6, 1861, the _Economist_, reviewing the progress of the war +preparations to date, asserted that it was universally agreed no +restoration of the Union was possible and answered British fears by +declaring it was impossible to believe that even the American madness +could contemplate a servile insurrection. The friendly _Spectator_ also +discussed the matter and repeatedly. It was a mistaken idea, said this +journal, that there could be no enfranchisement without a slave rising, +but should this occur, "the right of the slave to regain his freedom, +even if the effort involve slaughter, is as clear as any other +application of the right of self-defence[856]." Yet English +abolitionists should not urge the slave to act for himself, since "as +war goes on and all compromise fails the American mind will harden under +the white heat and determine that the _cause_ of all conflict must +cease." That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern +denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet +Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to her as +clear as anything in reason[857]. She had no patience with English +anti-slavery people who believed Northern protestations, and she did +not express concern over the horrors of a possible servile insurrection. +Nevertheless this spectre was constantly appearing. Again the +_Spectator_ sought to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed +that even such a contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of +the slave-power in the South[858]. + +Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument which +pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the bulk of the +British press was constant in holding up this bogie to its readers, even +going to the point of weakening its argument of the impossibility of a +Northern conquest of the South by appealing to history to show that +England in her two wars with America had had a comparatively easy time +in the South, thus postulating the real danger of some "negro Garibaldi +calling his countrymen to arms[859]." Nor was this fear merely a +pretended one. It affected all classes and partisans of both sides. Even +official England shared in it; January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The +question is rapidly tending towards the issue either of peace and a +recognition of the separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the +raising of a servile insurrection[860]." At nearly the same time +Russell, returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden, +expressed his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation, +meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been since +the revival of letters[861]." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic +which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able examination of +the underlying causes and probable results of the American conflict, +excused the Northern leaders for early denial of a purpose to attack +slavery, but expressed complete confidence that even these leaders by +now understood the "almost certain results of success in the present +conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and prophesied that "if the +writers who so severely criticize the present moderation of the +Free-soilers are desirous to see the war become an abolition war, it is +probable that if the war lasts long enough they will be gratified[862]." +John Bright, reaching a wider public, in speech after speech, expressed +faith that the people of the North were "marching on, as I believe, to +its [slavery's] entire abolition[863]." + +Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition war," and +believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, feared the same +development; friends of the North pushed aside the thought of a "negro +terror," yet even while hoping and declaring that the war would destroy +slavery, could not escape from apprehensions of an event that appeared +inevitable. Everywhere, to the British mind, it seemed that emancipation +was necessarily a provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief +largely affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact +almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing. + +Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation weaken +this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great advocate of +abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake was Charles +Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He early +took the ground that a proclamation everywhere emancipating the slaves +would give to the Northern cause a moral support hitherto denied it in +Europe and would at the same time strike a blow at Southern resistance. +This idea was presented in a public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts, +in October, 1861, but even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him +mistaken and his expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he +found at Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date +Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with +Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal activities +for their realization were well known to English friends, as in his +letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English public in general +through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long been a well-known figure +in the British press[864]. + +Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous utterance in +the 'fifties that the United States could not indefinitely continue to +exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in 1861, disapproved and recalled +the orders of some of the military leaders, like Fremont, who without +authority had sought to extend emancipation to slaves within the lines +of their command. But as early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual +emergence of emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that +wise "border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the +slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union and +to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the time was +ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the gradual approach +through legislation and administrative act. In February, 1862, a Bill +was under discussion in Congress, called the "Confiscation Bill," which, +among other clauses, provided that all slaves of persons engaged in +rebellion against the United States, who should by escape, or capture, +come into the possession of the military forces of the United States, +should be for ever free; but that this provision should not be operative +until the expiration of sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity +to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves[865]. This measure did +not at first have Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the +loyalists of the border states. Nevertheless he realized the growing +strength of anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with +it where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object +of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred in a +measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, freeing the +slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where there was no +question of the constitutional power of the national Government. + +From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation +proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict +between Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation. +Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadily +toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery in +the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation. +Neither party spoke the word "servile insurrection," yet both realized +its possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see and +use it as a threat. A brief summary of measures will indicate the +contest. March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that a +joint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national +Government to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed +purpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in the +hope that this might influence the Southern states[866]. Neither the +House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to this +resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but it +passed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved by +Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme radical element in Congress +had yielded, momentarily, to the President's insistence on an +olive-branch offering of compensated emancipation. Both as regards the +border states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was +determined to give this line of policy a trial. The prevailing +sentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive Confiscation +Bill. + +At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department of the +South," which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina, +Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in these +states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln immediately countermanded +Hunter's order, stating that such action "under my responsibility, I +reserve to myself[867]." He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnest +appeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by the +Congressional resolution of April 10. In truth, border state attitude +was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary +emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan. +Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation +Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his +signature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify that +fact to Congress until July 17._ On this same day of signature, July 12, +Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in +voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the +congressional representatives of the border states seeking their +definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority were +emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect the +border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire to +free the slaves even if compensated[868]. + +Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forced +toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the Confiscation +Bill. On the day following his failure to win the border state +representatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him, +that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issue +of a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within the +competence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered a +few objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more than +listen to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned +on July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of an +emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of which +referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would be +rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their +allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of a +gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning that +for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipation +of slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved except +Blair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching November +elections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicated +purpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recent +military disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The +measure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of an +exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth +its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to +the government. It will be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat." +He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern victory. This +appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside, +waiting for victory[871]." + +Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at Antietam, +and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. Five days later, +September 22, Lincoln issued the proclamation, expanded and altered in +text from the draft of July 22, but in substance the same[872]. The +loyal border states were not to be affected, but the proclamation +renewed the promise of steps to be taken to persuade them to voluntary +action. On January 1, 1863, a second proclamation, referring to that of +September 22, was issued by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested +as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time +of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the +United States...." The states affected were designated by name and all +persons held as slaves within them "are, and henceforward shall be, +free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to +abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence...." "And +upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by +the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate +judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God[873]." + +Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical Sumner began +his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when Lincoln's pledge of +emancipation was made. Did these steps indicate, as British opinion +unquestionably held, an intention to rouse a servile insurrection? Was +the Confiscation Bill passed with that purpose in view and had Lincoln +decided to carry it into effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is, +indeed, the great marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in +England only, but in America also. It was the expectation of the North +and the constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the +_purpose_ of the emancipation proclamation? + +This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American +historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to motives +at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are made to cover +nearly the entire argument for emancipation in September, 1862, but in +just what manner the military prowess of the North was to be increased +was not at first indicated. In 1864, Lincoln declared that after the +failure of successive efforts to persuade the border states to accept +compensated emancipation he had believed there had arrived the +"indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the +blacks[874]." Repeatedly in later defence of the proclamation he urged +the benefits that had come from his act and asserted that commanders in +the field "believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured +troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion[875]." He +added: "negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do +anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their +lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the +promise of freedom." + +There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor did +Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his mind, +though the thought of such possible result must have been present--was, +indeed, present to most minds even without a proclamation of +emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply to draw away slaves, +wherever possible, from their rebellious masters, thus reducing the +economic powers of resistance of the South, and then to make these +ex-slaves directly useful in winning the war. But after the war, even +here and there during it, a theory was advanced that an impelling motive +with the President had been the hope of influencing favourably foreign +governments and peoples by stamping the Northern cause with a high moral +purpose. In popular opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a +far-visioned statesman in anticipating that which ultimately came to +pass. This has important bearing on the relations of the United States +and Great Britain. + +There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had believed in +1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize strongly with the +North. The event did not prove this to be the case, nor could the North +justly complain in the face of administration denials of an anti-slavery +purpose. The English Government therefore was widely upheld by British +opinion in regarding the struggle from the point of view of British +interests. Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of +slavery compelled British governmental consideration. As early as +December, 1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported +a conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that the +South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade[876]. This was +limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which in +substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition that +Southern agents in England found it hard to explain[877]. As already +noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even after +Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the American +rupture[878]. By September, 1861, John Bright was writing to his friend +Sumner that, all indications to the contrary, England would warmly +support the North if only it could be shown that emancipation was an +object[879]. Again and again he urged, it is interesting to note, just +those ideals of gradual and compensated emancipation which were so +strongly held by Lincoln. In this same month the _Spectator_ thought it +was "idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all +disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause +rather than at the effect[880]." Three weeks later the _Spectator_, +reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as follows: + + "If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think you + madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of + Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in + holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud + your worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set + forth continually that you have forfeited all claim to the + _popular_ sympathy of England." + +This, said the _Spectator_, had been stated in the most objectionable +style by the _Times_ in particular, which, editorially, had alleged that +"the North has now lost the chance of establishing a high moral +superiority by a declaration against slavery." To all this the +_Spectator_ declared that the North must adopt the bold course and make +clear that restoration of the Union was not intended with the old canker +at its roots[881]. + +Official England held a different view. Russell believed that the +separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction of slavery +since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great and prosperous +free North, with a population united in ideals, would be forced, +ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He professed that he could +not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the war and thought she and +Sumner "animated by a spirit of vengeance[882]." If the South did yield +and the Union were restored _with_ slavery, Russell thought that +"Slavery would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish +for separation[883]." These views were repeated frequently by Russell. +He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, but was +careful to state, "I give you these views merely as speculations," and +it is worthy of note that after midsummer of 1862 he rarely indulged in +them. Against such speculations, whether by Russell or by others, Mill +protested in his famous article in _Fraser's_, February, 1862[884]. + +On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did so. +Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search off the +African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression of the +African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by Great Britain +but persistently refused by the United States. It could not well be +declined now by the British Government and was signed by Seward, April +8, 1862[885], but if he expected any change in British attitude as a +result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South of that trade might +be a barrier to British goodwill, but the action of the North was viewed +as but a weak attempt to secure British sympathy, and to mark the limits +of Northern anti-slavery efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager +for the treaty on other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any +interest in the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have +done ... they have done grudgingly and imperfectly[886]." + +This was written at the exact period when Palmerston and Russell were +initiating those steps which were to result in the Cabinet crisis on +mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly the Slave Trade treaty +with America had not influenced governmental attitude. At this juncture +there was founded, November, 1862, the London Emancipation Society, with +the avowed object of stirring anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against +"favouring the South." But George Thompson, its organizer, had been +engaged in the preliminary work of organization for some months and the +Society is therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group +who were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause +and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's +proclamation[887]. Thus for England as a whole and for official England +the declarations of these few voices were regarded as expressive of a +wish rather than as consistent with the facts. The moral uplift of an +anti-slavery object was denied to the North. + +This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by the +emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for so +believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times, though +rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, American Minister +at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September 14, 1861, strongly +urging the declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war and +asserting that public opinion in Europe would then be such in favour of +the North that no government would "dare to place itself, by declaration +or act, upon the side of a universally condemned institution[888]." +There is no evidence that Seward showed this despatch to Lincoln, but in +January, 1862, Schurz returned to America and in conversation with the +President urged the "moral issue" to prevent foreign intervention. The +President replied: "You may be right. Probably you are. I have been +thinking so myself. I cannot imagine that any European power would dare +to recognize and aid the Southern Confederacy if it became clear that +the Confederacy stands for slavery and the Union for freedom[889]." No +doubt others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign +friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the +North[890], and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work +in the spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue." +The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant +proclamation of Northern _intention_ to free the slaves[891]. +Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner +pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition arguments +which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign effect. On the +general question of emancipation Lincoln listened, even telling Sumner +that he "was ahead of himself only a month or six weeks[892]." + +Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, 1862, when +strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the President to issue a +general proclamation of emancipation, he reasserted in the famous reply +to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one single purpose to restore the Union +"with or without slavery." + + "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they + could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree + with them. + + "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they + could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree + with them. + + "_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to + save or to destroy slavery_[893]." + +Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown +to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed +in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presented +abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later, +September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had +an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid +stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was but +nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied +much as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede that +Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are +incited by something more than ambition[894]." Immediately after the +event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party, +Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is +now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take +action upon it[895]." Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual +message to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign +countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt +mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896]. + +Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been +convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation. +On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_ +the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lain +the true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was now +for "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." After +all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the +President's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this +entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation +Bill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to the +Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile +insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At +times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at +times not. + +Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal to +Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could not +state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had been met with +what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as unjustifiable +declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the conflict Lyons and +Mercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by the +American war upon the economic interests of their respective countries. +Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Seward +kept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the raw +cotton. He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans, +but the results were disappointing. As time went on Seward became +convinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude and +action of Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand +in the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when the +war was over _provided_ the war did not take on an uncivilized and +sanguinary character through a rising of the slaves. If that occurred +cotton would be burned and destroyed and cotton supply to Europe would +be not merely a matter of temporary interruption, but one of +long-continued dearth with no certainty of early resumption. Fearing the +growth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward +threatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not +so much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the +material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign +attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the +winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of servile +insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for fear it would +cause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent. + +His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In February, 1862, +the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in Congress. In April, +Mercier's trip to Richmond[897] had caused much speculation and started +many rumours in London of plans of mediation[898]. On May 28, Seward +wrote to Adams at great length and especially emphasized two points: +first that while diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from +discussing slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to +state that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression +of slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign +nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war, +Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all European +interests[899]...." A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell on +June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query about +mediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adams +perfectly understood Seward's policy. + +On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipation +proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Seward +commented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all its +bearings before committing himself[901]. The day following he +transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced into +Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensated +emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sent +the Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that this +method and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with his +theory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than would +an outright proclamation of emancipation. + +Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British +neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he had +learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon +"take new ground[903]." This despatch if it reached Seward previous to +the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of +the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet, +Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that +he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a +Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton's +notes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to prevent +the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton.... We break up our +relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty +years[904]." These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed +action. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams +covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which, +fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it there +was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the +South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Seward +was clinging to his theory of correct policy. + +Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmental +circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the day before +Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewing +military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening +the South is included a servile war[906]." To this Russell replied: "... +I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make +other nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating and +destructive conflict[907]." This was but brief reiteration of a more +exact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward's first hint of +servile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been +given to Russell on June 20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's +arguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the American +conflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote: + + "The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr. + Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another + element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of + property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a + country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908]." + +In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the +Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart +presented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909]. On August +22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as purely a +manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign +governments[910]. Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward, +since he also reported the latter's success in postponing the +proclamation? + +In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in the +light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both believed such +an event would add to the argument for foreign intervention. The +_threat_ Seward had regarded as useful; the _event_ would be highly +dangerous to the North. Not so, however, did emancipation appear in +prospect to American diplomats abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in +attempting to carry out the ideas and plans of his chief, but as early +as February, 1862, he had urged a Northern declaration in regard to +slavery in order to meet in England Southern private representations +that, independence won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual +emancipation to be applied "to all persons born after some specific +date[911]." Motley, at Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in +private letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step on +slavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into the +selected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far more +important was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month after +he had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward, +to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention +would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object in +the war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offer +of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery such +mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an end +to the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen the +Northern position abroad[913]. + +This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it was +assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on July 24, +Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote to +Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not be +encouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northern +attempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousand +times No," and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September +25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring that +for Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not +scarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but +know what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the +Government[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree with +Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when the +day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. On +that day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief. +The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach of +which he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad," and +he laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation +was to convince the South that its true interests were in the +preservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was +the return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was far +from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward's +first thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrection +he must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment was +improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained with vigour, the "high +moral purpose" argument as evinced in the emancipation proclamation. +"The interests of humanity," he wrote to Adams, "have now become +identified with the cause of our country[918]...." + +That the material interests of Great Britain were still in Seward's +thought is shown by the celerity with which under Lincoln's orders he +grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to liberated slaves. Stuart +wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, secretary of the colony of +British Guiana, was coming from Demerara to Washington to secure +additional labour for the British colony by offering to carry away +ex-slaves[919]. This scheme was no secret and five days after the issue +of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a convention by which the +British Government would be permitted to transport to the West Indies, +or to any of its colonies, the negroes about to be emancipated. On +September 30, Adams was instructed to take up the matter at London[920]. +Russell was at first disinclined to consider such a convention and +discussion dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed, +this time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate +influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the +attitude of the British Government[921]. + +To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matter +for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at once +convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it be +remembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted, save +by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt extending even to bitter +opposition and that British governmental and public opinion had long +dreaded a servile insurrection--even of late taking its cue from +Seward's own prophecies--the cool reception given by the Government, the +vehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem so +surprising. "This Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September +23, "seems a brutum fulmen[922]." One of the President's motives, he +thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no +pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a +Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct encouragement +to servile insurrections[923]." Received in England during the Cabinet +struggle over mediation the proclamation appears not to have affected +that controversy, though Russell sought to use it as an argument for +British action. In his memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove +to show that the purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both +on the horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry: + + "What will be the practical effect of declaring emancipation, + not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed by the + Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and + retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile + community, it is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms + of the United States penetrate, a premium will be given to + acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge. The + military and naval authorities of the United States will be + bound by their orders to maintain and protect the + perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the + Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be + disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors + of land alike reduced to beggary[924]." + +The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating the +proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one situation in +the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. Citations setting +forth such comment have frequently been gathered together illustrative +of the extent of press condemnation and of its unity in vicious +editorials[925]. There is no need to repeat many of them here, but a few +will indicate their tone. The _Times_ greeted the news with an assertion +that this was a final desperate play by Lincoln, as hope of victory +waned. It was his "last card[926]," a phrase that caught the fancy of +lesser papers and was repeated by them. October 21, appeared the +"strongest" of the _Times_ editorials: + +[Illustration: ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR. _Reproduced +by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_] + + "... We have here the history of the beginning of the end, + but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet + to be filled before the inevitable separation is + accomplished? Are scenes like those which we a short time + since described from Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the + reign of the last PRESIDENT to go out amid horrible massacres + of white women and children, to be followed by the + extermination of the black race in the South? Is LINCOLN yet + a name not known to us as it will be known to posterity, and + is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue of + monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind? + + "... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to + what the consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be, + except that it certainly will not have the effect of + restoring the Union. It will not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the + distinctive affix which he will share with many, for the most + part foolish and incompetent, Kings and Emperors, Caliphs and + Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the Last.'" + +The _Times_ led the way; other papers followed on. The _Liverpool Post_ +thought a slave rising inevitable[927], as did also nearly every paper +acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or professedly neutral, while +even pro-Northern journals at first feared the same results[928]. +Another striking phrase, "Brutum Fulmen," ran through many editorials. +The _Edinburgh Review_ talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair[929]," which +was little different from Seward's feared "last shriek." _Blackwood's_ +thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, devilish." It "justifies +the South in raising the black flag, and proclaiming a war without +quarter[930]." But there is no need to expand the citation of the +well-nigh universal British press pouring out of the wrath of heaven +upon Lincoln, and his emancipation proclamation[931]. + +Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at first +expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is apparent that here +and there a part of this British wrath was due to a fear that, in spite +of denials of such influence, the proclamation was intended to arouse +public opinion against projects of intervention and _might so arouse +it_. The New York correspondent of the _Times_ wrote that it was +"promulgated evidently as a sop to keep England and France quiet[932]," +and on October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very +important object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition +cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro or +the South, but at Europe." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_ believed that it +was now "the imperative duty of England and France to do what they can +in order to prevent the possible occurrence of a crime which, if carried +out, would surpass in atrocity any similar horror the world has ever +seen[933]." "Historicus," on the other hand, asked: "What is that +solution of the negro question to which an English Government is +prepared to affix the seal of English approbation[934]?" Mason, the +Confederate Agent in London, wrote home that it was generally believed +the proclamation was issued "as the means of warding off recognition.... +It was seen through at once and condemned accordingly[935]." + +This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictum +that the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate British +governmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief that +strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating an +argument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet the +new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to his +friends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in +favour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is +not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own +him unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality +whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon its +merits as a political measure[936]." Two weeks later, reporting a public +speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which +Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_, +while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it was +not to be understood as fully defending a system of government which +chose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]." + +Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though loudly +applauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincoln +was disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent, +though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow up +the victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November went +heavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground of +the President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole was +not favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as +but a useless bit of "waste paper[939]." In England, John Bright, the +most ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud +heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and even +then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public interest was +much aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date set +by Lincoln for actual enforcement of emancipation[940]. In a speech at +Birmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emancipation; +rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South for +admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was the +very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and society[941]. A few +public meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown were +tried in October and November with some success but with no great show +of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of public +opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by the +proclamation began to veer in favour of the emancipation edict[942]. By +the end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrified +hands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]." + +Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause of +emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by Jefferson +Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared that +Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection," +and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in arms +be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective +States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of +said State." This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for +his freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave +a good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944]. + +Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December that +the promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hoped +that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliation +would be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1 +proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]." + +But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an +"abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week of +December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, there +took place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were passed +enthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emancipation proclamation +and pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ from +week to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, noting +fifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The +American Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved +resolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations. +The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield, +January 10: + + "_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery + is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the + American States, and that the object of the leaders of the + rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman + system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion + may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the + Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its + emancipation policy till not a slave be left on the American + soil[947]." + +Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of +"nobodies." Adams commented: + + "They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, but + they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most + exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave + Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol, + and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to + the complete emancipation of the negro slaves in the British + dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of + the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I + feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective + sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]." + +Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expression +of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working classes," +and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949]. +The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to the +emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed communications with +increasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in the +public meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press. +Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letter +writer to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northern +cause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just and +holy[950]." In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the +proclamation to touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear +the fact that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict +to states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalled +the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetings +attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spoken +twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence. +Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slavery +feeling, now strongly for the North[952]. + +Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in an +address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe now +replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. A +largely signed "round robin" letter assured her that English women were +still the foes of slavery and were indignantly united against +suggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working class +Britain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those of +Manchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of +thanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships +resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot" +he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [of +human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not +been surpassed in any age or in any country[954]." Nonconformist England +now came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London, +made his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen +the North; give victory to their arms[955]." Further and more general +expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letter +received February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen, +urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln. +The London and Manchester Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up +a document for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption +at a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An +Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations +throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" but +the address was carried by a large majority and two representatives, +Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to the +brethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblical +sanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading this +sanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957]. +Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in +a pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" His +position and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to +the North. + +Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, became +aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamation +made good his pledge of the previous September: other elements of +opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like measure, and +everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrection +largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to such +lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound and alarm the +_Saturday Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival of +cant[959]." More neutral minds were perplexed over the practical +difficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January, +1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men +slaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popular +approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the +twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great mass +meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had been +advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hall +was jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptly +organized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admission +crowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand. +Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Hall +and cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. Newman +Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted to +heckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961]. + +The "carnival of cant," as the _Saturday Review_ termed it, was truly a +popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported by +the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its first effect was to +restore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upper +classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation, yet with some misgivings. He +now joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on +"Slavery and Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts. + +In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_, +which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influenced +largely upper-class attitude in favour of the South, Cairnes had +published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was a reasoned analysis of +the basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis of +Spence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power, +Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be read +with more conviction by that class which until now had been coldly +neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in the Northern cause +than that stirred by the emotional reception given the emancipation +proclamation. Yet at bottom it was emancipation that brought this +reasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logical +basis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterances +previously made in private correspondence, or in governmental +conversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North. +On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the +Duke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a +speech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of +Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to +object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," Argyll +said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of the +Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that the +contest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it that +great blessing to the white race which shall consist in the final +freedom of the black[963]." + +The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America that +governmental England would show some evidence of a more friendly +attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas he +thought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read: + + "Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have + tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the + world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, + upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental + object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, + therefore, + + _Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be + recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and + civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men + everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, + such recognition or admission[964]." + +This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Washington, in +November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation proclamation as a +political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administration +he thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This was +the burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but does +not appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to give +offence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the +correctness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm +leading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship +measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound by +the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at first not +the slightest conception of the force or effect of emancipation upon the +public in middle-class England. He feared an American reaction against +England when it was understood that popular meetings would have no +influence on the British Government. + + "Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the + effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to + fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely + round to the North that the Government will be obliged to + favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do + so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it, + unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]." + + * * * * * + +Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had little +relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude toward +emancipation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile war +might be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain, +from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emancipation into +effect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, in +part by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier British +newspaper speculations, was strongly associated with emancipation, in +the English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862, +proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public +with apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war +ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emancipation +and the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave of +relief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not so +quickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that England +which was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exulted +and now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affect +governmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyons +correctly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press +the British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the +same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a head +a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during the +war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctly +unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building in +British ports of Confederate naval vessels of war. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturing +Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III.] + +[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.] + +[Footnote 848: F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to be +already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint of +it in the interview with Lyons.] + +[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offer +of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructions +and those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelled +to face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offer +without England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to +Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O.S.)).] + +[Footnote 850: F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons to +Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.] + +[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.] + +[Footnote 852: F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.] + +[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152.] + +[Footnote 854: _Ibid._, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863.] + +[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861.] + +[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861.] + +[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs. +Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.] + +[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 859: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 17, 1860.] + +[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contest +in America."] + +[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69.] + +[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers of +Abraham Lincoln_, p. 243.] + +[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, pp. 229-32.] + +[Footnote 867: _Ibid._, p. 233, May 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 868: A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, 1862, on the lines +of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July 12, but no action was +taken on it.] + +[Footnote 869: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 70-71.] + +[Footnote 870: Abraham Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 213.] + +[Footnote 871: Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.] + +[Footnote 872: As issued September 22, the first paragraph refers to his +plan of securing legislation to aid compensated voluntary emancipation, +the next sets the date January 1, 1863, for completed emancipation of +slaves in states still in rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern +the carrying out of the confiscation law. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, +pp. 237-8.] + +[Footnote 873: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, 260-61.] + +[Footnote 874: Rhodes, IV, p. 214.] + +[Footnote 875: _Ibid._, p. 410. In letter, August 26, 1863, addressed to +a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional Union men."] + +[Footnote 876: American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7. Bunch to Russell, +Dec. 5, 1860.] + +[Footnote 877: Southern Commissioners abroad early reported that +recognition of independence and commercial treaties could not be secured +unless the South would agree to "mutual right of search" treaties for +the suppression of the African Slave Trade. Davis' answer was that the +Confederate constitution gave him no authority to negotiate such a +treaty; indeed, denied him that authority since the constitution itself +prohibited the importation of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's +instructions see Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 591-96.] + +[Footnote 878: _Spectator_, May 4, 1861.] + +[Footnote 879: Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. +XLVI, p. 95.] + +[Footnote 880: Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 881: October 5, 1861.] + +[Footnote 882: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, 1861.] + +[Footnote 883: _Ibid._, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The same ideas are +officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, 1861, and May 1, +1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and _Ibid._, Vol. 819, No. +197, Draft.).] + +[Footnote 884: See ante, p. 81.] + +[Footnote 885: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.] + +[Footnote 886: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, p. 227. Palmerston to Russell, +Aug. 13, 1862.] + +[Footnote 887: Garrison, _Garrison_, IV, p. 66. Many distinguished names +were on the roster of the Society--Mill, Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton, +Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes, +Cairns, Herbert Spencer, Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and +others. Frederick W. Chesson was secretary, and very active in +the work.] + +[Footnote 888: Schurz, _Speeches and Correspondence_, I, 190.] + +[Footnote 889: Schurz, _Reminiscences_, II, 309.] + +[Footnote 890: Gasparin, _The Uprising of a Great People_, 1861.] + +[Footnote 891: Gasparin, _America before Europe_, Pt. V, Ch. III. The +preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work went through three American +editions in 1862.] + +[Footnote 892: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, p. 63. No exact date, but Spring of +1862.] + +[Footnote 893: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, p. 253.] + +[Footnote 894: _Ibid._, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 895: Rhodes, IV, p. 162.] + +[Footnote 896: Lincoln's _Complete Works_, II, p. 454. But the +_after-comment_ by Lincoln as to purpose was nearly always in line with +an unfinished draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864, +when the specific object was said to be "inducing the coloured people to +come bodily over from the rebel side to ours." _Ibid._, p. 564.] + +[Footnote 897: See _ante_, Ch. IX.] + +[Footnote 898: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 83. +Adams to Seward, May 8, 1862.] + +[Footnote 899: _Ibid._, pp. 101-105.] + +[Footnote 900: _Ibid._, p. 122. Adams to Seward, July 3, 1862. In his +despatch Adams states the conversation to have occurred "last Saturday," +and with an "unofficial person," who was sounding him on mediation. This +was Cobden.] + +[Footnote 901: Welles, _Diary_, I, p. 70.] + +[Footnote 902: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 135.] + +[Footnote 903: _Ibid._, p. 133. To Seward. His informant was Baring.] + +[Footnote 904: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 333.] + +[Footnote 905: See _ante_, p. 35.] + +[Footnote 906: _Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords_, Vol. XXIX. +"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North +America." No. 8. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 907: _Ibid._, No. 10. Russell to Stuart, Aug. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 908: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further correspondence +relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." No. 2. +To Stuart.] + +[Footnote 909: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence +relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America," No. +20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16, 1862.] + +[Footnote 910: See _ante_, p. 37.] + +[Footnote 911: State Department, Eng., Vol. 78, No. 119. Adams to +Seward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar representation made +on Jan. 17, 1862. (_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, +p. 16.)] + +[Footnote 912: e.g., Motley, _Correspondence_, II, pp. 64-5. To O.W. +Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 913: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 140. +Adams to Seward, July 17, 1862.] + +[Footnote 914: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 336.] + +[Footnote 915: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 191. +Adams to Seward, Sept. 12, 1862.] + +[Footnote 916: _Ibid._, p. 199.] + +[Footnote 917: _Ibid._, p. 195.] + +[Footnote 918: _Ibid._, p. 202. Seward to Adams, Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons, +on his return to Washington, wrote that he found Seward's influence much +lessened, and that he had fallen in public estimation by his "signing +the Abolition Proclamation, which was imposed upon him, in opposition to +all his own views, by the Radical Party in the Cabinet." (Russell +Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 14, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 919: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 19, 1862.] + +[Footnote 920: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 202. The +instruction went into great detail as to conditions and means. A similar +instruction was sent to Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen.] + +[Footnote 921: There was much talk and correspondence on this project +from Sept., 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was suspicious of some "trap." +Russell at one time thought the United States was secretly planning to +colonize ex-slaves in Central America. Some of the Colonies were in +favour of the plan. (Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862. +F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863.)] + +[Footnote 922: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.] + +[Footnote 923: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 26, 1862.] + +[Footnote 924: Gladstone Papers. British agents still residing in the +South believed the proclamation would have little practical effect, but +added that if actually carried out the cultivation of cotton "would be +as completely arrested as if an edict were pronounced against its future +growth," and pictured the unfortunate results for the world at large. +(F.O., Am., Vol. 846, No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 925: See Rhodes, IV, 344, _notes_.] + +[Footnote 926: October 6, 1862. The _Times_ had used the "last card" +phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations on the effect of +Sumner's agitation for emancipation.] + +[Footnote 927: Oct. 6, 1862.] + +[Footnote 928: e.g., _Dublin Nation_, Oct. 11, 1862. _Manchester +Guardian_, Oct. 7. _London Morning Advertiser_, Oct. 9. _North British +Review_, Oct., 1862. _London Press_, Oct. 11. _London Globe_, Oct. 6. +_London Examiner_, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag," and Oct. 18: +"The Instigation to Servile War." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_, Oct. 11.] + +[Footnote 929: October, 1862.] + +[Footnote 930: November, 1862.] + +[Footnote 931: It is worthy of note that the French offer of joint +mediation made to Britain in October specified the danger of servile war +resulting from the proclamation as a reason for European action. +(France, _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 142.)] + +[Footnote 932: The _Times_, Oct. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 933: Oct. 18, 1862.] + +[Footnote 934: Communication in the _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 935: Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1862.] + +[Footnote 936: _Spectator_, Oct. 11, 1862.] + +[Footnote 937: _Ibid._, Oct. 25, 1862.] + +[Footnote 938: Rhodes, IV, 162-64.] + +[Footnote 939: Perry, _Henry Lee Higginson_, p. 175.] + +[Footnote 940: Rhodes, IV, p. 349, _note_. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, +1862.] + +[Footnote 941: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, pp. 216 ff.] + +[Footnote 942: _Liberator_, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a meeting at Leigh, +Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At Sheffield, Dec. 31, +1862, an amended resolution calling for recognition of the South was +voted down and the original pro-Northern resolutions passed. There were +speakers on both sides. _Liberator_, Jan. 23, 1863.] + +[Footnote 943: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 113. J.S. Mill to +Motley, Jan. 26, 1863.] + +[Footnote 944: Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order applied also to all +Northern white officers commanding negro troops. It proved an +idle threat.] + +[Footnote 945: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30, 1862. And +again, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a servile +insurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move for its +authors." Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed regret that the +emancipation proclamation had been issued, since it set up a further +barrier to the reconciliation of North and South--always the hope of +Russia. Seward replied that in executing the proclamation, there would +be, no doubt, many modifications. Stoeckl answered that then the +proclamation must be regarded as but a futile menace. (Russian Archives. +Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2171.)] + +[Footnote 946: Rhodes, IV, p. 357.] + +[Footnote 947: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 55. +Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863, transmitting this and other resolutions +presented to him. Adams by March 20 had reported meetings which sent +resolutions to him, from Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills, +Salford, Cobham, Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow, +Liverpool, South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh, +Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle, Bury, +Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Huddersfield, Ashford, +Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton, Newark, and York. See also +Rhodes, IV, 348-58, for resume of meetings and opinions expressed.] + +[Footnote 948: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 300. Adams to +Seward, Jan. 22, 1863.] + +[Footnote 949: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 100. +Adams to Seward, Feb. 5, 1863.] + +[Footnote 950: Goddard, _Letters on the American Rebellion_, p. 287. +Goddard contributed seventy letters before 1863.] + +[Footnote 951: _Ibid._, p. 307. Letter to _Daily Gazette_, May 2, 1863.] + +[Footnote 952: _The Liberator_, Feb. 27, 1863. At Bristol the opposition +element introduced a resolution expressing abhorrence of slavery and the +hope that the war in America might end in total emancipation, but adding +that "at the same time [this meeting] cannot but regard the policy of +President Lincoln in relation to slavery, as partial, insincere, +inhuman, revengeful and altogether opposed to those high and noble +principles of State policy which alone should guide the counsels of a +great people." The resolution was voted down, and one passed applauding +Lincoln. The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologize +for slurring remarks on Thompson.] + +[Footnote 953: _Atlantic Monthly_, XI, p. 525.] + +[Footnote 954: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 302.] + +[Footnote 955: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, p. 306. Also Rhodes, IV, p. +351.] + +[Footnote 956: Massie, _America: the Origin of Her Present Conflict_, +London, 1864. This action and the tour of the two delegates in America +did much to soothe wounded feelings which had been excited by a +correspondence in 1862-3 between English, French and American branches +of similar church organizations. See _New Englander_, April, 1863, +p. 288.] + +[Footnote 957: Jan. 6, 1863.] + +[Footnote 958: Published Oxford and London, 1863.] + +[Footnote 959: Rhodes, IV, p. 355.] + +[Footnote 960: Lutz, _Notes_. Schleiden's despatch, No. 1, 1863. German +opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal Germany sympathized +strongly with the North; while the aristocratic and the landowning class +stood for the South. The historian Karl Friedrich Neumann wrote a +three-volume history of the United States wholly lacking in historical +impartiality and strongly condemnatory of the South. (Geschichte der +Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 1863-66.) This work had much influence on +German public opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)] + +[Footnote 961: _Liberator_, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of J.P. Jewett to W.L. +Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in England who may still +sympathize with slavery and the Southern rebels, will be rendered +absolutely powerless by these grand and powerful uprisings of +THE PEOPLE."] + +[Footnote 962: Duffus, _English Opinion_, p. 51.] + +[Footnote 963: Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 196-7.] + +[Footnote 964: Trevelyan, _John Bright_. Facsimile, opp. p. 303. Copy +sent by Sunmer to Bright, April, 1863.] + +[Footnote 965: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. Lyons +was slow to favour the emancipation proclamation. The first favourable +mention I have found was on July 26, 1864. (Russell Papers. To Russell.) +In this view his diplomatic colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December, +1863, wrote that slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and +that even in the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian +Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But +immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl +could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made of +universal application it would have been a "great triumph for the +principle of individual liberty," but as issued they could only mean +"the hope of stirring a servile war in the South." _(Ibid._, Dec. 24, +1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)] + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +THE LAIRD RAMS + +The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like the +_Alabama_ and the subsequent controversy and arbitration in relation +thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed from every aspect +of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, and principles of +international law. There is no need and no purpose here to review in +detail these matters. The purpose is, rather, to consider the +development and effect at the time of their occurrence of the principal +incidents related to Southern ship-building in British yards. The +_intention_ of the British Government is of greater importance in this +study than the correctness of its action. + +Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a +belligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in the +ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite +application in international law. There were general principles already +established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its subjects to do, +anything directly in aid of belligerents. The British Foreign Enlistment +Act, notification of which had been given in May, 1861, forbade subjects +to "be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming, +of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel +shall be employed in the service ..." of a belligerent, and provided for +punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this prohibition +were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such punishment, or +seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. Here was the weak +point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were maintained by offenders +the proof was available only after the offence had been committed and +one of the belligerents injured by the violation of the law. Over twenty +years earlier the American Government, seeking to prevent its subjects +from committing unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion +of 1837, had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then +stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and therefore +limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a more perfect +law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral duty, had given +federal officials power to act and seize _on suspicion_, leaving the +proof of guilt or innocence to be determined later. But the British +interpretation of her own neutrality laws was that proof was required in +advance of seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic +principle that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that +preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so promptly +asserted at the beginning of the Civil War[966]. + +The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, early +conceived the idea of using neutral ports for the construction of war +vessels. Advice secured from able British lawyers was to the effect that +if care were taken to observe the strict letter of the Foreign +Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike equipment, a ship, even though her +construction were such as to indicate that she was destined to become a +ship of war, might be built by private parties in British yards. The +three main points requiring careful observance by the South were +concealment of government ownership and destination, no war equipment +and no enlistment of crew in British waters. + +The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these lines was +Captain J.D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive of his work +that he never violated British neutrality law and that prevailing legal +opinion in England supported him in this view[967]. In March, 1862, the +steamer _Oreto_ cleared from Liverpool with a declared destination of +"Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica." She was not heard of until +three months later when she was reported to be at Nassau completing her +equipment as a Southern war vessel. In June, Adams notified Russell +"that a new and still more powerful war-steamer was nearly ready for +departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand[968]." He +protested that such ships violated the neutrality of Great Britain and +demanded their stoppage and seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this +second ship, "No. 290" (later christened the _Alabama_) left Liverpool, +Adams and the United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in +securing evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each +protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been +referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, when +there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's Counsel, +Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive against the +"290," that Russell appears to have been seriously concerned. On July +28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for an immediate opinion, +and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent to Liverpool and to other +ports to stop and further examine the vessel. But the "290" was well +away and outside of British waters[969]. + +The _Alabama_, having received guns and munitions by a ship, the +_Bahama_, sent out from England to that end, and having enlisted in the +Confederate Navy most of the British crews of the two vessels, now +entered upon a career of destruction of Northern commerce. She was not a +privateer, as she was commonly called at the time, but a Government +vessel of war specially intended to capture and destroy merchant ships. +In short her true character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of +a "commerce destroyer." Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she +traversed all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal and +stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she evaded +battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear that an +almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to British or other +foreign register took place, in the mercantile marine. The career of the +_Alabama_ was followed with increasing anger and chagrin by the North; +this, said the public, was a British ship, manned by a British crew, +using British guns and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been +winked at by the British Government. What further evidence was necessary +of bad faith in a professed strict neutrality? + +Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion and +anger. At the last moment it had appeared as if the Government were +inclined to stop the "290." Was the hurried departure of the vessel due +to a warning received from official sources? On November 21, Adams +reported that Russell complained in an interview of remarks made +privately by Bright, to the effect that warning had come from Russell +himself, and "seemed to me a little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright +had heard this from me[970]." Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such +imputation, but at the same time expressed to Russell his conviction +that there must have been from some source a "leak" of the Government's +intention[971]. The question of advance warning to Bullock, or to the +Lairds who built the _Alabama_, was not one which was likely to be +officially put forward in any case; the real issue was whether an +offence to British neutrality law had been committed, whether it would +be acknowledged as such, and still more important, whether repetitions +of the offence would be permitted. The _Alabama_, even though she might, +as the American assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us a +sick turn[972]," could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the +war; but many _Alabamas_ would be a serious matter. The belated +governmental order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the future +since in reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective +claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop had +been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and that in +strict law there had been no neglect of governmental duty[973]. If this +were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit official +interference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet of +Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a real offence to +the North had taken place. He might write, "I confess the proceedings of +that vessel [the _Alabama_] are enough to _rile_ a more temperate +nation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on that +account[974]," but this was of no value to the North if the governmental +decision was against interference without complete and absolute proof. + +It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringing +home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in American +eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were to +be continued. An immediate downright threat of war would have been +impolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point of +resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required of +Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat as +would involve the two nations in war--a result that would have marked +the success of Southern secession. That Seward was able to find the way +in which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination and +gift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the +Civil War[975]. + +In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the "290," +June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contracts +made with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of two +vessels far more dangerous than the _Alabama_ to the Northern cause. +These were the so-called Laird Rams. They were to be two hundred and +thirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four and +one-half inch iron plate and be provided with a "piercer" at the prow, +about seven feet long and of great strength. This "piercer" caused the +ships to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped +it was expected the "piercer" would be three feet under the surface of +the water. This was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was +unusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at +sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close blockade +at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper comment in England +that the vessels were "new _Alabamas_," and in America that they were +"floating fortresses," suitable for attack upon defenceless Northern +cities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockading +squadrons[976]. + +Shortly before the escape of the _Alabama_ and at a time when there was +but little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly after +the news was received in Washington that still other vessels were +planned for building in the Lairds' yards, a Bill was introduced in +Congress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque and +privateering. This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wrote +to Adams of the proposed measure specifying that the purpose was to +permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the _Alabama_ or +other vessels of a like type. He characterized this as a plan "to +organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and +reprisal[977]." Neither here nor at any time did Seward or Adams allege +in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than the pursuit of +_Alabamas_, nor is it presumable that in July, 1862, the construction +plans of the Rams were sufficiently well known to the North to warrant a +conclusion that the later purpose of the proposed privateering fleet was +_at first_ quite other than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill +introduced in July, 1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the +_Oreto_ (or _Florida_) and to the failure of early protests in the case +of the _Alabama_. Moreover there had been an earlier newspaper agitation +for an increase of naval power by the creation of a "militia of the +seas," though with no clear conception of definite objects to be +attained. This agitation was now renewed and reinforced and many public +speeches made by a General Hiram Wallbridge, who had long advocated an +organization of the mercantile marine as an asset in times of war[978]. +But though introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" was +not seriously taken up until February, 1863. + +In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of introduction, +Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to encourage +privateers to pursue British ships when, as was expected, they should +"turn Confederate." Sumner objected that the true business of privateers +was to destroy enemy commerce and that the South had no such _bona fide_ +commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his opinion also, but explained +that the administration wanted the measure passed so that it might have +in its hands a power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion +of the Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but +without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up +again[979]. Six months later the progress of construction and the +purpose of the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7, +1863, the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred +to the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 was +passed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March 2 it was +given a third reading and passed without debate[980]. In the Senate, +Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the +Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to +break our blockade of their coast," and that the privateers were to +"assist in maintaining blockades." There was no thorough debate but a +few perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power in +the hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistent +opponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to the +North since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral +commerce. No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were +to be used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an +"administration measure." + +Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russell +at the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge. At first he +had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment +Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the +law officers of the Crown. Russell had even offered to take up with +America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their +neutrality laws at the same moment. This was in December, 1862, but now +on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment +had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981]. +While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from +Seward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of the +privateering bill. + +"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of the +United States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in any +war in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expected +that the Bill will become a law. Lord Lyons suggests that the +transaction may possibly be misapprehended abroad, if it come upon +foreign powers suddenly and without any explanations. You will be at +liberty to say that, as the Bill stands, the executive Government will +be set at liberty to put the law in force in its discretion, and that +thus far the proper policy in regard to the exercise of that discretion +has not engaged the President's attention. I have had little hesitation +in saying to Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there +will be entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating +to him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part of +friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be feared would +be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall be found expedient +to put the Act in force against the insurgents of the United +States[982]." + +Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object might +be asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents," the hint +was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be "incidentally +and indirectly affected." And so both Lyons and Seward understood the +matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a long conversation with +Seward in which after pointing out the probable "bad effect" on Europe, +Lyons received the reply that some remedy must be found for the fact +that "the law did not appear to enable the British Government to +prevent" the issue of Confederate "privateers[983]." On March 8, Seward +followed this up by sending to Lyons an autograph letter: + + "I am receiving daily such representations from our sea-ports + concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by the + vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I + do most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into + the unhappy condition of affairs, which, with all the best + dispositions of your Government and my own, cannot long be + controlled to the preservation of peace. + + "If you think well of it, I should like that you should + confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more + armed vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English + ports is a thing to be deprecated above all things." + +On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and it +appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward stated +that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about the _Alabama_, +declaring: + + "That no American merchant vessels would get freights--that + even war with England was preferable to this--that in that + case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least + find a profitable employment in cruising against British + trade." + +Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyons +protested vigorously and implied that war must result. + + "Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience + not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: that he + should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity + altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came + from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure + would be unavoidable[984]." + +Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must not +be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling on +the notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutral +Mexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruise +in destruction of French commerce, adding that "one might almost +suppose" some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for the +purpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985]. +Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9, +that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present to +Russell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance that +no further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports. +This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language but +in no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering +bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national navigating +interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ... the enforcement +of the neutrality law of Great Britain[986]...." + +Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was read to +him. Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateers +would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interfered +with neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in an +awkward position. To this Adams replied that the privateers would seek +and capture, if possible, vessels like the _Alabama_, but Russell asked +Lyons to find out "whether in any case they [privateers] will be +authorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case in +what case, and to what extent[987]." Three days later, on March 26, +Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as "not +unfriendly in tone," but in the long conversation that ensued the old +result was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent in +performance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stop +Southern shipbuilding if full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams +concluded that "he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but it +had become a most difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, +"Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured for +peace between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and those +of the two Governments fail of success[988]." + +In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to a +head both in America and England. At Washington, from March seventh to +the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisal +had been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposed +them was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to the +intentions of Great Britain. The final decision was to wait later news +from England[989]. This was Seward's idea as he had not as yet received +reports of the British reaction to his communications through Lyons and +Adams. March 27 was the critical day of decision in London, as it was +also the day upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most +vigorously debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Preceding +this other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the first +days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official assurances +that if the South wished to build ships in French yards "we should be +permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea[990]." This +suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the intention, no +doubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In the winter of +1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic fleet to cruise in +western waters and there was first a suspicion in America, later a +conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was distinctly friendly to +the North--that the orders might even extend to actual naval aid in case +war should arise with England and France. In March, 1863, this +was but vague rumour, by midsummer it was a confident hope, by +September-October, when Russian fleets had entered the harbours of New +York and San Francisco, the rumour had become a conviction and the +silence of Russian naval officers when banqueted and toasted was +regarded as discreet confirmation. There was no truth in the rumour, but +already in March curious surmises were being made even in England, as to +Russian intentions, though there is no evidence that the Government was +at all concerned. The truth was that the Russian fleet had been ordered +to sea as a precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, in +case the difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead to +war with France and England[991]. + +In England, among the people rather than in governmental England, a +feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the Ministry had been lax +in regard to the _Alabama_, and as news of her successes was received +this feeling was given voice. Liverpool, at first almost wholly on the +side of the Lairds and of Southern ship-building, became doubtful by +the very ease with which the _Alabama_ destroyed Northern ships. +Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests might, +after all, be directly opposed to those of the ship-builders. Meetings +were held and the matter discussed. In February, 1863, such a meeting at +Plaistow, attended by the gentry of the neighbourhood, but chiefly by +working men, especially by dock labourers and by men from the +ship-building yards at Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman be +requested to write to the Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestly +entreating him to put in force, with utmost vigilance, the law of +England against such ships as the _Alabama_[992]." Such expressions were +not as yet widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulge +in much discussion, but British _doubt_ was developing[993]. + +Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt as to +Britain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in Parliament +which Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all the speeches he +has made since I have been at this post[994]." On March 26, came the +presentation by Adams of Seward's instruction of which Russell wrote to +Lyons as made in no unfriendly tone and as a result of which Adams +wrote: "The conclusion which I draw ... is, that the Government is +really better disposed to exertion, and feels itself better sustained +for action by the popular sentiment than ever before[995]." Russell told +Adams that he had received a note from Palmerston "expressing his +approbation of every word" of his speech three days before. In a portion +of the despatch to Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, +Adams advised against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the present +favourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to run the +risk of changing the current in Great Britain by the presentation of a +new issue which might rally all national pride against us as was done in +the _Trent_ case[996]." That Russell was indeed thinking of definite +action is foreshadowed by the advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27, +as to the latter's language in the debate scheduled for that day on the +Foreign Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interview +with Adams: + + "The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked him + what he had to propose in reference to the _Alabama_ was that + the Government should declare their disapproval of the + fitting out of such ships of war to prey on + American commerce. + + "Now, as the fitting out and escape of the _Alabama_ and + _Oreto_ was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can + have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the + Government disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law + with a view to assist one of the belligerents[997]." + +But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the hopeful view +of the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to Sumner, "badly +managed and told against us[998]," and Bright himself participated in +this "bad management." For over a year he had been advocating the cause +of the North in public speeches and everywhere pointing out to +unenfranchised England that the victory of the North was essential to +democracy in all Europe. Always an orator of power he used freely +vigorous language and nowhere more so than in a great public meeting of +the Trades Unions of London in St. James' Hall, on March 26, the evening +before the parliamentary debate. The purpose of this meeting was to +bring public pressure on the Government in favour of the North, and the +pith of Bright's speech was to contrast the democratic instincts of +working men with the aristocratic inclinations of the Government[999]. +Reviewing "aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said: + + "Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this contest, + and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your + streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has + beheld an afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has + beheld thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without + emperor, without king, without the surroundings of a court, + without nobles, except such as are made by eminence in + intellect and virtue, without State bishops and + State priests. + + "'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation,' without + great armies and great navies, without great debt and without + great taxes. + + * * * * * + + "You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for + yourselves.... Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the + worst foes of freedom that the world has ever seen.... You + will not do this. I have faith in you. Impartial history + will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly + neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your + press--which ought to have instructed and defended--was + mainly written to betray, the fate of a Continent and of its + vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an + unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make + it the heritage of all His children[1000]." + +The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in support of +the North held throughout the whole course of the war, and it was also +the most notable one as indicating the rising tide of popular demand for +more democratic institutions. That it irritated the Government and gave +a handle to Southern sympathizers in the parliamentary debate of March +27 is unquestioned. In addition, if that debate was intended to secure +from the Government an intimation of future policy against Southern +shipbuilding it was conducted on wrong lines for _immediate_ +effect--though friends of the North may have thought the method used was +wise for _future_ effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster, +leading in the debate[1001], called on Ministers to explain the +"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer some +pledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should have been +active on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead of waiting to +be urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a certain degree of +complicity in the escape of the _Alabama_. The Solicitor-General +answered in a legal defence of the Government, complained of the offence +of America in arousing its citizens against Great Britain upon +unjustifiable grounds, but did not make so vigorous a reply as might, +perhaps, have been expected. Still he stood firmly on the ground that +the Government could not act without evidence to convict--in itself a +statement that might well preclude interference with the Rams. Bright +accused the Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality," and +referred at length to the public meeting of the previous evening: + + "If you had last night looked in the faces of three thousand + of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London, as + I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for + that country for which you appear to care so little, you + would imagine that the more forbearing, the more generous, + and the more just the conduct of the Government to the United + States, the more it would recommend itself to the magnanimous + feelings of the people of this country." + +This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the people +was not likely to win or to convince men, whether pro-Southern or not, +who were opponents of the speaker's long-avowed advocacy of more +democratic institutions in England. It is no wonder then that Laird, who +had been castigated in the speeches of the evening, rising in defence of +the conduct of his firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I would +rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen _Alabamas_ +than as a man who applies himself deliberately to set class against +class, and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when +they come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the +very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." This utterance was greeted +with great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the _Alabama_ as +in approval of the speaker's defiance of Bright. + +[Illustration: WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)] + +In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some immediate pledge +by the Government, had gone the wrong way about to secure it. Vigour in +attack was no way to secure a favourable response from Palmerston. +Always a fighting politician in public it was inevitable that he should +now fight back. Far from making the statement recommended to him by +Russell, he concluded the debate by reasserting the correctness of +governmental procedure in the case of the _Alabama_, and himself with +vigour accused Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as to +increase rather than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading of +the speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows that +while vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they were +avoiding _any_ pledge of whatever nature, for the future. + +Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of the debate +was "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of Lord Russell's +speech than to confirm it[1002]." He and his English advisers were very +uneasy, not knowing whether to trust to Russell's intimations of more +active governmental efforts, or to accept the conclusion that his advice +had been rejected by Palmerston[1003]. Possibly if less anxious and +alarmed they would have read more clearly between the lines of +parliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to hurry +the Government into public announcement of a new policy was no proof +that old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the result in +Parliament, they forgot that the real pressure on Government was coming +from an American declaration of an intention to issue privateers unless +something were done to satisfy that country. Certainly Russell was +unmoved by the debate for on April 3 he wrote to Palmerston: + + "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the + ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have + thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. + The Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the + measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law. + + "We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we + have satisfied the opinion which prevails here as well as in + America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be + allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it[1004]." + +Two days later, on April 5, the _Alexandra_, a vessel being equipped to +join the _Alabama_ as a commerce destroyer, was seized on the ground +that she was about to violate the Enlistment Act and a new policy, at +least to make a test case in law, was thereby made public. In fact, on +March 30, but three days after the debate of March 27, the case of the +_Alexandra_ had been taken up by Russell, referred to the law officers +on March 31, and approved by them for seizure on April 4[1005]. Public +meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's action, +as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people applauded the +seizure of the _Alexandra_, demanded vigorous prosecution of the Lairds +and others, and urged governmental activity to prevent any further +ship-building for the South[1006]. + +On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons: + + "The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be + procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate + service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings + which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from + justice of the _Oreto_ and _Alabama_[1007]." + +It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on _evidence_ to be +sure, but on evidence of the vessels being "_apparently_ intended" for +the South. This was far from being the same thing as the previous +assertion that conclusive evidence was required. What, then, was the +basic consideration in Russell's mind leading to such a face-about on +declared policy? Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing +neutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for the +rising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful +than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent in +application of the American "privateering" Bill. How did Russell, and +Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foresee +and fear? + +As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had been +introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason passed +without serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles, +Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that +"something must be done" because vessels were building in England +intended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under construction were +clearly understood to have that purpose. If privateers were to offset +the action of the Rams there must be some definite plan for their use. +Seward and Adams repeatedly complained of British inaction yet in the +same breath asserted that the privateers were intended to chase and +destroy _Alabamas_--a plan so foolish, so it seemed to British +diplomats, as to be impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of +Seward. How, in short, _could_ privateers make good an injury to +blockade about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockading +squadrons on station off the Southern ports they would but become so +much more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of +_Alabamas_ the chances were that they would be the vanquished rather +than the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile marine for +them to attack and privateering against "enemy's commerce" was thus out +of the question since there was no such commerce. + +There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended use of +privateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the close blockade +the only recourse of the North would be to establish a "cruising +squadron" blockade remote from the shores of the enemy. If conducted by +government war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to British +interpretation of international law[1008]. But the Northern navy, +conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfere +seriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy or +carrying cotton from Southern ports. A "flood of privateers," scouring +the ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effective +that closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in the +Northern war programme. + +This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he saw in it +a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clash +leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's desire should be +Russell's reaction, though never specifically explaining the exact +purpose of the privateers. Moreover, nine-tenths of the actual +blockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being so +it was to be presumed that "privateers" searching for possible blockade +runners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences with +British merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in +ordinary trade between non-belligerent ports. + +Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill, +Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raise +objections though not formally making official protest, and had asked +for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of such +vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by the +Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventing +unwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce by +privateers[1009]. The alteration of governmental policy as indicated in +the arrest of the _Alexandra_, it might be hoped, would at least cause a +suspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired. +Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations, +had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet +uninformed of the _Alexandra_ action, was still much alarmed. On April +13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative +to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last +effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had made +imminent[1010]." Lyons had argued with Seward the inadvisability of +sending such a despatch, since it was now known that Russell had "spoken +in a satisfactory manner" about Confederate vessels, but Seward was +insistent. Lyons believed there was real cause for anxiety, writing: + + "A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design + of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate + England, but still there can be little doubt that the + exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute a + serious danger. It is fully shared by many important members + of the Cabinet--nor are the men in high office exempt from + the overweening idea of the naval power of the United States, + which reconciles the people to the notion of a war with + England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned the flame in + order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I believe, + seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong + measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the + Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance + to them. If no military success be obtained within a short + time, it may become a Party necessity to resort to some means + of producing an excitement in the country sufficient to + enable the Government to enforce the Conscription Act, and to + exercise the extra-legal powers conferred by the late + Congress, To produce such an excitement the more ardent of + the party would not hesitate to go, to the verge of a war + with England. Nay there are not a few who already declare + that if the South must be lost, the best mode to conceal the + discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be to go + to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to + English interference[1011]." + +On the same day Lyons wrote, privately: + + "I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some + better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted + out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my + opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without + leading the people here to think that they had gained their + point by threats[1012]." + +So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, he +cipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing[1013], but +soon his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could report +that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for +communication to Russell[1014], and on the twenty-fourth when +presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the +privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that the +"latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of the +_Alexandra_, had caused Seward to become very conciliatory. Lyons was +assured that the plan "was for the present at rest[1015]." Apparently +Seward now felt more security than did Lyons as to future British action +for three days later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne +that an American issue of letters of marque would surely come if +England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a way +as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps _must_ be taken to +prevent their escape[1016]. + +The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show that he +regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern ship-building in +British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. Seward became unusually +friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in August he virtually forced +Lyons to go on tour with him through the State of New York, thus making +public demonstration of the good relations of the two Governments. This +sweet harmony and mutual confidence is wholly contrary to the usual +historical treatment of the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the +threat of the privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily +increasing in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by +Adams to Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September. +Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only +American sources and have been at a loss to understand the privateering +plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague generalization of its +object in official utterances. It is the British reaction to that plan +which reveals the real "threat" made and the actual crisis of +the incident. + +It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires less +extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The correct +understanding of this later story is the recognition that Great Britain +had in April given, a pledge and performed an act which satisfied Seward +and Adams that the Rams would not be permitted to escape. It was their +duty nevertheless to be on guard against a British relaxation of the +promise made, and the delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing the +Rams, caused American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of the +sincerity of British actions. + +Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against Southern +ship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the Foreign Office by a +group of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting an alteration in the +Foreign Enlistment Act if this were needed to prevent the issue of +Southern ships, and pointing out that the "present policy" of the +Government would entail a serious danger to British commerce in the +future if, when England herself became a belligerent, neutral ports +could be used by the enemy to build commerce destroyers[1017]. The +memorial concluded that in any case it was a disgrace that British law +should be so publicly infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gave +the old answer that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtained +of any act done with the intent to violate it[1018]." Evidently +ship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutely +alarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the _Alexandra_, +and on June 22, a decision was rendered against the Government, but was +promptly appealed. + +This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and the +latter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams. Rumours +were spread that the vessels were in fact intended for France, and when +this was disproved that they were being built for the Viceroy of Egypt. +This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was declared that the real +owners were certain French merchants whose purpose in contracting for +such clearly warlike vessels was left in mystery, but with the +intimation that Egypt was to be the ultimate purchaser. Captain Bullock +had indeed made such a contract of sale to French merchants but with the +proviso of resale to him, after delivery. On his part, Russell was +seeking _proof_ fully adequate to seizure, but this was difficult to +obtain and such as was submitted was regarded by the law officers as +inadequate. They reported that there was "no evidence capable of being +presented to a court of justice." He informed Adams of this legal +opinion at the moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearing +completion, and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlier +determination, began that series of diplomatic protests which very +nearly approached a threat of war. + +At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's decision in +the _Alexandra_ case, and shortly after the great Northern victories at +Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11, +which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war. In substance +Seward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of Great +Britain would find a way to nullify the _Alexandra_ decision, but +renewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northern +intention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to +"pursue" Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019]. But there are +two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative the +belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not read or communicate +it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and he +did not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell. The latter never +heard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United States +diplomatic correspondence[1020]. + +In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidence +secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urge +their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed his duty and was in +fact acting in accordance with Russell's own request[1021]. On July 16 +he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of the +South[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety +because of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape, +Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a +participant in the war[1023]. Further affidavits were sent to Russell on +August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that the +Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in any way with +these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed his +regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the grave +nature of the crisis pending between the United States and Great +Britain. To this Russell replied that the matter was "under serious and +anxious consideration," to which, on September 5, in a long +communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped: "It would be +superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war." + +The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war on +the explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in the +war. There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell's +"change of policy" of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact was +that on September 1, Russell had already given directions to take steps +for the detention of the Rams and that on September 3, positive +instructions were given to that effect[1024], though not carried out +until some days later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy" +of April; the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to +secure evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for +acting in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to +be the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the +_Alabama_. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain Bullock that +complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was forced, finally, to +act without it[1025]. + +It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston, on +September 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no Cabinet +approval for this step had yet formally been given, since Russell +notified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if he +disapproved, to call a Cabinet at once[1026]. The _plan_ to stop the +Rams must have long been understood for Palmerston called no Cabinet. +Moreover it is to be presumed that he was preparing the public for the +seizure, for on this same September 3, the _Times_, in a long editorial, +argued that the law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmony +with true neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to British +commerce, as had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the _Times_ was at +this period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at least +inferential that the editorial was an advance notice of governmental +intention to apply a policy known in intimate circles to have been for +some time matured. Four days later, while governmental action was still +unknown to the public another editorial advocated seizure of the +Rams[1027]. Russell had acted under the fear that one of the Rams might +slip away as had the _Alabama_; he had sent orders to stop and +investigate, but he delayed final seizure in the hope that better +evidence might yet be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letters +with Lairds (the builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It was +only on September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send the +vessels on a "trial trip," and it was not until September 16 that public +announcement was made of the Government's action[1028]. + +Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it was not +until September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him the Rams would +be seized, even though three days before, on September 5, this +information had been sent to Washington. The explanation is Russell's +eager search for evidence to _convict_, and his correspondence with +Lairds which did not come to a head until the eighth, when the builders +refused to give information. To the builders Russell was writing as if a +governmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no chance +of a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed, Adams was well +satisfied though his immediate reaction was to criticize, not Russell, +but the general "timidity and vacillation" of the law officers of the +Crown[1029]. Two days later, having learned from Russell himself just +what was taking place, Adams described the "firm stand" taken by the +Foreign Secretary, noted the general approval by the public press and +expressed the opinion that there was now a better prospect of being able +to preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since his +arrival in London[1030]. Across the water British officials were +delighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada expressed his +approval[1031]. Lyons reported a "great improvement" in the feeling +toward England and that Seward especially was highly pleased with +Russell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem for Seward together +with the hope that he would remain in office[1032]. + +The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur until +mid-October, though they had been placed under official surveillance on +September 9. Both sides were jockeying for position in the expected +legal battle when the case should be taken up by the courts[1033]. At +first Russell even thought of making official protest to Mason in London +and a draft of such protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officers +and subsequently revised by Palmerston, but finally was not sent[1034]. +Possibly it was thought that such a communication to Mason approached +too nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for in +December the protest ultimately directed to be made through +Consul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond and +after stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing the +Confederacy to present the following: + + "It appears from various correspondence the authenticity of + which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate Government + having no good ports free from the blockade of the Federals + have conceived the design of using the ports of the United + Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be + equipped and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce + of the United States of America, a State with which Her + Majesty is at peace...." + + "These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity + which ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a + Neutral Power. + + "Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly + to observe it. + + "You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his + Government to forbear from all acts tending to affect + injuriously Her Majesty's position[1035]." + +To carry out this instruction there was required permission for Crawford +to pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when Lyons made the +request[1036]. + +Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's course in +seizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very generally against +the act. Adams now pressed either for an alteration of the British law +or for a convention with America establishing mutual similar +interpretation of neutral duty. Russell replied that "until the trials +of the _Alexandra_ and the steam rams had taken place, we could hardly +be said to know what our law was, and therefore not tell whether it +required alteration. I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Seward +that the wish and intention of Government were to make our neutrality an +honest and bona-fide one[1037]." But save from extreme and avowed +Southern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less to +the stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political character, +attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign Minister and his +humiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to American threats." +Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling of Parliament, a party +attack was made on Russell and the Government by Derby in the House of +Lords. Derby approved the stopping of the Rams but sought to prove that +the Government had dishonoured England by failing to act of its own +volition until threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of July +II with much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printed +American diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was not an +instruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell flat for +Russell simply replied that Adams had never presented such an +instruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on February 15 +he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the dates of various +documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a threat of war and +Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was brief and to the effect +that orders to stop the Rams had been given before the communications +from Adams were received. Finally, on February 23, a motion in the +Commons called for all correspondence with Adams and with Lairds, The +Government consented to the first but refused that with Lairds and was +supported by a vote of 187 to 153.[1038] + +Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of Russell the +Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was virtually a vote +of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud as was the Government +in praise of Adams and in approval of the seizure of the Rams. Naturally +their cause was weakened, and the Ministry, referring to expressions +made and intentions indicated as far back as March, 1863, thus hinting +without directly so stating that the real decision had then been made, +was easily the victor in the vote[1038]. Derby had committed an error as +a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, 1864, he +attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on dates of +documents. Russell's reply ignored that point altogether[1039]. It did +not suit his purpose to declare, flatly, the fact that in April +assurances had been given both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward, +that measures would be taken to prevent the departure of Southern +vessels from British ports. To have made this disclosure would have +required an explanation _why_ such assurance had been given and this +would have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern +plan to create a _cruising squadron blockade by privateers_. _There_ was +the real threat. The later delays and seeming uncertainties of British +action made Adams anxious but there is no evidence that Russell ever +changed his purpose. He sought stronger evidence before acting and he +hoped for stronger support from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on +the Rams and when they had reached the stage where there was danger of +escape, he seized them even though the desired evidence was still +lacking[1040]. Seward's "privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon +in a moment of desperation and with no clear statement from him of its +exact application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats became +pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the +interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the +cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America complained. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 966: In other respects, also, this question of belligerent +ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguely +defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independence +against Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at +sea. Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firm +of Lizardi & Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the +ships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the +guns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British +Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority to +purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strict +neutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country. +Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command. One Mexican vessel, +the _Guadaloupe_, left England with full equipment as originally +planned; the other, the _Montezuma_, was forced to strip her equipment. +But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were +permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. In +all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, but +it is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusion +as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See my book, _British +Interests and Activities in Texas_, Ch. IV.] + +[Footnote 967: Bullock, _Secret Service under the Confederacy_.] + +[Footnote 968: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American +Civil War_, p. 338-9.] + +[Footnote 969: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. +"Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'" Also _ibid._, "Correspondence +between Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities at +Liverpool relating to the 'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to +the illness of a Crown adviser.] + +[Footnote 970: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264. Adams to +Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.] + +[Footnote 971: Selborne, in his _Memorials: Family and Personal_, II, p. +430, declared that in frequent official communication with all members +of the Cabinet at the time, "I never heard a word fall from any one of +them expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the detention +of the _Alabama_ were sent too late." Of quite different opinion is +Brooks Adams, in his "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (_Proceedings_, +Mass. Hist. Soc., Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, the +American Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what +purported to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse, +Southern agent in England, warning him of danger to his "protege." "This +Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office." (_Ibid._, p. +260, _note_.)] + +[Footnote 972: Fox, _Confidential Correspondence_, I, p. 165. Fox to +Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.] + +[Footnote 973: It is interesting that the opinion of many Continental +writers on international law was immediately expressed in favour of the +American and against the British contention. This was especially true of +German opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)] + +[Footnote 974: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, 1862.] + +[Footnote 975: I am aware that Seward's use of the "Privateering Bill," +now to be recounted is largely a new interpretation of the play of +diplomacy in regard to the question of Southern ship-building in +England. Its significance became evident only when British +correspondence was available; but that correspondence and a careful +comparison of dates permits, and, as I think, requires a revised +statement of the incident of the Laird Rams.] + +[Footnote 976: Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers and laying +Northern cities under contribution. According to a statement made in +1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the rams, no instructions as +to their use had been given him by the Confederate Government, but his +plans were solely to break the blockade with no thought of attacking +Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV. 385, _note_.)] + +[Footnote 977: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, p. 134.] + +[Footnote 978: Wallbridge, _Addresses and Resolutions_. Pamphlet. New +York, n.d. He began his agitation in 1856, and now received much popular +applause. His pamphlet quotes in support many newspapers from June, +1862, to September, 1863. Wallbridge apparently thought himself better +qualified than Welles to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his +agitation as instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet. +Welles professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress +unknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a statement +difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon it.] + +[Footnote 979: Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. IV, pp. +3271, 3325 and 3336.] + +[Footnote 980: _Ibid._, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, 393, and Part II, +pp. 960, 1028, 1489.] + +[Footnote 981: Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams." (Mass. +Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, pp. 265-6.)] + +[Footnote 982: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 116, +Feb. 19, 1863.] + +[Footnote 983: F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to Russell.] + +[Footnote 984: _Ibid._, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to Russell, March 10, +1863.] + +[Footnote 985: _Ibid._, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, March 13, 1863. +Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. (Russell Papers. To +Russell, March 24, 1863.)] + +[Footnote 986: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 141. +Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.] + +[Footnote 987: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to Lyons, March 24, +1863.] + +[Footnote 988: _Ibid._, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell to Lyons, March 27, +1863.] + +[Footnote 989: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 245-50.] + +[Footnote 990: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 634, Slidell to Benjamin, +March 4, 1863.] + +[Footnote 991: For example of American contemporary belief and later +"historical tradition," see Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, pp. 24-38. +Also for a curious story that a large part of the price paid for Alaska +was in reality a repayment of expenses incurred by Russia in sending her +fleet to America, see _Letters of Franklin K. Lane_, p. 260. The facts +as stated above are given by F.A. Golder, _The Russian Fleet and the +Civil War_ (_Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915, pp. 801 _seq_.). The plan was +to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of aid to the North +was "born on American soil," and Russian officers naturally did nothing +to contradict its spread. In one case, however, a Russian commander was +ready to help the North. Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the +harbour of San Francisco was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours +of the approach of the _Alabama_ and gave orders to protect the city. He +acted without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his +superiors at home.] + +[Footnote 992: _The Liberator_, March 6, 1863.] + +[Footnote 993: American opinion knew little of this change. An +interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan to thwart +Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by the United +States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams outright by the offer +of such a price as, it was thought, would be so tempting to the Lairds +as to make refusal unlikely. Two men, Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to +England with funds and much embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetly +refrained from stating details, but yet permitted him to guess their +object. The plan of buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic +protests on England's duty in international law and the agents +themselves soon saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the +Navy, wrote to Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in +England, I think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.) +Thurlow Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of +Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 632.) Forbes +reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on with the plan. +"We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we have put new fire into +Mr. Dudley by furnishing _fuel_, and he is hard at it getting +evidence.... My opinion _to-day_ is that we can and shall stop by legal +process and by the British Government the sailing of ironclads and other +war-ships." (Forbes MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department +plan and was disliked by State Department representatives is shown by +Dudley's complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately +discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding +citations, in his _Studies Military and Diplomatic_, Ch. IX. "An +Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by Chittenden +written in 1890, in which bad memory and misunderstanding played sad +havoc with historical truth.] + +[Footnote 994: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To +Seward, March 24, 1863.] + +[Footnote 995: _Ibid._, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, 1863.] + +[Footnote 996: State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356. Adams to +Seward, March 27, 1863.] + +[Footnote 997: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 27, 1863.] + +[Footnote 998: Rhodes, IV, p. 369, _notes_, April 4, 1863. Bright was +made very anxious as to Government intentions by this debate.] + +[Footnote 999: This topic will be treated at length in Chapter XVIII. It +is here cited merely in relation to its effect on the Government at +the moment.] + +[Footnote 1000: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, 307-8.] + +[Footnote 1001: Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for entire debate.] + +[Footnote 1002: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 164. +Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1003: Rhodes, IV, 369-72.] + +[Footnote 1004: Palmerston MS.] + +[Footnote 1005: Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in June, and the +seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government this decision was +upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It was again appealed, and +the Government defeated in the House of Lords in April, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1006: _Manchester Examiner and Times_, April 7, 1863. Goldwin +Smith was one of the principal speakers. Letters were read from Bright, +Forster, R.A. Taylor, and others.] + +[Footnote 1007: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 183.] + +[Footnote 1008: "Historicus," in articles in the _Times_, was at this +very moment, from December, 1862, on, discussing international law +problems, and in one such article specifically defended the belligerent +right to conduct a cruising squadron blockade. See _Historicus on +International Law_, pp. 99-118. He stated the established principle to +be that search and seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels +actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but +those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have +been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the +blockade." (_Ibid._, p. 108.)] + +[Footnote 1009: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to Lyons, March +28, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1010: F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 1011: _Ibid._, No. 310. To Russell, April 13, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1012: Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1013: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy enclosed in Lyons to +Russell, April 17, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1014: Russell Papers. To Russell.] + +[Footnote 1015: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to Russell, April +24, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1016: Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons wrote: "The stories +in the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England are +untrue. But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearly +determined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatches +sent were not satisfactory. It is very easy to see that if U.S. +privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on charges +of breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations would +have soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must +have ensued."] + +[Footnote 1017: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. +"Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on Foreign Enlistment Act."] + +[Footnote 1018: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1019: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, pp. +308-10.] + +[Footnote 1020: The despatch taken in its entirety save for a few +vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's phrase-making, is not at +all warlike. Bancroft, II, 385 _seq_., makes Seward increasingly anxious +from March to September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to +Adams, September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivings +reported in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my +interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made in +April would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to Russell +a communication from Seward denying that his July 11 despatch was +intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to Great Britain. +(F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons, April 3, 1864.)] + +[Footnote 1021: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. +"Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels building at Birkenhead."] + +[Footnote 1022: See next chapter.] + +[Footnote 1023: State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No. 452, and No. 453 +with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1024: Rhodes, IV, 381.] + +[Footnote 1025: Many of these details were unknown at the time so that +on the face of the documents then available, and for long afterwards, +there appeared ground for believing that Adams' final protests of +September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to yield. Dudley, as late as 1893, +thought that "at the crisis" in September, Palmerston, in the absence of +Russell, had given the orders to stop the rams. (In _Penn. Magazine of +History_, Vol. 17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England during +the Late War.")] + +[Footnote 1026: Rhodes, IV, p. 382.] + +[Footnote 1027: The _Times_, Sept. 7, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1028: _Ibid._, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863. The Governmental +correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a motion in Parliament, Feb. +23, 1864, but the Government was supported in refusing it. A printed +copy of this correspondence, issued privately, was placed in Adams' +hands by persons unnamed and sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Seward +thereupon had this printed in the _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1864-5, +Pt. I, No. 633.] + +[Footnote 1029: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 492. Adams to +Seward, Sept. 8, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1030: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 370. +To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at the whole matter of the +Rams and the alleged "threat of war" of Sept. 5, from the point of view +of his own anxiety at the time, was naturally inclined to magnify the +effects of his own efforts and to regard the _crisis_ as occurring in +September. His notes to Russell and his diary records were early the +main basis of historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved +the accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass. +Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, p. 293, _seq._) ignores Rhodes, +harks back to the old argument and amplifies it with much new and +interesting citation, but not to conviction. My interpretation is that +the real crisis of Governmental decision to act came in April, and that +events in September were but final applications of that decision.] + +[Footnote 1031: Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. 26, 1863. Copy in +Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1032: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1033: Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You will learn by the +papers that we have at last seized the Iron Clads. Whether we shall be +able to bring home to them legally that they were Confederate property +is another matter. I think we can, but at all events no moral doubt can +be entertained of the fact, and, therefore, we are under no anxiety +whether as to the public or Parliamentary view of our proceeding. They +would have played the devil with the American ships, for they are most +formidable ships. I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably in +consequence." (Lyons Papers.) The Foreign Office thought that it had +thwarted plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea. +(F.O., Am., Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine to +Hammond, Oct. 26, 1863.).] + +[Footnote 1034: F.O., Am., Vol. 929. Marked "September, 1863." The draft +summarized the activities of Confederate ship-building and threatened +Southern agents in England with "the penalities of the law...."] + +[Footnote 1035: F.O., Am., Vol. 932, No. 1. F.O. to Consul-General +Crawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7, 1863, had already +"expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to protest against this +also. (_Ibid._, No. 4.)] + +[Footnote 1036: Bonham. _British Consuls in the South_, p. 254. +(Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43.)] + +[Footnote 1037: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5, 1863. Bullock, +_Secret Service_, declares the British Government to have been neutral +but with strong leaning toward the North.] + +[Footnote 1038: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIII, pp. 430-41, 544-50, +955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by Brooks Adams, +_The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, pp. 312-324.] + +[Footnote 1039: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXIV, pp. 1862-1913. _The Index_, +naturally vicious in comment on the question of the Rams, summed up its +approval of Derby's contentions: "Europe and America alike will +inevitably believe that it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothing +else, which induced the Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the +1st September, and they will draw the necessary conclusion that the way +to extort concessions from England is by bluster and menace." (Feb. 18, +1864, p. 106.)] + +[Footnote 1040: Lairds brought suit for damages, but the case never +reached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by the Government. +This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the Government that it had +no case. In my view the failure to push the case to a conclusion was due +to the desire not to commit Great Britain on legal questions, in view of +the claim for damages certain to be set up by the United States on +account of the depredations of the _Alabama_.] + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +ROEBUCK'S MOTION + +In the mid-period during which the British Government was seeking to +fulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards ship-building and +while the public was unaware that such a promise had been given, certain +extreme friends of the South thought the time had come for renewed +pressure upon the Government, looking toward recognition of the +Confederacy. The _Alexandra_ had been seized in April, but the first +trial, though appealed, had gone against the Government in June, and +there was no knowledge that the Ministry was determined in its stand. +From January to the end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations in +approval of the emancipation proclamation had somewhat checked +expressions of Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friends +had recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came forward +in the person of Roebuck. + +Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends had not +ceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less vigorous tone. For +four months after the British refusal of Napoleon's overtures on +mediation, in November, 1862, the friends of the South were against +"acting now," but this did not imply that they thought the cause lost or +in any sense hopeless. Publicists either neutral in attitude or even +professedly sympathetic with the North could see no outcome of the Civil +War save separation of North and South. Thus the historian Freeman in +the preface to the first volume of his uncompleted _History of Federal +Government_, published in 1863, carefully explained that his book did +not have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued that the +breaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent weakness in a +federal system, but took it for granted that American reunion was +impossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a long tour of the +North, beginning in September, 1861, published late in 1862 a two-volume +work, _North America_, descriptive of a nation engaged in the business +of war and wholly sympathetic with the Northern cause. Yet he, also, +could see no hope of forcing the South back into the Union. "The North +and South are virtually separated, and the day will come in which the +West also will secede[1041]." + +Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual; they +were, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in November, +1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to prove it to be so +for never again was there so near an approach to British intervention. +Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think that true Southern policy +was now to make an appeal to the Tories against the Government. In +January, 1863, he was planning a new move: + + "I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time for a + thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a + vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body + and if so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I + have seen Mr. Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself + in communication with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for + action for this seems to me now our best card[1042]." + +That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the attitude +of the _Index_ which all through the months from November, 1862, to the +middle of January, 1863, had continued to harp on the subject of +mediation as if still believing that something yet might be done by the +existing Ministry, but which then apparently gave up hope of the +Palmerstonian administration: + + "But what the Government means is evident enough. It does not + mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if it + can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States, + unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over + which they have no control,' which leave weak men and weak + ministers no choice. They will not, if they are not forced to + it, quarrel with Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will + let Lancashire starve; they will let British merchantmen be + plundered off Nassau and burnt off Cuba; they will submit to + a blockade of Bermuda or of Liverpool; but they will do + nothing which may tend to bring a supply of cotton from the + South, or to cut off the supply of eggs and bacon from the + North[1043]." + +But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant encouragement +and was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by the debate in +Parliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby gave explicit +approval of the Government's refusal to listen to Napoleon[1044]. By +February, Russell, having recovered from the smart of defeat within the +Cabinet, declared himself weary of the perpetual talk about mediation +and wrote to Lyons, "... till both parties are heartily tired and sick +of the business, I see no use in talking of good offices. When that time +comes Mercier will probably have a hint; let him have all the honour and +glory of being the first[1045]." For the time being Spence's idea was +laid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from Mason: + + "The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at + present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be + useless to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North. + Any motion on the subject will be received with disfavour, + consequently the way in which it will be treated will only + make the North more elated, and will irritate the South + against us. If I saw the slightest chance of a motion being + received with any favour I would not let it go into other + hands, but I find the most influential men of all Parties + opposed to it[1046]." + +Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in France, +reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the Foreign Office" +that "It is believed that every possible thing has been done here in +your behalf--we must now await the action of England, and it is through +that you must aim all your efforts in that direction[1047]." + +With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to move the +British Government or to stir Parliament, energies were now directed +toward using financial methods of winning support for the Southern +cause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken with the double +object of providing funds for Southern agents in Europe and of creating +an interested support of the South, which might, it was hoped, +ultimately influence the British Government. + +By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the blockade, for +the Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its agents abroad. +Bullock, especially, required large amounts in furtherance of his +ship-building contracts and was embarrassed by the lack of business +methods and the delays of the Government at home. The incompetence of +the Confederacy in finance was a weakness that characterized all of its +many operations whether at home or abroad[1048] and was made evident in +England by the confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. At +first the Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with drafts +upon the house of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, of Liverpool, a branch of +the firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina, purchasing its +bills of exchange with its own "home made" money. But as Confederate +currency rapidly depreciated this method of transmitting funds became +increasingly difficult and costly. The next step was to send to Spence, +nominated by Mason as financial adviser in England, Confederate money +bonds for sale on the British market, with authority to dispose of them +as low as fifty cents on the dollar, but these found no takers[1049]. By +September, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted and +some new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was found in +adopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made the basis for +an advance of L60,000, a form of cotton bond being devised which fixed +the price of cotton at eightpence the pound. These bonds were not put on +the market but were privately placed by Lindsay & Company with a few +buyers for the entire sum, the transaction remaining secret[1050]. + +In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to the +authorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton should be +purchased by the Government, stored, and certificates issued to be sold +abroad, the purchaser being assured of "all facilities of shipment." +Spence was to be the authorized agent for the sale of these "cotton +certificates," but before any reached him various special agents of the +Confederacy had arrived in England by December, 1862, with such +certificates in their possession and had disposed of some of them, +calling them "cotton warrants." The difficulties which might arise from +separate action in the market were at once perceived and following a +conference with Mason all cotton obligations were turned to Fraser, +Trenholm & Company. Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but no +further attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants" +were considered a better means of raising funds. + +It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved a +governmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants" partook +of the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point the Richmond +authorities, after the first failure to sell "money bonds" abroad were +not keen to attempt anything that could be stamped as a foreign +"government loan." Their idea was rather that a certain part of the +produce of the South was being set aside as the property of those who in +England should extend credit to the South. The sole purpose of these +earlier operations was to provide funds for Southern agents. By July, +1862, Bullock had exhausted his earlier credit of a million dollars. The +L60,000 loan secured through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demand +and this had been followed by a development on similar lines of the +"cotton certificates" and "warrants" which by December, 1862, had +secured, through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars or +thereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of this +method and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however, there was +broached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for the definite +floating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan." + +This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by the +well-established firm of Erlanger & Company. First approached by this +company in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but found the latter +strongly committed to his own plans with Spence[1051]. But Slidell +persisted and Mason gave way[1052]. Representatives of Erlanger +proceeded to Richmond and proposed a loan of twenty-five million +dollars; they were surprised to find the Confederate Government +disinclined to the idea of a foreign loan, and the final agreement, cut +to fifteen millions, was largely made because of the argument advanced +that as a result powerful influences would thus be brought to the +support of the South[1053]. The contract was signed at Richmond, January +28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the day +following[1054]. But there was no Southern enthusiasm for the project. +Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy disclaimed the "desire or +intention on our part to effect a loan in Europe ... during the war we +want only such very moderate sums as are required abroad for the +purchase of warlike supplies and for vessels, and even that is not +required because of our want of funds, but because of the difficulties +of remittance"; as for the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would have +declined it altogether but for the political considerations indicated by +Mr. Slidell[1055]...." + +From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from +Slidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the purpose +of establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to suspend the +operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's offer was learned, +but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing agent of the Confederacy, +caused a further sale of "cotton warrants[1056]." Spence, fearing he was +about to be shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while +Slidell regarded Spence[1057] as a weak and meddlesome agent[1058]. But +on February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and +uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and +agreed to co-operate in floating the loan[1059]. Then followed a +remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so much as regards +the financial returns to the South, for these were negligible, as in +relation to the declared object of Slidell and the Richmond +Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would accompany the +successful flotation of a loan. + +Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to receive +promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress authorizing the +loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this contract Erlanger & +Company, sole managers of the loan, had guaranteed flotation of the +entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77, the profit of the Company to be +five per cent., plus the difference between 77 and the actual price +received, but the first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the +disposal of the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19, +in London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically +all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was +entitled "_Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States of +America for_ 3 _Millions Sterling at_ 90 _per Cent_." The bonds were to +bear interest at seven per cent. and were to be exchangeable for cotton +at the option of the holder at the price of sixpence "for each pound of +cotton, at any time not later than six months after the ratification of +a treaty of peace between the present belligerents." There were +provisions for the gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who +did not desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on +application. 10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the +days, the first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the +first of August, September and October. + +Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound it was +thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at least a good +chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. True "the loan was +looked upon as a wild cotton speculation[1060]," but odds were so large +as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed hardly conceivable +that cotton could for some years go below sevenpence per pound, and even +that figure would have meant profit, _if_ the Confederacy were +established. Moreover, even though the loan was not given official +recognition by the London stock exchange, the financial columns of the +_Times_ and the _Economist_ favoured it and the subscriptions were so +prompt and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as +over-subscribed three times in London alone[1061]. With the closing of +the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. Slidell wrote: "It is a +financial recognition of our independence, emanating from a class +proverbially cautious, and little given to be influenced by sentiment or +sympathy[1062]." On Friday, March 27, the allotment took place and three +days later Mason wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on +the triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, _malgre_ all +detraction and calumny, that cotton is king at last[1063]." + +"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble and it +took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep him in +state[1064]." On April 1, the flurry of speculation had begun to falter +and the loan was below par; on the second it dropped to 3-1/2 discount, +and by the third the promoters and the Southern diplomats were very +anxious. They agreed that someone must be "bearing" the bonds and +suspected Adams of supplying Northern funds for that purpose[1065]. +Spence wrote from Liverpool in great alarm and coincidently Erlanger & +Company urged that Mason should authorize the use of the receipts +already secured to hold up the price of the bonds. Mason was very +reluctant to do this[1066], but finally yielded when informed of the +result of an interview between Spence, Erlanger, and the latter's chief +London agent, Schroeder. Spence had proposed a withdrawal of a part of +the loan from the market as likely to have a stabilizing effect, and +opposed the Erlanger plan of using the funds already in hand. But +Schroeder coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative +refused to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market, +then Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their +contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued it, +they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up their +instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent sacrificed +is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government at all, but the +profits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co., actually in their hands, and they +cannot be expected to take a worse position. At any rate they will not +do so, and unless the compact can be made on the basis we name, matters +must take their course[1067]." + +In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he "could not +hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, as +well as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068]." Mason +gave the required authorization and this was later approved from +Richmond. For a time the "bulling" of the loan was successful, but again +and again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bonds +and in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy. Some +$6,000,000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entire +operation it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the +Confederacy, although, as stated by the _Economist_, over $12,000,000 of +the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investors +at the end of the war[1069]. + +The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell, +a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer of +Southern fortunes[1070]. From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loan +bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked the +regard attached to sound investment. This fact in itself denied to the +loan any such favourable influence, or "financial recognition of the +Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success, +attributed to it. The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited it +and tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus +"confidence in the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of +increased by this turning from political to financial methods of +bringing pressure upon the Government[1071]. + +Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reserved +from January to June, 1863. Public attention was distracted from the war +in America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly during +the months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relations +existing between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent on +going beyond British "meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily +might lead to war with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America, +and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish +question than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was +still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary "push" +and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancashire +little attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have been +seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration. This was +a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directed +against the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees' sufferings. +Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and +his brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet +no effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of the +South[1072]. + +In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to make +advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton loan, though +fairly strong again because of Confederate governmental aid, was in fact +a failure in its expected result of public support for the South; +something must be done to offset that failure. In Polish affairs France +had drawn back; presumably Napoleon was again eager for some active +effort. Best of all, the military situation in America was thought to +indicate Southern success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt +with the stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at +Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly +defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a +definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance north +did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in a select +circle in England and much was expected of it. The time seemed ripe, +therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck of a motion for +the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the real purpose of which +was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' which had been advocated by +Spence in January, but postponed on the advice of Gregory[1073]. _The +Index_ clearly indicated where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now +asks what will be the policy of Great Britain towards America; but +everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will do." + + "... England to-day pays one of the inevitable penalties of + free government and of material prosperity, that of having at + times at the head of national affairs statesmen who belong + rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and + merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details, + acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient + comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies.... + + "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a + diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or + determination, except where the display of these qualities + was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From + Great Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet + at Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States + nothing to expect[1074]." + +Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The _Times_ +minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as required for +political effect to hold the north-western states loyal to the Union, +and while indulging in no prophecies as to the fate of Vicksburg, +expressing the opinion that, if forced to surrender it, the South could +easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at some other point[1075]. Naturally +_The Index_ was pleased with and supported this view[1076]. Such +ignorance of the geographic importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful +misleading of the public; but professed British military experts were +equally ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at +Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American campaigns, +centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia and +reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, any +Northern attack[1077]. He dismissed the western campaigns as of no real +significance. W.H. Russell, now editor of the _Army and Navy Gazette_, +better understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed +Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the +Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the success +of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck's motion +for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it. + + "If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the + North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and + trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it + to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can + breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered + Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who + imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South, + divide the nations on each side of the black and white line + for ever, and bring this war to the end. There is probably + not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define + the limits of the State to be recognized.... And, over and + above all, recognition, unless it meant 'war,' would be an + aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid + the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity + and the fury of the North[1078]." + +The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck's +motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has given notice of +a motion to recognize the South. But I think it certain that neither +Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no great +number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from all parties will compose the +minority[1079]." Russell was correct in this view but not so did it +appear to Southern agents who now became active at the request of +Roebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of +willingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word. +There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but there +seemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one. +The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. On +June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuck +asking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrote +that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance that +he, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far he +might communicate them to "our friends in the House[1081]." Slidell saw +the Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of "forcing the +English Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry," asked that an +interview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, +a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in +a Tory cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid +in upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested +interview and declared he would go to the length of officially informing +the British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss the +advisability of recognizing the South[1082]. + +This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from Mocquard +stating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London, had been +instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and Lindsay had hurried +to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the twenty-fifth, Slidell +reported that they were authorized to state in the House of Commons that +France was "not only willing but anxious to recognize the Confederate +States with the co-operation of England[1083]." Slidell added, however, +that Napoleon had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal +proposal to Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received by +Slidell from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance be +known to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on +June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and asked +for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being permitted +to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed instruction[1084], he received a +reply indicating confusion somewhere: + + "I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires Etrangeres + on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just left me. + M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to Baron + Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he + directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading + Members of Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the + subject of American affairs were unchanged. That he was + disposed with the co-operation of England immediately to + recognize the Confederate States; this was in the form of a + draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he officially + instructed the Baron to sound _Palmerston_ on the subject and + to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This was + done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the + Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait + bien d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis decide a + reconnaitre le Sud.' This is by far the most significant + thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the + others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England + may do or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press + his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's + declaration. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute it and + the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest + entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not heard from + Baron Gros the result of his interview with Palmerston. I + see that the latter has been unwell and it is probable that + the former had not been able to see him. There can be no + impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will + doubtless give him information which he will use to + advantage. I write in great haste; will you do me the favour + to let Lord Campbell know the substance of this note, + omitting that portion of it which relates to the Emperor's + inclination to act alone. Pray excuse me to Lord Campbell for + not writing to him, time not permitting me to do so[1085]." + +This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, "Can I +put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by +Corcoran[1086]." To which Slidell replied by letter: + + "For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write to + say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be + _used in any way_. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay + when they were here and have no objection that they should + again see it confidentially[1087]." + +On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the information that +no formal communication had been made to Russell. The next day in an +effort in some way to secure an admission of what Mason and his friends +believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell asked Russell in the House of +Lords if he had received either a document or a verbal communication +outlining Napoleon's desires. Russell replied that Baron Gros had told +him "an hour ago" that he had not even received any instruction to +deliver such a communication[1088]. This was in the hours preceding the +debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had been an +error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck and Lindsay, +or else there was a question of veracity between Russell, Baron Gros +and Napoleon. + +Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the Queen to +enter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation in +recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had in +fact established its independence and that this was greatly to England's +advantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in the +West. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancashire--a +point his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerous +concern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and +minimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easy +victory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the +Government Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon, +claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to +action and asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply +again to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was +concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, he +added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could be +renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, through +Lyons, the contents of a former application. + +Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat +perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot with +all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was direct +attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate. +Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, was +sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field of +diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in the +war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality. +Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government, +while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or +South, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster +to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was +positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck's +motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herself +to any line of policy, especially as military events were "now +occurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "the +main result of the contest was not doubtful." Here spoke that element of +the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success. + +If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends +might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change +of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself +than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in +meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and +emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home +Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself +to be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It early +became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had +been committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new +French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of +it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to +unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a +support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck +"feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party strongly +supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere +party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial +resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and +in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government. +Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British +emancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most +powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In +particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of +Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his +"friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by +recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond +of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated upon +the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor +of France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, he +asserted, was in great danger of being too much represented in +Parliament[1091]. + +The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting to +Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they +were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal to +permit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's assertions. +Mason wrote: + + "I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of + to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was + present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell + said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair + remains in a 'muss,' unless the Emperor will show his hand + _on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or + derive any benefit from his private and individual + revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can + be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one language in + private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge,' + and another to his ambassador here. The debate is adjourned + to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his + explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no + confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from + him so far can invite only distrust[1092]." + +As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of the +Confederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic with +the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no value +unless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedly +opposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring that +premature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war +by the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to be +renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and return +to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layard +reaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received from +France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a British +revelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the document +in question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward's +attention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence +wrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion: + + "I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and + great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr. + Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated + by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the + North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the + minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North.... + + "The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on + the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which + tells injuriously instead of being the great support.... + + "If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to + support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In + the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and + would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members + are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the + vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]." + +On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured an +agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]." +Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the +matter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy +and actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a +feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a +pro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further +discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrote +in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9: + + "Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you, + and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping + altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further + mention or discussion of what passed between you and Mr. + Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the + other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the + other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The + British Parliament receives messages and communications from + their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other + countries...." + + "No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor + from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the + multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused + for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr. + Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any + discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations + between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you + to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow + traveller[1099]." + +The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to +withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the +uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed +to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the +debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of +the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper +matters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the French +Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this +case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay +entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the +accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not +to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The _Scotia_, +he said was due and any moment news from America might change the +governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply +disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's +actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for +continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's +"diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and +those of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the +motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord +Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this +was finally done[1100]. + +All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's +advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yet +at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive +campaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, that +Lee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met by +a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and +eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101]. +Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victorious +advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came +out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion, +arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no +hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck +moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the +impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, +his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own +"amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon +and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, +"employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in +reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this +would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his +duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have +passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]." + +The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of +the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of +the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover +into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal +veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt +the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon +which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a +deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might +now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no +evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any +consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even to +the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the +Government in relation to Southern ship-building. + +Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern +victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be +overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on +the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at +Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_ +two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army +had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it +was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope +there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of +the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from +Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though +efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither +side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous +assertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose +Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the +capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great +disaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly a +British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_ +since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of +Vicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place renders +the blow heavier[1107]." + +"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week, +never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that +the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds +and that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they had +refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109]. + +If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern +effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from +the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune +of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental +attitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by +the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was +acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the +Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention +had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the +Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing +that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined +not to receive him: + + "Under these circumstances, your continued residence in + London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent + with the dignity of this Government, and the President + therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end, + and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from + London[1110]." + +A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain +if there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but since +the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made +public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received, +September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the +very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though +there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping +of Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was with +the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of +Roebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "serious +reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England +"has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention +or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict +neutrality[1111]." + +Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction +and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed +making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took +place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the +regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened to +join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in +her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from +the _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the only +Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the +Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all +hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt +distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final. + +On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly +in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made +public, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the folly +of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In +general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let +Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal +understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict +neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of +the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy +but also with seeming finality: + + "I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which + have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the + overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto + prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the + accredited Minister of an established State. + + "These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to + repeat them. + + "I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating + your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of + affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and + satisfaction[1116]." + +Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were +still to be his, but the chief role there was now assigned to others and +the principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully +concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is +evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He +regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an +English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of +Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the +Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston +were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of +action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his +acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events. + +If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was +correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was +officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same +private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a +notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by +England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_, +unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of +a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea +came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result +of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the +war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory +clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American +Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing +difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was +quick to see the danger. He wrote: + + "Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath + from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be + denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be + founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end + firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But + then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not + allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its + being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal + on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to + break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force + the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the + United States Government and people would become more + difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am + going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only + an excuse for doing so[1118]." + +Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's +readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of +1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a +contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught +napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general +speculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think the +Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any +European Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it +will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of +withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his +representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the +matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21: + + "I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think + this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship + which might turn sour like beer if there should be a + thunder-storm. + + "But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers + with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom + our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United + States[1121]." + +If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there +was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the +South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I +hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the +past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry +Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open +public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two +pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123]. +Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was +bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams, +by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the +ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125]. + +Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the +cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of +activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the military +situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely +negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by +organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West +had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September +18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover +Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled +to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen +back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable +front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been +expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. +Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small +wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now +declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count +much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published +book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the +organization of the "Southern Independence Association." Seeking a +specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first +fixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appeal +from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On +December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to +town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would +again be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the +seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to +Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or +on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128]. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124.] + +[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.] + +[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in +control of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing +this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the +support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all +the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never +to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made +notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in +the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a +letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a +copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy +letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16, +1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F. +Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams' +death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My +references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and +transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities +to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_, +he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, had +seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant +distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American +whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the +question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to +Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his +regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the +Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on +the _Times_.] + +[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI.] + +[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3, +1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.] + +[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives the +best analysis and history of Southern financing.] + +[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to +contractors in payment for materials.] + +[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to +Erlanger's son.] + +[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in +recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe +that even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influence +will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, +Oct. 28, 1862.)] + +[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31. +Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond, +since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact +with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.] + +[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1058: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1059: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to +Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.] + +[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._, p. 33. In France permission to advertise the +loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of +the Emperor.] + +[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at +Stanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I am +much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."] + +[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the +real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental +intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary +debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other +hand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4 +they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be +presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had +not failed to reach the bond market.] + +[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1067: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was +written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact +statement of what had occurred.] + +[Footnote 1068: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger & +Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves +been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the +presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly +unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market +showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to +Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.] + +[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run by +Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a +recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per +cent. discount.] + +[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and +published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which +appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a serious +one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his +_Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many +writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic +denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley, +_Gladstone_, II, p. 83.] + +[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.] + +[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155.] + +[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.] + +[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland +and Virginia_, London, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1078: _Army and Navy Gazette_, June 6, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1080: Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the Southern +Confederacy_, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England" +is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in the +Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himself +notes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misled +some historians who have derived from his work the idea that the +critical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863, +whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt, +"Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War," pp. 413 _seq_. Schmidt's thesis +is largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).] + +[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell.] + +[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5.] + +[Footnote 1083: _Ibid._, p. 186. To Benjamin.] + +[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Mason +wrote: "The question of veracity is raised."] + +[Footnote 1085: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1086: _Ibid._, To Slidell.] + +[Footnote 1087: _Ibid._, To Mason. "Monday eve." (June 29, 1863.)] + +[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXI, p. 1719.] + +[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrier +labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his enemies.] + +[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends. +They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy their +friendship.] + +[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate of +June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London on +his way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before the +debate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he +expected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck +sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story--the +story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not cross +swords with me again." Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck given +by Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I ever +witnessed." (_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 161-2.)] + +[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. 67-73.] + +[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli, +throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing with +many of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately as +believing the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrain +from such comment publicly. (Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, p. 328.)] + +[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. 252.] + +[Footnote 1098: _The Index_ felt it necessary to combat this, and on +July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to be +negligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "All +the sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been with +the South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated the +line which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist +_Debats_, Republican _Siecle_, The Palais Royal _Opinion_, all join in +the halloo against the South."] + +[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 _seq_., July 10, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New York +correspondent of the _Times_, containing a similar prediction but in +much stronger terms. For the last half of the war the _Times_ was badly +served by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation from +an extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay who +served the _Times_ in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865. +(Mackay, _Forty Years' Recollections_, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had +strict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to +Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported that +Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington should +fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, since +it would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could no +doubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southern +defeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought +the complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie +Stephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this +time. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met +Seward, being received with much cordiality as a _verbal_ champion in +England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on the +war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of the +friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on political +economy. (Maitland, _Leslie Stephen_, p. 120.)] + +[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent, +dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, would +welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride in +triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiastic +multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America." The New York +city which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give some +ground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless--and New +York was not the North.] + +[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 _seq_. Ever afterwards +Roebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. At +a banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "political +testament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of +America." (Leader, _Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck_, p. 330.)] + +[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce another +recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance to +make it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act. +The reply was a brief negative.] + +[Footnote 1105: The _Times_, July 18, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1106: The power of the _Times_ in influencing public opinion +through its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in the +lead in its foreign correspondence and the information printed +necessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the British +public. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread about +America by the _Times_, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so +much as in this matter the enormous power which the _Times_ has, not +from the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but +from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to a +vast number of minds. The _ignorance_ in which it has been able to keep +a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. Beesly. Haultain, +_Correspondence of Goldwin Smith_, p. 11.)] + +[Footnote 1107: _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics are +mine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one of +rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No _Englishman_ would be likely +to regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing.] + +[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1109: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329. +Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1110: Mason, _Mason_, p. 449.] + +[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The _Times_ was now printing American +correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg +when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated +upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the +writer's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had +fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).] + +[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863. +Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his +opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value +diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all others +would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason, +had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his +family's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.] + +[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1115: e.g., _Manchester Guardian_, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in +_The Index_, Sept. 24, p. 343.] + +[Footnote 1116: Mason's _Mason_, p. 456.] + +[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1118: _Ibid._, Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a +despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1119: F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, +Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement +of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States +and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would +have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of the +two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the +struggle--the coasts of the United States would present few points open +to attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the +neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas, +would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might at +the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops +into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been +immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. It +seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without +difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force +which Great Britain would be likely to place there."] + +[Footnote 1120: _Ibid._, Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.] + +[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1123: _The Liberator_, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt upon +Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in +"winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a gifted +public orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majority +in each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of +opinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exalt +Beecher's services.] + +[Footnote 1124: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 319. The words are Dodd's.] + +[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to +Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The preface +in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863. +For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc. +_Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_.] + +[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.] + + + +CHAPTER XV + +THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION + +Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public +meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1, +1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends, +confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally +confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion +in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public +expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to +November, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But by +the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion +that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, +especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern +sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his +initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that +others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In +Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist +meeting in the Free Trade Hall": + + "These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of + energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It + appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint + money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the + truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and + you will see there are here the germs of important work--but + they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good + deal of money individually but I see room for the use of L30 + or L40 a month or more[1129]." + +The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the +required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate +secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions +willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste +for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat +dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of +patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence +succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24, +1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course +of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form +an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the +auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., +Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, +Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and +others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and +postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the +principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never +_publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South: + + "The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the + war is to be worked out to success without the action of + Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a + power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred + up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most + agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition + signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and + brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of + 4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them + completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial + to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings, + Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We + have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury, + Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work + up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the + latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon + the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I + think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert + latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side + to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse + that power. At any rate the object is worth the + effort[1131]." + +In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. In +nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the +speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were +voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called +"indefatigable": + + "The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded + with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout + the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_ + policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood + are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while + England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It + remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have + any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]." + +By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation +was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was +really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as +characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement +lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an +association which should become the main-spring of further activities. +Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to +draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from +the big blockade-running firms + + "Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific + sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in + proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was + near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote + a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the + blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once + L500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and + have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you + see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]." + +Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too +late: + + "Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings + make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered + round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The + _Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more + especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. + I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, + so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our + side[1135]." + +Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention: + + "I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to + move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the + end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible + that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our + Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: + 'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought + back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the + efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or + death what effort should be spared[1136]?" + +The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by +Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts. +On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) took +place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster +referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts +being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American +affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and +plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston, +Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of +Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed +in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the +district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she +should lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club. +"Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be +formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence +Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the +reassembling of Parliament. + +The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern +Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright +and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily +the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly +represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to +influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from +Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by +those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of +their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in +the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so +diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _London +Confederate States Aid Association_ which came to the attention of Adams +and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early +meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who +reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3 +Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons +and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome +guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and +got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was +present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing +a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in +such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South. +Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold +regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a +shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for +non-attendance[1142]. + +Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly +its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal +to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence +Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to +match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and +carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles +of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their +cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places, +ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity +toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of +America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the +South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's +emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers +of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling +and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of +the constitution read: + + "The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation + of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of + the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily + but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition + by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system + of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, + in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine + the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of + property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true + civilization of the negro race[1144]." + +The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of +heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one +guinea annually) was large enough to attract the elite, but it remained +to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet +the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a +curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring +that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 +at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on +January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade +Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to +a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall +in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent +of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their +resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against +them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while _The +Index_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great +activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The +reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters, +from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective +counties[1146]." + +Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association +programme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of +standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes +it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England--already +largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his +"Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made +the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest +presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of +Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith +appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the +aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the +Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause. +Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list +of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title +and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for +its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148]. + +It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern +Independence Association at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the end +of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public +meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy +organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first +move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the +_Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should +render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On +January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the +public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen +the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the +Government is entirely wrong": + + "I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the + Government persisted in proceeding further, that our + Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed) + would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if + we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that + we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the + purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the + South might not require them. I think public opinion will go + with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his + failings--loves fair play[1149]." + +It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was +thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the +_Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's +policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to +bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an +_Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a +corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a +Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the +"acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister": + + "Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is + blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. + We can trace his influence in the detention of the + _Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which + have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at + Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to + alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in + accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When + one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to + marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one + reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is + Earl Russell[1151]." + +But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], +the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home +the meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging the +Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an +effort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, to +belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by +the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries +out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent. +Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus +on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building. +Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into +details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on +the _policy_ of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of +the _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the +uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of +justice[1153]." + +As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff +manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other +were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to +protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language. +Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the +North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for +interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South +on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate +debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern +answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by +force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were +already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As +to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never +pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great +Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for +ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid +no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in +political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the +measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by +Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of +establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on +imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to +explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great +Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be +refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British +withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold +Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the +project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it +and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a +matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to +learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and +France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly +at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed +to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican +policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of +helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158]. + +For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a +firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately +the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he +began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the +South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government. +As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could +be made to see this. + + "... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it + worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they + are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or + lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. + If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New + Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates + Charleston and Savannah[1159]." + +This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the +United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the +warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long +confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was +acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire" +must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864, +Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of +the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military +expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the +arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially +by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, +often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing +of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to +avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he +ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]." + +Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and +disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already +attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety +to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the +Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry +in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an +increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in +large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle +'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply, +easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few +Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive +immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the +efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid +resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of +Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental +agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into +the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered +under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit. +Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of +these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to +secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to +red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers. + +As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps +were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few +cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of +_bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations +in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of +enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams, +investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized +Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been +dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour +emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden +increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and +public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel +_Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board +fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received +indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men +had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at +Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well +under way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed the +men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give +orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation +against the consul but it still remained a question whether the +commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British +neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded +guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of +the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, +April 11, of further investigation[1166]. + +The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in +1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not, +therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past, +named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying +off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, +forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject +of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply +made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law +and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations +than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the +Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July, +1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of +Russell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed on +many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry +for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of +Danish policy. + +In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side +in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question +which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence +until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of +Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the +Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of +Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional +act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The +law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days +later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to +hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from +Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The +Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of +Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had +given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various +occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour +for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point +of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A +distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when +Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, +thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed +command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. + +This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's +utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet +colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British +public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain +could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on +Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the +Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time +threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and +unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government +laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that +should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige. +Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, +broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which +could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it +became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the +defence of the Danish King. + +From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier +stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential +bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that +in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association +on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, +Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move +by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other +rumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that an +important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore, +the herald of this glad news also wrote: + + "Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The + Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar + the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain + in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]." + +Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme +Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made +clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect +the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant +and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political +questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon +disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and +threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much +trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public +demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be +known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and +recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once +declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties. +Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break +up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of +the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would +be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready +to support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ and +from experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debate +in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the +provinces[1175]." + +Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began +anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in +America. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at the +very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited +the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had +then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no +moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would +result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and +defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to +Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with +Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential +feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a +_party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing +Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly +understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial +desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to +find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American +policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27: + + "I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter + of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in + regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am + therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On + this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on + Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another + meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there + as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at + present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by + the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent + our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the + motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point + will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings + forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see + the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the + American question are so well known. As no competent member + however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the + responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable + to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the + subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He + sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, + therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the + result of which was that if I brought forward a motion + somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be + prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him + again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about + was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply + regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the + people of the United States and the Confederate States of + North America by the continuance of the war which has been so + long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government + will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in + conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a + cessation of hostilities.'" + +Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to +return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this +Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay +strongly urged Mason to come over: + + _I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston. + It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters + I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of + much service to the South[1177]." + +Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association +permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _The +Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letter +was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had +come for action: + + "215 _Regent Street, + London, W. + May 28th_, 1864. + + "SIR, + + "The Society which has the honour to present to you the + accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in + Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken + by the Government of this country in concert with other + Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the + belligerents in North America. + + "I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you + will, before the Session closes, support a motion in + Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see + evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in + this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before + you[1178]." + +Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred +the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter, +following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive. +The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful. +Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall, +that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and +that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay +had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to +shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority +to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined +to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, +or at least suggestion: + + "Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation + with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not + have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once + acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to + a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it. + + "Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special + Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full + powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire + to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even + without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have + had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]." + +The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last +paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay +renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming +success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston +and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures +when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of +recognition of the Confederacy: + + "I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering + that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly + hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., + etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable + effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He + again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South + could not be effected by the North, and he added that he + thought the people of the North were becoming more and more + alive to the fact every day." + +Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell +and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be +plain sailing: + + "Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern + facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that + all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an + end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. + He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I + ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I + may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has + been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day, + that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion + at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared + to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed + much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it + is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is + supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby + is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive, + and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would + seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any + motion which would not be carried." + +Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London. + + "Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must + earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much + wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can + do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great + service to your country_[1180]." + +Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have +amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his +"gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary +motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked +for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other +light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from +joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the +Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not +clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been +hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much +was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. +The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In +addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over +Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in +this the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the +Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular +letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on +Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture. +Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the +feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not +be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in +Parliament: + + "The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is + disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here + contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation + would strengthen his hands[1182]." + +This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later +objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be +unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of +the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern Independence +Association_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to +join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some +specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he +favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and +as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the +mild lines of Lindsay's original motion: + + "Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, + still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to + have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have + consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to + bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the + Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the + resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be + allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only + quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will + avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.' + + "This is just leaving the Government where they have been all + along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest + opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!" + +Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the +leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay +the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his +motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it. +Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it +should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern +forces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meeting +fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy +advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the +West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in +England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason +understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and +had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the +interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell: + + "Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance + that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well + disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that + the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and + that neither could union be restored nor the South brought + under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell + said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for + discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is + to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it." + +This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest +opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell +scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It +must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to +Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but +political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming +contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary +management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with +Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to +suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, +and found him unexpectedly in agreement: + + "I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, + editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his + connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the + latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands + and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he + would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_. + Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon + our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay + that the movement could not be in better hands and as there + were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I + thought the better policy would be for the present that he + should be silent and to await events[1186]." + +Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best +advantage the South to be rid of Russell: + + "If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, + Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being + brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he + can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us + perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified + assent[1187]." + +But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British +policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a +change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory +attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of +course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the +Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was +renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster +followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of +censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental +policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the +Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial +majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of +Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was +needed[1189]. + +Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with +Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in +view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it +resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the +South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to +acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming +Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have +said little. + + "At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that + he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt + obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the + obligation would be increased if I could take with me any + expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared + to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense + that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as + I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be + better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my + opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as + that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]." + +Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason +wrote: + + "My own impressions derived from the whole interview are, + that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the + separation of the States is final and the independence of the + South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under + the menaces of the North[1191]." + +Slidell's comment was bitter: + + "I am very much obliged for your account of your interview + with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had + anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said + even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has + now arrived when it is comparatively of very little + importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A + plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]." + +Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had +nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge +the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed much +the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _Morning +Herald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview +with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties": + + "The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the + result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of + implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; + that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated, + and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition." + +In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen, +noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential +gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a +cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of +the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting +the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution +_after_ the political storm had passed and not before--when the +deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no +deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before +the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no +party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received +Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was +to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation +itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this +demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _The +Index_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston: + + "... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he + has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he + can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by + telling them that + + They who in quarrels interpose + Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)-- + + a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the + British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as + not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]." + +Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into +personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming +contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]." +But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to +London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad +taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of those +who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had +been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London +was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument +for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the +break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was +due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and +recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without +intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated that +mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely +desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet +one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as +reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but +just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the +powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as +of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that +British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of +the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant +to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed +to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war" +was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each +of the three preceding years. + +Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically +ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but +British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a +confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed its +strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped +upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 1130: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1131: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1132: _The Index_, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518.] + +[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London was +ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My recollection is that +while many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those who +favoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open +(i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South, +much as its splendid courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in +Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of +these pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is +clear from the reports in _The Index_.] + +[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1135: _Ibid._, The _weight_ of the _Times_ is here evident +even though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence, +R.I., in 1864, be true that the London _Daily Telegraph_, a paper not +committed to either side in America, had three times the circulation of +the _Times_. (_The Liberator_, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made +on the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown University.] + +[Footnote 1136: _Ibid._, That Mason did contribute Confederate funds to +Spence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount is +uncertain.] + +[Footnote 1137: _The Index_, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance of +representatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifested +throughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R. +Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs. +Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W. +Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse, +Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, the +Secretary of the Association, was also present. The districts were +severally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs. +Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J. +Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield; +Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and +Saddleworth--Mr. Lees, J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge; +Heywood--Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley +(Chorley)---Mr. J. Beesley, etc., etc."] + +[Footnote 1138: So reported by _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, in +comment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughout +Lancashire.] + +[Footnote 1139: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22.] + +[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason.] + +[Footnote 1141: _The Liberator_, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract from +the London _Morning Star_ of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson.] + +[Footnote 1142: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18. +Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by the +Association.] + +[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women. +"Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insulted +virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty and +omnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object the +highest human aims--the amelioration and exaltation of humanity."] + +[Footnote 1144: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee of +organization was as follows:-- + + The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian, + The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath, + The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., + The Lord Eustace Cecil, + The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe. + The Right Honourable Lord Campbell, + The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P., + The Honourable Robt. Bourke, + Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax, + Colonel Greville, M.P., + W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P., + T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P., + A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq., + W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P., + G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P., + Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P., + James Spence, Esq., Liverpool, + William Vansittart, Esq., M.P. + + * * * * * + + Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq. + Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil. +] + +[Footnote 1145: _The Liberator_, Feb. 26, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1146: _The Index_, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing reply +from an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. One +would like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was. +"An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to +become a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should take +that open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to +the neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and +responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto +invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of +opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by my +former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from the +reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of the +Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectually +in my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my +'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunities +of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself.'"] + +[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman had +much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in the +Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozanne +wrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy, +increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedom +of discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque, +patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, it +favours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class of +thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends to +elevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially he +insisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissed +slavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higher +objects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175).] + +[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 1150: The _Alexandra_, as a result of the Court's decision, +was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceeded +to Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of +the Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the close +of the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard, +pp. 354-5.)] + +[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.] + +[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII.] + +[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1154: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1156: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1157: _Ibid._, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1158: _Ibid._, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1160: April, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, and +F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. A +Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmed +Lyons' reports.] + +[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The tone +of the _New York Herald_ might well have given cause for anxiety. "In +six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to a +close. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments that +have either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'the +belligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid +which they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how they +swell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have +unemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops +in the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the +French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our +powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in European +affairs." (Quoted by _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 203.)] + +[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 563, states that great +efforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both to +secure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and even +since the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreign +element, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way +of determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were +kept. A Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15, +1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the +several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at which +time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), the +figures of nativity stood: United States, 341,569; Germany, 54,944; +Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; England, 16,196; and various +other countries no one of which reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics +really mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do not +show _when_ the foreign-born came to America; further, from the very +first days of the war there had been a large element of American +citizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the +British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figures +given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38,000 +subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862, +48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, and this +figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds were +from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in 1863, considering the +number of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evident +that the bulk must have gone into labour supply.] + +[Footnote 1164: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. +"Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of British +subjects."] + +[Footnote 1165: The _Times_, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. +"Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen at +Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.] + +[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney case +see _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence +respecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United States +Army." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.] + +[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353, +and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, papers +were asked for on "Emigration to America," and readily granted by the +Government.] + +[Footnote 1169: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch. +VI.] + +[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell) +was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at this +time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of the +Queen. (Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, Ch. XVI.)] + +[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason, +April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received by +Delane from Mackay, the _Times_ New York correspondent. The expected +Southern victory was to come "in about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)] + +[Footnote 1173: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1175: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers.] + +[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1180: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a dark +picture for Northern armies.] + +[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed by +F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.] + +[Footnote 1183: _Ibid._, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams to +Seward, June 2, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Mason +wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends and +followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motion +as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's _Mason_, p. 500. To Benjamin, June +9, 1864.) Evidently the friend was Hunter.] + +[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1188: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1189: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch. +VI.] + +[Footnote 1190: Mason's _Mason_, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1192: _Ibid._, To Mason, July 17, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1193: _The Index_, July 21, 1864, p. 457.] + +[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864.] + + + +CHAPTER XVI + +BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH + +After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and of +Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but later +involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, had +reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To the +European neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appeared +to the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years of +fighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied a +short conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and with +each additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increase +of the forces employed and a psychological change in the people whereby +war seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American Civil +War, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources +employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," to +date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreign +observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparent +check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America had +become engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope of +emergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge of +the steady decline of the resources of the South even though Jefferson +Davis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, had +spoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief in +stalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for +the function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until its +independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England both +felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitude +of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefinite +Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions. + +There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered these +Southern champions. The North was at last fully identified with the +cause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By +1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject and +even in the original constitution and address of the Southern +Independence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for the +gradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason some +heartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply +being that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offered +gratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that +the topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand, +at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, there +arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "In +Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and the strongest man on the +board, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I went +up to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]." + +Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southern +armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," and by mere +iteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it was +repeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled to +meet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," argued the +error of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in +characterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there could +be no effective British push for Southern independence and it asserted +that slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not exist +in the Confederacy. + + "... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the + condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and + otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending + such practices to say that the South does none of these + things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in + practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a + soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in + the social order in a subordinate place, and of an + intellectual organization which requires guardianship with + mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery, + because it developed itself out of an older and very + different one of that name, but for this the South is not + to blame. + + * * * * * + + "But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so + long as they make no determined effort to relieve the + Southern character from this false drapery, they will never + gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of + Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke + effective assistance.... The best assurance you can give that + the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands + is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she + has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and + benefactor of that race. + + * * * * * + + "It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such + expressions as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from + the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As + a concession they are useless; as a confession they are + untrue.... Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen + that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say + the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not + that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves + never were treated before, that she has used power as no + nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she + has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem + which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he + might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at + hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark + and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required + all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now + is[1200].'" + +In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slavery +was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic +institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was +evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation +edicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March, +quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon a +report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read +before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author +and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the +contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and +placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a +fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to +emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American +War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel +with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is +justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate +a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political +freedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]...." + +Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many +sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_, +acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the +carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and +intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the +end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern +meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief +period in the fall just before the Presidential election in +America[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole +period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were +almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and +religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An +analysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, and +in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following +classification[1203]: + + YEAR. NUMBER. CHARACTER. + ANTI-SLAVERY + AND RELIGIOUS WORKING-MEN. + 1860 3 3 - + 1861 7 7 - + 1862 16 11 5 + 1863 82 26 56 + 1864 21 10 11 + 1865 5 4 1 + +Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as +speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with +frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John +Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A. +Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and +Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great +majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing +districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old +anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most +active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the +moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompson +asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and +energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or +city[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the +most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, +not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206]. +Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the +North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament, +rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and +became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested +by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the +appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred +Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of +San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern +commerce[1207]. + +This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the +relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus +indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation +of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of +English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of +resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was +exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the +more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a +sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in +opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and +France[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of +the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these +Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He +wrote to Lyons: + + "I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes + of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward + should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to + distract their attention from the arduous task they have so + wantonly undertaken[1209]." + +Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought +that the current of political opinion was running against the +re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of +expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the +"peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any +solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly +advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment +the better[1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he +stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military +probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout +all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of +warning as to the great power and high determination of the North. + +But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory +of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only +hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading +British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in +the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected +defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the +few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily +professing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of the +metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from +the columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming a +position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the +war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent, +Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the +_Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its +readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured +to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. +Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation +throughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlier +years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year +of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting +reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the +West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. The +same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to +be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond +who wrote in contempt of Grant's army. + + "I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in + which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of + the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured + victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and + Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines.... + The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are + contemplating an army which is at once republican and + undisciplined[1212]." + +At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading +paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to +prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers +to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was either +ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment +during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and +determination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that the +earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. One +element in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartiality +accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and +wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as +making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a +_Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for +a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared: + + "Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only + shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian + philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command + admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and + contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]." + +Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was at +bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said: +"There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity +of the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies were +in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your +double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus +in[1216]." In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war the +Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its +preachments[1217]. + +There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not +greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly +_Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war +correspondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after his +famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after +the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of +the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was +the real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed in +Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after +the event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for that +journal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidents +unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern +disaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those in +the service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation of +Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite +readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct +appreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time to +time proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in such +terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with +the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most +definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864: + + "The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by + itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it; + and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and + resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually + dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the + Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the + matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that + its component parts can never again be welded into a + Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common + executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only + that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding + States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has + arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and + spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the + Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North + be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the + action of force for that of free will, we think it will + reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...." + +Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the +"Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiate +the _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description and +estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them +and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a +fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment +editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta: + + "The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North + have so long been fixed promises to become a source of + fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not + advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously + with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has + eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the + enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been + nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington + civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous + spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]." + +Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the +Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's +defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the +citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern +weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed +in _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, got +frequent quotation: + + "We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you + have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly + be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years + longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals + override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings + forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You + have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory, + and we must have both_[1223]." + +It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an +important bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressing +admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident +of his defeat: + + "... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a + still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his + predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty + miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous + country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line + as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal + general having ventured far from water communications. That + Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both + courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in + a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]." + +And W.H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approaching +disaster: + + "The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous + as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman. + Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an + ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank + and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking + eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer + despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to + shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know + that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful + artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners + have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of + average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]." + +On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city of +Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the +_Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was +unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and, +two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political +struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, +would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226]. +Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks +earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta: + + "General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an + able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he + won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which + carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of + Georgia[1227]." + +But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would +acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Not +so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than he +would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for some +time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from the +summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctly +interpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a renewed +determination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured. +Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected: + + "The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as + an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the + Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently + desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments + when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for + recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not + come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be + publicly made[1228]." + +The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in the +election, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicate +process of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at the +point where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did +so by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party +convention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an +excellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peace +afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late +analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called for +a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restore +peace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumed +temporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its hands +of further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected: + + For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it + otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that + we are aware of against the present Government of America. + Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position, + they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights + of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from + the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we + have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly + withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade + are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an + equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the + vast impulse that has been given towards the development of + the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not + been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of + our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and + without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon + itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from + his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage + his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less + and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will + ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more + likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far + beyond the present division between North and South.... Were + we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always + assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view + the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should + rejoice that the American people, untaught by past + misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, + and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln + as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady + continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that + the people of this country view the prospect of another four + years of war in America with very different feelings. They + are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of + their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the + path that leadeth to destruction[1230]. + +Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would +again be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledge +its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting +that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty +in escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232]," +but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and +results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that +election day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanism +known to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it +continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it +dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for +justice and honour throughout the world[1233]." Again official England +was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adams +paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief +informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in +determining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by +Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident +unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was +inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential election +in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events. +Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in +America to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, as +always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to +Russell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreign +policy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering +purposes[1236]." Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four +days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as +possible all business with him until after the election[1237]." By +November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in +replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he was +entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious +difficulties with Great Britain. + + "... I do not think the U.S. Government have any + ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing + themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their + existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and + buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the + popular clamour is over[1238]." + +In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212 +electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the +_Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendous +majority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Having +prophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back for +her behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith" +against reunion: + + "Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln + I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so + far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the + measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most + creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the + elections ... passed off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln + has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems + little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action, + or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of + his second period of government will find him President of + the United States[1239]." + +The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious in +comment: + + "Ever since he found himself firmly established in his + office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had + begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of + the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been + less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due + allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his + situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such + been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige + of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this + country what the necessities of his situation demanded from + him, and he has done no more[1240]." + +This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the real +reaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix, +bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the ashes +where lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the +_liberties_ of America[1241]. + +During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election English +friends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twitted +that at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_, +Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free Trade +Hall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there +met with opposition from those who attended. At three other places, +Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the +manufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, as +reported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy, +leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives," +the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, and +presumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted +"follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an +appearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as +"the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a meeting held at all +comparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northern +friends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture this +meeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned by +handbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" there +gathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between +5,000 and 6,000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children +in their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment, +had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to +be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threatening +violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed as +to seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the misery +and the revolutionary character of the meeting: + + "That in consequence of the widespread distress that now + prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the + war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's + Government should use their influence, together with France + and other European powers, to bring both belligerents + together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of + life and property that is now going on in that unhappy + country[1246]." + +No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truth +it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress in +Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, while +elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was with +the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signature +among the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by the +administration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on the +ground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier, +in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he might +the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _The +Index_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congress +at Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a plan +of transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and +thus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was +hard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in fact +no evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the +part of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms +in defence of his country[1248]. + +This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon the +absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however, +permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, and +indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in the +spring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11, +Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe a +communication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto," of which the +blockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth the +objects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition: + + "'All they ask is immunity from interference with their + internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the + undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life, + liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common + ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to + the Social compact[1249].'" + +Russell replied, November 25: + + "Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception + of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both + the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement + of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's + Government have continued to entertain sentiments of + friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the + causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never + presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this + sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period + of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that + they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the + rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial + Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully + maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]." + +If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto," and had +sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let the +slaves win their freedom," the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yet +at the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, the +current of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favour +of the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him as +attempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend": + + "The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the + representatives of the Confederate States without appearing + rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to + acknowledge the authority of the United States without + affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two + pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts + his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in + recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the + other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or + two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto + stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue + to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting + that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that + if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict + neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of + friendship to either belligerent[1251]." + +This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifying +the allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion to +which the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed and +that Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" from +Atlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were +appalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The +son of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron +wall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a +step after all[1252]." + +The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the event +falsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after having +acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the +_Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that: + + "... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and + Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the + South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than + could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though + Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away + piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the + Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the + wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body + which now represents the Federal States of North + America[1254]." + +But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and foretold +with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_, +privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, while +publicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had not +been heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December +5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficulties +to be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on +December 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his +inability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta: + + "If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the + great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into + Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will + succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that + his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was + unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the + most remarkable feature of the war, according to the + President, is the wild and desperate effort of an + out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position + which, whatever effect it may have had on the election, + should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at + all[1255]." + +This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review of +Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that his +sole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coast +where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken a +definite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive that +Sherman would venture to attack Savannah: + + "For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is + essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring + point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be + equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create + it[1256]." + +Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowed +championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserve +British confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of the +North were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged in +by that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superior +information. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on +the American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern +cause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received that +Savannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_ +recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern +prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long +silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial +wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a +complacent resumption of authoritative utterance. + +For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall of +Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the +_Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the South +waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the +_Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then but +half-heartedly. + + "The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's + march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of + the most singular military achievements of the war. + + "... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the + possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his + army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the + better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as + desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of + retreat could make it, the command of a point near the + sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously + an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of + subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be + commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the + Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact + that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the + capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage + of the war. + + "... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would + be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression + unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]." + +Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture +presented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent, +printed in this same issue: + + "No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the + heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of + conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the + Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the + first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again, + and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for + the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the + next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest destiny is + to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to + conquer." + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233.] + +[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192.] + +[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.] + +[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the +_Reader_ for March 19.] + +[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have found +record of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour +Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_. +Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that +the South was the best buyer of English goods.] + +[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all +held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of +1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866.) The list may be +regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention +of _The Liberator_ and of Adams.] + +[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared +by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English +colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy +and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having +rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."] + +[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum, +of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An +Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and +Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute +to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with +the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page +list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern +friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, +John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them +Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this +society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four +hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the +activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis +Train, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-three +speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in +England.")] + +[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. +296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem +held by the United States of America for the high character and steady +friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of +the South have been given in Chapter XV.] + +[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the time +and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the +thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing +the development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutrality +and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States +and Russia_, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You +have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you +have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large +and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical +importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.] + +[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.] + +[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and +July 5, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to +his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the +atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our +success is not admitted."] + +[Footnote 1214: _Ibid._, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.] + +[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles of +Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more +marked in 1864.] + +[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War ran +two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every +three days.] + +[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know, +perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was +tabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even after +my return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Army +and Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be +weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such +ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I +maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment" +(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865, +Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the _Times_ followed my advice, how +different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal, +but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from +America." (Atkins, _Life of W.H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also +Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the +_Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left +it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task +in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ may +be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to +the _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding +the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for +its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This +dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A +Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North +and South'"), published in London in 1863.] + +[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1221: _Ibid._, June 25, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials +might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_ +and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not +examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond +determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional +special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to +warrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencing +opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in: + + (1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in + Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV, + p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_, + Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the + United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the + following facts of circulation are derived: + +(A) _Daily Papers_: + + (1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150,000 (neutral). + + (2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern). +Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but with +small circulation (Southern). + + (3) The _Times_ (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The +prestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearing +in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_." +Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as +well-known ... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our +European kings.... The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarch +of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.) + + (4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000), +but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the +Clubs (neutral). + + (5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6,000 (Northern). + + (6) _The Morning Star_, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000) +(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright +was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits. +_The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular. + + (7) _The Morning Post_, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as +Palmerston's organ. + + (8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties +(neutral). + +(B) _Weekly Papers._--No approximate circulation figures are available, +but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers. + + (1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny +paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing +districts (Northern). + + (2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper." + + (3) _The Spectator_ (Northern). + + (4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern). + + (5) _The Economist_ (Neutral). + + (6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern). + +In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment +_The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _Westminster +Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester +Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and some +few others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863.) +The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ to +be like that of the _Times_. +] + +[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231.] + +[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention, +modified this in his letter of acceptance.] + +[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1233: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was more +divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in +America. The _Siecle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman as +about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie, +Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neither +occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the +defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood +on July 22." (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent +wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in +the Shenandoah Valley: + +"The _Siecle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal, +whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of +which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the +American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are +running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at +last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to +the Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high a +pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_ + +"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines +undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what +will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses +himself relative to the issues of the coming election? + +'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South +will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to +barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the +labour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight, +and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify and +regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their +own hands....' + +"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the +robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for +the welfare of the American brethren. + +"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of +delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent +writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France. +(_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.) + +A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money" +pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, under +the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business +of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the +benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This +bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. +Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully +deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he +stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the +French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in +the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly +superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his +own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty +toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)] + +[Footnote 1235: e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society, +Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.)] + +[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1237: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons +reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America. +Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great +Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave +offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise +and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government. +No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, +even though at first sharing in the view that there was small +possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to +Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the +relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the +Government at home.] + +[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of a +silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is +an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those +who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power +though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.] + +[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker +to Garrison, August 27, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1243: _Ibid._, Nov. 4, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the +meeting at Ashton.] + +[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.] + +[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.] + +[Footnote 1249: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell, +Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden +and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).] + +[Footnote 1250: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the +"Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to +his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233.] + +[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864.] + +[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping +up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.] + +[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown by +Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams' +Letters_, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever +that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in +attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is +enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the +sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on +Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."] + +[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864. +Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving +such deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864, +p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and +threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive +deputations.] + +[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for +the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in +Ch. XVIII.] + +[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865.] + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +THE END OF THE WAR + + "I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this + moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and + our people and indeed our Government is more moderately + disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from + a member of the Government that it is believed that the + feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has + been steadily improving[1261]." + +Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Three +weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours that +Europe was still planning some form of intervention to save the South: +"_All parties and classes_ here are resolved on a strict +neutrality[1262]...." This was a correct estimate. In spite of a +temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewed +assertions from the South that she "would never submit," British opinion +was now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict was +soon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina, +was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, though +since midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yet +known to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while his +ability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedom +with which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederate +capital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city. +Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, by +illness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could be +spared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters. +Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advance +northwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee, +to end, it was hoped, in writing _finis_ to the war. + +From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in +Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter date +he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance and +easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, was +burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in North +Carolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress was +encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, in +command of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperate +effort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was +at Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to +cut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an +energetic offensive. + +In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond, +thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, to +come out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front. +The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment of +Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city on +the night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of +joining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at +Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston +surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of the +war and of the Confederacy. + +[Illustration: THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET! _Reproduced by permission +of the Proprietors of "Punch"_] + +The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865 +when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreign +observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseen +from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperate +courage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equally +desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederate +agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery in +return for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, Southern +Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and was +committed to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his +withdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any +point to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of +Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other +representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than a +beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond not +only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messenger +also of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly and +with full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction was +therefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in +Paris early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such +an offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London. + +The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reached +London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuation +of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressed +by Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wish +to see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, on +receiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been +consulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as ready +as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay until +more favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason's +instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or +resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13, +therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview and +was promptly granted one for the day following. + +Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgment +that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himself +to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country in +condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form of +allusion to the _concession_ we held in reserve, as would make him +necessarily comprehend it[1266]," and turning again and again to a +supposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition, +Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not +mentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the +South had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British +objections to recognition were those which had long since been stated, +and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called on +the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he had +long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston's +Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery to +recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone by +now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spoken +boldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of +1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its present +overture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinion +clashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to be +hoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could +help the South. + +There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southern +effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some such +move was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southern +fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attention +was fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North and +South and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles in +a foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society +and gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen +enemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The +Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had +learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davis +by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state of +Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln of +armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would be +popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269] +to-morrow." In London the _Army and Navy Gazette_ declared that Davis +could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any other +terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of a +common aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams pictured +all British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near, +and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders of +public opinion as the _Times_, adding that it was being "whispered about +that if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army +left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility to +this country[1271]." + +The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator. +He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward +to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. But +Lincoln made positive in his instructions three points: + + (1) Complete restoration of the Union. + + (2) No receding on emancipation. + + (3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war, + and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government." + +A few days later the President decided that his own presence was +desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads +Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates did +indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditional +American object," using the argument that _after_ such a war restoration +of the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was not +Great Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There was +much discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading +Southern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for +comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would be +entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southerners +urged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessation +of hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads. +Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On +all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect +about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]." + +When news of the holding of this conference reached England there +occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created by +the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "The +consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]." What did the +United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general that +peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with this +country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite +apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to Seward; and he +advised that it might be well for the United States "to consider the +question how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance"; +due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders who +had been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that might +now fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the +United States might aid in the coming elections in retaining the +Government in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be +desired[1274]. + +Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of that +given earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was then +in no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent in +tone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting the +enemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposed +of abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and the +agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were but +defensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. These +matters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but with +discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as +inopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward's +complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment +would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and +disarming our own friends[1277]." The day before this was written home +Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the +agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United +States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great +Lakes[1278]. + +Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over +a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was +seriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not share +this fear, but Delane, of the _Times_, kept it alive in the public mind, +and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger. +"I do not know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to +his American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about +to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely +less horrible[1279]." Governmental circles, however, belittled the +agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was +assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign +war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the +Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as +but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been +flatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March +13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in +Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with +America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general +tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful +relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left +criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing +members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the +pacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch with +America his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances that +the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly +friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was +to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to +and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physical +power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence and +moderation in tone[1283]." + +Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible +effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time +anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee's +surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the _Times_ and +other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspaper +comment on the event followed closely that of the _Times_, rendering +honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing +_finis_ to the war: + + "Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the + extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other + commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this + war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count + a series of more brilliant victories than the force which, + raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia, + has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the + hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have + now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious + until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour, + and then they fell with honour[1286]." + +The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowly +developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, a +fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very first +of military nations[1287]." No one remained to uphold the Southern +banner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even they +were hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own +courage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming +disaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace +on the basis of separation; finally, "5th. _I know_ that no terms of +peace would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the +conclusion of this letter he acknowledged: + + "I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume, + that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived + from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace + would be entertained that did not rest on + _independence_[1288]." + +But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied: + + "I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning + of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With + Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular + organized armies and I can see no possible good to result + from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must + submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for + vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under + our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a + soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes.... I am + sick, sick at heart[1289]." + +The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of a +serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial on +the end of the war the _Times_ took occasion to pay a tribute to the +statesman whom it had been accustomed to berate. + + "There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire + to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance + of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in + the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we + trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by + gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his + term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities + which have been raised by these years of war[1290]." + +Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of British +statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to be +regarded in an aspect far different from that with which he was +generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports of +Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was received +also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attack +on Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror. +"Few events of the present century," wrote Adams, "have created such +general consternation and indignation[1291]." + +In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot by Booth, +a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the box where the +President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next morning. On the same +evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man was admitted to Seward's +house on the plea that he had a message from the physician, passed +upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's son at the door of the sick room. +Beating the son into semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had +missed fire, the stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as +he lay in bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward +rolled off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides, +his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved, +probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw fractured in +the runaway accident nine days before[1292]. The assailant fought his +way out of the house and escaped. For some days Seward's life was +despaired of, whether from his injuries or from shock. + +These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit in the +hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense represented the +feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, that abroad so +horrible a crime should react both to the detriment of the Confederacy +and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with the North took the form +of a sudden exaltation of the personality of Lincoln, bringing out +characterizations of the man far different from those which had been his +earlier in the war. The presence of a "rural attorney" in the +Presidential office had seemed like the irony of fate in the great +crisis of 1861. Even so acute an observer as Lyons could then write, +"Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto given proof of his possessing any natural +talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois +village politics. He seems to be well meaning and conscientious, in the +measure of his understanding, but not much more[1293]." But Lyons was no +more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all characterizations, +whether American or foreign, were of like nature. + +But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a different +estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for the growth of +his personal authority and for his steadiness of purpose, with criticism +of his alleged despotism. Now, with his death, following so closely the +collapse of the Confederacy, there poured out from British press and +public a great stream of laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a +national recantation. In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as +a few dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, _Punch_ led the +way in a poem by Tom Taylor: + + "_You_ lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier, + _You_, who with mocking pencil wont to trace, + Broad for the self-complacent British sneer, + His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face." + + * * * * * + + "Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer, + To lame my pencil and confute my pen-- + To make me own this hind of princes peer, + This rail-splitter a true-born king of men[1294]." + +Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of Lincoln, +stood the _Times_. Severely reprobating the act of Booth and prophesying +a disastrous effect in the treatment of the conquered South, it +proceeded: + + "Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest + eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a + make-shift, simply because Mr. Seward and their other + prominent leaders were obnoxious to different sections of + the party, it was natural that his career should be watched + with jealous suspicion. The office cast upon him was great, + its duties most onerous, and the obscurity of his past career + afforded no guarantee of his ability to discharge them. His + shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The education of a + man whose early years had been spent in earning bread by + manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults of + manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the + outset. In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won + for himself the respect and confidence of all. His perfect + honesty speedily became apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more + to his credit, amid the many unstudied speeches which he was + called upon from time to time to deliver, imbued though they + were with the rough humour of his early associates, he was in + none of them betrayed into any intemperance of language + towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His utterances + were apparently careless, but his tongue was always under + command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which + served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy + of bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way + gradually to his conclusions, and those who will compare the + different stages of his career one with another will find + that his mind was growing throughout the course of it." + + * * * * * + + "The gradual change of his language and of his policy was + most remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who + showed the best characteristics of their race in his respect + for what is good in the past, acting in unison with a + recognition of what was made necessary by the events of + passing history[1295]." + +This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far warmer +expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all England, there +appeared another and longer editorial: + + "If anything could mitigate the distress of the American + people in their present affliction, it might surely be the + sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We + are not using the language of hyperbole in describing the + manifestation of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has + been witnessed in our generation.... But President Lincoln + was only the chief of a foreign State, and of a State with + which we were not infrequently in diplomatic or political + collision. He might have been regarded as not much more to us + than the head of any friendly Government, and yet his end has + already stirred the feelings of the public to their + uttermost depths." + + * * * * * + + "... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to + fill the country with grief and indignation, but to evoke + almost unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted + bodies. It was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the + murder reached us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and + Commons, the Corporation of the City of London, and the + people of our chief manufacturing towns in public meeting + assembled had recorded their sentiments or expressed their + views. In the House of Lords the absence of precedent for + such a manifestation was actually made the subject of remark. + + "That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the + tragical character of the event and the horror with which the + crime is regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble + the the fact that the loss which the Americans have sustained + is also thought our own loss in so far as one valuable + guarantee for the amity of the two nations may have been thus + removed. But, upon the whole, it is neither the possible + embarrassment of international relations nor the infamous + wickedness of the act itself which has determined public + feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine + sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck + down by an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the + trouble which at a crisis of their destinies such a + catastrophe must bring. Abraham Lincoln was as little of a + tyrant as any man who ever lived. He could have been a tyrant + had he pleased, but he never uttered so much as an + ill-natured speech.... In all America there was, perhaps, not + one man who less deserved to be the victim of this revolution + than he who has just fallen[1296]." + +The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on receipt +of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and Commons for +an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next," expressing "sorrow +and indignation" at the assassination of Lincoln[1297]. April 28, +Russell instructed Bruce to express at Washington that "the Government, +the Parliament, and the Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of +abhorrence of the criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious +crimes, and sympathy for the Government and People of the United +States[1298]...." Russell wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The +Queen wrote a personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce +had written from Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the +South in his party[1299]," and he was extremely anxious that Seward's +recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of Sumner's +assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss terribly the +comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward[1300]." + +[Illustration: BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA. _Reproduced by +permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_] + +The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which the +public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in this +country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes of +society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and +resolutions[1301]...." Indeed all the old sources of "addresses" to +Adams on emancipation and many organizations having no professed +interest in that subject now sent to him resolutions--the emancipation +societies, of horror, indignation, and even accusation against the +South; the others of sympathy, more moderate in tone, yet all +evincing an appreciation of the great qualities of Lincoln and of the +justice of the cause of the North, now victorious. Within two weeks +Adams reported over four hundred such addresses from Emancipation +Societies, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities, +boroughs, churches, indeed from every known type of British +organizations[1302]. + +On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for debate. In +the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving qualities of +Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost by his death. +Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of the world at Booth's +act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the United States, but +repeated the old phrase about the "North fighting for empire, the South +for independence," and hinted that the unusual step now being taken by +Parliament had in it a "political object," meaning that the motion had +been introduced in the hope of easing American irritation with Great +Britain[1303]. It was not a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in +the Commons, Disraeli, saved his party from criticism by what was +distinctly the most thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day. +Palmerston was ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who +incautiously began by asserting that the majority of the people of Great +Britain had always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of +"No, no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said: + + "There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation + approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking, + are supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form + the happy privilege of private life; and this is one. Under + all circumstances we should have bewailed the catastrophe at + Washington; under all circumstances we should have shuddered + at the means by which it was accomplished. But in the + character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his + last moments there is something so homely and so innocent + that it takes as it were the subject out of all the pomp of + history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart + of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind. + + "Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this + House, and in the country generally on the policy of the late + President of the United States, on this, I think, all must + agree, that in one of the severest trials which ever tested + the moral qualities of man, he fulfilled his duty with + simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible for the people of + England, at such a moment, to forget that he sprang from the + same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue. + + "When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to + fall into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of + the causes and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one + of our duties to reassure the country under unreasoning panic + or despondency. Assassination has never changed the history + of the world.... + + "In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the + citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their + elected Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of + depression, but rather let us express a fervent hope that + from out the awful trials of the last four years, of which + not the least is this violent demise, the various populations + of North America may issue elevated and chastened; rich in + that accumulated wisdom, and strong in that disciplined + energy which a young nation can only acquire in a protracted + and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not merely + to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will + renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind. + It is with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to + the Crown[1304]." + +Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British popular +sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and the North +victorious. But officially the Government had not yet recognized this. +Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had returned to the old proposal +that the nations of Europe should withdraw their recognition of +Southern belligerent rights[1305], and in March he had asked Stoeckl, +the Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion of +this measure to England and France[1306]. Meanwhile Sherman's army was +rapidly advancing northward and reports were arriving of its pillagings +and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in the Commons whether the +Government was taking any steps to prevent the destruction of British +property and received from Layard an evasive reply. Merely a "confident +hope" had been expressed to the United States that "every facility will +be given" to British subjects to prove ownership of property[1307]. +Evidently the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at +a moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events +of the war. + +Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination of +Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from active +duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on England--a +fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great Britain in that it +gave time for a clearer appreciation of the rapidity and completeness of +the collapse of the South. May 15, Lord Houghton asked whether the +Government did not intend, in view of recent events in America, "to +withdraw the admission of belligerent rights conceded to the so-called +Confederate States." Russell promptly objected to the form of the +question: England had not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had +merely issued a proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared +the existence of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no +other recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade, +and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal of the +neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official announcement from +the United States that the war was at an end. Texas was still in arms +and Galveston still blockaded, and for this section the United States +would no doubt continue to exercise on neutral vessels a belligerent +right of search. It followed that if Great Britain did prematurely +withdraw her proclamation of neutrality and the United States searched a +British vessel, it would be the exercise of a right of search in time of +peace--an act against which Great Britain would be bound to make +vigorous protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming +the end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at the +prospect of peace[1308]. + +But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. Seward, +though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was eager to +resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was held at his +house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some anxiety that America +was about to _demand_ the withdrawal by Great Britain of belligerent +rights to the South, that if Great Britain would but act before such a +demand was made it would serve to continue the existing good feeling in +America created by the sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially, +that there was a decided danger to good relations in the fact that +Confederate cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be +sent to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and +supplies[1309]. Three days later Bruce repeated his warning[1310]. This +was, apparently, a complication unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any +case Russell at once made a complete face-about from the policy he had +outlined in reply to Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in +Paris to notify France that England thought the time had arrived for +recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the +question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper treatment +in British ports[1311]. Thus having given to France notice of his +intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, on June +2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was ended and +stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were to be +treated[1312]. Here was prompt, even hurried, action though the only +additional event of war in America which Russell could at the moment +cite to warrant his change of policy was the capture of Jefferson Davis. +On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce stating what had been done and +recognizing the "re-establishment of peace within the whole territory of +which the United States, before the commencement of the civil war, were +in undisturbed possession[1313]." + +This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's caustic +criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's previous +inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government had not stuck to +its earlier position and calling attention to the fact that the United +States, while now proclaiming certain ports open to trade, yet specified +others as still closed and threatened with punishment as pirates, any +vessel attempting to enter them. Derby desired information as to what +the Government had done about this remarkable American proclamation. +Russell, "who was very imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it +was embarrassing that no "regular communication" had been received from +America giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two +Confederate cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to +various Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had +consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the United +States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The "piracy +proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby pushed for an +answer as to whether the Government intended to let it go by unnoticed. +Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce showed that "notice" had been +taken of it. Derby asked whether the papers would be presented to +Parliament; Russell "was understood to reply in the affirmative[1314]." +Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a hectoring of Russell for his quick +shift from the position taken a month earlier. But the very indifference +of Russell to this attack, his carelessness and evasion in reply, +indicate confidence that Parliament was as eager as the Government to +satisfy the North and to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken +by Bruce at Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to +report it to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and +probably a mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners[1315]. Russell +instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had been +captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there was +presumably no port left where it could be applied[1316]. + +In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrun +diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces still in the +field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington all +was temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illness +of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russell +fortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 as +ending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essential +injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South, +and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he +yet admitted that normal relations were again established and +acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of +search[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament, +reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the +United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great +Britain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not +expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutrality +position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood +and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the +expression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimate +friendship between the two nations[1319]." + + * * * * * + +Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January, +1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which +occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching +dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of the +world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto +blocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or more +hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her +plaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal +dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which +it has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return +for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed +support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the +slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all +nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and +the United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious +projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]." + +This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated +frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two +years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The French +Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzled +himself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own +interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint +action in support of the South[1321]. + +The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded was +such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing, +apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late +'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to the +expansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged to +have been an error and in its place there sprang into being a conviction +that the might of America would tend toward the greatness of England +itself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all +British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the +quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there were +those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North and +South, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy. + +The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, was +prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear of +maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North, +which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like that +of every other European state, believed that a revolution for +independence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful as +that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on, +the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much +uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire was +first of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any other +motive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately +for America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by cool +heads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved, +permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle +in the American crisis. + +This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both North +and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathy +and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" is +evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment, +could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl, +who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state," unaffected by popular +emotions. Aside from race, which could be claimed also by the South, the +one great argument of the North in appeal to England lay in the cry of +anti-slavery. But the leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself +unsympathetic with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the +British Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of +strict neutrality. + +In all this the Government but pursued that line which is the business +of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and power of the +state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and the British +recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there came, as is evident +from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone and acts, a growing belief +that the North might after all succeed in its purpose, at least of +subjugating the South. This would mean the possibility of continuing +that policy of friendship for a united America which had been determined +upon in the 'fifties. Here was no special sympathy, but merely a cool +calculation of benefits to Great Britain, but there can be no question +that the general attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was +distinctly favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began +to replace a "cold neutrality." + +But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard national +interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own authority and +seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, never greatly +stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised an increasing +pressure by the force of public approval. It made impossible any attempt +to overthrow the Ministry on the score of non-interference in America, +or of favouritism toward the North. It gave to an enthusiastic and +vociferous section of the British public just ground for strong support +of Lincoln and his cause, and in some degree it affected +governmental attitude. + +There was, however, another question, much more vital than emancipation +in its relation to British home politics, that ran like a constant +thread through the whole pattern of British public attitude toward +America. It had always been so since the days of the American revolution +and now was accentuated by the American war. This was the question of +the future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the result of that +war? And if so where lay British interest? Always present in the minds +of thoughtful Englishmen, appearing again and again through each +changing phase of the war, this question was so much a constant that to +have attempted discussion of it while other topics were being treated, +would have resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made +the subject of a separate and concluding chapter. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1261: Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. Hist. Soc. +_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 132).] + +[Footnote 1262: To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (_Ibid._, p. 133).] + +[Footnote 1263: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 343] + +[Footnote 1264: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1265: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, March 5 and 6, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1266: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, March 15, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1267: Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. (Richardson, II, pp. +709-17.)] + +[Footnote 1268: _Ibid._, p. 717.] + +[Footnote 1269: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 24, 1865. No. +187. It is interesting that just at this time Gortchakoff should have +sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by one, C. Catacazy, employe of +the Foreign Office and long-time resident in the United States, in which +was outlined a plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum +specified that such an offer should be based on the idea that the time +had come for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both +North and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's +interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain. +Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to Stoeckl's +judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian Archives. F.O. to +Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)] + +[Footnote 1270: Feb. 4, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1271: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 254. To his son, Feb. +10, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1272: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 410-14.] + +[Footnote 1273: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 256. To his son, Feb. +17, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1274: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182. +Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1275: _Ibid._, p. 112. Adams to Seward, Feb. 2, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1276: _Ibid._, p. 180. Seward to Adams, Feb. 21, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1277: _Ibid._, p. 199. Adams to Seward, March 9, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1278: _Ibid._, p. 197. Seward to Adams, March 8, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1279: March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, II, p. 361.)] + +[Footnote 1280: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. 23 and March +13, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1281: "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted to +have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style of +oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of the +House, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine, +which has the aid of a strong and savoury medium to overwhelm the +nauseous taste." (_U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246. +Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865.)] + +[Footnote 1282: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1283: _Ibid._, p. 262. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Adams +wrote of his own situation that it "seems at last to be getting easy and +comfortable, so far as freedom from anxiety is concerned." (_A Cycle of +Adams' Letters_, II, p. 258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)] + +[Footnote 1284: Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at Washington, reached New +York on April 7. His first letter to Russell from Washington, dated +April 14, stated that America was certainly preparing to oust Maximilian +in Mexico, and that even the Southern prisoners were eager to join the +United States troops in an expedition for this purpose. +(Russell Papers.)] + +[Footnote 1285: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Part II, p. 323. +Adams to Seward, April 20, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1286: April 24, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1287: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1288: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 23, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1289: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, April 26, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1290: April 24, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1291: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331. +Adams to Seward, April 28, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1292: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 417.] + +[Footnote 1293: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 9, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1294: May 6, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1295: April 27, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1296: April 29, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1297: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 and 1081.] + +[Footnote 1298: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. +"Correspondence respecting the Assassination of the late President of +the United States."] + +[Footnote 1299: Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April 18, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1300: _Ibid._, April 24, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1301: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 267. Charles Francis +Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1302: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865-66_, Pt. I, pp. 344, +361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May 11, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1303: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p. 1219.] + +[Footnote 1304: _Ibid._, pp. 1242-46.] + +[Footnote 1305: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. 16, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1306: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March 1-13, 1865. No. +523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.] + +[Footnote 1307: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p. 1922.] + +[Footnote 1308: _Ibid._, CLXXIX, p. 286.] + +[Footnote 1309: F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to Russell, May 16, +1865.] + +[Footnote 1310: _Ibid._, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, May 19, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1311: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. +"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North +America." No. 10.] + +[Footnote 1312: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting the Cessation of +Civil War in North America."] + +[Footnote 1313: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the +Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9.] + +[Footnote 1314: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp. 1-6.] + +[Footnote 1315: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. +"Correspondence respecting President's Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865." +Bruce to Russell, May 26, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1316: _Ibid._, June 16, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1317: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the +Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9. Seward to Bruce, June +19, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1318: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p. 1143.] + +[Footnote 1319: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1865, _Commons_, Vol. LVII. +"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North +America." No. 10.] + +[Footnote 1320: Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec. 23, 1859/Jan. 4, +1860. No. 146.] + +[Footnote 1321: _Ibid._, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 17-29, 1861. No. 267. He +reports that he has seen a confidential letter from Thouvenel to Mercier +outlining exactly his own ideas as to England being the sole gainer by +the dissolution of the Union.] + +[Footnote 1322: For an analysis of this change see _The Cambridge +History of British Foreign Policy_, Vol II, p. 277, which also quotes a +remarkable speech by Disraeli.] + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE + +On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's surrender +to Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the Commons the first +serious debate in thirty-three years on a proposed expansion of the +electoral franchise. It was a dramatic coincidence and no mere +fortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen who had seen in the +Civil War a struggle as fateful in British domestic policy as in that of +America herself. Throughout all British political agitation from the +time of the American revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of the +American "example" as argument to some for imitation, to others for +warning. Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing his +impressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental and +political institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of what +was desirable in his own country[1323]. In the ten years immediately +preceding the Civil War most travellers were laudatory of American +democracy, and one, the best in acute analysis up to the time of Lord +Bryce's great work, had much influence on that class in England which +was discontented with existing political institutions at home. This was +Mackay's _Western World_ which, first published in 1849, had gone +through four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was frequently +reprinted[1324]. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no longer an +experiment; its success and permanence were evident in the mighty power +of the United States; Canada would soon follow the American example; the +"injustice" of British aristocrats to the United States was intentional, +seeking to discredit democracy: + + "... Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with their + judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the + interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever + it is found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the + people have too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided + them in their object. They recognize America as the + stronghold of republicanism. If they can bring it into + disrepute here, they know that they inflict upon it the + deadliest blow in Europe[1325]." + +On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued the +inapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain[1326]. The +theoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects admirable +but in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of the mob and had +debased the nation in the estimation of the world; bribery in elections, +the low order of men in politics and in Congress, were proofs of the +evils of democracy; those in England who clamoured for a "numerical" +rather than a class representation should take warning from the American +experiment. Occasionally, though rarely, there appeared the impressions +of some British traveller who had no political axe to grind[1327], but +from 1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing on +America was coloured by the author's attitude on political institutions +at home. The "example" of America was constantly on the horizon in +British politics. + +In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb since the +high tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to have made a +private agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory parties would +oppose any movement toward an expansion of the franchise[1328]. Lord +John Russell, in his youth an eager supporter of the Reform Bill of +1832, had now gained the name of "Finality John" by his assertion that +that Reform was final in British institutions. Political reaction was in +full swing much to the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden and +their supporters. When the storm broke in America the personal +characteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and Davis, +took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme importance as if +representative of the political philosophies of the two sections. +Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis' "culture" was +aristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had "aristocratic" views +on government[1329]. But that this issue had any vital bearing on the +quarrel between the American sections was never generally voiced in +England. Rather, British comment was directed to the lesson, taught to +the world by the American crisis, of the failure of democratic +institutions in _national power._ Bright had long preached to the +unenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and these +had long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a result of +democratic institutions. At first the denial was now repeated, the +_Saturday Review_, February 23, 1861, protesting that there was no +essential connection between the "shipwreck" of American institutions +and the movement in England for an expanded franchise. Even, the article +continued, if an attempt were made to show such a connection it would +convince nobody since "Mr. Bright has succeeded in persuading a great +number of influential persons that the admission of working-men into the +constituencies is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground that +it has succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panacea +against the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of old +Governments in Europe." Yet that the denial was not sincere is shown by +the further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of Birmingham and +other kindred platforms must bear the blame of the inference, drawn +nearly universally at the present moment, that, if the United States +become involved in hopeless difficulties, it would be madness to lower +the qualification for the suffrage in England." + +This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the American +struggle and British institutions was not long persisted in. A month +later the _Saturday Review_ was strong in contemptuous criticism of the +"promiscuous democracy" of the North[1330]. Less political journals +followed suit. The _Economist_ thought the people of England would now +be convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who had +advocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm, +gratitude and shame[1331]." Soon W.H. Russell could write, while still +at Washington "... the world will only see in it all, the failure of +republican institutions in time of pressure as demonstrated by all +history--that history which America vainly thought she was going to set +right and re-establish on new grounds and principles[1332]." "The +English worshippers of American institutions," said the _Saturday +Review_, "are in danger of losing their last pretext for preferring the +Republic to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England.... It now +appears that the peaceable completion of the secession has become +impossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground of +superiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be advantageously +contrasted with Queen Victoria[1333]." + +These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of the war +and may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers rather than as +attempts to read a lesson to the public. No such expressions are to be +found in the letters of leading officials though minor ones occasionally +indulged in them[1334]. As late as June, 1861, Adams declared that while +some in England welcomed American disunion as a warning to their +countrymen it was evident that but a small number as yet saw the cause +of the North as identical with the world progress of free +institutions[1335]. Evidently he was disappointed that the followers of +Bright were not exhibiting more courage and demanding public support of +the North as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangely +silent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. It +required time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the American +question and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic Britain +was first to declare a definite lesson to be learned, thereby bringing +out the fighting qualities of British democracy. Throughout 1861, the +comment was relatively mild. In July, _Blackwood's_ declared: + + "It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of + America for her own institutions and political tendencies + that we do not now see in the impending change an event + altogether to be deplored. In those institutions and + tendencies we saw what our own might be if the most dangerous + elements of our Constitution should become dominant. We saw + democracy rampant, with no restriction upon its caprices. We + saw a policy which received its impulses always from below + ... nor need we affect particularly to lament the exhibition + of the weak point of a Constitution ... the disruption of + which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages which + America owes to England, and which have contributed so + powerfully to her prosperity...." + + "With a rival Government on the frontier ... with great + principles to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we + should probably see the natural aristocracy rise from the + dead level of the Republic, raising the national character + with its own elevation[1336]." + +In the same month the _Quarterly_, always more calm, logical and +convincing than _Blackwood's_, published "Democracy on its Trial[1337]." +"The example of America kept alive, as it had created, the party of +progress"; now "it has sunk from the decrepitude of premature old age." +If England, after such an example, permits herself to be led into +democracy she "will have perished by that wilful infatuation which no +warning can dispel." + +Adams had complained that few British friends of progress identified the +cause of the North with their own, but this was true of Americans also. +The _Atlantic Monthly_ for July 1861, discussed British attitude wholly +in terms of cotton supply. But soon there appeared in the British press +so many preachments on the "lesson" of America that the aristocratic +effort to gain an advantage at home became apparent to all[1338]. The +_Economist_ moralized on the "untried" character of American +institutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant as the +"masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual still more +worthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral degradation" to the +level of their constituents[1339]. "The upper and ruling class" wrote +Bright to Sumner, were observing with satisfaction, "that democracy may +get into trouble, and war, and debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has done +for this country[1340]." Thus Bright could not deny the blow to +democracy; nor could the _Spectator_, upbraiding its countrymen for lack +of sympathy with the North: "New England will be justified in saying +that Old England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimental +pretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with cotton +against the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her gentle regret +over the new impulse given to slavery by her lively gratification over +the paralyzing shock suffered by Democracy[1341]." This was no taking up +of cudgels for the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for. +Vigour rested with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a short +war vanished. The _Saturday Review_ asserted: + + "In that reconstruction of political philosophy which the + American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of + the popular element will be reduced to its due + proportions.... The true guarantee of freedom will be looked + for more in the equilibrium of classes than in the equality + of individuals.... We may hope, at last, that the delusive + confusion between freedom and democracy is finally banished + from the minds of Englishmen[1342]." + +"The real secret," wrote Motley, "of the exultation which manifests +itself in the _Times_ and other organs over our troubles and disasters, +is their hatred, not to America, so much as to democracy in +England[1343]." It was scarcely a secret in the columns of the journals +already quoted. But no similar interpretation had as yet appeared in the +_Times_ and Motley's implication was justified for it and other leading +daily newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leading +the attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright and +his followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis. The +_Edinburgh_ at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the American +dispute[1344], then attributed it to the inevitable failure in power of +a federal system of government, not mentioning democracy as in +question[1345]. _Blackwood's_ repeatedly pushed home its argument: + + "Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that the end + of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than + terrible.... But for our own benefit and the instruction of + the world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so + fatal, of their political system exposed, in the most + effective way.... And the venerable Lincoln, the respectable + Seward, the raving editors, the gibbering mob, and the + swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no malicious tricks + of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are all of + them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic ... + dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the + spoiled child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before + high heaven, and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises, + dies as sheerly from lack of vitality as the oldest of + worn-out despotisms.... In the hope that this contest may end + in the extinction of mob rule, we become reconciled to the + much slighter amount of suffering that war inflicts on + America[1346]." + +Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the cause of +the South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished audience" used +language insulting to the North, fawning upon the South and picturing +the latter as wholly admirable for its aristocratic tendencies. For this +he was sharply taken to task by the _Spectator_[1347]. More sedately the +Earl of Shrewsbury proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracy +and its failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union is +inevitable, and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracy +established in America[1348]." In all countries and at all times there +are men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but in such +utterances as these there is manifest not merely the customary desire to +stand in the limelight of assured knowledge and wisdom, but also the +happy conviction that events in America were working to the undoing of +the Radicals of Great Britain. If they would not be supine the Radicals +must strike back. On December 4, at Rochdale where, as the _Times_ +asserted, he was sure of an audience sympathetic on purely personal +grounds, Bright renewed his profession of faith in the American Republic +and sang his accustomed praises of its great accomplishments[1349]. The +battle, for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challenge +issued by aristocratic England, accepted. + +But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there stood a +group holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the historical +significance of the American collapse. To this group belonged Gladstone, +as yet uncertain of his political philosophy, and regretful, though +vainly, it would appear, of the blow to democracy. He wrote his thought +to Brougham, no doubt hoping to influence the view-point of the +_Edinburgh_. + + "This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor + 'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier + discount since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of + the American constitution in the main fact of the rupture. + On the contrary it was a great achievement to strike off by + the will and wit of man a constitution for two millions of + men scattered along a seaboard, which has lasted until they + have become more than thirty millions and have covered a + whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and follies, not to + say worse, with which the rupture has been met in the + Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not + exposition but) exposure have really given as I have said the + old lady in question such a heavy blow and great + discouragement that I hope you will in the first vigour of + your action be a little merciful and human lest you murder + her outright[1350]." + +On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions the +American Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not believing in +1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade advantage would lead Great +Britain from just rules of conduct. Even in the crisis of the _Trent_ +affair he was firm in this opinion: + + "Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be + disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils, + and much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make + democracy responsible for them, the inexorable logic of + events is contradicting each and every assertion based on + these notions, and proving that the American struggle is, + after all, the ever-recurring one in human affairs between + right and wrong, between labour and capital, between liberty + and absolutism. When such an issue comes to be presented to + the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the disguises + which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to + predict at least which side it will _not_ consent to + take[1351]. + +April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on American +democracy and December its acceptance by Bright. Throughout 1862 he +practically deserted his seat in Parliament and devoted himself to +stirring up labour and radical sentiment in favour of the North. In +January, 1862, a mass meeting at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced the +daily press and was thought of sufficient moment to be reported by +Adams. A motion was carried: + + "That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the + ill-disguised efforts of the _Times_ and other misleading + journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American + questions ... to decry democratic institutions under the + trials to which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of + the working-men especially as unrepresented in the National + Senate to express their sympathy with the United States in + their gigantic struggle for the preservation of the + Union[1352]...." + +The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in the +controversy. The _Morning Post_, stating with conviction its belief that +there could be no re-union in America, added: + + "... if the Government of the United States should succeed in + reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still extensive + dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest triumph + since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the ample + satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is + even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate + not only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can + ride safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf + every other craft laden with human destinies; that it can + descend to the darkest depths of adversity, and rise from + them all the stronger for the descent.... And who can doubt + that Democracy will be more arrogant, more aggressive, more + levelling and vulgarizing, if that be possible, than it ever + had been before[1353]." + +By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that the +political controversy in England had an important bearing on the +attitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of _Fraser's +Magazine_ seemed turning to one-sided presentation of the "lesson" of +America. Mill's defence of the North, appearing in the February number, +was soon followed in July by the first of a series of articles, +"Universal Suffrage in the United States and Its Consequences," +depicting the war as the result of mob rule and predicting a military +despotism as its inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losing +strength, wrote Adams: + + "That the American difficulties have materially contributed + to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the + leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United + States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. + The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate + subdivision of America into many separate States which will + neutralize each other. This is most visible among the + conservative class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of + liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the + nursery of them[1354]." + +From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully aloof at +least in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell commented to +Palmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson by De Witt, which +is both interesting and instructive. It shows how the Great Republic of +Washington degenerated into the Democracy of Jefferson. They are now +reaping the fruit[1355]." Was it mere coincidence or was there +significance in an editorial in Palmerston's alleged "organ," the +_Morning Post_: + + "That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure to the + calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably false. + But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful + Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United + States during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a + democratic tyranny compared with which the most corrupt + despotisms of the Old World appear realms of idyllic + happiness and peace, have gratefully recognized the finger of + Providence in the strife by which they have been so + frightfully rent asunder[1356]...." + +In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again brought +into action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than heretofore. +"For a great number of years," said the _Quarterly_, "a certain party +among us, great admirers of America ... have chosen to fight their +English battles upon American soil." Now the American Government "has +disgracefully and ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evident +that "political equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera[1357]." +At last, in November, the _Times_ openly took the position which its +accusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial utterances +almost from the beginning of the Civil War. + + "These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form of + government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city + attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if + such a terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in + England we should at the earliest moment possible have sent + the incapables about their business, and put ourselves in the + hands of better men...." + + "This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model + for imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how + it works now, when for the first time it has some work to do. + We believe that if the English system of Parliamentary action + had existed in America, the war could not have occurred, but + we are quite sure that such Ministers would have long since + been changed[1358]." + +In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the failure of +democracy, the open friends of the South dilated also upon the +"gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and society. This was +the frequent burden of articles in _The Index_ in the early weeks of its +publication. To this was soon added a picture of Northern democracy as +composed of and controlled by the "immigrant element" which was the +source of "the enormous increase of population in the last thirty years" +from revolutionary areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carried +with them more than their strong arms, they imported also their theories +of equality.... The revolutionary party which represents them is at this +moment master in the States of the North, where it is indulging in all +its customary licence[1359]." This fact, complained _The Index_, was not +sufficiently brought out in the English press. Very different was the +picture painted by Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states: + + "... this man has his romance, his high poetic feeling, and + above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him + without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers + and old flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws + the signs of ague and sickness; but he will stand upright + before you and speak to you with all the ease of a lettered + gentleman in his own library. All the odious incivility of + the republican servant has been banished. He is his own + master, standing on his own threshold, and finds no need to + assert his equality by rudeness. He is delighted to see you, + and bids you sit down on his battered bench, without dreaming + of any such apology as an English cotter offers to a Lady + Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his independence, + and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He tells you + of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will + always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some + token of advance in education. When he questions you about + the old country he astonishes you by the extent of his + knowledge. I defy you not to feel that he is superior to the + race from whence he has sprung in England or in Ireland." + + * * * * * + + "It is always the same story. With us there is no level of + society. Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd + congregates near the bottom, and the lower steps are very + broad. In America men stand upon a common platform, but the + platform is raised above the ground, though it does not + approach in height the top of our staircase. If we take the + average altitude in the two countries, we shall find that the + American heads are the more elevated of the two[1360]." + +A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative and +aristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy and its +lesson to England was most marked and most open at the moment when the +Government was seriously considering an offer of mediation in the war. +Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of September, 1862, had +appeared. It did not immediately affect governmental attitude, save +adversely to the North, and it gave a handle for pro-Southern outcry on +the score of a "servile war." Indeed, the radicals were at first +depressed by it; but when months passed with no appearance of a servile +war and when the second emancipation proclamation of January, 1863, +further certified the moral purpose of the North, a great element of +strength was added to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous +"addresses" to Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for the +cause of anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation of +American political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter Hall, +January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an American +paper as largely deriving its strength from the universal +dissatisfaction of the lower orders of the English people with their +existing conditions under the Crown: + + "The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing under + the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the + contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the + soil, the grievous effects of the laws of entail and + primogeniture, whereby they are kept poor and rendered liable + to starvation and pauperism--these have looked to America as + the model democracy which proves the poor man's capacity for + self-government." The meeting was called for seven o'clock + but at half after five the hall was filled, and at six + crowded. A second hall was filled and outdoor meetings of two + thousand people organized in Exeter Street. "All + working-class England was up in arms, not so much against + slavery as against British oligarchy[1361]." + +The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had caused +anxious consideration to the managers of the _Times_, and the decision +to step more warily. No doubt this was exaggeration of the political +character and effect of the meeting, but certain it is that the +political element was present joining hands with anti-slavery +enthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the last confident and vigorous +expression of the "failure" of democracy, from sources professedly +neutral, appeared immediately after the St. James' Hall meeting, but was +necessarily written before that meeting took place. _Blackwood's_, in +its issue of February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man in +this country now acknowledges ... that we have already gone as far +toward democracy as is safe to go.... This is the great moral benefit +which we have derived from the events in America." John Blackwood was an +intimate friend of Delane, editor of the _Times_, holding similar views +on political questions; but the _Times_ was suddenly grown cautious in +reading English political lessons from America. In truth, attack now +rested with the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand[1362]. +He now advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North to +the offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merely +because it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it desired +to make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was the +negro[1363]. It was now Radical purpose to keep the battle raging and +they were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the United States might well +recognize its opportunity in this controversy and give aid to +its friends: + + "After all, this struggle of ours both at home and abroad is + but a struggle between the principle of popular government + and government by a privileged class. The people therefore + all the world over are in a species of solidarity which it is + our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost[1364]." + +But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the democratic +movement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise, developed, he yet +feared that the extremes to which Bright and others were going in +support of the North might create unfortunate reactions in the +Government. Especially he was anxious that the United States should not +offer opportunity for accusation of interference in a British political +quarrel. It is noteworthy that while many addresses to Lincoln were +forwarded by him and many were printed in the annual publication of +diplomatic correspondence, those that thus appeared dealt almost +exclusively with emancipation. Yet Adams was also forwarding addresses +and speeches harping on American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh, +February 19, found place, in its emancipation aspect in the United +States documents[1365], but the burden of that meeting, democracy, did +not. It was there proclaimed that the British press misrepresented +conditions in America, "because the future of free political +institutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of Independence +and in the State Constitutions of the Northern States, would be a +standing argument against the expansion of the franchise and the +enjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a convenient +argument in favour of the continued domination of our aristocratic +parties[1366]." The tide of democratic feeling was rising rapidly in +England. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a recent debate in +Parliament that that body was much more judicious in expressions on +America than it had been before 1862. "It will not escape your +observation that the question is now felt to be taking a shape which was +scarcely anticipated by the managers [of the _Times_] when they first +undertook to guide the British mind to the overthrow of free +institutions in America[1367]." + +On the evening of the day on which this was written there occurred the +greatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the aristocracy, of +the meetings held to support the cause of the North. This was the +spectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of London at St. James' Hall, +on March 26, usually regarded as the culminating effort in Bright's tour +of England for the cause of democracy, but whose origin is somewhat +shrouded in mystery. Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceived +the idea of the meeting and was responsible for its organization[1368]. +The press generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting." Adams wrote to +Seward of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the University +of London, to send a representative from the American Ministry, Beesly +expanding upon the importance and high standing of the Trades Unions. To +this Adams demurred but finally sent his son to sit in the audience and +report the proceedings. + +Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the most +important of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the Civil +War, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle of +democracy." Save for some distinguished speakers those in attendance +consisted almost wholly of three thousand picked representatives of the +Trades Unions of London. Adams transmitted to Seward his son's report of +the meeting, its character, composition, names of speakers and their +emphatic expressions of friendship for the North[1369], but it is again +noteworthy that Henry Adams' clear analysis of the real significance of +the meeting was not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence. +Giving due praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commenting +on press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were only +brought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright," Henry Adams +continued: "That this was not the case must have been evident to every +person present. In fact, it was only after he closed that the real +business of the evening began." Then followed speeches and the +introduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a bricklayer ... Mr. Odgers, +a shoemaker ... Mr. Mantz, a compositor ... Mr. Cremer, a joiner, who +was bitter against Lord Palmerston ... Mr. Conolly, a mason...." and +other labouring men, all asserting "that the success of free +institutions in America was a political question of deep consequence in +England and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavourable +to the North." No one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what was +intended." + + "The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength and + no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a + direct political bearing on internal politics in England it + needed little of doing so. There was not even a profession of + faith in the government of England as at present constituted. + Every hostile allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the + opinions of the 'privileged classes,' was received with warm + cheers. Every allusion to the republican institutions of + America, the right of suffrage, the right of self-taxation, + the 'sunlight' of republican influence, was caught up by the + audience with vehement applause. It may therefore be + considered as fairly and authoritatively announced that the + class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of + the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an + act almost without precedent in their history, the principle + that they make common cause with the Americans who are + struggling for the restoration of the Union and that all + their power and influence shall be used on behalf of the + North[1370]." + +Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege," and his +appeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America have been +given in a previous chapter[1371]. Evidently that appeal, though +enthusiastically received for its oratorical brilliance, was unneeded. +His was but an eloquent expression of that which was in the minds of his +audience. Upon the American Minister the effect was to cause him to +renew warnings against showing too keen an appreciation of the support +of political radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at once +stirred anxiety in Parliament and verged: + + "... much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic + politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or + sympathize with by Foreign Governments.... Hence it seems to + me of the greatest consequence that the treatment of all + present questions between the two nations should be regulated + by a provident forecast of what may follow it [the political + struggle in England] hereafter. I am not sure that some + parties here would not now be willing even to take the risk + of a war in order the more effectually to turn the scale + against us, and thus, as they think, to crush the rising + spirit of their own population. That this is only a feeling + at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a policy + may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon + the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if + possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such + hopes.... We owe this duty not less to the great body of + those who in this kingdom are friends to us and our + institutions, than to ourselves[1372]." + +[Illustration: JOHN BRIGHT (_From a photograph taken of him in the +attitude in which he usually spoke_) (_From Trevelyan's "Life of John +Bright_")] + +Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect to +democratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received a +deputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutions +passed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed fears +that a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain and +America, and that this would have a disastrous influence on the +aspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms of +appreciation for the sympathies expressed by the meeting but +carefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose. "He was +too prudent," said the _Times_ in reporting the deputation, "to appraise +the importance of the particular demonstration to which his notice was +invited ..." and his reply was given favourable comment[1373]. This +reply, wrote Adams, "appears to have had a sedative effect[1374]." +Meanwhile, Bright continued his preachment to the English people though +modifying his tone of fierce accusation against "privilege," and +confining himself to declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in the +American conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Society +of London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people in +this country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I say that +these have an interest, almost as great and direct as though they were +living in Massachusetts or New York, in the tremendous struggle for +freedom which is now shaking the whole North American Continent[1375]." +Like utterances were repeated at further public meetings and so +insistent were they as to require reply by the conservative faction, +even if, as was supposed, the effect of the Trades' Union attitude had +been to give a halt to the vehemence of those who had been sounding the +"lesson" of American failure in democracy. Bright became the centre of +attack. The _Times_ led. + + "His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the + Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant + Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it + must go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives + up all his most cherished notions and all his less absorbing + principles...." + + "Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion and + his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master + passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He + worshipped it while rising to its culminating point, and he + is obliged to turn right round to worship it while setting. + He did not himself know, until tested by this great trial, + how entirely his opinions as to war and peace, and slavery + and freedom, and lust of conquest and hatred of oppression, + were all the mere accidents which hung loosely upon him, and + were capable of being detached at once in the interest of the + ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant Democracy. + Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been a + failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright + up to this time has been but a foolish dream[1376]." + +Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness; but an +"if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American democracy, +caused less by the progress of the war than by the rising excitement of +democratic England. The _Times_ editorial just quoted appeared when the +faith was generally professed that Lee was about to end the war through +the invasion of Pennsylvania. In the reaction created by the arrival of +the news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned his +Government against either a belligerent or interfering attitude toward +Great Britain, but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supreme +importance in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is to +show, by our example to the people of England in particular, and to all +nations in general, the value of republican institutions." There was +still a general belief in the incompetency of those institutions. "The +greatest triumph of all would be to prove these calculations vain. In +comparison with this, what would be the gain to be derived from any +collision with the powers of Europe[1377]?" + +It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of English +opinion on American democracy few in America itself appreciated the +significance of the British controversy. J. M. Forbes, who had been on a +special mission to England, wrote to Lincoln, on his return[1378]: + + "Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his glorious band + of English Republicans see that we are fighting for Democracy + or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal + institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world + are as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have + on this side. + + Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and + the Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of + the People against an Aristocracy[1379]." + +But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly always came +from men who had been abroad and had thus come into direct contact with +British political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's retreat from Pennsylvania +had produced a like retreat in the opinions on the failure of democracy +earlier confidently held by the professedly neutral press. In September, +having arrived at the point by the usual process of gradually facing +about, the _Times_ was bold enough to deny that England had any personal +feeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had anything +to do with English attitude on the war[1380]. Thenceforth neither the +_Times_ nor any of the leading papers saw fit to revive with vigour the +cry of "democracy's failure," no matter how persistent in proclaiming +ultimate victory for the South. Aristocratic exultation had given place +to alarm and it seemed wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue[1381]. Not +so the Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in the +minds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence but +increased firmness debated the question in every public meeting +favourable to the North[1382]. Many Conservatives, Adams reported, were +now anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a difficult +one because of their irritation at Bright's taunts[1383]. Bright's star +was rising. "The very moment the war comes to an end," wrote Adams, "and +a restoration of the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reaction +that will make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man in +England[1384]." + +The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly one-sided. +In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent upon the more +eager and professed friends of the South to take up the cudgels. Hence, +in part, came the organization of the Southern Independence Association +and the attempt to hold public meetings favourable to the South, in the +early months of 1864. Much talk had been spent on the "British issue" +involved in the war; there was now to be vigorous work to secure +it[1385]. _The Index _plunged into vigorous denunciation of "The +Manchester School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better for +the future call the American School." Even the Government was attacked +for its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining as a +member Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that he shared +Bright's views on democracy: + + "That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter the + Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament + despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and + vituperation, his vulgarity, and his incurable want of + veracity, had made him so hateful to the educated classes + that it would have required no common courage to give him + office; his insolent sneers at royalty would have made his + appointment little less than a personal insult to the Queen; + and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable + colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a + faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other + existence but what it borrowed from him, while its previous + life and education had accustomed it to the society of + statesmen and of gentlemen[1386]." + +Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they were +too evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical and +pro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the Southern +Independence Association, analysed with clarity the situation. Answering +criticisms of the passionate mob spirit of Northern press and people, he +accused the _Times_ of having + + "... pandered to the hatred of America among the upper + classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at + least had been taught by what we have lately seen not to + shrink from an extension of the suffrage, if the only bad + consequence of that measure of justice would be a change in + government from the passions of the privileged class to the + passions of the people.... History will not mistake the + meaning of the loud cry of triumph which burst from the + hearts of all who openly or secretly hated liberty and + progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the Great + Republic." British working men "are for the most part as well + aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right + of labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can + be that the other cause in his[1387]." + +The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as an +institution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the front +in politics. This was very largely a result of the American Civil War. +Roebuck, after the failure of his effort for mediation in 1863, was +obsessed with a fear of the tendency in England. "I have great faith in +my countrymen," he wrote, "but the experience of America frightens me. I +am not ashamed to use the word _frightened_. During my whole life I have +looked to that country as about to solve the great problem of +self-government, and now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth and +manhood are destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my political +philosophy, and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point[1388]." +More philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule of +aristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the discovery +of some middle ground or method--some "influence [which] may help us to +prevent the English people from becoming, with the growth of democracy, +_Americanized_[1389]." "There is no longer any sort of disguise +maintained," wrote Adams, "as to the wishes of the privileged classes. +Very little genuine sympathy is entertained for the rebels. The true +motive is apparent enough. It is the fear of the spread of democratic +feeling at home in the event of our success[1390]." + +The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser Conservative +elements in proclaming the "lesson" of American democracy--a retreat +caused by alarm at the vigour with which Radicals had taken up the +challenge. Conservative hopes were still fixed upon Southern success and +Conservative confidence loudly voiced. Even the pride of the _Times_ in +the accuracy of its news and in its military forecasts was subordinated +to the purpose of keeping up the courage of the faction it +represented[1391]. Small wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving the +news of Sherman's arrival before Savannah, should be made physically ill +and write to Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow to us as well +as to the South." The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed about +Sherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the mischief[1392]." +"Attenuation" of Northern progress in arms was, indeed, attempted, but +the facts of the military situation were too strong for continued +concealment. From January, 1865, only the most stubborn of Southern +friends could remain blind to the approaching Northern victory. Lord +Acton, a hero-worshipper of the great Confederate military leader, +"broke his heart over the surrender of Lee," but was moved also by keen +insight as to the political meaning of that surrender[1393]. + +So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War in +America was closing in Northern victory that the final event was +discounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for an +English political struggle on the great issue heralded as involved in +the American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a motion in +Parliament for expansion of the franchise the ultra-Conservatives +attempted to read a "lesson" from America. The _Quarterly_ for April, +1865, asserted that even yet "the mass of educated men in England retain +the sympathy for the South which they have nourished ever since the +conflict assumed a decided shape." America was plainly headed in the +direction of a military despotism. Her example should warn England from +a move in the same direction. "The classes which govern this country are +in a minority," and should beware of majority rule. But events +discredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination of +Lincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring of +expressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exalt +Lincoln's leadership in democracy[1394]. + +In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new Parliament. Not a +single member who had supported the cause of the North failed of +re-election, several additional Northern "friends" were chosen, and some +outspoken members for the South were defeated. Adams thought this a +matter deserving special notice in America, and prophesied a new era +approaching in England: + + "As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period marks + an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure + old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the + confidence of the country that it will not appear in that + guise any more. Unless some new and foreign element should + interpose, I look for decided progress in enlarging the + popular features of the constitution, and diminishing the + influence of the aristocracy.... It is impossible not to + perceive traces of the influence of our institutions upon all + these changes.... The progress of the liberal cause, not in + England alone, but all over the world, is, in a measure, in + our hands[1395]." + +The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams anticipated. +Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October 18, 1865. Russell +succeeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost immediately declared +himself in favour of Parliamentary reform even though a majority in both +Houses was still opposed to such a measure. Russell's desertion of his +earlier attitude of "finality" on franchise expansion correctly +represented the acceptance, though unwillingly, by both political +parties of the necessity of reform. The battle, long waged, but reaching +its decisive moment during the American Civil War, had finally gone +against Conservatism when Lee surrendered at Appomatox. Russell's +Reform Bill of 1866 was defeated by Tory opposition in combination with +a small Whig faction which refused to desert the "principle" of +aristocratic government--the "government by the wise," but the Tories +who came into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voiced +even to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill. +Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises," +which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to British +working-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic criticism that all +the planned advantages to Conservatism were soon thrown overboard, and a +Bill presented so Radical as to permit a transfer of political power to +the working classes[1396]. The Reform Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain +from a government by aristocracy to one by democracy. A new nation came +into being. The friends of the North had triumphed. + +Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the incidental +frictions, the effect on trade relations, the applications of British +neutrality, and the general policy of the Government, there existed for +Great Britain a great issue in the outcome of the Civil War--the issue +of the adoption of democratic institutions. It affected at every turn +British public attitude, creating an intensity and bitterness of tone, +on both sides, unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. In +America this was little understood, and American writers both during the +war and long afterwards, gave little attention to it[1397]. Immediately +upon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during the +conflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that "the +territorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of the +Established Church" would have been excusable "if they could only have +said frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions opposed to +their own, instead of talking about their sympathy for the weak, and +their respect for national independence, and their anxiety for the +triumph of Free Trade[1398]." This was stated before the democratic hope +in England had been realized. Three years later the same staunch friend +of the North, now removed to America and occupying a chair of history at +Cornell University, wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of their +attitude: "I fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, that +their defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But I +daresay we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been born +members of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under the +blessed influence of equality and justice[1399]." + +Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian as +well-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one fought +first of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue of democracy +in England seemed of little moment and little to excuse either the "cold +neutrality" of the Government or the tone of the press. To Americans +Great Britain appeared friendly to the dissolution of the Union and the +destruction of a rival power. Nationality was the issue for the North; +that democracy was an issue in America was denied, nor could it, in the +intensity of the conflict, be conceived as the vital question +determining British attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a new +British nation into existence, the nation decrying American institutions +was dead and a "sister democracy" holding out hands to the United +States had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for the +North long remained blind. Not during the generation when Americans, +immersed in a life and death struggle for national existence, felt that +"he who is not for me is against me," could the generally correct +neutrality of the British Government and the whole-hearted support of +Radical England be accepted at their true value to the North. For nearly +half a century after the American Civil War the natural sentiments of +friendship, based upon ties of blood and a common heritage of literature +and history and law, were distorted by bitter and exaggerated +memories. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1323: See my article, "The Point of View of the British +Traveller in America," _Pol. Sci. Quarterly_, June, 1914.] + +[Footnote 1324: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World; or Travels in the +United States in_ 1846-47.] + +[Footnote 1325: _Ibid._, Fourth Edition, London, 1850, Vol. III, p. 24.] + +[Footnote 1326: Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, _The Constitution of the +United States compared with Our Own_, London, 1854.] + +[Footnote 1327: e.g., William Kelly, _Across the Rocky Mountains from +New York to California_, London, 1852. He made one acute observation on +American democracy. "The division of parties is just the reverse in +America to what it is in England. In England the stronghold of democracy +is in the large towns, and aristocracy has its strongest supporters in +the country. In America the ultra-democrat and leveller is the western +farmer, and the aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst the +manufacturers and merchants of the eastern cities." (p. 181.)] + +[Footnote 1328: Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, pp. 293-4, states a Tory +offer to support Palmerston on these lines.] + +[Footnote 1329: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 217.] + +[Footnote 1330: March, 30, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1331: March 16, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1332: To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861. (Bigelow, +_Retrospections_, I, p. 347.)] + +[Footnote 1333: April 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1334: Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861, that the war in +America was the "natural result of the much vaunted system of government +of the United States"; it had "crumbled to pieces," and this result had +long been evident to the public mind of Europe. (F.O., Am., Vol. +780, No. 58.)] + +[Footnote 1335: State Department, Eng., Vol. 77, No. 9. Adams to Seward, +June 21, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1336: I have made an effort to identify writers in +_Blackwood's_, but am informed by the editors that it is impossible to +do this for the period before 1870, old correspondence having been +destroyed.] + +[Footnote 1337: July, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1338: The _Atlantic Monthly_ for November, 1861, takes up the +question, denying that democracy is in any sense "on trial" in America, +so far as the permanence of American institutions is concerned. It still +does not see clearly the real nature of the controversy in England.] + +[Footnote 1339: Aug. 17, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1340: Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. +94.)] + +[Footnote 1341: Sept. 7, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1342: Sept. 14, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1343: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 35. To his mother, +Sept. 22, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1344: April, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1345: Oct., 1861.] + +[Footnote 1346: Oct., 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching by Example."] + +[Footnote 1347: Nov. 23, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1348: Cited by Harris, _The Trent Affair_, p. 28.] + +[Footnote 1349: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, pp. 177 _seq._] + +[Footnote 1350: Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27, 1861.] + +[Footnote 1351: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78, No. 95. Adams to Seward, +Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. +I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word "_not_" is unindicated, by the +failure to use italics.] + +[Footnote 1352: _Ibid._, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams to Seward, Jan. 31, +1862.] + +[Footnote 1353: Feb. 22, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1354: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 80, No. 206. Adams to Seward, +Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV, 78) writes that "the +most significant and touching feature of the situation was that the +cotton operative population was frankly on the side of the North." Lutz, +_Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten +waehrend des Sezessionskrieges_, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysis +of the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude by +factional political idealisms in Germany.] + +[Footnote 1355: Palmerston MS., Aug. 24, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1356: Aug. 30, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1357: October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle and +Recognition."] + +[Footnote 1358: Nov. 4, 1862.] + +[Footnote 1359: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63. (Communication.)] + +[Footnote 1360: Anthony Trollope, _North America_, London, 1862, Vol. I, +p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862, and was in its third +edition by the end of the year. It was also published in New York in +1862 and in Philadelphia in 1863.] + +[Footnote 1361: _The Liberator_, March 13, 1863, quoting a report in the +_New York Sunday Mercury_.] + +[Footnote 1362: Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince, _John Bright_, p. +204, as stating that Bright "was the greatest master of English oratory +that this generation--I may say several generations--has seen. I have +met men who have heard Pitt and Fox, and in whose judgment their +eloquence at its best was inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright. +At a time when much speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated, +eloquence, he maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style in +which he gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts he +desired to utter."] + +[Footnote 1363: Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863. (Robertson, _Speeches +of John Bright_, I, pp. 234 _seq._)] + +[Footnote 1364: Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863. (Bigelow, +_Retrospections_, I, p. 600.)] + +[Footnote 1365: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 123.] + +[Footnote 1366: State Dept., Eng., Adams to Seward. No. 334. Feb. 26, +1863. enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as printed in _The +Weekly Herald, Mercury and News_, Feb. 21, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1367: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157.] + +[Footnote 1368: Spargo, _Karl Marx, _pp. 224-5. Spargo claims that Marx +bent every effort to stir working men to a sense of class interest in +the cause of the North and even went so far as to secure the presence of +Bright at the meeting, as the most stirring orator of the day, though +personally he regarded Bright "with an almost unspeakable loathing." On +reading this statement I wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence and +received the reply that he believed the tradition unquestionably well +founded, though "almost the only testimony available consists of a +reference or two in one of his [Marx's] letters and the ample +corroborative testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others." +This is scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talk +with Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary, and +who attended and reported the meeting, the information was given that +Henry Adams himself had then understood and always since believed Marx's +to have been the guiding hand in organizing the meeting.] + +[Footnote 1369: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 162. +(Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.)] + +[Footnote 1370: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 358. Adams to Seward, +March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams. There was also enclosed +the printed report, giving speeches at length, as printed by _The Bee +Hive_, the organ of the London Trades Unions.] + +[Footnote 1371: See _ante_, p. 132.] + +[Footnote 1372: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 360. Adams to Seward, +April 2, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1373: May 5, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1374: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 243. +Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1375: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, p. 264. In a +letter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863, Bright estimated that there were +seven millions of men of twenty-one years of age and upward in the +United Kingdom, of whom slightly over one million had the vote. +(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 610.)] + +[Footnote 1376: July 2, 1863. The editorial was written in connection +with Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise interesting for an +attempt to characterize each of the speakers in the Commons.] + +[Footnote 1377: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Part I, p. 319. +To Seward, July 23, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1378: See _ante_, p. 130, _note_ 2.] + +[Footnote 1379: MS. letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession of C. F. Adams, +Jr.] + +[Footnote 1380: Sept. 24, 1863.] + +[Footnote 1381: Even the friendly Russian Minister in Washington was at +this time writing of the "rule of the mob" in America and trusting that +the war, "the result of democracy," would serve as a warning to Europe. +(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900.)] + +[Footnote 1382: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and 559. Adams to +Seward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to "keep out of it."] + +[Footnote 1383: _Ibid._, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to Seward, Jan. 29, +1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was partly the +aristocratic antipathy to Bright that had _produced_ the ill-will to the +United States.] + +[Footnote 1384: _Ibid._] + +[Footnote 1385: See Ch. XV.] + +[Footnote 1386: _The Index_, Jan. 28, 1864, p. 58.] + +[Footnote 1387: Goldwin Smith, _A Letter to a Whig Member of the +Southern Independence Association_, London, 1864, pp. 14, 68, and 71.] + +[Footnote 1388: Leader, _Roebuck_, p. 299. To William Ibbitt, April 26, +1864.] + +[Footnote 1389: Arnold, _Mixed Essays_, p. 17. N.Y., Macmillan, 1883.] + +[Footnote 1390: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 86, No. 709. Adams to Seward, +June 9, 1864] + +[Footnote 1391: See _ante_, Ch. XVI.] + +[Footnote 1392: Dasent, _Delane_, II, pp. 135-6. Delane to Dasent, Dec. +25 and 26, 1864. The _Times_ on December 26 pictured Sherman as having +_escaped_ to the sea, but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements.] + +[Footnote 1393: _Lord Acton's Letters to Mary Gladstone_, p. 183.] + +[Footnote 1394: These were not confined to Great Britain. The American +Legation in Berlin received addresses of sympathy from many +organizations, especially labour unions. One such, drawn by W. +Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in part: "Members of the +working-class, we need not affirm to you the sincerity of these our +sympathies; for with pride we can point to the fact, that, while the +aristocracy of the Old World took openly the part of the southern +slaveholder, and while the middle class was divided in its opinions, the +working-men in all countries of Europe have unanimously and firmly stood +on the side of the Union." (_U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865_, Pt. +IV, p. 500.)] + +[Footnote 1395: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865_, Pt. I, p. 417. +Adams to Hunter, July 13, 1865.] + +[Footnote 1396: Disraeli was less disturbed by this than were other Tory +leaders. He had long before, in his historical novels, advocated an +aristocratic leadership of democracy, as against the middle class. Derby +called the Bill "a leap in the dark," but assented to it.] + +[Footnote 1397: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 151-153, summarizes the +factors determining British attitude and places first the fear of the +privileged classes of the example of America, but his treatment really +minimizes this element.] + +[Footnote 1398: Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in America: An Address +read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation +Society." (Jan. 26, 1866.) London, 1866, pp. 71-75.] + +[Footnote 1399: Goldwin Smith, _America and England in their present +relations_, London, 1869, p. 30.] + + + + +INDEX + +Aberdeen, Lord, i. 10, 13, 14, 15; ii. 117 _note_[1] +Acton, Lord, ii. 301 +Adams, Brooks, _The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, cited, ii. 120 + _note_[2], 125 _note_[1], 147 _note_[1], 150 + _note_[1] +Adams, Charles Francis, i. 49, 62-3, 80-1; + attitude in the early days of the American crisis, 49 _and + note_, 55, 63; + appointed American Minister in London, 62, 80-1, 96; + impressions of English opinion on the crisis, 96, 97, 98, 107; + alarm at Seward's Despatch No. 10, i. 127; + attitude of, to the Palmerston-Russell ministry, 170; + controversy on General Butler's order, 302-5; + reports to Seward on British public meetings on Emancipation + Proclamation, ii. 107 _and note_[3], 223; + view of the popular manifestations on Emancipation, 108; + view as to decline of British confidence in the South, 184; + and the London Confederate States Aid Association, 191, 192; + receives deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall + of Savannah, 245 _and note_[1]; + quoted on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war, + ii. 251-2, 253; + on effect in England of the Hampton Roads Conference, 253; + advice of, to Seward on attitude to be observed to Britain, 253-255; + attitude to Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences, + 253-4; + comments of, on parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of + confidence in Lincoln, 255 _and note_[1]; + on feeling in Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt + on Seward, 257, 262-3; + receives addresses of sympathy from British organizations, 262-3; + and formal declaration of the end of the war, 268; + faith of, in ultimate British opinion on the issues in the Civil + War, ii. 283; + views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing + attitude to America 284, 285; + advice to Seward on the political position in relation to + democracy, 290, 294, 296, 298 _note_[1]; + quoted on the rising of democratic feeling in Britain, 291; + disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, 278, 279, + 280; + report of, on London mass meeting in favour of the North, 284; + and the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292, 294-5; + quoted on John Bright, 298; + on the attitude of the privileged classes to democracy, + 298 _note_[2], 300; + on the influence of American institutions on the political + movement in Great Britain, 302 + + _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to:_ + _Alabama case_: ii. 35, 120 _and note_[2], 121, 131 + British Foreign Enlistment Act, i. 135, 148-9; ii. 201-2 + Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190, 193, 195 + Confederate Commissioners: representations on intercourse with, + i. 105-6, 107 + Confederate Cotton Loan: reported connection with, ii. 161 + _and note_[4]; + views on, 179 + Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. 118, + 128, 131, 137, 143, 145 _note_[2]; + and U.S. Navy Department plan to stop, 130 _note_[2]; + Laird Rams incident, 144, 146, 147 _note_[1], 150 + Cotton: report on British position, ii. 99 + Declaration of Paris negotiation: + action on proposed convention, i. 141-69 _passim_; + view of American intention, 144, 169; + failure of his negotiation, 137, 145-6, 169-71 + Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. 55 + Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. 201-2 + Lindsay's efforts for mediation, ii. 34-5. 212 + Mediation: + presents the "servile war" threat against, ii. 18-19, 95; + view of England's reply to French proposals on, 71; + advantages of an anti-slavery avowal, 98-9 + Neutrality Law, _See_ British Foreign Enlistment Act _supra_ + Privateering Bill, ii. 122-3, 125, 127; + advises against issue of privateers, 131 + Proclamation of Neutrality, The: + representations on, i. 98-100, 101, 105, 107 _and note_[2], 300-1; + despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, 134; + protests against British recognition of belligerency, 159; + advice to Seward on, 275 + Roebuck's motion: report on, ii. 144 + "Servile War" threat, ii. 18-19, 95 _and note_[4] + Slavery: + urges Northern declaration on, ii. 98-9; + comments on _Times_ criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108 + Southern Ports: plan of collecting duties at, ii. 198 + _Trent_ Affair, the: + interviewed by Palmerston, i. 208-9; + statement on the _James Adger_, 209-10; + suspicion of British policy in, 218; + views on public opinion in, 222-3; + officially states Wilkes acted without authorization, 226; + report on English hope of peaceful settlement, 228, 229; + on British opinion after settlement of, 238, 240; + on effect of, in Great Britain, 243; + view of popular attitude in Britain in the crisis of, ii. 283 + Appreciation and criticisms on: + Characterized in _The Index_, ii. 196 + Lord Lyons', report on, i. 62-3; + opinion on, ii. 71 _note_[4] + Lord Russell's view of his diplomacy, ii. 128 + Tory approval of, ii. 197 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 1, 2, 129, 198, 263, 274, 276; + ii. 31, 100 +Adams, C.F., Jun., + view of British attitude and the Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 109, 110; + view of the delay in his father's journey to England, 112 _note_; + view on Seward's attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 138, + 153-6; + examination of British action in the negotiation, 154-5; + review of the _Trent_ affair, cited, 203 _note, et seq. + passim_; + on American feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, 218; + and the Hotze materials, ii. 154 _note_ +Adams, E.D.: + _British Interests and Activities in Mexico_, cited ii. 117 _note_[1] + "The Point of View of the British Traveller in America," cited, + i. 23 _note_; ii. 274 _note_[1] +Adams, Henry, i. 138; + ii. 292 _note_[1]; + view of, on W.E. Forster, i. 58 _note_[2]; + on British Proclamation of Neutrality, 110; + on American exultation in _Trent_ affair, 223; + on British attitude in _Trent_ affair, 230; + view of Gregory's speech on the blockade, 270; + on British view of prospects in the War, 297; + on possibility of intervention, ii. 23; + on advantage of a Northern declaration on slavery, 23; + on the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292 _and note_[1] 293 + "Declaration, The, of Paris," + 1861 ... reviewed, 146 _et seq._, 153; + view of Russell's policy in, 146-150, 159; + view of Lyons, 147, 150 + _Education of Henry Adams_ quoted, i. 149 _note_[3]; + ii. 172 _note_[2]; + cited, ii. 50 _note_[1] +Adams, John (Second President of the U.S.), i. 62, 81 +Adams, John Quincy, i. 11, 20, 62, 81 +African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. 85-6; + ii. 88; + suppression of, international efforts for, i. 8-10; + punishment to slave traders in American law, 9; + American attitude to right of search, 9, 10, 219; + British anti-slavery policy, 31-2; + wane of British interest in, 10, 32; + ii. 90; + Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. 10, 275, 276; + ii. 90, 91 +Agassiz, L., i. 37 _note_. +Akroyd, Edward, ii. 193 _note_. +_Alabama_, The, ii. 35, 116, 119-120; + departure of, from Liverpool, 118; + British order to stop + departure, 119, 120 _and note_[2], 133; + Russell's private feelings as to, 121, 124; + public opinion in Great Britain on, 129-130; + Palmerston's defence of Government action on, 134-5; + American anger over, 119, 127; + measures against, 121-3, 127; + New York Chamber of Commerce protest on, 126; + claim for damages on account of, 151 _note_[1]; + mentioned, i. 138; ii. 129 _note_[1], 131, 134, 136, 145, 146 +_Alexandra_, case, The: + Seizure of the vessel, ii. 136, 139, 140, 152, 161 _note_[4]; + public approval, 136; + law actions on, 136 _note_[2], 142, 149, 152, 185, 195; + American anxiety at Court decision, 143; + final result, 196 _note_[2] +America, Central: British-American + disputes in, i. 16, 17 +American: + Civil War: i. 86, 87 _and note_[2], 99; + British public and official views at the commencement of, 40-60; + origins of; American and British views, i. 47-8; + efforts at compromise, 49; + British official attitude on outbreak of, 73; + European opinion of, after duration of three years, ii. 219; + compared with the Great War in Europe, 219; + British attitude to democracy as determining attitude to the War, + i. 77; ii. 303-5; + bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain, 299 + Union, The: British views of, i. 15; + prognostications of its dissolution, 36, 37 + War of Independence, i. 2-3, 17; + adjustments after the Treaty of Peace, 3; + as fostering militant patriotism, 7, 8 _note_; + commercial relations after, 17-18 + "War of 1812" i. 4, 7, 18; + causes leading to, 5-7; + New England opposition to, 7, 18; + effect of, on American National unity, 7 + _See also under_ United States +Anderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. 117 +Anderson's Mission, ii. 53 _note_[3]; + reports, ii. 53 _and note_[2] +Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. 219-20 +Anthropological Society of London, ii. 222 +Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. 43, 85, 105; + effect of, on Lord Palmerston, 43 +Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. 63, 64 +Argyll, Duke of, i. 179, 212; + anti-slavery attitude of, i. 179, 238; ii. 112; + views of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 212, 215, 229, 238; + on calamity of war with America, 215, 238; + on Northern determination, ii. 30 +Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. 172 +_Army and Navy Gazette_, The, ii. 228, 229; + attitude in the conflict, 229-30, 236; + on the Presidential election, 235-6, 238; + summary of military situation after Atlanta, 243; + on "foreign war" rumours, 251; + cited or quoted, 68, 166, 232-3, 243. + (_See also under_ Russell, W.H.) +Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. 47; + on British "superiority," 258; + on the rule of aristocracy and growth of democracy, ii. 300 +Arnold, _The History of the Cotton Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2], 10, 11; + quoted: first effects of the war on the cotton trade, 9-10; + cotton operatives' song, 17 _note_[6]; + on the members for Lancashire, 26-7 +Ashburton, Lord, i. 13; + Ashburton Mission, i. 13 +Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2] +Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. 233-5; + effect of, on Northern attitude, 233-4; + effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, 235 +_Atlantic Monthly_, The, ii. 109 _note_[3]; 279 _and note_[3] + +Bagley, Mr., ii. 224 +Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, cited, ii. 129 _note_[1] +Baligny. _See_ Belligny +Bancroft, Frederic, cited, i. 117 _note_; + analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 150-3; + view on Russell's aims in, 152 _and note_[2] + _Life of Seward_, cited or quoted, i. 106 _note_[1], 118 _note_, + 130 _note_[3]; 132 _note_[3], 138, 150-3, 186 _notes_, + 191 _note_[4], 196 _note_[1], 200 _note_[2], + 213 _note_[4], 231 _note_[3], 280 + _and note_[1], 281; ii. 1-2, 96, + 99 _note_[2], 143 _note_[3], 253 _note_[1], + 258 _note_[1] +Banks, Governor, i. 37 _note_ +Baring, ii. 96 _note_[3] +Bath, Marquis of, ii. 193 _note_ +Beals, Mr., ii. 191 +Bedford, Duke of, i. 96 _and note_[3] +_Bee Hive, The, _cited, ii. 293 _note_ +Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. 184 _and + note_[3] +Beesly, Professor, speech of, at + Trades Unions of London Meeting, + ii. 292 +_Belfast Whig_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; + 231 _note_ +Belligny, French Consul at Charleston, + i. 185 _note_[1], 186, 188, 189, + 191 _and note_[4] +_Bell's Weekly Messenger_, quoted, + ii. 104 +Benjamin, Confederate Secretary + of State, ii. 5; Mercier's interview + with, i. 284, 285; report of, + to Slidell on Mercier's visit, + 284 _note_[2]; instructions of, to + Slidell offering commercial advantages + for French intervention, + ii. 24 _and note_[2]; on idea + of Confederate loan, 158-9; recalls + Mason, 179; and recognition + of the Confederacy, 217; on the + attitude of France to the Confederacy, + 236 _note_[2]; plan of + offering abolition of slavery in + return for recognition, 249; + otherwise mentioned, i. 292; + ii. 88 _note_[2], 148, 154 _note_[1], 213 + _note_[1] +Bentinck, i. 268, 269 +Bernard, Montague: + _Neutrality, The, of Great Britain + during the American Civil War_, + quoted, i., 100 _and note_[1], + 137-8; ii. 118; cited, i. 171 + _note_[1], 245 _note_[3], 246 _note_[2], + 263 _notes_; ii. 136 _note_[2]; on + the American representations + on the British Proclamation + of Neutrality, i. 100; on + Declaration of Paris negotiations, + 137-8; on the Blockade, + 263 _and notes_ + "Two Lectures on the Present + American War": on recognition, + cited, i. 183 +Bigelow, John, ii. 71 _note_[3]: + _France and the Confederate Navy_, + cited, ii. 57 _note_[2] + _Retrospections of an Active Life_, + cited, i. 56 _note_, 217 _note_[2]; + ii. 71 _note_[3], 88 _note_[2], 128 _note_[3], + 130 _note_[2]; Gladstone and the + Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; U.S. + stimulation of immigration, + 200 _note_[1]; cited, 229 _note_[1]; + Quoted, ii. 254; advice of, on the + political position in Britain; + quoted, 290; cited, 295 _note_[3] +Billault, M., i. 288, 289 _and note_[1] +Birkbeck, Morris, _Letters from Illinois_, + quoted, i. 25 +_Birmingham Post_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; + ii. 231 _note_; letters of S.A. + Goddard in support of emancipation + in, ii. 108-9 +Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. 224 +Bismarck, ii. 203 +Black, Judge, American Secretary + of State, i. 52, 244 +Blackwood, John, political views + of, ii. 289 +_Blackwood's Magazine_, ii. 279 _note_[1]; + on cotton and the blockade, 10; + on French mediation proposals, + 68; on the Emancipation Proclamation, + 103; on democracy + as cause of the war, 278-9, 281, + 289 +Blair, member of the United States + Cabinet, i, 130 _note_[1], 231; ii. 85, + 251, 252 +Blockade of Southern Ports, the: + Lincoln's declaration on, i. 83, + 89, 90, 92, 111, 121, 122, 244, + 245; commencement of, i. 245; + method of warning at the port, + 245, 246; as involving hardship + to British merchants, 245-6; + effectiveness of, 252-71 _passim_; + effect on British Trade, 252, 254, + 263; effect on Cotton Trade, + 262; ii. 8, 9; statistics as to + effectiveness, i. 268 _note_[3] + Southern Ports Bill, i. 246 _et seq._ + Stone Boat Fleet Blockade, + i. 253 _et seq._, 269, 302 + British attitude to, i. 95, 244, 245, + 246, 263 _and note_[2], 267, 270; + ii. 5, 265; Parliamentary debate + on, i. 267 _et seq._; Gregory's motion + 268 _et seq._; press attitude, + 246; Bright's view, ii. 14, 15 + Confederate representations on, + i. 265 + Napoleon's view of, i. 290 +Booth, assassinator of Lincoln, + ii. 258, 259, 263 +Border States, The: efforts at + compromise, i. 49; sympathies + in, 173; the "Border State + policy" of Lincoln, 173, 176, + 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82; and Confiscation + Bill, Lincoln's fears, 82; + attitude of, to emancipation, + ii. 83, 84, 87; not affected in Proclamation + of Emancipation, 86 +Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. 187, 193 +Boynton, Rev. C.B., _English and + French Neutrality, etc._, cited + and quoted, ii. 225 _note_[1] +Bright, John, i. 58 _note_[2], 77; + quoted on _Times_ attitude towards + the United States, 55 + _note_[3]; view of the Northern + attempt at reconquest, 72; views + of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality, + 108, 110; speech on + _Trent_ affair, 221-2; letter to + Sumner on _Trent_ affair, influence + on Lincoln, 232; speech on + Britain's attitude on conclusion + of _Trent_ affair, 241-2; view on the + war as for abolition, 241; on + distress in Lancashire, ii. 13, 14; + view of the blockade, 14, 15; + on the cotton shortage, 15; + and Gladstone's Newcastle + speech, 48; view of Emancipation + Proclamation, 48 _note_[2], + 105-6, 111-12; on England's + support if emancipation an object + in the war, 88-9; the escape + of the _Alabama_, 120; at Trades + Unions of London meeting, 132-3, + 134, 291-3; support of the + North, 132, 283-4, 290, 291-295; + on the interests of the unenfranchised + in the American conflict, + 132, 295; on the unfriendly + neutrality of the Government, + 134; rebuked by Palmerston, + 135; trouncing of Roebuck, 172 + _and note_[2]; on Britain's neutrality + (Nov., 1863), 184; championship + of democratic institutions, i. + 221-2; ii. 132-3, 276-7, 282, 283; + popularity of, as advocate of + Northern cause, 224, 225; influence + of, for the North, i. 58 + _note_[2]; ii. 224; Lincoln's pardon + of Alfred Rubery in honour of, + 225 _and note_[1]; quoted on feeling + of the British Government and + people towards United States in + Jan., 1865, etc., 247; confidence + of, in pacific policy of Lincoln, + 255 _and note_[1]; quoted on the + ruling class and democracy, 280; + attack on Southern aristocracy + by, 290; heads deputation to + Adams, 294; eulogy of George + Thompson by, 224 _note_[1] + Adams' opinion on, ii. 298; + view of, in _The Index_, ii. 298-9; + Laird's view of, ii. 134; + Karl Marx's view of, 292 + _note_[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted + on the oratory of, 290 _note_[1], + the _Times_ attack on, 295-6 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 69, 179, + 289; ii. 68, 69, 132 _note_[1], 172 + _note_[1], 186, 187, 191, 278, 281. + (See also under _Morning Star_) +British, _See also under _Great + Britain +British emigration to America, i. + 23 _et seq_, 35; effect of American + political ideals on, 23, 24, 25, 26 +British Foreign Enlistment Act, + ii. 116-7, 118; application of, in + American crisis, question in + Commons, i. 94; Russell's idea + of amending, ii. 124, 196; + Russell's advice to Palmerston + on, 131; debate in Parliament + on, 132, 133-4, 135; Forster and + the violation of, 133; Government + reply to Liverpool shipowners + on, 142; _Kearsarge_ incident, + 202 +British Press. _See under names + of Papers and under subject + headings_ +_British Standard_, The, i. 70 _note_[1] +British travellers' views on America, + i. 23 _and note_, 24, 28, 30; ii. 274-5 +Brooks, i. 80 +Brougham, i. 94 _note_[2]; ii. 282 +Brougham, Lord, i. 19 +Brown, John, raid of, i. 33 _note_[2] +Browning, Robert, pro-Northern + sentiment of, i. 70; on stone-boat + blockade, 256; on Slavery a + factor in the struggle, 238-9; on + British dismay at prospect of + war in _Trent_ crisis, 240; mentioned, + 228 _note_[4] +Bruce,--, British Ambassador in + Washington, ii. 255 _note_[4]; report + of American intentions against + France in Mexico, 255 _note_[4]; + comment of, on Lincoln, Seward + and Sumner, 262; warns Russell + of probable American demands + at end of war, 266, 268; attitude + to "piracy" proclamation, 268. + Otherwise mentioned, ii. 262, 269. +Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador: + on British policy, + i. 50-1, 74; interpretation of + Russell's "three months" statement, + 272 _note_[1]; report of, on + Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 + _note_[3]; interview of, with Russell + on joint mediation offer, 73 + _note_[1] +Bryce, Lord, i. 30; ii. 188 _note_[3], 274 +Buchanan, President, i. 16, 49, 52, 117, 259; ii. 278 +Buckingham, James Silk, _America, Historical, Statistic and Descriptive_, + cited, i. 29 +Buckley, Victor, ii. 120 _note_[2] +Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. 135, 154, 176, 201; + as affecting Seward's policy, considered, 154, 155-6; + effect of, in Great Britain: + press views, 176, 177-8, 179; + official views, 178, 179 _and note_[1]; + public opinion, 201 +Bullock, Captain J.D., Confederate Agent in Britain, ii. 118, 129, 145; + on the proposed use of the Laird rams, 122 _note_[1], 143; + shipbuilding contracts of, ii. 156, 157; + _Secret Service under the Confederacy_, cited, ii. 118, 149 _note_ +Bunch,--, British Consul at Charleston, + description of Jockey Club dinner, i. 43; + on Southern anti-British sentiment, 44 _note_[2], ii. 71 _note_[2]; + instructions to, on the secession, i. 53 _note_[1]; + appeal of, to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, 52; + characterizations of Southern leaders, 59; + view of President Davis, 59; + views on the South and secession, 59, 93; + characterizations of Southern Commissioners, 63; + negotiations of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris, + 168 _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 193; + attitude of, to the South, 185 _and note_[4], 103, 195 _note_[2]; + American complaints of, 187, 189, 193-4; + recall of exequatur of, 184, 187 _et seq_., 193, 194-5, 201; + defence of his action in the Mure case, 187, 188, 192, 199; + subsequent history of, 195 _note_[2]; + view of, as scapegoat, 195 _note_[2]; + on attitude to the Blockade, 252 _note_[2], 253 _note_[2], 268; + on Southern intentions, 252 _note_[2]; + view of Southern determination, 252 _note_[2]; + on Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, 63, + 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5; + on effect of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, 9 _note_[2]; + on burning of Mississippi cotton, 16 _note_[1], 17 _note_[4]; + on the American system of government as the cause of the Civil War, + 278 _note_[2] + British attitude to the controversy over, i. 188-9, 190, 191, 194; + French attitude, i. 189, 191 _and_ _note_[4], 192, 201 _note_ + Lyons' views on Bunch controversy, i. 187, 193, 194 _and note_[1] + Russell's views, i. 187, 190, 193, 194 _and note_[4] + Otherwise mentioned, i. 66; ii. 88 +Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with America, + ii. 254 +Butler, General, + order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i. 302-4, 305; ii. 68; + Palmerston and Adams controversy on, i. 302-5; + Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, 303, 304 + +Cairnes, Professor, ii. 224 _note_[3]; + pamphlet by, on "Slave Power," 112 +_Caledonian Mercury_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_ +California, acquisition of, by U.S., i. 15, 16 +Callahan,--, _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_, cited, +i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 167 _notes_, 169 _note_[4] +Campbell, Lord, i. 271, 292; ii, 28, 77, 169, 172, 193 +Canada: + Rebellion of 1837 in, i. 4, 109; ii. 117; + British fear of American attack on, i. 4; + sentiment in, as affected by the American Wars against England, 8 _note_; + suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U.S., 54-5; + "compensation" in, idea in British press, 54-5; + and in views of American political leaders, 55; + Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. 69-70; + military defence of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 213, 241-2; + views in, on _Trent_ affair, 222 _note_; + on British policy and defence, 222 _note_; + view of the _Times_ in, 222 _note_ + Free Trade policy and, a Southern premonition as to, i. 22 + Reciprocity Treaty of, with U.S., ii. 198, 253-4 + Otherwise mentioned, ii. 251, 254, 275 +Canning, i. II, 12, 20 +Cardwell, ii. 64 +Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. 172 +Carolina, South, secession of, i. 41, 43-44, 55; ii. 3-4; + seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. 52; + requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter, 117 +"Caroline" affair, The, i. 109 +Case, Walter M., _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_, + cited and quoted, i. 261 _note_; ii. 161 _and note_[3] +Catacazy, C., and mediation by Russia, ii. 251 _note_[1] +Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. 187, 189, 193 +Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i. 268; + supports Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 175-6; + on Committee of Southern Independence Association, 187, 193 +Charleston, S.C.: + Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. 43, 44 _note_; + seizure of customs house at, 52; + British appeal on question of port dues at, 52, 244; + "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, 253; + evacuation of, ii. 248, 249 +Charleston _Mercury_, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. 5 +Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. 115, 121; ii. 72, 283; + quarrel with Seward, 72 +Chase, W. H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. 4 +Chattanooga, ii. 185 +Cheever, Rev. Dr., ii. 224 +Chenery, ii. 301 +Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. 165 +Chesson, F. W., ii. 224 +Chicago Convention, the, i. 175 +Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. 49 _note_[3] +Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. 184 +Chittenden, cited, ii. 130 _note_[2] +Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. 203 +Clanricarde, Lord, ii. 168 +Clarendon, Earl of, i. 199 _note_[3], 215; + ii. 3, 51-8 _passim_, 63, 203 _note_[2]; + on Russell's mediation project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, 57-8 +Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation of, i. 113 +Cobden, i. 77; quoted, on the _Times_, 222 _note_; + opinion of Seward, 222 _note_; + and Sumner, 222 _note_; + on Palmerston's action in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[3]; + letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, 232 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 289; ii. 26, 67, 80, 95 _and note_[4], 166, 276 +Collie, ii. 189 +Collier, legal advice of, on _Alabama_, ii. 118-9 +Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. 83 +Columbia, S.C., burning of, ii. 248, 249 +Combe, George, _Notes on the United States, etc._, cited, i. 29 +Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the: + Bunch's characterization of, i. 63; + unofficial interview with Russell, 85-6, 106, 158; + protest against closing of British ports, 170 _note_[2]; + replaced by "Special Commissioners," 203; + attempt to make use of the _Trent_ affair, 214; + British attitude to, not modified by _Trent_ affair, 235; + policy of, with regard to recognition and the blockade, + i. 264-5, 267, 273, 300; + acquire a "confidential" document, 265 _and note_[2]; + hopes of, from Parliament, 265, 266, 272; + instructions of the first Commissioners, ii. 4 _and note_[3]; + failure of the first Commission, 4-5; + suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, 88 _note_[2]; + slavery abolition offer, 249 + Confederate Agents' correspondence, collections of, i. 261 _note_[1] + _See also under personal names_ +Confederates, _See under_ Southern States +Confiscation Bill, The, ii. 82, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95; + Lincoln's attitude to, 82, 84; + Lord Russell's comment on, 97 +_Constitutionel_, The, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2] +Continental Press and American News, ii. 71 _note_[2] +Corcoran, ii. 169 +Cotton supplies and slavery, i. 13; + in British-American commercial relations, 21, 22; + British manufacturers' dependence on, 22; + effect of the Civil War on, 55, 246; ii. 53; + the crop of 1860 ... ii. 7 + Blockade, The, and, i. 252 _and note_[2], 253; ii. 9; + effect of, on price, i. 262, 270; + Napoleon's views on, 290 + England, need of, for, i. 196-7, 200 _note_[1], 294, 296; ii. 17, 99; + cotton famine in, 294; ii. 6, II _et seq._, 16 _note_[1]; + cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii. 6-7, 8; + first effects of the war on, 8, 9, 10. + _See also under_ Lancashire. + France, necessity of, for cotton, i. 279, 290, 293, 294, 296, 300; + ii. 17; Mercier's plan to relieve, i. 196-201 + Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on price of, ii. 48; + "King Cotton" theory, i. 63; ii. i _et seq._; + belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy, 2-3, 4, 5 + Southern orders for destruction of, ii. 16, 17 _note_[4]; + effect of, on British officials, 17 +Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. 88; + reports French agreement with British policy on Southern belligerent + rights, 88; + in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, 88, 143, 156, 157, 158, + 162, 167; + conversations with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, 189; + disturbed at French evasion of direct support, 189, 192, 201 _note_[1]; + in _Trent_ affair fears war with America, 214; + communications on Southern Ports Bill, 247 _and note_[2]; + view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill, 247; + on French policy in Mexico, 260, 261 _note_; ii. 46; + quoted, on Thouvenel's view on mediation in Feb., 1862 ... i. + 266 _note_[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 288; + statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with Napoleon, 290; + on the possibility of reunion, 290; + on the blockade, 290-1; + denial of Napoleon's "offer" to England, 290, 291; + reports of, on Lindsay's mission, 291-2, 293, 295 _note_[1]; + conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, 291, 293-4; + Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted, 295 _note_[2]; + interview with Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 38, 39 + _and note_, 46; + on Napoleon's suggestion of joint mediation, 59; + instructed to notify France of England's view of the war as ended and + of attitude to Confederate cruisers, 266-7 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 218 _note_ +Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. 148 +Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce, i. 139 +Crittenden, i. 49 + +_Daily Gazette_, The, cited, ii. 109 _note_ +_Daily News_, + attitude of, during the American Civil War, i. 69-70 _and note_ + 1, 176, 181-2; ii. 230 _note_[3], + on Lincoln's message to Congress, i. 176; + letters of W.W. Story in, 228 +_Daily Telegraph_, cited, ii. 50 _note_[1], + attitude and circulation of, 189 _note_[2], 226, 230 _note_[3] +Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. 62; + lack of instructions on American intentions, 62, 108, 112; + communications with Lord Russell, 62, 66, 74; + despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions, 66-7; + Russell's pledge of delay to, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108; + report on proposed British joint action with France, 84-5, 86 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 74, 96, 156 _note_[1] +Dana, R.H., cited, i. 218; + _The Trent Affair_, cited, 203 _note_, 205 _note_[2], 237 _note_ +Danish question, The, ii. 203-5, 214 +Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. 180 _and note_[4] +Davis, Bancroft, _Times_ correspondent in New York, i. 56 +Davis, Jefferson, + personal characteristics of, i. 59, 81, 82: ii. 276; + attitude of, in the opening of the crisis, i. 49; + elected President of the Southern Government, 59, 81; + foreign policy of, 81-2; + aristocratic views of, on government, ii. 276; + proclamation of, on marque and privateering, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, + 121, 122, 141, 160; + defensive measures of, in the South, 172; + on Bunch's negotiations on Declaration of Paris, 186; + replaces Confederate agents to Europe, 203; + and the African Slave Trade, ii. 88 _note_[2]; + proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, + 106 _and note_[4]; + on England's conduct towards the South, 184; + on Southern disorganization, 219; + flight of, from Richmond, 248; + approves plan of offering abolition of slavery in return for + recognition, 249; + capture of, 267 + British views on, ii. 276 + Bunch's characterization of, i. 59, 185 _note_[4] + Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. 47 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 163 _note_[1], 185 _note_[4], 254, 265 + _note_[2], 283; ii. 5, 6, 176 _note_[3], 251, 252, 285 +Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. 129, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 163, + 165, 167 _note_[3], 168, 200, 231, 300 +de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. _See under_ Brunow +de Flahault, French Ambassador. _See under _Flahault +_Debats_: + French press views on military situation, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3] +_De Bow's Review_, + eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii. 2, 3, 4; + on cotton and slavery, 3; + view of England's action on blockade, 4 +Declaration of Paris, The, i. 102, 139-40; + attitude of United States to, 140-1, 156; + American offer of adherence during the Civil War, 104, 137, 141-2, + 150, 151 +Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. 137 _et seq._, 184, 201; + British suggestion to France in, i. 88, 91, 142, 146-7, 156, 157 + _and note_[3]; + American offer of adherence, 104, 137, 141-2, 150, 151; + convention agreed between Britain, France, and America, 142-3; + addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed + by Lord Russell, 143-6, 149, 151, 154, 68, 170, 201; + American rejection of convention, 145, 168, 201 + American argument at Geneva on effect of British diplomacy in, i. 146 + _note_[2] + Confederates: + approach of, in the negotiation, i. 161, 164, 165, 166, 168 + _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 192, 193; + Confederate Congress resolution of approval in, 186 + Convention, the, proposed by U.S. + Cowley's opinion on, i. 167 _and note_[3]; + Thouvenel's opinion on, 167; + Palmerston's suggestion on, 167 _and note_[4] + Seward's motives in, _See under_ Seward +Delane, editor of the _Times:_ + Palmerston's letters to, on American rights in interception of + Confederate Commissioners, i. 207-8, 209; + close relations of, with Palmerston, 229 _note_[2]; ii. 145; + anticipations of Southern victory, ii. 204 _and note_[2]; + on prospective war with America, 254; + effect of Sherman's arrival at Savannah on, 245 _and note_[2], 300-1 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 177, 178, 180; ii. 65, 289 +de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier, + ii. 59 _and note_[4], 60, 63 _note_[5], 168 +Democratic element in British Society: + lack of press representation, i. 24, 41 +Democracy: + British views on American institutions, i. 24, 28, 30, 31; ii. 274-5; + view of the American struggle as a failure of, 276 _et seq. passim;_ + Press comments on the lesson from failure of American democratic + institutions, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 297; + bearing of the Civil War on, 299; + aristocratic and conservative attitude to, 286, 287, 297, 298, 300, 301; + rise of democratic feeling in Great Britain, 291; + effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, 304 +Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. 76, 77, 79, 94 + _and note_[2], 240, 241; + attitude to recognition and mediation, i. 240; ii. 51, 52, 53, 54, 77; + attacks governmental policy in relation to Laird Rams and Southern + shipbuilding, 149-50, 197; + approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation proposals, 154-5; + speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, + 263; + attacks Government on American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war, + 267-8; + attitude to expansion of the franchise, i. 77; + ii. 276, 303 _and note_[1] + Otherwise mentioned, i. 292, 295; ii. 51 _note_[2], 166, 210, 214 +_Dial_, The, i. 70 _note_[1] +Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. 79; + on _Trent_ affair, 241; + connection with Lindsay's motion, 292, 295, 296, 306; + ii. 213 _and note_[1]; + approval of neutrality, ii. 77, 174 _note_[1]; + in Roebuck's motion, 153, 171, 174; + attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, 197; + speech, of, on the motion for the + Address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, 263-4; + Reform Bill of (1867) ... 3 03 _and note_[1] + Mentioned, ii. 270 _note_[3] +Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. 204 _and note_[2]; + reply to Mason, 250-1 +D'Oubril, ii. 59 _note_[4], 62 _note_[5] +Doyle, Percy, i. 218 _note_[1] +_Dublin News_, quoted, i. 45, 46 _note_[1] +_Dubuque Sun_, The, ii. 22 _note_ +Dudley, U.S. Consul at Liverpool, + ii. 118, 130 _note_[2], 144, 145 _note_[2] +Dufferin, Lord, i. 240 +Duffus, R. L., "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the American Civil + War," i. 41 _note_[1]; quoted, 41, 48; + cited, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 112 _note_[1] +Dumfermline, Lady, i. 224 _note_[3] +Dumping of British goods: + effect on American feeling, i. 19, 21 + +_Economist_, The: + attitude in the struggle, i. 41, 54, 57, 173-4; + ii. 15, 173, 231 _note_; + cited or quoted: + on Lincoln's election, i. 39 _and note_[1]; + on impossibility of Northern reconquest, 57; + on secession an accomplished fact, 174; ii. 79; + on Bull Run, i. 179; + on cotton shortage, i. 55; ii. 14, 15; + on servile insurrection, 79; + on Cotton Loan, 160, 162; + on Roebuck's motion, 173; + on extension of the franchise, 277; + on American institutions and statesmen, 279-80 +_Edinburgh Review_, The: + attitude to slavery, i. 33, 45; ii. 281; + attitude in the conflict, i. 42; ii. 50 _note_[2], 68; + on recognition, 46 _note_[3]; + on the Emancipation Proclamation, 103; + on the causes of the war, 281 +Elliot, charge, i. 14 +Elliott, E.N., editor of _Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments_, + ii. 3 _note_[2] +Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. 74, 78, 80, 86 _and note_[1], 91; + idea of military necessity for, 81, 82, 85, 87; + Lincoln's alleged purpose in, 87; + purpose of, according to Seward, 99-100; + viewed as an incitement to servile insurrection, 49, 74, 98, 101, 103 + _note_[6] + American reception of, ii. 101, 105 + British attitude to, ii. 101 _et seq._; + Press denunciation of, 102-5, 106; + public meetings in favour of, 106 _and note_[2], 107, 108; + English women's support of, 109; + Nonconformist support, 109, 110; + Emancipation societies support of, 110 + Confiscation Bill, _See that heading_ + _See also_ Border States _and sub-heading under_ Lincoln +Emigration, British, to America, i. 23-4; ii. 200-1; + _Kearsarge_ incident, 200-1 +England: cotton famine. _See under_ Cotton. + _See_ Great Britain +Erlanger & Co. and Confederate Cotton Loan, + ii. 158-60, 161, 162 _and note_[3] +European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years, ii. 219 +Eustis, i. 204, 234 _note_[2] +Evans, William, ii. 224 +Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of Neutrality, + i. 166 _note_[3] +Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i. 90 +Expatriation, American and British views on, i. 16 + +Fairfax, Lieut., of the _San Jacinto_, i. 205 +Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," + ii. 12 _note_, 20 +Fawcett, Prof., ii. 224 _note_[3] +Featherstonaugh, G.W., _Excursion through the Slave States_, cited, i. 29 +Federals. _See under _Northern +Ferguson, Sir James, i. 268; ii. 175 +Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii. 164 +_Fishmongers of London_: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii. 223 _note_[1] +Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. 306; ii. 25 +Fitzwilliam, Hon. C., ii. 193 +Flahault, M. de, French Ambassador, i. 88, 197, 260 _note_[1], + 288, 291, 293; ii. 19 _note_[3], 45 +Forbes, J.M., and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2], 297 +Forbes, J. M., quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for Democracy, + ii. 297 +Forster, William E., i. 58 _and note_[2]; + a friend of the North, 58 _note_[2]; ii. 224; + quoted, on Harriet Martineau, i. 70 _note_[3]; + question in Commons on privateering, 94, 157; + speech against Gregory's motion on blockade, 268, 270; + speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion, + ii. 22; + close touch with Adams, 22, 36; + attacks Government in debate on Southern shipbuilding, 133; + rebuked by Palmerston, 135; + in Roebuck's motion, 171-2, 175; + comment on Southern meetings, 190 _and note_[2] +Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note_[1], 274 +Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note[1]_, 274 +Fox, G.V.: _Confidential Correspondence_, cited, + i. 257 _note_[3], 268 _note_[2]; ii. 120 _note_[3]; + quoted, on Confederate ironclads in England, 130 _note_[2] +France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. 6; + and American contentions on neutral rights, 18; + Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2] + Cotton: lack of, i. 279, 290, 293-4, 296, 300; ii. 17 + Mediation and armistice, attitude to British unofficial overture + on, ii. 38-9, 45-6, 59-60 + Ministerial crisis, ii. 39, 45, 59 + Neutrality of, i. 299; + Northern sentiment on, ii. 225 _and note_[2] + Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great Britain, i. + 84, 88, 156, 166 _note_[1], 196, 249-50, 252, 259, 260, 284, + 294; ii. 28, 75, 198; + break in, 77 + Press of, and the events in U.S., ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 + _note_[2] + _See also under _Mercier, Napoleon, Thouvenel, _and under + subject-headings_ +_Fraser's Magazine_, ii. 284; + J.S. Mill's articles in, i. 240, 242; ii. 81, 90, 285 +Fraser, Trenholm & Company: Confederate financial agents in + Liverpool, ii. 156, 157 +Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203 +Free Trade, i. 21; ii. 304 +Freeman, E.A., _History of Federal Government_, cited, ii. 152-3 +Fremont, ii. 82 + +Gallenga,----, _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 189 +Gait, Sir J.T., i. 221 _note_[1]; 222 _note_ +Galveston, Tex. i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 266, 268 +Garrison, W.L., American abolitionist, editor of the _Liberator_, + i. 31, 33, 46 _and note_[1] +Garrison, _Garrison_, cited, ii. 91 _note_[1], 111 _note_[3] +Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. 92 _notes_ +Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British Neutrality, + in, i. 138; + American argument before, on Declaration of Paris, 146 + _note_[2] +German opinion on the Civil War, i. 178 _note_[3]; ii. 111 + _note_[2]; + press attitude, 285 _note_[1] +Germany: the _Index_ quoted on "aid given by, to the North," ii. + 236 _note_[2] +Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. 143, 176 _note_[2], 185, 296 +Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the _Times_, i. 32, 33 + _The Englishman in Kansas_, i. 32 _note_ +Gladstone, W.E., i. 76, 78; + fear of war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215; + influence of the commercial situation on, ii. 26; + attitude to intervention, 26, 27, 30-1, 48, 57; + Newcastle speech, 47 _and note_[3], 48, 49, 50 _and + note_[1], 51 _and notes_, 55, 58; + memorandum in reply to Lewis, 57; + supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and blockade, ii. 64, + 69; + account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's suggestion, 65 _and + note_[1]; + idea of offering Canada to the North, 69, 70 _and note_[1]; + and the Confederate Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; + reply of, in Roebuck's motion, 170-1; + quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to democracy, 282-3 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 179, 200 _note_[1], 224, 266; ii. 59, + 66, 77, 80 +Goddard, S.A., ii. 108 + _Letters on the American Rebellion_, cited, ii. 108 + _note_[3], 109 _note_[1] +Godkin, E.L., _Daily News_ correspondent, i. 70 _and note_[2] +Golder, Dr. F.A., cited, i. 53 _note_[3]. + "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," cited, i. 227 _note_[1]; + ii. 129 _note_[1] +Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for foreign war, + ii. 199 _note_[3] +Gorgas, Col., ii. 5 _note_[1] +Gortchakoff, comment of, + on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 _note_[2]; + and idea of Russian mediation, 251 _note_[1]; + mentioned, i. 164 _note_[1]; + ii. 59 _note_[4], 66 _note_[2], 70 _note_[2] +Grant, General, + capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i. 273 _note_[1], 274; + victory at Shiloh, 278; + captures New Orleans, 279; + Western campaign of, ii. 164, 166, 184-5; + capture of Vicksburg by, 176 _note_[2], 185; + advance to Richmond, 217, 219; + siege of Southern lines at Petersburg, 217; + capture of Petersburg and Richmond by, 247-8; + _Times_ report of reverses to, 212, 227, 243; + condition of his army, Southern account in _Times_, 227; + W.H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign, 232-3; + Henry Adams, quoted, on, 243 + Otherwise mentioned, ii. 215, 249, 256 +Grant's _The Newspaper Press_, cited and quoted, ii. 231 _note_ +Granville, Lord, i. 76, + quoted, 199 _note_[3]; + on difficulties in Washington and attitude of neutrality, 241; + opposition of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. 42 _and note_[2], + 43, 44, 46; + mentioned, i. 94 _note_[3]; ii. 203 _note_[2] +Grattan, Thomas Colley, + quoted, i. 36; + _Civilized America_, i. 36 _note_[1] +Great Britain: + Citizenship, theory of, i. 5-6 + Colonial system: trade basis of, i. 17, 20, 21 + Commercial relations with America after independence, i. 17 _et seq_., 22 + Franchise, + expansion of the, in, i. 26, 28; ii. 274, 276-7, 301, 302, 303, 304; + effect of the American example on political agitation in, 274; + connection of the American struggle with the franchise movement in, + 276, 277, 278, 286; + Radical acceptance of the challenge on democracy, 282, 283, 290, 298, + 300; + aristocratic and conservative attitude to democracy, 286, 287, 298, + 300, 301 + Policy toward America: + conditions affecting, i. 2 _et seq_. 35; ii. 270; + the right of search controversy, i. 6-10; + territorial expansion 13-15, 16; + extension of slavery, 13, 15; + Mexican War, 15-16; + commercial interests, 19-22; + in the Civil War, 50-4, 58, 59, 79, 84, 136, 178, 199; ii. 270-2; + influence of democracy in determining, ii. 303-5; + policy of joint action with France. _see under_ France. + _See also under_ Lyons, Russell, _and subject-headings._ + Public opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America, + i. 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30 + Public opinion and official views in, + at the opening of the Civil War, i. 40-60; + doubts of Northern cause, 48, 50; + attitude to recognition of the South, 53 _note_[1], + on secession, 54, 55, 57 + Trade: + exclusive basis in, i. 17, 20, 21; + effect of American retaliatory system on, 20; + free trade theory, 21; ii. 304; + hopes from cotton interests, i. 22 + Working classes in: Northern sympathies of, ii. 284, 285 _note_[1] + _See also subject-headings_ +Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. 4; ii. 253, 254 +Greeley, Horace, editor of _New York Times_, + attack on Seward by, i. 280 _note_[1]; + and Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. 75; + Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, 92-3 +Gregg, Percy, ii. 154 _note_[1] +Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South), + i. 90, 91 _note_[1], 267; + motion of, for recognition of the South, 85, 91, 108; + advice to Mason on blockade question, 267; + motion to urge the blockade ineffective, 268-72; + speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire, ii. 21, 22 _and note_; + quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and recognition, 155; + view of Roebuck's motion, 175; + question of, on the destruction of British property in America, 265; + mentioned, i. 292; ii. 153, 164 +Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. 3 +Greville. Colonel, ii. 193 _note_ +Grey, Sir George, i. 163, 207; ii. 171, 263 +Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii. 123-4 +Gros, Baron, ii. 167, 168-9, 170 +Grote, George, quoted, i. 1 + +Haliburton, T.C., ii. 187, 193 _note_ +Hall, Capt. Basil, _Travels in North America_, cited, i. 26-7 +Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. 111, 224 +Hamilton, R.C., "The English Press and the Civil War," i. 38 _note_[2] +Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, _Men and Manners in America_, quoted, i. 27 +Hammond, E., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. 189; + enquiry as to possible action of American Navy to intercept Southern + Commissioners, 206-7, 210, 211 _and note_[1]; + on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. 142; + letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird Rams, 147 _note_[4]; + quoted, on public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, 66; + mentioned, i. 256; ii. 45 +Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. 2-3 +"Hampton Roads Conference," The, ii. 252-3 +Harcourt, Sir William, + quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship during the American Civil War, + i. 1; + letters of, in the _Times_ on questions of International Law, + i. 222 _note_; ii. 63 _and note_[2]; + _and see under_ "Historicus" +Hardwicke, Earl, i. 94 _note_[2] +Harris, T.L., _The Trent Affair_, + cited, i. 203 _note_, 205 _note_[1], 217 _note_[1], + 227 _note_[1], 231 _note_[2]; ii. 282 _note_[2]; + citations of anti-Americanism in _Times_, i. 217 _note_[1] +Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. 47 +Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. 129, 197 _note_[2] +Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, cited, i. 94 _note_[3] +"Historicus," Letters of, to the _Times_, cited and quoted, + i. 222 _note_; ii. 63, 104, 138 _note_[1] +Holmes, O.W., i. 37 _note_ +Hood, General, ii. 236 _note_[2] +Hope, A.J. Beresford, ii. 187, 189, 193 _note_, 281-2 +Hopwood, i. 305; ii. 11, 18, 21 +Horsfall, Mr., ii. 153 +Horton, Wilmot, i. 23; + Committee on Emigration to America, 23, 24 +Hotze, H., Confederate agent, + quoted on effect of _Trent_ affair, i. 243; + descriptive account of his activities, ii. 154 _note_[1]; + and the "foul blot" phrase, 240; + and the Southern arming of negroes, 241; + mentioned, ii. 68 _note_[1], 180 _note_[3], 213 + Hotze Papers, The, ii. 154 _note_[1], 180 + _note_[2], 185 _note_[1] +Houghton, Lord, ii. 265-6, 267 +Hughes, Thomas, i. 181; ii. 224 _note_[3] +Hunt, James, _The Negro's Place in Nature_, cited, ii. 222 +Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. 8 _note_[2], 14 _note_[1] +Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. 264 +Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. 84 +Hunter, Mr., editor of the _Herald, _ ii. 213 _and note_[1] +Huse, Caleb, ii. 120 _note_[2], 159 +Huskisson, cited, i. 20 +Huxley's criticism of Hunt's _The Negro's Place in Nature_, ii. 222 + +Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i. 6, 7, 8, 16 +_Index, The_, ii., 33 _and note_[3]; + agitation of, for recognition of the South and mediation, 33-4, 153-4; + on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 51 _note_[3]; + views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, 51 _note_[3], + 55 _and note_[4], 68, 69, 165, 196, 197; + on reply to French joint mediation offer, 68-9; + on Laird Rams, 150 _note_[2]; + quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents, 154, 164-5; + connection with Hotze, 154 _note_[1]; + and the fall of Vicksburg, 165, 178 _and note_[1]; + on French press and policy of France, 174 _note_[3], 180; + reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, 188, + 190 _and notes_, 194 _and note_[2], 195, + 239 _and note_[4], 240; + comments on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 215-6; + criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on mediation, 216; + view of mediation, 217; + defence of slavery in the South, 220-2, 240-1; + criticism of the _Times_, 228; + quotations from the French press on the war, 236 _note_[2]; + and the Presidential election, 236 _note_[2]; + on Germany's aid to the North, 236 _note_[2]; + on reception of Northern deputations by Adams, 245 _note_[1]; + on characteristics of Southern leaders and society, 287; + view of Northern democracy, 287; + denunciation of the Manchester School 298-9; + cited, ii. 181 _note_[2], 186, 190 _note_[3], 199 + _note_[4], 232, 241 _note_[1], 242; + quoted, 192, 193 _note_[1] +Ionian Islands, control of, i. 79 +Ireland: + Irish emigration to America, i. 29; ii. 200, 201; + enlistments in, for Northern forces, 200, 201; + the _Kearsarge_ incident, 201-2; + petitions circulated in, in support of the North, 240 +Italy, disturbances in, ii. 29 + +Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia: + effect of, on Russell and Palmerston, ii. 38 +Jackson, W.A., ii. 191 +James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, + quoted, i. 228 _and note_[4]; + cited, 256 _note_[4] +_James Adger_, The, American war-ship, + i. 208, 209, 210, 211 _note_[1] +Jameson, Professor J.F., ii. 154 _note_[1] +Japan: + Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against, + i. 126 _note_[1] +Jefferson, President, i. 7, 11, 18 +Jewett, J.P., quoted, ii. 111 _note_[3] +_John Bull_, ii. 231 _note_; + quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. 179; + Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. 179-80 +Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. 248, 274 +Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. 193-4. 195. 224 +Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. 198 +"Justicia," letters of, in the _Times_, i. 217 + +Kansas border struggles, i. 32 +_Kearsarge_ incident, The, ii. 201-2 +Kelly, William, _Across the Rocky Mountains, etc._, cited and quoted, + ii. 275 _note_[3] +Kennedy, William, _Texas, etc._, cited, i. 29 +Kenner, Duncan F., Confederate Commissioner, ii. 249-50 +Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. 173 +Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. 175 + +_La France_, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2] +Laird Brothers: + builders of the _Alabama_ and _Laird Rams_, ii. 120, 121-2, 129; + prosecution of, demanded, 136; + officially ordered not to send Rams on trial trip, 146, 149; + Government's correspondence with, 146 _and note_[2], 149-50 +Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government, ii. 134 +Laird Rams, the, ii. 121-2, 123, 124, 137, 140 _et seq._, 196; + description and purpose of, 122 _and_ _note_[1]; + British Government position, 133, 134; + rumours regarding, 142-3; + seizure of, 145-50, 179-80, 182; + suit for damages, 151 _note_[1]; + British Government purchase of, 151 _note_[1]; + U.S. Navy plan to purchase, 130 _note_[2]; + usual historical treatment of the incident, 141, 147 _and note_[1] +Lamar, Confederate representative: + account of Roebuck and Bright, ii. 172 _note_[2] +Lancashire: + Cotton trade, + distress in, ii. 6, 11 _et seq._, 21, 26, 29, 31, 240; + attitude in, to Government policy, 10, 11, 13-15; + attitude of the "Cotton Lords" to, 10, 16; + Farnall report on, 12, 20; + Northern sympathies of cotton operatives, 13, 285 _note_[1] + Cotton factories, statistics, ii 6 + Cotton manufacturers, attack on in Commons, ii. 163-4 +_Lane, Franklin K., Letters of_, cited ii. 129 _note_[1] +Layard, reply of, + on Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 173; + on destruction of British property in America, 265 +_Le Siecle_, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 _note_[2] +Lee, General, + turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii. 1; + defeated at Antietam, 43, 85; + retreat of, through Shenandoah valley, 43; + advance in Pennsylvania, + 163 _note_[1], 164, 176; + defeats Hooker at Chancellorsville, 164; + retreat from Gettysburg, 163 _note_[1], 178, 179, 297; + defence of Richmond, 185, 217, 247, 248; + surrender, 248, 255, 256-7, 265, 301, 303 + _Times_, quoted or cited, on his campaign, ii. 227, 256, 296 +Lees, Mr., ii, 220 +Lempriere, Dr., i. 180; ii. 191 +Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. 76, 78 _and note_, 94; ii. 52; + views of, on the Civil War, ii. 50 _and note_[2], 51; + article on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences," + i. 78 _note_; + fears war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215, 226; + objections of, to mediation, ii. 44-6; + Hereford speech of, in reply to Gladstone, 50 _and note_[1], 51, 55, 58; + view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 52; + action of, on Russell's proposed intervention, 52 _et seq_., 73-4; + memorandum of, on British policy in opposition to Russell, 62-3; + account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion, 63-5; + Hereford speech, effect on Adams, ii. 55; + Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, 56; + Russell's reply to Lewis, 56, 57 +_Liberator, The_, + Garrison's abolition organ, i. 31, 33 _and note_[3]; + 46 _and note_[1], 47; + cited or quoted, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 106 _note_[2], 107, + 109 _note_[2]; III _note_[3], 130, 184 _note_[3], + 189 _note_[2], 191 _note_[2], 194, 223 _and note_[2], + 224 _note_[2], 237 _note_[1], 239 _notes_, 240 + _note_[2], 289 +Liebknecht, W., ii. 301 _note_[3] +Lincoln, President, i. 115 + Characteristics of, i. 115, 119, 120, 127-8; + influence of, in Britain, ii. 276 + Election and inauguration, i. 36, 38, 39, 48, 51, 64, 82, 110, 115; + inaugural address, 38, 50, 71, 175; + personal view of terms of election, 49; + popular views on 79, 114, 115 + Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. 117, 118, 119, 120; + and defend Federal forts, 118; + attitude to Seward's foreign war policy, 119-20, 136; + reply to Seward's "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," + 119-20, 124; + modifies Despatch No. 10, 126-7; + attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, 121 122; + emergency measures of, 172, 173 + _Policy and views of, on:_-- + Blockade proclamation, i. 83, 110, 111, 244. _See heading_ Blockade + Border State policy of, i. 173, 176, 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82 + Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. 82, 84 + Emancipation Proclamation of, _See that heading_ + Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. 252-3 + Intervention, on, ii. 36 + Piracy proclamation, i. 83, 111, 160 + Servile insurrection, ii. 83 + Slavery: + inaugural address on, i. 38. 50, 71, 175; + view of the terms of his election regarding, 49; + denial of emancipation as an issue, 239; ii. 88; + reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. 49 _note_[3]; + declarations on, 78; + conversations with Sumner on, 82; + attitude to emancipation, 82, 83-4, 96; + and anti-slavery sentiment, 83; + denial of, as a cause of the war, 88; + reply to Schurz on emancipation, 72; + reply to Greeley, 93, 94; + orders of, as to liberated slaves, 100 + _Trent_ affair; + attitude to release of envoys, i. 231 _and note_[2], + British view of, in, i. 225, 226, 230 + Union, the: + efforts to preserve, i. 49, 121; + efforts to restore, ii. 82, 83, 93-5; + reply to Greeley on, 92-3 + Attitude of, to England, i. 301; + curtails authority of General Butler, 305; + settles quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. 72; + letter to Manchester supporters of the North, 109; + drafts resolution for use in British public meetings on slavery, 113; + British addresses to, 288, 290-1 + Re-election, ii. 226, 234, 235, 238; + expectations of his defeat, 226, 231; + British Press views on, 234-5, 238; + _Punch_ cartoon, 239 _and note_[1]; + complaints of his despotism and + inefficiency in press, ii. 176, 232; + his terms to the South, 251, 252 + Assassination of, ii. 257-8, 265; + political effect of, + in Britain, 301, + and in Germany, 301 _note_[3]; + British sympathy, 259-64 + Appreciations of, ii. 258-61 + British opinion of, during the War, ii. 239 _note_[1] + Bright's confidence in, ii. 255 _and note_[1] + Lyons' view on, i. 51; ii. 258-9 + Press views, i. 38-9; ii. 102-5 _passim_ + Schleiden's view of, i. 116 + Influence of Bright's letters on, i. 232; + pardons Rubery in honour of Bright, ii. 225 _and note_[1] + Otherwise mentioned, i. 59, 81, 149, 223; ii. 39, 68, 91, + 109 _note_[2], 126, 225, 251, 278, 281, 297 +Lindsay, William Schaw: + descriptive account of, i. 267, 289; + on the blockade and French attitude to intervention, 267; + project of mediation of, 279; + account of interview with Napoleon III, 289-90; + interview with Cowley, 290-1; + second interview with Napoleon, 291; + effect of interviews on Confederate Commissioners, 292; + refused an interview by Russell and Palmerston, 294-5, 296; + third interview with Napoleon, 295; + interview with Disraeli, 295, 296; + proposed motion in Parliament, 301-2, 305-6, 307; + account of a letter to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion, + 305 _and note_[5]; + introduces motion in Parliament on mediation, ii. 18, 20, 21-23; + withdrawal of, 23, 34; + with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on recognition, 166, 167, 168, 169, + 172, 173, 174-5, 177; + suggestion by, on Confederate finance, 156; + proposes a further recognition motion, 178 _note_[1]; + connection with Southern Independence Association, 193, 195, 204, + 205, 206, 211; + hopes of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern + vessels, 185, 195, 196; + hopes from Napoleon and from Southern victory, 204; + fresh agitation for mediation and recognition, 205-6, 209, 210; + interviews Palmerston, 206-7, 209; + urges Mason to interview Palmerston, 207, 208, 209; + interview with Lord Russell 209-10, 212-13; + use of the Danish question, 206, 210; + hopes from Disraeli, 213; + postponement of his motion, 214, 215, 218 + Friendship with John Bright, ii. 172 _note_[1]; + otherwise mentioned, i. 197, 268; ii. 25, 181 +Lindsay & Co., ii. 157 +Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the _Alabama_, ii. 129-30 +_Liverpool Post_, The, cited on the Emancipation Proclamation, ii. 103 +Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing of + Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats," i. 256 +_London Chronicle_, The, quoted, i. 46 +London Confederate States Aid Association, + ii. 191, 192 _and note_[2], 195 +London Emancipation Society, ii. 91, 110; + distinguished members of, 91 _note_[1] +_London Gazette_, The, i. 94 +_London Press_, The, quoted i. 54-5, 68 +_London Review_, The, cited, i. 46 _and note_[4] +Longfellow, H. W., i. 37 _note_, 55 _note_[2] +Lothian, Marquis of, ii. 187, 193 _note_ +Lousada, letter to Lyons on _Trent_ affair, quoted, i. 220 _note_[2] +Lowell, J. R., i. 37 _note_, 236 +Lushington, Dr., i. 207 +Lutz, Dr. Ralph H., + cited, i. 117 _note_; ii. 111 _note_[2]; 121 _note_[1] + _Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland_, etc., cited, i. + 117 _note_; ii. 285 _note_[1] +Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. 42, 51, 114; + attitude in the American dispute, 51, 53, 88 _note_[2], + 93 _and note_[3], 254; ii. 237 _note_[4]; + on Southern clamour at Lincoln's election, i. 51; + views on the personnel of the Northern Government, i. 59-60; + view of Seward, 59, 60, 65, 114, 129; ii. 72; + fears from Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-36 _passim_; + efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the South, + i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244; + views on the American controversy, 72, 73; + advises joint action + with France, 84; + receives instructions on British policy, 87; + and course of action if disavowed by America, i. 190; + suspicion of French policy, 201 _and note_; + survey of the situation after Shiloh, 278; + farewell interview with Lincoln, 301; + opinion of Adams, ii. 71 _note_[4]; + views on Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, 106; + friendliness of Seward to, 72, 141, 176 _note_[2]; + report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, 147, 182; + report on "scare" at Lee's advance, 176 _note_[2]; + view after Gettysburg, 176 _note_[2]; + protests against Russell's motion to withdraw belligerent rights + to the North, 182, 183; + attitude to American public animosity towards Great Britain, 197, 198; + on Seward's plan to collect import duties at Southern ports, 198; + description of American readiness for foreign war, + 183 _and note_[2], 199; + on arrogance of American ministers, 199; + advises quiet attitude towards the North, 226; + view of Northern determination 226, 233; + view of Lincoln's chances of re-election, 226, 233; + on effect of the fall of Atlanta, 234; + advice on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, 237; + illness of, 233, 237; + return to London, 237 _note_[4]; + appreciation of diplomatic service of, 237 _note_[4] + _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_: + Belligerent rights to the South, i. 87; + attitude to request for withdrawal, i. 274-5; ii. 198 + Blockade, i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244-5; ii. 226; + and legislative closing of Southern ports, i. 244, 246; + communications with Seward on, 244, 245, 246, 250, 257; + opinion on, 254 + Southern Ports Bill, i. 246-50 _passim_ + Bunch controversy, i. 184 _et seq._; + view on Bunch's conduct, 187; + conferences with Seward in, 191-2, 193, 194 _and note_[1]; + comment on Bunch's explanation, 192-3; + attitude to American decision in, 193, 194 + Cotton, i. 54 _note_[1], 64, 196-7; ii. 20 _and note_[3] + Declaration of Paris negotiations: + alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. 151, 163 _notes_; + view of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, 153 _and note_[2]; + communications with Confederates in, 161, 163 _notes_, + 164, 165, 166, 168 _note_[4], 185, 188; + view on the American proposal, 154, 162, 164 + Emancipation, as an issue, i. 223 + Emancipation proclamation, ii. 106, 113, 114 _and note_ + Intervention, i. 197; ii. 26, 36; + fears commercial influence on policy, 26; + _See also_ Mediation _infra_ + Irish emigrants: enlistment of, ii. 201 + Mediation, i. 284, 286, 297, 298-9; ii. 23, 37 _note_[1], 70; + summary of Mercier's plan of, i. 298-9; + report on French isolated offer of, ii. 75-6; + on Russian suggestion of, 76 + Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 281 _et seq. passim_; + ii. 24 _note_[2]; + comment on the result of, i. 286; + effect of, on, 287; + comment on newspaper report of, 287 + Privateering Bill, ii. 125, 126, 127 + Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of, to Seward, + i. 102, 103, 132, 133, 163 _note_[3], 164, 184 + Recognition of the South, i. 65, 66, 73, 197, 198; ii. 70 + Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-9, 130, 132, 133, 136; + advice to Russell on, 128-9, 131; + anxiety as to Canada, 128, 129, 131 + Slave Trade Treaty, i. 276 + Slavery, i. 52, 73, 93 _and note_[3]; + account of changes in Northern feeling on, 223 + Southern Commissioners, i. 65, 72 + Southern shipbuilding, ii. 127, 139-141; + on American War feeling over, 139-40 + _Trent_ affair, i. 210, 211, 221; + instructions in, 212-4; + anxiety for Canada in, 221 + + Otherwise mentioned, i. 43, 57, 59, 74, 242, 243; ii. 147 _note_[4], 170 +Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. 182 + +McClellan, General: + advance of, on Richmond, i. 276, 279, 297, 298, 301; ii. i, 33; + defeat of, by Lee, 1, 18, 33; + rumoured capture of, 20, 21 _note_; + Adams' opinion on rumours, 20, 21 _note_; + British newspaper reports of capture of, 20, 21 _note_; + removal of, 30; + defeats Lee at Antietam, 43, 85; + fails to follow up his victory, 43, 105; + as candidate in Presidential election, 234 _note_[2], 238 +McFarland, i. 204, 234 _note_[2] +McHenry, George, _The Cotton Trade_, cited, + ii. 6 _note_[2], 13 _note_[2], 185 _note_[2] +Mackay, Alexander, _The Western World,_ cited and quoted, i. 30; ii. 274-5 +Mackay, Charles, i. 37 _and note_, 46 _note_[4]; + as _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 176 _notes_; 189, 226 + _Forty Years' Recollections_, cited, ii. 176 _note_[2] + "John and Jonathan" poem, quoted, i. 37 _note_ + _Life and Liberty in America_, quoted, i. 37 _note_ +Mackay, Dr., editor of the _London Review_, i. 46 _note_[4] +McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837), i. 4 +McLaren, Duncan, ii. 224 _note_[3] +McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. 180 _note_[3] +Madison, President, i. 11 +"Madison's War," i. 4 +Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. 4, 9 +Malmesbury, Lord, i. 79, 84, 149; ii. 25, 167 +Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. no, 224 _note_[3] +_Manchester Examiner and Times_, i. 70 _note_[1]; + ii. 231 _note_; cited, ii. 136 _note_[2] +_Manchester Guardian_, The, ii. 231 _note_; + cited, 181 _note_[2] +Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of delegates, + ii. 190 _and note_[2] +"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society," The, ii. 110; + leading members and activities of, ii. 224 _note_[3] +Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85 _notes_; + 264, 265, ii. 24 _note_[2], 241 + _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners +Marchand, Captain, of the American ship, _James Adger_, i. 208; + instructions of, to intercept the _Nashville_, + 209, 210, 211 _note_[1] +Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i. 140-1 +Marryat, Captain Frederick: _A Diary in America_, etc., + cited and quoted, i. 27 +Martin, M. Henri, ii. 236 _note_[2] +Martin, T.P., theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations, + ii. 8 _note_[2] +Martineau, Harriet: + faith of, in democracy, i. 27; + ardent advocate of the North, 70 _and note_[3]; + view of slavery as cause of the Civil War, ii. 79-80 +Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii. 291, + 292 _and note_[1] +Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i. 173 +Mason, James M., Special Commissioner of the Confederates to Britain, + i. 183 _note_[2], 203; + relations with Spence, 183 _note_[2], 266 _note_[3]; + captured in the _Trent_, 204 _et seq._, 234 _and note_[2]; + reception of, in England, 264; + interview with Russell, 265-6, 267, 268; + statistics of, on the blockade, 268 _and note_[2]; + effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, 272, 273; + hope in a change of Government, 273; + views of, on capture of New Orleans, 296; + comment of, on mediation after the Northern successes, 300, + and Lindsay's motion, 305, 306-7; + on the state of the cotton trade in England, ii. 10; + request to Lord Russell for recognition of the South, 25, 28; + and Slidell's offer to France, 24 _and note_[2]; + refused an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, 27; + view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 104; + nominates Spence as financial adviser in England, 156; + and Confederate cotton obligations, 157, 158, 159; + and Confederate Cotton Loan, 161, 162; + in Roebuck's motion, 167, 168-9, 172-3; + opinion of Napoleon, 172-3; + recall of, 179, 181-2; + determines to remain in Europe, + 182; hope from a change of + Government, 185, 213-4; demonstration + against, after a Southern + meeting, 191; representations on + _Kearsarge_ enlistment of Irishmen, + 201; interview with Palmerston + suggested to, 207, 208-9, + 214-5; returns to London, 212; + opinion of Palmerston and + Russell's attitude in interview + with Lindsay, 213; suggests + Disraeli to handle Lindsay's + motion, 213; protests against + clause in Southern Independence + Association address, 220; attitude + of, to slavery, 249, 250; + interview of, with Palmerston, + on Confederate offer to abolish + slavery, 250; interview with + Earl of Donoughmore, 250-1; + quoted on Lee's surrender, 256 + Correspondence of, i. 261 _note_ + Otherwise mentioned, i. 255, + 263 _note_[3], 267, 292; ii. 19, 31, + 147, 154 _note_[1], 185, 186, 195, + 206, 241 +Mason Papers, cited, i. 261 _note_[1]: + ii. 24, _et passim_ +Massie, Rev., ii. no, 190 _note_[3], 239 +Maximilian, Archduke, i. 260; + ii. 255 _note_[1] +Melish, John, _Travels_, quoted, i. 25 +Mercier, French Minister in Washington: + with Lyons attempts + official presentation to Seward of + Proclamations of Neutrality, i. + 96 _note_[1], 102, 103, 132, 164; in + Declaration of Paris negotiations + 157, 158, 162, 163 _note_[3], 165; + negotiations with Confederates, + 163 _notes_, 164, 165, 184, 185, + 191 _note_[4]; plan for recognition + of Southern independence, 192; + plan to relieve French need for + cotton, 196-201; supports British + demands in _Trent_ affair, 230; + on withdrawal of belligerent + rights to South, 275; efforts + for mediation, 279, 298, 300; + ii, 36, 37 _note_[1], 41, 70 _note_[2], 71 _note_[1] + 75, 76 _note_[1]; idea of an armistice, 41, 47 + Richmond visit, i. 280 _ct seq._, ii. 24 _note_[2], 95; + Seward's acquiescence + in, i. 280, 281, 282; consultation + with Lyons on, 281-2, + 283; result of, 284-5; report to + Thouvenel on, 285; effect of, + on Lyons and Russell, 287; + _New York Times _report + of, 287; effect of, in Paris + and London, 287-8; ii. 95; + effect of, on Confederate agents, + i. 288 + Southern Ports Bill, attitude to, + i. 247 _note_[2], 248 _note_[3], 249; views + of, on recognition, 285-6; belief + of, in ultimate Southern success, + 298; and isolated French offer of + mediation, ii. 75; proposes Russo-French + mediation, 76 _note_[1]; precautions + of, during Lee's northern + advance, 176 _note_[2] + Bancroft quoted on, i. 280 + + Otherwise mentioned, i. 166 _note_[1] + 191; ii. 23, 40, 155, 270 _note_[2] +_Merrimac_, The, i. 276, 277 +Mexican War of 1846, i. 7, 15, 206 +Mexico, British influence in, i. 13; + revolt of Texas from, 12-15; + ii. 117 _note_[1]; contract of, for + ships and equipment in Britain, + 117 _note_[1]; British policy towards, + after revolt of Texas, i. 13-14; war + with United States, 1846 ... 7, + 15, 206; expectation in, of British + aid, 15; loss of California by, 15; + joint action of France, Great + Britain and Spain against, for + recovery of debts, 259-60; designs + of France in, 260; ii. 46; + American idea to oust France + from, 198, 251, 252, 255 _note_[4] +Mill, J.S., ii. 224 _note_[3]; article + in defence of the North contributed + to _Fraser's Magazine_, + cited or quoted, i. 240, 242; + ii. 80-1, 90, 285; on _Trent_ + affair, i. 240, 242; on slavery, + i. 240; ii. 80-1 +Milne, Admiral, i. 211; Lyons' + letter to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American + letters of marque, ii. 140, 141 _and note_ +Milner-Gibson, i. 226; ii. 36; + attack on, by _The Index_, 298 +Milnes, Monckton, i. 268 +Missouri, State of, and the Union: + effect of the "border state" + policy, i. 173 +Mobile, Ala., i. 253 _note_[1] +Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's + proposal on recognition in + Roebuck's motion, ii. 167, 168, + 169, 172 +Monck, Viscount, ii. 140; approves + seizure of Laird Rams, 147 +_Monitor_, The: duel of with the + _Merrimac_, i. 276; effect of, in + Great Britain, 276, 277 +Monroe Doctrine, The, i. 11, 12, 259; + as a medium for American territorial expansion, 12 +Monroe, President, i. 11 +Monson, cited, i. 93 +Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. 170; + amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, 170, 171 +Montgomery, Ala., i. 81, 82 +Moore, _Digest of International Law_, cited, i. 137, 145, + 195 _note_[2], 212 _note_[3] +Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky: + speech of, at Liverpool, accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. 105 +_Morning Herald_, The, ii. 67, 68 _note_[1], 231 _note_; + quoted, 67-8; cited, 215 +_Morning Post_, The, i. 229; + ii. 231 _note_; + in _Trent_ crisis, i. 226 _note_[3], 229; + views on the conflict and democratic tyranny, 229; + ii. 284, 285-6; + on the war and the cotton industry, ii. 10; + on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 49 _note_[1], 55 _note_[1] +_Morning Star_, The, i. 69, 70 _note_[1], 179; + ii. 191 _note_[2], 231 _note_; + criticism of _Times_ war news in, 228 +Motley, J.L., United States Minister at Vienna: + letter of, analysing nature of the American constitution, i. 174-6; + urges forward step on slavery, ii. 98; + reply to Seward on effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, 99; + quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in the British Press, 280-1; + otherwise mentioned, i. 190 _note_[2], 191 + _Causes, The, of the American Civil War_, i. 174, 175 + _Correspondence_, i. 179 _note_[2], 184; + ii. 33, 98 _note_[4], 106 _note_[3], 280-1 +Motley, Mrs., i. 179 +Mure, Robert: + arrest of, i. 186-8, 192, 193 _note_[1], 201; + Lyons' views on, 187-8 + +Napier, Lord, ii. 63, 66 +Napoleon I., Emperor, i. 4, 8; + and American contentions on neutral rights, i. 18 + Napoleonic Wars, i. 4-7, 23 +Napoleon III., Emperor: + American policy of, ii. 39; + differences with Thouvenel on, ii. 19 _and note_[2], 39 + Blockade, view of, on the, i. 290 + British policy: + vexation at, i. 295 + Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2] + Mediation: + hopes for, ii. 23, 59; + suggests an armistice for six months, 59, 60 _et seq._, 69; + request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on, 60; + British views on, 60-65; + British reply, 65 _and_ _note_[1], 66, 152, 155; + Russian attitude to, 59 _note_[4], 63 _and _[3], 64, 66; + offers friendly mediation, 75-6 + Interview with Lindsay on, i. 289 _et seq._; + reported offer on, to England, 290, 291 + Interviews with Slidell on, ii. 24, 57 _note_[2], 60 + Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of with, i. 287, 288; + displeasure at, 288 + Mexican policy of, i. 259-61; + ii. 163, 198 + Polish question, ii. 163, 164 + Recognition: + private desires for, ii. 20; + endeavours to secure British concurrence, 19-20, 38; + reported action and proposals in Roebuck's motion, 166-77 _passim_; + interview with Slidell on abolition in return for recognition, 249-50 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 114, 191; + ii. 32, 54, 71, 180, 204, 270 + Benjamin's view of, ii. 236 _note_[1] + Mason's opinion of, ii. 172-3 + Palmerston's views of, ii. 59 +_National Intelligencer_, The, i. 297; + ii. 49 _note_[2] +Neumann, Karl Friedrich: + History of the United States by, cited, ii. 111 _note_[2] +Neutrality, Proclamations of: + British i. 93, 94-6, 100, 110, 111, 134, 157, 168, 174; + statements on British position, 99, 111, 163 _note_[3]; + ii. 265; British Press views on, i. 136 _note_ + French, i. 96 _note_[1], 102 + American attitude to, i. 96-110 _passim_, 132, 135, 136, 142, 174; + British-French joint action, 102, 132 _and_ _note_[2]; + Seward's refusal to receive officially, 102, 103, 132 _and note_[2]; + 133, 164, 169; + view of, as hasty and premature, + 107-8, 109, 110, 112; Seward's + view of, 134-5; modern American + judgment on, 110 +New England States, The, i. 17, 18; + opposition of, to war of 1812 ... + i. 7 +_New Nation_, The (New York), + quoted on Lincoln's despotism, + ii. 232 +New Orleans, i. 253 _note_[1]; capture + of, 279, 296; ii. 16; effect of, on + Confederates, i. 296; Seward's + promises based on, ii. 16, 26 +New York, rumour of Russian + fleet in harbour of, ii. 129 +New York Chamber of Commerce, + The, protest by, on the _Alabama_, + ii. 126 +New York City: anti-British attitude + of, i. 29; idea of separate + secession, 83 +_New York Herald, _The, i. 56, 255; + ii. 199 _note_[4] +_New York Times, _The, attack on + W.H. Russell in, i. 178 _note_[2]; + quoted on _Trent_ affair, 220 _note_[1]; + report of Mercier's Richmond + visit, 287 +Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement + to, i. 80, 114, 216, 227 +_Newcastle Chronicle_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; + ii. 231 _note_ +Newfoundland fisheries controversy, + i. 4 +Newman, Professor, ii. 224 +Newton, Dr., in _Cambridge History + of British Foreign Policy_, cited, + i. 35 _note_ +Nicaragua, i. 16 +Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, cited, + i. 126 _note_[2], 138, 146 _note_[2] +_Nonconformist_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. + 231 _note_ +Nonconformist sympathy with + emancipation proclamations, ii. + 109-10 +Norfolk, Va., i. 253 _note_[1] + "No 290," Confederate War Vessel. + See _Alabama_ +Northern States: + Army, foreign element in, ii. + 200 _note_[1] + Emancipation: identified with, + ii. 220 + Immigration and recruiting in, + ii. 200 + "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War, + i. 96, 102, 103 _and note_[1], 111, 246 + Intervention: determination to + resist, ii. 35-6, 71 + "Piracy" declaration, ii. 267-8 + Public and Press views in, at + the outbreak of the struggle, i. + 42 + Union, the: determination to + preserve, i. 54, 55, 173, 236; + ii. 226 + Western and Eastern States + attitude to the War, compared, + ii. 53 + +_Opinion Nationale_, The, cited, ii. + 174 _note_[2], 236 _note_[2] +Oregon territory controversy, i. 15 +_Oreto_, The, Confederate steamer, + ii. 118, 123, 131, 136 +_Ottawa Sun_, The, cited, ii, 70 _note_[1] +Ozanne Rev. T.D., _The South as_ + _it is, etc._, quoted, ii. 195 _note_[1] + +Page, Captain, instructions to, + on the use of the Laird Rams, ii. 122 _note_[1] +Pakenham, British Minister to + Mexico, i. 13-14 +Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General, + i. 268, 271 +Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government + of, in 1859 ... i. 76, + 77, 78; on Seward's attitude, + 130; on reinforcement of Canada, + 130-1; statement of reasons for + participation in Declaration of + Paris, 139; suggests method + of approach in Declaration of + Paris negotiations, 156 _note_[1]; + on the object of the belligerents, + 178; on British policy and the + cotton shortage, 199-200; on + possible interception of Mason + and Slidell, 207-8, 209; action + of, in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[2], 229, + 241; statement of, on British + neutrality, 241; interview with + Spence, 266; refusal to interview + Lindsay, 295-6; letters + to Adams on General Butler's + order, 302-5; reply to Hopwood + on mediation, ii. 18; definition + of British policy in debate on + Lindsay's motion, 22-3; sneers + at the silent cotton manufacturers, + 26; views of, on mediation, + 31; participates in Russell's + mediation plan, 34, 36, 40-44, 46, + 51, 54, 56, 73; traditional connection + with Lewis' Hereford + speech, 50 _and note_[1]; 51 _note_[2]; + on the folly of appealing to the + belligerents, 56, 59, 73; opinion + of Napoleon, 59; views on + French proposals for armistice, 60-1; + on British position in regard to slavery, 61, 78-9; + approves Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, 131; + defends Government procedure in _Alabama_ case, 134-5; + accusation of, against Forster and Bright, 135; + attitude to seizure of Laird Rams, 145; + on the use of Napoleon's name in Roebuck's motion, 174-5, 177; + the crisis over Danish policy of, 203-4, 210, 214, 216; + interviews with Lindsay, 206-8, 209, 210, 213; + consents to interview Mason, 207; + opinion of, on the ultimate result of the Civil War, 209, 215; + attitude to resolution of Southern Societies, 211; + interview with Mason, 214-5; + reply to joint deputation of Southern Societies, 216; + reply to Mason's offer on abolition, 250; + assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads + Conference, 255; + attitude to expansion of the franchise, 276 _and note_[1]; + death of, 302 + Characteristics of, as politician, ii. 134 + Cobden quoted on, i. 226 _note_[2] + Delane, close relations with, i. 229 _note_[2] + _Index_: criticism of, in the, ii. 216 + Press organ of, i, 229 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 168, 194, 262; + ii. 19, 68, 90, 112, 168, 170, 173, 185, 188, 190, 249, 263, 285, 293 +Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 ... i. 4 +Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. 129 _note_[1] +Paris, Congress of (1856), i. 139 +Peabody, George, quoted, i. 227 +Peacocke, G.M.W. ii. 187, 193 _note_ +Persigny, i. 303; + conversation with Slidell on intervention, ii. 19 +Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. 248 +Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern army, + ii. 202 _and note_[2] +Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina, + i. 120, 185, 186 _and note_[1] +Pickett Papers quoted, i. 243; + ii. 155; + cited, i. 261 _note_; ii. 69 _note_[5] +Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question, + ii. 129, 163, 164 +Pollard, _The Lost Cause_, + quoted on attitude of England on the cotton question, ii. 5-6 +Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. 164, 224, _and note_[3] +Prescott, i. 37 _note_ +Press, British, + the attitude of, in the American Civil War. + _See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc._ +Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i. 259 +Prince Consort, The, i. 76, 213, 224-5; + influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy, 224; + policy of conciliation to United States, 228; + Adams, C. F., quoted on, 225, 228 +Privateering, i. 83 _et seq_., 153 _et seq. passim_ + Russian convention with U.S. on, i. 171 _note_[1] + Southern Privateering, i. 86, 89, 153, 156, 164, 165, 167, 171 + _note_[1], 186. + Proclamation on, _see under_ Davis. + British attitude to, i. 86, 89-92, 95, 158, 160, 161, 163, 166; + Parliamentary discussion on, 94, 95, 157; + closing of British ports to, 170 _and note_[2] + French attitude to, i. 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165 + Northern attitude to, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 163; + Seward's motive against in Declaration of Paris negotiation, + 162, 164, 169; + Northern accusations against Britain on, 91 + United States policy on, i. 141, 156. + _See_ Privateering Bill, _infra_ + _See also under_ Declaration of Paris negotiation +Privateering Bill, The, ii. 122 _et seq_.; + purpose of, 122-3, 125, 137; + discussion in Senate on, 123-4; + passed as an administrative measure, 124, 137; + influence of, on Russell's policy, 137; + British view of American intentions, 137-8; + historical view, 141; + Seward's use of, 121 _note_[2] +Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203-4 +_Punch_, cartoons of, cited: + on _Trent_ affair, i. 217-8, 237; + on Stone Boat Blockade, 255; + suggesting intervention by France, ii. 75 _note_[1]; + on Roebuck, 170 _note_[1]; + on Lincoln's re-election, 239 _and note_[1] + Poem in, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259 +Putnam, G.H., _Memories of My Youth_, cited, i. 178 _note_[3] +Putnam, G.P., _Memoirs_, cited, ii. 163 _note_[2] + +_Quarterly Review_, The, i. 47; + views on the Southern secession, 47; + on the lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, 47; + ii. 279, 286, 301; + attitude in the conflict, 199, 301; + on British sympathy for the South, 301 + +_Reader_, The, cited, ii. 222, _and note_[2] +Reform Bill of 1832 ... i. 26, 28; ii. 276; + of 1867 ... 303, 304 +Republican Party, The, i. 114, 115 +Rhett, cited, ii. 4 _and note_[3], 88 +Rhodes, _United States_, cited or quoted, + i. 110 _note_[4], 138, 217 _note_[2], 231 _note_[2]; + ii. 16 _note_[2], 57 _note_[2], 147 _note_[1], + 285 _note_[1] _et passim_. +Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, + cited or quoted, i. 261 _note_, 266 _note_[1]; + ii. 57 _note_[2], 69 _note_[5], 155 _note_[6], + _et passim_. +Richmond, Va., Southern Government head-quarters at, i. 81; + capture of, by Grant, ii. 248 +_Richmond Enquirer_, The, quoted on attitude of France to the + Confederacy, ii. 180 +_Richmond Whig_, The, cited, ii. 68 +Right of Search controversy, i. 6-10 _passim_, 16; + recrudescence of, in _Trent_ affair, 218, 219, 233, 235 +Robinson, Chas. D., Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. 93 _note_[4] +Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. 34 _note_[1]; + motion of, for recognition of the Confederacy, + 74 _note_[1], 144, 152, 164 _et seq._; 296 _note_[1]; + W.H. Russell's views on, 166; + Lord Russell's opinion on, 166; + interview of, with Napoleon, 167; + Parliamentary debate on, 170-2, 176-8; + withdrawal of motion, 175, 176-7; + subsequent attitude of, to America, 177 _note_[1], 299-300; + opinion on the failure of democracy in America, 299-300; + _Punch_ cartoon on, 170 _note_[1]; + otherwise mentioned, i. 306 +Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. 224 _note_[3] +Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. 184 +Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85, 86, 264 +Rouher, M., French Minister of Commerce, i. 293, 294 +Roylance, ii. 110 +Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. 225 _and note_[1] +Russell, Lord John, i. 42, 76, 77, 78-9, 81; + attitude of, in the early days of the American struggle, + 42, 51, 53, 57, 60, 73-4, 79, 84; + views on the secession, 52-3; + views and action in anticipation of war, 57-8; + instruction on possible jingo policy toward England, 60-1; + recommends conciliation, i. 67, 74; + refusal to make a pledge as to British policy, + 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 125; + promise of delay to Dallas, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108; + plan of joint action with France, 84, 85; + advises Parliament to keep out of the Civil War, 90 _and note_[3]; + uncertainty as to American intention, 201-2; ii. 237; + interview with Spence, i. 266; + "three months" statement, 272 _and note_[1]; ii. 22; + effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii. 38; + effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, 49; + idea of withdrawal of belligerent rights to the North, 182, 183; + on relations with United States and Seward, 183-4; + attitude to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern + ports, 198; + views on the conflict: belief in ultimate Southern independence, + 198-9, 212, 271; + and the Danish question, 203; + action in withdrawing neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights, + 266-7, 268, 269; + attitude to piracy proclamation, 267-8, and the Reform Bill, + 276, 302, 303; + quoted on the degeneration of the American Republic, 285; + succeeds to Premiership, 302 + + _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_: + _Alabama_, the, ii. 120, 121, 124; + interview with Adams on, 128, 131; + private feelings on 121, 124, 130 + Belligerent rights to the South, i. 86, 87, _and note_[3]; + reply to Houghton on, ii. 265-6, 267 + Blockade, the: + views on, i. 58, 91, 246, 252-3; + instructions to Lyons on, 58, 244, 248, 263, 267, 271, 272; + instructions to Bunch, 253 _note_[2]; + view on notification at the port method, 246; + on British Trade under, 252, 253; + aim in presenting Parliamentary Papers on, 252, 267; + on irritation caused by, ii. 225-6 + Southern Ports Bill, protests against, i. 247-51; + instructions to Lyons on, 248, 249 + Stone Boat Fleet, i. 254-5, 256 + Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190-5; + letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture, 190; + anxiety in, 190, 191 + Butler's, General, order to troops: + advice to Palmerston on, i. 303-4; + reply to Adams, 304 + + Confederate Commissioners: + attitude to, i. 67, 68; + interviews with, i. 85-6, 158; + declines official communication with, 214 _and note_[4], 265-6; + reception of Mason, 235, 265-6, 267, 268; + suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of Slidell, 235; + reply to Mason's notification of his recall, ii. 181; + reply to Confederate "Manifesto," 241-2 + Confederate Shipbuilding: + reply to Adams' protests, ii. 118, 120-1, 127; + advice to Palmerston on, 131; + orders detention of contractors, 135; + seizure of _Alexandra_, 136; + stoppage of, 197; + result of _Alexandra_ trial, 197. + _See also sub-headings_ Alabama, Laird Rams + Confederates: + negotiations with, i. 161, 163, 166, 168 _note_[4], 170, 184; + attitude to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, 189; + explanation to Adams of British attitude to, 190 + Cotton supply: + attitude to French proposals on, i. 197, 199, 294 + + Declaration of Paris negotiation: + request to France in, i. 142, 146-7, 156, 157 _and note_[3]; + instructions to Lyons on, 146-62 _passim_, 184; + interviews with Adams, 141-8, 158; + proposals to the United States, 153 _and note_[2], 170; + instructions to Cowley, 156-9 _passim_; + suggested declaration in proposed convention, 143-6, + 146 _note_[1], 149, 151, 154, 168, 170, 201 + Emancipation Proclamation: + views on, ii. 101-2, 107 _and note_[1] + + Foreign Enlistment Act: + idea of amending, ii. 124; + offer to United States on, 124-5; + reply to Adams' pressure for alteration of, 149 + + Gregory's motion, i. 108 + + Irishmen: + recruiting of, ii. 201-2 + + Laird Rams: + conversations with Adams on, ii. 144; + orders detention of, 144-5, 146, 150, 151; + correspondence with the Lairds, 146; + drafts protest to Mason, 147, 148 _and note_[1]; + reply to attack on Government policy on, 149-50 + Lindsay: + approval of Cowley's statement to, i. 293, 294; + reply to request of, for an interview, 294-5; + interview with, on motion for mediation and recognition, ii. 212-13 + + Mediation: + advice to Palmerston on reported French offer, i. 305; + reply to Seward's protest, ii. 19, 25-6, 27; + project of, with Palmerston, ii. 31-2, 34, 36 _et seq._, 91, 271; + instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel, 38; + letters to Gladstone on, 40, 41; + points of, 46; + responsibility for, 46 _note_[4]; + Russia approached, 45; + memorandum on America, 49 _and note_[3]; + proposal of an armistice, 31-2, 49, 53-5, 56-7; + comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion, 61-2, 64; + wish for acceptance, 62, 64; + declaration of no change in British policy, 71; + end of the project, 72, 155; + motive in, 73; + viewed as a crisis, 73; + comments of, to Brunow + on joint mediation offer 73 _note_[1] + Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 287, 288 + + Privateering, i. 89, 91, 159-63 _passim_; + possible interference of, with neutrals, ii. 127, 138-150; + opinion of, on intended use of privateers, 138 + Proclamation of Neutrality. + British position in, i. 166 _note_[2]; ii. 265-6 + + Recognition of the Confederacy: + attitude to, i. 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 242, 243; ii. 54, 59, 77-8; + influence of _Trent_ affair on, i. 243; + reply to Mason's requests for, ii. 25, 27; + opinion of Roebuck's motion on, 166, 177; + denies receipt of proposal from France on 168-9, 172 + + Servile War, ii. 80, 97, 98 + Slavery, ii. 89, 90; + view of Seward's proposal for transport of emancipated slaves, 100 + + _Trent_ affair, view of, i. 212; + letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America over, 215; + on possible ways of settlement of, 224; + instructions to Lyons on learning officially that Wilkes acted + without authorization, 226 + Policy of, in the American Civil War: + i. 145, 202, 243, 299; ii. 271-2; + declaration to Adams on, 55, 71 + Attitude to Adams, i. 81; + view of, i. 131; ii. 128 + View of Lincoln, i. 189; ii. 263 + View of Seward, i. 67, 68, 131, 235-6; + improved relations with, ii. 72, 197 + Criticism and view of, in _The Index_, + ii. 51 _note_[2], 68, 69, 196 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 101 _note_[1], 198, 274, 277; + ii. 190, 208, 254 +Russell, Lady, quoted on _Trent_ affair, i. 224 _note_[3] +Russell, W.H., _Times_ correspondent, i. 44, 56, 66, 177; + letters of, to the _Times_, 71, 177; ii. 229 _note_[1]; + on the secession, i. 56, 177; + impression of Lincoln, 61 _note_[2]; + description of Bull Run, 177-8; ii. 229 _note_[1]; + abhorrence of slavery, i. 71, 177; + American newspaper attacks on 178 _and note_[2]; + recall of, 178 _and note_[2]; + ii. 228, 229 _note_[1]; + on Napoleon's mediation offer, 68; + on recognition, 166; + editor of _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 68, 228, 229 _and note_[1]; + belief of, in ultimate Northern victory, i. 178 _note_[2], 180; + ii. 68 _note_[2], 228, 229 _and note_[1]; + view of the ending of the War, 229-30; + on campaigns of Grant and Sherman, 230, 232-3, 243; + quoted on Delane, 254; + on prospective war with America, 254; + on failure of republican institutions, 277 + _My Diary North and South_, i. 177 _notes_; + quoted 44 _note_[1], 61, 71; + cited, 124, 178, ii. 229 _note_[1] +Russia: + attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 164 _note_[1]; + convention with United States on privateering, 171 _note_[1]; + attitude to recognition of the South, 196 _note_[2]; ii. 59; + and mediation, i. 283 _note_[1]; + ii. 37 _note_[1], 39, 45 _note_[2]; + British approach to, on mediation, 40, 45, _and note_[2]; + attitude to joint mediation, 59 _note_[2], 63 _and note_[5], + 66 _and note_[2], 70 _note_[2]; + on joint mediation without Britain, 76 _and note_[1]; + plan of separate mediation, 251 _note_[1]; + Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, + 265 _and note_[2]; + policy of friendship to United States, + 45 _note_[2], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2]; + United States friendship for, 225 + Polish question, ii. 129, 163 + Fleets of, in Western waters: + story of, in _Trent_ affair, i. 227 _note_[1]; + ii. 129 _and note_ + _See also under_ Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl + +St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston, + i. 185, 186, 191 _note_[4] +Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. 290 _note_[1] +Salt, price of, in Charleston: + effect of the blockade, i. 270 +San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention to + guarantee independence of, i. 126 _note_[1] +San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. 129 _and note_[1] +_San Jacinto_, the, i. 204, 205, 216 +_Saturday Review_, The: + views of, on Lincoln's election, i. 39; + judgment of Seward, 39; + views at outbreak of war, 41, 46; + on Southern right of secession, 42; + on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100-1; + on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, 146 _note_[1]; + on slavery as an issue: attack on Mrs. H.B. Stowe, 180-1; + on blockade and recognition, 183; + on duration of war and cotton supply, 246 _note_[3]; + on servile insurrection, ii. 80; + and the relation between the American struggle and British + institutions, 276, 277-8, 280; + on the promiscuous democracy of the North, 277; + on the Republic and the British Monarchy, 277-8; + cited, 111, 231 _note_ +Savannah, Ga., i. 253 _note_[1]; + captured by Sherman, ii. 245, 249, 300-1 +Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, cited, ii. 6 +Schilling, C., ii. 301 _note_[3] +Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen, + i. 115, 116 _note_, 130; + views of, on Seward and Lincoln, 115-6; + offers services as mediator: plan of an armistice, 121, 122; + visit of, to Richmond, 121-3; + failure of his mediation, 122-3; + report of Russian attitude to privateers, 171 _note_[1]; + on _Trent_ affair, 231 _note_[2], 242; + on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of envoys, 231 _note_[2]; + on attitude of Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _note_[3]; + quoted, on slavery, ii. 111 _and note_[2] +Schleswig-Holstein question, i. 79; ii. 203-4 +Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War_, cited, + ii. 7 _notes_; 167 _note_[1]; + arguments in, examined, 13 _note_[2] +Scholefield, Wm., ii. 193 _note_ +Schouler,----, on diplomatic controversies between England and America, + cited, i. 35 +Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate Cotton + Loan, ii. 161-2 +Schurz, Carl, + papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i. 117 _note_; + advocates declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. 91, 92; + cited i. 83 _note_[2] +Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, cited, + ii. 156 _note_[1], 158 _note_[4], 160 _notes_, + 162 _note_[3] +Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in _Trent_ + affair, i. 218 +Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_, + cited, i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 24 _note_[1] +Secession States, ports of, i. 253 _note_[1] +Semmes, captain of the _Alabama_, ii. 119 +Senior, Nassau W., article on "American Slavery," i. 33; + quoted, 33 _note_[1], 34 +Servile insurrection, i. 271; ii. 83, 87; + British apprehension of, i. 93; ii. 49, 79, 80, 81, 101, 110; + emancipation viewed as provocative of, 49, 81, 86, 98, 101, 114; + as an argument for intervention, 98, 101, 103 _note_[6]; + use of as a threat, 18-19, 83, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 114 +Seward, W.H., American Secretary of State, + i. 39, 49, 59, 60, 64, 79, 80, 115; + British view of, 60, 80, + view of, as unfriendly to Great Britain, + 39, 67, 68, 113-4, 125 _et seq._ 242; + reputation as a politician, 80, 114, 115; + efforts of, to secure European support for the North, 67, 137, 152; + view of his relation to Lincoln, 114, 115-6, 118, 120, 127-8, 130; + document "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," + 118-9, 123, 124; + advice on Fort Sumter, 118, 120; + his "Despatch No. 10", 125-30, 154, 155; + reversal of his policy, 130, 132; + action on Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, 164; + instructions to American diplomats on slavery as issue, i. 176; ii. 95; + offers facilities for transport of British troops, i. 213 _note_[4]; + change of attitude to England, ii. 72; + quarrel with Chase, 72; + influence of, lessened by signing Abolition Proclamation, 100 _note_[2]; + friendliness to Lyons, 72, 141; + appreciation of Russell's expression of esteem, 147; + attitude to Russell, 197; + policy in regard to reunion, 197; + plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, 198; + tests British-French harmony, 198; + anxiety to avoid irritating incidents, 199; + considers abrogation of treaties with Canada, 253-4; + denies rumours of prospective foreign war, 254; + accepts notification of ending of British neutrality, 268-9; + meets with an accident, 257; + attempted murder of, 257-8, 265 + _Diplomatic action and views of, with regard to:_ + Belligerent rights to South + denial of, i. 87, 102, 169, 233, ii. 182; + remonstrance on concession of, i. 247, 274, + proposes withdrawal of, ii. 264-5, 266; + _See also under_ Declaration of Paris _and_ Neutrality _infra_. + Blockade, i. 54 _note_[1], 65, 246, 295; + interviews with Lyons on, 244, 245, 246, 251, 256, 257; + suggested alleviation of, i. 274 + Southern Ports Bill: + reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. 249; + attitude to issue of, 248 _note_[3], 250, 251, 252; + on closing of ports by proclamation, 250, 252 + Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement on, i. 256-7 + Bunch affair, i. 184, 189, 191 _and note_[4], 192, 193, + 194 _and note_[1] + Confederate debts: statement on, ii. 197 + Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i. 105 + Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. 121, 139, 140; + effect of seizure of the _Alexandra_ on, 140; + despatch on _Alexandra_ case decision, 143 _and note_[2]; + refuses to allow British Consul through the blockade, 148 + Cotton: + on proposed French intervention to secure, i. 198, 200; + promises of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. 16 + Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 137, 141, 145, 147, 150 _et seq._; + statement in refusing convention as modified by Russell, 145; + motives in, 150-2, 153, 169; + hope to influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent + rights, 150-1, 162, 164, 165, 169; + as part of foreign war policy: considered, 153-4, 155-6 + Emancipation Proclamation: + urges postponement of, ii. 37. 85, 95, 96, 98, 114; + informed as to effect of, on intervention, 98, 99 + comments on purpose of, 99-100 + the "high moral purpose" argument, ii. 100; + proposes convention for transport of emancipated slaves, 100 + Hampton Roads Conference, ii. 252; + attitude to Britain after, 253-4 + Intervention: + attitude to, i. 145, 178, 200; + threat of servile war and, ii. 18-19, 22, 95; + instructions to Adams on, 35-6, 96-7; + view of the effect of emancipation, on, 98, 114. + _See also_ Mediation _infra_. + Irish Emigrants: + enlistment of, ii. 201 + Mediation: + attitude to, i. 283 _note_[1], 297; ii. 18, 57 _note_[2]; + by France, i. 283 _note_[1]; + by Russia, 283 _note_[1]; + view of England's refusal to act with France in, ii. 71, 72; + declines French offer of, 76 + _See also_ Intervention _supra_. + Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 280-4, 286; + statement to Lyons: + view of Confederate position, 286; + newspaper statement on, 287 + Napoleon's Mexican policy: + attitude to, ii. 198 + Neutrality Proclamations: + representations on, i. 100, 101; + despatch on American view of, 101, 103 _note_[1], 134; + refusal to receive officially, 102-3, 132, 133, + 153 _and note_[2], 164; + efforts to secure recall of, 152-3, 169, 198, 234, 274-5, 300, 301 + Privateering, i. 160; + convention with Russia, 171 _note_. + _See also_ Southern Privateering _infra_. + "Privateering Bill:" + use of, ii. 121 _note_[3], 141, 151; + on the purpose and use of the privateers, 122-3, 125, 137, 143; + conversations with Lyons on, 125, 126; + on necessity for issuing letters of marque, 126, 143; + advised by Adams against issue of privateers, 131, 139 + Recognition of Southern Independence, i. 65, 74, 198 + Servile War threat, ii. 18-19, 22, 83, 95, 98 + Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. 10, 275, 276; ii. 90 + Southern privateering: + view of, i. 104, 105; + efforts to influence European attitude to, + i. 104, 150-1, 154, 162, 164, 169; + attitude on issue of privateers from British ports, ii. 126, 127 + _Trent_ affair: + reception of British demands in, i. 230, 232, 233; + on Wilkes' action, 231; + attitude to release of envoys, 231 _and note_[2], 232, 233, 234, 236; + British opinion on Seward in, 239 + Foreign Policy: + high tone, i. 236, 252 _and note_[1], 301; + restoration of the Union as basis of, 236; + influences affecting, ii. 95, 100 + Foreign war panacea, i. 60, 113, 120, 123-4, 125, 126 _note_[1], + 127, 130, 132, 134-5, 137, 154, 155, 214; + appreciation of, 136. + Southern conciliation policy of, i. 49, 83, 117, 118, 120-1, 123, 125; + expectations from Union sentiment in the South, 60, 117; + aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, 121-3; + communications with Confederate Commissioners, 117-8, 120 + Appreciation and criticism of: + by British statesmen and press in 1865.... ii. 257; + _Times_ tribute to, 257; + Horace Greeley's attack on, i. 280 _note_[1]; + Gregory's attack on, i. 269; + Lyons' view of, i. 59, 60; + Adams' admiration for i. 80, 127 + British suspicion of, i. 113, 114, 128, 133, 136, 227, 235-6; + ii. 101 _note_[1]; + the Newcastle story, 80, 114, 216, 227; + Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, 227; + Adams' view, 227 + Otherwise mentioned, + i. 66, 163 _notes_, 177, 186, 188, 209, 212, 213, 217; + ii. 39, 84, 123 _note_[2], 170, 173, 175, 223, 225, + 245 _note_[1], 259, 281 +Shelburne, Earl of, i. 240 +Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on, + ii. 236 _note_[2] +Sherman, General: + Atlanta campaign of, ii. 217; + captures Atlanta, 233; + march to the sea, 243-5; + captures Savannah, 245, 249, 300-1; + campaign against Johnston, 248; + reports of pillaging and burning by his army, 265; + mentioned, 215 + Russell, W.H., views of, on Sherman's campaigns, ii. 230, 232-3, 243 + _Times_ view of his campaigns, ii. 212, 227, 232, 243-6 +Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. 278 +Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. 116, 117 _note_[1], 128; + Continental opinion of international law on, 121 _note_[1] +_Shipping Gazette_, quoted, ii. 14 +Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its failure, ii. 282 +Slavery: + cotton supplies and, i. 13; + controversy in America on, 32, 36; + English opinion on, 31-5, 37-8, 40; + as an issue in the Civil War, 45, 46, 173, 175, 176, 179, 181, 241, 242; + ii. 78, 88-93, 222; + Confederates identified with, i. 71; ii. 220; + Southern arguments for, 3 _and note_[2]; + attitude of the North to, 78; + growth of anti-slavery sentiment, 83, 84; + failure of the slaves to rise, 86; + Northern declaration on, urged, 98-9, 107; + British public meetings on, 109 _note_[2]; + Southern declaration on, 106. + _See also_ African Slave Trade, Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc. +Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to France, + i. 203; captured on the _Trent_, 204-5, 234 _and note_[2]; + connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, 261 _note_[1]; + plan of action of, 264-5; + received by Thouvenel, 266 _note_[1]; + view on Continental and British interests in the blockade, + 267 _note_[3], 273; + view of Mercier's Richmond visit, 228; + on Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, 292; + views of, on the capture of New Orleans, 296; + idea to demand recognition from France, 306, 307; ii. 25, 28; + hopes of mediation by France, ii. 19, 25; + interview of, with Napoleon, 23, 24; + makes offers to Napoleon and to Thouvenel, 24, 25; + letter to Benjamin on failure to secure intervention, 29; + interview with Napoleon on Armistice, 59 _and note_[2], 60; + memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking for separate recognition, 75; + on shipbuilding for Confederates in France, 128; + quoted on position of France + in relation to mediation, 155; + and Confederate Cotton Loan, 158 _and note_[3], 159, 161, 163; + interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition, 167; + and Napoleon's instruction on recognition + in Roebuck's motion, 168-9, 172; + and Mason's recall, 180, 181, 182; + opinion of Russell, 213; + suggestion on Lindsay's motion, 213; + disappointment at result of Mason's interview with Palmerston, 215; + opinion on European attitude to the South, 215; + interview with Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for + recognition, 249-50; + quoted on Lee's surrender 256-7; + appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii. 25, 180 _note_[3]; + correspondence of, i. 261 _note_; + otherwise mentioned, ii. 154 _note_[1]. + _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners +Smith, Goldwin, ii. 136 _note_[2], 189 _note_[2]; + on Gladstone and Canada, 69, 70 _note_[1]; + quoted on the influence of the _Times_, + 178 _note_[3], 189 _note_[2]; + on the _Daily Telegraph_, 189 _note_[2]; + tribute of, to T.B. Potter, 224 _note_[3]; + view of the _Times_ attitude to democracy, 299; + criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, 303-4 + _America and England in their present relations_, quoted, + ii. 304, _and note_[2] + _Civil War, The, in America_, cited, ii. 223 _note_[2], + 224 _note_[3]; quoted, 304 _note_[1] + Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?" ii. 110 + _Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence + Association_, ii. 194-5; quoted, 299 +Smith, T.C., _Parties and Slavery_, cited, ii. 3 _note_[2] +Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America, ii. 207; + letters of, to Members of Parliament, 207-8, 210-11; + deputation of, to Palmerston, 216 +Somerset, Duke of, i. 207 +South Carolina, secession of, i. 41, 44; + _Times_ view on, 55; + and restoration of Colonial relations: some British misconceptions + on, 43, 44 _and note_ +Southern Independence Association, The, ii. 185, 189, 191-5, 204, 220, 298; + cessation of meetings of, 193-4, 222-3; + apathy and dissension in, 205, 207, 208; + resolution and deputation to Palmerston, 210-2, 216; + ticket meetings, 239; + Oldham meeting, 239, 240 +Southern Ports Bill. _See_ Blockade +Southern States: + attitude of, to protection policy, i. 21, 47; + and reciprocity treaty with British-American provinces, 21-2; + influences directing British trade to, 22; + British press attitude to, 40-48 _passim_; + characterization of, 41; + right of secession, 42, 82, 175, 176, 269; + tariff as a cause for secession, 47; + question of recognition considered, 58; + secession, 172-3; + preparations for war, 172; + recognized as belligerents, 190, 191, 172; + expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. 148 _note_[2]; + activities of British friends of, 152, 187-8, 190, 193-4, 239, 298; + Conservative hopes for success of, 300; + views on French attitude, ii. 236 _note_[2]; + effect of the fall of Savannah on, 246; + end of the Confederacy, 248, 259, 268; + hope of, from "foreign war," 252; + effect on, of Lincoln's assassination 258; + withdrawal of belligerent rights to, 264-6; + end of the war; naval policy towards, 266-7 + Belligerent rights, recognition of, + i. 87, 88, 95, 108, 109, 150, 151, 155, 166 _note_[3]. + _See_ Neutrality Proclamations. + Commissioners of, _See under_ Confederate Commissioners + Cotton, obsession as to, i. 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5 + Cotton Loan, ii. 155 _et seq._ 179; + reception of, in England, 160-1; + amounts realized by, 162 + Declaration of Paris negotiation: + attitude to, i. 186 + Finance, ii. 156 _et seq._ + Hampton Roads Conference: + suggestions in, ii. 252-3 + Leaders of: + British information on, i. 58-9 + Manifesto to Europe, ii. 241 _and note_[2], 242 + Mediation: + feeling in, on England's refusal of, ii. 71 _and note_[2]; + hope of change in British policy on, 213-4 + Military resources: + decline of, ii. 219; + desertions from the Army, 222 + Negroes, arming of, ii. 240-1, 251 + Privateering. _See that heading._ + Recognition of independence: + anger at failure to secure, i. 252 _note_[2]; + desire for, without mediation, ii. 217 + Secret service funds, ii. 154 _note_[1] + Shipbuilding in British ports for, ii. 115 _et seq._; + British protest to, on, 148. + _See also under_ Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc. + Slavery attitude, ii. 88 _and note_[3]; + intention of gradual emancipation, 98; + British views on, 220; + offer of abolition in return for recognition, 249-51 +Spain, and Mexican debts, i. 259, 260 +Spargo, _Karl Marx_, cited, ii. 292 _note_[1] +_Spectator_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_; + constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. 39; + on Lincoln's election, 39; + views on the Civil War, 41, 69, 100, 181; + on secession, 57; + on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100, 136 _note_[1]; + attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech on dissolution of the Union, 182; + on servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. 79, 80; + on British Press attitude to emancipation, 89; + on declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, 89; + on the Emancipation Proclamation, 104-5; + on British lack of sympathy with the North, 280; + on anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, 280; + otherwise mentioned, i. 180; ii. 105, 223 _note_[1], 282 +Spence, James, i. 183 _note_[2], 266 _and note_[2]; + conferences of, in London, 266, 267, 272 _and note_[1], 273; + prevents demonstration by cotton operatives, 300; + plan to appeal to the Tories, ii. 153, 155, 164; + as Confederate financial adviser, 156, 157, 158; + and Confederate Cotton Loan, 159, 161-2; + urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, 173-4; + effect of the fall of Vicksburg on, 179; + organization of Southern Clubs by, 186-7, 188, 189, 190; + hopes for intervention, 187-8, 189-90; + organization of Southern Independence Association by, 191; + organization of meetings by, 191, 222-3; + organizes petitions to Parliament, 193; + comments of, on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 216-7; + on slavery clause in Southern Independence Association's address, 220 + Slidell's opinion of, i. 266 _note_[3]; ii. 159; + Otherwise mentioned, i. 302; ii. 49 _note_[2], 181, 193 + _The American Union_, i. 183 _and note_[2], 266 _note_[3]; + ii. 112 +Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. 38 +Spurgeon, C. H., prayer of, for victory of the North, ii. 109-110 +Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. 42 +Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. 176 _note_[2] +Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of Southern Government, + i. 59, 81, 121; + interview of, with Schleiden, 122, 123; + discussion of, with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. 252 +Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to Palmerston, + quoted, i. 109-10 +Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington: + view of the secession, i. 53 _note_[3]; + on Russian policy in Declaration of Paris negotiations, 164 _note_[1]; + on privateers in Northern Pacific, 171 _note_[1]; + and recognition of the South, 196 _note_[3], + and Mercier's Richmond visit, 283 _and note_[1]; + on mediation, 283 _note_[1]; + ii. 37 _and note_[1], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2], 76; + comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation, 107 _note_[1]; + on the reconciliation of North and South followed by a foreign war, 251; + Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, 265; + views on probable policy of Britain at the beginning + of the Civil War, 269-70, 271; + on the Civil War as a warning against democracy, 297 _note_[4]; + Otherwise mentioned, i. 54 _note_[1]; ii. 45 _note_[2] +Stone Boat Fleet. _See_ Blockade. +Story, William Wetmore, i. 228, 256; + letters of, in _Daily News_, 228 _and note_[4] +Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the _Saturday Review_, i. 181; + mentioned, ii. 89-90, 109 + _Uncle Tom's Cabin_, i. 33 _and note_[1] +Stowell, Lord, i. 208 +Stuart--, British Minister at Washington: + report of new Northern levies of men, ii. 30; + on recognition, 30 _and note_[3]; + views on British policy, 30 _note_[3]; + attitude to intervention and recognition, 36, 37, 66 _note_[3]; + report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, 37, 98; + suggestion of armistice, 47; + account of Federal "reprisals," 66 _note_[3]; + on servile insurrection, 97; + describes Emancipation proclamation as a _brutum fulmen_, 101 + Otherwise mentioned, ii. 25, 26, 66 _note_[3], 70, 100, + 101 _note_[1] +Sturge, Joseph, _A Visit to the United States in_ 1841, cited, i. 29 +Sumner, Charles, i. 79, 80; + Brooks' attack on, 33, 80; + hope of, for appointment as Minister to England, 55 _and note_[2]; + views on annexation of Canada, 55; + in _Trent_ affair, 231, 232, 234 _note_[3]; + attitude to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _and note_[3]; + advocacy of abolition, ii. 81, 90; + conversations with Lincoln on abolition, 82, 86; + attitude to Privateering Bill, 123, 124; + otherwise mentioned, i. 49 _note_, 83, 130 _note_[1], 220; + ii. 80, 132, 184, 247, 262, 280 +Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. 63, 73, 74, 83, 120, 172, 173; + Seward's policy on reinforcement of, 118 +Sutherland, Rev. Dr., prayer of in American Senate, i. 233 _note_ + +Tariff Bill (U.S.) of 1816, i. 19; + of 1828, 21 +Taylor, P.A., abolitionist, ii. 224; + eulogy of George Thompson, 224 _note_[1] +Taylor, Tom, poem by, in _Punch_, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259 +Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. 173 +Texas, State of: + revolts from Mexico, i. 12; + Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular agents to, 12; + independence of, as affecting British policy, 13-16; + enters the American Union, 14, 15, 16; + in War of Independence against Mexico protests against shipbuilding + for Mexico in Britain, ii. 117 _note_[1]; + mentioned, 266 +Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of G.V. Fox, + etc._, cited, i. 257 _note_[3] +Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society, ii. 91; + work of, for emancipation, 109, 224 _and note_[1]; + mentioned, 109 _note_[2], 184, 191 +Thouvenel, M., French Foreign Minister, i. 88, 143; + in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, + 151, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163; + initiates negotiations with Confederates, 157, 189; + policy of, for relief of French need for cotton, 196, 197, 198; + attitude of, in Charleston consuls case, 189; + and Southern Ports Bill, 247, 248 _and notes_, 249 _and note_[4]; + interview with Slidell, 266 _note_[1]; + attitude of, to mediation, 266 _note_[1], 279; ii. 19-20, 28; + on difficulties due to lack of cotton, i. 279, 293-4; + conversations on Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, 291, 293; + and Mercier's Richmond visit, 280, 281, 282, 285, 288, 299; + conversation with Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of + the South, 294; + on French neutrality, 299; + opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii. 19 _and note_[3], 20, 39; + Slidell's offer to, on mediation, 24, 25; + reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of mediation, 38-9, 46; + retirement of, 45, 59; + view of England's advantage from dissolution of the Union, 270 _note_[2]; + otherwise mentioned, i. 275, 289 +_Times_, The: + characteristics of, as newspaper, i. 42, 229 _note_[2]; + ii. 178 _note_[2], 228, 230 _note_[2], 234; + influence on public opinion, 178 _note_[3], 189 _and note_[2], 228; + influence on public press, 226, 230 _note_[3]; + accuracy of reports in, 226; + pro-Southern attitude in last year of the conflict, 226-8, 242, 244 + _and note_[3]; + attitude to Hotze, 154 _note_[1]; + relations of, with W. H. Russell, + i. 177, 178, ii. 228, 229 _and note_[1] + Criticisms of: + John Bright's view of, i. 55 _note_[3]; + citations of anti-Americanism in, 217 _note_[1]; + Cobden, on, 222 _note_; + Canadian opinion on, 222 _note_; + in _Index_, ii. 228; + in _Morning Star_, 228; + Goldwin Smith's attack on, 299 + "Historicus," articles by, in. _See under_ "Historicus." + _Views expressed in, on:_ + Civil War: non-idealistic, i. 89, 97; + prints Motley's letter on causes of, 174-5 + Confederate Manifesto, ii. 242 + Cotton, i. 55; ii. 7 _and note_[1], 14 15 + Democracy: attitude to, i. 8; ii. 280-1, 284, 289, 297, 300; + change of view on, 289-90, 291, 297; + comparison of British and United States Governments, 286; + attack on John Bright, 295-6 + Foreign war plans of America on, ii. 252, 254 + Gladstone's speech, ii. 49 _note_[1] + Laird Rams, ii. 146 + Lincoln: + on Slavery speech of, i. 38; + on re-election of, ii. 234-5, 238; + appreciations of, after his death, ii. 259-61 + Lindsay's proposed motion: ii. 205-6 + Mediation, i. 303, 305; ii. 67 + Military situation, ii. 165, 176 _and note_[2], 178, 297; + after Gettysburg, ii. 180 _and note_[1], 228 _note_[3]; + Lee's Northern advance, 176; + on Grant's reverses and Sherman's march on Atlanta, + 212, 227, 232, 243; + capture of Atlanta, 233, 234, 235; + fall of Savannah, 245-6, 300-1; + Lee's surrender, 255-6; + appreciation of Lee's campaign, 256; + Northern ability in war, 256; + Sherman's campaign, 301 _note_[1] + Neutrality in non-idealistic war i. 89, 97 + Northern ability in war, ii. 256 + Privateers, i. 158 + Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 103-4, 158 + Roebuck's motion, ii. 173, 176, 296 _note_[2] + Secession, i. 45, 68 + Seward, i. 216; ii. 257 + Slavery: + attitude to controversy on, i. 32, 55; + condemnation of, 38-9, 40, 71; + on Northern attitude to, ii. 89; + Emancipation Proclamation, 102-3, 104; + criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108; + on Biblical sanction of, 110 + South, The: + condemnation of, i. 38-9, 40; + lawless element in, 40, 41; + changing views on, at opening of the war, + 55 _and note_[3], 56-7, 68-9; + demand of, for recognition, ii. 181; + renewed confidence in, ii. 210 _and note_[2] + Southern shipbuilding, ii. 145, 146 + _Trent_ affair, i. 216-7, 225-6, 237 + War of 1812 ... i. 8 + "Yankee," The, ii. 246 + Otherwise mentioned, i. 174; ii. 65 _and note_[1], + 160, 201 _and note_[2], 204 _and note_[2], 295 +Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. 129; ii. 4 _note_[3] +Toronto _Globe_, the, cited, i. 222 _note_ +Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. 132-3, 134, 291-3 +Train, George Francis, of the _New York Herald_, speeches of, + in England, ii. 224 _note_[2] +Treaty of Washington (1842) i. 4, 9 +Tremenheere, H.S., _The Constitution of the United States_, etc., + cited, ii. 275 _note_[2] +Tremlett, F.W., quoted, ii. 211-12 +_Trent_ affair. The, i. 195, 203 _and note_, 204 _et seq._ + British demands in, i. 212-3, 226, 230, + points of the complaint, 214 _note_[1]; + American reply, 232, 234 + British views on, i. 203, 216, 216-8, 221-4, 225, 226-7; + American exultation in, 205-6, 218, 219; + effect of in Canada, 222 _note_; + Cabinet members' sentiments on, 223; + change in American views, 226, 230-1; + British speculation on probable war, 228, 229; + European support of Britain in, 229, 235; + French views on, 230, 234-5; + release of envoys, 235; + American feeling after settlement of, 236 _and note_[3], 237; + Parliamentary debate on conclusion of, 240-1, 262, 265, 274; + influence of, on British policy in relation to the Civil War, 242; + ii. 15-16; + Southerners' action in, i. 211 _note_[1]; + effect of, on British cotton trade, ii. 9 + + Otherwise mentioned, i. 171 _note_[1], 201, 202, 244, 253, 254; + ii. 72, 131 +Trescott, William Henry, i. 186, 188 +_Tribune_, The New York, cited, i. 280 _note_[1] +Trimble, W., "Surplus Food Production of the United States," + cited, ii. 13 _note_[2] +Trollope, Anthony, i. 239 _and note_[5], 240; ii. 153; + description of the United States citizen by, ii. 287-8 + _North America_, i. 239; ii. 153, 287, 288 _and note_[1] +Trollope, Mrs., i. 27, 48 +Tyler, President, i. 10 + +Union and Emancipation Society of London, The: + Bright's speech to, ii. 295 +United Empire Loyalists, i. 8 _note_ +United States: + Citizenship: theory of, i. 5-6 _and note_ + Commercial relations with Great Britain, i. 17 _et seq._ + Democracy in, _See under_ Democracy. + International law, influence of U.S. on, belligerent and neutral + rights in, i. 5-10, 140 + Naval power: + agitation for increase of, i. 123 + Policy in the Civil War, ii. 197 + _See under_ Adams, Lincoln, Seward, _and subject-headings_ + Political principles of: + British sympathy for, i. 3, 26 + Political institutions in: + views of travellers and writers, i. 30; ii. 274 _et seq._ + Population, growth of, i. 12 + Protection policy: + beginnings of, i. 18-19, 20-1; + reaction against in the South, 21 + Territorial expansion, i. 12 _et seq._ + + _See also under subject-headings._ + +United States Supreme Court: + decision on Lincoln's blockade proclamations, i. 110 _note_[3] + +Van Buren, President, i. 109 +Vansittart, William, ii. 187, 193 _note_ +Vicksburg, capture of, + ii. 143, 165, 176 _note_[2], 178, 228 _note_[3], 296; + Southern defence of, 164, 165, 178; + importance of, in the military situation, 165 +Victoria, Queen, i. 76, 96, 168, 190 _note_[2]; ii. 40, 190, 262; + pro-German influence of, 203 _note_[3]; + writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln, 262 +Vignaud, Henry, ii. 154 _note_[1] +Virginia, State of, i. 121, 122, 172, 245 +Vogt, A., ii. 301 _note_[3] + +Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, ... i. 80 +Walker, Mr., and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii. 100 +Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. 123 _and note_[2] +Warburton, George _Hochelaga_: i. 29 +Washington, President, i. 11 +Watts, _Cotton, Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2] +Weed, Thurlow, i. 114 _and notes_, 129, 227, 231; ii. 130 _note_[2] +Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. 199; + in _Trent_ affair, congratulates Wilkes, i. 220; + attitude to the "Privateering Bill," ii. 123 _note_[2], 128, 137; + mentioned, 84, 96 +West Indian Colonies, i. 3; + American trade with, 17, 19, 20, 21; + slavery in, 31 +Westbury, Lord, i. 262-3; ii. 64 +_Westminster Review_, The, i. 48, 70 _and note_[1], 71 +Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. 187, 193 _note_ +Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. 13 _note_[2] +Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. 26, 28 +White, Andrew D., "A Letter to W.H. Russell," + etc. cited, ii. 229 _note_[1] +Whittier, J.G., i. 29, 47 +Wilberforce, Samuel, i. 31 +Williams, Commander, R.N., i. 204 +Wilkes, Captain, of the _San Jacinto_, intercepts the _Trent_, + i. 204, 216, 219-20; + American national approbation of, 219-20; + Seward on, 233; + his action officially stated to be unauthorized, 226, 254 +Wilmington, N.C., i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 247 +Wilson, President, i. 90 _note_ +Wodehouse, Lord, i. 84 + +Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. 63, 82 _and note_, 85, 86, 264; + ii. 4 _note_[3], 223 _note_[1] +Yeomans, cited, i. 38 + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil +War, by Ephraim Douglass Adams + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN CIVIL WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 13789.txt or 13789.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/7/8/13789/ + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Charlie Kirschner and the PG Online +Distributed Proofreading Team. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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